For Immediate Release: September 22, 2025

Media Contact: Daryl Kimball, ACA Executive Director, (202) 462-8270 ext. 107

(Washington, D.C.)—Earlier today, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that “Russia is ready to continue to adhere to the central quantitative restrictions under the [New] START Treaty for one year after February 5, 2026.”

In response, ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball said “President Putin’s proposal is a positive and welcome move, and one that many of us have been advocating. More nuclear weapons will not make the U.S., Russia, or the world safer.”

“If Putin and Trump agree to maintain current strategic nuclear limits after the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expires and launch talks on more ambitious nuclear disarmament measures, they can help reduce the most immediate existential security threat facing the world,” he said.

“An agreement not to exceed the current strategic nuclear limits would reduce tensions, forestall a costly arms race that no one can win, create diplomatic leverage to curb the buildup of China’s arsenal, and buy time for talks on a broader, more durable, treaty,” Kimball said

“We strongly encourage President Trump to reciprocate Putin’s proposal to maintain existing limits on their long-range nuclear weapons, and we urge the Kremlin and the White House to immediately direct their teams to begin negotiations on a new more comprehensive agreement or agreements that address difficult issues with which the two sides have long struggled.”

For more than a decade, Russia and the United States have failed to engage in meaningful talks designed to verifiably reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals; maintain restrictions on intermediate-range forces and account for and limit sub-strategic nuclear weapons; and establish common-sense limits on strategic missile defense, space-based weapons, and long-range conventional strike weapons.”

“To broaden the disarmament effort, Putin and Trump could also call on China, France, and the UK to report on their total nuclear weapons holdings and freeze their nuclear stockpiles, provided Russia and the United States pursue deeper verifiable reductions in their far larger arsenals,” Kimball suggested.

“A Trump-Putin pledge to maintain mutual restraints on their already massive strategic nuclear arsenals, combined with the resumption of formal U.S.-Russian talks on further nuclear arms reductions, would be a positive and essential step for U.S. and world security,” said Thomas Countryman, Chair of the Board of Directors of the Arms Control Association, and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation.

The 2010 New START agreement—the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreement between the United States and Russia—will expire in 136 days. The agreement limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads on no more than 700 deployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers.

When previously asked about the expiration of the treaty, Trump said on July 25: “That is a big problem for the world, when you take off nuclear restrictions that’s a big problem.”

Additional Resources:

“U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance“ an ACA Fact Sheet

“After the New START Treaty,” Deep Cuts Commission Fact Sheet, Sept. 15, 2025

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, membership-based organization dedicated to providing authoritative information and practical policy solutions to address the threats posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. ACA is one of many organizations that has recently issued a “New Call to Halt and Reverse the Nuclear Arms Race.”

Statement from Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, 

Sept. 19, 2025

Today’s UN Security Council vote to restore international sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program does not close the door on diplomacy, but if the United States and Iran do not move swiftly to restart negotiations on a pragmatic, effective nuclear agreement, there is an increased risk that Iran will resume sensitive nuclear activities and a new military crisis between Washington and Tehran could erupt.

The UN measures, which were lifted under Resolution 2231’s endorsement of the 2015 nuclear deal, will reimpose international sanctions on Iran, restrict the country’s nuclear activities, including a prohibition on enrichment, and ban ballistic missile development. Iran has threatened to suspend recently renewed cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in response.

With bold, decisive leadership, Washington and Tehran could still avert snapback and reduce the risk of an escalatory spiral that puts the two countries back on a path to conflict.

Next week, as heads of state gather at the UN General Assembly, there will be an opportunity for U.S. President Donald Trump to extend to Iran a serious diplomatic offer to avert a new nuclear proliferation crisis. Iran’s own proposal to extend snapback, which reportedly does not provide specific timelines on restoring safeguards, is insufficient. Nonetheless, it is another signal that Tehran is interested in diplomatically extending snapback and the Trump administration should test that willingness. 

The United States, with the support of the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), should respond by proposing an agreement that would:

• extend the option to snapback UN sanctions for 12 months beyond the October expiration,
• encourage the resumption of direct negotiations between the United States and Iran on a new framework for addressing concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities,
• recognize Iran’s rights to a peaceful, safeguarded nuclear program under Article IV the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
• call upon Iran to immediately resume full implementation of its legally binding safeguards agreement with the IAEA,
• put in place a voluntary 12-month enrichment moratorium, and
• strengthen the ceasefire Trump announced in June, including with a commitment from both sides to refrain from strikes or support for strikes, while negotiations are underway.

Such an agreement could be endorsed by the UN Security Council, superseding the Sept. 19 resolution that restored UN sanctions on Iran.

A Security Council resolution along these lines will advance international peace and security, without jeopardizing U.S. nonproliferation interests. The resumption of IAEA monitoring and the temporary enrichment moratorium would provide ample early warning if Iran were to resume proliferation-sensitive activities in violation of the Security Council-endorsed arrangements.

The window for reaching such an agreement to avert escalating tensions over snapback is very short. But the door to diplomacy remains open even if the United States and Iran cannot agree on any interim measures before Sept. 28.

If UN sanctions are snapped back, it will be critical for Washington and Tehran to exercise restraint in the coming weeks and focus on resuming negotiations. If both the United States and Iran seek to build pressure and leverage, there is a greater risk that a military conflict will re-erupt.

Iran should refrain from actions that will complicate future diplomatic efforts and drive speculation about its nuclear intentions, such as ending all cooperation with the IAEA, threatening NPT withdrawal, resuming uranium enrichment, or moving enriched uranium. Such actions would raise doubts about Iran's claim that its program is entirely peaceful, may be used a pretext for further military strikes, and will only create new challenges in negotiating a comprehensive nuclear accord.

The United States must recognize that there is no military solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis.  Further strikes at this time risk driving Iran closer to nuclear weapons and following through on its threat to withdraw from the NPT. Furthermore, the Trump administration should make clear to Israel that it will oppose further strikes on Iran’s nuclear program and the targeting of Iran’s nuclear scientists. The Trump administration should also recognize that demanding Iran agree to zero enrichment before negotiations resume is unnecessary and a nonstarter.

Snapback of Security Council resolutions will formally put an end to the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Although restoration of the JCPOA was not a viable technical or political option for the past several years, it continued to serve as a framework for negotiations. The end of the JCPOA era, however, is an opportunity for both sides to pursue creative, pragmatic options for a long-term agreement that recognizes Iran’s peaceful nuclear ambitions, while ensuring it is not used to build nuclear weapons. 

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nongovernmental, nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to the providing authoritative information and practical solutions to eliminate the threats posed by the world's most dangerous weapons.

Kelsey Davenport is the Director for Nonproliferation Policy, and is a leading expert on nuclear and missile programs in Iran and North Korea and on international efforts to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

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