July/August 2024  
By Daryl G. Kimball

The experience of the Cold War proves that nuclear arms racing produces only losers and increased risks for everyone.

Nevertheless, following more than a decade of deteriorating relations between the United States and its main nuclear rivals, dimming prospects for disarmament diplomacy, and major nuclear weapons modernization efforts, China, Russia, and the United States are now on the precipice of a dangerous era of unconstrained nuclear competition. Concern in U.S. national security circles about Chinese and Russian nuclear capabilities has grown since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine effectively shut down the U.S.-Russian nuclear risk reduction and arms control dialogue. The Kremlin has rejected the White House proposal to negotiate a new nuclear arms control framework to replace the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires on February 5, 2026.¹ China has declined U.S. offers to continue bilateral discussions on reducing nuclear risk and on nuclear postures.²

Moreover, as the U.S. intelligence community forecasts that China could amass as many as 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030, with several hundred of them deployed on a larger force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), some members of the nuclear weapons establishment, leading members of Congress, and Biden administration officials have suggested that the massive U.S. arsenal may not be sufficient to deter two “near peer” nuclear rivals.³ China is currently estimated to have some 500 nuclear weapons and 310 long-range, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.⁴

In response, proposals have been advanced to expand the U.S. nuclear modernization program to provide the United States with the capability and flexibility to deploy more strategic nuclear weapons on more delivery systems and field new types of theater-range nuclear weapons. Some experts argue that the United States should prepare to build up its deployed nuclear force at some unspecified future point while others suggest that such efforts should begin now.

An expansion of Russian and U.S. deployed nuclear forces would be unnecessary, counterproductive, and expensive for both sides. Adding more nuclear warheads to missiles, fielding more nuclear-capable bombers, or deploying nuclear-armed cruise missiles would not enhance deterrence capabilities or improve security. If one side were to break out of the New START limits, the other side could match the increase and further stimulate China’s effort to increase its strategic nuclear force so as to maintain an assured retaliatory strike capability.

The United States is estimated to have roughly 3,700 warheads in its active arsenal. This includes 1,670 thermonuclear warheads deployed on 660 powerful long-range missiles on land and at sea or available for delivery on strategic bombers. There are also another 100 tactical nuclear bombs that can be delivered on shorter-range aircraft, according to independent estimates.⁵ The use of a fraction of these weapons, many primed for launch within minutes, would lead to mass destruction on an unprecedented global scale.

Contrary to the hype, more nuclear weapons would not improve, on balance, the U.S. capability to deter nuclear attack. In fact, significant increases in the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal would undermine mutual and global security by making the existing balance of nuclear terror more unpredictable and would set into motion a counterproductive, costly action-reaction cycle of nuclear competition.

A Russian-U.S. breakout from the New START limits would constitute a reversal of a quarter century of progress to reduce the two nations’ bloated nuclear arsenals and likely encourage China to accelerate its nuclear buildup. Expanding Chinese, Russian, and U.S. nuclear forces also would represent a gross violation of the three states’ obligation under Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to engage in good faith negotiations to end the arms race and pursue disarmament. It would deliver a body blow to the international nuclear nonproliferation system. Halting spiraling nuclear tensions is in every nation’s interest.

The U.S. Modernization Program

Since the early 2010s, the United States has been pursuing an ambitious multidecade, multi-billion dollar, across-the-board effort to modernize, upgrade, and maintain its entire nuclear enterprise. This includes programs to field 400 new ICBMs called Sentinels, 12 Columbia-class strategic submarines, and 100 nuclear-armed B-21 Raider strategic bombers.

In addition, the United States is producing a new nuclear-armed, air-launched cruise missile and pursuing a new nuclear-armed, sea-based cruise missile. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is overseeing an effort to refurbish all nuclear warhead types, developing a new-design warhead called the W-93, and building two new plutonium pit production facilities that together can produce 80 units per year.⁶

Costs have risen steadily above initial projections. In 2017 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the plans President Donald Trump inherited from President Barack Obama to maintain and upgrade the arsenal over the next 30 years would cost $1.2 trillion in current dollars. By 2023 the CBO estimate had risen to more than $1.5 trillion over the next 30 years.⁷

According to the CBO, the plans of the Department of Defense and Department of Energy call for spending more than $756 billion in 2023-2032, or an average of just more than $75 billion a year. Some of these programs are more expensive, risky, and vulnerable to delay or cancellation than others. For example, the Air Force announced in January that the new Sentinel ICBM would cost 37 percent more than previously expected and take about two years longer than planned to build and deploy.⁸ The cost hike puts the Sentinel program in a “critical” breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act, a law designed to prevent major cost overruns.

The law requires that the Sentinel program be terminated unless the secretary of defense certifies in writing that the program is essential to national security, there are no alternatives that will provide acceptable capability, and the new cost estimates are reasonable. In addition, the secretary must certify that the program is a higher priority than programs whose funding will be reduced to cover the increased cost of the Sentinel program and that the management structure is sufficient to control additional cost growth.

In a June 24 letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, several congressional members who are highly skeptical of the need for and affordability of the Sentinel ICBM charged that “public statements by [department] officials have not provided confidence that this review is being conducted in the manner required by law.”⁹ They also noted that “there is still no integrated master schedule encompassing the full scope of work, anticipated timelines, and resource phasing for all government and contractor lines of effort. Unfortunately, this trend of escalating costs and unstructured schedules is likely far from over.” The skepticism was warranted. In its July 9 certification decision, the Pentagon announced that the total cost of the Sentinel missile program had ballooned to $141 billion or 81 percent above initial estimates. It is three years behind schedule.¹⁰

The delay in fielding the new ICBMs likely will increase the cost of extending the service life of the 400 existing Minuteman III ICBMs now deployed in silos in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming. As a result of delays affecting the Sentinel and Columbia-class submarine programs, Biden administration officials say that they are “seeking to extend the life of certain Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines to provide additional margin during the transition from legacy to modern capabilities across the triad.”¹¹

U.S. Expansion Proposals

Despite the immense, expensive array of existing U.S. nuclear firepower and the booming cost of the modernization program, lobbyists for defense contractors, defense industry-affiliated think tanks, and some members of Congress want to invest even more in building up the U.S. defense enterprise. In October 2023, the 12-member Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States issued a detailed report outlining options to add more capability and flexibility to the U.S. strategic deterrent to counter two near-peer nuclear adversaries.¹² Yet, crucial matters were unaddressed. The commission did not estimate the costs of its recommended options and did not evaluate how adversaries might counter moves by the United States to augment its existing nuclear force. As Adam Mount, nonresident senior fellow at the Federation of American Scientists, has argued, the commission’s report also makes no attempt to describe which categories of adversary targets must be held at risk or why these targets require more U.S. nuclear capabilities.¹³ Nevertheless, the report recommended that several “strategic nuclear force posture modifications should be pursued with urgency.” [See Box 1.]

The report also says that the “U.S. theater nuclear force posture should be urgently modified in order to…provide the president a range of militarily effective nuclear response options to deter or counter Chinese or Russian limited nuclear use in theater” and to “[a]ddress the need for U.S. theater nuclear forces deployed or based in the Asia-Pacific theater.”

Some commissioners in their individual capacities, such as Frank Miller, have argued that “deterring China and Russia simultaneously [requires] an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads” and enhancing U.S. substrategic nuclear capabilities.¹⁴ Miller proposed that the United States should seek a new arms control agreement with Russia that allows it to increase the size of its strategic and tactical nuclear force to some 3,500 nuclear warheads, roughly twice the current number.¹⁵

Key elements of the commission’s options for enhancing the current U.S. nuclear force have found their way into several legislative proposals this year. Some of these may be codified into law by year’s end, including restoring nuclear capabilities across the B-52 strategic bomber fleet, requiring that no fewer than 400 deployed ICBMs be on alert, fielding a plan for acquiring and deploying up to 450 Sentinel ICBMs, and funding development of a new nuclear-capable, sea-launched cruise missile system and the associated nuclear warhead.¹⁶

None of the congressional proposals evaluate what countermoves adversaries might adopt, nor do they provide a strategic rationale for why augmenting the U.S. arsenal is necessary to maintain the U.S. capability to deter a nuclear attack.

A ‘More Competitive’ U.S. Approach

On June 7, a senior White House official provided an update of the Biden administration’s approach to nuclear deterrence and arms control that was delivered a year earlier by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. The update, by Pranay Vaddi, the National Security Council’s senior director for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, at the Arms Control Association annual meeting was billed as a “more competitive approach.” In comparison to the strategic posture commission, however, it outlined a more sober and balanced mix of strategies to deal with the possibility of nuclear competition with China and Russia without arms control limitations. Nevertheless, the Biden administration also hinted about the need to make possible adjustments to the composition and size of the U.S. nuclear force down the road.¹⁷

Vaddi reiterated the June 2023 U.S. offer for talks “without preconditions” with Russia on a new nuclear arms control framework following the expiration of New START and for further engagement with China on nuclear risk reduction issues. He noted that President Joe Biden recently issued updated the nuclear weapons employment guidance, which “takes into account the realities of a new nuclear era.” It “reaffirms our commitment to use arms control and other tools to minimize the number of nuclear weapons needed to achieve U.S. objectives…and reiterates that the United States will continue to abide by New START limits for the duration of the treaty, so long as Russia does the same,” Vaddi said.

Although Russia in early 2023 announced plans to suspend implementation of New START, it said it would observe the limits on the number of strategic warheads that can be deployed until the treaty expires to maintain “stability in the nuclear missile area.” The United States continues to assess that Russia has not exceeded the New START limits.¹⁸

Vaddi also noted that the administration is “thinking through what a future arms control agreement with Russia after New START might look like.” Yet, with New START due to expire in fewer than 600 days and the prospects for a new, formal nuclear arms framework dim, he also warned that “[w]e must be prepared for that possibility that these constraints disappear without replacement.” [See Box 2]

“[W]e do not need to increase our nuclear forces to match or outnumber the combined total of our competitors to successfully deter them,” Vaddi said, while adding that, “absent a change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from current deployed numbers is required.” Vaddi did not explain what factors might lead Biden to determine that more nuclear weapons are necessary to deter a strategic attack from nuclear adversaries. He only hinted that “[i]t will not be a simplistic calculation that more for them requires more for us.”

Vaddi was not specific about how many years from now the Biden administration might want to consider some increase in the U.S. force size or structure beyond the current ceilings set by New START. The administration’s commitment to stay within the New START limits into 2026 and to negotiate a new framework agreement with Russia suggests the decision is unlikely to come before 2027 and could be much later depending on the trajectory of China’s strategic nuclear buildup.

Vaddi also was not specific about what new force options might be considered other than to say that the White House is focused on a “better” approach, not necessarily a “more” approach, which will require some creative solutions and potentially discrete capabilities that fill an important niche.” He noted that as the administration considers possible adjustments, it is important to “keep in mind…the implications for strategic stability, the capacity of our defense and nuclear enterprise, and competing budget priorities.” The latter points reflect the growing concern inside the executive branch about the skyrocketing costs of the nuclear modernization program, the already stretched capacity of key defense contractors to deliver, and the challenges facing the NNSA as it fulfills its mandate to execute complex warhead life-extension campaigns in the coming years.

A Reality Check

The challenge of deterring two major nuclear adversaries instead of one is far more complex than simple arithmetic. Building up the current U.S. deployed nuclear weapons arsenal is not only unnecessary, but it would be counterproductive and prohibitively expensive.

As Austin noted in remarks at Strategic Command Headquarters in December 2022, “Nuclear deterrence isn’t just a numbers game. In fact, that sort of thinking can spur a dangerous arms race.” Madelyn Creedon, chair of the strategic posture commission, also was dismissive of those who advocate for a U.S. nuclear “overmatch.” Speaking on a panel at the June 7 Arms Control Association annual meeting, she said that “when people say that ‘we have to have the same numbers as the combined total of everybody else, it makes no sense, it absolutely makes no sense.”

In response to Obama’s guidance in 2013, the Pentagon issued a nuclear weapons employment document that reported that, “[a]fter a comprehensive review of our nuclear forces, the president has determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level established” in New START.¹⁹ Such a reduction would have slashed the U.S. strategic arsenal to approximately 1,000 deployed warheads, but it was never pursued because Russia refused Obama’s proposal for talks on further mutual strategic arms cuts.

Despite Russia’s reckless behavior over the last decade and China’s more recent push to increase its own strategic nuclear retaliatory force, the scale and diversity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal still exceed what is plausibly necessary to hold a sufficient number of adversary targets at risk so as to deter an enemy nuclear attack. That is true whether there is a sudden crisis or conflict or a longer-term effort to dissuade nuclear-armed adversaries from launching a massive surprise attack.

As Steve Andreasen, former National Security Council director for defense policy and arms control, recently wrote, “Adding more nuclear weapons…will not change the nuclear fundamentals.”²⁰ Nuclear deterrence is based on the threat of retaliation in response to a nuclear attack. It is implausible that China or Russia would conclude that they could degrade U.S. nuclear capabilities sufficiently with a first strike, even in the highly unlikely scenario of a joint Chinese-Russian first strike, and avoid massive nuclear retaliation.

The U.S. strategic submarine force alone can deliver a retaliatory strike that would devastate any current or future nuclear adversary that was foolish enough to launch an attack. There are more than 1,000 nuclear warheads on 8 to 10 invulnerable U.S. ballistic missile submarines continuously at sea. Just one submarine, which normally carries 20 ballistic missiles loaded with 100 warheads, each with a yield of 90 kilotons or more, could obliterate a large country and kill many tens of millions of people in the first hours of a major nuclear exchange.

There is no evidence to suggest that China and Russia will not continue to be deterred from initiating a nuclear attack by the current U.S. deployed strategic force even if their combined nuclear forces exceed that of United States. None of the proposals for augmenting the U.S. nuclear force attempt to explain why the existing powerful arsenal would be insufficient to inflict devastating damage on an adversary’s assets or how additional U.S. strategic forces would help address any perceived “deterrence” gaps.

Nevertheless, proponents of the nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile, which would cost more than $10 billion, argue that this weapon would give the president additional and “more credible” options in the event of a regional war. The Biden administration countered in its statement of administration policy on the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act that this missile is of “marginal utility” and “would divert resources and focus from higher modernization priorities for the U.S. nuclear enterprise and infrastructure.” A year later, however, having failed to end the program, the administration said in a written reply to Arms Control Today, “We will comply with the [defense act] requirement and will look to execute in a manner that provides the most deterrence value for the least risk to the modernization program, the production enterprise, and other defense priorities.”²¹

If nuclear weapons, such as this nuclear-capable cruise missile, are used in a regional conflict involving nuclear-armed adversaries, there is no guarantee that the face-off could be limited and not escalate to all-out, global nuclear war.

Achieving or maintaining numerical nuclear parity may seem superficially necessary to deter nuclear aggression, or it may be politically expedient for members of Congress to suggest that the United States do so. In reality, given the overwhelming power of nuclear weapons, there is no strategic or deterrence logic that requires that the United States respond to a buildup of nuclear weapons by its adversaries with more nuclear weapons of its own.

As Congress and the executive branch evaluate options to address nuclear challenges posed by China and Russia in the years ahead, it would be prudent to examine in detail and more transparently the underlying assumptions that drive the current thinking about U.S. nuclear strategy and force requirements. For instance, the president should adjust which categories of targets are appropriate under which war scenarios, reconsider what amount of damage he wants to threaten to impose on adversaries under various circumstances, and evaluate how much risk and damage the United States should be willing to accept if an adversary carries out a surprise nuclear attack or decides to use nuclear weapons first in a regional conflict. Changes in these parameters could lead to overdue adjustments to the so-called military requirements for deterring adversary nuclear weapons use, which in turn could lead to more modest and prudent judgments about how many nuclear weapons are “enough” to deter nuclear attack.

In the post-Cold War era, significant changes have been made in these areas, leading to significant reductions in the size and diversity of the U.S. stockpiles. The president can and should make more changes to the underlying guidance for nuclear deterrence strategy that would reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and facilitate reductions in the nuclear force.

Before Congress or the executive branch takes further steps to increase the overall size of the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal, there should be a serious public examination of the serious risk of doing so. In the current geostrategic and political context, any decision to increase the number of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons above New START levels could accelerate an action-reaction cycle involving China and Russia, further undermining strategic stability and increasing the risk of nuclear war. For example, building up the U.S. strategic nuclear force or adding new capabilities, such as a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile, very likely would encourage China to deploy even more nuclear weapons on an even wider array of delivery systems over the coming decade. It would prompt Russia to match any increases in U.S. nuclear force deployments, all of which could negate any perceived gains to U.S. deterrence capabilities.

If the president and the Pentagon believe there are additional military targets that leaders in Beijing or Moscow value and Washington has a military reason to hold at risk, they should examine non-nuclear options that could effectively do the job. These options could include prioritizing U.S. conventional military capabilities, coordinating with the conventional forces of U.S. allies, and using U.S. space, cyber, economic, and diplomatic tools.

Congress, the executive branch, and the public need to consider the fact that increasing the number of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons or adding new types of nuclear war-fighting weapons to the arsenal also would be prohibitively expensive. The Biden administration’s $850 billion defense budget request for fiscal year 2025 already calls for $69 billion for nuclear weapons operations, sustainment, and modernization, an increase of 22 percent over the current fiscal year.²² Of the Pentagon’s major defense acquisition programs, nuclear weapons modernization accounts for about a quarter of the projected costs for 2025, amounting to $23.4 billion out of $96.1 billion. The costs of the nuclear weapons modernization program will rise even further if some or all of these proposals are pursued and will put even more severe pressure on the U.S. ability to fund other urgent defense and human security priorities.

The Priority of Sensible Nuclear Arms Control

To its credit, the strategic posture commission acknowledged the value of effective nuclear arms control, although the report underplays the importance of this tool as well as the opportunities and options for maintaining meaningful nuclear restraints. For more than 50 years, U.S. presidents of either party have recognized the value of nuclear arms control to constrain adversary capabilities that can threaten the United States, its allies, and the world. That is why the Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states that “[m]utual, verifiable nuclear arms control offers the most effective, durable and responsible path to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy and prevent their use.”

That is also why Sullivan said in June 2023 that the United States is ready to engage in nuclear arms control diplomacy with Russia and with other nuclear-armed members of the NPT, including China, without preconditions. With respect to Russia, he said that “rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework.” Russia has refused the offer so far, but government statements and behavior suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin understands that it remains in Russia’s national interest to avoid a costly, unconstrained nuclear arms race.

Considering that a new, multifaceted nuclear arms control deal with Russia will be difficult if not impossible to achieve as long as the war on Ukraine rages, the United States should seek an executive agreement, or a reciprocal unilateral arrangement, that simply commits Russia and the United States to respect New START’s central limits until a more comprehensive nuclear arms control framework agreement can be concluded. At the same time, world leaders, particularly those leading the non-nuclear and nonaligned states, should urge China, France, and the United Kingdom to freeze the size of their nuclear arsenals while pressing Russia and the United States to begin negotiations on a new nuclear arms control framework agreement before 2026.

More nuclear weapons do not make the world safer. Therefore, it is vital to pursue nuclear arms control diplomacy with China and Russia more energetically to better manage strategic competition, lower the risk of war, and reduce the dangers posed by the world’s most lethal weapons.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Rejects U.S. Proposal to Reopen Arms Control Dialogue,” The Wall Street Journal, January 18, 2024; The White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for the Arms Control Association (ACA) Annual Forum,” June 2, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/02/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-for-the-arms-control-association-aca-annual  
-forum/.

2. Xiaodon Liang and Shizuka Kuramitsu, “China Silent on U.S. Risk Reduction Proposals,” Arms Control Today, June 2024.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2023: Annual Report to Congress,” n.d., https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023  
-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

4. Hans M. Kristensen et al., “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 80, No. 1 (2024): 49-72.

5. Hans M. Kristensen et al., “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 80, No. 3 (2024): 182-208.

6. Sarah Scoles, “Behind the Scenes at a U.S. Factory Building New Nuclear Bombs,” Scientific American, Vol. 329, No. 5 (December 2023): 39.

7. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2023 to 2032,” July 2023, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-07/59054-nuclear-forces.pdf.

8. Libby Flatoff, “Sentinel ICBM Exceeds Projected Cost by 37 Percent,” Arms Control Today, March 2024.

9. Office of Representative John Garamendi, “Co-Chairs of Congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group Lead Letter to U.S. Secretary of Defense Regarding Concerns About Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program,” June 24, 2024, https://garamendi.house.gov/media/press-releases/co-chairs -congressional-nuclear-weapons-and-arms-control-working-group-lead.

10. U.S. Department of Defense, "Results of Sentinel Nunn-McCurdy Review," Press Release, July 9, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3829985/department-of-defense-announces-results-of-sentinel-nunn-mccurdy-review/.

11. Pranay Vaddi, “Adapting the U.S. Approach to Arms Control and Nonproliferation to a New Era,” Remarks before the Arms Control Association, June 7, 2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/2024AnnualMeeting/Pranay  
-Vaddi-remarks (hereafter Vaddi remarks).

12. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, “America’s Strategic Posture,” October 2023, https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/a/am/americas-strategic-posture/strategic-posture-commission-report.ashx.

13. Adam Mount, “A Not-So-Strategic Posture Commission,” Arms Control Today, November 2023.

14. Heather Williams et al., “Project Atom 2023: A Competitive Strategies Approach for U.S. Nuclear Posture Through 2035,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2023, pp. 38-48, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-09/230929_Williams_ProjectAtom_2023.pdf?VersionId=E4fE84FiQPvhIupSf4bZuZVV0v0tHvt6.

15. Frank Miller, “As the world changes, so should America’s nuclear strategy,” The Economist, April 4, 2024, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2024/04/04/as-the-world-changes-so-should-americas  
-nuclear-strategy-says-frank-miller

16. Senate Armed Services Committee, “SASC Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025,” June 14, 2024, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/sasc-completes-markup-of-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2025.

17. Vaddi remarks.

18. U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty,” n.d., https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/2023-New-START-Treaty-Implementation-Report.pdf (containing 2023 information).

19. U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States,” n.d., https://uploads.fas.org/2013/06/NukeEmploymentGuidance_DODbrief061213.pdf.

20. Steve Andreasen, “The Great Powers Are Itching for Another Nuclear Arms Race. Who Will Stop Them?” Los Angeles Times, June 21, 2024.

21. Xiadon Liang, “U.S. Starts Work on Sea-Launched Missile,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2024.

22. Xiaodon Liang, “U.S. Nuclear Costs, Projections Continue to Rise,” Arms Control Today, April 2024.

July/August 2024
By Nickolas Roth

Multilateral conferences often feel like opaque affairs, distant and disconnected from reality, but the 2024 International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) in May could not have come at a more critical moment. Its goal, “Shaping the Future,” and its potential for good could not have been more relevant.

As wars rage in two regions that are home to nuclear weapons, dozens of countries consider acquiring or expanding nuclear power, and nuclear security conditions deteriorate in countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials, the week-long event brought together government ministers and other officials from around the world. Convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), participants aimed to strengthen the norms, legal mechanisms, and institutions designed to reduce the possibility that a terrorist would weaponize stolen nuclear material or commit an act of sabotage leading to widespread radiological release.

Since the last conference in 2020, world leaders have grappled with a global pandemic, wars in Europe and the Middle East, and the first military occupation of an operational civilian nuclear facility by Russia in Ukraine. The conference closed with governments announcing measures strengthening nuclear security implementation, a co-chairs statement endorsed by most participants emphasizing important new nuclear security concepts, and robust information exchange about how nuclear security is being implemented around the world.

As with many other international forums, this year’s event was shaken by shifting geopolitical currents as the tension between national interests and collective nuclear security played out in real time. For the first time since the IAEA started holding these conferences a little more than a decade ago, participating governments failed to produce a consensus statement supporting efforts to sustain and strengthen nuclear security.¹

The event, held in Vienna, still enabled experts from many different countries to discuss technical details, and governments expressed support for nuclear security. Nevertheless, the absence of a consensus statement indicates a dangerous level of complacency toward nuclear terrorism risks that urgently need to be addressed.

Conference Origins

To understand how the conference played out, it is useful to understand the history of these events. The conference is an extension of the nuclear security summit process that occurred from 2010 to 2016. Early in that process, participants concluded that the IAEA would be the focal point for strengthening nuclear security worldwide. It was a controversial idea at the time because some member states perceived of the agency as having a more limited mandate.

The IAEA convened the first security conference ministerial under the ICONS format in 2013 at a high point for international nuclear security engagement. The conference drew representatives from 125 countries, including 34 ministers, and produced a consensus declaration that reinforced international support for nuclear security, urging states to commit to effective nuclear security, support the IAEA’s role to strengthen the global nuclear safety and security framework, and join relevant treaties.² Due to political dynamics within the IAEA, however, the declaration did not include any specific commitments or mention complementary efforts by other international organizations or groups. This highlighted the limitations of the IAEA consensus approach, compared to the invitation-only nuclear security summits, which led to hundreds of specific national and joint actions on nuclear security.³

By the end of 2016, after the final nuclear security summit was held and the IAEA was preparing another conference under the ICONS format, the international environment had become significantly more challenging. With the notable exception of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which significantly limited Iran’s stocks of nuclear material and created new opportunities for cooperation, attention to nuclear security had peaked several years earlier. Nuclear security cooperation between Russia and the United States was collapsing. Countries were making fewer commitments to strengthen nuclear security.

Although the 2016 conference took place with 47 ministers in attendance and countries pledged to consolidate or eliminate their weapons-usable nuclear material and tighten security, it closed without an answer to a pressing question: Could the ICONS format adequately succeed the nuclear security summits as a forum for building confidence in nuclear security implementation, supporting international institutions and legal frameworks, encouraging action, and drawing attention to nuclear security?

That question lingered for four years until the IAEA held its third ICONS ministerial and it became increasingly clear that many commitments to encourage nuclear security leadership at a national level were not panning out. The nuclear security contact group that grew out of a nuclear security summit joint statement on sustaining action to strengthen global nuclear security was floundering as it searched for new leadership.⁴ India’s pledge to host a 2018 summit on countering weapons of mass destruction terrorism was unfulfilled.⁵ Many action plans developed by international institutions to carry on the nuclear security summit legacy were incomplete.⁶

Still, the 2020 conference, which hosted a record 53 ministers, continued to build on the previous two conferences. Although the event was considered successful, the ICONS format did not carry the political gravitas of the summits and did not draw the same level of commitment from governments. Based on the Nuclear Security Index, which has benchmarked nuclear security progress since 2012, political attention to nuclear security had waned.⁷

Within weeks of the close of the 2020 conference, the world changed drastically. The COVID-19 pandemic upended nuclear security implementation and regulation and limited travel and in-person meetings, bringing much of the international nuclear security cooperation to a halt. The IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) nuclear security peer reviews, which are crucial for enhancing nuclear security practices and providing reassurance to the international community, were suspended. By 2023, half of the countries with weapons-usable nuclear material had regressed in implementing measures to strengthen international confidence in their nuclear security arrangements. Significant gaps in nuclear security implementation went unaddressed.⁸

Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its assault and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant heightened the specter of widespread radiological release throughout Europe, exacerbated tensions among governments, and caused many to fundamentally rethink the nature of nuclear security. Vienna was not immune to the fraught international political landscape, as diplomats prepared for ICONS 2024.

2024 Conference

At first glance, the 2024 conference looked much like the IAEA nuclear security conferences that came before it. Of the 100 governmental statements delivered on nuclear security, about two-thirds came from Asian or European countries, roughly the same as in 2020. However, for the first time in at least a decade, the United States notably did not send a cabinet-level official to the conference. Unofficially, attendance was reported to be comparable to previous conferences. Plenary and technical sessions were relevant and compelling and covered the most pressing topics of the day.

On closer inspection, however, the discourse and denouement were very different from prior conferences. The tone of delivered remarks was markedly more subdued, reflecting not only the tumultuous preceding four years but also current international tensions and the anticipation of impending challenges. As IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi remarked, “Many of us could not have imagined the momentous change we would experience between then and today, change that would affect billions of people, international peace and security, and nuclear security.”⁹

The themes emerging from the national statements emphasized these changes. Governments took note of the grave dangers posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its occupation of the Zaporizhzhia plant, the challenges of COVID-19, and the benefits and risks to the rapid development of technologies such as artificial intelligence, small modular reactors, and uncrewed systems.¹⁰ The emphasis on emerging technologies was particularly striking because the nuclear security community sometimes can be slow to respond to new and evolving risks.

In addition to these thematic shifts, what made ICONS 2024 distinct was that participating countries failed to achieve a consensus ministerial declaration. According to diplomats involved in the negotiations, consensus became impossible when the Iranian government objected to language that included promoting gender diversity. This type of language is relatively new to consensus nuclear security statements, appearing first at ICONS 2020. Although the failure to reach consensus could be viewed as a weakening of international unity on nuclear security, the good news was that all countries but Iran were prepared to support the language.

In place of the ministerial declaration, conference co-presidents Australia and Kazakhstan issued a statement that countries could choose to support.¹¹ Several provisions in the document represented a step forward for nuclear security. Previous ministerial declarations emphasized the threat of attacks by nonstate actors. The co-presidents’ statement, however, highlights the vulnerability of nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes, stressing for the first time that any attacks or threats against them could compromise nuclear security. It refers to past IAEA resolutions endorsing prohibitions on armed attacks or threats against nuclear installations. The statement also recognizes for the first time the need to ensure resilience in nuclear security regimes and emergency preparedness in extraordinary circumstances, noting Grossi’s “seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict” developed in response to Russia’s occupation of Zaporizhzhia.

Finally, the statement promotes gender diversity, equity, and inclusion. Ministers who endorsed the co-presidents’ statement committed to encouraging equitable geographical distribution and gender equality within IAEA nuclear security activities and urged member states to establish inclusive workforces in their national nuclear security regimes, ensuring equal access to education and training.

Addressing broader diplomatic concerns, the statement answered one of the major questions in the run-up to the conference: Would participants chart a path forward for multilateral nuclear security engagement? The answer was yes. The co-presidents’ statement supports a second review conference for the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM), the foundational treaty supporting nuclear security worldwide, and endorses holding another nuclear security conference in 2028, thus creating new, high-level opportunities for countries to make nuclear security commitments.

The co-presidents’ statement could have been stronger in several key areas. As with the previous ministerial, the co-presidents’ statement only focuses on reducing highly enriched uranium (HEU), reflecting long-standing political sensitivities about plutonium risks. Given the growth in plutonium stocks, however, minimizing all weapons-useable nuclear materials should be receiving greater attention.¹² At least the United States committed to “avoiding the production, use, and accumulation of weapons-usable nuclear material and the use of these materials in new nuclear fuels.” It was further disappointing that, because consensus already had been broken by Iran, the co-presidents’ language does not go further in recognizing diversity as a fundamental element in strengthening nuclear security implementation, a concept that has gained traction in recent years.¹³

Also regrettable is the fact that individual countries signed up for only a handful of multilateral initiatives and that the political commitments within new initiatives were not stronger. By comparison, in 2016, more than two dozen countries, including more than half the countries with weapons-usable nuclear material, endorsed a commitment to mitigate insider threats, now formalized as IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) 908.¹⁴ The two original co-authors of that commitment, Belgium and the United States, announced a revision of that circular this year. This revision, just like the original, however, does not commit countries to take any specific measures to protect against insider threats, even those recommended by the IAEA.

Still, countries did announce meaningful progress in their national statements. For instance, Poland, aiming to build new nuclear power plants, will be updating its design basis threat assessment, which serves as the foundation for designing and testing nuclear security systems. Kazakhstan reiterated its commitment to converting its HEU fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) and reported that it had made further progress by successfully converting one of its research reactors to use LEU, which is less susceptible to proliferation. Japan announced it had “significantly enhanced” its regulatory requirements for computer security at nuclear facilities in 2022 and would host an IPPAS mission in 2024. Unfortunately, it is the only country with weapons-useable nuclear material scheduled to do so. The United States announced that it had hosted an IPPAS mission and urged other countries to follow its lead.

In addition to the tangible outcomes, the conference aimed to foster a stronger nuclear security community by providing a platform for governments to discuss their work with the IAEA and for the IAEA to promote its assistance, follow up on existing plans, or develop new initiatives. The conference facilitated informal collaboration among many countries from different regions, especially during the technical sessions. For the first time, it featured a “nuclear security delegation for the future” in which 10 future leaders participated in programming to help them gain experience in leadership, diplomacy, and international nuclear security.

Despite such progress, these conferences are not creating the sense of urgency necessary to inspire widespread meaningful action to reduce nuclear security risks. With fewer countries making significant commitments, the gatherings do not carry the same weight as the nuclear security summits. Yet, as the only inclusive forum focused on advancing a wide range of nuclear security issues available for gathering high-level government officials, each conference creates an opportunity for progress. For that reason alone, it remains indispensable.

Pathway to Progress

The 2024 conference was a reflection of and an inflection point for nuclear security efforts worldwide. It allowed countries to discuss not only how nuclear security has evolved but also the direction it should take in the future. Unfortunately, another nuclear security conference or an A/CPPNM review conference that might create high-level, multilateral platforms for nuclear security leadership is likely years away. That means the future of nuclear security is uncertain at a dangerous moment. Given the geopolitical tensions making multilateral cooperation difficult and the rapidly evolving threats from state and nonstate actors, there is a serious risk that the norms, institutions, and legal frameworks that underpin nuclear security worldwide will continue to regress.¹⁵

Despite these challenges, the 2024 conference illuminated crucial opportunities and myriad ways that governments can help avert further decline. First on this list is promoting high-level nuclear security dialogue. 
Now that governments have embraced the idea of future high-level meetings to promote nuclear security, the next stage is to delineate the details. To allow time for preparations, the IAEA should announce a date for a review of the 
A/CPPNM during its General Conference later this year. An A/CPPNM review conference would provide an opportunity for governments to focus on strengthening the legal underpinnings of nuclear security worldwide. Realistically, given the requisite preparation period, the earliest feasible time frame for this review would be in 2027. The IAEA also should announce a date for the next nuclear security conference as soon as is practicable.

International leaders also should focus on revitalizing a culture of commitment. The nuclear security conference process offers governments an opportunity to make new commitments to strengthen domestic nuclear security and the institutions and laws that support nuclear security internationally. Although this year’s event saw some progress on this front, there is still considerable untapped potential. For instance, at the 2014 nuclear security summit, 35 countries endorsed an initiative to strengthen nuclear security implementation, now formalized as INFCIRC/869. This initiative involves pledges to adhere to IAEA security recommendations and undergo regular reviews of countries’ nuclear security practices. Unfortunately, many commitments made a decade ago, such as this one, have faded. If governments cannot reaffirm their dedication to these initiatives, they should establish new multilateral political commitments to enhance nuclear security. For example, INFCIRC/869 could be updated and promoted just like INFCIRC/908.

States need to reconsider the need for conference consensus documents as a barometer of success. Although such an outcome is commendable, this year’s conference still achieved quite a lot by producing an ambitious and forward-leaning statement that aligned with its theme of “shaping the future.” Rather than simply releasing a conference statement that failed to gain consensus, the co-presidents issued their own, more progressive statement supported by most participating countries. This allowed the co-presidents to include elements that would never have been included in a consensus document. If achieving a more ambitious document requires sacrificing total consensus, it may be a worthwhile trade-off. That was evidently the calculation made by the conference co-presidents and is an instructive lesson for future summits.

Nuclear security implementation should be strengthened. The ICONS process has been successful in highlighting the progress that countries have made in bolstering nuclear security and the remaining implementation gaps. In the future, there will be an opportunity to address these gaps as the IAEA updates its 2011 Nuclear Security Recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.  These recommendations serve as the foundation for responsible nuclear security practices worldwide. In the 13 years since publication, there have been notable advances in nuclear security regulations, best practices, and international norms. Many countries also have made new political and legal nuclear security commitments. Yet, new global threats have emerged from uncrewed vehicles, attacks on digital systems, and domestic terrorists posing fresh challenges to physical protection systems.

New recommendations for nuclear security implementation should encompass key topics at the conference such as peer review mechanisms, confidence-building measures, continuous improvement strategies, protection against all plausible threats, mitigation of insider threats, performance evaluation, crisis management, fostering a strong security culture, and the consolidation and reduction of stockpiles of weapons-usable material. Although some of these topics already are addressed in IAEA documents, there is room for improvement.¹⁶

Much more is required to bolster nuclear security resilience, which generally refers to a system’s ability to bounce back from internal or external shocks. This topic has gained more attention in recent years because of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and because of the ongoing crisis at the Zaporizhzhia plant and threats to other Ukrainian nuclear facilities. Reference to this goal in the co-presidents’ statement signals a groundswell of interest in addressing the security risks to nuclear facilities during crises. In the future, it will be important for nuclear security systems to be resilient to rapidly evolving state and nonstate threats and to risks posed by naturally occurring events such as wildfires, storms, and droughts, especially if reliance on nuclear energy is to grow.

The IAEA can play a central role in responding to future crises by coordinating the shipment of equipment to help nuclear facilities weather prolonged disasters, sharing information, and offering technical support. It also can help develop nuclear security guidance for crises that require a whole-of-government response, not just at the facility or regulator level. Member states can further support Grossi’s “seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety” by developing a code of conduct based on them.¹⁷

In his opening remarks at the conference, Grossi emphasized that nuclear security is not just a commitment to the international community or other nations but a responsibility to all people. The national responsibility to protect nuclear facilities is a fundamental tenet of nuclear security.¹⁸ Governments should openly acknowledge their responsibility to improve nuclear security and recognize their duty to neighboring states, the international community, and their own societies.

Continuous improvement involves allocating adequate political and financial resources to nuclear security and maintaining high-level political attention. It also means adhering to international guidance and best practices and providing assurances to stakeholders.¹⁹ Strengthening accountability represents a necessary evolution from viewing nuclear security solely as a domestic issue to understanding it as a matter of international importance, where actions taken by one nation can have implications for the rest of the world.

Governments can begin to strengthen an accountability norm by acknowledging in their national statements at multilateral gatherings that nuclear security decisions made at the national level can have an international impact. These decisions could include, for example, failing to adhere to international recommendations, providing insufficient assurances about the effectiveness of implementation, or taking actions that undermine another country’s nuclear security. Some of this transition began at the conference, but governments will need to build on it moving forward.

Attended by more than 100 countries from five continents, the conference was an important platform for strengthening the international nuclear security community and broadening its scope. By incorporating diverse perspectives, nuclear security conferences are more likely to tackle a comprehensive range of nuclear security concerns, fostering new ideas to improve institutions, legal frameworks, and practices. Embracing diversity within these forums enhances the conversation and the effectiveness and resiliency of nuclear security efforts. To signal broad, high-level support for strengthening nuclear security, governments should send ministerial-level delegations to future conferences and other major multilateral meetings that are gender, socioeconomically, and culturally diverse.

Despite the conference emphasis on diversity, equity, and inclusion, more work is needed to encourage widespread participation in high-level nuclear security events. For example, only 16 of 54 African countries made statements at the conference. The next few years provide an opportunity to facilitate regional nuclear security dialogues that could lead to stronger nuclear security and greater participation in broader high-level dialogues, especially among the Global South, where states have made great strides recently in nuclear security.²⁰

The 2024 conference marked an opportunity to recalibrate the trajectory of global efforts to strengthen nuclear security. As governments and international organizations chart the course forward, it is imperative that they seize the opportunities highlighted in Vienna to collectively advance the mission of reducing nuclear terrorism risks.

ENDNOTES

1. The first International Conference on Nuclear Security took place in 2005 without a dedicated ministerial component. See International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global Directions for the Future,” n.d., https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/meetings/Announcements.asp?ConfID=136.

2. IAEA, “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions,” n.d., 
https://www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/50809/international-conference-on-nuclear-security-commitments-and-actionsz (taking place December 2016).

3. The Arms Control Association identified “935 distinct commitments to strengthen and improve nuclear security.” Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Kelsey Davenport, and Erin Connolly, “The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010-2016,” Arms Control Association, July 2018, exec. summ., https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/NSS_Report2018_final.pdf.

4. Nuclear Security Contact Group, “Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security,” April 5, 2016, https://www.nscontactgroup.org/joint-statement.php.

5. U.S. Embassy and Consulates in India, “Joint Statement: The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century,” June 7, 2016, https://in.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-united-states-india-enduring-global-partners-21st-century-june-7-2016/.

6. N. Roth and M. Bunn, “Assessing Progress on Nuclear Security Action Plans,” n.d., https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/IAEA-CN-278-605.pdf (paper presented at the International Atomic Energy Agency International Conference on Nuclear Security, February 2020).

7. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “NTI Nuclear Security Index: Losing Focus in a Disordered World,” July 2020, https://media.nti.org/documents/2020_NTI-Index_Report_Final.pdf.

8. NTI and EIU, “NTI Nuclear Security Index: Falling Short in a Dangerous World,” July 2023, https://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/2023_NTI-Index_Report.pdf.

9. IAEA, “Statement by IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi on the Occasion of the International Conference on Nuclear Security 2024,” May 20, 2024, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/statement-by-iaea-director-general-rafael-mariano-grossi-on-the-occasion-of-the-international-conference-on-nuclear-security-2024.

10. IAEA, “Nuclear Security Through the Eyes of the Co-Presidents of ICONS 2024,” May 15, 2024, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/nuclear-security-through-the-eyes-of-the-co-presidents-of-icons-2024; Insun Kang, Statement at the International Conference on Nuclear Security, 
May 20, 2024, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/05/cn-321_rok.pdf.

11. “Statement by the Co-Presidents of the International Conference on Nuclear Security 2024: Shaping the Future,” n.d., https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/05/joint_statement_of_the_co-presidents_icons_2024.pdf.

12. Frank N. von Hippel and Masafumi Takubo, “Banning Plutonium Separation,” International Panel on Fissile Materials Research Report, No. 20 (July 2022), https://fissilematerials.org/library/rr20.pdf.

13. Sneha Nair, “Converging Goals: Examining the Intersection Between Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion and Nuclear Security Implementation,” n.d., https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GD-Paper_Converging-Goals-Examining-the-Intersection-Between-Diversity-Equity-and-Inclusion-and-Nuclear-Security-Implementation.pdf.

14. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats,” 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2017/infcirc908.pdf.

15. NTI and EIU, “NTI Nuclear Security Index: Falling Short in a Dangerous World.”

16. Matthew Bunn et al., “IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations (INFCIRC/225): The Next Generation,” n.d., https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/IAEA-225-Recommendations.pdf.

17. For more information, see Nickolas Roth, Ross Matzkin-Bridger, and Jessica Bufford, “Nuclear Facilities in Times of Crisis,” NTI, May 2024, https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/NTI_Paper_FITOC_FINAL_060724.pdf.

18. For example, the IAEA’s nuclear security recommendations state, “The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State rests entirely with that State.” See IAEA, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5),” Vienna, 2011, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD
/Publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf.

19. For more, see Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey, “Revitalizing Nuclear Security in an Era of Uncertainty,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/RevitalizingNuclearSecurity_Mar19.pdf.

20. NTI, “Building an Inclusive Narrative About the Importance of Nuclear Security,” n.d., https://www.ntiindex.org/recommendation/build-an-inclusive-narrative-about-the-importance-of-nuclear-security/ (accessed June 21, 2024).

July/August 2024
By Alison Cartier, Juline Horan, and Molly Mullin

As a general matter, most Americans do not worry much these days about the threat of a nuclear weapons strike on the U.S. homeland. Gone are the Cold War days of duck-and-cover drills in schools, the need to know the location of the nearest fallout shelter, and the lurking dread of possible nuclear annihilation.

Yet with roughly 12,000 nuclear warheads still in existence and heightened geopolitical tensions fueled by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the threat of nuclear catastrophe today arguably is more immediate than at any time since the nuclear age began.¹ That was the message that the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of American Scientists signaled when it set its “Doomsday Clock” at 90 seconds to midnight in January 2023 and repeated that judgment this year.²

It is critical that younger generations understand the threat presented by these weapons, most of which are possessed by Russia and the United States. According to survey research that we did for a class at the Catholic University of America, however, nuclear weapons education is virtually missing from schools across the country.³ Too many young people are unaware of the nuclear threats voiced by Russian President Vladimir Putin concerning the war in Ukraine and of the history of nuclear weapons.⁴ These armaments will continue to affect the future in fundamental ways. It is imperative to understand how young people perceive this issue today and to prepare them to lead in constraining, if not eliminating, these nuclear arsenals.

Class Research Project

As part of a research project for a foreign policy class designed to understand college students’ knowledge about nuclear weapons, we surveyed more than 100 students attending nearby colleges and universities in Washington, D.C. Through our professor, we contacted other professors who distributed the survey to their students. We also distributed it among our peers at Catholic University.

The data showed that many college students lack a comprehensive and standardized knowledge of nuclear weapons. When students were asked, “When was the last time nuclear weapons were used in a war?” 78 percent of respondents answered correctly that it was World War II. Even so, 12 percent believed the answer was the Iraq war. In addition, students were asked, “What piece of legislation limits the spread of nuclear weapons?” To this question, nearly 60 percent of respondents answered correctly, the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Even so, a not insignificant 27 percent of respondents said that no legislation placed limitations on the size of nuclear arsenals.

To assess the depth of knowledge more thoroughly, a handful of the 100 students were also interviewed individually. When asked what background knowledge, if any, the interviewees had on nuclear weapons, answers ranged from knowing little to knowing an extensive amount. Maria, a senior economics major from Minnesota at Catholic University who did not want her last name used, described having “some general” background. “I know about the history of them, such as when they’ve been used during war. I know about some of the destruction of nuclear weapons and the attempts to disarm countries,” she said. At the other end of the spectrum, Mike Graves, a senior history major from Rhode Island also at Catholic University, confessed to having “very little knowledge” of nuclear weapons. “I understand the creation of them and the usage during World War II, but other than that, I don’t know much,” he said.

The stark difference between these answers seems to have its origins in the way that the subject of nuclear weapons is taught or not taught in primary and secondary schools across the country. Our research, although limited, suggests that teaching is neither extensive nor standardized. The interviewees were asked when in school they remembered learning about nuclear weapons, with answers including 7th grade, 10th grade, AP U.S. and European history courses, and college.

Maevis Fahey, a junior politics and philosophy major at Catholic University, said that she first heard about nuclear weapons in middle school, but she specifically remembers “learning about them in more detail in high school Model UN when we discussed nuclear proliferation.” Alternatively, Alex Harvey, a senior politics and history major at Catholic University, said that he did not encounter in depth information about nuclear weapons until college when he took a course on U.S. intelligence that highlighted developments such as the Cuban missile crisis, the Strategic Defense Initiative missile defense program, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaties. The contrast in answers to this question again highlights the lack of a substantial, comprehensive education on these issues.

In our interviews, many students expressed curiosity about the fact that Russia and the United States are no longer engaged in active nuclear negotiations, which could mean that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the last remaining nuclear agreement between the two nuclear-armed states, could expire in 2026. Graves, in particular, expressed surprise that there was no conversation in the classroom during his high school and college experience about how “nuclear weapons have vastly changed conflicts in the 21st century.”

Curiousity About Nuclear Arms

Many interviewees said they have heard about nuclear weapons-related issues on the news or social media and are interested in learning more about them and about the problem of nuclear proliferation. Harvey said that he is especially interested in learning more about nuclear weapons in view of a potential conflict between China, which has nuclear weapons, and Taiwan, which does not. A recent survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs underscores this interest, reporting that 62 percent of respondents who identified as being part of Generation Z wanted to learn more about nuclear weapons.⁵

Yet, some other students said they are afraid to learn about nuclear weapons. As one student put it, “Being oblivious is the best way to protect myself from overthinking the situation.” Knowledge is power, however; given the current geopolitical climate, a lack of knowledge can be dangerous.

The release last year of the blockbuster movie Oppenheimer has made it more difficult for even apathetic students to be oblivious to the nuclear weapons issue, given how the film reignited public discussion on the topic and became a fixture of pop culture. For many young moviegoers, this was their introduction, outside the classroom, to the legacy of U.S. nuclear weapons and their destructive power. When Harvey saw the film, he “did not possess a lot of background information on this particular subject.” Although he first learned about nuclear weapons in a high school history class, “[t]he film helped me better understand the complexity of this topic and made me realize the inevitability of nuclear weapons development,” he said. Another student, Julia Pandolfi, a senior history major at Catholic University, felt the film was lacking because it “concentrated more on Oppenheimer as a person and his ties to communism than the nuclear weapon itself.”

With the release of Oppenheimer, many young people took to social media to share their thoughts and opinions about the film. Some created TikTok videos while others posted on Instagram, Facebook, or X (formerly Twitter), forcing many of their peers to confront the morality of the United States building the world’s most lethal weapon and the environmental impacts of testing nuclear bombs in a way that they perhaps would not have done before. Some social media posts discussed how testing atomic bombs in New Mexico affected those living in the area and the lasting impacts that the testing continues to have.

Social media has provided a platform for many students to engage cursorily with world events. Graves said he would “first discover information on social media and follow up with news sources to assess factual information.” The same was true for almost all students interviewed. Although movies, pop culture, and social media can spark interest in major world events and national security policy, it is difficult to say whether they will have any lasting meaningful effects on individuals’ awareness and understanding of nuclear weapons.

The base for such knowledge must be laid earlier, in a more deliberate way, in the classroom. Local school systems, colleges, and universities must educate today’s students about nuclear weapons because they will be the future voters, choosing elected officials who will have control over the nuclear arsenal and, later, will be the decision-makers themselves.

As one nuclear expert emphasized in an interview, “The problem is that people think [nuclear weapons have] gone away, are out of sight and out of mind,” but this is not the case. China, North Korea, Russia, and the United States are all modernizing or expanding their nuclear arsenals. Young people need to learn about that and start using their political clout to shape a more secure future.

ENDNOTES

1. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, July 7, 2017, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.

2. John Mecklin, ed., “A Moment of Historic Danger: It Is Still 90 Seconds to Midnight,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 23, 2024, https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/.

3. “Nuclear Disarmament” (presentation, Washington, DC), November 8, 2023 (copy on file with authors).

4. Han Kristensen et al., “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, March 31, 2023, https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.

5. “What Young Americans Think About Nuclear Weapons,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs. July 27, 2023, https://globalaffairs.org/events/what-young-americans-think-about-nuclear-weapons.

July/August 2024

Nuclear Decisions: Changing the Course of Nuclear Weapons Programs

By Lisa Langdon Koch
Oxford University Press
2023

In Nuclear Decisions, Lisa Langdon Koch centers a fact that is widely known but seldom emphasized in theorizing about nuclear proliferation: the pathway from initial choices about nuclear weapons to successful deployment can be halting and full of secondary decision-points. Koch’s work attempts to explain this meandering by focusing the reader’s attention on the internal organizational factors that can accelerate or reverse nuclear programs, highlighting the autonomy of nuclear agencies and the degree of military involvement in decision-making. Although the author gives equal credit to changes in the permissiveness of external nonproliferation regimes, her case studies are most valuable in tracing the interplay of bureaucratic and individual preferences as they are mediated by the political structure of each proliferating state. Koch provides periodic examples of how her theoretical approach produces a more satisfactory explanation for proliferation patterns than security-focused accounts. The choice of including lesser-known cases of states that have eschewed nuclear weapons programs, such as Sweden and South Korea, makes this book easily recommendable as an introduction to historical proliferation cases, even to a reader uninterested in the theoretical goals of the project.—XIAODON LIANG

 

Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Existential Risks of Nuclear War and Deterrence Through a Legal Lens

By Charles J. Moxley
Hamilton Books
2024

Charles J. Moxley pulls no punches in the revised second edition of his book Nuclear Weapons and International Law. He makes the legal case that “the threat and use of nuclear weapons, including low-yield nuclear weapons, are unlawful in all or virtually all circumstances in which the United States might consider using such weapons.” His book has three forewords, including one by former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, highlighting the importance that other experts assign to the text. The book looks at how nuclear weapons intersect with the law, public health, human rights, and U.S. policy. He analyzes nuclear deterrence; legal probabilities relating to the potential use of nuclear weapons, recklessness, and foreseeability; and principles and laws applied throughout history. Moxley also explores the risk factors of a nuclear weapons regime, addressing not only the weapons themselves but also delivery vehicles, radiation effects, risks to human life, nuclear winter risks, and the fostering of an arms race.  Moxley ends on a powerful note, stating that nuclear-weapon states are “substantially failing” their Article VI commitments under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by not negotiating disarmament agreements in good faith.—LIBBY FLATOFF

July/August 2024
 

The Long, Sad History of Weapons in Space

Weapons in Space: Technology, Politics, and the Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative
By Aaron Bateman
The MIT Press
2024

Reviewed by Joe Cirincione

This year, Congress will authorize $30 billion for missile defense programs with little or no oversight. It will be no different from last year or the year before that. Whether Democrats or Republicans are in control, neither party shows much interest in knowing what became of the more than $415 billion that Congress has authorized for these programs since President Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly called “Star Wars,” in 1983.¹

Most of these funds have been spent on failed national missile defense, that is, weapons designed to shoot down an adversary’s long-range, nuclear-armed missiles that could cross the oceans to attack the continental United States. Other funds devoted to intercepting short-range missiles that fly a few hundred miles eventually produced fairly valuable weapons, as the recent Russian attacks on Ukraine and Iranian attacks on Israel have demonstrated.

That is chiefly because short-range missiles are slow, fat, and hot and travel primarily in the atmosphere, preventing their deployment of effective decoys. Reliably intercepting long-range missile warheads that are fast, small, and cold as they speed through outer space has proved impossible, particularly if the adversary deploys countermeasures, such as decoys, chaff, and jammers.²

U.S. policymakers have known this for decades. Scores of independent technical studies informed anyone who cared to read them that national missile defense would not work.³ Republicans largely did not care. The SDI program became the tip of their ideological spear aimed at killing arms control agreements in favor of strategically overwhelming adversaries with superior weaponry and massive budgets.

For Democrats, it was largely a game of blunting political attacks by continuing to fund the program so as not to look weak on national security. Democratic efforts in Congress helped contain the missile defense program and, for a while, prevented hard-line Republicans from killing arms control.⁴ Yet, Democratic presidents never restructured Reagan’s unrealistic missile defense vision into a reasonable research program or disbanded what became a permanent pro-missile defense lobby within the Department of Defense known today as the Missile Defense Agency.

Those who favor national missile defense programs despite the scientific evidence are part of the long history of forces within the military and defense establishments who have championed the weaponization of space. George Washington University professor Aaron Bateman details the policy disputes in his new book, Weapons in Space: The Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

His history is particularly useful in understanding the debates of the 1960s that, over the objections of hard-liners in the Air Force and the Pentagon, yielded the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 banning nuclear weapons in space. That victory endured for almost 60 years, but it may now evaporate. Russia again appears to be developing precisely this capability. The treaty may soon become the most recent of the giant arms control treaties to fall to an ideological axe.

Bateman shows how the desire to deploy new or imagined technologies in space became a key motivation for those who favored using military superiority to defeat the Soviet Union, rather than negotiated agreements to contain and prevent a wider conflict. For decades, some strategists have seen space as just the newest battleground, a “high frontier” that the United States must dominate. Treaties that limited the military’s ability to deploy these weapons were, in this view, signs of weakness and retreat.

Thus, the drive to develop and deploy anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons in the 1960s and 1970s morphed into proposals to deploy ASAT and anti-missile battle stations in space in the 1980s. President Jimmy Carter’s efforts to get an ASAT weapons ban were opposed by those who claimed that the United States was losing a fierce “space race.” Batemen writes, “George Keegan, the recently retired former head of U.S. Air Force intelligence, stirred anxieties about ‘a fast-emerging beam weapon ‘gap’ with the Soviet Union [in the lead].’ He claimed that Soviet laser weapons would be able to ‘completely neutralize the American strategic deterrent.’”

Such fantasies not only derailed Carter’s efforts, but they became the main argument for those who dreamed of U.S. space weapons that could defeat Soviet missiles and satellites. These included the U.S. Committee on the Present Danger, which warned of a “window of vulnerability” wherein the Soviets could wipe out all U.S. nuclear forces in a surprise first strike, and Senator Malcom Wallop (R-Wyo.), who convened a “laser lobby” of 39 senators in favor of deploying a space-based strategic defense system.

Fueled by dreams of techno-dominance, Reagan announced that “the United States will develop and deploy an ASAT capability” and, in March 1983, launched SDI, promising to make ballistic missiles “impotent and obsolete.” Bateman’s history helps us understand the rise of SDI, but his story falters on its fall. Although the author says that the aim of the book is to move “SDI’s technological dimensions to the center stage of the narrative,” he is surprisingly short on the program’s technological failures. Bateman never comes to grips with the fact that none of SDI’s proposed weapons ever worked.

Weapons in Space came out in May, 33 years to the month after Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, convened the first of a series of investigative hearings into the Star Wars program.⁵ Conyers opened the hearing with an overview of SDI failures. He said that billions had been poured into too many projects that were later abandoned, including $1 billion for the Free Electron Laser, $1 billion for the Boost Surveillance and Tracking satellite system, $720 million for the Space-Based Chemical Laser, $700 million for the Neutral Particle Beam, and $866 million for the Airborne Optical Aircraft.

Conyers presciently warned that these weapons had not only failed but that President George H.W. Bush’s plan to restructure the program also would fail. He was right. Bush’s plan for a limited, ground-based missile defense system was just the first of multiple efforts to reconfigure the program, reduce its goals, and lower exceptions, all while keeping the contracts going. As Conyers warned, “This year, the administration officially abandoned its quest for a system that could protect the United States from a massive Soviet nuclear attack. President Bush has tried to find a new mission for this faltering program. Although the new plan is little more than a series of [viewgraphs], SDI officials are repeating the mistakes of the past and plunging ahead with plans to spend over $120 billion over the next 15 years.”

SDI officials explained that lasers in space would be replaced by kinetic interceptors in space (“Brilliant Pebbles”) and ground-based interceptors that would be highly effective against what they claimed was a growing threat of “Third World” ballistic missiles. These claims would prove to be just as false as the previous claims. None of the systems ever worked. The failure to learn the lessons of the past condemns people to repeat them, and the U.S. government has repeated them every year.

Bateman defends the program. “The fact that Reagan’s strategic defense dream never came to fruition makes it easy to dismiss SDI as a science-fiction fantasy,” he writes. Well, yes, it does. It was a fantasy. It still is.

The author also claims that by focusing on “the rationale for particular missile defense technologies,” we can better understand why SDI “continues to shape the space security environment at the present time.” That may be partially true, but not as much as two other aspects of the policy debate that are sidelined in his book: contracts and Congress.

Unarguably, spending $415 billion on a program is a lot of money. The drive to secure and continue weapons programs, whether they are real or imagined, effective or not, is the major factor that explains why these efforts continue. The strategic rationale and policy pronouncements are just a veneer justifying a mountain of contracts. Focusing on what officials say is not nearly as important as looking at why they are saying it.

The defense industry deploys an army of 775 lobbyists in Washington. No one can understand why the military budget is more than $850 billion this year and why the country continues to fund weapons that do not work and are not needed without examining the activities of the corporations profiting from the Pentagon’s largesse.

Similarly, the role of Congress is a vital element in any defense discussion. At least, it was during the SDI program. Congress featured significantly in restraining the excesses of the program and in limiting the new offensive weapons proposed as the “swords” to accompany this SDI “shield.” Public opposition to the nuclear arms race and the members of Congress who reflected that opposition in the authorization and appropriations processes where major factors in bringing SDI to ground. They are sidelined in Bateman’s book.

For example, Bateman minimizes the seminal 1985 Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies report from the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, which exposed the infeasibility of Reagan’s space plans. Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) disbanded the office when he became speaker as revenge for this report. The author similarly airbrushes the 1987 congressional hearings centered on the American Physical Society’s devastating technical critique of SDI’s infeasibility and vulnerability.⁶ That report and hearing largely killed the fanciful notion that the United States could soon deploy giant lasers in space.

This neglect may be because Congress no longer plays a significant role in shaping Pentagon budgets or programs. It is difficult to name any major investigation into failed weapons programs in the past 15 years. The last serious oversight hearing on missile defense was conducted in 2008 by Rep. John Tierney (D-Mass.), chair of the same defense subcommittee of the Government Reform and Oversight Committee that had held the 1991 hearings.⁷

The defense industry learned from the gun, oil, and drug lobbies. They poured grants into Washington think tanks to neuter criticism and produce scores of favorable reports. They flooded Congress with campaign contributions. As Tierney said recently, “Too many members of the key committees have been captured by the industry. They buy what the companies are selling, without sufficient oversight, without serious questioning.”⁸

This is why Bateman’s prediction that there will be a new push for space-based anti-missile systems is so chilling. He asserts that technical considerations will be a minor factor in such a decision. In the coming debates, “[b]oth perceptions of threats and ideas about the proper role of space in U.S. national strategy will be overwhelmingly powerful,” he writes. He may be right. Proponents are very likely to push bothersome scientific facts aside. They would much prefer to let abstract policy assertions decide budgets and programs.

Bateman’s book is a useful but not sufficient contribution to this history. Until there is serious, hard-hitting governmental oversight for these expansive programs, Americans will continue to buy the snake oil that defense corporations and their policy advocates are selling.

 

ENDNOTES

1. Estimate provided by Stephen Schwartz, author of Atomic Audit, in conversation with Joseph Cirincione, Washington, DC, June 2024.

2. See Joseph Cirincione, “Assessing the Assessment: The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2000), https://www.nonproliferation.org
/wp-content/uploads/npr/circ71.pdf.

3. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, “Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies,” OTA-ISC-254, September 1985, https://ota.fas.org/reports/8504.pdf.

4. Joseph Cirincione, “Why the Right Lost the Missile Defense Debate,” Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 38-55.

5. R. Jeffrey Smith, “GAO Calls ‘Star Wars” Planners Too Optimistic,” The Washington Post, May 15, 1991.

6. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Physicists Fault SDI Timetable,” The Washington Post, April 23, 1987.

7. Subcomm. on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, “Oversight of Missile Defense (Part 3): Questions for the Missile Defense Agency,” H.R. Rept. No. 110-150 (2008).

8. Rep. John Tierney, conversation with author, Washington, DC, May 2024.

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Joe Cirincione is a national security author and analyst with 40 years of experience, including as director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non-Proliferation Program and president of Ploughshares Fund. He was chief investigator for the House Government Operations Committee during major battles over missile defense programs. 

July/August 2024
By Thomas Wuchte

This year marks the 20th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, part of the global response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that transformed the international security landscape.

The adoption of Resolution 1373 some two weeks after the September 11 attacks, followed by Resolution 1540 in April 2004, established a range of unprecedented legal and operational requirements on all UN member states. This laid the foundation for international counterterrorism and nonproliferation cooperation that has expanded manyfold over the past two decades with significant tangible results.

The expansion remains a lucrative and well-resourced global priority. As one cornerstone of the post-September 11 counterterrorism architecture, Resolution 1540 is focused on preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from falling into the hands of nonstate actors.¹ Just as there is no agreed definition for terrorism, the definition of nonstate actor has become blurred. With conflict raging in many regions, the line between ensuring effective strategic trade controls among state actors and preventing WMD-related materials from falling into the hands of nonstate actors is now in peril.

Strategic trade controls are designed to prevent dual use technology from being transferred to bad actors. Russia’s need to get the chips and military parts for its full-scale war in Ukraine and Iran’s need for supplies for its nuclear efforts and drones has destabilized the whole process. It is now more difficult to control dual-use items and determine where they end up.

Origins of Resolution 1540

The nonproliferation community jump-started Resolution 1540 by working together to ensure that it would apply universally to all UN member states. The most positive aspect of the subsequent implementation endeavor was the absence of challenges to the legitimacy of Resolution 1540 and to plans to set up the Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities. When the mandate for renewing the resolution came up in 2011, there was no question about whether to extend it, only about its duration and the specific guidance needed to support implementation responsibilities.

Some states, particularly those not closely involved in awareness raising in the early years, remained cautious about giving the Security Council too much leeway. They wanted to be sure that Resolution 1540 would not become a tool for enforcing compliance or naming and shaming states that perhaps lacked the capacity to fully implement its requirements, but that has never been the purpose. Advocates of the resolution repeatedly have stressed that implementation is about raising standards, not pointing fingers.

Today, work on implementing the resolution remains supported by a group of nine experts administered by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and under the direction of a UN Security Council entity known as the 1540 Committee, which includes the council’s five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus 10 others elected every two years on a rotating basis. In 2022 its charter was extended for another 10 years by a new Security Council resolution.

This committee will be almost 30 years old in 2032 and “in perpetuity” is never a useful goalpost. Should the 1540 Committee be brought to an end then, and if so, why? Much has changed since 2011, including rising global aggression, divisive populist policies, a worldwide pandemic, a growing voice from the Global South, and an increased disregard for arrangements and treaties agreed under the strategic trade control regime.² This raises the question of how to protect the gains against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery that were achieved during an era of post-September 11 goodwill.

The Appeal of Resolution 1540

Since the cataclysmic events of September 11, the resolution has helped make the world safer by reducing the chances that nuclear and other dual-use material would fall into the hands of terrorists. Toward this goal, a cadre of true believers has built awareness of international obligations under Resolution 1540 by reaching out to states and making information widely available, including at international and regional forums, workshops, meetings, and briefings. These advocates have engaged with a broadening range of international and regional organizations, whose mandates relate to the Resolution 1540 goals.

This approach has succeeded in establishing regular points of contact and useful cooperation with these organizations, which are normally closer to their members’ regional or functional needs than the Security Council. It also has facilitated assistance to states in meeting their Resolution 1540 obligations. This can include expert advice about the obligations themselves, information sharing regarding effective practices used by other countries, and acting as a clearing house to match up requests for technical assistance with offers of assistance.

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency are key players in implementing Resolution 1540 commitments. Yet, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Implementation Support Unit, which has almost no staff and is woefully underrepresented in the Resolution 1540 process, oversees the potential use of the biological weapons that many experts view as most damaging in the hands of terrorists.

An often-overlooked point is that implementation is essential because the resolution establishes binding obligations for all states to prevent and deter illicit access to weapons of mass destruction and related materials. These standards benefit regions that seek to be key global economic centers for the supply of goods and services, including to and from the United States. Putting in place adequate measures that help to protect states from nonstate actors trafficking in WMD-related materials makes good business sense.³ U.S. and other global businesses are attracted to increasing trade with states that have the highest international standards. Businesses that unwittingly are used by proliferators risk economic blowback when investors lose confidence in them. The apparent absence of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of nonstate actors over the last 20 years is the best way to quantify success.⁴

The 1540 Committee has proven its value to the international community as a facilitator rather than an enforcer, and this approach has won the backing of many countries and international and regional organizations. For example, through Resolution 1540-related programs, states have installed radiation detection equipment at nearly all ports. It is fair to say that the resolution’s approach has achieved unparalleled recognition as an important component of the global counterterrorism and nonproliferation architecture.

The Times Are Changing

It was visionary how supporters of Resolution 1540 turned words into action and action into partnership. WMD terrorism and collective international efforts now fit into a broader UN counterterrorism framework. This partnership has grown but also changed, grown perhaps too large and not to the benefit of the Global South. When is knowledge transfer considered a success?

Those tasked with implementing Resolution 1540 are disappointed that there is resistance by Russia to any UN-drafted implementation guides.⁵ This reflects the long-standing argument by Russia and China that “implementation” is a member state responsibility and should not be encumbered by an expectation that states adopt best practices imposed by the 1540 Committee. Moreover, the resolution predates technology such as artificial intelligence, blockchains, and rapid biological advances. It would be beneficial if the 1540 Committee would consider extending strategic trade controls to these technologies, but the committee has been reluctant to discuss the issue.

As a result of tensions exacerbated by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Resolution 1540 could face the same fate that the Security Council’s sanctions committee on North Korea, an analogous UN Security Council body, experienced this year.⁶  Russia vetoed and China abstained on a measure renewing the North Korea committee’s work. This has weakened an important sanctions-related UN responsibility.

Given the tensions, policymakers should consider promoting more attention within the Security Council about nontraditional security issues such as the climate crisis, pandemics, and poverty and their relationship to the current counterterrorism and nonproliferation framework. This would be an important step toward building a transformed international peace and security architecture. Increased attention multilaterally among UN member states would help to align national priorities of the Global South countries, for example, with these emerging challenges that are linked to terrorism but are underrepresented in international policymaking forums.

Twenty years after its adoption, the 1540 Resolution is a true “little engine that could,” a multilateral initiative that has achieved far more than its advocates ever imagined.⁷ Now there is a need to consider whether what is needed today is continued capacity building or a complete rethink of the approach. Given the daunting future challenges facing the world, the Security Council should go for option two, combining Resolution 1540-related capacity building with better-resourced efforts to address the emerging threat conditions that foster terrorism. This would involve retooling collective UN counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts to be leaner and more geographically disbursed, while leaving the empowerment of the resolution to local governments and officials who best understand the nexus of hard and soft security.

There also is a strong argument for moving the UN’s Resolution 1540 efforts out of the Security Council to Geneva, where the Conference on Disarmament is located. This would bring the group of experts closer to the regions most at risk of proliferation by nonstate actors and to the functional work of the BWC, which is underserved despite its risk. Resolution 1540 will keep chugging along if these attempts at decentralization are encouraged by a right-sized nonproliferation and counterterrorism architecture.

ENDNOTES

1. Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only: Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use. Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution. Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. UN Security Council, S/RES/1540, April 28, 2004, p. 1 note.

2. Justyna Gudzowska, Eliza Lockhart, and Tom Keatinge, “Disabling the Enablers of Sanctions Circumvention,” Royal United Services Institute, May 7, 2024, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/policy-briefs/disabling-enablers-sanctions-circumvention/.

3. Richard Cupitt, “Developing Indices to Measure Chemical Strategic Trade Security Controls,” Strategic Trade Review, Vol. 3, No. 5 (Autumn 2017): 47-70.

4. In 2004 many experts worried about the likelihood of a “dirty” nuclear bomb in the hands of terrorists—a so-called suitcase bomb. Fortunately, this has not happened. In 2024, nuclear saber-rattling supplants dirty bombs with a state actor, Russia, threatening nuclear Armageddon as the Ukraine war drags on.

5. Scott Spence, “The 1540 Nonproliferation Regime and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2663 (2022): What’s Been Achieved and What Lies Ahead,” Strategic Trade Review, Vol. 9, No. 10 (Winter/Spring 2023): 25-36.

6. Joel S. Wit and Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “Insights From the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea,” 38North, May 14, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/05/insights-from-the-un-panel-of-experts-on-north-korea/.

7. Watty Piper, The Little Engine That Could, Platt & Munk, 1930, tells a story that in the United States is used to teach the value of optimism and hard work.