September 2024
By Aaron Bateman
Author of Weapons in Space: Technology, Politics, and the Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative

The review of Weapons in Space in the July/August issue of Arms Control Today does not address the core arguments of my book. Weapons in Space is an academic history that situates the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) within a broader transformation in the military uses of space that began in the 1970s. The book is also the first academic history of space arms control in the late Cold War and explains why space arms control failed, in stark contrast to nuclear arms control at that time. Moreover, the book uncovers the political and technological reasons why U.S. allies participated in SDI, thereby illuminating the international dimensions of controversy surrounding military space activities in this period. Critically, it explains the origins and evolution of SDI, but does not defend SDI.

A central argument of the book is that SDI emerged from intensifying military space competition in the 1970s. As détente crumbled in that decade, the Soviet Union and the United States were developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons designed to attack space systems. Both countries sought the ability to destroy satellites that were increasingly important for military applications, such as enabling precision strikes against adversary forces. Nevertheless, there were concerns about the implications of ASAT weapons systems for stability and conflict escalation. In the late 1970s, Moscow and Washington entered into ASAT weapons arms control negotiations that ultimately were unsuccessful. These developments did not make SDI inevitable, but they are key parts of its origin story.

Histories of Ronald Reagan’s presidency frequently cite nuclear abolitionism as a core reason why he pursued SDI. In contrast, the book shines a spotlight on the place of SDI within Reagan’s broader space policy. Reagan had concluded that Moscow was waging a campaign for space superiority, and he sought to expand U.S. military power in space. Yet, he also believed that SDI was a mechanism for eliminating nuclear weapons, a view not shared by Reagan’s advisers. Reconciling Reagan’s rhetoric of SDI as a tool of peace with the reality that SDI technologies could be used offensively was no easy task for his administration.

Weapons in Space further reveals how U.S. allies shaped SDI. Many were skeptical that SDI technologies were feasible and worried that the program would lead to a space arms race. Although many allies and partners became involved in SDI research, several of them continued to oppose deployment of space-based defenses. Analyzing the role of allies in SDI underscores that the expanding militarization of space in this period was an international phenomenon that transcended the bipolar superpower competition.

The consequences of the linkage between SDI and ASAT weapons technologies are especially important from an arms control perspective. As the book shows, due to this relationship, Reagan would not accept any constraints on U.S. freedom of action in space. Despite his public commitment to field ASAT weapons systems, the book reveals that he was willing to trade them away until his advisers explained that doing so would constrain the eventual deployment of missile defense interceptors in space.

In the end, space-based missile defense was not deployed for technological and political reasons. The book details the multiple failures of space-based interceptor tests in 1990 and 1991 that undermined the cause of SDI promoters. Even more importantly, improving U.S.-Soviet relations and progress in nuclear arms control called into question the arguments in favor of continued investment in space-based defenses. Consequently, Congress tightened the purse strings, and President Bill Clinton eliminated space-based interceptors. In this context, momentum for space arms control also waned.

In a counterfactual world, it is unlikely that a space arms control treaty, including limits on SDI, would have prevented the complex space security challenges in the post-Cold War era. Yet, such an agreement would have provided a valuable precedent for current international efforts to reduce risks in space.

September 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

Iran’s new president expressed support for nuclear diplomacy, but the Biden administration says it is looking for the new leadership in Tehran to take action to demonstrate that it intends to take a different approach to negotiations.

After taking office on July 30, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian expressed support for constructive engagement and said he would work to “remove the oppressive sanctions” targeting the country. He named Abbas Araghchi, one of Iran’s negotiators on the 2015 nuclear deal, as foreign minister.

Pezeshkian has denied that Iran has any interest in developing nuclear weapons, despite recent comments from senior officials suggesting Tehran will change its nuclear doctrine if the security environment changes or its nuclear facilities are attacked. (See ACT, May 2024.)

In a Tehran Times op-ed on July 12, Pezeshkian wrote that “Iran’s defense doctrine does not include nuclear weapons” and called for the United States to “adjust its policy.” He warned that Iran “does not and will not respond to pressure.”

U.S. State Department spokesperson Verdant Patel said in a July 29 press briefing that the United States still views diplomacy as the “best way to achieve an effective, sustainable solution with regards to Iran’s nuclear program” but “we are far away from anything like that.” The United States will judge Iran’s new leaders “by their actions, not their words,” he said.

Patel suggested that if Pezeshkian wants to “show seriousness or a new approach,” Iran could take some immediate actions, such as cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), rather than escalating tensions over various long-standing issues.

In June the IAEA Board of Governors censured Iran for failing to cooperate with a years-long investigation into past, undeclared nuclear activities. The IAEA is also pressing Iran to expand agency monitoring of the nuclear program. (See ACT, July/August 2024.)

Monitoring is particularly important because Iran is expanding its uranium-enrichment capacity and can produce weapons-grade nuclear material more quickly.

In response to the June censure, Iran informed the IAEA of plans to install additional cascades of advanced centrifuges at its enrichment facilities. The IAEA confirmed on June 28 that Iran installed four of the eight cascades planned for the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.

In addition to the uranium-enrichment capacity expansion, an annual U.S. intelligence assessment for Congress of Iran’s proliferation risk released in July noted that Iran has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device.” The report did not offer details on those activities, but U.S. officials told The Wall Street Journal that Iran does not have “an active military nuclear program.”

In addition to Iran’s nuclear advances, regional tensions and Iran’s deepening relationship with Russia continue to complicate the prospects for renewed nuclear diplomacy.

Iran threatened to retaliate against Israel after Ismael Haniyeh, a senior Hamas official, was assassinated in Tehran on July 31 during a trip for Pezeshkian’s inauguration. Iranian officials said the response will be severe unless there is a ceasefire agreement for Gaza.

After Pezeshkian took office, Sergei Shoigu, the secretary of Russia’s security council, traveled to Tehran to meet with military leaders and the new president.

Following his visit, the United States expressed concern that Iran may be preparing to transfer ballistic missiles to Russia. Patel said the United States is prepared to deliver a “swift and severe response” if Iran provides Russia with missiles.

September 2024
By Xiaodon Liang

The United States will deploy conventionally armed ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in Germany on a rotational basis beginning in 2026, the two countries announced July 10 on the sidelines of a NATO summit in Washington.

U.S. Army forces in Germany will field the multipurpose Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile, and a hypersonic missile that is still in development in “episodic deployments…as part of planning for enduring stationing of these capabilities in the future,” the joint announcement said. These weapons will equip the army’s Multi-Domain Task Force based at Wiesbaden, Germany, which the army first activated in September 2021.

Russia will adopt “mirror measures” in response to the German-U.S. announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin said July 28, the Associated Press reported. If the deployments go forward, Russians will consider themselves “free” from a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles, he said. Prior to the German-U.S. announcement, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov confirmed in a June 27 interview with Izvestia that Moscow also is revising its nuclear declaratory policy.

The Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile has a reported range of more than 1,600 kilometers, while the hypersonic missile, known as the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), will have a range of at least 3,000 kilometers. Both previously would have been prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which barred the production and deployment of ground-launched missiles having a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The Trump administration withdrew the United States from that treaty in August 2019, and Russia reciprocated by suspending its participation.

After the U.S. withdrawal, Russia proposed a joint moratorium on the deployment of missiles with these ranges and indicated it would be willing to halt deployment of the 9M729 cruise missile, which had been the focus of U.S. allegations about treaty violations. In talks prior to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia proposed agreements with NATO and the United States that would bar deployments inside and outside national territories that allowed this category of missiles to reach the territories of other parties to the agreements. (See ACT, January/February 2022.)

The U.S. Army first introduced the idea of a multidomain task force in a March 2021 concept paper. Under those plans, each task force would contain a Strategic Fires Battalion with three sets of capabilities: a short-range ballistic missile battery, a midrange capability battery, and a long-range hypersonic battery. The United States deployed a midrange battery, fielding the SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles, to a foreign country for the first time earlier this year when a unit participated in exercises in the Philippines. (See ACT, May 2024.)

The Army completed the first successful end-to-end flight test of the LRHW system in May after a series of cancellations and setbacks in 2023. (See ACT, November 2023.) The Government Accountability Office said in a July report that officials believe it will take the Army roughly 11 months to field an LRHW battery after an initial successful test.

The LRHW and Tomahawk weapons systems are not the only intermediate-range missiles that will soon equip NATO forces in Europe. France, Germany, Italy, and Poland signed a letter of intent July 11 at the NATO summit on development of a new ground-launched cruise missile with a range of more than 500 kilometers, Reuters reported. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said other countries are welcome to join the acquisition initiative.

The German-U.S. announcement did not include a new public arms control proposal to Russia, but on July 25, Mallory Stewart, U.S. assistant secretary for arms control, deterrence, and stability, said that the United States has been “explaining to [the Russians] why having some type of limitation on arms racing in this particular context is in their interest as well as ours.”

The reaction in Germany exposed rifts in the governing coalition. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock of the Green party welcomed the forthcoming deployment in a July 21 interview with the Funke Media Group, noting that Putin had “broken with disarmament treaties and our common European peace architecture” years ago. Her comments came in response to the parliamentary leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Rolf Mützenich, who expressed concerns about the destabilizing effects of short missile flight times to the same news group.

But the SPD party presidium on Aug. 12 backed Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Defense Minister Boris Pistorius in endorsing the deployment decision, according to the German news agency dpa. The endorsement resolution emphasized that “nuclear armament of the systems is not envisaged,” dpa reported.

Separate surveys conducted by the opinion research firms Forsa and Civey indicate deep divisions in German society on the deployment.

On July 19, Vipin Narang, the acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for space policy, told a Washington think tank that NATO has made less prominent adjustments to its nuclear forces that were not highlighted at the NATO summit. These include an ongoing “raising and refreshing [of] the nuclear IQ” with a focus on developing expertise in nuclear planning.

Narang said the alliance is integrating the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb and the F-35 combat aircraft as the new combination of systems for delivery of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons. He added there are no plans to change where nuclear weapons are stored in Europe.

September 2024
By Michael T. Klare

The United States has approved its inaugural sale to Taiwan of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and attack drones. The transaction, announced by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency on June 18, is worth an estimated $360 million.

Previous U.S. sales to the self-governing island largely have involved major crewed platforms such as F-16 fighters and M-1 Abrams tanks, but the drone sale involves small, man-portable devices employing artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies to locate and attack enemy targets with minimal human oversight.

“Until now, we have no real loitering munition for the army to use. So after about nine months, the U.S. government decided to sell these to Taiwan,” Chen Kuo-ming, a Taipei-based defense analyst, told Defense News.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the new arms package on June 18. Because no objection was raised within 30 days, negotiations are proceeding on its final provisions. Although the numbers could change, the package is slated to include the Switchblade 300 loitering munition and the ALTIUS 600M-V multipurpose UAV. Armed drones of this sort largely are intended for use by ground combat forces against an opponent’s armored vehicles, artillery pieces, and command posts located beyond line of sight.

The Switchblade 300, made by AeroVironment, can carry an explosive payload of 3.7 pounds and has a flight range of 30 kilometers and a loiter time of 20 minutes. It is described as a “kamikaze” drone because it is intended to seek out enemy armored vehicles or other enemy assets and crash into them, detonating its payload on impact. The plan is for Taiwan to receive 720 Switchblade missiles plus 101 SB 300 fire-control systems, for a total of $60 million.

The ALTIUS 600M-V UAV, made by Anduril Industries, can be used as a loitering munition as well as a reconnaissance drone or communications relay. It is equipped with electro-optic/infrared cameras for target acquisition and possesses greater range (440 kilometers) and flight endurance (up to four hours) than the Switchblade.

According to Anduril, the ALTIUS 600M-V “has demonstrated autonomous coordinated strike, target recognition, and collaborative teaming,” allowing a single operator to control multiple drones. The proposed sale to Taiwan incorporates up to 291 ALTIUS missiles plus their launch systems and transport trailers, worth a combined $300 million.

The sale of such devices reflects a growing Pentagon consensus that Taiwan could not match China’s military on a one-to-one basis in conventional military platforms, such as tanks, destroyers, and jet fighters. Instead, Taiwan must adopt an asymmetric strategy, using drones and other unconventional weapons to inflict heavy losses if Chinese forces attempt to invade and occupy the island. By providing the Taiwanese with plentiful short-range defensive weapons such as the Switchblade and ALTIUS, U.S. officials hope China will think twice before undertaking an invasion or, if the Chinese military does invade, the assault will be slowed long enough to allow U.S. and other friendly forces to come to the island’s rescue.

The same philosophy undergirds the Pentagon’s Replicator strategy, intended to speed the delivery of small unmanned weapons to U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region. “Replicator is meant to help us overcome [China’s] biggest advantage, which is mass. More ships. More missiles. More people,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said when announcing the program in August 2023.

By arming U.S. forces with “multiple thousands” of autonomous weapons systems, she said, “[w]e’ll counter the [Chinese military’s] mass with mass of our own, but ours will be harder to plan for, harder to hit, harder to beat.”

On May 6, Hicks announced that Switchblade drones would be part of the first tranche of munitions to be procured under the Replicator program. “U.S.-supplied Switchblade drones have already demonstrated their utility in Ukraine, and this system will provide additional capability to U.S. forces,” the Pentagon said in a statement.

When viewed together, the decision to supply armed drones to Taiwan and to U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region can be seen as part of a larger U.S. strategy for countering China in a future war over Taiwan, a scenario that many Pentagon leaders believe is increasingly likely.

China wants “to offer the world a short, sharp war so that it is a fait accompli before the world can get their act together,” Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told The Washington Post on June 10 in reference to a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

To prevent such an invasion from succeeding, the Pentagon plans to deploy thousands of unmanned ships, planes, and submarines in the region before larger, crewed platforms can arrive in strength.

“I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities,” Paparo said. That way, “I can make their lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything.”

September 2024
By Xiaodon Liang

The United States will continue building a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force despite escalating cost overruns, according to the Pentagon.

The acquisition program for the Sentinel ICBM, which involves the design and purchase of 659 missiles and the refurbishment and construction of support infrastructure, is now projected to cost $141 billion in 2020 dollars. That figure is 81 percent more than estimated when the Pentagon granted Milestone B approval in September 2020, at which point the program was authorized to enter the engineering and manufacturing development phase.

The decision to continue the program and the new cost estimate were announced in a July 8 press briefing by William LaPlante, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, after the Pentagon completed a statutorily mandated review triggered by cost projection increases first disclosed to Congress in January. (See ACT, March 2024.) The Defense Department has not released a public report on the six-month review.

The estimate does not take into account the W87-1 nuclear warhead for the ICBM, which the National Nuclear Security Administration believes will cost $15.9 billion.

LaPlante led the review process required by the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which contains fiscal discipline measures that are triggered when the cost increases of a major acquisition program cross certain thresholds. A breach is triggered by a 15 percent unit cost increase over the baseline, while a critical breach requires a rise of 25 percent over the baseline. In December, before the in-depth review, the Air Force found that running cost estimates indicated that the Sentinel program was in critical breach of the law.

The Pentagon has not released an updated estimate of the cost in current and future dollars, but application of the same adjustment as the one used in the last declassified Selected Acquisition Report on the Sentinel program from December 2023 would suggest an inflation-adjusted cost of $202 billion.

“I am deeply disappointed by the decision to continue this wasteful and unnecessary endeavor,” Rep. John Garamendi (D-Calif.) said in a July 9 press release. A leading congressional critic of the Sentinel program, Garamendi expressed regret that the review did not address “whether it is necessary to maintain the land-based leg of the nuclear triad at its current levels” and called on the Defense Department and the White House to revisit this question.

LaPlante certified that the ICBM program was essential to national security and that there are no alternatives. Under the Nunn-McCurdy Act, these certifications are required to continue a program that is in critical breach of cost thresholds. LaPlante confirmed during the July 8 briefing he had rescinded the program’s Milestone B approval and announced that he had requested that the Air Force develop a plan for restructuring the program. These steps are also mandated by the act.

LaPlante said the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office had led a study of “four or five” alternatives to the Sentinel program, including extension of the service life of the existing Minuteman III ICBM until 2070, a road-mobile basing mode, and “hybrid options.” All major alternatives were rejected because they did not meet requirements or were more costly than the current plan.

Vipin Narang, the acting assistant secretary of defense for space policy, confirmed on July 19 that the review also considered adapting the Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile for a ground-based role. He said that option was rejected because it did not produce any significant cost savings while creating a common point of failure across the sea- and land-based legs of the nuclear triad.

In March, Garamendi and Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) sent a letter to Kristyn Jones, acting undersecretary of the Air Force, urging her to ensure that the Nunn-McCurdy review would price out alternative plans to extend the service life of the Minuteman III to 2030, 2040, or 2050.

Although the Pentagon did not consider these options, the Air Force opted to reduce the complexity of ICBM launch facilities as a result of the review with the hope of saving time and money, LaPlante said. Without any adjustments, the expected cost of the original Sentinel plan had increased to $160 billion in 2020 dollars, 106 percent over the Milestone B baseline.

The program is now “several” years behind schedule, according to LaPlante. The Pentagon previously anticipated a two-year delay past the May 2029 target for initial deployment. (See ACT, May 2023.)

Officials blamed rising cost estimates on an immature understanding of the scope of work needed for the ground segment of the program when Milestone B approval was granted. Andrew Hunter, an Air Force senior acquisition executive, said at the July 8 press briefing that the ground segment, which includes not only launch facilities but also silos and communications infrastructure, accounted for “the vast majority” of the cost increase. Speaking July 20 in the United Kingdom, Hunter said, “I think there are elements of the ground infrastructure where there may be opportunities for competition,” Breaking Defense reported.

Northrop Grumman has been the lead contractor for the Sentinel program since September 2020, while Bechtel is the primary construction subcontractor.

September 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

North Korea deployed launchers for nuclear-capable missiles along its southern border after South Korea and the United States announced new guidelines for strengthening U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden announced the new guidelines for responding to North Korean threats during a July 11 meeting in Washington. The joint statement described the guidelines document as providing a “solid foundation” for enhancing South Korean-U.S. cooperation on extended nuclear deterrence.

The guidelines were crafted by the Nuclear Consultative Group, a body Biden and Yoon established in 2023 to increase South Korean participation in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence decision-making. (See ACT, May 2023.)

Although the presidents did not go into detail about the nature of the guidelines, a U.S. Defense Department press release on July 11 said the document will “provide principles and procedures to assist alliance policy and military authorities in maintaining effective nuclear deterrence policy and posture.”

Yoon said that, as a result of the guidelines and the work of the consultative group, U.S. nuclear assets will be “specifically assigned” to Korean peninsula missions. He described the move as an upgrade to the alliance.

Vipin Narang, the acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for space policy and co-chair of the consultative group, said on July 16 that the guidelines will allow the group to “evolve with the threat environment.”

Narang, speaking to VOA Korean Service, said that South Korea and the United States approach extended deterrence as “equal partners,” but reiterated that only the U.S. president will be able to authorize the use of nuclear weapons.

In their statement, Biden and Yoon also called for the consultative group to make further progress on several issues, including South Korean conventional support for U.S. nuclear operations “through conventional-nuclear integration” and “nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies.”

North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on July 13 described the announcement as a demonstration of South Korean and U.S. “sinister intentions to step up preparation for a nuclear war” with North Korea. Its statement said that Seoul and Washington are driving Pyongyang to “further improve its nuclear deterrent readiness and add important elements” to its nuclear arsenal.

Several weeks later, North Korea announced the deployment of the 250 missile launchers to military units stationed near the border with South Korea.

In an Aug. 4 speech marking the delivery, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un described the systems as “new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers” for the military’s “new core offensive weapon.” He said that North Korea is “attaining [its] first-stage goal of building missile forces in the first line units on the front” with South Korea.

Images from the event suggest that the launchers are designed for the Hwasong-11D, a short-range ballistic missile that North Korea says is nuclear capable. Each launcher can carry four missiles. Independent assessments of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal suggest that the country has assembled an estimated 50 warheads.

Kim blamed U.S. military activity for North Korea’s decision to deploy the launchers. He said that as the “U.S.-led alliance” evolves into a “nuclear-based military block, the military security environment surrounding” North Korea is changing drastically and that Pyongyang cannot “rest content with its current level of war deterrent.” He said that South Korea has “grown reckless enough” to want to share U.S. nuclear weapons.

North Korea later accused the United States and South Korea of using joint military exercises as “preparation for a war.” An Aug. 18 commentary in KCNA rejected the U.S. description of the annual exercises as “defensive” and described the drills as “offensive and provocative.”

South Korea and the United States announced previously that the annual August drills, called Ulchi Freedom, would not include responding to a North Korean nuclear attack. But South Korea announced separate plans to hold its own nuclear response training during the joint exercise.

The South Korean unilateral exercises also included responding to “gray zone provocations,” such as the trash-filled balloons that North Korea sends over the border and false information spread by “anti-state forces” within South Korea, and defending infrastructure from attacks, Yoon said in an Aug. 19 speech.

Yoon raised similar concerns about divisive propaganda during an Aug. 15 speech laying out South Korea’s new strategy for unification with North Korea.

Yoon reaffirmed South Korea’s commitment to “peaceful unification based on freedom and democracy,” even though North Korea abandoned the goal of unification last year. (See ACT, January/February 2024.)

To achieve unification, Yoon said South Korea must pursue “three key undertakings” of building the capabilities to pursue “freedom-based unification,” fostering a “strong desire for unification” among the North Korean people, and acting in solidarity with the international community.

September 2024
By Xiaodon Liang

China confirmed that it has rejected the U.S. offer for more nuclear arms control talks as a follow-on to a dialogue held Nov. 6. (See ACT, June 2024; December 2023).

At a July 17 press conference, Lin Jian, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, criticized the U.S. decision to continue selling arms to Taiwan. “Consequently, the Chinese side has decided to hold off discussion with the [United States] on a new round of consultations on arms control and nonproliferation,” he said.

Lin said that China “stands ready to maintain communications” on international arms control but only if the United States respects China’s “core interests and create[s] necessary conditions for dialogue and exchange.”

In response, U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said on July 17 that the Chinese decision to entangle nuclear arms control talks with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “undermines strategic stability” and “increases the risk of arms race dynamics.” He added that the United States remains open to “developing and implementing concrete risk-reduction measures.”

Since the meeting last November, the United States has announced the approval of several foreign military sales packages for Taiwan. Approvals of these packages do not always result in arms contracts or arms deliveries.

In December 2023 and February 2024, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced that the State Department had approved the transfer of two bundles of various military electronics and related support services to Taiwan worth $300 million and $75 million, respectively. Contracts for these items will be tendered by the United States.

On June 5, the agency announced the potential sale of $300 million in F-16 spare and repair parts for Taiwan’s air force, to be taken out of U.S. Air Force stock. On June 18, the agency announced the approval of a transfer to Taiwan of $360 million in loitering munitions and unmanned aerial vehicles.

These transfers are administered by the U.S. government. The Taiwanese government negotiates commercial arms purchases directly from U.S.-based contractors, but data on approval of these transfers are published by the State Department on an annual basis only.

In April, Congress approved and President Joe Biden signed into law a supplemental foreign military aid package that included an appropriation of $2 billion in foreign military financing for Taiwan. This sum, which may be used for loans and loan guarantees, supplements a $300 million fund created as part of regular fiscal year 2024 State Department appropriations.

Congress authorized military financing for Taiwan in the fiscal year 2023 defense authorization act, but did not appropriate funds in the same budget cycle.

Last August, the Biden administration notified Congress that it would offer $80 million in military financing support for an arms transfer to Taiwan for the first time, Reuters reported. The program normally is used for sovereign states.

September 2024
By Garrett Welch

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited the nuclear power plant in the Kursk region of Russia as threats to the facility grew because of the Russian war against Ukraine.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi told a news conference after the Aug. 27 site visit that the plant was extremely fragile because it had no protective dome. “The danger or possibility of a nuclear accident has emerged near here,” he said according to Reuters.

Grossi said the plant was still operating very close to normal, but this meant the security situation was even more serious, the news agency reported.

Russia has accused Ukrainian forces, which recently launched a ground assault into the Kursk region, of repeated attacks on the plant. Reuters reported on Aug. 27 that Ukraine has not responded to the allegations.

The IAEA has said it was informed by Russia on Aug. 22 that the remains of a drone had been found within the plant. The same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Ukraine of trying to strike the Kursk facility in an overnight attack.

Tensions rose in recent weeks after Ukrainian forces launched a ground assault and pushed into Russian territory for the first time since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in 2022. As of Aug. 27, Kyiv claimed to control roughly 1,263 square kilometers of Russian territory in the Kursk region and advanced to within 40 kilometers of the plant.

The nuclear facility contains six reactors, of which two are fully operational, two are shut down, and two are under construction. According to photos obtained by the BBC, Russian forces appear to be constructing defenses and digging trenches near the facility. Russia has since accused Ukraine of planning to attack the facility and blame it on Russia, which Ukraine denied as “insane” propaganda.

For months, Grossi also has warned about potential damage to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, which Russia occupied early in the war and has been attacked by drones. “These reckless attacks (against both plants) endanger nuclear safety at the plant and increase the risk of a nuclear accident. They must stop now,” Grossi said in an Aug. 11 statement.

The IAEA team on-site at Zaporizhzhia reported that a fire broke out at one of the facility’s cooling towers on Aug. 11. The agency statement said the team “witnessed thick dark smoke coming from the northwestern area of the plant.” The team also reported hearing an explosion, and the Russian operators at the facility reported that “a drone had allegedly struck one of the plant’s two cooling towers.”

The fire has been contained, but Zaporizhzhia personnel suggested that the cooling tower may need to be dismantled. The IAEA statement confirmed that there was no immediate impact on nuclear safety.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Aug. 12 blamed Russian forces for starting the fire in an attempt at “nuclear blackmail,” while Zaporizhzhia’s Kremlin-installed governor blamed Ukrainian shelling.

The IAEA inspected photos of the cooling tower and did not report any visible foreign objects among the debris. Grossi said the evidence gathered suggests that the fire did not start at the base of the cooling tower.

Russia previously accused Ukraine of conducting drone strikes on June 19 and 21 that cut power to residents of Enerhodar, near the Zaporizhzhia plant, which the IAEA condemned as “unacceptable.” (See ACT, July/August 2024.) The IAEA, in an Aug. 17 statement, confirmed that a drone strike hit a road around the plant’s protected area that day.

In an Aug. 9 statement, Grossi called on both parties “to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid a nuclear accident.” He reiterated that “any military action taken against the plant represents a clear violation of the five concrete principles for protecting the facility,” established by the UN Security Council in 2023. These five principles seek to ensure nuclear safety and security, including prohibitions on an attack of “any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel.”

Prior to the latest round of escalations, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding that Russia immediately return full control of the Zaporizhzhia plant to Ukraine.

September 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

Japan and the United States have reaffirmed and expanded their commitments to maintain peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, where extended deterrence is becoming a significant component of alliance and regional cooperation.

At the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting, known informally as 2+2, on July 28 in Tokyo, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defense Minister Minoru Kihara held talks with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on regional security in Asia and on Japanese-U.S. alliance cooperation. The last such meeting was in Washington in January 2023.

According to a joint statement, the officials “reaffirmed their intent to implement new strategic initiatives…including upgrading alliance command and control, deepening defense industry and advanced technology cooperation, and enhancing cross-domain operations.”

During a joint press conference, Austin emphasized that the upgrade of the “U.S. Forces Japan to a Joint Force Headquarters with expanded missions and operational responsibilities…will be the most significant change to [the command] since its creation and one of the strongest improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years.”

Following the 2+2 meeting, which focuses on alliance security cooperation generally, the four officials attended the first Japanese-U.S. ministerial meeting dedicated specifically to deterrence. In those talks, the officials focused on the U.S. commitment under the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to extend deterrence to Japan by guaranteeing the use of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear forces, to counter enemy threats. The credibility of these assurances is a central issue in alliance policy, especially given rising regional tensions.

The United States and another extended deterrence partner, South Korea, already upgraded their consultative body, the Nuclear Consultative Group, which issued guidelines earlier in July.

Japan and the United States have conducted the extended deterrence dialogue at the working level since 2010. Although that format will continue as a primary platform, Kihara emphasized the importance of the new ministerial initiative, stating that, “[i]n view of the severe security environment, including nuclear, it was extremely meaningful that the first ministerial meeting dedicated [solely] to extended deterrence was held [and] where intensive discussions took place.”

In a second joint statement, the officials said that they “shared assessments of an increasingly deteriorating regional security environment” related to China, North Korea, and Russia. As a result, “the United States and Japan reiterated the need to reinforce the alliance’s deterrence posture, and manage existing and emerging strategic threats through deterrence, arms control, risk reduction, and nonproliferation.”

The officials also reaffirmed their “commitment to close consultations on U.S. nuclear policy and posture, as well as the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear military matters within the [a]lliance.”

“Our commitment to Japan’s defense is unwavering, and that includes extended deterrence by providing the full range of our conventional and nuclear capabilities. This commitment is at the heart of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and our alliance has never been stronger,” Austin said.

The meetings followed Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s official visit to Washington in April and are aimed at realizing a “free and open” Indo-Pacific region.

Japan is increasing its reliance on U.S. extended deterrence, but worldwide nuclear disarmament remains a national goal.

Speaking in Hiroshima on Aug. 6, the anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of that city, Kishida noted that “[t]he widening division within the international community over approaches to nuclear disarmament, Russia’s nuclear threat, and other concerns make the situation surrounding nuclear disarmament all the more challenging.”

But “no matter how arduous this path towards a world without nuclear weapons may be, we must continue moving forward along that path,” he said.

Kishida, who represents Hiroshima’s 1st legislative district, has a reputation for a strong political interest in nuclear disarmament. He recently announced that he would not run for the upcoming party leadership vote in September, meaning that Japan is expected to have new prime minister later that month. Before he steps down, he plans a last trip to the UN headquarters in New York.

September 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

With the future of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in the balance, states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are persisting in efforts to manage divisions and preserve the regime.

At the second meeting to prepare for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, the 118 states-parties showed that although chronic tensions over core nuclear weapons issues continue and deepen, there is still serious interest in salvaging the NPT regime.

The preparatory committee meeting was held July 22-Aug. 2 in Geneva to review implementation of the landmark 1968 treaty and develop a plan for making progress on its key components of nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These preparatory committee meetings are intended to lay the groundwork for the NPT review conferences, which usually are scheduled every five years.

“The impact of the current contentious geopolitical environment has put the NPT under enormous strain. But lapsing into cynicism and inaction cannot be permitted; the stakes are too high,” said Izumi Nakamitsu, UN undersecretary-general and high representative for disarmament affairs, at the opening session.

Amid growing nuclear risks and geopolitical confrontations, delegates diverged on many issues such as the implementation of key treaty obligations and Iran’s nonproliferation commitments.

One particularly contentious topic was nuclear sharing arrangements, including the recent deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus. (See ACT, May 2024.) In a joint statement, Belarus and Russia said that the current international strategic environment is not favorable for disarmament and they justified the deployment by arguing that “such arrangements have been practiced by NATO members.”

Responding to international criticism, the Russian delegation said that the deployment “does not change the strategic situation at all because [the weapons] cannot reach the United States.”

Differences over the Russian deployment and NATO’s nuclear weapons policy led to the intense exchange of views among Belarus, Russia, Iran, the United States, and other NATO members. Italy, for example, echoed other allies in arguing that NATO nuclear sharing arrangements are legally compatible with the NPT and “have prevented proliferation…. No one objected to these arrangements for decades” until Russia’s “illegal annexation of Crimea,” an Italian delegate said.

Many states, including within the Non-Aligned Movement and New Agenda Coalition, voiced concerns regarding nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and extended deterrence more generally because they rest on threats of nuclear weapons use. These states-parties urged all countries to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies.

The NPT process has long considered the ideal outcome of preparatory committee meetings to be a formal consensus agreement on the draft rules of procedure and provisional agenda, along with a formal summary by the meeting chair and recommendations for the review conference.

But because of intense divisions, no meeting since 2002 has adopted a chair’s factual summary by consensus. Instead, meeting chairs normally issue their factual summary as a working paper on their own authority. This is meant to put on record what states discussed during the meeting and serve as a blueprint for further discussion.

At last year’s first preparatory committee meeting, Iran, backed by Russia and Syria, challenged this practice and refused to list the chair’s summary even as a working paper, claiming that the summary favored Western states. Due to the objection, that meeting concluded unprecedently without a chair’s summary. (See ACT, September 2023.)

By contrast, the latest preparatory committee meeting listed the chair’s summary as a working paper in the meeting’s report, but with another unprecedented ending. On the last day, Russia asked the chair to insert a footnote to the summary to clarify that the document “represents solely the views of the chairman” and to add that “it is not agreed upon by the delegations and it does not fully reflect the positions of the delegations. This document shall not be considered as a basis for future work within the NPT review process.”

Austria, Germany, Mexico, and the Netherlands questioned this suggestion, but the meeting accepted Russia’s footnote and succeeded in leaving a chair’s summary in the record.

As the session concluded, the chair, Akan Rakhmetullin, Kazakhstan’s deputy foreign minister, admitted that, “undeniably, this meeting took place in extremely difficult challenging circumstances.” But he insisted that he “witnessed rich and active exchanges of positions which demonstrated the persistent interest of states-parties and the unquestionable relevance of this treaty.”

The third preparatory committee meeting is set for April 9-May 9, 2025, in New York and will be chaired by Harold Agyeman, Ghana’s UN ambassador.