October 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

U.S. President Joe Biden inherited the challenge of an unconstrained Iranian nuclear program and is poised to leave office with Tehran on the threshold of possessing nuclear weapons. Unlike January 2021, however, there is no straightforward path for Biden’s successor to roll back Iran’s nuclear program. Both the United States and Iran have acknowledged that the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is beyond revival.¹ Even if the deal could be restored, it is no longer a sufficient bulwark to guard against proliferation.

Despite Iran’s technical advances, a nuclear-armed Iran is not inevitable. Recently elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has expressed support for nuclear diplomacy and campaigned on the promise of lifting sanctions. Although Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, sets the country’s nuclear policy, he appears to have given Pezeshkian a green light to engage. Khamenei said in August that there is “no barrier” to negotiations even as he warned that Iran should not trust the United States.²

The next U.S. president will need to move swiftly to engage Tehran because the door for diplomacy may not remain open for long. If Khamenei withdraws his support for negotiations or regional tensions push the Iranian government to determine that nuclear weapons or Iran’s nuclear threshold status is necessary for deterrence, it will be more challenging to persuade Tehran to engage in nuclear talks. Washington also will need a new playbook for reaching an effective, verifiable nuclear deal because Tehran’s advances over the past several years will require a different approach to reducing proliferation risk sustainably.

The New Nuclear Threat

The risk posed by Iran’s nuclear program has been growing since Tehran began breaching the limits imposed by the JCPOA in 2019, a year after U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the accord and reimposed sanctions on the country. The steps that Tehran initially took to violate the JCPOA restrictions and build leverage in response to U.S. pressure were quickly and fully reversible.³ Since 2021, however, Iran has invested in new, more proliferation-sensitive capabilities. This acceleration appears driven by a desire to gain political leverage and reach nuclear weapons threshold status.

As a result of these activities, Iran’s nuclear program today is fundamentally different when compared to the pre-JCPOA period. Key differences include a shorter breakout time, expanded pathways to nuclear weapons development, and gaps in monitoring. In terms of the rapid breakout issue, Iran’s research and development activities, particularly on uranium enrichment, better position it to produce weapons-grade material quickly. As of mid-2024, Iran could produce enough nuclear material for one bomb in less than a week and enough material for five weapons in about three weeks.⁴ The time frame to produce multiple weapons will continue to shrink as Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent uranium-235, which is nearly the 90 percent U-235 that is considered weapons grade, grows and it installs additional advanced centrifuges, which enrich uranium more efficiently. This shortened time period increases the risk that Iran could try to break out between inspections of its enrichment facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or divert material to a covert location to complete enrichment to weapons-grade levels.

In addition to affecting the short-term proliferation risk, the decline in breakout time has longer-term implications. In the event of a new deal, the breakout time could be extended if limits were imposed on Iran’s uranium-enrichment program. Yet, Iran’s knowledge gains make it highly unlikely that any new deal could reach the 12-month breakout period achieved by the JCPOA. The United States will need to contend with the implications of a shorter breakout period and Iran’s ability to reconstitute its uranium-enrichment capacity more quickly as it considers the framework for a new nuclear agreement.

Meanwhile, Iran’s R&D activities over the past several years have diversified the pathways to developing weapons available to Tehran if the political decision were made to build a nuclear arsenal. For example, Iran now can produce weapons-grade uranium using fewer steps than was likely pre-JCPOA. Furthermore, Iran’s development of more efficient centrifuges increases the risk that it could set up an illicit, parallel program to produce weapons-grade material, a path called a “sneakout.”Although sneakout always has been a risk, Iran’s experience producing and operating more advanced centrifuges suggests that the country could pursue this option more rapidly and with less risk than was likely before the nuclear deal. A covert site with a smaller footprint that can produce weapons-grade materials more quickly decreases the likelihood of detection, making the pathway more viable.

Finally, there are the monitoring and inventory gaps. The JCPOA required Iran to implement voluntarily an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement, which gave IAEA inspectors more access to information and sites. The deal also allowed the agency to monitor every aspect of the uranium-enrichment program, including continuous surveillance of certain activities. This verification regime provided greater assurance that Iran could not divert materials to a covert program without swift IAEA detection and that any deviation from its declared activities, such as enrichment to higher levels of U-235, would be detected quickly. In February 2021, however, Iran suspended these more intrusive measures and now is implementing only the comprehensive safeguards agreement required under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which history has demonstrated to be insufficient in preventing proliferation.⁵

As a result of Iran’s decision to reduce monitoring, there is an increased risk that it could attempt to produce weapons-grade material at its declared enrichment facilities between inspections or divert non-nuclear materials, such as centrifuges, from facilities that are no longer inspected to a covert program. As IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated in 2023, it is no longer possible to ensure that the IAEA is accounting for all of Iran’s centrifuges.⁶

Beyond the immediate risk of diversion, the monitoring gaps could pose additional challenges for verifying a future deal. The IAEA already has stated that it may not be able to reestablish reliable baseline inventories in certain areas, such as centrifuge components and uranium ore concentrate. If a future deal imposes limits in areas where the IAEA does not have a baseline, monitoring uncertainty could undermine confidence in implementation.

In addition to these technical challenges, Iran’s nuclear posture is shifting. Tehran always has denied illegally pursuing nuclear weapons, despite assessments by the IAEA and the U.S. intelligence community that it had an organized nuclear weapons program through 2003 in violation of its NPT commitments.⁷ Although Iran still does not acknowledge the pre-2003 weapons program, high-level Iranian officials recently have suggested that the government will rethink its position on nuclear weapons if security conditions change. Pezeshkian emphasized after his election that “Iran’s defense doctrine does not include nuclear weapons,” but the shift in doctrine likely will persist.⁸ It is unlikely that high-level officials would suggest repeatedly that Khamenei’s fatwa against nuclear weapons could be reconsidered without his tacit approval. For instance, Kamal Kharrazi, an adviser to the supreme leader, said in April that “if the enemy threatens you, you will inevitably have to make changes to your doctrine.”⁹ Kharrazi made similar comments several days later when he said that Iran has reached “no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there [will] be no choice but to change our military doctrine.”

Further bolstering the threat that Iran could pursue a nuclear arsenal, Iranian leaders have emphasized that the government has the capabilities necessary to develop nuclear weapons. Prior to Kharrazi’s comments, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mohammad Eslami, acknowledged that Iran has the technical knowledge necessary to build nuclear weapons, as did his predecessor, Ali Akbar Salehi.¹⁰

Even if Tehran does not cross the nuclear weapons threshold, it no longer appears to be using its nuclear advances just to create leverage in future negotiations. Iran’s threats to develop nuclear weapons in response to direct attacks or targeting of its nuclear infrastructure suggest it is using threshold status to deter aggression.¹¹ The more Iran perceives benefits from retaining its threshold status, the more challenging it may be to negotiate a deal that moves Iran off the threshold. This shift underscores the importance of the next U.S. president moving swiftly to engage Iran and the importance of taking Iran’s changing security calculus, as well as its technical advances, into account when developing a new framework for negotiations.

Using the Lame Duck Wisely

Despite expressing support for restoring the JCPOA and nuclear diplomacy, the Biden administration has done little to slow Iran’s advancing nuclear program. Biden does not have enough time left in office to negotiate an agreement with Tehran, but his administration could still pursue deescalation to stabilize the nuclear crisis and reduce the risk of miscalculation. It pursued similar steps in 2023, but progress was derailed after the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on October 7 and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza.¹²

Pezeshkian’s support for engagement, however, may have reopened the door for diplomacy on the Iranian side. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on September 15 that Iran does not intend to wait until after the U.S. election to pursue negotiations. He suggested that Iran will pursue talks with other states, including European countries, if the United States does not want to engage. On the U.S. side, Biden’s decision not to seek reelection creates more political space for him to provide incentives if Tehran deescalates. In a deescalation package, the Biden administration’s primary focus should be on enhancing the monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program to reduce the risk of undetected breakout and diversion. For example, Washington could propose that Tehran negotiate an access agreement with the IAEA that would allow inspectors to visit nuclear facilities that contribute to the Iranian nuclear program but do not house nuclear materials, such as centrifuge production workshops. The IAEA has not inspected these facilities since February 2021 when Iran suspended the more intrusive monitoring arrangements put in place by the JCPOA.¹³ This additional transparency also would reduce the risk of the United States or Israel misjudging Iran’s nuclear advances or intentions and prematurely resorting to force.

In exchange, the United States could allow Iran to transfer additional funds held in foreign countries to the accounts set up in 2023 in Qatar that can be used to pay for certain humanitarian goods. Another option could be for the United States to allow sales of a certain quantity of Iranian oil. Both options could be facilitated quickly and reversed quickly if Tehran failed to meet its end of the bargain.

A deescalation package focused on limited relief in exchange for enhanced monitoring will not provide the wide-scale sanctions relief that Pezeshkian seeks, but it would give him an early victory without trading away aspects of the program that Iran views as critical leverage for negotiations on a more comprehensive deal. More transparency also would support Pezeshkian’s claims that the program is entirely peaceful and that Iran is willing to pursue a broader nuclear agreement.

A New U.S. Strategy

Irrespective of whether Biden negotiates an interim deescalatory package with Iran, the next U.S. president will need a diplomatic strategy that takes into account the realities of Iran’s advancing program, its shift in nuclear doctrine, and the credibility deficit Washington faces after withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018, despite Tehran’s compliance. A new approach to negotiations is particularly crucial because Iran’s nuclear advances make a military option, which successive U.S. presidents including Biden have threatened to use as a last resort, less viable.

U.S. or Israeli military strikes always have risked pushing Iran to make the decision to develop nuclear weapons, and the country’s threshold status and shift in doctrine now increase the credibility of that threat. Furthermore, Iran has hardened and dispersed its facilities in recent years, making military strikes more complex and challenging.¹⁴ There also is a risk that Iran already has diverted materials, such as centrifuges, to covert facilities. Iran’s nuclear advances and its possible diversion of materials would make it easier for the country to reconstitute its program after a military strike. As retired U.S. General Frank McKenzie, former commander of U.S. Central Command, said at a gathering in April, military action is the “worst way” to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. “The less you know about the problems and risks inherent in a strike, the more positive about its potential success one tends to be,” he said.¹⁵

Given these realities, diplomacy remains the best option for reducing the proliferation risks of Iran’s nuclear program in the long term. An effective deal can draw on aspects from the JCPOA, but will need to include several key elements as part of a new framework. The most critical element should be extensive monitoring and verification. The irreversibility of Iran’s knowledge gains, particularly on uranium enrichment, will leave Iran technically closer to developing nuclear weapons even if its nuclear program is subject to limitations under a new agreement. This proximity, coupled with the challenge of verifying that Iran has not diverted centrifuges or other material for a covert program, suggests that monitoring and verification measures will be even more crucial in a future accord.

In addition to requiring that Iran implement the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and agree to intrusive monitoring of fuel cycle capabilities, including real-time monitoring of uranium-enrichment levels, a deal should prohibit certain weaponization-related activities beyond what was required by the JCPOA. The parties also should negotiate verification measures so the IAEA can assess compliance with the weaponization prohibitions. Furthermore, the deal could include specific steps that Iran will take to assist the IAEA as the agency seeks to close the gaps in its knowledge of Iran’s nuclear activities resulting from its decision to reduce IAEA monitoring and access in February 2021.

Beyond this, the United States and the European signatories to the JCPOA (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) should support cooperative nuclear activities as an additional means of fostering transparency. As part of a nuclear deal or in a separate agreement, the United States and the European countries could agree to support the establishment of a nuclear security center in the region, for instance. Creating spaces for Iran and other states with established or planned nuclear programs, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to collaborate on regionally identified security needs would build ties among expert communities and provide greater insights into the trajectories of each country’s nuclear program.

A new framework proposal also must involve enrichment limitations, but the limits should be structured to shift the direction and drivers of Iran’s enrichment activities. Currently, Iran’s uranium-enrichment program significantly exceeds the limits set by the JCPOA and the country’s domestic needs. For instance, Iran is enriching uranium up to 60 percent U-235, despite having no domestic justification for uranium enriched to that level, and it has installed more than 50 cascades of advanced centrifuges. Despite the current program exceeding the country’s requirements for enriched uranium, Iran is highly unlikely to agree to limitations similar to those in the JCPOA, which allowed the use of only 30 cascades of its first-generation IR-1 centrifuges to enrich uranium to 3.67 percent U-235, a level suitable for nuclear power reactors. Those limitations were based on an assessment of Iran’s practical needs and the goal of a 12-month breakout period; they are no longer politically or technically feasible. Although achieving a similar 12-month breakout period in a new deal is not necessary from a nonproliferation perspective if the agreement contains stringent monitoring measures, a new agreement must extend the current breakout period and should prohibit more sensitive enrichment activities, such as enrichment of uranium to 60 percent U-235.

The United States could look at two options for restricting enrichment limits under a new deal in a way that provides a strong barrier to proliferation but is also acceptable to Iran. One option would be to support regionally negotiated limitations on uranium enrichment. The nuclear landscape in the Middle East has shifted significantly since negotiations commenced on the JCPOA. There is greater interest in civil nuclear energy and other peaceful applications of nuclear technology, such as nuclear medicine and nuclear applications in agriculture.¹⁶ Saudi Arabia, which has threatened to develop nuclear weapons if Iran does, also intends to enrich uranium domestically. To reduce proliferation risks regionally, Iran and the Persian Gulf states could agree to cap enrichment at reactor-grade levels and set stockpile limitations for uranium kept in gas form, which can be enriched to weapons-grade levels more easily.

An alternative to regional limitations would be for the United States to negotiate limits with Iran as part of a nuclear supply arrangement that would benefit both countries. The United States, for instance, could agree to purchase uranium enriched to 20 percent U-235 from Iran to meet U.S. domestic needs in exchange for Iran agreeing not to enrich above that level and to retain a limited stockpile in gas form. Iran could blend down any uranium produced in excess of that limit. The size of Iran’s enrichment program could be based on supply contracts and monitored by the IAEA.

Similarly, the United States, the European countries, or China, another JCPOA signatory, could agree to work with Iran on fuel fabrication, provided Iran limits quantities of enriched uranium in gas form and limits the overall capacity of its enrichment program. This supply-driven approach would provide Iran with additional tangible benefits that would be lost if it breached its obligations and would enhance transparency by forging further connections between Iranian and foreign nuclear communities.

Finally, there is the issue of incentives beyond sanctions relief. Iran will demand sanctions relief as a core element in any future deal, but the demonstrated U.S. ability to reimpose sanctions reduces the benefits that Iran will receive from the lifting of those measures. It is likely that the United States will need to put more on the table in a future deal to benefit Iran. In addition to studying the JCPOA experience and examining how to provide more tangible and durable benefits when sanctions are lifted, the next U.S. administration should consider additional, durable incentives that would be attractive to Iran. This could include encouraging greater direct investment in Iran, particularly from states in the region; exempting certain regional trade from sanctions;¹⁷ and guaranteeing support for cooperative nuclear activities that do not pose a proliferation risk. Nuclear cooperation projects would be specific, required commitments for the United States and other parties to the deal, as opposed to the voluntary ones in the JCPOA, and could include assistance with developing fuel fabrication in Iran, expanding medical isotope production, and constructing proliferation-resistant power reactors. These activities would be consistent with Iran’s nuclear goals.

Sustaining an Agreement

If the United States and Iran can reach a nuclear agreement, the next U.S. president will face challenges in sustaining support for the accord, particularly through presidential transitions. A new strategy should include steps to mitigate the risk of a future president withdrawing from an effective nuclear deal, as Trump did.

In Washington, the JCPOA experience highlighted that a transactional nuclear agreement likely will be held to a transformational standard. Although the 2015 nuclear deal was never intended to be a panacea for all the problems in the Iranian-U.S. relationship, it still was criticized for failing to address other key U.S. concerns about Iranian activity, particularly the country’s growing ballistic missile program and its support for regional proxies, namely Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. When Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, he described it as a failure because it did not address these other issues.¹⁸

Negotiating a grand bargain between the United States and Iran would be far more difficult and time-consuming than the JCPOA negotiations. The immediacy of the proliferation risk argues for prioritizing a dedicated nuclear deal. Yet, the next administration should situate its approach to nuclear negotiations within a more comprehensive Iran strategy to demonstrate U.S. intentions to address a broader array of concerns. This strategy could include U.S. support for regional security talks, separate channels for Iran and the United States to discuss issues of mutual concern, and security assurances to U.S. partners in the region. The conclusion of a nuclear agreement should not be tied to addressing these other concerns successfully, but a more comprehensive strategy would demonstrate that the United States is actively engaged on these issues, increasing the likelihood of sustaining an accord. Supporting dialogue between Iran and other states in the region regarding the security environment is particularly critical because Iran is more likely to agree to nuclear restraints if it assesses that nuclear weapons or a threshold status are not necessary for national security.

In addition to developing a more comprehensive engagement strategy, the United States needs to bolster nonproliferation norms writ large and demonstrate strong global support for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The group of countries that negotiated the JCPOA (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the United States) was important in demonstrating to Iran the strength of the nonproliferation norm. Unfortunately, that model is no longer viable for negotiations. Russia’s blatant rejection of nuclear norms and failure to hold Iran accountable for safeguards violations demonstrate that it is no longer committed to upholding the nonproliferation and disarmament architecture. This break in unity among the JCPOA parties on nonproliferation has ramifications for Iran: if Iran believes it can flout its obligations with impunity and trusts that Russia will block any punitive action at the UN Security Council, Iran will be under less pressure to negotiate.

China, however, has an interest in preventing erosion of the nonproliferation regime. Beijing appears reluctant to use its leverage in Tehran to stabilize the current nuclear crisis, but it may be willing to reinforce nonproliferation norms more generally. If these states were to express shared concerns about certain civil nuclear activities relevant to weaponization or articulate the consequences of a state withdrawing from the NPT or weaponizing a civil nuclear program, it could help demonstrate to Iran that it will face costs for developing nuclear weapons.

Despite the collapse of the JCPOA, diplomacy still stands the best chance of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran and providing assurance that the country’s nuclear program remains on a peaceful trajectory. Concluding an effective, verifiable accord will be more challenging than ever given Iran’s nuclear advances and diminished U.S. credibility. If the next U.S. president moves swiftly to signal support for negotiations and embeds nuclear talks within a broader strategy to reduce Iranian-U.S. tensions, there is a chance to reach a deal that reduces proliferation risk, benefits Tehran, and contributes to regional stabilization.

ENDNOTES

1. “Exclusive: Iran Indicates ‘JCPOA Not Good Enough for Us Anymore,’” Amwaj Media, August 26, 2024, https://amwaj.media/article/exclusive-iran-indicates-jcpoa-not-good-enough-for-us-anymore.

2. Eve Sampson, “‘No Barrier’ to Nuclear Talks With U.S., Iran’s Supreme Leader Says,” The New York Times, August 27, 2024.

3. Julia Masterson and Kelsey Davenport, “Restoring the Nuclear Deal With Iran Benefits U.S. Nonproliferation Priorities,” Arms Control Association Issue Brief, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 15, 2021), https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2021-03/restoring-nuclear-deal-iran-benefits-us-nonproliferation-priorities.

4. Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin, “Iran’s Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential,” 
Iran Watch, June 27, 2024, https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable-weapon-potential#10.

5. Trevor Findlay, “Looking Back: The Additional Protocol,” Arms Control Today, November 2011.

6. Jon Gambrell, “UN Atomic Chief Backs Nuclear Power at COP28 as World Reckons 
With Proliferation,” Associated Press, November 30, 2023.

7. U.S. National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203_release.pdf.

8. Masoud Pezeshkian, “My Message to the New World,” Tehran Times, July 12, 2024, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/501077/My-message-to-the-new-world.

9. Beatrice Farhat, “Iran Warns It Will Change ‘Nuclear Doctrine’ If Threatened by Israel,” Al-Monitor, May 9, 2024, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/05/iran-warns-it-will-change-nuclear-doctrine-if-threatened-israel.

10. Toby Dalton and Ariel Levite, “Iran’s Nuclear Threshold Challenge,” War on the Rocks, May 23, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/irans-nuclear-threshold-challenge/.

11. Eric Brewer, “Iran’s New Nuclear Threat: How Tehran Has Weaponized Its Threshold Status,” Foreign Affairs, June 25, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-new-nuclear-threat.

12. Humeyra Pamuk and Daphne Psaledakis, “U.S. Says Iran Cannot Access Its $6 Billion in Qatar Any Time Soon,” Reuters, October 12, 2023.

13. International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015): Report by the Director General,” GOV/INF/2021/13, February 16, 2021.

14. Jon Gambrell, “An Iranian Nuclear Facility Is So Deep Underground That U.S. Airstrikes Likely Couldn’t Reach It,” Associated Press, May 22, 2023.

15. Global and National Security Institute, “GNSI Policy Dialogues: The Iran Enigma - General (Ret) Frank McKenzie Featured Remarks,” YouTube, April 24, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kgJzDXhWfdw&list=PLm9bckPQyMTohGAbdty7uPx0dpzTppEyJ&index=3&t=701s.

16. Sarah Ruth Opatowski, “Development and Cooperation on Nuclear Research and Energy in the Middle East: Workshop Report,” UN Institute for Disarmament Research, n.d., https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/UNIDIR_Development_and_Cooperation_Nuclear_Research_and_Energy_Middle_East.pdf.

17. Ali Vaez and Vali Nasr, “The Path to a New Iran Deal,” Foreign Affairs, May 8, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/path-new-iran-nuclear-deal-security-jcpoa-washington.

18. “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” The White House, May 8, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/.       

Kelsey Davenport is director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association.

October 2024
By Sina Azodi 

After Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in May, Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist politician and a heart surgeon, was chosen his successor in a runoff election. This development has reignited hopes for a revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany is known.

Since 2019, when Iran initiated “remedial measures” in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement and the subsequent failure of the European signatories to alleviate the impact of U.S. sanctions, Iran’s nuclear program has expanded significantly. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification mission in Iran has been hampered severely, primarily due to Tehran’s lack of adequate cooperation with the agency. Despite this impasse, there is now an opening for Iran and the world powers to potentially reach a new agreement that addresses Iran’s nuclear expansion in return for relief from U.S. sanctions.

Prior to Raisi’s victory in the controversial June 2021 elections, Iran and the other negotiators almost reached a draft agreement to revive the JCPOA, although details still needed to be worked out. According to the framework of the proposed agreement, the outcome of negotiations would have involved a resolution adopted by the JCPOA Joint Commission, which aimed at reviving the JCPOA, and the subsequent return of the United States to the agreement. The resolution had three appendixes, on lifting sanctions, Iran’s nuclear actions, and an implementation plan that addressed the sequencing of steps to be taken by each side. Because of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, the resolution would be passed without U.S. participation; but after the lifting of sanctions, the United States would return as a participant. In response, Iran would roll back its nuclear program to the JCPOA limits.¹

Despite this progress, the Iranian president at the time, Hassan Rouhani, could not finalize the agreement; and his top negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, now foreign minister, was not given the authority to sign the draft document. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, apparently had decided that the task of reviving the agreement should be left to the next administration, headed by Raisi. Some reports from Iran indicate that Rouhani had urged that he be allowed to sign the agreement so that the next administration could reap the benefits. Still, his request was denied, most likely by Khamenei.²

Once in office, Raisi initially expressed interest in the nuclear talks, but several factors greatly reduced the possibility of reviving the JCPOA. The new president was a hard-liner and an opponent of the JCPOA who previously criticized the deal for failing to deliver economic benefits and compared it to an “uncashed check.”³ Ironically, Raisi’s chief nuclear negotiator also criticized the JCPOA, questioning its benefits for Iran and its dispute resolution mechanisms.⁴ In essence, the people who oversaw negotiations to revive the deal did not even believe in it and its benefits for the country.

Furthermore, the new negotiation team came to the table with a new set of demands, including a renegotiation of the previous draft. Although that request was rejected categorically, the Iranian team’s maneuver squandered precious time. The outbreak of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine further complicated the process of reviving the JCPOA by souring the relationship between Russia and other negotiating parties. Meanwhile, the death of Mahsa Amini in Iranian police custody in September 2022 and the ensuing political protests within the country severely restrained the negotiating parties’ space to maneuver and to give concessions.

Concurrently, the Raisi administration rapidly expanded Iran’s nuclear program, leveraging it as a diplomatic tool against the United States and other Western powers. An IAEA report in September 2021 indicated that as of August 2021, Iran had a total stockpile of 2,441.3 kilograms of enriched uranium, of which 10.0 kilograms was enriched to 60 percent uranium-235.5 As of October 28, 2023, however, the IAEA reported that the total stockpile of Iran’s enriched uranium had increased to 4,486.8 kilograms, including 567.1 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent U-235 and 128.3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235.⁶ By July 2024, when Pezeshkian was elected, Iran’s breakout time (the period needed to produce enough weapons-grade fissile material for one nuclear warhead) had been reduced to between one and two weeks.⁷

Defeating ‘Talibanism’ in Tehran

During the campaign, Pezeshkian used the opportunity to criticize the handling by Iranian hard-liners of the country’s nuclear file and vowed to resolve Iran’s issues with the IAEA and engage with the outside world.⁸ “My foreign policy aims to normalize relations with the world. I support the implementation of Financial Action Task Force and JCPOA” demands, Pezeshkian said on July 1.⁹ A former health minister, he also acknowledged that sanctions have had a devastating effect on the country and that they need to be lifted. “I consider sanctions a serious detriment” because they cause “prices [to] inevitably rise, and we cannot make purchases, leaving the government to dip into people’s pockets,” he said.¹⁰ On reviving the JCPOA, Pezeshkian asserted that if the United States fulfills all its commitments, Iran will return to the JCPOA. “We are never supposed to lift all sanctions, but we have to wait and see what we give [to them] and what concessions they will give [to us],” he said.¹¹

Pezeshkian was careful not to antagonize Khamenei by repeatedly emphasizing his obedience and fealty to the supreme leader. Not even that could stop Khamenei from pushing back and criticizing politicians who sought relations with the United States. “Those who are attached to America and think that without America’s favor, nothing can be achieved in the country will not be good partners for you,” Khamenei said.¹² Yet, he did not interfere with Pezeshkian’s election victory, a fact that Pezeshkian would recognize. “Without Supreme Leader Khamenei…I do not imagine my name would have easily come out of these [ballot] boxes,” Pezeshkian said after being elected.¹³ During the cabinet selection, Pezeshkian went even further, ensuring that Khamenei approved his appointments.

Pezeshkian ultimately secured the presidency in the runoff elections by convincing skeptical Iranian voters that the hard-line alternative presented by candidate Saeed Jalili, the former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, would exacerbate the country’s domestic and international standing. As an Iranian journalist told the author, comparing Jalili’s worldview with that of the Taliban, “Iran was only a few hours from Taliban’s takeover of the country.”¹⁴ Despite his victory, winning nearly 54 percent of the 30.5 million votes cast, Pezeshkian now faces the daunting task of navigating a political minefield.¹⁵

The new president faces immense pressure to revive Iran’s economy, which is buckling under the pressure of U.S. unilateral sanctions, while steering the nation through unprecedented regional tensions, particularly the war in Gaza. Also, his administration must strive to prevent the extension of UN sanctions on Iran, scheduled to expire in October 2025 under Security Council Resolution 2231, as the JCPOA European signatories grow increasingly frustrated with Iran’s expanding nuclear program, lack of cooperation with the IAEA, and material support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.¹⁶ Iran’s relationship with the IAEA has deteriorated significantly in the last year, and the agency director-general, Rafael Mariano Grossi, repeatedly has criticized Iran’s lack of cooperation.¹⁷ On June 5, 2024, the IAEA adopted a censure resolution that called for Iran’s further cooperation with the agency. If Iran does not comply, this resolution has the potential to take Iran’s nuclear file back to the Security Council.¹⁸

Pezeshkian’s Message to the World

Shortly after his election, Pezeshkian published an op-ed outlining his foreign policy agenda. He emphasized his administration’s plan to improve cooperation with regional countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as with Iran’s powerful partners, China and Russia. Pezeshkian also called for engaging in “constructive dialogue” with European countries based on “mutual respect and equal footing.” Nonetheless, he criticized the Europeans for failing to protect Iran’s interests in the JCPOA. “Iran’s relations with Europe have known its ups and downs,” he said. “After the United States’ withdrawal…European countries made 11 commitments to Iran to try to salvage the agreement and mitigate the impact of the United States’ unlawful and unilateral sanctions on our economy…. European countries have reneged on all these commitments yet unreasonably expect Iran to unilaterally fulfill all its obligations under the JCPOA.”¹⁹

Pezeshkian’s frustrations echo a widespread sentiment in Tehran that following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, European promises to uphold the agreement amounted to little more than empty rhetoric. Some Iranians have suggested that the United States and Europe engaged in a good cop-bad cop strategy by deceiving Iran into remaining in the deal for an additional year while U.S. sanctions crushed its economy.²⁰ This view was reflected in Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s letter to Federica Mogherini, the EU foreign policy chief, on November 6, 2018. Zarif stated that he “still does not buy” the good cop-bad cop argument and complained about Europe’s inability to safeguard Iran’s interests.²¹

In his op-ed, Pezeshkian also addressed the United States. He urged Washington to “recognize the reality” that Tehran will not yield to pressure and emphasized that his country entered the JCPOA negotiations in “good faith” and fully met its obligation under the agreement. The United States “unlawfully withdrew from the agreement motivated by purely domestic quarrels and vengeance, inflicting hundreds of billions of dollars in damage to [the Iranian] economy and causing untold suffering, death, and destruction on the Iranian people,” he said.²² Although Pezeshkian did not call explicitly for negotiations with Washington, he hinted at an “open invitation” for constructive engagement on the international stage, adding that his administration “will welcome sincere efforts to alleviate tensions and will reciprocate good faith with good faith.”²³

The experiences of the early 2000s and the JCPOA highlight that, without U.S. involvement and consent, European countries are unable to deliver any meaningful trade or commercial benefits to Iran. In both instances, despite Europe’s strong political will to uphold agreements and fulfill commitments, this resolve failed to translate into tangible benefits for Iran due to the absence of U.S. support. In the case of the JCPOA, for example, the European companies that invested in Iran in the aftermath of the agreement chose to kowtow to U.S. sanctions while disregarding the position of their respective governments. As a result, Pezeshkian cannot improve the Iranian economy significantly or bring about any changes without striking some sort of agreement with the United States. This will not be an easy endeavor.

An Experienced Team

Aiming to remove the sanctions, Pezeshkian has brought the right people onto his foreign policy team, but faces domestic challenges. Zarif, a main architect of the JCPOA, joined Pezeshkian from the beginning and, in an unprecedented move, went on the campaign trail to support his presidential bid. On August 1, Pezeshkian appointed the savvy Iranian diplomat as vice president for strategic affairs. Since then, Iranian hard-liners who opposed negotiations with the United States and the JCPOA from the beginning have resumed their attacks on Zarif, accusing him of having a “pro-American” agenda.²⁴ Given Zarif’s familiarity with the intricacy of the nuclear talks, experience in international diplomacy, and unique knowledge of U.S. politics, he can facilitate Pezeshkian’s bid to conclude new talks if the president can secure Khamenei’s approval.

The appointment of Araghchi, Iran’s former chief nuclear negotiator, as the new foreign minister should be seen as another indication that Pezeshkian’s administration is serious about striking a nuclear agreement with the United States and the European signatories to the JCPOA. As Zarif’s deputy, he played a key role in the talks that led to the signing of the nuclear deal and has remained a staunch defender of that agreement. Araghchi, who has more revolutionary bona bides than Zarif, is a career diplomat with the Iranian Foreign Ministry and has held several ambassadorial postings. He has argued previously that as long as Iran adheres to its anti-imperialistic discourse, resolving fundamental issues with the United States is impossible but differences can be managed. “Either you abandon the anti-imperialistic discourse, which means you are no longer the Islamic Republic [of Iran], or you must confront the United States,” Araghchi has stated.

In the foreign policy agenda that he presented to the Iranian parliament, Araghchi called for “managing the hostilities” with the United States and for an “honorable” lifting of the U.S. unilateral sanctions through “serious and goal-oriented” negotiations.²⁵ Nonetheless, he recently stated on Iranian state television that although the JCPOA can be a guide in future talks, it cannot be revived “in its current form” because the world has changed as the result of conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. “There will be other forms for an agreement that we will pursue,” he asserted.²⁶ This is a realistic view because Iran’s technological advancements have rendered some of the JCPOA limitations obsolete, including testing and operating advanced centrifuges.

The primary challenge for Pezeshkian and his team will be persuading Khamenei once again that nuclear negotiations with Washington could be beneficial. In 2012, when Iran and the United States began their secret talks in Masqat, Oman, the task of convincing Khamenei to approve the talks fell on Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi. He urged Khamenei in a meeting that Iran had nothing to lose by engaging the United States.²⁷ Khamenei had approved the talks reluctantly, under the condition that they would be limited strictly to the nuclear issue and that Iran’s uranium-enrichment rights would be protected.

Throughout the process, Khamenei continued to support the talks, but remained wary, often describing U.S. officials as “deceitful” and “prone to breaking their promises.”²⁸ Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA only reinforced Khamenei’s deep skepticism, leading him to reverse his position quickly. In August 2018, shortly after the U.S. withdrawal, the Iranian leader expressed regret for approving the nuclear talks, adding that, “in the JCPOA nuclear negotiations, I made a mistake.”²⁹ Khamenei also banned any further nuclear talks with the United States, reiterating in November 2020 that negotiations to end the sanctions did not work.³⁰

Convincing the Supreme Leader

To fulfill his promises of improving the economy, Pezeshkian and his advisers face the daunting task of convincing Khamenei that Iran once again must negotiate conditions on its nuclear program and strike a deal with the “Great Satan,” as some Iranian officials refer to the United States. Although Khamenei remains deeply skeptical of the United States, Pezeshkian’s bear-hug approach to Khamenei could help him win the supreme leader’s consent. During a meeting with Pezeshkian’s newly appointed cabinet on August 27, Khamenei hinted that he would not oppose engagement with the United States. “We do not have to pin our hope to the enemy. For our plans, we should not wait for approval by the enemies, but [it] is not contradictory to engage the same enemy in some places. [T]here’s no barrier,” Khamenei said.³¹

In the search for a new deal with the United States, Khamenei’s approval is necessary but not sufficient. Simultaneously, Pezeshkian must contend with Iranian hard-liners who, after losing the election, are likely to work tirelessly to sabotage his efforts to resolve the nuclear issue and boost the economy. Pezeshkian faces formidable opposition, particularly in the parliament and the Supreme National Security Council. Jalili, a staunch opponent of the JCPOA and defeated presidential candidate, remains a significant obstacle within the council. To some extent, Khamenei’s support can shield Pezeshkian from domestic attacks, but the new president still has to build a domestic consensus to mitigate the influence of these spoilers.

As the U.S. presidential campaign nears a reckoning, Iranians, having witnessed the United States reneging on its commitments, are likely to wait for the outcome of the November election before considering any new agreements. Washington also appears unhurried about striking a deal with Iran over its nuclear program. On July 9, White House spokesperson John Kirby stated that the United States “was not ready” to resume nuclear talks with Iran under the new president.³² This is shortsighted. Amid unprecedented tensions in the Middle East, Washington should not overlook any opportunity that could help deescalate the situation. Raisi’s death has provided a rare opening for Iran and the United States. After decades of missed opportunities due to reluctance on one side or the other, Tehran seems ready to strike a deal that could lead to a mutually beneficial diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis.

Trump’s potential return to the White House could jeopardize any chance of a deal, but a Harris administration likely would be much more conducive to reaching a nuclear agreement. In the short term, a limited-scope, transactional arrangement could create the necessary political space for negotiating a more comprehensive deal. This interim arrangement should prioritize freezing and rolling back the most sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, such as halting enrichment to higher levels and reducing Iran’s growing stockpile of enriched uranium. Such measures could extend Iran’s breakout time and move it further away from a nuclear bomb.

For any agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis effectively, it must involve reciprocal concessions from all parties. Although an ideal outcome for one side might seem like unconditional surrender by the other, this is simply impractical. Iran’s nuclear program, thanks to Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, is now far more advanced, and Iran effectively is a nuclear threshold state. Its nuclear program is here to stay. Regime changes will not fundamentally change Iran’s nuclear posture. The question remains, after repeated failed attempts, how the United States will approach one of its enduring foreign policy dilemmas.

ENDNOTES

1. Javad M. Zarif, Raaz-e Sar be Mohr: The Nuclear Deal; Untold Story of JCPOA Protecting Iran’s Security, Rights and Development (Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies [IPIS], 2021), pp. 580-581.

2. “Behzad Nabavi: Dar Dolat e Rouhani Ehyaye Barjam dar Dastras Bud vali Ejazeh Nadadand” [Behzad Nabavi: Reviving JCPOA was attainable under Rouhani but they were not allowed to], Rouhanihassan.com, August 23, 2023, https://www.rouhanihassan.com/Fa/News/103157/آگاهی-نو-بهزاد-نبوی-در-دولت-روحانی-احیای-برجام-در-دسترس-بود-اما-اجازه-ندادند. All translations by the author.

3. BBC, “Rast Azmayi e Monazere Dovom” [Fact checking the second debate], May 5, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-features-39821825.

4. “Goft-o-goo ba Ali Bagheri kani” [A conversation with Ali Bagheri Kani], Aparat, n.d., https://www.aparat.com/v/dH2jD (accessed September 15, 2024).

5. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015): Report by the Director General,” GOV/2021/39, September 7, 2021.

6. IAEA, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015): Report by the Director General,” GOV/2023/57, November 15, 2023.

7. Jennifer Hansler and Kylie Atwood, “Blinken Says Iran’s Nuclear Weapon Breakout Time Is Probably Down to 1-2 Weeks,” CNN, July 20, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/19/politics/blinken-nuclear-weapon-breakout
-time/index.html.

8. Iranian Students News Agency, “Pezeshkian: agar barjam bad ast beguyand an raa edame nemidahand” [If JCPOA is bad they should say that they will not continue it- and what their alternative is], June 24, 2024, https://www.isna.ir/news/1403040402796/پزشکیان-اگر-برجام-بد-است-بگویند-آن-را-ادامه-نمی-دهند-و-جایگزینشان.

9. “Pezeshkian: On the Issues,” U.S. Institute of Peace, July 8, 2024, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2024/jul/08/pezeshkian-issues.

10. Ibid.

11. Mehr News Agency, “Pezeshikian: Amrika bayad tamam-e ta’ahodatash ra anjam dahad ta ma be barjam bargardim” [Pezeshkian: The U.S. must fulfill all its commitments so that we return to the JCPOA], July 2, 2024, https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6155077/پزشکیان-وارد-صدا-و-سیما-شد.

12. Keyvan Hosseini, “Khamenei aab e paaki ra rikht rooye dastan-e mozakere ba Amrika. Hala Taklif chist?” [Khamenei has definitively ruled out negotiations with the U.S.; what course of action will Pezeshkian take now?], BBC, June 25, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cl77ydldekeo.

13. “Pezeshkian: Agar Magham-e Moazam-e Rahbari Nabud, Fekr Nemikonam Esme ma be Rahati Az in Sandough Ha dar miamad” [Pezeshkian: Without Supreme Leader Khamenei…I do not imagine my name would have easily come out of these [ballot] boxes], Hamshahri Online, July 6, 2024, https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/865040/پزشکیان-اگر-مقام-معظم-رهبری-نبودند-فکر-نمی-کنم-اسم-ما-به-راحتی.

14. Iranian journalist, telephone interview with author, July 5, 2024.

15. Nadeen Ebrahim and Michael Rios, “Reformist Lawmaker Masoud Pezeshkian Wins Iran’s Presidential Vote,” CNN, July 6, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/05/middleeast/pezeshkian-wins-irans-vote-intl-hnk/index.html.

16. Laurence Norman, “Biden Administration Presses Allies Not to Confront Iran on Nuclear Program,” The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2024.

17. Radio Free Europe, “IAEA Chief Says Cooperation From Iran ‘Completely Unsatisfactory,’” May 7, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/grossi-iran-nuclear-iaea/32937031.html.

18. See International Crisis Group, “Man on a Wire: A Way Forward for Iran’s New President,” Crisis Group Middle East Report, No. 245, July 30, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/245-gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/man-wire-way-forward-irans-new-president.

19. Masoud Pezeshkian, “My Message to the New World,” Tehran Times, July 12, 2024, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/501077/My-message-to-the-new-world.

20. For example, see “Police-e Khub va bad Orupa Va Amrika Dar Barjam” [Europe and the U.S. Good Cop, Bad Cop], Iranian Diplomacy, February 2018, http://irdiplomacy.ir/fa/news/1981673/پلیس-خوب-و-بد-اروپا-و-امریکا-در-برجام.

21. “Letter of 6 November 2018 to JCPOA Coordinator on Iran’s Exhaustion of All DRM Procedures and Its Initiation of Remedial Action Under Paragraph 36,” in Javad Zarif, Letter to the UN Secretary-General: Documenting Six Years of Western [Non-] Implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal (Tehran: IPIS, 2023), p. 88.

22. Pezeshkian, “My Message to the New World.”

23. Ibid.

24. See Hamid Resaeee (@hamidresaee), “Mr. Mezeshkian, the appointment of this individual with his pro-American views as your Vice President, a day after Haniyeh assassination, does not send the proper message to our people,” X, August 2, 2024, 5:35 a.m., https://x.com/hamidrasaee/status/1819305954573263013?s=46.

25. “Araghchi Barname-hayash ra Baraye Vezarat-e Khareje Tashrih Kard” [Araghchi outlined his agenda for the Foreign Ministry], Jamaran News, August 12, 2024, https://www.jamaran.news/بخش-سیاست-12/1640074-عراقچی-برنامه-هایش-برای-وزارت-خارجه-را-تشریح-کرد-هماهنگی-کامل-میدان-دیپلماسی-رفع-شرافتمندانه-تحریم-ها-با-مذاکرات-هدفمند-غیر-فرسایشی-ادامه-روابط-مستحکم-با-چین-روسیه-ایجاد-پیوندهای-نوین-با-اقتصادهای-نوظهور.

26. BBC, “Abbas e Araghchi vazir-e Khareje Jadid-e Iran Miguyad Barjam Ghabel-e Ehya Nist” [The new foreign minister of Iran, Abbas Araghchi, says that the JCPOA cannot be revived], August 24, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/czx6n53dy09o.

27. Ali-Akbar Salehi, Passage in History: Memoirs of Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi (Tehran: Iranian Foreign Ministry, 2018), p. 472.

28. Khamenei.ir, “11 Answers to Questions About the Nuclear File,” January 20, 2015, https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=29440#1.

29. BBC, “Ayatollah Khamenei: Dar Mozakerat e Barjam Eshtebah Kardam” [Ayatollah Khamenei: I made a mistake in the JCPOA negotiations], August 13, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-45167008.

30. Khamenei.ir, “We Tried Negotiations to End the Sanctions and It Did Not Work,” November 24, 2020, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/8141/We-tried-negotiations-to-end-the-sanctions-and-it-did-not-work.

31. “Iran’s Supreme Leader Opens Door to Talks With ‘Enemy’ US Over Tehran’s Nuclear Programme,” South China Morning Post, August 27, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3276141/irans-supreme-leader-opens-door-talks-enemy-us-over-tehrans-nuclear-programme.

32. Iran Front Page, “US Says Not Ready to Resume Nuclear Negotiations With Iran Under Pezeshkian,” July 9, 2024, https://ifpnews.com/us-nuclear-negotiations-iran-pezeshkian/.

Sina Azodi, an expert on Iran’s nuclear program and national security policies, is a professorial lecturer of international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University.

October 2024
By Michal Smetana and Michal Onderco

In the years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s nuclear saber-rattling has become almost routine. President Vladimir Putin frequently highlights the power of Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal in his public speeches, while other Russian politicians and foreign policy experts do not shy away from discussing the possibility of nuclear strikes against Ukraine’s Western backers.¹ Many NATO countries have taken the threat of nuclear escalation very seriously since the war began, and according to new reporting, the U.S. administration believed that Russia was on the brink of using a tactical nuclear weapon against Ukraine in the second half of 2022.²

Yet, in one of his recent speeches, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy downplayed the threat of Russian nuclear use, arguing that the Russian government would not break the decades-old “nuclear taboo” for fear of losing broad societal support.³ If this argument holds, it would suggest that nuclear employment represents a true redline for the Russian public beyond which the Kremlin can no longer count on popular approval for its foreign policy adventurism. Is there any ground for the claim that a majority of the Russian public would oppose nuclear use, especially if doing so would increase Russian chances for a swift victory in Ukraine or even prevent Russia from losing the war?

In June 2024, we conducted a unique survey experiment in Russia to find out.⁴ In contrast to vague questions in more traditional public opinion polls, participants in our experiment were provided with very specific hypothetical scenarios in which the Russian government considered nuclear strikes against NATO or Ukraine as a way of averting military defeat.⁵

We worked together with a local, independent nongovernmental organization in Russia, the Levada Center, to conduct our experiment on a large representative sample of the Russian population. Levada is a trusted partner for numerous Western organizations and media to conduct public opinion research in Russia. Our experiment was embedded in Levada’s monthly omnibus survey, which is a Russia-wide poll, with participants coming from large cities such as Moscow and Saint Petersburg and small rural settlements in Siberia and the Far East. In total, we conducted our study on a representative sample of 1,600 Russian citizens aged 18 years or older from 137 settlements in 50 regions of the Russian Federation.⁶

The results have been fascinating in many ways (fig. 1). A majority of Russians (71 percent) disagreed with a limited nuclear strike against a NATO military base in Poland, even when not doing so would result in the Russian army being defeated in a fictional conflict in the Baltics. Comparing these numbers to the results of our 2021 study, we can conclude that the percentage of Russians who would agree with their government’s decision to conduct a nuclear strike against NATO—28 percent in 2021 and 29 percent in 2024—has changed little over the past three years.⁷ This finding suggests that the Russian war against Ukraine and the Kremlin’s nuclear saber-rattling have not had a dramatic impact on the widely shared public aversion to the idea of a nuclear escalation.⁸

The results also show that roughly the same proportion of Russian citizens who disagreed with nuclear weapons use against NATO (72 percent) rejected a nuclear strike against a military target in Ukraine, despite the fact that Ukraine is not covered by NATO’s nuclear umbrella. It suggests that the Russian aversion to nuclear escalation is not merely due to a concern about nuclear retaliation by NATO allies. Not using a nuclear weapon in our scenario came with serious strategic consequences, specifically, the loss of Crimea, the Ukrainian region whose illegal annexation by Russia in 2014 is supported by a majority of the Russian public.⁹

Somewhat disconcerting was the slightly higher public support for a demonstrative nuclear explosion over the Black Sea (36 percent). A Russian expert recently proposed such a nuclear demonstration “to show the seriousness of Russia’s intentions and convince our opponents of Moscow’s resolve to escalate.”¹⁰ Yet, even in this less escalatory scenario, almost two-thirds of Russians (64 percent) disagreed with pressing the nuclear button.

It is fair to ask whether Russian leaders even care what the public thinks. After all, Putin’s regime is a repressive autocracy that has become even more so since the start of the full-blown invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.¹¹ Yet, for Putin’s regime, what people think matters. The Kremlin has been highly sensitive to any signs of fluctuations in public opinion, and frequent public polling has been a standard practice of this regime.¹² Overall, many experts on Russian politics agree that the Russian government does not only shape public preferences in foreign policy, but it also is partially responsive to public sentiments in this area.¹³ A case in point may be Putin’s hesitation to order a military mobilization in the first year of the war, likely postponed mainly due to concerns about public backlash.¹⁴

Interestingly, the Russian public generally tends to have a positive relationship with the country’s nuclear arsenal and sees it as a source of Russian power and status.¹⁵ This standing is due in no small part to consistent messaging in Russia, which has portrayed the nation’s enormous nuclear arsenal as prideworthy. Putin’s regime has invested heavily in showing off Russia’s newest nuclear missiles and using them as props during military parades.

The domestic nuclear messaging has continued after the invasion. Russia’s nuclear rhetoric during the first 16 months of the war was often directed at the Russian public, as well as at Western audiences. Although official Kremlin messaging has been somewhat careful, opinions peddled by Moscow’s pundits in popular outlets and various magazines and on TV have been anything but. This more hawkish narrative has been reinforced and strengthened by a religious undertone, which included the blessing of nuclear missiles by the Russian Orthodox Church.¹⁶

The amount of attention that the nuclear saber-rattling gets on Russian public TV, from which most Russians get their news, underscores that the Russian regime still cares about public views on the nuclear arsenal. Far from being irrelevant, public opinion matters for Putin’s Russia. The results of our survey indicate that, despite significant public propaganda by the Russian government and its surrogates, the Russian public thus far has not become more enthusiastic about the prospect of using nuclear weapons to influence the course of the war in Ukraine. This finding alone might cause some disappointment in the Kremlin.

For Western policymakers, these findings offer a rare glimpse of hope. The Kremlin’s coercive messaging in the war in Ukraine has shown the limited capacity of the Russian leadership to learn from the failures of its nuclear threats.¹⁷ The results of the study indicate that domestic audiences are not more eager to consider nuclear options, even in the face of potential Russian military failure and persistent domestic messaging. This finding underscores that ordinary Russians understand the limits of nuclear coercion well and their belief in the nuclear taboo appears rather firm. The lack of change in Russian public attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons since the invasion of Ukraine underscores how difficult it might be to shift public views and how strong the atomic aversion among the Russian public is.

For Western governments, the most fruitful strategy appears to be to continue their persistent messaging rejecting the legitimacy of the Kremlin’s nuclear threats. It makes sense to continue underscoring that any use of nuclear weapons would lead to a forceful response by NATO and to material, political, and moral consequences for Russia. The Russian public subconsciously understands this message, which needs to be firmly reinforced.

ENDNOTES

1. “Putin Says Russia Will Develop Its Nuclear Arsenal to Preserve Global Balance of Power,” Reuters, June 21, 2024; “Nukes! Medvedev Again Threatens West With Nuclear Escalation,” Kyiv Post, June 1, 2024, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/33622; Sergei A. Karaganov, “A Difficult but Necessary Decision,” Russia in Global Affairs, June 13, 2023, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-difficult-but-necessary-decision/.

2. Jim Sciutto, “Exclusive: U.S. Prepared ‘Rigorously’ for Potential Russian Nuclear Strike in Ukraine in Late 2022, Officials Say,” CNN, March 9, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/09/politics/us-prepared-rigorously-potential-russian-nuclear-strike-ukraine/index.html.

3. Nina Tannewald, “Is Using Nuclear Weapons Still Taboo?” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/01/nuclear-war-taboo-arms-control-russia-ukraine-deterrence/; Kateryna Shkarlat, “Zelenskyy Outlines What Is Restraining Putin From Nuclear Strike on Ukraine,” RBC-Ukraine, May 3, 2023, https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/zelenskyy-outlines-what-is-restraining-putin-1714764161.html.

4. For full results of our experiment and a detailed statistical analysis, see Michal Smetana and Michal Onderco, “I Hope the Russians Love Their Children Too”: Experimental Evidence on Russian Public Support for Nuclear Use After the Invasion of Ukraine,” September 2024, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4906365 (preprint).

5. “On the Possibility of Using Nuclear Weapons in the Ukrainian Conflict,” Levada Center, June 21, 2023, https://www.levada.ru/en/2023/06/21/on-the-possibility-of-using-nuclear-weapons-in-the-ukrainian-conflict/.

6. For more information, see “Levada Omnibus Survey,” Levada Center, n.d., https://www.levada.ru/en/methods/omnibus/ (accessed September 20, 2024).

7. See Michal Smetana and Michal Onderco, “From Moscow With a Mushroom Cloud? Russian Public Attitudes to the Use of Nuclear Weapons in a Conflict With NATO,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 67, Nos. 2-3 (2023): 183-209.

8. Heather Williams et al., “Deter and Divide: Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric and Escalation Risks in Ukraine,” CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues, 2024, https://features.csis.org/deter-and-divide-russia-nuclear-rhetoric/.

9. “Most Russians Support Annexation of Crimea - Poll,” The Moscow Times, April 26, 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/04/26/most-russians-support-annexation-of-crimea-poll-a73741/.

10. Dmitriy Suslov, “Пора подумать о демонстрационном ядерном взрыве” [It’s time to think about a demonstration nuclear explosion], Profil, May 29, 2024, https://profile.ru/abroad/pora-podumat-o-demonstracionnom-yadernom-vzryve-1520096/.

11. “Russia: New Heights on Repression,” Human Rights Watch, January 11, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/11/russia-new-heights-repression.

12. Olga Oliker et al., “Russian Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context: A Reassessment,” Rand Corp., September 12, 2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE144.html.

13. Anna Efimova and Denis Strebkov, “Linking Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Russia,” The International Spectator, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2020): 93-111.

14. Oleg Sukhov, “Putin Lacks Troops in Ukraine but Fears Mobilization in Russia,” Kyiv Independent, July 5, 2022, https://kyivindependent.com/putin-lacks-troops-in-ukraine-but-fears-mobilization-in-russia/.

15. Larisa Deriglazova and Nina Rozhanovskaya, “Building Nuclear Consensus in Contemporary Russia: Factors and Perceptions,” in Nuclear Russia: International and Domestic Agendas, ed. Andrey Pavlov and Larisa Deriglazova (Tomsk: Tomsk University Press, 2020), 131-162.

16. Mansur Mirovalev, “‘God of War’: Russian Orthodox Church Stands by Putin, but at What Cost?” Al Jazeera, February 9, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/9/far-from-harmless-patriarch-kirill-backs-putins-war-but-at-what-cost.

17. Anna Clara Arndt, Liviu Horovitz, and Michal Onderco, “Russia’s Failed Nuclear Coercion Against Ukraine,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2023): 167-184.

Michal Smetana is an associate professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, and director of the Peace Research Center in Prague. Michal Onderco is a professor of international relations in the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University in Rotterdam.

October 2024
By Matthew R. Costlow

I read with some dismay Frank von Hippel’s “The 1970s ICBM ‘Window of Vulnerability’ Still Lingers” in the September 2024 issue of Arms Control Today. In making his case concerning the alleged dangers of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), he errs on matters of policy, strategy, and operations to such a significant degree that I believe a public correction of the record is necessary.

Von Hippel states that “[t]he primary advantage of a launch-under-attack posture is its low cost. Its major disadvantage is the danger of accidental launch.” Addressing both assertions in turn, the U.S. ability to launch its ICBMs under attack is one option among many for a president facing an apparent attack. But the advantage of this posture lies in its deterrence effect, not in its cost. Even an ICBM force in a de-alerted state would constitute a “low cost” posture and thus cannot be why U.S. officials in Democratic and Republican administrations have long seen an advantage in keeping U.S. ICBMs on alert. Instead, as the historical record attests, U.S. officials see a great advantage in complicating adversary targeting plans by retaining the option of launching ICBMs while adversary missiles are still in flight. This approach leaves open the possibility that the adversary will have expended potentially thousands of warheads for no apparent military gain, not to mention the incoming U.S. response.

On the matter of accidental launch, von Hippel expands on his concern by stating without citation or evidence, “In contrast to this redundancy of positive controls to assure the ICBMs would be launched if ordered, there is not a single system to deal with the possibility of a mistaken or unauthorized launch.” He correctly notes that ICBMs can be launched, with proper authorization from the chain of command, from one of five launch control centers or an airborne asset called “airborne launch control system.” What he fails to note is that each of these systems can issue “inhibit launch” orders against the silo or silos in question. Far from “not a single system” to address the possibility of unauthorized launch, there is a host of systems and procedures built for that exact purpose, including manual locks, safing pins, and more.¹

The Air Force is not a passive observer of the issue either. It conducts “Unauthorized Launch Studies” to red-team potential problems and undertakes “Threat Mitigation Plans” if any problems are found.² Unsurprisingly, the Air Force mandates numerous redundant safeguards for the software used in nuclear systems that are biased toward making it far easier to inhibit a launch than to enable it.³ As the Defense Department states, “The U.S. alert system prioritizes surety over speed.”⁴

The policy debate over the value of ICBMs in U.S. nuclear strategy can continue usefully only if all sides have a clear understanding of the safeguards in place to prevent unauthorized or accidental launches.

ENDNOTES

1. See U.S. Air Force, “Safety Rules for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile System,” AFI91-114, January 6, 2023.

2. U.S. Air Force, “Unauthorized Launch, Threat Mitigation, and Launch Action Studies,” AFI91-106, August 28, 2019.

3. U.S. Air Force Headquarters, “Department of the Air Force Guidance Memorandum (DAFGM) to Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 91-119, Safety Design Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software,” DAFMAN91-119_DAFGM2024-01, June 11, 2024.

4. U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States - 2020,” n.d., p. 6, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.

Matthew R. Costlow is a senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy.

October 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

The United States accused Iran of sending ballistic missiles to Russia, an accusation Iran denied.

Iran reached an agreement with Russia to transfer hundreds of missiles in 2023, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, but the Sept. 10 announcement was the first time that the United States confirmed that Iran shipped any missile systems to Russia.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a Sept. 10 press conference in London that the United States had warned Iran publicly and privately that transferring the missiles would be a “dramatic escalation.” Blinken said that Russia is likely to use the weapons within the next several weeks.

Iran called the accusation “a vile propaganda ploy” and said that the United States is disseminating “misleading information.”

Iran was prohibited from transferring missiles and related technologies under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and modified UN sanctions on Iran. The missile restrictions expired in October 2023. Prior to the expiration, Iran transferred drones to Russia in violation of the UN restrictions. Iran admitted to exporting some drones, but denied it was a violation of Resolution 2231.

The United States and European countries responded to the missile transfer by announcing additional sanctions against Iran, including against Iran Air.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom said in a Sept. 10 statement that the transfer of missiles is “a direct threat to European security.” The move is “further escalation of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and will see Iranian missiles reaching European soil,” the statement said.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said that Tehran and Moscow are cooperating in “sensitive” areas, but did not confirm or deny the transfer of missiles.

Blinken said the missile involved was the Fath-360, which has a range of 75 miles. He said Russian military personnel were trained in Iran to use that system and suggested that Russia will use the Iranian systems for “closer-range targets.”

U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said that Iran benefits militarily from the security relationship with Russia. The two countries share technology and tactics, he said.