Remarks by Daryl G. Kimball for the Japan Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

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"Steps to Move Us Back from the Nuclear Brink" Remarks by Daryl G. Kimball for the Japan Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and the Japan NGO Network for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (JANA) at the Public Symposium Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, September 26, 2024.

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"Steps to Move Us Back from the Nuclear Brink"

Remarks by Daryl G. Kimball for the Japan Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

and the Japan NGO Network for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (JANA)

Public Symposium Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, September 26, 2024

Event streaming link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amfrs8WilT4

Thanks to the Japan Network for Nuclear Weapons Abolition and the Japan Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons for the invitation to speak and for your important efforts for safer world.

Over the decades, public pressure for disarmament diplomacy has helped reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, halted nuclear testing, and prevented proliferation.

But as we approach the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear risks are growing once again. Human civilization remains precariously tethered to the existence of nuclear weapons and the threat they might be used again.

As U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres warned in June: "We need to move back from the nuclear brink."

All of the major nuclear weapon states are spending tens of billions of dollars modernizing their arsenals, some are recklessly threatening nuclear first use, and the regime designed to prevent the use, testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons is under stress.

The last remaining agreement limiting the world's two largest arsenals, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), will expire on February 5, 2026.

We need to see disarmament commitments translated into action.

The nuclear weapons states must, of course, lead the way by engaging in meaningful negotiations to cap and further reduce their deadly arsenals, but all countries need to step up, including Japan.

To get back on track, responsible leaders will need to deploy new, more creative approaches to put in place new constraints and guardrails against against nuclear catastrophe.

As we commemorate the International Day for Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, I would like to share some observations and recommendations.

Today none of the nuclear armed states are meeting their legal obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to engage in negotiations to end the arms race and on disarmament.

As we get closer to the expiration date for New START, Russian President Vladimir Putin has refused to engage with the Biden administration on its 2023 offer to discuss “without preconditions” a new nuclear arms control framework to prevent an unconstrained nuclear arms race. Putin’s excuse is that such a dialogue would not be fruitful as long as Washington continues to support Ukraine as it defends itself against Russian aggression.

Meanwhile, China is building up its smaller but deadly nuclear force now estimated to consist of some 310 warheads on long-range missiles, with perhaps 500 nuclear weapons in total. Unfortunately, China’s leaders also have rejected U.S. offers for bilateral follow-up talks on nuclear risk reduction and arms control issues, citing ongoing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

If Russia and the United States exceed New START limits, it would destabilize their mutual balance of nuclear terror, increase price tag of the $1.5 trillion U.S. nuclear modernization program, and prompt China to accelerate its own nuclear buildup. Such an action-reaction cycle would be madness.

What can be done?

First, in the coming weeks, U.S. President Joe Biden and whoever is the next president-elect should reaffirm U.S. support for negotiating a new nuclear arms control framework with Russia.

Because such a deal would be difficult to hammer out and take time, the U.S. president should propose that Washington and Moscow conclude a simple, bilateral understanding promising that neither side shall increase the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads beyond the New START limits of 1,550 deployed warheads each. This would remain in force until they can conclude a more comprehensive, durable framework to limit and reduce their deadly nuclear arsenals.

As long as Russia and the United States agree to cap their strategic deployed nuclear arsenals and work to negotiate a new nuclear arms reduction framework, Washington, along with leading non-nuclear-weapon states, should call on China, France, and the United Kingdom to freeze the overall size of their nuclear arsenals and negotiate a ban on fissile material production for weapons.

Second, as China continues to decline talks with Washington on nuclear matters, it has an even greater responsibility to elevate the underperforming P5 consultation process, the dialogue on nuclear risk reduction involving the NPT’s five nuclear-weapon states, that has been underway since 2010.

China, which now chairs the group, is in a unique position to launch an ambitious program to increase the frequency of these meetings; raise the level of participation; and expand the topics of discussion, including exchanges on nuclear postures and joint pledges not to use nuclear weapons first. The group also needs to try to build on their past efforts.

For example, the five states could expand on their 2022 joint declaration that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” by adopting a statement in the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War that pledges that the nuclear powers will “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party and against other countries.”

Senior U.S. diplomats should clarify that they will not seek and will not pursue an increase in the size or diversity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal as long as Russia continues to respect the New START ceilings and China does not expand its strategic nuclear arsenal significantly, which it is not likely going to do until the year 2030 or later.

China could also explain what is driving its buildup and clarify its nuclear modernization plans. Such an approach would help Beijing avoid worst-case assumptions about its intentions and the reduce the potential for a three-way arms race.

Third, leading non-nuclear-weapon states not only need to press the United States and Russia to engage on nuclear arms control and push China to halt its nuclear buildup.

The also need to step forward and lead. For example, they should consider launching a new initiative that would lead to a series of high-level nuclear disarmament summits involving a group of 20 to 30 leaders from nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-weapon states.

As outlined in a new Arms Control Association report, such an approach could help overcome existing obstacles of disarmament diplomacy, increase public pressure action, and complement existing forums designed to advance progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Finally, Japan also has a crucial role to play. As Fumio Kishida prepares to step down as prime minister, he and his successor could help advance efforts to prevent nuclear war and nuclear arms racing by convening a landmark two-day global conference on the human health and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons next year as the world marks the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Such a conference would be consistent with Japan's history of leadership in building the global arms control and nonproliferation system. It could not only recall the devastation and legacy of the atomic bombings of 1945 and honor the Hibakusha, but underscore the devastating global effects of more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions since 1945 and the toxic legacy of nuclear weapons production.

Through his career, Kishida has helped Japan increase attention on the nuclear danger. During his tenure as a foreign minister of Japan, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs led a “Research Study on Impacts of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Various Aspects,” which was published in March 2014. He also hosted the historic 2016 visit of then-U.S. President Barack Obama to his hometown Hiroshima.

As Prime Minister, he chose Hiroshima as the location for the 2023 Group of Seven (G7) Summit. This helped to elevate nuclear disarmament on the global agenda. And Kishida also pursued initiatives to advance disarmament education and talks on a ban on fissile material production for weapons.

As Kishida said at the G7 Summit and on other occasions: "Conveying the reality of the nuclear attack is important as a starting point for all nuclear disarmament efforts."

Indeed, in this era of heightened nuclear risks, it is imperative that global leaders have a deeper appreciation and understanding of the impacts of nuclear weapons testing, production, and use.

This is all the more important as the number of Hibakusha with direct memories of the atomic attacks continues to dwindle.

Japan -- the only nation that has experienced the unspeakable horrors of a nuclear weapons attack -- is uniquely positioned to take the lead for a high-level nuclear weapons impacts conference in 2025.

A Japan-convened Nuclear Weapons Impacts conference would also energize public pressure in Japan and around the globe for further action to put us back on the path to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kishida's successor can and should consider helping to advance disarmament efforts by organizing such a conference.

In this era of heightened nuclear risk, all of us must reflect on what is at stake and what each of us can do to redouble our efforts to push our leaders to take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons before it is too late.

Thank you.

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Nuclear Disarmament Summits: A Proposal for Rejuvenating Progress Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

Submitted by Libby Flatoff on Fri, 09/13/2024 - 17:15

The failure to abolish nuclear weapons is due in part to the limitations of the current nuclear disarmament architecture. The complex array of treaties, voluntary multilateral initiatives, and negotiating forums dedicated to fostering action toward the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons has produced many important initiatives and agreements designed to reduce nuclear risks, curb proliferation, and slow nuclear arms competition.

REMARKS: Closing the Door on Nuclear Testing to Honor Past Generations and Build a Better Future for the Next Generations

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ACA Research Assistant Shizuka Kuramitsu speaks at the UNGA high-level plenary for the International Day Against Nuclear Tests (IDANT).

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Closing the Door on Nuclear Testing to Honor Past Generations and Build a Better Future for the Next Generations 

Shizuka Kuramitsu, Research Assistant, Arms Control Association, and former participant of the #Leaders4Tomorrow project of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’ #Youth4Disarmament Programme

President of the General Assembly,

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the outset, allow me to thank His Excellency Dennis Francis, President of the General Assembly, and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs for this opportunity. Thank you for your leadership in keeping the world’s attention on this priority issue as we commemorate the International Day Against Nuclear Testing of last week.

My name is Shizuka Kuramitsu - I am a former participant of the #Leaders4Tomorrow project of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’ #Youth4Disarmament Programme, who now working as a research assistant at a civil society organization called the Arms Control Association in Washington D.C.

As a representative of civil society and member of an emerging, younger generation of nuclear disarmament researchers and activists, I would like to share the following observations for Member States to consider.

Our generation is very concerned. We see growing dangers of nuclear weapons and feel aghast at the human consequences of past nuclear weapons development, testing, and use.

I am a native of Hiroshima, where the first nuclear test explosion in warfare took place. I grew up surrounded by the A-bomb survivors in my hometown. I heard their testimonials from generations of hibakusha about the horrors of the first use of nuclear weapons in war.

As if the bombings of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not horrific and inhumane enough, the world's nuclear weapons states have detonated more than 2,000 nuclear weapon test explosions.

The adverse health, social, environmental, and enduring consequences of these detonations is still too poorly understood, and the victims and survivors are still in need of medical monitoring and assistance. Their voices need to be heard and answered.

We need more research, more resources, and more support for nuclear testing victims.

We need acknowledgement and apologies for the wrongs committed in the past.

We need to see a strong commitment to never repeat the evil of nuclear detonations.

About ten years ago, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon said:

“The best way to honour the victims of past tests is to prevent any in the future.”

I agree.

But we must continually ask ourselves: Are we doing what is necessary to prevent further detonations for nuclear weapon testing or any nuclear detonations in a war in the future?

No, we are not.

Collectively, we are not doing enough to strengthen the taboo against the use and testing of nuclear weapons, not doing enough to halt a new arms race, and not doing enough to get back on track to build a world without nuclear weapons.

We must recall that generations of concerned citizens, scientists, diplomats, doctors, mothers and fathers from around the world pressed global leaders to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere, then everywhere through the 1996 CTBT.

Even though the treaty has not yet entered into force, it remains one of the most successful nuclear risk reduction and nonproliferation agreements in history.

But we cannot take it for granted.

Just in the past months, a former national security official called for a resumption of U.S. nuclear testing, and another state withdrew its ratification of the CTBT.

As we observe another International Day Against Nuclear Testing, we must honor communities around the world that have been harmed by nuclear testing, and past generations who have fought for a global test moratorium.

We need more than statements, we need actions. Now is the time to do so by recommitting ourselves to prevent the resumption of nuclear testing through energetic, high-level, bilateral, and multilateral diplomacy through all possible channels, the UN General Assembly, the Security Council and beyond.

Going forward, we can rebuild relationships, break the trust deficit, stop the what-aboutism, and act in the interest of humanity.

As my generation knows, when we start telling ourselves that we're doing enough, we stop moving forward and improving as a person.

When we point fingers at one another, even young people know that we will fail to halt the arms race.

Failure must never be an option - particularly for my generation, who will inherit this world and live with its consequences.

On behalf of a concerned, younger generation, I call on all UN Member States, especially those that have conducted nuclear detonations in the past, to be accountable, and commit to all possible efforts to preserve the taboo against nuclear testing so my generation -- and the generations that follow -- can live in a world without the fear of nuclear explosions and in a world that is moving closer to the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Thank you for your attention. 

Avoiding Nuclear War Through Nuclear Failsafe

September 2024
By Steven Andreasen 

At a time of heightened global tensions, when a handful of leaders with only a few minutes of decision time could determine the world’s fate, the next U.S. president must prioritize nuclear risk reduction. Faster, more powerful delivery systems and new technologies, including cyber and artificial intelligence, are increasing the risk of nuclear blunders.1 The best way to reduce these risks is global nuclear failsafe.2

A presidential military aide, disembarking from Marine One, carries the nuclear football, which contains the necessary materials for the U.S. president to launch a nuclear strike. (Photo by Andrew Leyden/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

“Failsafe” refers to safeguards that prevent the unauthorized, accidental, or mistaken use of a nuclear weapon. In the United States, these safeguards could involve nuclear policy or force posture, such as adopting a no-first-use policy or modifying the nuclear triad. They also could include procedures that would strengthen the decision-making process for nuclear use, such as placing guardrails around the president’s sole authority to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. Further, they could involve the design of nuclear weapons or delivery systems, for example, by ensuring that they are built to prevent a terrorist from using a stolen bomb or by installing a system that would allow for the postlaunch destruction of nuclear weapons or their associated delivery systems if launched by mistake.

Hollywood has highlighted these risks through iconic performances by its biggest stars. In the 1964 movie “Failsafe,” Moscow is destroyed by a U.S. nuclear bomber due to computer error. The box-office hit “Dr. Strangelove” involves an unauthorized U.S. nuclear attack on Russia instigated by the mad commander of U.S. nuclear forces. In the 1990s, “Crimson Tide” depicted a tense standoff between a U.S. nuclear submarine captain and his executive officer over whether a U.S. nuclear strike on Russia has been properly authorized.

The epilogue to “Crimson Tide” notes that Washington was taking steps to ensure that the scenario in the movie could not happen. Those steps were mandated in an independent review by the Kirkpatrick Commission, which the George H.W. Bush administration initiated at the urging of Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.).3 In 1992 the commission authorized more than 50 steps to prevent unauthorized, accidental, or mistaken nuclear use, but that was more than 30 years ago during the digital Stone Age. Since then, the world has entered a new era, with new threats and new technologies.

The good news: In the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated a new independent failsafe review.4 The Biden administration included a commitment to conduct this review in its Nuclear Posture Review with the results due this fall.5

The responsibility will fall to the next U.S. president to ensure that the review’s recommendations are implemented, to think creatively about enacting additional steps that might be needed and to institutionalize a process of future failsafe reviews to keep pace with evolving threats. Finally, the next president should make a major push to internationalize failsafe reviews in every nuclear-armed state. These reviews can be done without any agreements, treaties, or verification.

Each nation with nuclear arms has a responsibility to reduce the risk of nuclear blunders and can benefit from unilateral actions and similar actions taken by other nuclear powers. Leaders must give themselves every available tool to prevent a mistake from turning into a catastrophe.

ENDNOTES

1. Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn, “The Return of Doomsday,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 5, (September/October 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2019-08-06/return-doomsday.

2. Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group, “Advancing Global Nuclear ‘Fail-Safe,’” 
February 2023, https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/EASLG-Statement_GNFS_FINAL-022723.pdf.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, “Final Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Risk Reduction (FARR),” n.d., https://archive.org/details/FinalReportoftheFederalAdvisory
CommitteeonNuclearFailsafeandRiskReductionFARR/mode/2up.

4. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act states, “The Secretary of Defense shall provide for the conduct of an independent review of the safety, security, and reliability of covered nuclear systems. The Secretary shall ensure that such review is conducted in a manner similar to the review conducted by the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Failsafe and Risk Reduction.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).

5. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states, “[A]s directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, [the Department of Defense] will commission an independent review of the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons, [nuclear command, control, and communications], and integrated tactical warning/attack assessment systems.” U.S. Department of Defense, “2022 Nuclear Posture Review,” October 27, 2022, p. 13, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF#page=49.


Steven Andreasen, the National Security Council’s staff director for defense policy and arms control from 1993 to 2001, teaches national security policy and crisis management at the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota.

How to Spend $1 Trillion for the Military?

September 2024
By Jessica Sleight 

The next U.S. president will inherit a program to modernize each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad (intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarines, and bombers) to the tune of $1.7 trillion. The program is already marred by delays and overruns, including an 81 percent increase in the cost of the Sentinel ICBM and doubts over the ability of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to meet plutonium pit production goals. Additionally, China’s nuclear expansion and Russia’s growing reliance on nuclear coercion have fueled calls for an expanded U.S. nuclear force in the name of deterring two nuclear peer adversaries.

The United States plans to spend more than $1 trillion over the next 30 years on  modernizing its nuclear weapons arsenal, including the development of the new nuclear-armed B-21 Raider strategic bomber (shown). (Photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman)

The next president will need to prioritize a rethinking of nuclear strategy that avoids fear-based, short-term thinking; guards against gatekeeping and steamrolling by the military-industrial complex; and takes a holistic approach to strategic deterrence. The decisions made over the next four years will shape the U.S. nuclear arsenal for decades to come.

For former President Donald Trump, the influence of the Heritage Foundation, crafters of Project 2025, cannot be overlooked. A new report by a Heritage expert calls for the nuclear modernization program to be “accelerated and expanded,” including a new road-mobile ICBM, additional nuclear-armed submarines, and new nuclear variants of hypersonic, anti-ship, and intermediate-range missiles.1 It also calls for a small, accelerated nuclear strategy development process; the NNSA to be put on “wartime footing”; and forgoing some safety and environmental regulations in order to move quickly.

There is little justification for such steps, aside from an ambiguous “deterrence gap,” and no real consideration of budgetary impacts. Nevertheless, a second Trump administration likely would have little hesitancy with implementation, having previously introduced new capabilities, including a low-yield warhead for sea-based nuclear missiles. Following up with recommendations from the Heritage report would increase the bloated nuclear budget, threaten to replicate past harms to communities and the environment, further isolate nuclear decision-making, and place the United States squarely in a new nuclear arms race.

As a U.S. senator, Vice President Kamala Harris opposed the development of new low-yield nuclear warheads and encouraged broad interagency input into nuclear strategy development.2 As vice president, Harris has not had much presence on these issues, indicating that her potential administration may follow the Biden administration’s lead.

Pentagon modernization plans include investment in a new class of ballistic missile submarines.  (Photo by Paul Hennessy/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)

Recently, Biden officials announced a new strategic review and consideration of options to increase deployed nuclear weapons and other adjustments to U.S. posture to address the new threat environment.3 This comes on the heels of the 2023 report produced by the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which deemed the current modernization program “necessary but not sufficient.”4 Although the new strategic review is necessary, such efforts traditionally fall victim to momentum, tinkering at the margins of strategy development, undervaluing discussion of risks associated with U.S. action, and shutting down perspectives that may threaten current or future programs. It will be important for a potential Harris administration to stand against such practices.

The difference between a modernization program that ensures a credible nuclear deterrent and one that needlessly throws resources at new and additional weapons starts with nuclear strategy. There are additional options for a future administration to consider. For example, taking adversarial forces off the nuclear targeting list could alleviate a so-called need for new nuclear capabilities and decrease incentives for preemptive nuclear use.

It is imperative that the next president demand in-depth analysis of all options and refrain from deferring to those that conflate supremacy with security. Sober analysis of the assumptions, risks, budget implications, impacts on local communities and the environment, and non-nuclear strategic deterrence tools can save the United States from entering an unwinnable arms race.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert Peters, “A Nuclear Posture Review for the Next Administration,” Heritage Foundation Special Report, No. 287 (July 30, 2024), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/SR287.pdf.

2. See Edward J. Markey et al., Letter to Rex W. Tillerson, James N. Mattis, and Rick Perry, July 19, 2017, https://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-07-19-Markey-letter-State-Energy-DoD-NuclearPostureReview.pdf; “Harris Statement on Vote Against NDAA,” VoteSmart, June 18, 2018, https://justfacts.votesmart.org/public-statement/1257967/harris-statement-on-vote-against-ndaa/.

3. “Nuclear Threats and the Role of Allies: A Conversation With Acting Assistant Secretary Vipin Narang,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, n.d., https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-08/240801_Narang_Conversation_Secretary.pdf?VersionId=ITu9zdugiGiBfBig7gUEICXnw9nYn9yR (transcript of August 1, 2024, event).

4. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, “America’s Strategic Posture,” October 2023, https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/a/am/americas-strategic-posture/strategic-posture-commission-report.ashx.


Jessica Sleight is the Janne E. Nolan Nuclear Security Fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy.