Remarks by Thomas Countryman, Chair of the Arms Control Association board of director, at the 2024 Annual Meeting.                         

June 7, 2024

For a number of reasons, many of which have been discussed today, this is a very difficult, dangerous, pivotal moment in the long journey to address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.  So, what kind of a talk can I give you today?

Well, this is not a graveside eulogy.  Reports of the death of arms control are greatly—and deliberately—exaggerated.

This is not a religious service, where the pastor tells the faithful—in gory detail—what awaits the sinners who are not in church.

It’s also not a cable news show, where pundits bemoan the perilous state of the world (or of an election) and ask plaintively “Won’t somebody do something?”

I think it is a little more like a football coach’s locker room pep talk, fine-tuning the game plan for the second half.

So today, I will offer some thoughts not just on what we want from the possessors of nuclear weapons—what they must do—but also what this community and others need to do to effect a change in direction.

This moment is dangerous NOT because world governments have forgotten the risk of nuclear war, but because too many world leaders no longer see it as the overriding existential risk.  After the Cuban crisis of 1962, two superpowers recognized that if nuclear destruction were not averted, no other national goals mattered.

Today is different.  At least Moscow views the risk of nuclear war as secondary to the risk of failing in its goal of territorial expansion.  And this drives reactive decisions in other capitals.

As Secretary-General Guterres noted in his remarks, the primary responsibility for addressing nuclear risk continues to lie with the owners of the two supersized arsenals, the United States and the Russian Federation.  The refusal of Russia to engage in any kind of bilateral discussion is not just irresponsible, it is inconsistent with a history in which arms control dialogue continued, even at a time when one side’s weapons were killing the other side’s soldiers, in Vietnam or Afghanistan.

Just as unfortunately, in response to Moscow’s refusal, many officials in this city shrug their shoulders and say, “We tried arms control; now let’s rebuild our arsenal.”  That ignores a central lesson of the fifty years in which arms control negotiations improved America’s national security. That lesson is that the indispensable ingredient is American creativity, American persistence, American leadership.  Note that leadership does not mean American dominance or American control of a process—it simply means tireless determination.  At this moment, it means refusing to take "no" as the final answer.

As Pavel Podvig writes in the May issue of Arms Control Today, there exists still both a conceptual basis and a historical basis for Washington and Moscow to reach a successor agreement to New START those addresses both states’ national security interests.  As he notes, the political change that would make negotiation possible “may seem distant today, but it may be closer than it appears.”

There still exists a place where Russian and American officials speak to each other on nuclear issues: the P5 process.  At a moment when bilateral dialogue is impossible, the P5 dialogue should assume greater importance.  In a private dialogue, new steps—small or large—can be explored without the posturing and the point-scoring that marks the public debate in Geneva, or New York, or Vienna.

China will soon assume, for one year, the chairmanship of this process. Recall that last year Presidents Biden and Xi agreed that proliferation concerns was one topic on which the two sides need to cooperate. It is my deep hope that China will show some ambition, equal to the importance that it claims in world affairs, that it will increase the frequency of P5 meetings, elevate their level, and expand their agenda. They don't need to focus on reaching consensus among the five on every issue; they do need to focus on listening and on mutual understanding.

As I noted, the primary responsibility for progress lies with Washington and Moscow.  France, and China, and the United Kingdom are not off the hook, however. They do not have the option of sitting on the sideline, waiting for the U.S. and Russia.  They must recognize—and respond to—the overwhelming view of non-weapon states that the P5 are failing to meet—and even consciously ignoring—their obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Let me say a little bit about what we should expect and demand from the non-nuclear weapon states.

I am impressed by the way the non-weapon states parties to the NPT have stepped up in recent years. They correctly concluded that arms control initiatives are urgently needed—so urgently that the initiative should not rest only with the P5.  One result was the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an admirable if imperfect document.

Non-weapon states now need to step up higher if we are to preserve the essential norms of global security. As the late Michael Krepon described them, these are the norms against use or threats of use, against nuclear testing, and against the transfer and proliferation of nuclear weapons.                         

So, let's be specific: when President Putin and his acolytes make nuclear threats, there is no audible pushback from the non-nuclear world, only a deafening silence. Saying out loud that such threats—whether subtle or explicit—are unacceptable to the international community is NOT taking sides on the war in Ukraine; it is simply living up to the principles that non-nuclear states proclaim in the sound-proof chambers in Geneva and New York.  Mr. Putin does not expect anyone to endorse his methods, but because he does not hear anyone outside of NATO criticizing his threatening words, he will continue to use them.

Let's be more specific: the level of the speaker matters. When I was an assistant secretary of state, I took the statements of my counterparts to represent accurately the positions of their governments.  but presidents and prime ministers do not listen to their own assistant secretaries and assistant ministers as closely as they listen to other presidents and prime ministers.  If arms control concerns are not conveyed at a higher level directly to the leaders of the P5 states, those leaders will conclude—correctly, perhaps—that nuclear issues are of lower importance to the rest of the world. Putin is not the only leader who needs to hear directly from other world leaders, but his is the right address to begin.

Non-weapon states also have a duty to preserve the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT. At a moment when several states speak openly about leaving the Treaty or developing their own nuclear arsenal, non-weapon states need to speak with one voice; they should declare, jointly and publicly, that any such move would make it impossible to continue normal political and economic relations with a new weapons-possessing state.

All of these are ideas that we have to convey loudly to the world’s governments, and since we are here in Washington, we need to start with the United States government.  Our public statements need to support the White House when it says or does the right thing.  The best example was the statement Jake Sullivan made here one year ago when he said the nuclear arsenal was sufficient for deterrence for the foreseeable future and declared that the U.S. wanted bilateral dialogue with Russia without preconditions.  (Sadly, at least a few people in the U.S. government seemed to believe that Mr. Sullivan’s offer has been overtaken by events and is now no longer relevant.)

At the same time, we have to be vocal about backward steps and persistent in convincing this government and others that there are alternatives to a new nuclear arms race.  Our work to reduce and eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons must be informed by the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of nuclear war, but our dialogue with policymakers must also recognize the validity of genuine national security concerns, made more and more obvious by threatening rhetoric from nuclear-possessing states.  We can critique the flaws in deterrence theory and postures, but we can’t simply dismiss deterrence as a concept without offering realistic alternatives sufficient to provide security.

The Arms Control Association, this tiny but mighty team, with great analytic contributions from so many of you in this room, has worked to analyze and address the questions that should be discussed among governments.  Can our national security be better protected by concepts of sufficiency rather than symmetry?  Are we tied to ratified treaties as the best form of agreements, or can we find new forms (which sometimes means old forms) of bilateral and multilateral agreements, focusing as much on behavior and transparency as on numbers? How do we achieve the goal that Presidents Xi and Biden agreed to pursue, maintaining human control of nuclear decisions?

It is also important as we push back against those who argue that arms control is dead or dying that we do one thing better than government spokesmen or diplomats: we have to speak with an air of civility, even when those who disagree with us are condescending or insulting.  As in diplomacy, anyone in or out of government who is trying to solve the same vexing issues should be seen as a potential partner, not an eternal adversary.

Our target audience is broad, perhaps impossibly broad for the size of our community.  In Washington, as in other countries, it comprises political and military leadership and workers—thousands of dedicated specialists—as well as the Congress.  We need new ways to appeal to public opinion and to mobilize public engagement, and that door is more open at this moment when more citizens are aware of nuclear risk than at any time in the last forty, or perhaps sixty years.

We cannot avoid the awareness that elections matter.  Since the 1950s, every U.S. president—except one—has acknowledged that arms control IS national security; that it can be win-win, not zero-sum; that speaking to an adversary is a sign of confidence, not of weakness; that insisting on absolute American sovereignty or American dominance in arsenals is a recipe for tragic conflict.  The results here on November 5 will affect the strategy of our efforts, but not their urgency.

In particular, we have to look to younger people, the generation from which I draw my daily dose of optimism.  Are we doing enough to raise their consciousness, to equip them with the concepts and analytic tools to address the dilemmas that my generation is leaving to them? I was pulled kicking and screaming into the 21st Century, and I don’t know how to get meaningful news and analysis from TikTok or other social media.  But millions of young people do, and we have to meet them where they are, where they read, where they watch, where they think.

In one way, I am nostalgic for the 1980s, when millions of people in the U.S. and abroad mobilized in support of saner responsible nuclear policies and arms control diplomacy to halt and reverse the arms race; their activism convinced national leaders that sensible national security pays political dividends.  We live in a different time that requires new alliances and strategies. I am heartened—but confess also envious—when I see millions of people, primarily young people, demanding responsible action on climate change, the other existential threat we face.  I recommend an article in Arms Control Today last November by Ambassador Kenneth Brill.  He notes there should be, there must be a common cause between climate change activists demanding a secure and prosperous future and nuclear activists who are simply demanding a future.

It’s a long list of tasks and it can be discouraging.  Setbacks have been frequent, and advances have only been at the margins.  The issues are many and our numbers are not. As fishermen traditionally pray: “The sea is so wide, Lord, and my boat is so small.”  The total annual budget for all of the organizations working in this field—in the U.S. and elsewhere—is less than governments spend on nuclear weapons in half a day.

As John Kennedy said about going to the moon: “We choose to do this not because it is easy, but because it is hard, because the goal will organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because the challenge is one we are unwilling to postpone”.

I still believe—despite all evidence to the contrary—that humans are better at solving problems than at creating problems. In September 1962, nobody would have predicted that within a few months, Moscow and Washington would initiate decades of world-changing negotiations, making both nations safer.

Today, we both need to work to prevent the breakdown moment when guardrails against nuclear catastrophe evaporate, and be prepared to seize the breakthrough moment, when we can advance again in the direction of the security of a world free of nuclear weapons.  Your contributions now—whether in time, or money, or analysis, or activism—will be crucial as we head toward that moment.

Now I realize that this was more like a church sermon than a locker room pep talk. I can tell because I can see a couple of people nodding off. I want to simply thank you for your attention and above all thank you—tomorrow—for your commitment.

God bless.

Opening remarks from Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball to the 2024 ACA Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.  

June 7, 2024  

Good day everyone and welcome to the National Press Club and the 2024 to Arms Control Association Annual Meeting!

I am Daryl Kimball, executive director, and we are delighted to have so many of you here in the room and online for today's event which is titled: "Moving Back from the Nuclear Brink."

We are indeed, on the brink, or at least closer to it that we have been in decades.

The three states with the largest nuclear arsenals—Russia, the United States, and China—are on the precipice of an unconstrained era of dangerous nuclear competition. Billions of dollars are being spent by the world’s nine nuclear weapons possessor states to maintain and upgrade their deadly arsenals.

Key nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agreements that have helped to ease tensions and reduce the nuclear danger are either gone, are being ignored, or are in jeopardy.

The last remaining treaty constraining U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons will expire in about 600 days ...

... and so far, the Kremlin also rejected the U.S. offer—announced at by Jake Sullivan at ACA 2023 Annual Meeting—to engage in talks on a new U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control framework before New START expires.

Russia has also de-ratified the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, deployed sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus, and is alleged to be developing a nuclear-armed space weapon. Meanwhile, as Putin's deadly and illegal assault on Ukraine continues, he continues to threaten possible nuclear weapons in response to Western efforts to help Ukraine defend itself.

Citing a China's nuclear modernization efforts, some members of the U.S. nuclear weapons establishment are proposing to spend even more U.S. tax dollars to expand the U.S. nuclear arsenal for the first time in decades.

There are other stresses the broader arms control and nonproliferation system.

Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza following the Oct. 7 terror attack has produced a monumental humanitarian catastrophe that U.S. arms transfer policies and laws were supposed to help prevent but haven't.

And, in the absence of the agreed limits on its nuclear program and tougher international monitoring through the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Iranian leaders have expanded their capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material and restricted IAEA access to key sites.

As the risk of an Iranian nuclear bomb has grown, Saudi Arabia has redoubled its campaign to acquire sensitive nuclear technologies from Washington.

Our meeting today will explore these issues in depth with the help of some of the most experienced, best-informed experts from outside of government and some from inside the government, including our first keynote speaker.

We hope today's discussions will provide some new insights and ideas about how to best address these massive challenges.

Let me close this brief introduction to the day by underscoring the fact that if we are going to be successful in moving back from the nuclear brink, it will take all of us and much more to make it happen.

ACA is a medium-sized organization, with just a dozen full time staffers, a volunteer Board, working with a very modest budget that is supported by a very small number of generous foundations and our loyal members.

As the MacArthur Foundation once said about us, ACA is an "exceptional organization that effectively addresses pressing national and international challenges with an impact disproportionate to its small size.'

But we cannot succeed by ourselves. In my 35 years as a professional in the arms control and disarmament field, its clear that progress depends on:

• Smart, collaborative, sustained civil society campaigns, involving multiple organizations, large and small, local, and national, to engage and inform and mobilize the public to put pressure on key policy makers to take responsible action.
• It takes bold presidential leadership and constructive Congressional action.
• It requires responsible behavior and initiative from other governments.
• We also need the active and principled leadership of the UN and the UN Secretary-General, who we will hear from later this morning.
• and it takes some good luck and more.

Together, over the years, we've all helped to establish and defend the norms against nuclear weapons use, threats of use, nuclear testing, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear weapons buildups, and to advance progress on nuclear disarmament.

But as the civil rights and nuclear disarmament champion Coretta Scott King once said (in 1993):

“The struggle is a never-ending process. Freedom is never really won. You earn it and win it in every generation.”

At this time, the collective efforts of our generation are more important than ever.

Closing Remarks from Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball to the 2024 ACA Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.  

What a great discussion on a difficult topic that bears our urgent attention. Thank you, Rachel, and to each of the other panelists we just heard from.

I just want to close today's event with a few words of thanks to those who helped make this all possible.

First, thanks to our ACA team who have been working for several weeks and through the day today to make this event run smoothly. ACA is fortunate to have not only a very professional and capable staff team, but they are passionate about their work, and they are a joy to work with. Let's give them all a generous round of applause.

I want to give a particular shout out to our dedicated COO Kathy Crandall Robinson, our Director of Communications and Operations Tony Fleming, our program and operations assistant Libby Flatoff, and to Allen Harris, our stellar production and design editor, who along with our chief editor Carol Giacomo, is responsible for making Arms Control Today look so sharp.

For those of you watching online, you have our videographer Brendan Kowanoski to thank for his work today.

ACA's appreciation to all of our speakers and expert panelists. We heard from some of the very best in our field today. Thanks for all you do.

Finally, I want to recognize all of this year's generous annual meeting sponsors and everyone who joined us here today in person, and online. Your financial support, your interest, and your engagement is essential to our ability to pull this off and to pursue ACA programs and initiatives throughout the year.

You'll see the list of more than 40 meeting sponsors in the back of your program book and on our online 2024 Annual Meeting page, which will soon host an archived recording of today's proceedings.

I want to give a shout out to the essential grant-making foundations in the peace and security field who generously and loyally provide much of the financial support we need to sustain our work. These include our friends at:

• the Prospect Hill Foundation
• the Ploughshares Fund
• the Carnegie Corporation of New York
• the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and
• the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, which has for many years been a major supporter of our work and that of many others in the nuclear risk reduction and nuclear policy field, but will, beginning next year, shift their attention to other urgent issues.

Yet, our work to address the threats posed by the world's most dangerous weapons must go on.

As Secretary General Guterres said, "the world is on a knife's edge," and as Tom Countryman reminded us, its our time to act to try to tackle the big challenges ahead and to make a difference.

That makes your engagement, your own efforts, and your financial support for ACA's work more important than ever.

[It will take persistence, it will take passion, it will require considered risks, it will require a more engaged and informed public, it will take new ideas and new voices, it will take all of us all working together.]

Thanks for joining us today.

We are adjourned.

Remarks from Rep. John Garamendi (D-CA8), co-chair of the Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group, to the ACA 2024 Annual Meeting.
(Official Transcript)

June 7, 2024

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to join you today. To Daryl and the Arms Control Association: thank you for your continuing work for a safer world and for this event. And to all of you joining; thank you for being a part of this critical dialogue.

In these unsettled times, events like this are important. They provide a forum for honest discourse and an opportunity to cut through the rhetoric of fear and doomsaying that too often pervades our nuclear policy. Unfortunately, dispassionate, calm voices are regularly drowned out by the loudest, most fearful voices.

Last year, at this event, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan outlined three goals: prevent an arms race, reduce the risk of misperception and escalation, and ensure the safety and security of people from nuclear threats. He emphasized that these were the “same goals, new strategy” and that “effective deterrence means we have a ‘better' approach, not a ‘more' approach.”

While these are fine principles, I am concerned that, in practice, we are moving in the direction of “more” and not “better." Instead of developing cost-effective systems that provide security while defusing tensions, we have fallen into the fallacy that more missiles make us more secure. Nothing could be further from the truth.

It’s well past time for our voices, the voices of restraint and risk reduction, to be heard in the nuclear arms debate. The United States, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China are locked into an extraordinarily dangerous nuclear arms race. All three countries are rapidly increasing their nuclear firepower with new and more capable bombs, more long-range missiles, new stealth delivery systems, bombers, submarines. And all of this totally dependent on the newest field of warfare: space. All three countries depend upon their space assets to observe, detect threats, and communicate the commands to act.

Today, we must call out the failures of our current approach to nuclear modernization and demand that we treat arms control and de-escalation with the same dedication and focus we give to our nuclear weapons development. It is long past time to develop a strategy that sets priorities, recognizes limitations, and strives for a safer future.

Before diving into the specifics of how Congress is approaching our nuclear weapons systems, I think it is important to step back and consider the broader context. Since their development almost 80 years ago, the destructive capability of nuclear weapons has terrified and shocked, but also led governments to pursue their own arsenals and develop the capacity to destroy our civilization multiple times over. Governments justified expanding stockpiles with convoluted theories of nuclear deterrence that often defy common sense.

It wasn’t until arms control programs and treaties were established that Russia and the United States de-escalated this spiral of stockpiling bombs. Through four decades, progress was made, and the number of deployed and existing nuclear bombs was reduced, and even the most adversarial countries agreed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Yet, despite this understanding, we continue to maintain and modernize our arsenals with a belief that these weapons dissuade others from employing theirs. The threat of nuclear conflict remains, and with it, life on our planet ending or becoming dramatically changed.

It would be useful to remind people of the arms control agreements and the leaders that negotiated them. I’m sure that some of my congressional nuclear warriors would be surprised to see that their most ardent nuclear security heroes negotiated the reductions and controls.

I recognize the nuclear threats posed by countries like North Korea, Russia, and China. I do not deny the challenging security environment we face. I am fully aware of the Taiwan/China threat, as well as China’s military buildup and South China Sea expansion. The North Korean regime is dangerous and could precipitate a conflict at any moment. I condemn Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling, and dangerous nuclear exercises.

Despite these serious threats, we must be wise in preparing our defense and response.

Aggression should not be our first thought when faced with threats, uncertainty, and misunderstandings. Therefore, I strongly support efforts by the US and Chinese governments to engage in meaningful dialogue that results in specific, concrete actions to reduce the risk of miscommunication or escalation.

As we navigate these complex geopolitical landscapes, it is imperative that we pause and reflect on the strategies guiding our nuclear policy. Strategy must be more than a word thrown on top of grandiose statements. True strategy is making the hard choices to align our country’s limited resources with our unlimited aspirations.

The greatest problem facing our nuclear strategy today is that we fail to realistically consider that balance, revisit our assumptions, adjust course when programs fail, and figure out new paths forward. Once approved, weapons programs persist, even when they nearly double and triple their budget. No one stops and says, “Enough.”

Too often, we allow these debates to be driven by military calculations and how "experts" would fight a nuclear war. But we must not forget that in a democratic society, the military is the extension of the political and not the other way around. When it comes to programs and strategies that threaten our very existence, we, as a whole society, must decide what costs we should bear and what risks we must take. Our nuclear strategy must be balanced and rational, allowing for deterrence and defensive actions while encouraging collaboration for a more peaceful future.

We in Congress are part of the problem. We have bought into the assumption that more nuclear weapons will make us safer.

Ever-growing costs reflect the irrationality that has plagued our nuclear policy. In the name of “modernization,” we’ve taken on hundreds of billions of dollars of additional spending, and the nuclear accounts grow without question or scrutiny.

An example is the nuclear modernization efforts. The political price tag for New START was the modernization of all three legs of America’s nuclear triad. Proponents told us the multi-billion-dollar cost was necessary to ensure that we continue to have a viable deterrent. Today, we can and should debate whether every part of modernization is cost-effective and necessary for deterrence. We must also fully understand the reasons for the massive growth in the cost of all these programs.

Let’s turn to the new Sentinel ICBM, which is destined to replace the Minuteman III. It has incurred an egregious 37% cost overrun, making the program's cost almost 211% higher than the Air Force’s initial 2015 estimate. This has triggered a critical Nunn-McCurdy cost overrun, forcing a stop and a full statutory review. Despite the new estimated cost of $130 billion, there are loud and clear reflexive signals that the Pentagon and Congress intend to plow ahead no matter the cost or the necessity. “We’ll do whatever is necessary.”

While this may be convenient, the law requires a complete and full review that addresses five critical steps. 1) The program is essential to national security; 2) there are no alternatives to the program that will provide acceptable capability; 3) the new cost estimates have been determined to be reasonable; 4) the program is a higher priority than programs whose funding will be reduced to cover the increased cost of this program; and 5) the management structure is sufficient to control additional cost growth. It is imperative that the Pentagon conduct a thorough examination to assess the necessity and feasibility of continuing the program in its current state. Equally necessary is that Congress engage in a full debate to access the Pentagon’s rationale.

Without public pressure, it is doubtful that any hearings will occur, and that’s why our Congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group will hold its own hearing on July 24^th.

For years, Congress has dictated in the annual NDAA that the US maintain a minimum of 400 ICBMs. A number founded not on logic but because “that’s what we have always had.” The number of ground-based ICBMs should not be set by the number of existing concrete silos but in the honest analysis of nuclear strategy. Such a review must consider the risk of a catastrophic mistake inherent in the Sentinel program. In the event of an attack, it is assumed that the first target is the well-known locations of the ICBMs. It’s a use-it or lose-it situation. Therefore, a “Launch on Warning” is the operational imperative. The President has only minutes to decide if the attack is real.

If the nuclear program is for deterrence, then the submarines, airplanes, and their missiles offer sufficient firepower to dissuade an adversary. These systems have the benefit of stealth, and the President has the time to gather all information and then decide to use the nuclear response. If that weren’t enough, we also have ample conventional weapons capability to deter potential adversaries.

However, the Sentinel program is not the only problem. The hidden costs of ground-based ICBM modernization are found in unexpected and little-noticed places like the "Energy and Water" appropriations bill. Did you know that it appropriates $19.8 billion for "Weapons Activities," a $2.7 billion increase from the previous year? So, what is the $20 billion for? This year, the Department of Energy/NNSA requested a nearly $3 billion down payment for the modernization of "plutonium pits," which are the hollow plutonium shells used to trigger the nuclear reaction. On its own, this number is astonishingly high, but it doesn’t even include $8 billion to build the production facility in Los Alamos and the second facility at Savannah River, which alone has a projected total project cost of $18-25 billion, nearly 6 times the cost initially planned for construction. It will be the most expensive building in America. Oh, and there is the $1.4 billion requested for stockpile sustainment, the $1.1 billion dollars for the Sentinel warhead development at Lawerence Lab, which has grown by 63%, and the untold cost of the 6 other warheads and bombs that support the other nuclear modernization programs.

Even proponents of modernizing nuclear programs should be concerned about the high costs.

The January 2023 GAO report found that the NNSA has not developed a comprehensive schedule or cost estimate and has not identified all necessary activities or milestones to achieve the required 80-pit-per-year production capacity. And why do we need to produce 80 pits per year when America already has over 4,000 plutonium pits in storage? Has anyone studied the potential of repurposing these pits for the new bombs? The bottom line is this: Senior officials at the NNSA admit they won't meet deadlines and have no idea what the ultimate cost will be.

My simple, straightforward amendment would change the current law requiring 80 pits per year to a lower number that represents the realistic number of plutonium pits our country needs and can feasibly produce. To some, this is seen as an "extreme radical position," and my proposal was voted down. Too bad the same Nunn-McCurdy law does not apply to the DOE, although I have included in this year’s NDAA a requirement that the GAO review the feasibility of applying the Nunn-McCurdy law to the DOE.

Across the nuclear enterprise, costs are soaring, fears are growing, and it remains unclear what goals we are achieving. Yet, amidst soaring costs and escalating risks, it's imperative to reassess our nuclear priorities. Investing more of the modernization budget into diplomacy, arms control, and education could yield far-reaching benefits, fostering a stronger and more secure nation. Congress must fulfill its duty to allocate taxpayer funds responsibly, avoiding excessive expenses on wasteful nuclear programs that do little to enhance genuine security. Maintaining a "safe, secure, and effective deterrent" does not necessitate these costly modernization plans, especially given the pressing needs in other areas critical to national strength and stability.

The significance of arms control cannot be overstated. Prioritizing de-escalation isn’t just an idealistic notion; it’s a necessity. Arms races cannot be won. When we attempt to outpace our adversaries in weapon development, they inevitably respond in kind, draining our limited resources and fostering international instability as fear predominates and the world’s most devastating weapons become a more likely option.

The critical role of arms control in preserving global stability and security is evident from history's many close calls. We can't afford to wait for another Cuban missile crisis to recognize the dangers of miscommunication and the failure to engage in dialogue.

I know that many of you in this room have spent years drawing attention to the importance of arms control, and I am grateful for your efforts. Like Sisyphus pushing the boulder up the hill, I know that it is often thankless work, fighting and clawing for progress only to see it roll back down again. But the work could not be more important, and, unlike that Greek myth, I do believe that we can get the boulder to the top of the hill and develop robust arms control regimes that will help us all to avoid an existential threat.

I believe there are three key pillars in this endeavor. First, sharing knowledge and fostering understanding are paramount. There are some in the room who have written compelling arguments calling public attention to the dangers of nuclear weapons. We cannot forget the horrors that nuclear weapons would inflict if they were ever used again. This work cannot be understated. It’s been 40 years since The Day After aired, showing Americans and their leadership just how terrible such an event would be. It is a hard truth, but one we must face. We can't allow nuclear rhetoric to be divorced from its very real consequences.

Secondly, encouraging dialogue and fostering open communication channels are essential.

The recent dialogues with China’s political and military leaders is encouraging. We should accept China's offer to discuss “No first use” policy. We don’t know where the discussion may lead, but it’s an opening.

Lastly, garnering political support is crucial. Non-profits and advocacy groups have laid the groundwork; now, we must amplify their efforts and call on Congress to act. For too long, our focus on arms control has waned, and members of Congress have paid too little focus.

This is the moment to redouble our efforts. In a world marked by uncertainty and growing competition, building bridges and fostering understanding is more critical than ever. However, this effort must start at home. Inevitably, we must reconcile our infinite desires with our limited means. That means making hard decisions about how and where to spend taxpayer dollars. No other country in the world approaches its geopolitical environment by promising to win everywhere, against everyone, because such hegemony is not, nor ever was, possible. One needs only count the empires that have fallen in time to realize how such lofty visions detached from practical reality led to instability and decline.

Inevitably, we must reconcile our infinite desires with our limited means. That means making hard decisions about how and where to spend taxpayer dollars. Billions of dollars and at least a decade has been spent justifying weapons programs, instead of finding paths to peace. It’s time we said, “enough.”

We face real challenges in this world, but too often, hyperbole and fear are being used to drive our decision-making. Competition need not mean hostility. It is time we returned to reason and rationality. Together, we must confront the challenges before us, not by building ever more dangerous weapons, but by placing the same priority on effective arms control and risk reduction measures that we currently place on modernization. We may face challenges, but we still have the choice of which future we will pursue. We know the risks; we know the dangers that modernizations and the inevitable arms race could hold, but that’s why it is so important we redouble our efforts toward making de-escalation real. Let us take this moment, this opportunity, to engage in a meaningful dialogue and choose the path towards a safer and more secure world.

Remarks from Pranay Vaddi, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation at the National Security Council

June 7, 2024

Thank you for that introduction, Daryl.

You know, as you went through your list of the different things I’ve been doing in this current job, I just immediately felt my energy leave my body thinking about how busy we’ve been.

But I really do appreciate that kind introduction—and I want to thank the Arms Control Association for bringing us all together today for this important set of conversations.

And most importantly, I want to thank all of you for giving me this opportunity to address you—to update you on where things stand in the administration’s approach to this important set of issues.

Since the dawn of the nuclear era, the United States has focused on a central goal: reducing the risk of a catastrophic nuclear conflict occurring.

President Biden has been personally committed to reducing nuclear dangers throughout his career—and since day one of this administration.

We are committed to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all;

To upholding strategic stability;

To working with allies and partners to strengthen arms control and nonproliferation under the rules-based international order;

And to reducing the global salience of nuclear weapons.

We have pursued these goals with urgency, as well as pragmatism—

Balancing the imperative to maintain the capability and will to deter aggression or a nuclear attack;

Against the need to control the build-up and further spread of nuclear weapons.

The need for this dual track approach was described aptly by President Carter, who said, “National weakness, real or perceived, can tempt aggression and thus cause war.”

“That's why the United States can never neglect its military strength.”

“We must and we will remain strong.”

“But with equal determination,” he went on to say, “the United States and all countries must find ways to control and reduce the horrifying danger that is posed by the enormous world stockpiles of nuclear arms.”

In the period following the Cold War, the world made significant progress in reducing nuclear dangers thanks to U.S. leadership—

Together, we reduced the salience of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction threats;

We strengthened the international nonproliferation regime and the global commitment to nuclear security;

And we limited the strategic arsenals of the largest nuclear powers.

Just fifteen years ago, we would have celebrated the trajectory that we were on.

But the last decade has revealed cracks in each of these pillars—

Cracks that, as the National Security Advisor said at this forum last year, run substantial and deep.

Russia, the PRC and North Korea are all expanding and diversifying their nuclear arsenals at a breakneck pace—showing little or no interest in arms control.

Those three, together with Iran, are increasingly cooperating and coordinating with each other—in ways that run counter to peace and stability, threaten the United States, our allies and our partners, and exacerbate regional tension.

They are also freely proliferating advanced missile and drone technology among one other, and around the globe.

They also possess capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a threat to the United States and allied and partner forces, as well as civilian populations—

Russian forces have even used chemical weapons and riot control agents on the battlefield in Ukraine—in violation of Moscow’s obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

This is a new and dangerous era marked by evolving proliferation risks and rapid changes in technology.

It’s an era that demands we adapt both our strategy and our solutions.

So today, I want to describe how we are adapting our approach to arms control and nonproliferation for this new era.

In each pillar—

• Demonstrating what it means to take action as a responsible nuclear power;
• Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
• And continuing to pursue arms control arrangements;

There should be no question—we have adjusted our strategy to account for a more complex and worsening security environment.

But we are in no way abandoning our principles. We are taking a more competitive approach.

First, this administration remains determined to lead by the power of our example—

To show what it means to act responsibly as a nuclear power—and encourage others to do same.

To ensure that all five nuclear weapon states live up to their statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

In terms of our capabilities, we are developing and fielding only what is required to deter.

The President recently issued updated nuclear weapons employment guidance, which takes into account the realities of a new nuclear era.

It emphasizes the need to account for the growth and diversity of the PRC’s nuclear arsenal—and the need to deter Russia, the PRC, and North Korea simultaneously.

It also reaffirms our commitment to use arms control and other tools to minimize the number of nuclear weapons needed to achieve U.S. objectives.

And reiterates that the United States will continue to abide by New START limits for the duration of the Treaty, so long as Russia does the same.

Unlike our adversaries, we will not develop radiation-spewing, nuclear-powered cruise missiles—

Or nuclear weapons designed to be placed in orbit—which would be a clear violation of the Outer Space Treaty.

We will continue to uphold the global norm against nuclear explosive testing.

We remain committed to bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force.

And we will ask the world to join us in supporting a treaty to cut off production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

We will continue to forswear chemical and biological weapons, meet our obligations under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, and hold countries accountable for compliance.

Indeed, this administration completed the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile last year—

A disarmament milestone decades in the making that earned our workers and technicians this Association’s distinction of Arms Control Persons of the Year for 2023.

In our doctrine, we have reaffirmed that U.S. nuclear weapons are reserved for deterring strategic attack by those that threaten us and our allies and partners with nuclear weapons.

And we will maintain a human in the loop for all decisions regarding nuclear weapon employment.

Together with the United Kingdom and France—and in stark contrast to the PRC—we have committed to transparency regarding our nuclear policies and forces.

However, we know that leading by example has only limited influence on our adversaries’ behaviors these days.

If they are unwilling to follow—and instead take steps to increase the salience of nuclear weapons—we will have no choice but to adjust our posture and capabilities to preserve deterrence and stability.

Stable deterrence—that is what we’re aiming for with our posture.

Toward that end, we are modernizing each leg of our nuclear triad, updating our nuclear command, control, and communication systems, and investing in our nuclear enterprise—to ensure that we can sustain, and if necessary, enhance our capabilities and posture.

We remain confident in our position today.

And, as the National Security Advisor made clear, we do not need to increase our nuclear forces to match or outnumber the combined total of our competitors to successfully deter them.

But without a change in the trajectory that Russia, the PRC, and North Korea are on—

The United States will need to continue to adjust our posture and capabilities to ensure our ability to deter and meet other objectives going forward.

We have already taken some prudent steps in this regard.

For example, we decided to pursue the B61-13 gravity bomb to provide an additional capability against certain harder and large-area military targets—

And that will allow us to move beyond the outdated megaton-class B83-1 that we seek to retire.

We are also seeking to extend the life of certain Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines to provide additional margin during the transition from legacy to modern capabilities across the triad.

The B61-13 is an example of a qualitative improvement to our arsenal that aligns with our approach—

It will enhance deterrence without increasing overall numbers, unduly stressing the existing program of record, or requiring any substantial new resources that would force a trade-off with other defense priorities.

As we consider potential adjustments, we will carefully keep in mind—

• the implications for strategic stability;
• the capacity of our defense and nuclear enterprise;
• and competing budget priorities.

We’re focused on a “better” approach, not necessarily a “more” approach—which will require some creative solutions, and potentially discrete capabilities that fill an important niche.

But let me be clear—

Absent a change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from current deployed numbers is required—

And we need to be fully prepared to execute if the President makes that decision—if he makes that decision.

If that day does come, it will result from a determination that more nuclear weapons are required to deter our adversaries and protect the American people and our allies and partners.

It will not be a simplistic calculation that more for them requires more for us.

The second area of focus for our administration is preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities by strengthening the global nonproliferation regime.

Extended deterrence has been one of our greatest contributions to the nonproliferation regime.

For decades, U.S. security guarantees have persuaded many of our allies that they do not need to develop nuclear weapons of their own to deter against the greatest threats that they face.

The continued success of extended deterrence is not, however, a foregone conclusion—

Allies face ever-increasing nuclear and conventional threats from Russia, the PRC, and North Korea, and may worry about the credibility of our guarantees.

Under the President’s leadership, we have fully invested in strengthening our alliance system—to ensure that extended deterrence continues to contribute to nonproliferation.

The Washington Declaration between the United States and South Korea is an example of our efforts to jointly approach nuclear scenarios with our allies, as equal partners.

NATO is also taking steps to improve its capabilities, posture, exercises, and planning.

This is work we are advancing ahead of the Washington Summit—to account for Russia’s actions in Europe, including in the nuclear domain.

In both Asia and Europe, we are looking for ways that allies can contribute to nuclear deterrence—

Whether by easing the burden on U.S. conventional or dual-capable forces, or stepping up their conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency.

Enabling greater participation will increase allied confidence in U.S. security guarantees and achieve this extended deterrence for nonproliferation approach that we’ve taken.

This administration also continues to uphold the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime—

We are committed to advancing all three NPT pillars: disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We are reestablishing U.S. leadership in the peaceful use of nuclear energy by making significant investments in our domestic industry and banning Russian uranium imports—

And, we are using that leadership to ensure that new reactor designs integrate the highest standards of safety, security, and safeguards;

To export our nonproliferation values through nuclear supply arrangements;

And to prevent the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology to new countries.

We are also seeking to establish nonproliferation norms as part of the Administration’s effort to accelerate the development of fusion energy—

And are working with like-minded countries to establish a framework for guardrails on fusion energy systems, equipment, and related materials.  

We are committed to working closely with the IAEA to maintain the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear technology—including on AUKUS, where we are working to set the highest nonproliferation standard as part of our cooperation with Australia and the United Kingdom. 

A related aspect of our nonproliferation policy is strategic trade controls.

We have traditionally worked through the multilateral arrangements to limit the spread of long-range missile technology that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons.

And we continue to advance strategic trade controls internationally by

• improving coordination among like-minded partners;
• strengthening existing multilateral regimes;
• and taking steps to address any gaps that may emerge.

But there are limits to this consensus-based approach in a more competitive environment.

Our adversaries are blatantly disregarding their commitments and standing in the way of reforms.

To support its war in Ukraine, Russia has turned to the PRC to prop up its defense industrial base, North Korea to provide artillery and missiles, and Iran to provide missiles and drones.

Russia is increasing its defense cooperation with all three, and creating concerns as to what capabilities and know-how Russia may share as payment for the assistance it is receiving.

It has also been blocking new controls from being implemented on the most advanced technologies in the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Given the blatant steps by our adversaries to undermine the Missile Technology Control Regime, we are working to streamline our trade and cooperation to boost allied and partner defense capabilities—particularly with regard to long-range strike.

We are calibrating our “small yard, high fence” of controls to ensure that we can enable our allies and partners to strengthen their defense and deterrence.

We are looking to create new opportunities for exports and co-production that have been challenging because of existing controls and licensing requirements—

Not only within AUKUS but among a broader set of allies and partners.

A final area where our nonproliferation policy has adapted has been with regard to Iran.

The President remains as resolved as ever to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon—and we are prepared to use all elements of national power to ensure that outcome.

We have been increasing pressure on Iran through a combination of sanctions, deterrence, and international isolation—

Including sanctioning over 700 additional individuals and entities connected to the full range of Iran’s problematic and dangerous behaviors in this administration.

We have long said that diplomacy is the best way to achieve a sustainable, effective solution to Iran’s nuclear program.

Iran’s escalations related to its nuclear program, support for Russia, and support for Hamas have undermined our ability to compartmentalize Iran-related issues—and caused us to lose opportunities for multilateral diplomacy.

We must, therefore, focus on setting the conditions for future diplomacy.

By taking steps to underscore to Iran the consequences of its nuclear escalations;

• Building leverage;
• Redoubling coordination with key partners;
• Encouraging the PRC to press Iran to cease destabilizing behavior;
• And insisting that Iran fully cooperate with the IAEA, and not further escalate its nuclear program. 

Earlier this week, we voted in favor of a Board of Governors resolution that calls out Iran for its lack of cooperation with the IAEA.

We also supported a comprehensive report by the IAEA to provide a greater understanding of the Agency’s outstanding concerns regarding Iran.

Such a report will be important as we approach a key inflection point in October 2025—when the UN Security Council could close consideration of the Iran nuclear issue under Resolution 2231.

Above all, our objective has been and will remain a diplomatic solution that ensures that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

For the third pillar of our approach, we continue to prioritize arms control.

U.S. leadership on arms control and risk reduction makes tangible contributions to global security—

It also affirms the importance that we place on taking “tangible steps” under Article 6 of the NPT;

And it builds our credibility with close allies and partners and non-aligned countries.

The President made clear at the UN last September that “no matter what else is happening in the world, the United States is ready to pursue critical arms control measures.”

We are upholding that promise by thinking through what a future arms control agreement with Russia after New START might look like.

In any future agreement, our goal will be to reduce nuclear threats to the United States and our allies and partners by limiting and shaping adversary nuclear forces.

Without a doubt, the type of limits we will be able to agree to with Russia will be impacted by the size and scale of the PRC’s nuclear buildup, and U.S. deterrence needs vis-à-vis Beijing.

We are also investing in new monitoring and verification technologies and approaches—

Both to solidify existing agreements and set the stage for a future where the arms control arrangement, subject matter, and implementation may be very different than the past.

What’s more, this Administration is vigorously pursuing the arms control opportunities that do exist.

We’re pushing for results-based discussions at every major multilateral body that seeks to limit nuclear and other WMD risks:

• The United Nations;
• The NPT Preparatory Committee and Review Conference;
• The P5;
• The Conference on Disarmament;
• The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention;
• Among many others.

We are thinking creatively about the content and mechanisms of arms control—and pursuing opportunities when they arise, even where treaty-based solutions are not going to be available.

We’ve committed to not conduct destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing.

And put forth proposals for responsible behavior in space, and principles for the responsible military use of artificial intelligence—all unilaterally.

We are working to institutionalize new norms by bringing them into UN mechanisms.

We are also supporting arms control through accountability.

Together with our NATO allies, we suspended the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in response to Russia’s withdrawal—opening the possibility of larger U.S. conventional force deployments and exercises in Eastern Europe.

We enacted lawful countermeasures in response to Russia’s suspension of New START that ensure Moscow would garner no advantage.

States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention also voted to oust Russia from the governing body of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons—

This was fitting given Russia’s continued violations of the Convention and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine.

But at least in the near term, the prospects for strategic arms control are dim.

Russia’s outright rejection of arms control dialogue casts a shadow over the likelihood of a New START successor after February 2026.

We must be prepared for that possibility—that these constraints disappear without replacement.

With the PRC, the United States offered a number of specific proposals focused on managing strategic risks in connection with a bilateral consultation held last year.

The PRC has shown no interest in engaging on these proposals and rejected holding a follow-on arms control-focused meeting.

With North Korea too, our attempts to engage on risk reduction and nuclear issues have been answered with more missile tests and greater hostility to us and our close allies.

In their outright refusal to even discuss arms control, Russia and the PRC are failing to meet their international obligations.

Practically speaking, they are forcing the United States and our close allies and partners to prepare for a world where nuclear competition occurs without numerical constraints.

The reality is that further enhancing our capabilities and posture is incredibly important to rejuvenating strategic arms control.

It will incentivize Russia and the PRC to engage in arms control;

Frame the subject matter at the heart of those engagements;

Provide the United States with leverage in those engagements;

And prepare us for an environment in which they may continue to refuse engagement.

We need to persuade our adversaries that managing rivalry through arms control is preferable to unrestrained competition across domains.

Let me close with this.

We should be under no illusions about the challenges ahead.

But we have a tremendous opportunity to chart a new path for arms control and nonproliferation—

Same goals, new approach.

I look forward to continuing to work with all of you to make that happen. Thanks for your time.