E3, US Needs A More Effective Diplomatic Strategy for Iran Post-Snapback

Statement from Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, August 28, 2025

Today’s decision by the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) to initiate the process to snap back UN sanctions on Iran that were modified as part of the 2015 nuclear deal must be paired with an effective diplomatic strategy that restarts talks between the United States and Iran. If the E3 and the United States fail to prioritize pragmatic diplomacy in the coming weeks and provide assurance that there will be no further military attacks while bilateral talks proceed, they risk pushing Tehran closer to nuclear weapons and putting the region back on a path to war.

Under the so-called snapback process outlined in Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal, the Security Council now has 30 days to pass a resolution continuing the UN sanctions relief. If such a resolution does not pass, there will be an automatic reimposition of the UN sanctions and nuclear restrictions—including a prohibition on uranium enrichment—contained in resolutions passed by the Security Council between 2006 and 2010 as part of the global pressure campaign that contributed to the negotiation of the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Iran has threatened to respond to the snapping back of UN measures, including by withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—a step that would put the United States and Iran back on a path to conflict.

To avert this crisis, the Trump administration must take advantage of the 30-day window before snapback is finalized to reach an interim agreement with Iran that stabilizes the current crisis and extends the option to snapback UN sanctions. Such an arrangement would reduce the risk of further conflict and create the time and space for the complex negotiations that will be necessary to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear deal.

In any interim agreement, the Trump administration must prioritize the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi’s announcement that inspectors returned to Iran and Tehran’s decision to allow inspectors access to the Bushehr site is a positive step, but it is imperative that Iran meets its legal obligations by allowing the full resumption of IAEA safeguards inspections at all sites and cooperating with IAEA efforts to account for Iran’s stockpiles of nuclear materials, particularly the uranium enriched to 60 percent.

An interim deal should also take into account Iran’s legitimate concerns about further illegal attacks on its nuclear facilities and scientists by solidifying the ceasefire that ended the 12-day war between Israel, Iran, and the United States and recognizing Iran’s NPT right to a peaceful nuclear program under IAEA safeguards. 

An agreement along these lines would be insufficient to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis, but it would be a positive step that de-escalates tensions and creates time for further diplomacy to reduce Iran’s proliferation risk in the long term. 

Failure to use the 30-day window to reach an agreement that staves off snapback risks putting the United States, Israel, and Iran back on the path to conflict and could drive Tehran to follow through on its threat to withdraw from the NPT, a step that increases the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran and weakens the treaty.

Despite President Donald Trump’s claims that the U.S. and Israeli military strikes set Iran’s program back by years, military action is incapable of addressing Iran’s proliferation threat. Iran’s nuclear knowledge cannot be bombed away, and Tehran still possesses nuclear capabilities and material that pose an urgent proliferation threat. And now some of those materials, including Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to near-weapons grade levels, remain accounted for and unmonitored. It is highly likely that Iran retains the capabilities and materials to quickly return to the threshold of nuclear weapons or weaponize if the decision were made to do so.

If Trump fails to seize this moment, he risks dragging the United States back into a military conflict with Iran, weakening the NPT, and driving Tehran closer to the bomb. It is in neither the interest of Tehran nor Washington to miss this window of opportunity to pursue a lasting diplomatic solution that verifiably blocks Iran's pathways to nuclear weapons and provides Iran with benefits in return.

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nongovernmental, nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to the providing authoritative information and practical solutions to eliminate the threats posed by the world's most dangerous weapons.

Kelsey Davenport is the Director for Nonproliferation Policy, and is a leading expert on nuclear and missile programs in Iran and North Korea and on international efforts to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

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Media inquiries and interview requests should be directed to [email protected] and 1-202-463-8270 x105

For Immediate Release: August 13, 2025 (Updated August 14.)

Media Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director (202-463-8270 x107); Xiaodon Liang, Senior Policy Analyst (202-463-8270 x113); Thomas Countryman, Chair of the Board and former Asst. Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation (via 202-463-8270 x113)

(Washington, D.C.)— U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Anchorage, Alaska, this week for a snap-summit that will focus primarily on options for ending Russia’s brutal and illegal war on Ukraine. There are also indications, however, the two leaders will also likely discuss the uncertain future of the U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear relationship.

After the Aug. 6 meeting between Trump’s personal envoy, Steve Witkoff, and Putin in Moscow that set up the Alaska summit, Putin’s advisor Yuri Ushakov said that the two main topics discussed were “the Ukrainian crisis” and “the prospect of possible development of strategic cooperation between the United States and Russia.”

Ushakov’s comment refers to the fact that the last remaining treaty limiting the two countries’ nuclear arsenals, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), will expire on February 5, 2026. The treaty has been extended once and cannot be extended again. No talks are yet underway on a follow-on agreement.

Two weeks earlier, on July 25, Trump was asked by a reporter from Russia’s TASS news agency about the prospects for broader nuclear arms reductions between the United States and Russia after New START expires. In response, Trump said, “I would like to see it. We are starting to work on that.” 

“That is a big problem for the world, when you take off nuclear restrictions that’s a big problem,” Trump added.

In remarks on August 14, Putin said the discussions with the United States were aimed at creating "the long–term conditions of peace between our countries, in Europe, and in the world as a whole, if we reach agreements in the field of strategic offensive arms control in the next stages.”

If New START expires with no successor arrangement, Washington and Moscow could, in theory, increase their arsenals beyond New START limits on deployed warheads (1,550) and deployed delivery systems (700) by uploading more warheads on existing long-range missiles or deploying more missiles and bombers.

Experts at the Arms Control Association and others have noted that given the fact that negotiating a new, formal treaty would take time, it is vital that Trump and Putin reach an interim agreement to continue to respect the current strategic nuclear weapons limits until a new, more comprehensive framework deal can be achieved between the U.S and Russia. Failure to do so risks the first buildup of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons in more than 35 years.

The Alaska summit provides an opportunity to pose probing questions for both leaders and their senior teams on their respective plans for talks on how to manage the two countries’ delicate and dangerous nuclear balance of terror. 

These include:

1. Plans for nuclear arms talks: “As both presidents are aware, the last remaining U.S.-Russian bilateral nuclear arms control treaty will expire in about six months. President Trump has expressed an interest in further talks with Russia on strategic nuclear arms control and on July 25 President Trump said ‘when you take off nuclear restrictions that’s a big problem for the world.’

Q: Have you discussed how each side seeks to address this challenge, and will each of you agree to continue to respect current nuclear limits while your teams begin negotiations on a follow-on agreement?”

2. The impact of strategic missile defense: “For decades, U.S. and Russian leaders have recognized the ‘interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms’ because strategic missile defenses can upset the nuclear balance and lead to offensive buildups.

President Trump, you have recently announced plans to expand U.S. missile defenses to try to counter all missile threats, not just from North Korea, but also from Russian and Chinese strategic weapons. President Putin has expressed deep concern about those plans. 

Q: A question for each of you: do you intend to take up this issue in future talks and will you seek new solutions to address mutual concerns about missile threats and missile defenses?”

3. Options for reducing the risks of nuclear miscalculation: “In 1984 President Reagan first said that ‘A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?’

In 2022, Russia, the United States, China, France, and the U.K. also issued a joint statement declaring that ‘a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.’

Q: Do both of you continue to agree that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought?

Q: If so, how might you work with each other and with other nuclear-armed states to formalize that statement, for instance by updating and implementing the 1973 U.S.-Soviet agreement on the “Prevention of Nuclear War” that requires the two countries to refrain from nuclear threats and, in times of increased risk of nuclear conflict, “immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk.”