April 2025
By Daryl G. Kimball

During the high-stakes, February 28 Oval Office meeting when U.S. President Donald Trump tried to bully Volodymyr Zelenskyy into accepting a pro-Kremlin formula for ending the war in Ukraine, he accused the Ukrainian president of not wanting peace, and claimed he was “gambling with the lives of millions of people. You’re gambling with World War III.”

Although it is reassuring that Trump wants to avoid nuclear war, his comments show a failure to comprehend who and what actually drives nuclear risk: the nuclear weapons and deterrence policies of the nuclear-armed states that are used to justify their possession.

In reality, Zelenskyy is leading a non-nuclear-weapon state that is defending itself from a brutal, unprovoked invasion by Russia, a larger nuclear-armed state that has violated its 1994 pledge (shared by the United States and the United Kingdom) to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and refrain from the use of military force against it.

Those assurances were extended to facilitate Ukraine’s decision to relinquish the strategic nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union and to join the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Today, Zelenskyy is still seeking to ensure his country’s independence and a just peace, which requires security assurances that are meaningful and durable.

Trump’s Republican allies have become so fearful of his threats of political retribution that they fail to acknowledge, much less call out, his numerous exaggerations and lies. But when it comes to war and peace and nuclear weapons, there can be no excuses.

Trump and his acolytes should acknowledge that Russia continues to illegally occupy and attack Ukrainian territory, and it is Russian President Vladimir Putin who has threatened World War III. Not long after launching the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin made veiled threats of nuclear weapons use if any state were to interfere. “No matter who tries to stand in our way ... they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history,” Putin said.

Seven months later, as Russian forces were in retreat in eastern Ukraine, Putin suggested that he might order the use of shorter-range nuclear weapons “if the territorial integrity of our country is threatened,” including the territory in Ukraine that Russia had illegally seized. “This is not a bluff,” he added.

Of course, the Soviet Union and the United States issued various kinds of nuclear threats and alerts during the Cold War, before the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and after. However, Russia’s recent nuclear rhetoric, which was designed to shield its assault against a non-nuclear-weapon state, is unprecedented and unacceptable in the post-Cold War era.

During his presidency, Joe Biden did not reciprocate Putin’s threats of nuclear annihilation. Instead, he reaffirmed that U.S. and NATO forces would not become engaged directly in the war, warned that the use of nuclear weapons would lead to nuclear escalation, and ensured the supply of weapons and intelligence to help Ukraine thwart aggression.

Trump may find it hard to adopt such a balanced approach. In August 2017, he engaged in a dangerous round of tit-for-tat taunts with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, threatening North Korea with nuclear “fire and fury like the world has never seen.”

Nevertheless, rather than chastise Zelenskyy, it will be in the U.S. and global interests for Trump to stand up to Putin and say that any further nuclear threats would be “inadmissible,” as the Group of 20 countries declared in 2022.

During Trump’s discussions with Putin, he should also note that nuclear threats clearly violate the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which commits Russia and the United States to “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.” Such an agreement should be extended to include China, France, and the United Kingdom.

Trump and the leaders of the world’s other eight nuclear-armed states must recognize that for non-nuclear-weapon states such as Ukraine, nuclear weapons and the deterrence strategies of the nuclear-armed states represent a grave threat to their security.

As explained in a new report issued by states-parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, “the nuclear policies of all nuclear-armed states are based on implicit or explicit nuclear threats, which create an aggregated and interconnected set of global and existential risks that undermine the security of states not engaged in this practice. From this perspective, the theory of nuclear deterrence is a highly precarious gamble: one that no human being or Government should be entrusted to make.”

Trump, Putin, and the other leaders of the nuclear-armed states are gambling with the lives of every person on the planet. To improve humanity's odds of survival, we must demand that they follow through on their obligation under Article VI of the 1968 NPT to engage in good-faith negotiations to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament.

April 2025
By Xiaodon Liang

The defense ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland announced March 18 that they would recommend withdrawal from the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty to their respective governments.

In a joint statement, the ministers said that “threats to NATO member states bordering Russia and Belarus have significantly increased” and withdrawal would “provide our defence forces flexibility and freedom of choice to potentially use new weapons systems and solutions to bolster the defence of the alliance’s vulnerable Eastern Flank.”

Nevertheless, the four countries will “remain committed to international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians during armed conflict,” the ministers said.

Latvian Prime Minister Evika Silina confirmed March 18 that her government has “decided to initiate the process to withdraw” from the treaty, according to Latvian Public Media.

Tamar Gabelnick, director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, strongly condemned Latvia’s move in a March 19 press release and questioned how the country would “uphold its obligations towards International Humanitarian Law by reintroducing a weapon that is unable to distinguish between civilian and military targets.”

Finland is also considering withdrawing from the treaty, Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen, told Reuters Dec. 18.

The Mine Ban Treaty, which is limited in scope to antipersonnel mines, prohibits their use, development, production, stockpiling, and transfer. The treaty entered into force in 1999 and has 165 states-parties.

The decision comes three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and follows recent suggestions by the United States that it might condition its collective defense commitments under the NATO alliance. 

Speaking before the Polish parliament March 7, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Poland also was considering withdrawal from the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Although the Mine Ban Treaty permits withdrawals, countries must give six months’ notice and cannot be involved in ongoing armed conflict. Russia has used landmines extensively across Ukrainian territory, according to the landmine campaign’s Landmine Monitor 2024 report. In 2022, Human Rights Watch accused Ukraine of deploying mines by rocket.

Neither Russia nor the United States are states-parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, but Ukraine is. At the November 2024 review conference of the treaty’s states-parties, Ukraine reiterated its commitment to destroying its Soviet-era stockpile of landmines, of which some 4.3 million remain. In the same month, it received a first transfer of landmines from the United States. (See ACT, December 2024.)

April 2025
By Mina Rozei

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has found more evidence of chemical weapons use in Ukraine, it said in a Feb. 14 report.

The findings came after Ukraine requested that the OPCW investigate three separate incidents in October 2024 when toxic chemicals were allegedly used along the confrontation lines between Russian and Ukrainian forces in the Dnipropetrovsk region.

The OPCW deployed its technical assistance visit team on two missions to Ukraine to collect documents, digital files, witness testimonies, and environmental samples. These samples were analyzed independently by laboratories that are part of the OPCW network, and the organization confirmed that the chain of custody was maintained throughout the analysis process.

The laboratory analyses revealed the presence of 2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS), in all three alleged instances. CS is a riot control agent, which when used in a conflict setting constitutes a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias said the CS was used in riot-control-agent grenades.

The report did not identify who was responsible for using CS on the battlefield. The OPCW Technical Secretariat circulated a note at the most recent Executive Council meeting stating that “the mandate of the secretariat under this [technical assistance visit] request was never to look at where the grenades came from but to determine whether they were indeed found along the frontlines.”

This is not the first time that CS has been found on the battlefield in Ukraine. The OPCW confirmed the presence of the CS agent in November after its first technical assistance visit to Ukraine in July. (See ACT, December 2024.)

The findings were published several weeks before the most recent meeting of the OPCW Executive Council. At the meeting, held March 4-7 in The Hague, the Russian delegation circulated a diplomatic note criticizing the report for containing “discrepancies” and casting doubt on the integrity of the chain of custody. The delegation also circulated a document Feb. 28, before the council meeting, in which it accused Ukraine of using toxic chemicals as weapons against Russian military and civilians.

The Ukrainian delegation exercised its right of reply at the council meeting by issuing a statement in which it rejected the Russian allegations as “disinformation,” and said Russia “continues to use riot control agents against Ukrainian troops.” At the meeting, the OPCW Technical Secretariat responded to Russia’s accusations by saying that “the secretariat works impartially for the 193 states-parties to the convention, including the Russian Federation.”

April 2025
By Xiaodon Liang

The U.S. Congress approved a $185 million cut to the defense nuclear nonproliferation budget managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in a March 14 continuing resolution that funds the federal government through Sept. 30, the end of the 2025 fiscal year.

The resolution transfers those funds instead to the NNSA’s weapons activities budget, bringing it up to $19.29 billion for the remainder of this fiscal cycle.

The slashed nonproliferation funding is equal to a 7.2 percent cut. According to an analysis by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, the reduction will probably impact NNSA programs on nuclear smuggling, radiological security, export controls, reactor conversion, nuclear materials security and elimination, and research into the impacts of artificial intelligence on nuclear threats.

In a March 11 statement opposing the continuing resolution, Rep. Bill Foster (D-Ill.) said the funding cut “would substantially affect our national security, paving the way for countries like Iran, terrorist groups, and other adversaries to more easily get their hands on nuclear material.”

The continuing resolution, which President Donald Trump signed into law March 15, included several other changes to the previous year’s funding levels. The annual budget for the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program was increased to $9.6 billion, on the heels of an initial plus-up to $8.9 billion in a December short-term continuing resolution. (See ACT, January/February 2025.)

In nonbinding funding tables accompanying the new resolution, appropriators suggested that the Pentagon cut $640 million from the budget for the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program and its warhead, reflecting ongoing delays. (See ACT, September 2024.) The appropriators also suggested a $150 million budget for initial work on the nuclear-capable, sea-launched cruise missile, down from the $252 million authorized in December by Congress in the now-abandoned fiscal 2025 budget process. (See ACT, January/February 2025.)

The continuing resolution was negotiated by the House Republican majority and passed largely on a party-line vote in the lower chamber. Senate minority Democrats split on the resolution, providing enough votes to bring the measure to a vote and ensuring its passage.

April 2025

U.S. President Donald Trump rescinded his predecessor’s Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy, which was intended to encourage restraint and adherence to higher human rights standards in governmental approvals of arms transfers.

The White House offered no explanation for the decision, announced in a March 14 statement, and did not put forward a replacement policy. The United States is the world’s largest arms supplier.

President Joe Biden’s policy, embodied in National Security Memorandum 18 (NSM-18), was released in 2023. It differed from those issued by President Barack Obama and Trump, in his first term, by adopting the objective of “prevent[ing] arms transfers that risk facilitating or otherwise contributing to violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.” (See ACT, May 2023.)

Trump’s rescission of NSM-18 and the lack of a replacement could complicate U.S. arms transfer operations by leaving federal agencies to make decisions at their own discretion on the basis of laws and regulations that offer little policy guidance, arms trade experts Elias Yousef and Rachel Stohl wrote in a March 20 analysis for The Stimson Center.

All presidents have released a CAT policy since the first one was introduced by President Jimmy Carter in 1977. The administration could direct agencies to refer to Trump’s 2018 CAT policy, which integrated economic objectives into arms transfers policy, but also mentions the goal of reducing civilian harm, Yousef and Stohl suggested.

Trump also revoked National Security Memorandum 20 (NSM-20) Feb. 21. Announced by the Biden administration in 2024, it expanded on NSM-18 to require “credible and reliable written assurances” that a recipient country would use U.S. weapons “in accordance with international humanitarian law and, as applicable, other international law.”

The impact NSM-18 and NSM-20 have had on elevating human rights concerns in U.S. arms transfer decisions is disputed. In a May 2024 report required by NSM-20, the Biden administration said Israel may have violated international humanitarian law in its war on Gaza, but cited a lack of verifiable evidence as reason to continue arms transfers, Reuters reported May 10.—LIPI SHETTY

April 2025

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio bypassed Congress and signed a “declaration to use emergency authorities to expedite the delivery of approximately $4 billion worth” of munitions to Israel.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency said that the sale included 35,529 BLU-117 2,000-pound bombs, which are among the most powerful and destructive in the U.S. inventory.

Under Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act, the president or secretary of state must notify Congress of any major arms transfer worth more than $100 million to Israel or another close ally 15 calendar days in advance before the administration can proceed with the transaction.

That section allows the president to waive the 15-day review process by informing Congress that “an emergency exists” necessitating that the sale be made immediately, if deemed “in the national security interests of the United States.” When conveying such a notification, the president is required to provide Congress with a “detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the emergency circumstances” that necessitates the waiver.

In his March 1 announcement, Rubio did not cite any specific emergency necessitating the sale or provide a detailed justification for it, saying only that the Trump administration “will continue to use all available tools to fulfill America’s long-standing commitment to Israel’s security, including means to counter security threats.”

Two-thousand-pound bombs such as the BLU-117 have been used by the Israeli military to level buildings in Gaza thought to house Hamas militants, who launched the deadly Oct. 7, 2023, raid on Israel. Whether or not such heavy bombs succeed in killing militants, they typically kill or injure many noncombatants living in or near the targeted structures. The Biden administration suspended deliveries of these munitions in May 2024, fearing that their use by Israeli forces to destroy Hamas strongholds in the Gazan city of Rafah would result in excessive civilian casualties, but the Trump administration resumed shipments Jan. 25.—MICHAEL T. KLARE