The U.S. implemented more sanctions and called for further investigation into chemical weapons use by Sudan in 2024.

September 2026
By Libby Flatoff

The United States implemented additional sanctions and called for further investigation into chemical weapons use by Sudan in 2024.              

The additional economic sanctions went into effect July 20 as Sudan continued to deny the chemical weapon use allegations. New sanctions included aviation restrictions preventing airlines owned by Sudan’s government from engaging in any air transportation to or from the United States.

Sudan’s army chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, greets military personnel on a visit to Gedaref state in 2024. The United States in June implemented additional sanctions on Sudan for allegedly using chemical weapons during fighting that occurred in 2024. (Photo by AFP via Getty Images)

During the 112th session of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) July 7-10, the United States reiterated its allegations that Sudan “used chemical weapons in 2024 and remained in non-compliance in 2025.”

In April 2025, Washington first announced that it, “determined under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 … that the Government of Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024.”

As a result, the United States implemented its first round of sanctions against Sudan for chemical weapons use June 26 and 27. The sanctions were to remain in place for at least one year and followed a France 24 investigation published in November 2025 that found strong evidence of chlorine gas used as a chemical weapon by the Sudanese Army Forces in 2024 (See ACT, January/February 2026.)

In response to these initial allegations and sanctions, Sudan formed an internal national technical committee. In May 2025, the Sudan Tribune quoted Sudan’s army chief, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as saying that the purpose of the committee was “to investigate the American allegations, and it is to submit its report immediately.”

The Sudanese government committee’s interim report was circulated at the OPCW’s July session and concluded: “Based on the information reviewed, field inspections conducted, interviews undertaken, and observations made during the reporting period, the National Committee has not, identified any material, technical, or documentary evidence that substantiates the allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons in the locations examined.”

Delivering the U.S. statement at the OPCW session, Ambassador Nicole Shampaine emphasized that “domestic bureaucratic mechanisms are not a substitute for treaty compliance and independent verification.” She called on Sudan to grant the OPCW Technical Secretariat “unhindered, transparent access.”

After the session, Sudan’s foreign ministry issued a statement asserting that the United States had ignored proposals to verify the chemical weapons use allegations, the Sudan Tribune reported. “The government of Sudan proposed through the joint mechanism to send U.S. experts to Sudan for field investigation and direct verification of claims regarding the army’s use of chemical weapons, but the American side refrained from responding to these invitations.”

The complex lost all off-site power 25 times since Russia invaded Ukraine.

September 2026
By Shaghayegh Chris Rostampour

Attacks and disruptions on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant are rising, heightening concerns about the facility’s ability to maintain essential safety functions.

Two cooling towers dominate the landscape in a 2019 file photo of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southeastern Ukraine. Attacks and disruptions at the complex are intensifying due to Russia’s war against Ukraine.  (Photo by Dmytro Smolyenko/Future Publishing via Getty Images)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported Aug. 14 that the plant experienced three losses of off-site power in the first eight days of August, requiring emergency diesel generators to power vital safety systems. This brings the total number of times the plant lost all off-site power since the beginning of the conflict to 25. Thirteen of those outages have occurred in the last four months.

The incidents come amid continuing uncertainty over the plant’s future, which has been illegally occupied by Russia since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The United States and Russia have proposed different arrangements for the future control and operations of the complex, but Ukraine opposes both proposals. (See ACT, May 2026.)

Meanwhile, a more immediate concern remains the deterioration of plant infrastructure, which increases the risk of meltdown and radiation release. According to the IAEA, the nuclear power complex requires reliable external electricity for reactor and spent-fuel cooling and other essential safety systems. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, the plant had access to 10 off-site power lines. It now has only one operational connection, the 330-kilovolt Ferosplavna-1 line, after damage left the 750-kilovolt Dniprovska line unavailable. When that line is disconnected, as it was on Aug. 8, the plant experiences a complete loss of off-site power and must rely on emergency diesel generators.

A drone struck a turbine May 30, causing localized damage. The IAEA described the incident as the first military activity to directly affect the plant site since April 2024. The plant subsequently suffered repeated power disruptions.

In a June 26 statement, IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi stressed the challenging nature of making repairs during temporary ceasefires, especially as military action continued in the area.

The IAEA reported July 15 that more than two-thirds of the complex’s off-site radiation monitoring stations appeared not to be transmitting data because of power losses or damage. Attacks on local electrical infrastructure disrupted water supplies to parts of the complex and nearby Enerhodar, although groundwater wells remained available for reactor cooling.

On August 1 and 4, the plant lost off-site power, automatically activating emergency diesel generators. The IAEA has described the increasing frequency of outages as “deeply concerning” and reported that the plant raised water levels in its six spent-fuel pools as a precaution against prolonged loss of power and diesel supplies.

No radiological release or loss of reactor cooling has occurred. Although the power plant reactors are currently shut down and therefore in a cold state, continued damage to supporting infrastructure could leave the complex increasingly vulnerable to a prolonged power loss or other emergency.

Virtual Briefing: Syria's Chemical Weapons Legacy: Current Issues and Challenges

Description

The nongovernmental Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition and the Arms Control Association will host a virtual briefing on Sept. 16 featuring remarks by Syria’s Amb. to the OPCW, Mohamad Katoub, followed by a panel discussion. 

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September 16, 11am-12:30pm

Watch the recording.

Fifteen years have elapsed since the forces of deposed Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad used banned nerve agents in an attack on anti-regime populations outside Damascus, killing more than 1200 people. The incident led to a global pressure campaign that brought Syria into the Chemical Weapons Convention and led to the removal of most, but not all, of its large and deadly chemical arsenal.

Today, Syria's new government and its people are still grappling with the deadly legacies of the civil war. Syria is working with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the international community to account for and demilitarize Assad's residual chemical weapons arsenal, seeking to assist victims, and pursuing accountability for the perpetrators.

Key Remarks: 

  • Amb. Katoub will provide an update on the important developments relating to the ongoing chemical weapons demilitarization efforts. 

Speakers:

  • Amb. Ahmet Üzümcü, former Director-General of the OPCW, on the organization's past contributions and its role today.
  • Fadel Abdulghany, Director, Syrian Network on Human Rights, on the importance of the Syrian government’s efforts to hold perpetrators accountable and what governments can do to assist such efforts.
  • Richard Yates, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the OPCW, on the role of the "Breath of Freedom" coalition supporting the OPCW-Syria CW demilitarization effort.

Moderator:

  • Gregory D. Koblentz, associate professor and director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government.

This virtual briefing will be on the record and open to the public, reporters, diplomats, and members of the CWC Coalition around the globe.

Watch the recording.

U.S. to Embrace Limited Nuclear War in New Guidance

August 24, 2026

The Pentagon is planning revisions to U.S. nuclear employment guidance that will emphasize the role of tactical nuclear weapons and limited employment options, while possibly de-emphasizing certain missions for U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

The changes would mark a stark shift toward an embrace of nuclear warfighting at the tactical level while, at the same time, potentially opening a path toward avoiding a strategic arms race between the United States and Russia and the United States and China.