Arms Control Now

Since the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, the United States and Russia have negotiated agreements that have set verifiable limits on their deadly long-range nuclear arsenals and intermediate-range systems to mitigate the dangers of nuclear arms racing and nuclear war. The process has reduced nuclear dangers, reduced the size of their deadly arsenals and partially fulfilled their obligations under Article VI of the NPT to engage in good faith negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on disarmament.

If U.S. and Iranian negotiators return to Islamabad for a second round of talks, the United States and Iran will need to bridge the gaps on key nuclear issues to reach an agreement. With pragmatic diplomacy and the political will to compromise, a deal is possible. But the nonproliferation value of any nuclear limitations will be minimal without effective verification. Defining the scope of inspections and monitoring mechanisms is arguably the most important component of an effective deal and should be a U.S. priority. 

The Trump administration engaged in three rounds of talks with Iran before striking Iran on Feb. 28. Comments from President Donald Trump's lead negotiator, Steve Witkoff, however, suggest that the White House missed a diplomatic opportunity because the negotiating team was ill-prepared for talks and lacked the technical expertise to engage in effective diplomacy. 

Prior to New START’s expiration, ACA board chair Tom Countryman joined Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey, Oregon Senator Jeff Merkley, and California Representative John Garamendi to urge the replacement of New START and a return to negotiation to prevent an US-Russia arms race.

With signals pointing to a resumption of U.S.-Iran talks, the Trump administration has another opportunity to reduce Tehran’s proliferation risk and the likelihood of the United States getting sucked into further, counterproductive military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program. Going into talks, the United States should prioritize restoring IAEA safeguards and move away from unrealistic demands on enrichment. 

Last autumn, Greg Thielmann stepped down from the board of directors of the Arms Control Association (ACA) after nearly a decade of counsel and support. Thielmann sat down in October 2025 with Lipi Shetty, ACA’s Herbert Scoville Peace Fellow, to discuss his career and his concerns regarding current U.S. nonproliferation policy vis-a-vis Iran.

The increasing availability of benchtop nucleic synthesis equipment paired with the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities raises concerns that malicious actors could clandestinely synthesize dangerous pathogens or toxins with biological-weapon potential. Current national and international regulatory mechanisms do not adequately address the rising biosecurity risks that accompany this development.

Israel's strikes on Iran, beginning on June 13, 2025, include the targeting of nuclear facilities. The United States also targeted three nuclear facilities on June 21. This post lists key nuclear facilities in Iran, the activities conducted at each site, and the status of those facilities. It will be updated as events warrant. 

An examination of recent cost estimates for space-based interceptor constellations highlights the key questions that need to be asked of the Trump administration's Golden Dome missile defense program.

The IAEA’s May 2025 evaluation of Iran's nuclear activities underscore the urgent need for a nuclear deal that brings Iran back into compliance with its legally binding safeguards obligations and limits its future proliferation risk.