September 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

The conflict in Gaza cast a shadow on the recent memorial ceremony recognizing the 79th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Representatives of Canada, France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union skipped the ceremony in Nagasaki on Aug. 9 after Israel was disinvited.

The annual ceremony is designed to honor the victims of the U.S. atomic bombing on August 9, 1945; renew a commitment to nuclear disarmament; and honor a long-standing vow never to let such a tragedy happen again. It is estimated that, by the end of 1945, 75,000 people died from the bombing on Nagasaki. The bombing of Hiroshima three days earlier killed an estimated 140,000 people.

The ceremonies are hosted by the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and their respective mayors have authority to decide who should receive invitations. Since 2022, Belarus and Russia have been the only countries to be disinvited from both ceremonies. This year, Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui invited Israel, and Nagasaki Mayor Shiro Suzuki did not.

On Aug. 6, after attending the Hiroshima memorial ceremony, Julia Longbottom, the UK ambassador to Japan, told journalists she would not attend the Nagasaki ceremony because disinviting Israel “created an unfortunate and misleading equivalency with Russia and Belarus,” the only other countries not invited to this year’s ceremony, according to multiple Japanese media sources.

On the following day, U.S. Ambassador Rahm Emanuel announced his absence from the Nagasaki ceremony, saying “the mayor of Nagasaki politicized the event by snubbing Israel.” White House spokesperson Karine Jean-Pierre declined to comment on Emanuel’s decision, but State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said on Aug. 8 that “[n]o country should be singled out, not to be invited for a celebration.”

That same day, Nagasaki’s mayor told a press conference that “the decision to disinvite Israel was not for a political reason.” He confirmed that he received a joint letter from Group of Seven (G7) and EU ambassadors on July 25, stating that “it would be difficult for us to have high-level participation” in the ceremony if Israel were excluded.

Suzuki told reporters on Aug. 8 that it was regrettable that the ambassadors could not understand that “the reason why we did not invite Israel was solely because we wanted to conduct the ceremony smoothly in a peaceful, solemn atmosphere.” After Hiroshima invited Israel to its ceremony this year, its decision was met with public criticism and protests, resulting in more security installations.

Yoshimasa Hayashi, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, declined to comment on the controversy at an Aug. 8 press conference, saying that Nagasaki hosted the ceremony, not the Japanese national government. Meanwhile, Asahi newspaper reported on Aug. 9 that the Japanese government privately warned Nagasaki city officials that uninviting Israel “could develop to a diplomatic issue.”

Tamashii Honda, a president of Nagasaki A-Bomb Bereaved Families Association, told Yomiuri News on Aug. 8 that he “wanted the [G7] ambassadors to visit the A-bombed city and feel Nagasaki’s desire for peace especially because the war is still ongoing.” It is “very regrettable that the ambassadors will not be attending,” Honda said.

Billionaire businessman Elon Musk fueled more controversy on Aug. 13 when he described Hiroshima and Nagasaki as “bombed but now…full cities again” during a live streaming interview with former U.S. President Donald Trump on X. “It is not as scary as people think, basically,” Musk said of nuclear war. (See ACT, June 2024.)

September 2024
By Mina Rozei

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) conducted its first technical assistance visit in Ukraine on July 2-3 as a response to months of alleged illegal chemical weapons use by Ukraine and Russia. (See ACT, June 2024.)

Ukraine requested the visit after the country signed an ad hoc privileges and immunities agreement with the OPCW on May 24. As part of the agreement, OPCW experts delivered 70 devices that detect gas and vapor threats and conducted training on how to use them for 20 experts from the Ukrainian State Emergency Service, including first responders.

After long accusing Russia of using chemical weapons since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kyiv provided evidence for its claim at the OPCW Executive Council meeting July 9-12 in The Hague. In a report to the council, Ukraine alleged that Russia used various weapons containing hazardous chemical agents more than 3,000 times between February 2023 and June 2024.

The documentation offered, including evidence prepared by the Ukrainian armed forces commander, contained photos and detailed analysis of the types of munitions found on the battlefield, alleging that “most of the munitions (82 percent) used were hand gas grenades of the K-51 and RG-VO types…which are riot control agents and are prohibited for use as means of warfare” under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Riot control agents are permitted in certain circumstances by the CWC, but are prohibited under Article 1 when used “as a method of warfare.”

Ukraine warned that the lack of international response to Russia’s unlawful weapons use means that the risk of recurrence is increasing. It said that there would be follow-up to the OPCW July visit to Ukraine, with “more such activities…scheduled throughout the year.”

It is unknown whether this report will provide the necessary “specific substantiated request” required of at least one CWC state-party for the OPCW to formally begin any OPCW activities related to the use of chemical weapons.

The issue is expected to be raised at the next CWC conference of states-parties in The Hague on Nov. 25-29. Nicole Shampaine, U.S. ambassador to the OPCW, told Arms Control Today that the United States “will join many other countries in ensuring this issue is at the top of the agenda at the OPCW in order to hold Russia accountable for its actions.”

The technical assistance visit came after the OPCW issued a statement May 7 that it is monitoring the situation in Ukraine and open to requests from member states for formal investigations. Both Ukraine and Russia have made allegations of chemical weapons use on the battlefield, reflecting the struggles to ensure CWC compliance that have dogged the OPCW since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012.

“The norm against the possession or use of chemical weapons embodied in the [CWC] is being challenged due to repeated violations by a small number of countries,” Bonnie Jenkins, the U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, told Arms Control Today.

September 2024
By Daryl G. Kimball

For more than a decade, the five nuclear-armed states recognized under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have failed to engage in constructive nuclear disarmament and risk reduction diplomacy. Instead, they are spending tens of billions of dollars annually to modernize, upgrade, and in some cases expand their deadly arsenals.

To get back on track, leaders in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington will need to deploy new, more creative approaches to put in place new constraints and guardrails against a dangerous arms race in which everyone loses.

Although the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire in 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin has refused to engage with the Biden administration on its 2023 offer to discuss “without precondition” a new nuclear arms control framework to prevent an unconstrained nuclear arms race. Putin’s excuse is that such a dialogue would not be fruitful as long as Washington continues to support Ukraine as it defends itself against Russian aggression.

Meanwhile, China is building up its smaller but deadly nuclear force now estimated to consist of some 310 warheads on long-range missiles, with perhaps 500 missiles in total. Unfortunately, China’s leaders also have rejected U.S. offers for follow-up talks on nuclear risk reduction and arms control issues, citing ongoing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

If Russia and the United States exceed New START limits, it would destabilize their mutual balance of nuclear terror, strain the already costly and behind-schedule U.S. nuclear modernization program, and prompt China to accelerate its own nuclear buildup. Such an action-reaction cycle would be madness.

What can be done? First, in the coming weeks, U.S. President Joe Biden and whoever is the next president-elect should reaffirm U.S. support for negotiating a new nuclear arms control framework with Russia. Because such a deal would be difficult to hammer out and take time, the president should propose that Washington and Moscow conclude a simple, bilateral understanding promising that neither side shall increase the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads beyond the New START limits. This would remain in force until they can conclude a more comprehensive, durable framework to limit and reduce their deadly nuclear arsenals.

As long as Russia and the United States agree to cap their strategic deployed nuclear arsenals and work to negotiate a new nuclear arms reduction framework, Washington, along with leading non-nuclear-weapon states, should call on China, France, and the United Kingdom to freeze the overall size of their nuclear arsenals and negotiate a ban on fissile material production for weapons.

Second, if China continues to decline talks with Washington on nuclear matters, it has an even greater responsibility to elevate the underperforming P5 consultation process, the dialogue on nuclear risk reduction involving the NPT’s five nuclear-weapon states, that has been underway since 2010.

China, which now chairs the group, is in a unique position to launch an ambitious program to increase the frequency of these meetings; raise the level of participation; expand the topics of discussion, including exchanges on nuclear postures and joint pledges not to use nuclear weapons first; and build on past success.

For example, the five states could expand on their 2022 joint declaration that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” by adopting a statement in the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War that pledges that the nuclear powers will “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party and against other countries.”

In the context of these discussions, senior U.S. diplomats should clarify that they will not seek and will not pursue an increase in the size or diversity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal as long as Russia continues to respect the New START ceilings and China does not expand its strategic nuclear arsenal significantly, which is not likely until the year 2030 or later.

China could explain what is driving its buildup and clarify its nuclear modernization plans. Such an approach would help Beijing avoid worst-case assumptions about its intentions and the potential for a three-way arms race.

Finally, leading non-nuclear-weapon states not only need to press the United States and Russia to engage on nuclear arms control and push China to halt its nuclear buildup. They seriously should consider launching a new initiative that would lead to a series of high-level nuclear disarmament summits involving a group of 20 to 30 leaders from nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states. If designed properly, such an approach could help overcome existing obstacles of disarmament diplomacy, increase pressure for action, and complement existing forums designed to advance progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

If the world is to halt and reverse the cycle of spiraling nuclear tensions, it will require new, bolder global leadership and sustained public pressure in the weeks, months, and years ahead.