January 28, 2025

Recommendations for Congressional Priorities on Nuclear Weapons & Arms Control Policy During the 119th Congress

U.S. Senate/House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Member of Congress,

The risk of nuclear war, nuclear arms racing, and nuclear proliferation is greater than at any point since the Cold War. At the same time, the guardrails to reduce global nuclear dangers, including the bedrock 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), are under severe stress. In the months and years ahead, the new Trump administration and members of Congress will make key choices that could help determine whether the situation improves or deteriorates.

The American people know and are deeply concerned about these risks. Congress has the opportunity to provide responsible and sober leadership to reduce the existential threats posed by nuclear weapons.

The undersigned organizations and individuals respectfully urge you to prioritize the following policies, which we believe will reduce the nuclear threat and help the United States emerge stronger and safer in a period of renewed global competition and increased nuclear risk.

1. As the War On Ukraine Continues, Condemn Threats of Nuclear Use to Avoid

Escalation

President Vladimir Putin's illegal war against Ukraine has not only re-shaped the European security environment, but it has increased the risk of direct conflict between the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and Russia. Putin’s brash threats of nuclear first use have -- as both President Trump and former President Biden warned -- increased the danger of nuclear war. 

We encourage you and other members of Congress to use every opportunity to reinforce statements from the G-20 and other global leaders that threats of nuclear first use are "inadmissible" and encourage U.S. and allied leaders to refrain from engaging in similar, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric.

Congress, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular, can also help resist Putin's attempts at nuclear coercion and underscore that the United States is supporting efforts to reduce the nuclear threat by ratifying the protocols to three nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties (for Africa, Central Asia, and the South Pacific). The United States signed the protocols more than a decade ago and is the only NPT-participating nuclear weapon state that has yet to do so.

For non-nuclear states and U.S. partners in these zones, many of whom live in the shadow of Russia and China, U.S. ratification is important because it would establish a legally binding guarantee against nuclear use or threats of use against any NWFZ state from all of five major nuclear-armed states.

2. Reinforce the Global Moratorium on Nuclear Explosive Testing and the CTBT

No state, except North Korea, has conducted a nuclear test explosion in this century. For the United States, nuclear explosive testing is technically and militarily unnecessary. The sufficiently funded and proven Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) maintains the existing U.S. nuclear warheads.

On Dec. 20, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, Dr. Marvin Adams, said “based on purely technical considerations, we are confident that we can get the information we need [through] subcritical” experiments and other elements of the SSP.

Nevertheless, some have proposed spending hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to shorten the time (to six months) needed to resume U.S. nuclear testing in Nevada. A renewal of nuclear explosive testing would be a self-inflicted disaster that violates the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and opens the door to Chinese, North Korean, and Russian testing at a time of heightened nuclear danger. Nuclear testing would not demonstrate strength or resolve but would squander a hard-won advantage at a time of heightened nuclear danger.

We urge you to reinforce the bipartisan opposition to accelerate or facilitate the resumption of U.S. explosive nuclear weapons testing.

3. Encourage President Trump to Maintain a Cap on U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons After New START Expires and Pursue a New Framework Deal

For decades, Republican and Democratic administrations negotiated nuclear arms control and reduction agreements to constrain and verifiably eliminate Russian and U.S. nuclear forces. However, deteriorating relations and the Russian war on Ukraine have stymied progress for years.

On February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire. This critical U.S.-Russian agreement limits each side to no more than 1,550 treaty accountable strategic nuclear weapons. Despite severe strains in all other aspects of the bilateral relationship the two sides have stayed below the limits set by the treaty since entry into force in 2011.

After the treaty expires, there will be no constraints on the number of nuclear warheads Russia and the United States can deploy to strike each other’s homelands. Each side could double the number of deployed warheads by uploading additional warheads on land- and sea-based missiles. If Washington and Moscow fail to reach a deal to maintain the current limits on their arsenals, China will almost certainly build-up its nuclear force even further based on a worst- case assessment of U.S. intentions.

On Jan. 23, President Trump while addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos said that he wants to hold talks with Russia and China about reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles. 

"We want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible,” Trump said.

With support from you and other members of Congress, President Trump should try to achieve what President Biden could not: a simple, informal deal with President Putin committing the United States and Russia to the existing caps on their strategic nuclear arsenals as long as the other does. This would allow the U.S. nuclear enterprise to focus on maintaining the existing force, buy time for formal talks to limit and reduce strategic, intermediate, and tactical nuclear weapons and the systems that carry them, and forestall a costly, unconstrained arms race that has no winner.

4. Encourage Engagement with China on Risk Reduction and Nuclear Arms Control

China is now estimated to possess some 600 nuclear weapons, including more than 300 on long-range systems. China could build up its force to 1,000 total warheads by the end of the decade, apparently in response to concerns about growing U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities. Since the buildup began around 2018, both the Trump and Biden administrations sought to engage China on arms control and risk reduction with limited success.

Congress should encourage the new administration to engage with Chinese counterparts bilaterally on mutual nuclear risk reduction measures and mutual arms control options, as well as through the "P5 Process" involving working consultations between senior U.S., UK, French, Russian, and Chinese officials.

5. Block Proposals for an Unnecessary Buildup of U.S. Nuclear Forces

The United States has more than enough nuclear firepower to deter a nuclear attack despite recent Chinese actions. More deployed U.S. nuclear weapons would not enhance deterrence and would likely prompt Russian and Chinese countermeasures. Proposals to build up the size of the U.S. nuclear force through warhead "uploading" or by adding new nuclear systems to the inventory would be premature, counterproductive, and cost prohibitive.

President Trump's nominee to be Undersecretary for Defense Policy, Elbridge Colby, addressed this in 2024, stating: "We're going to be lucky to just replace our existing nuclear force. We're not in a position to pursue dramatic expansions."

We respectfully urge you to oppose legislative initiatives that seek to build up the size of the U.S. nuclear force. Congress should examine whether build-up proposals would influence adversaries' decisions about whether or not to use nuclear weapons and how they might counter any additional U.S. nuclear weapons deployments.

6. Direct the Pentagon to Re-Examine the Current Nuclear Modernization Program

Over the past 15 years, the United States has spent hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to "modernize" the existing arsenal of nuclear warheads and associated delivery systems. Costs have soared, milestones have been missed, and not enough was done to re-evaluate programs. The current $756 billion, 10-year price tag for so-called modernization will likely grow further. We urge Congress to hold hearings, critically review and reassess the modernization plan in its entirety and re-examine spending priorities. 

For example, the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM has grown to an estimated $214 million per unit. Unlike submarine-based ballistic missiles, land-based ICBMs are vulnerable to attack and not essential to deter attacks on the U.S. homeland. This leg of the triad could be phased out to pursue a broader strategy to limit adversary nuclear weapons systems through arms control diplomacy.

The NNSA reports production capabilities stretched beyond capacity already. It is important that Congress desist from adding new nuclear programs to the agency’s list of priorities. At present, the NNSA is designing, building, or updating seven nuclear warheads and proposing a costly, and in our view unnecessary, expansion of nuclear weapons production capacity. Rather than setting unrealistic goals or adding more funding and projects to an organization that is already struggling with cost overruns, Congress should press for independent, updated NNSA budget estimates and realistic assessments of challenges.

7. Ensure Adequate Checks on Any Decision to Use Nuclear Weapons

It is important that Congress place sufficient checks on any decision to launch nuclear weapons. Last year, Congress endorsed the Biden Administration’s policy that “in all cases, the United States will maintain a ‘human in the loop’ for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the president to initiate and terminate nuclear weapons decisions.”

The Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act stated artificial intelligence should not “compromise the integrity of nuclear safeguards, whether through the functionality of weapons systems, the validation of communications from command authorities, or the principle of requiring positive human actions in execution of decisions by the President with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons.”

Congress should press the Pentagon to explain the operationalization of this concept. This includes building "firebreaks" to avoid the potential risks that integration of artificial intelligence into nuclear command and control and other decision-support systems could create.

Also, the U.S. President has sole authority to order the launch of nuclear weapons, seemingly subverting Congress’s constitutional authority to declare war. We respectfully encourage you to critically examine nuclear command and control procedures and potential points of failure, as well as the legal underpinnings for U.S. nuclear targeting and the need for checks and balances regarding any decision to order the use of nuclear weapons.

Congress is uniquely situated to guide the United States safely through a period of renewed nuclear rivalry and danger. Each one of our organizations stand ready to support your staff’s work in this area. We encourage you to engage with other members of Congress on these issues, including through the bicameral congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group. The working group is a forum for discussing and coordinating action on these critical issues.

Sincerely,

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association

Peter Wilk, Administrative Chair, Back from the Brink Coalition

John Tierney, Executive Director, Council for a Livable World

Brian Volsky, Policy Director, Foreign Policy for America

Bridget Moix, Executive Director, Friends Committee on National Legislation

Kevin Martin, President, Peace Action

Brian Campbell, PhD, Executive Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility

Dr. Emma Belcher, President, Ploughshares

Sarah Streyder, Executive Director, Secure Families Initiative

Scott Yundt, Executive Director, Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment

Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation

Tara Drozdenko, Program Director, Global Security, Union of Concerned Scientists

Bishop Julius C. Trimble, General Secretary, The United Methodist Church – General Board of Church and Society

Sara Haghdoosti, Executive Director, Win Without War

Dr. Frank N. von Hippel, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University*

Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

*Organization listed for identification purposes only

“Promoting Nuclear Disarmament in East Asia”

International Civil Society Forum to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Daryl G. Kimball, February 8, 2025

Thank you to our esteemed hosts for the invitation to this important gathering at this critical time.

On behalf of the Arms Control Association, I want to congratulate Nihon Hidankyo, the well-deserved recipients of the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize, and thank all of the Hibakusha for sharing their stories and for reminding the world why we must pursue and achieve a nuclear-weapons free-world.

Over the decades, civil society organizations around the globe have successfully pushed governments to take steps to reduce the nuclear danger, agree to cut the number of nuclear weapons, halt and then ban nuclear explosive testing, curb the spread of nuclear weapons, and to conclude the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

But as we approach the 80th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear risks are growing once again.

Human civilization remains precariously tethered to the existence of nuclear weapons and the threat they might be used again—in South Asia, in Europe, between the United States and Russia, or here in East Asia between the United States and China or on Korean Peninsula.

Dangerous, nuclear deterrence relationships exist between and among the world's nine nuclear armed states.

At some point, it is likely the dangerous nuclear balance of terror will fail.

If there is a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, it is currently U.S. policy to use nuclear weapons first if necessary, which would likely lead to a massive U.S.-Chinese nuclear exchange. It is also not clear whether, in such a conflict, China would respect its no-first-use policy.

If NATO-Russian forces engage directly, or if Russia were to use nuclear weapons in the conflict in Ukraine, it too could lead to all out nuclear war and kill or injure hundreds of millions of people in the first hours and days.

Making matters worse progress on nuclear disarmament is stalled and an unconstrained three-way nuclear arms race is on the horizon.

A special UN Security Council meeting on nuclear disarmament issues convened by Japan in 2024 underscored agreement among all 15 members that the risk of nuclear war and arms racing is higher than at any point since the end of the Cold War.

But the meeting also highlighted chronic differences among the nuclear-armed states about how to reduce the danger.

The five nuclear-armed states recognized under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have failed to engage in constructive nuclear disarmament and risk reduction diplomacy for more than a decade. Instead, they are spending tens of billions of dollars annually to modernize, upgrade their nuclear weapons.

As the Japanese foreign minister warned: “The world now stands on the cusp of reversing decades of declines in nuclear stockpiles.”

In a June 3 presentation to the Arms Control Association, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said the states with the largest arsenals “must find a way back to the negotiating table He said, correctly, that Russia and the United States “must reengage” to reduce nuclear stockpiles, prevent nuclear use, stop nuclear saber-rattling, and reaffirm support for the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

To help promote nuclear disarmament in East Asia and globally, civil society must:

1. Push harder on governments to head-off an unconstrained nuclear build-up and press for bilateral U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese disarmament diplomacy.

2. Urge leading nuclear-armed and nonnuclear states to create new fora to engage in a sustained, multilateral dialogue on nuclear disarmament.

3. Encourage leading governments, particularly Japan, to provide greater leadership to highlight the devastating human consequences of nuclear war.

1. Foster Disarmament Diplomacy to Head-Off a Three-Way Nuclear Arms Race

For decades, Washington and Moscow have negotiated nuclear arms control and reduction agreements to constrain and verifiably eliminate their nuclear forces. But deteriorating relations and the Russian war on Ukraine have stymied progress for years.

And on February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire.

In response, Congressional Republicans and some Trump advisors want Washington to spend even more than the current $756 billion, ten-year price tag for nuclear modernization in order to increase the number and diversity of the arsenal.

Without some new form of mutual restraint, Russia and the United States could double the number of deployed warheads—from about 1,550 each to more than 3,000—by uploading additional warheads on their land- and sea-based missiles.

Such a buildup would reverse 35 years of Russian-U.S. reductions. More nuclear weapons would not "enhance deterrence" and are not necessary to deter nuclear attack. It would divert resources from other defense and human needs. It would prompt China and Russia to match any U.S. increase.

On Jan. 23, President Trump while addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos said that he wants to hold talks with Russia and China about reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles.

"We want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible,” Trump said.

It might be possible, but a new, comprehensive framework agreement will be difficult and would take months if not years to achieve.

Furthermore, hopeful presidential statements alone do not constitute an effective nuclear arms reduction strategy. And Trump's recent proposal to expand U.S. research and development on a wide array of strategic and space-based missile defense technologies will only encourage Russia and China to build up their offensive capabilities to ensure they can deter U.S. nuclear attack.

History shows there is no feasible missile defense technology that can make a nation invulnerable to nuclear attack. It simply gives nuclear-armed adversaries incentives to expand and adapt their offensive nuclear forces to ensure that they’re able to assure their ability to retaliate.

In order to succeed on "denuclearization" Trump will need a more practical and effective approach and he will need a more realistic plan for engaging China in bilateral talks that could lead to limits on long-range nuclear and conventional weapons on each side.

To start, we recommend that the United States and Russia could reach a simple, informal deal to maintain the existing caps on their strategic arsenals as long as the other side agrees to do so.

Leading states, including Japan, have an important role to play by pressing Washington and Moscow to conclude a simple, bilateral understanding that neither side shall increase their arsenals beyond the New START limits of 1,550 deployed warheads each.

This would remain in force until they can conclude a more comprehensive, durable framework to limit and reduce their deadly nuclear arsenals.

As long as Russia and the United States agree to cap their strategic deployed nuclear arsenals and work to negotiate a new nuclear arms reduction framework, Washington, along with leading non-nuclear-weapon states, should call on China, France, and the United Kingdom to freeze the overall size of their nuclear arsenals, negotiate a ban on fissile material production for weapons, and recommit to pursue negotiations on reductions in their offensive nuclear stockpiles.

NPT member states should make it their highest priority at the NPT preparatory committee meeting in July to press Moscow and Washington to observe the New START limits on deployed warheads until a more permanent, comprehensive nuclear arms control arrangement is concluded.

To promote disarmament globally and in East Asia, the United States and China also need to resume a bilateral nuclear dialogue on issues of mutual concern.

China is now estimated to possess some 600 nuclear weapons, including more than 300 on long-range systems. China could build up its force to 1,000 total warheads by 2030, apparently in response to concerns about growing U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities.

Since the buildup began around 2018, both the Trump and Biden administrations sought to engage China on arms control and risk reduction with limited success.

To promote a more substantive dialogue with China, the White House should agree to seriously discuss China’s proposal on a joint no first use agreement as a first step toward a broader understanding about their respective nuclear postures and strategic stability.

Trump should also assure President Xi Jinping that United States does not plan to threaten nuclear coercion against China, and Xi should extend the same assurance.

Such a shift could reduce tensions and lead to more concrete measures designed to prevent a Chinese-U.S. nuclear arms race.

For its part, China needs to elevate the underperforming "P5 Process," the dialogue on nuclear risk reduction involving the NPT’s five nuclear-weapon states, that has been underway since 2010.

China, which now chairs the group, should increase the frequency of these meetings; raise the level of participation; expand the topics of discussion, including exchanges on nuclear postures and joint pledges not to use nuclear weapons first and not to resume nuclear testing.

In addition, the five states could expand on their 2022 joint declaration that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” by adopting a statement in the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War that pledges that the nuclear powers will “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party and against other countries.”

2. Launch a New, High-Level Nuclear Disarmament Summits Initiative

The five major nuclear-armed states have a special responsibility to follow through on their disarmament obligations. But ultimately, the other nuclear-armed states also need to be drawn further into the nuclear disarmament process, or else these states—the DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan—will continue to build up their capabilities.

Unfortunately, the current nuclear disarmament architecture has proven to be inadequate in facilitating the progress and actions necessary to address new challenges to disarmament, which include more competitive and less cooperative relations between major nuclear-armed states and a lack of political will to pursue the bold, creative steps to reduce nuclear risks and further reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons.

For example, the 60-nation Conference on Disarmament has not been able to overcome political differences that has blocked consensus decisions that are required to begin talks on new measures for more than a quarter century.

To overcome this problem, the Arms Control Association has proposed that a group of leading states, possibly including Japan, work together to launch a new, high-level series of disarmament summits to inject momentum into global efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Modeled after the highly successful nuclear security summits, these high-level nuclear disarmament summits could involve a group of 20 to 30 leaders from nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states. If designed properly, such an approach could help overcome existing obstacles of disarmament diplomacy, increase pressure for action, and complement existing forums designed to advance progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

These summits would put the global spotlight on the issue, put pressure on leaders to deliver on promises and commitments, and could foster constructive dialogue on practical, balanced nuclear risk reduction and disarmament proposals.

The risk of nuclear war exists as long as there are nuclear weapons, but we can reduce the risk of nuclear war by making steady progress toward a nuclear weapon free world.

3. Increase Global Awareness of the Risks and Consequences of Nuclear War

For decades, the Hibakusha have provided the world with powerful reminder of the devastating human impacts of nuclear weapons use, development, production, and testing, and ongoing risks of nuclear war.

At the 2023, G7 summit in Hiroshima, former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida wisely observed:

"Conveying the reality of the nuclear attack is important as a starting point for all nuclear disarmament efforts."

Indeed, in this era of heightened nuclear risk, it is imperative that global leaders have a deeper appreciation and understanding of the impacts of nuclear weapons testing, production, and use.

This is all the more important as the number of Hibakusha with direct memories of the atomic attacks continues to dwindle.

As we look forward, we must all seek bold new ways to ensure that their experience and memories are not lost so that future generations fully understand why a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

Japan—the only nation that has experienced the unspeakable horrors of a nuclear weapons attack—is uniquely positioned to take the lead for a high-level international conference on the impacts of nuclear weapons.

This conference, organized by Japan's most important NGOs, is an important step in this direction that the Japanese government might build upon in order to engage government leaders from around the world on the issue.

A two- to three-day, head of state-level conference on the health and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons and war would be consistent with Japan's history of leadership in building the global arms control and nonproliferation system.

This gathering should not only recall the devastation and legacy of the atomic bombings of 1945 and honor the "hibakusha," but underscore the devastating global effects of more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions and the toxic legacy of nuclear weapons production activities by the world's nine nuclear weapon states.

A Japan-convened Nuclear Weapons Impacts Conference could also indirectly encourage the leaders of Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to engage in direct talks to reduce nuclear risks and to reach new agreements to halt and reverse the arms race.

It is also an essential way to push our leaders our fellow citizens to re-consider the risks and the immorality of nuclear deterrence strategies, and to away from the dangerous and unsustainable reliance on threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

The conference, which would likely follow this year's 80th anniversary, would also help maintain pressure in Japan and around the globe for further action to put us back on the path to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

If the world is to halt and reverse the cycle of spiraling nuclear tensions, it will require new, bolder global leadership and sustained public pressure in the weeks, months, and years ahead.

Thank you for your attention.