December 2025
By Rose Gottemoeller 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, after mysteriously disappearing from the public eye for a few weeks, reemerged November 9 to give an interview to Russian news service RIA Novosti. He took a question about whether Moscow has proposed a meeting with Washington to discuss President Vladimir Putin’s offer to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) limits for one year beyond February 5, 2026, when the treaty goes out of force. With an exasperated edge, his specialty, Lavrov answered,

The constructive initiative put forward by President Vladimir Putin in the post-New START context speaks for itself. It contains no hidden agenda and is perfectly clear for understanding. Its practical implementation would not require any special additional efforts. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to hold in-depth discussions on this proposal.… So far, there has been no substantive response from Washington.¹

In past times, the two sides could be expected to be engaged in sustained, even urgent, negotiations to determine the future of their nuclear relationship and the treaty that imposes the last remaining limits on their strategic arsenals, which together contain roughly 10,000 nuclear weapons.

But since Putin announced September 22 that Russia is “prepared to continue observing the … central quantitative restrictions” of New START for one year after its expiration if the United States “acts in a similar spirit,” there has been no formal U.S. response, just President Donald Trump’s off-the-cuff comment to reporters Oct. 5 that “it sounds like a good idea to me.”²

One Right Thing

Yet, Lavrov has one thing right: Putin’s proposal does not require any negotiation. Both Putin and Trump could simply declare their intention to continue to abide by the New START limits: 1,550 warheads, 700 delivery vehicles, 800 launchers.³ This handshake arrangement could hold until one side declared its intention to leave the limits, or started building up beyond the agreed numbers and the other side noticed through its national technical means of verification, which involve overhead satellites and other national monitoring assets.

Further, while the treaty remains in force, both presidents can actually do better than that—and still not need to negotiate.

Putin stopped implementing New START in February 2023 because he objected to the continuing U.S. assistance to Ukraine.⁴ The United States, for its part, quite correctly held Russia accountable, stopped implementing the treaty on a reciprocal basis, and pushed Russia to change course. For that reason, Russia and the United States no longer exchange New START data twice a year, nor do they exchange notifications about the movements of their strategic nuclear forces on a nearly daily basis. Similarly, the treaty-mandated short-notice, on-site inspections are on pause, depriving both sides of valuable and stabilizing insights into each other’s nuclear forces.

But even in this situation of suspended implementation, the treaty itself remains in force. That means implementation can easily be resumed until February 5, 2026. Trump could improve Putin’s offer by proposing that both sides resume implementation measures and do so quickly. This would allow each party to have up-to-date knowledge about the status of the other’s strategic nuclear forces when the treaty does go out of force in just over two months’ time. Our mutual knowledge would be “level set” after a period when Moscow and Washington had to depend only on national technical means for monitoring the other’s forces. The result is bound to be a mutual improvement.

The two sides would not have to negotiate; they only have to flip the implementation switch back on. Both countries have a legal obligation under the treaty to fulfill these measures which are clearly laid out in treaty protocols and procedures; notification formats, for example, are well-understood on both sides, and are transmitted by experienced teams at the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington and Moscow. The data exchanges also are conducted in a well-practiced way by the center staffs.⁵

As for inspections, they were suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic but were ready to resume in 2023. Although in many instances, U.S. sanctions and visa requirements can impact work with Russia, in this instance, the treaty itself solves the problem. It obligates the parties to accept each other’s inspectors. As with the data exchange, there is “muscle memory” here, too; both sides have experienced inspectors who know how to navigate the procedures. The technical implementation teams were set to meet in the fall of 2022 to chart a post-COVID resumption of inspections— just when Putin ordered the cessation of contact.⁶

Simple and Fast Implementation

As a result, Russia and the United States could resume full implementation of New START before February 5, 2026. It could be simple and it could be fast. All it requires is that both sides resume implementing the treaty that remains in force until February. This “re-baselining” of insight into their nuclear forces would be a powerful complement to a handshake to abide by New START limits for one year after the treaty expires.

For the United States, the benefit of this move would be buying more time to decide what to do about the ongoing Chinese buildup without having to worry simultaneously about new Russian deployments. It also would permit the U.S. triad modernization program to proceed, unimpeded by new requirements: any decision to re-open that program would add to its already high cost and ever lengthening schedule.

For Russia and the United States, benefits would spring from restored predictability about each other’s nuclear forces, and from the renewed lines of communication that would pay dividends in mutual confidence. With effort, trust may be restored to a level sufficient to make progress on larger strategic stability topics, a process interrupted by the war in Ukraine.

After a nearly four-year pause, Russia and the United States have crucial questions to wrestle with in the strategic stability space, including what to do about the proliferation of drones and missiles at all ranges. One approach would be to ban nuclear weapons on missiles and drones in the short to intermediate ranges. This would challenge the boundaries of what has previously been agreed at the negotiating table but is well worth considering because of the widespread nature of the proliferation. Russia and the United States could look together for ways to propose such limits to other states possessing nuclear weapons. It should be in no one’s interest to face, in the future, a nuclear weapon amid a drone swarm.⁷

Moscow and Washington also could begin what should become a wider conversation about the need that all states will have to defend against drones and missiles—what is known as integrated air and missile defense—and sustain a balance between strategic offensive deterrence and missile defense. The preamble to New START was succinct on that point,

Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties…⁸

Defending Against Drones and Missiles

Now the parties must think hard about how to build defenses against drones and missiles in multiple ranges, while ensuring that their strategic triads remain a viable means to deter nuclear attack on their homelands. It is a common problem, once again, that affects all states deploying strategic offensive forces, not just Russia and the United States. With long experience addressing this vital balance, the two largest nuclear powers can perhaps together lay the groundwork for a broader consideration, amid rampant missile proliferation, of the offense-defense relationship among all states possessing nuclear weapons.

The United States, of course, also must address the Chinese nuclear buildup, which will be a long-running challenge in the 21st century. The Chinese are fiercely reluctant to engage on the issue, not wanting to limit or reduce their nuclear forces until an uncertain point in the future. Either they want to build up to the levels of Russia and the United States, thus creating the two-nuclear-peer problem that so worries Washington, or they want to wait until Russia and the United States reduce their arsenals down to China’s level, Beijing’s canonical talking point.

Although China refuses to discuss limits or reductions, it seems more open to conversations about constraining nuclear risks. For that reason, the twin challenges of missile proliferation and defense necessity perhaps will be one way to open a conversation with Beijing about controls on nuclear weapons, such as a ban on nuclear weapons on short- and intermediate-range missiles. If Russia and the United States can advance the issue, then at a minimum, China might be ready to listen to what they have accomplished, perhaps in the context of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the so-called P5.⁹ The P5 process, which also includes France and the United Kingdom, could be a practical place to discuss integrated air and missile defense and how it relates to the viability of strategic offensive deterrence.

By contrast, one place where China and the United States could take the lead is in fleshing out the meaning of the statement agreed by U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping at their Lima summit meeting in November 2024.¹⁰ The two leaders, discussing the security implications of AI, agreed that there should always be a human in the loop for nuclear command and control decision-making, but what precisely that means has yet to be determined. As the countries leading AI innovation on a global basis, China and the United States are in a good position to begin this conversation, with a view to expanding it apace to the rest of the P-5.

Because the level of geopolitical tension is so high, such ideas may seem outlandish, but it is important to stress that they are all on a sound foundation. Russia and the United States first tackled the offense-defense balance in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and that long-ago experience can inform current discussions, even if no one wants to negotiate another ABM Treaty. China, as standoffish as it has been on nuclear negotiations, has already agreed at the highest level that AI and nuclear command and control decision-making must be treated with supreme caution. This, too, is a sound basis for fruitful discussions.

Extending the limits of New START by one year would build momentum toward such engagements. Exercising the treaty now—while it remains in existence—is a positive and achievable step. And it does not require negotiation, just the flip of a policy switch.

ENDNOTES

1. “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with RIA Novosti, Moscow, November 9, 2025,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, November 9, 2025.

2. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Kremlin welcomes Trump’s comments on Putin’s offer to extend the New START nuclear arms pact,” Associated Press, October 6, 2025.

3. Under the New START Treaty, operationally deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers assigned to nuclear missions are limited to 700. Deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and bombers are limited to 800. Operationally deployed warheads are limited to 1,550.

4. Vladimir Putin, “The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, February 21, 2023.

5. Rose Gottemoeller and Dan Zhukov, “Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Stable Channel in Unstable Times,” Stanley Center for Peace and Security, October 2023.

6. Mike Eckel, “How Bad Are Things Between Russia and the U.S.? They Can’t Even Agree To Discuss Nuclear Weapons Inspections,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 2, 2022.

7. Rose Gottemoeller, “The US and Russia can lead the way in banning nuclear-armed drones,” The Financial Times, October 30, 2025.

8. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Ex. Rept. 111-6 - Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (The New START Treaty),” Congress.gov, October 1, 2010.

9. Thomas Countryman, “The Potential of the P5 Process,” Arms Control Today, March 2025.

10. “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” The White House, November 16, 2024.

Rose Gottemoeller, William J. Perry Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and a Hoover Institution Research Fellow at Stanford University, was chief U.S. negotiator for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and a former NATO deputy secretary-general. Paul Dean was senior legal advisor to the U.S. New START Treaty delegation and a former deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for implementing the treaty. He assisted Gottemoeller with this article. 

December 2025
By Zahir Kazmi

Adopted unanimously in 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 established a binding, universal obligation for all states to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation to nonstate actors.¹ Today, that framework operates in a more contested landscape. On one track, debates over additional, country-specific sanctions—whether the North Korea file or UN Security Council Resolution 2231 relating to Iran—have become increasingly polarized at the security council.^{2 3}  Meanwhile, a renewed global push for nuclear energy is spreading sensitive technologies in a wider group of new entrants.⁴ At the same time, these dynamics heighten the value of Resolution 1540’s universal baseline.

At its core, the resolution is a nonproliferation instrument designed to keep the most dangerous materials from reaching the most dangerous actors while ensuring that implementation should not undermine all states’ rights, under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), to peaceful nuclear energy uses.^{5 6} Effective controls strengthen security; responsible access sustains legitimacy.

The mandate now faces dual disruption. Politically, consensus on additional sanctions has become harder to achieve. Technologically, advances in AI, additive manufacturing, and synthetic biology lower barriers for misuse.⁷ Nevertheless, the resolution remains one of the few consensus-based, universal tools that can still drive practical cooperation. The task of the next decade is not to reconsider its necessity, but to strengthen its implementation so it keeps pace with political and technological change.

A Universal Framework Beyond Sanctions

Sanctions are a central tool of international nonproliferation policy, but they can be selective and are often contested. They apply to specific states or entities, require repeated Security Council agreement, and are vulnerable to enforcement fatigue. By contrast, Resolution 1540 is universal and permanent: It applies to all states, irrespective of alliances, politics, or region.

This universality is its greatest strength. It closes gaps that proliferators might otherwise exploit. In an era of proliferating technologies and transnational supply chains, this baseline of obligations to adopt effective laws, controls, and enforcement measures is indispensable.

For states in the Global South, universality also means legitimacy; the resolution does not target any country by name, nor does it impose discriminatory restrictions. It balances responsibilities with rights, which helps explain why it was adopted unanimously in 2004 and extended by consensus in 2022 until 2032.⁸

When Sanctions Stall: Resolution 1540’s Stabilizing Role

The Security Council’s increasing difficulty in reaching agreement on, or uniformly implementing, additional country-specific sanctions by contrast has made the resolution’s stabilizing role more visible. In the North Korea file, efforts to adjust sanctions have repeatedly encountered deep divisions among major powers.⁹ In the Iran context, debates over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and certain UN sanctions have underscored how contentious and fragmented coercive approaches have become. For states such as Pakistan, which consistently call for dialogue-based approaches on these files, these episodes highlight why a universal, non-discriminatory instrument like Resolution 1540 remains so valuable.^{10 11}

In such contexts, the resolution provides continuity. Regardless of political divisions, all states remain obligated to prevent nonstate actors from developing, acquiring, or using WMD-related materials and delivery systems. The resolution thus functions as a backstop: even when sanctions politics become deadlocked, the resolution’s baseline obligations continue to bind the international community.¹²

This does not mean that Resolution 1540 replicates country-specific sanctions regimes. Rather, it complements them by providing a universal, non-discriminatory floor of obligations that all states have already accepted. This reality becomes particularly valuable when consensus on additional measures is lacking. That complementarity is often underappreciated, yet it is central to keeping the system credible.

Nuclear Energy Expansion and Rising Risks

The global energy transition is renewing the resolution’s relevance. Driven by climate- and energy-security concerns, more countries throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia are advancing nuclear power programs. Some pursue small modular reactors; others full-scale plants, often with external partners. Although this expansion supports sustainable development, it also multiplies proliferation risks if export controls, physical protection, and interagency coordination are underdeveloped.¹³

An initiative such as a regional practitioners’ week would directly address these needs, offering practical training on supply chain risk assessments, compliance programs, and safeguards. In this situation, the resolution is uniquely placed to provide continuity: Its reporting system, points-of-contact network, and assistance mechanism can match emerging nuclear states with the expertise they require.^{14 15}

In this way, the resolution functions as a preventive investment. By embedding safeguards at the outset of peaceful nuclear programs, it simultaneously strengthens nonproliferation norms and builds the capacity of practitioners in responsible use of nuclear technology. This dual role—preventing misuse while supporting legitimate development—will only grow more critical as the nuclear energy renaissance gathers pace.¹⁶

Balancing Gaps with Achievements

Resolution 1540 has always been more about sustained implementation than one-time compliance. Over two decades, progress in preventing proliferation has been steady but uneven, reflecting the varied capacities and political contexts of states.

On the positive side, implementation rates are impressive. By mid-2025, 185 UN member states had submitted their mandated national compliance reports to the 1540 Committee,¹⁷ a UN body established to oversee and support the resolution’s implementation, leaving only eight outstanding. Many states have refreshed their information in recent years; in 2024-25 alone, 42 states updated their points of contact and 24 states submitted 33 formal requests for assistance. The 1540 Committee has also resumed regional training courses after the COVID-19 hiatus with successful sessions in Asia-Pacific and Africa.¹⁸ These courses provide national officials with practical tools to strengthen licensing, enforcement, and interagency coordination.

Challenges remain. The 2025 program of work has not been adopted, largely due to procedural disagreements. Vacancies in the 1540 Committee’s group of experts persist, limiting the committee’s responsiveness. The mandated reporting, while widespread, varies in depth and quality, and some states lack the resources to translate obligations into effective national legislation. Most importantly, emerging technologies are outpacing the committee’s matrix, meaning that core tools used to assess national implementation do not yet reflect major risk vectors created by emerging technologies.AI, synthetic biology, additive manufacturing, and cloud-based computing are now central to the proliferation debate yet not fully captured in current tools.¹⁹

This combination of steady progress and persistent gaps underscores the need for innovation. The task is not to reinvent Resolution 1540 but to equip it for today’s security landscape while maintaining its universal legitimacy. A notable example of effective capacity-building was the European Union’s outreach in Southeast Asia, which paired technical experts from member states with counterparts in ASEAN countries to develop customized risk assessment models for their specific ports and financial systems. This model of sustained, peer-to-peer mentorship offers a template for the broader, more systematic approaches now required.

A Three-Part Practical Agenda

To the extent that progress has been achieved through steady and inclusive cooperation within the committee, it reflects a constructive spirit that continues to underpin the 1540 process despite broader political headwinds. The following three-part agenda enhances proven models while directly addressing political gridlock and technological change.

Building on lessons from the committee’s existing outreach and reporting experience, three practical initiatives could generate additional momentum for compliance with the resolution: convening a regional practitioners’ week, piloting an emerging technologies annex, and creating a matchmaking assistance hub. Each initiative responds to a recognized need, each is feasible within existing mandates, and each offers benefits across political divides.

Regional Practitioners’ Week

One of the committee’s quiet successes has been its regional training programs for points of contact in national governments. A next step would be to scale this into a practitioners’ week—an intense, exercise-based workshop designed to move beyond passive seminars. The aim is to create “muscle memory” for nonproliferation enforcement, giving officials tangible skills that they can immediately apply in their national roles.²⁰

The practitioners’ week would convene officials from customs, border security, export control agencies, law enforcement, and industry. Co-hosted with the 1540 Committee, the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and regional co-sponsors, the first event week could be launched in the Asia-Pacific region in 2026. The agenda would center on practical exercises: simulating interdictions along dual-use supply chains, building internal compliance programs tailored to small and medium-sized enterprises, and peer-review sessions pairing experienced national officials with first-time reporters.

To ensure sustainability, such workshops should be directed to produce concrete outputs: a model national help-desk template to streamline communication between points of contact and industry, a quick-start toolkit for drafting, updating, and harmonizing their national control lists with guidelines of the four export control arrangements, and a peer review playbook that institutionalizes mentoring voluntarily among the states. The Resolution 1540 framework and the four multilateral export control arrangements—the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime—can be more effective if their processes keep pace with global technological diffusion, including increased systematic engagement with capable states that remain outside their exclusive membership.

These events would be cost-effective, inclusive, and regionally owned. For countries aspiring to establish nuclear energy programs for the first time, the tools would help launch peaceful programs under strong safeguards, reducing the risk of diversion or misuse. For all states, the initiative would accelerate measurable implementation while reinforcing regional networks of practitioners who can share challenges, coordinate across agencies, and transfer lessons learned.

Emerging Technologies Annex

Resolution 1540’s implementation matrix,²¹ used to assess national measures, was last revised in 2017.²² At the time, AI, additive manufacturing, and synthetic biology were not seen as urgent proliferation risks. Today, they are central to the debate.²³

Updating the matrix entirely would be contentious because the multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral arms control and disarmament guardrails embattled under the load of geopolitical developments for more than two decades. But a voluntary annex, piloted by willing states, could provide a flexible solution. Participation would be voluntary and confined to information-sharing, without creating any new verification or reporting obligations. It would not reopen negotiations on the core matrix or expand the committee’s mandate. Instead, it would allow states to share how they are addressing new risks, creating a clearer picture of global implementation.

The annex could include a shared glossary of emerging technology terms: sample compliance checklists for companies in AI, biotech, or advanced manufacturing and an optional assurance statement that firms could file with national authorities to confirm safeguards.

Dual-use ambiguity makes these modifications especially urgent. The same AI models that accelerate drug discovery can also be used to design pathogens. The same 3D printers that manufacture medical devices can also produce weapon components. Nuanced frameworks are needed to distinguish legitimate innovation from misuse, without stifling scientific progress.

This annex would reassure Western states that the committee is not ignoring technological change, while assuring others that no new obligations are being imposed. It is a way to future-proof Resolution 1540 without politicizing it.

An Assistance Matchmaking Hub

The committee received 33 assistance requests from 24 states in 2024-25.²⁴ The demand is clear, but the current process is slow, fragmented, and opaque. States often do not know the status of their requests or which donor is responding.

A 1540 assistance matchmaking hub would transform this system into a transparent, predictable process. States often do not know the status of their requests or which donor is responding. The hub would complement, not duplicate, the work of the Group of 7 Partnership Against the Spread of WMD, which primarily supports funded capacity-building projects. In contrast, the hub would provide a universal, transparent coordination mechanism for all UN member states, including those outside GP’s donor circle.²⁵ Hosted by UNODA, which manages the committee’s website, the hub could provide a secure, dedicated portal where requests would be standardized, needs mapped to donor expertise, and a visible queue maintained so applicants can track progress on their requests for assistance in real time.

A simple, public-facing site would guarantee universal access and legitimacy, while a more robust, permission-based portal, similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s technical cooperation systems, would better protect sensitive information but require greater investment.²⁶ Regardless of design, the shift from ad hoc email exchanges to a structured platform would itself be a major improvement.

The hub should encourage joint, multi-country proposals, such as regional port security upgrades or shared frameworks for cybersecurity at nuclear facilities, allowing donors to support scalable projects rather than isolated requests. To ensure quality, a small rotating “red team” of experts could test deliverables before deployment.

For some states, the hub would accelerate measurable implementation; for others, it would demonstrate respect for sovereignty and demand-driven assistance. For developing countries in particular, it would offer faster, more reliable access to the support they need, including for peaceful nuclear programs.

Shared Gains from Cooperative Implementation

The strength of Resolution 1540 lies not only in its universality, but also in its potential to deliver benefits across political and regional divides. The three initiatives outlined above are designed with this goal in mind.

For states that emphasize rapid implementation, particularly in the West, these proposals offer measurable gains. A practitioners’ week produces trained officials, an annex provides clearer data on emerging risks, and a hub accelerates assistance request processing. Each initiative has direct metrics of success, which donors and policymakers can point to as evidence that Resolution 1540 is being implemented in practice, not just 
in principle.

For states that prioritize discipline and sovereignty, these initiatives respect the resolution’s boundaries. The annex is voluntary, not mandatory. The practitioners’ week is regional and inclusive, not donor-driven. The assistance hub responds to requests from states rather than imposing projects on them. Each initiative is firmly anchored in the committee’s existing mandate, avoiding any expansion that could be construed as politicization.

For developing states, the benefits are even clearer. A hub provides faster, more transparent access to support. Training courses deliver hands-on skills for national officials and industry. An annex allows developing states to demonstrate responsible innovation without being locked out of emerging technologies. Perhaps most importantly, these initiatives create opportunities for the Global South to shape the agenda, not just accept one imposed by others. Participation in piloting the annex, co-hosting the practitioners’ week, or leading regional joint requests through the hub would give developing states a stronger voice in implementation. In short, this agenda is not about dividing the world into “implementers” and “recipients.” It is about shared ownership of a universal mandate.

The Opportunity of Continuity

In November 2022, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2663, extending the 1540 Committee’s mandate until 2032. In the realm of multilateral arms control, where mandates often expire after two or three years, a decade of stability is a rare achievement.

This continuity offers a strategic opportunity. It allows the committee to focus less on its own renewal and more on helping states deliver. It provides time to modernize tools such as the matrix, expand capacity-building programs, and institutionalize mechanisms such as the assistance hub. It also creates space for trust-building across political divides, which cannot be developed overnight.

The challenge, however, is that continuity can breed complacency. Without innovation, the committee risks becoming stagnant at precisely the moment when proliferation risks are evolving most rapidly. By adopting modest, consensus-friendly initiatives now, states can ensure that the next decade is not lost to inertia.

Resolution 1540 was conceived to prevent the most dangerous weapons from reaching the most dangerous actors. That mission has not changed. What has changed is the context: sanctions fatigue, technological disruption, and rising nuclear energy demand.

The resolution’s genius lies in refusing to treat nonproliferation and development as competing agendas. Instead, it treats them as complementary pillars. Effective security creates the conditions for peaceful innovation, while equitable access to science and technology strengthens the legitimacy of nonproliferation norms.

The way forward is not to debate this balance endlessly, but to demonstrate it in practice. By convening practitioners’ weeks, piloting an emerging technologies annex, and creating an assistance hub, states can show that implementation is possible even in a divided world.

For some, these initiatives will deliver faster compliance. For others, they will protect sovereignty and respect rights. For still others, they will provide capacity to pursue peaceful nuclear programs safely. For all, they will keep Resolution 1540 relevant, credible, and legitimate.

As the mandate moves into its third decade, the opportunity is clear: invest in inclusive, practical measures now, and Resolution 1540 can remain not only a shield against proliferation, but also a bridge to shared technological prosperity. Security and development do not compete; they complete each other.

ENDNOTES

1. United Nations, “About the 1540 Committee,” Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), accessed October 4, 2025.

2. United Nations, “Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution That Would Continue Iran Sanctions Relief,” September 19, 2025.

3. Kelsey Davenport, “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,” Arms Control Association, Factsheet last updated January 2022.

4. International Energy Agency, “A New Era for Nuclear Energy Beckons as Projects, Policies and Investments Increase,” January 16, 2025.

5. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), adopted April 28, 2004.

6. International Atomic Energy Agency, “NPT – The Full Text,” accessed August 2025.

7. Hynek, Nik, “Synthetic Biology/AI Convergence (SynBioAI): Security Threats in Frontier Science and Regulatory Challenges,” AI & Society, September 1, 2025.

8. United Nations, “Highlights of Security Council Practice 2022,” accessed September 2025.

9. United Nations, “Persistent Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons by Pyongyang Continues to Undermine Global Non-proliferation Regime, Assistant Secretary-General Tells Security Council,” May 7, 2025.

10. United Nations, “UN Security Council Blocks China-Russia Resolution on Iran Sanctions,” September 26, 2025.

11. Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN, “Statement by Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN, After the Vote on Draft Resolution (S/2025/561) Concerning Resolution 2231 (2015)/JCPOA,” X (formerly Twitter), September 19, 2025.

12. Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 2008.

13. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy in a Sustainable Development Perspective, 2000, published online May 30, 2025.

14. Debra Decker and Kathryn Rauhut, “The Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” Stimson Center, August 23, 2024.

15. Richard T. Cupitt, “Nearly at the Brink: The Tasks and Capacity of the 1540 Committee,” Arms Control Today, August 2012.

16. IEA, “New Era.”

17. United Nations, “1540 Committee: National Reports,” UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), accessed September 2025.

18. United Nations, “Security Council Reaffirms Importance of 1540 Committee amid Growing Weapons of Mass Destruction Concerns,” August 6, 2025.

19. Hynek, “SynBioAI.”

20. Adapted the phrase “muscle memory” from Bec Shrimpton, “Deterrence, escalation and strategic stability: Rebuilding Australia’s muscle memory,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2024.

21. United Nations, “Final Matrix Template (E),” UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), accessed August 2025.

22. United Nations, “Revision of the Matrix Template,” UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), accessed August 2025.

23. Stewart Patrick and Josie Barton, “Mitigating Risks from Gene Editing and Synthetic Biology: Global Governance Priorities,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2024.

24. UN Security Council, “Reaffirms Importance of 1540 Committee.”

25. Global Partnership Working Group, “How We Work,” accessed December 2025.

26. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Online tools for the IAEA TC community,” accessed October 2025.