December 2024
By Tong Zhao

Following President Donald Trump’s reelection, China anticipates a more confrontational U.S. policy and is bracing for intensified strategic competition. Beijing is likely to double down on bolstering its nuclear arsenal, emphasizing the Chinese military Rocket Force mission of “strategic counterbalance,” the use of strategic military capabilities to moderate adversaries’ broader approaches toward China.

During Trump’s first term, the Chinese leadership came to view the United States as an existential threat, not primarily due to changes in U.S. nuclear policy but because of a severe deterioration in bilateral relations broadly. This has driven Beijing to rely increasingly on the perceived coercive power of nuclear weapons to stabilize its overall relationship with Washington. In Trump’s second term, non-nuclear tensions may escalate further through systematic economic decoupling and heightened geopolitical confrontation.

In the nuclear domain, U.S. patience with China is wearing thin. Beijing’s unwillingness to explain or constrain its nuclear buildup has prompted Washington to consider significant enhancements to U.S. nuclear capabilities. Owing to its deep-rooted siege mentality, China likely will interpret these measures as further evidence of U.S. “hegemonic” ambitions rather than responses to its own actions. Beijing may become more convinced that Washington is actively pursuing a disarming first-strike capability.

The second Trump presidency likely will revive strict visa and security measures, thus constraining personnel exchanges between the two countries. The resulting decline in dialogue between nuclear policy experts could lead both sides to embrace more pessimistic interpretations of each other’s nuclear capabilities, goals, and strategic designs.

Compounding the challenges, Washington’s internal policy environment under the new administration is likely to be highly polarized. Fierce clashes between “pro-deterrence” and “pro-arms control” advocates could lead to intense criticism of many of the administration’s nuclear policy decisions. This internal discord could lead Beijing to view the U.S. political landscape as too unstable for meaningful long-term engagement and thus further entrench its resistance to engaging in substantive strategic dialogue with Washington. Paradoxically, fierce domestic opposition to Trump’s nuclear policies also might amplify unintentionally China’s internal narrative, which fixates on U.S. policy flaws, making Beijing even less likely to recognize its share of responsibility for rising tensions.

The next four years mark a critical juncture in the nuclear paths of both nations. As the Trump administration sets the direction of U.S. nuclear enhancement, China also enters a critical phase of its own nuclear development. Having restructured the Rocket Force leadership, Chinese President Xi Jinping now emphasizes “strengthening targeted training with new equipment, skills, and combat methods.”¹ In the coming years, the Rocket Force likely will prioritize developing operational doctrines that define how to employ its expanded capabilities. This process will determine whether and to what extent the leadership’s focus on “combat capabilities” evolves into a more pronounced war-fighting doctrine for its nuclear forces.

A particularly volatile issue lies in the two countries’ approaches to theater-range nuclear forces. Potential U.S. efforts to increase the number of warheads on intercontinental delivery systems may draw attention, but it is the possibility that the United States might deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region that raises greater alarm in China. The second Trump presidency overlaps with Xi’s reported timeline for developing sufficient military capabilities to overtake Taiwan. As the U.S. and Chinese militaries intensify preparations for a Taiwan contingency, they also are conducting increasingly detailed planning for nuclear deterrence in regional conflicts. Each side seeks the ability to manage nuclear escalation if deterrence fails, attempting to prevent unlimited nuclear exchange while securing advantageous terms for ending the conflict.

Once started, competition in escalation management propels rivals into a destabilizing spiral of increasingly diverse and expanding nuclear arsenals. The scarcity of authoritative information about operational military planning on both sides fuels excessive threat perception. It is also difficult to prevent competition that begins at lower rungs of the escalation ladder from expanding upward to higher levels, further increasing the likelihood of a full-scale arms race.

Failure to appreciate action-reaction dynamics heightens these risks. China has assumed mistakenly that its nuclear expansion, including its massive development of increasingly accurate theater-range nuclear-capable missiles, would not provoke responses from other powers. Many U.S. experts also downplay the likelihood that U.S. efforts to enhance low-yield nuclear weapons and forward-deployment capabilities will intensify China’s threat perception and trigger additional countermeasures.

The Trump administration appears prepared to advocate for the expansion of tactical nuclear capabilities, believing that perceived weaknesses in this area could embolden China to consider nuclear first use in a regional conflict. Yet, there is no evidence in Chinese writings or analysis that the Chinese military perceives such weaknesses in U.S. nuclear capabilities. On the contrary, Chinese military analysts are focused predominantly on what they see as a growing U.S. interest in lowering the nuclear threshold and preparing for limited nuclear wars. This perception in turn has driven China’s investments in limited nuclear retaliation and escalation management capabilities.

Likely destabilizing the situation further is the erosion of the global nonproliferation regime. Trump’s anticipated rollback of U.S. security commitments to allies and partners has sparked concerns that countries such as South Korea might pursue nuclear weapons technology. Some U.S. experts are suggesting that Ukraine consider developing its own nuclear weapons option if it cannot secure adequate external security guarantees such as NATO membership. Any shift toward tacitly endorsing such “friendly proliferation” would dismantle decades of nonproliferation norms and remove crucial guardrails in Chinese-U.S. competition. Beijing might interpret this as confirmation that foundational international norms have lost their relevance.

In this climate, convincing China that the Australian-UK-U.S. nuclear submarine program is not a pathway to Australian nuclear weapons development would be much more difficult. It also would be difficult to foresee how Beijing might recalibrate its stance on nuclear nonproliferation in response. Before introducing radical changes with unpredictable consequences, Trump should engage Xi directly on two key issues: initiating serious arms control discussions and addressing how China’s passivity toward Russian aggression and North Korean provocations fuel nuclear proliferation, ultimately undermining China’s own strategic interests.

Confronted with unprecedented risks of nuclear arms races and proliferation, Chinese and U.S. nuclear policy experts carry a historic responsibility to assess critically their respective leaders’ policy choices.

Thoughtful debate on the long-term consequences of their own country’s policies, coupled with a nuanced understanding of their rival’s perspective, is essential to avoiding the catastrophic outcomes of strategic miscalculations.

ENDNOTES

1. “Xi Urges Strategic Missile Troops to Enhance Deterrence, Combat Capabilities,” Xinhua 
News Agency, October 19, 2024, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202410/19/content_WS67136968c6d0868f4e8ec184.html.

Tong Zhao is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, working for the Nuclear Policy Program and Carnegie China.

December 2024
By Doniyor Mutalov

U.S. President Joe Biden approved plans to supply Ukraine with anti-personnel landmines, changing his administration’s policy barring such transfers and violating the global norm against their use.

U.S. officials argue that landmines would bolster Ukrainian defenses against Russia’s full-scale invasion. The Ukrainians “have a need for things that can help slow down that effort on the part of the Russians,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told a press briefing on Nov. 20 while traveling in Laos. Austin attempted to address concerns about the humanitarian impact of the landmines by asserting that the United States will provide nonpersistent anti-personnel landmines that are designed to self-destruct.

In a briefing on Nov. 22 at the White House, senior officials said the decision was designed to thwart Russia's increasing reliance on infantry to attack Ukrainian defensive positions.

The decision to supply landmines to Ukraine is a change to U.S. policy adopted in 2022 that prohibits any transfer or export of U.S. landmines and bars their use anywhere except the Korean peninsula. (See ACT, July/August 2022.) The policy also indicated the intention of the United States to “undertake diligent efforts to pursue materiel and operational solutions to assist in becoming compliant with and ultimately acceding to the Ottawa Convention.” The 2022 policy restricted the broader use of landmines permitted by the Trump administration in 2020. At the time, Biden described the Trump administration’s stance on landmines as “reckless.”

The 1997 Ottawa Convention, also known as the Mine Ban Treaty, outlaws the production, use, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines worldwide. As of November, there are 164 states-parties to the treaty, representing more than 80 percent of the world’s states. Ukraine ratified the treaty in 2005, but Russia and the United States are not signatories.

Russia’s relentless use of landmines in the war has already made the conflict zone in Ukraine one of the most heavily mined areas in the world, and the supply of landmines by the United States will very likely exacerbate the contamination.

By acquiring or using anti-personnel landmines, Ukraine will violate its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. Ukraine cannot withdraw from the treaty before acquiring landmines because the treaty bars withdrawal if a state-party is engaged in armed conflict. A decision to withdraw would only enter into effect after the end of the Russian war against Ukraine.

The fifth review conference of the Mine Ban Treaty will take place in Cambodia Nov. 25-29 and will be attended by representatives of the United States and Ukraine.

December 2024
By Daryl G. Kimball

The Kremlin announced on Nov. 19 that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree updating the government’s formal policy on the possible use of nuclear weapons. The document outlines a wider range of contingencies that might trigger nuclear weapons use, especially in regard to non-nuclear weapons threats to Russia and its allies, and appears to lower the threshold for nuclear use.

The update of Russia’s nuclear doctrine was previewed by Putin in comments delivered on Sept. 25. (See ACT, November 2024.) It was issued just days after it was reported that U.S. President Joe Biden had decided to authorize Ukraine’s use of U.S.-supplied long-range missiles to strike targets deeper into Russia as a means of thwarting ongoing Russian attacks on Ukrainian territory. Russia had warned that such a U.S. move would change the nature of the conflict.

The revised nuclear doctrine includes language asserting that Russia “reserves the right” to use nuclear weapons not only in response to a nuclear attack, but also to respond to a conventional weapons attack that creates a “critical threat” to its “sovereignty and territorial integrity” or to that of Russia’s ally, Belarus. The previous version of Russia’s nuclear weapons doctrine, issued in 2020, reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if an attack on Russia threatens “the very existence of the state.”

The new document, titled “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” states that Russia considers “nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, the use of which is an extreme and necessary measure, and is making all necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent the aggravation of interstate relations that could provoke military conflicts, including nuclear conflicts.”

The revised policy also states that Russia may use nuclear weapons in the event there is “reliable information on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and/or its allies” or “the use by the enemy of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction on the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies, on military formations and/or facilities of the Russian Federation located outside its territory.”

It says that Russia may use nuclear weapons in the event of “aggression against the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of Belarus…with the use of conventional weapons, creating a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.” Another scenario involves a response to the “receipt of reliable information on the massive launch (take-off) of aerospace attack weapons (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aircraft) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation.”

In contrast, the Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review asserts that the “fundamental purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack and that nuclear weapons use would be reserved for “extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.”

December 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors censured Iran for failing to cooperate with the agency, despite Tehran signaling it would freeze its stockpile of uranium enriched to near-weapons-grade levels.

The censure was introduced by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States after IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi reported that Iran did not provide any information to resolve a years-long investigation into the presence of undeclared nuclear materials at two sites that are not part of the country’s nuclear program.

Grossi did report that the agency verified on Nov. 16 that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) took initial steps to halt the accumulation of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235, a level just shy of the 90 percent U-235 considered weapons-grade.

Grossi said during a Nov. 20 press conference that he proposed that Tehran take this step during a Nov. 14-15 trip to Iran.

He also observed an “intense disposition” for engagement by Iranian officials during his trip, which included meetings with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Although Grossi described Iran’s commitments during the trip as “important,” the progress was not enough to prevent the Europeans and the United States from moving forward with the resolution, which passed Nov. 21 by a vote of 19-3, with 12 abstentions. The censure marks the fourth time that the board has used a resolution to push Iran to provide the agency with technically credible explanations for uranium detected at undeclared locations in 2020 and 2021. (See ACT, July/August 2024.)

Similar to the previous three resolutions, Russia and China opposed the measure.

Prior to the vote, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharib Abadi told journalists that Iran would “respond decisively and immediately” to a resolution. Following the vote, the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the AEOI issued a statement ordering the “activation” of “various types” of advanced centrifuges.

The statement did not provide specifics, but a IAEA report on Nov. 19 regarding Iran’s nuclear program noted that Iran has IR-2 centrifuges at its Natanz uranium-enrichment facility and IR-6 centrifuges at its Fordow uranium-enrichment facility that are not currently operating. The IR-2 and IR-6 centrifuges enrich uranium more efficiently. The AEOI order to “activate” additional centrifuges likely referred to introducing uranium into those machines.

The statement did not mention if Iran would reverse its commitment to halt the accumulation of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235.

Grossi told reporters that there was “no conditionality” regarding the proposal on 60 percent U-235 enrichment, but Iranian officials suggested that the country would reverse the decision if the board passed the censure.

The Europeans and the United States consistently have raised concerns about Iran’s enrichment of uranium to 60 percent U-235, given how quickly the material can be enriched to weapons grade. But it is not mentioned in the resolution, which focuses on safeguards issues.

In the Nov. 21 resolution, the board “reaffirms its decision that it is essential and urgent” for Iran to provide “technically credible explanations” for the presence of uranium at Varamin and Turquzabad.

During his trip, Grossi discussed “possible elements” to resolve the agency’s questions about undeclared nuclear materials detected at Varamin, a site where the IAEA assesses that Iran undertook uranium-milling and -conversion activities that were not declared to the agency. The IAEA “will continue to work with Iran towards making substantive progress” on this issue, the Nov. 19 report said.

The Europeans and the United States did not view the discussions as tangible progress. In a Nov. 21 joint statement, they said that there has been “no progress” on the safeguards investigation since June. The statement noted that the resolution passed by the board in June said that Tehran needed to provide “full and unambiguous cooperation with the agency to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues” or face further action.

The Nov. 2 resolution also requests that Grossi provide a “comprehensive and updated assessment” regarding the undeclared nuclear materials in connection with “past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program” by March 2025.

Grossi has suggested that such a report is not necessary. During the board meeting in September, he said at a press conference that the IAEA already has provided an assessment of what occurred at the sites where undeclared uranium was detected. (See ACT, October 2024.)

The Europeans and the United States said that the requested comprehensive report will allow the board to “consider whether further steps are needed.”

Iran, joined by eight other states including China and Russia, said in a Nov. 21 statement that the resolution demonstrated an “unconstructive and confrontational approach” and “undermines ongoing” engagement. 
The board’s priority should be to “strongly encourage and support” engagement between the IAEA and Iran, the statement said.

After the resolution passed, the Europeans and the United States welcomed the vote and expressed hope that Iran will “take the opportunity” to resolve the outstanding issues before the comprehensive report is completed so that the board can “close consideration” of the matter.

Despite the contentious meeting, Iranian officials and representatives of the three European countries met in Geneva on Nov. 29 to discuss a range of issues, including Iran’s nuclear program. The United States did not participate in the talks, but that could change after U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January. During his campaign, Trump said the United States “has to make a deal” with Iran.

Despite Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal in May 2018, Pezeshkian suggested on Nov. 12 that Iran is willing to engage the Trump administration. Iran will “have to deal” with the United States, and it is better for Tehran to “handle the relationship,” he said.

Pezeshkian’s support for nuclear diplomacy comes amid continued calls by high-level Israeli officials to strike Iran’s nuclear program.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Nov. 11 that Iran is “more exposed than ever to damage to its nuclear facilities” and that Israel has the chance to “remove the threat” posed by the nuclear program.

December 2024
By Michael T. Klare

The Biden administration signaled that it will not restrict U.S. arms transfers to Israel despite that country’s failure to permit increased deliveries of humanitarian aid to Gaza as top U.S. officials had demanded.

Although the situation in Gaza “is a very dire circumstance,” there will be no reduction in U.S. arms assistance to Israel, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel told a news briefing on Nov. 12.

But the United States will continue to press the Israelis to expedite the flow of humanitarian aid to the embattled enclave, Patel indicated. “[W]hat we need to see is we need to see these steps acted on,” he said. “We need to see them implemented.”

In a letter to senior Israeli officials on Oct. 14, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin complained of the sharply deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza, where Israel has conducted a fierce retaliation since the Oct. 7, 2023, raid in which Hamas killed 1,200 people and took 250 hostage.

According to the letter, Israel had imposed severe restrictions on aid flows to Gaza, resulting in a 50 percent decline in deliveries over the preceding six months, drastically reducing food and medical supplies to the Palestinian civilian population.

To be assured of receiving U.S. military assistance, Israel would have to take immediate steps to eliminate those restrictions and allow more aid to reach Gaza, the letter said.

“To reverse the downward humanitarian trajectory [in Gaza] as consistent with its assurances to us, Israel must, starting now and within 30 days act on [a number of] concrete measures,” such as opening additional border crossings and lifting restrictions on aid convoys from southern to northern Gaza, Blinken and Austin wrote. A failure to do so, they indicated, could result in diminished U.S. arms aid to Israel as required by law.

Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act states that, “No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any country when it is made known to the President that the government of such country prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance.” The president can waive this restriction if he determines that doing so would be in the national interest.

Any significant reduction in U.S. arms transfers to Israel, if sustained for any length of time, would have serious consequences for that country. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States is Israel’s leading arms supplier, accounting for 69 percent of its arms imports in 2023. These include many of the weapons used by the Israelis in their war against Hamas and Hezbollah.

Despite this dependency, Israel made no visible effort to comply with the requirements in the Blinken-Austin letter. Among the demands was a requirement for daily entry into Gaza of 350 trucks carrying humanitarian aid. In late October, an average of only 58 trucks were reported to be making the crossing.

A group of scientists from the UN-affiliated Famine Review Committee said on Nov. 8 that, with food supplies rapidly diminishing, “starvation, malnutrition, and excess mortality due to malnutrition and disease are rapidly increasing” and that a deadly famine was “imminent.”

Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), a vocal critic of Israeli tactics in its war against Hamas and of the Biden administration’s military support for Israel despite serious human rights concerns, proposed three resolutions to block continued arms transfers, but they were soundly defeated by the Senate on Nov. 20. Nevertheless, 17 Senate Democrats and two independents voted for at least one of the measures, a sign of growing party divisions over Israel’s handling of the war, now entering its 14th month.

Meanwhile, on Nov. 18, Politico reported that 20 White House staff members had written a letter to their superiors calling on President Joe Biden to follow through with the threat to close the arms spigot.

December 2024
By Xiaodon Liang

As he prepares to leave office, U.S. President Joe Biden issued a policy memorandum on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for national security purposes and reiterated his administration’s stance that a human should always remain “in the loop” for informing and executing decisions on nuclear weapons use.

The national security memorandum, published Oct. 24, addresses not only the use of AI by executive branch agencies involved in national security, but also expands on the outgoing administration’s policy of promoting U.S. research into leading-edge AI models.

“We have to be faster in deploying AI in our national security enterprise than America’s rivals are in theirs. They are in a persistent quest to leapfrog our military and intelligence capabilities,” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said in a speech introducing the memorandum at the National Defense University.

The memorandum sets forth immigration, energy, resource-sharing, and rules-setting policies and practices designed to promote U.S. leadership in what the Biden administration calls “safe, secure, and trustworthy AI.”

The memorandum, prepared by the National Security Council and signed by Biden, calls for the publication of a subsidiary document, titled “Framework to Advance AI Governance and Risk Management in National Security” by the council’s deputies committee. A first version of this framework was released concurrently with the memorandum.

The framework creates three regulated categories of cases for AI use: prohibited, high impact, and those affecting federal personnel. Agencies will be required to adopt minimum risk management practices for high-impact and federal personnel-impacting cases or seek an annual waiver to avoid this requirement when it would “increase risks to privacy, civil liberties, or safety, or would create an unacceptable impediment to critical agency operations or exceptionally grave damage to national security.”

“The policy imposes few substantive safeguards on a wide range of AI-driven activities, by and large allowing agencies to decide for themselves how to mitigate the risks posed by national security systems,” the American Civil Liberties Union warned in an Oct. 24 press release. Patrick Toomey, deputy director of the advocacy organization’s National Security Project, criticized the Biden administration’s approach for lacking “transparency, independent oversight, and built-in mechanisms for individuals to obtain accountability.”

Waivers will not be available for prohibited cases of AI use. The list of prohibitions includes violations of certain civil liberties, as well as a general ban on using AI to “[r]emove a human ‘in the loop’ for actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate or terminate nuclear weapons employment.”

The framework requires that oversight and “rigorous testing and assurance” accompany the use of AI in determining collateral damage and estimating casualties before kinetic actions. Intelligence analysis and reports based “solely” on AI outputs also are permitted as long as the reader is provided with sufficient warning.

The Commerce Department will play a significant role through its AI Safety Institute in assessing the national security risks of leading-edge AI models. The institute will serve as the “primary port of call for U.S. AI developers,” according to an unnamed senior administration official speaking to journalists on Oct. 24 regarding the memorandum.

The memorandum also addresses the nonproliferation implications of AI by instructing the National Nuclear Security Administration to develop within 120 days, in partnership with the AI Safety Institute and the National Security Agency, “the capability to perform rapid systematic testing of AI models’ capacity to generate or exacerbate nuclear and radiological risks.”

By empowering and creating an AI risk assessment structure within the government, the White House hopes to accelerate 
AI research by making clear the rules of the road. “Ensuring security and trustworthiness will actually enable us to move faster, not slow us down. Put simply, uncertainty breeds caution,” Sullivan said in his speech.

“We know that China is building its own technological ecosystem with digital infrastructure that won’t protect sensitive data, that can enable mass surveillance and censorship, that can spread misinformation, and that can make countries vulnerable to coercion,” Sullivan said. Nonetheless, the United States should be “willing to engage in dialogue about this technology with [Beijing] and with others to better understand risks and counter misperceptions,” he said.

Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping renewed their commitment to the human-in-the-loop principle during a Nov. 16 meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima, according to Bloomberg.

During the U.S. presidential campaign, the Republican Party adopted a policy platform calling for the revocation of Executive Order 14110, which laid out in October 2023 the Biden administration’s AI policies and preceded the publication of the recent national security memorandum. Instead, the platform promised to “support AI Development rooted in Free Speech and Human Flourishing.”

Some parts of the Biden framework may survive a partisan transition in the White House. The AI Safety Institute has bipartisan support, and bills granting it a basis in law have passed out of House and Senate committees.

December 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

The UN General Assembly, overcoming objections from Russia, reaffirmed the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

The vote on Dec. 2 was 167-4 with 6 abstentions, a gain of 8 votes in favor of the treaty over the tally cast on Nov. 8 by the General Assembly’s First Committee, which handles disarmament and security threat issues. The committee vote was 159-5 with 6 abstentions.

 Led by Argentina, Japan, and the United States, the votes culminated an initiative that has been the subject of debate since U.S. intelligence reported on a new Russian space capability in February. (See ACT, March 2024.)

The resolution affirmed the obligation of all states-parties “to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”

It also includes a call for states-parties “not to develop nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction specifically designed to be placed in orbit around the Earth, to be installed on celestial bodies, or to be stationed in outer space in any other manner.”

Prior to the final vote in the First Committee and later in the full General Assembly, Russia submitted two amendments that were strongly opposed by the resolution sponsors. One Russian amendment would have expanded the prohibition to include “any other kinds of weapons,” not only weapons of mass destruction, and the other amendment would have called for negotiations on new legally binding agreements that are “reliably verifiable.”

Introducing the two amendments, Russia said in a statement on Nov. 5 that it “has no objection to reaffirming the obligations already contained [in the treaty]…. Nevertheless, it is unacceptable to give the impression that UN member states are prepared to limit themselves to reaffirming already existing international legal norms.”

Russia argued that “it could be interpreted” that the resolution as conceived by the authors was an “attempt to legitimize the placement of any other weapons other than [weapons of mass destruction] in outer space, which would provoke a conventional arms race in outer space.”

In a joint statement on Nov. 7, the resolution sponsors dismissed the Russian amendments as an attempt to materially alter the nature of the draft resolution.

Bruce Turner, U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), called the amendments an attempt “to hijack a resolution…[intended] to address a focused topic,” and he urged states to vote against them.

Further, he criticized Russia’s approach to negotiations on the resolution, saying that Russia repeatedly refused to engage on any opportunities for compromise. “This constitutes bad practice and a dangerous precedent,” Turner said.

Both Russian amendments were rejected by the committee. The votes were 41-66 with 49 abstentions for one amendment and 42-65 with 49 abstentions for the other.

Russia failed in trying to advance a similar amendment to a Japanese-U.S. resolution in the UN Security Council in April. (See ACT, May 2024.) Since 2008, Russia and China have been advocating at the CD to ban placement of all weapons in outer space by introducing a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects. These efforts have not drawn widespread international support.

December 2024
By Michael T. Klare

The UN General Assembly mandated new international consultations intended to advance slow-moving negotiations on a treaty or agreement that would regulate autonomous weapons systems.

In a resolution adopted Dec. 2, the assembly said informal talks among member states and nongovernmental organizations should be held in New York in 2025 to consider the dangers posed by autonomous weapons systems, often called “killer robots” by critics, and possible measures for their control.

The vote was 166-3 with 15 abstentions. It quickly followed action by the UN First Committee which approved the resolution 161-3 with 13 abstentions on Nov. 5.

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, an umbrella organization for other civil society activists on this issue, described the resolution as a “small step” forward. It expressed disappointment that “the resolution does not reflect the clear desire of the majority of the international community to urgently launch negotiations on a legal binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems.”

In statements submitted to the UN secretary-general pursuant to a 2023 UN resolution on this topic, many governments and nongovernmental organizations expressed frustration that the group of governmental experts created by the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to develop international restraints on autonomous weapons systems has not achieved any notable progress after years of deliberation. (See ACT, October 2024.)

Meanwhile, Israel’s reported use of autonomous weapons systems and artificial intelligence (AI) tools in Gaza has “shown the devastating and unacceptable harm that can result from seeking to increase the speed of violence through AI and automation,” the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots said. The group also noted that U.S. and Russian weapons programs show “that countries are already looking to compete for military advantage through increasing autonomy in weapons systems.”

Alexander Kmentt, the director of disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation in the Austrian Foreign Ministry and a key figure in deliberations on the First Committee resolution, also expressed regret that the final text only authorized two days of consultations and lacked a more explicit focus on crafting international regulations.

But Kmentt welcomed the new venue for discussions. “I believe that the urgency about integrating autonomy into weapons systems is such that we need to really elevate the issue much higher on the political agenda,” he told Arms Control Today.

The expert group discussions “must certainly progress to negotiations on a legally binding instrument as soon as possible but, in addition to this, we also need to generate momentum for the need for regulation in other relevant forums as well, such as the UN General Assembly,” Kmentt said.

Similar to the 2023 UN directive on autonomous weapons systems, the new resolution expresses concern “about the possible negative consequences and impact of autonomous weapon systems on global security and regional and international stability, including the risk of an emerging arms race, [and] lowering the threshold for and escalation of conflicts.” (See ACT, December 2023.)

While noting that considerable international attention has been focused on these dangers by governments and civil society organizations, the resolution warned that the development of autonomous weapons systems has been occurring at a faster pace than efforts to adopt reasonable controls.

The governmental and civil society submissions to the secretary-general also raised concerns that the expert group had not adequately addressed ethical and moral issues raised by the deployment of machine combatants governed by AI with a capacity to take human lives.

To address these concerns, the resolution calls on the secretary-general to facilitate “informal consultations” next year intended to “further the international community’s understanding of the issues involved by discussing the full range of views received, including proposals and relevant aspects raised in the report that may thus far not have been discussed in detail” in the experts group.

The consultations are to be held over a two-day period.

 

December 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

The UN General Assembly First Committee authorized three new initiatives concerning nuclear weapons issues during its annual meeting as it sought to advance a commitment to international peace and security.

The committee, which focuses on disarmament and international security, met from Oct. 7 to Nov. 8 in New York amid rising geopolitical tensions and deepening polarization among states. It adopted 77 draft resolutions altogether, including the three new initiatives related to nuclear weapons.

Among the more significant resolutions was a proposal by Ireland and New Zealand to establish an independent scientific panel on the effects of nuclear war. The resolution was adopted 144-3, with 30 states abstaining, including India, North Korea, Poland, and the United States. France, Russia, and the United Kingdom voted no.

Unlike other multilateral disarmament meetings, the First Committee adopts resolutions by a majority vote, not by consensus. The independent scientific panel will consist of 21 members who will be tasked with examining the physical effects and societal consequences of a nuclear war on local, regional, and planetary scales.

“A new U.N.-mandated expert study assessing and addressing the current knowledge of the effects of nuclear war can spur a better-informed, inclusive and much-needed global debate on what nuclear war means for people and the planet,” physicist Zia Mian of Princeton University, a proponent of the study, wrote in Scientific American on Oct. 28.

“It also would help governments and people in nuclear-armed states better understand the nature, scale and severity of the many catastrophic consequences of nuclear war, not just for adversaries but for everyone, including themselves,” Mian added.

Explaining her country’s vote against the resolution, Camille Petit, France’s ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), said on Nov. 4 that the study group “would not be able to provide new elements to contribute to understanding of the effects of nuclear war” as the devastating consequences are already well known.

Likewise, David Riley, UK ambassador to the CD, said that the international community “always recognized…the devastating consequences” of nuclear war, thus they are not “persuaded of the utility of the independent scientific panel.”

Bruce Turner, U.S. ambassador to the CD, said that the United States also is “clear-eyed about the consequences of nuclear war” and “skeptical of this resolution or [that] the panel’s findings will help move us toward that goal” of no nuclear use.

Nevertheless, Turner said that the United States is “not opposed in principle to a discussion” and would “carefully consider” U.S. participation in this study group process. He stressed that the resolution mandate “must remain unbiased, evidence based…and not be politicized.”

The other new resolutions on nuclear weapons were less contentious. One, advanced by Brazil and Norway, encourages UN member states to engage in a discussion on the establishment of a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification. It was adopted 173-1 with two abstentions.

The third resolution, proposed by 46 non-nuclear-weapon states, seeks to “convene a qualified group of up to 25 experts…to prepare a new comprehensive study” on nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was adopted 172-2 with three abstentions. The two countries in opposition were Argentina and Israel.

In addition to the three new nuclear-related resolutions, others focused on the topics of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Outer Space Treaty, and autonomous weapons systems. The full General Assembly began acting on the resolutions on Dec. 2.

The First Committee was chaired by Costa Rica’s UN ambassador, Maritza Chan, who served as the committee’s first female chair. “We can only build true security by working together to address the root causes of violence. We must cooperate, not compete with each other in order to survive and thrive in our dynamic world,” she said.

Chan also spoke of the advances women have made in playing a larger role in the First Committee and disarmament generally. “Throughout the history of our work, we have seen that women and a range of diverse stakeholders have brought important insights, experiences, and knowledge for disarmament. We have also been bridge-builders, bringing people together and finding common ground,” she said.

“I hope that the trend of increasing gender perspectives in our statements and resolutions, and including women in meaningful roles within our delegations, continues to the 80th session and beyond,” added Chan.

December 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

North Korea tested a new long-range missile and ratified a mutual defense treaty with Russia as Japan, South Korea, and the United States announced a new mechanism for monitoring Pyongyang’s sanctions evasion and coordinating regional actions.

The state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) described the new North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as the “world’s strongest strategic missile” and said the Oct. 31 launch demonstrates the credibility of the country’s nuclear deterrent.

The missile, dubbed the Hwasong-19, is a solid-fueled system that is more powerful than the ICBMs North Korea tested in the past. North Korea already can target the entire continental United States with previously tested ICBMs, but the Hwasong-19 appears designed to carry multiple warheads with independently targetable reentry vehicles. The Hwasong-19, along with the previously tested Hwasong-18, will serve as the “core means” of defending North Korea by “containing the enemies’ acts of aggression and reliably protecting the national security,” according to KCNA.

North Korea launched the missile in violation of UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting its ballistic missile activities.

According to KCNA, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was present for the launch. Kim said that North Korea’s “rivals’ dangerous tightening of their nuclear alliance” highlights the “importance of strengthening our nuclear forces.”

Prior to the launch, KCNA reported that Kim visited an ICBM base to review the “operational readiness” of North Korea’s strategic missile forces. He called for modernizing missile facilities and reviewing launch procedures to ensure North Korea can “swiftly deliver strategic counterattacks against enemies at any moment.”

Although the UN Security Council met to discuss the launch of the Hwasong-19, the body failed to condemn North Korea, following a pattern of inaction in response to the country’s violations. (See ACT, July/August 2023.)

During the council meeting on Nov. 4, North Korean Ambassador Kim Song justified the test and said Pyongyang will accelerate its nuclear weapons buildup to “counter any threat presented by hostile nuclear-weapon states.” He said the test posed no threat to the region.

Japanese Ambassador Kazuyuki Yamazaki refuted that assessment, telling the council that the launch was “more threatening than ever” and that the missile splashed down in waters near Japan. He urged North Korea to refrain from further launches.

U.S. Deputy Ambassador Robert Wood also condemned the missile launch during the meeting and described it as a “direct violation of multiple Security Council resolutions.” He said that North Korea’s continued missile testing allows the country to identify and address capability gaps to advance its weapons program. Wood accused Russia and China of repeatedly shielding North Korea from “any reprisal” by the council.

Chinese Ambassador Fu Cong told the council that it should focus on “easing rather than exacerbating tensions” in the region and that further pressure will lead to escalation. The key to resolving tensions lies with the United States, he said.

During the meeting, Wood also raised North Korea’s transfer of weaponry to Russia for use in Ukraine and the presence of North Korean troops in Russia. He called North Korea’s weapons exports an egregious violation of Security Council resolutions and said that if North Korean troops “engage in combat or combat support operations against Ukraine,” they will be “legitimate military targets.”

Russian Deputy Ambassador Anna Evstigneeva denied the presence of North Korean military in Russia. She accused the United States of creating a “negative buzz” about North Korea in order to keep “ineffective sanctions measures afloat.” Evstigneeva said North Korea “has every right to apply measures to ensure the security and sovereignty of their country.”

Several days after the Security Council meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the mutual defense treaty with North Korea that Moscow and Pyongyang announced during Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June. (See ACT, July/August 2024.) Kim Jong Un ratified the treaty two days later, on Nov. 11.

The treaty includes a provision requiring Russia and North Korea to “immediately provide military” assistance if the other country is attacked. Even though Russia invaded Ukraine, it is unclear if Putin will invoke the treaty’s provisions to request additional North Korean assistance more formally.

Japan, South Korea, and the United States condemned the growing ties between North Korea and Russia in a Nov. 15 joint statement during a trilateral heads of state meeting. The three leaders announced the establishment of a new joint secretariat to coordinate actions and implement shared goals, including security on the Korean peninsula.

The statement committed the three countries to “respond resolutely to any violations or evasions” of UN Security Council resolutions and emphasized the importance of the new multilateral sanctions monitoring team.

Launched in October by 11 states, including Japan, South Korea, and the United States, the team is tasked with monitoring the implementation of Security Council resolutions on North Korea. According to an Oct. 16 press release announcing the new mechanism, the monitoring team will support implementation of council sanctions against North Korea by “publishing information based on rigorous inquiry into sanctions violations and evasion attempts.”

A UN panel of experts previously performed a similar task, but its mandate was vetoed by Russia in March. (See ACT, May 2024.)