June 2024

A Middle Eastern region already on edge over the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza faced another escalation of violence on April 1 when Israel struck the Iranian embassy complex in Damascus, killing 16 people, including eight officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Two weeks later, Iran responded by attacking Israel from Iranian territory for the first time with at least 300 drones and missiles. An Israeli base in the Negev desert sustained light damage, and a 7-year-old girl was seriously wounded, The New York Times reported, but more serious damage was averted because the United States and its allies helped Israel intercept the Iranian onslaught. Israel’s retaliation on April 18 was more limited than expected, but as the two countries had brought their long shadow war into the open, many people were fearful of what might come next. Arms Control Today gathered three experts on May 24 to discuss the implications of the Iranian-Israeli faceoff for the region. Nicole Grajewski is a fellow with the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sina Toossi is a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Ali Vaez is senior adviser at the International Crisis Group and director of the group’s Iran Project. This transcript has been edited for clarity and length.

Arms Control Today: Why did the shooting war between Iran and Israel not explode into a wider war? What does this escalation mean to regional stability and the regional balance of power?

Ali Vaez: I think there are two main reasons why the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel did not result in an all-out war. The first is that none of the key stakeholders—Iran, the United States, and I would even say the Israeli government—had an interest in this turning into a regional conflagration. We know the United States already has its hands full with the war in Ukraine, with the war in Gaza, with concerns about China’s designs over Taiwan and it’s an election year, of course. In Iran, there is deep socioeconomic discontent, and the country just does not have the bandwidth to go through a conflict with much stronger adversaries such as Israel and the United States. Finally, Israel already is bogged down in Gaza and has serious concerns with Hezbollah on its northern border. I think this reluctance on all sides was one of the key reasons that they could manage the repercussions of an Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate on April 1, the Iranian retaliation on April 14, and Israel’s pinpoint attack on April 18.

The second reason is that there was a lot of behind-the-scenes diplomacy aimed at trying to minimize the risks of tensions spiraling out of control. We know that the United States was surprised by Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus and tried to take distance from it. We know that, since the attack, not just the United States but also Iran’s neighbors and European governments reached out to Iran, urging a restrained or at least a limited response. That is why, I think, the Iranian response was calibrated and telegraphed in advance. Finally, once the response took place, attention shifted toward trying to hold Israel back. That 
is why Israeli response was quite limited in nature.

Sina Toossi: I think neither side wanted war. The United States certainly didn’t want war. I would argue that Israel’s attack on the Damascus consulate ended up being a miscalculation. The Israelis did not think that Iran would launch a direct attack on Israel. The Iranians in that attack sought to establish a new redline. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, characterized the attack on the Damascus consulate as an attack on Iranian soil and one that would be directly responded to by Iranians, and we saw that the attack was telegraphed 10 days in advance.

According to what the Iranians say, they didn’t use their best missiles and armaments. It started with these more slow-moving drones, which took five hours to get there, followed by ballistic missiles. But their goal was to establish deterrence. Israel, until now, has had deterrence domination in the region. We’ve seen years of Israel, pretty much with impunity, attacking Iranian-aligned targets in Syria, acts of sabotage and subversion within Iran, assassinations, and Iran has more or less been restrained or unable to respond or had this policy of so-called strategic patience. But this [attack] was an example of the Iranians explicitly trying to establish a new deterrence equation; that’s how the IRGC chief characterized it.

In terms of whether they’ve successfully achieved that, Israeli officials immediately claimed that 99 percent of Iranian missiles were intercepted. I think that has to be taken with a certain amount of salt. Regardless of what [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu’s personal ambitions might be, I think that U.S. pressure pushed the Israelis towards restraint. I think they had an incentive to downplay the impact of the Iranian strike. Regardless, U.S. officials told ABC News that around 10 Iranian missiles hit some of these Israeli facilities that were responsible for the attack on the Damascus consulate and airbase. There are also videos out there that show some impacts, at least. I think the Iranians did manage, on a minor level and without an intention of this escalating into a regional war, to penetrate the Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems, this kind of multilayered air defense that Israel has. I think that is partly why this has not escalated, that in addition to all the regional diplomacy and the personal stakes for all these countries, that this deterrence equation is changing. For now, temporarily at least, I would again argue that Israel’s very measured response, compared to what they’ve done in the past, which was much more brazen, much more aggressive in what they’ve claimed to do and what they’ve seemingly done, this one was much smaller by all accounts. The Iranians pretty much claimed that nothing really happened. Again, part of that is a desire not to escalate, and a new deterrence has been salvaged from the Iranian side, but that is tenuous. I think the direction of the Gaza war, and especially with Lebanon, will be very decisive.

ACT: In addition to adding anything to that last question, what does this Iranian-Israeli escalation mean to regional stability and the regional balance of power?

Nicole Grajewski: I think when we’re thinking about regional stability and the balance of power, this kind of acrimonious relationship between Iran and Israel has really shaped the broader regional order, and that’s likely to continue. One thing about the attacks that was so remarkable was that this was an escalation outside of the traditional area where Iran and Israel usually have engaged. Typically, Syria and parts of Iraq or Lebanon are where the main tension between Israel and Iran has played out. In December, there was an assassination of a higher-level IRGC general and then of course the consulate attack [in Damascus]. There’s still ongoing hostilities between Iran and Israel within Syria or within Iraq. I believe some of the Iranian proxies claimed that they were targeting Israel from Iraq a few days ago. So, this has not really faded away.

One thing about the April 14 attack on Israel that is less discussed is just the precision of Iranian weapons and munitions was actually very bad. Some of the missiles were not intercepted because of the lack of precision of Iranian ballistic missiles, which deviated from their targets. The strikes, although overwhelming, showed some of Iran’s weaknesses when it comes to precision targeting and accuracy. In contrast, the Israeli strike on Iran’s S-300 pinpointed the missile defense system’s battery down to a T. This shows a weakness when it comes to Iran’s capabilities.

But on the regional balance of power, I think that Iran restored deterrence, and we see a return to kind of the status quo. Obviously, Israel is bogged down in Gaza, but there are discussions ongoing still with Israel and the Saudis on potential normalization. Iran has normalized relations with the Saudis. But there hasn’t been a major disruption in terms of military or coercive power that has radically shifted the balance of power since the events.

ACT: The recent deaths of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian in a helicopter crash introduced a new element of instability. What does Raisi’s death mean to politics in Iran and the region?

Toossi: I don’t expect much change in the near term. Foreign policy in Iran is implemented by the presidential administration, but devising it is more with the supreme leader’s office and more through a consensus approach in the Supreme National Security Council. As for the driver of Iran’s policies in the region, I don’t think any of those factors are going to change in the near term. Iran is still trying to engage in this proxy war with Israel, with the United States, but we’ll have to see what happens in Iran’s upcoming presidential election. The calculations for Iranians are contradictory in a way. There are opposing forces; and they’re having this increased legitimacy crisis in the past five years, where the turnout in the past presidential election and the parliamentary election was at historic lows; and there have been these protests over the death in custody of Mahsa Amini.

On the other hand, all the factors that contributed to Raisi’s rise and to the main center of power in Iran engineering the 2021 election to ensure his victory are still largely in place. I would argue it was largely about the conservative factions most fiercely loyal to Khamenei trying to maximize their influence over the system and Khamenei’s eventual succession. They want to have all these institutions aligned with them for when Khamenei passes; he’s obviously at a very advanced age. I think that logic still applies. If they allowed a Mohammad Javad Zarif [a moderate former foreign minister] to run now for president to boost public enthusiasm and potential turnout, that to me is still in contradiction with what seemingly has been their agenda all along. But I think they ultimately have to balance these forces. We’ll see who the Guardian Council approves as presidential candidates. If it does approve a more prominent moderate or reformist figure who could potentially generate more public enthusiasm, then that could potentially have implications for Iran’s foreign policy. But I think that is unlikely. Most likely, they’ll look for someone like Raisi, someone more passive and docile who’s more in line with what Khamenei wants.

ACT: Do you think that there’ll be any real change?

Vaez: It appears unlikely. At this moment in its history, the Islamic Republic seems to be primarily focused on ideological and political conformity at the top rather than legitimacy from below. In that sense, it is very likely, as has been the case with the past three elections—one presidential and two parliamentary—that the Guardian Council is only going to allow a very limited number of candidates that are in line with the supreme leader’s vision for the future of the Islamic Republic to participate. Even if there are reformist or pragmatist candidates, those would be rather safe bets who would not be able to garner sufficient support from the electorate. For its part, the electorate is experiencing political apathy. Two weeks ago, there were run-up parliamentary elections; and only 8 percent of Tehranis in the Iranian capital went to the polls, which was quite telling about how the institution of elections has been emptied out of any meaning for bringing about viable change and reforms to the political system.

Having said this, without any doubt, the upcoming election is going to splinter the conservative camp and deepen the rivalries as they jockey for the position of president, with the succession of the supreme leader looming large on the horizon. We don’t know this for sure, but if President Raisi was being groomed for the top job, then it’s back to the drawing board because it will be hard to find someone who would have all of the characteristics that Raisi had, in the sense that he’s a cleric subservient to the supreme leader with a long track record of proven loyalty and a relative consensus figure within the conservative camp. Most of the names that are out there right now [as alternative candidates] are actually laypeople, not clerics. It wouldn’t be hard, however, to find someone who would be a figurehead for succeeding the supreme leader, someone who would no longer be supreme. Earlier this week, a 92-year-old ayatollah was selected as the head of the Assembly of Experts, which nominally is in charge of selecting the next supreme leader. He can barely speak. People with that kind of characteristic are not difficult to find, but not all the characteristics that I mentioned in one person.

In terms of regional and foreign policy, I do agree with what Sina said. There’s just one consideration: this unexpected, sudden demise of the president and his foreign minister means that the country, at least for the next few weeks as it goes through a condensed electoral process and then will have to get confirmation for a new cabinet, would be inward-looking. That means that it would not have enough bandwidth to engage in any kind of serious discussions, whether that’s with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or in direct talks with the United States that we know recently took place in Oman.

ACT: There has been an uptick in Iranian rhetoric about its nuclear weapons capability in recent weeks. Kamal Kharrazi, adviser to Iran’s supreme leader and a former foreign minister, for one, has said an Israeli strike on an Iranian nuclear facility could provoke Iran to build a weapon. Why is this rhetoric churning now? What are the implications?

Grajewski: The increase in rhetoric about this looming threat of weaponization, I think that’s a conscious choice, and in a sense that was part of this whole deterrence strategy that you’ve seen out of Iran. Obviously Iran, if it wanted to, has the ability to reconstitute some of its former activities prior to 2003, but we’ve not seen that decision made. Iran’s political elites have not made the decision to weaponize. The rhetoric has mostly been used as kind of a deterrence tactic or part of this larger strategy of leveraging Iran’s status as a threshold state, meaning that in many ways Iran has the fissile material and the experience to potentially break out, although it has not made that decision. When you see the rhetoric coming out from high-level officials, it seems to be almost coordinated. There are statements from Ali Akbar Salehi, the former head of the atomic energy organization, that would imply that. Then you have the supreme leader’s advisers making similar statements on multiple occasions within a few days. Other people have different interpretations, but it seems to me that there is an understanding that the West is paying attention to that and that this is an issue that is more directed outwardly, then there’s one that is directed inwardly toward its populations as a way to normalize a nuclear program to the Iranian population. In my view, the rhetoric is mostly directed outwardly in an effort to leverage Iran’s threshold nuclear status.

Toossi: I think there’s definitely this element of using warnings about potential weaponization as leverage, also with an interest for some kind of negotiation, such as Kharrazi last week explicitly tying the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal and the desire for negotiations. But both Zarif and a senior IRGC commander, Ahmad Haghtalab, who is in charge of the protection of nuclear facilities, also tied their warnings about Iran potentially changing its nuclear doctrine to an Israeli attack on Iran. I think that’s also an important context where we are in this unprecedented situation where Iran ultimately did launch a direct attack on Israel. We were talking about whether deterrence is established early or not, but I also read into that rhetoric a kind of warning that if this situation with Israel escalates, that could factor into Iran’s nuclear calculations. We’ve seen that, for example, Israeli officials are seemingly primed to eventually attack Lebanon. It’s unclear when that would happen, but there are a lot of indications of that. In the case of a major regional escalation with Hezbollah, I think potentially the Iranians are also putting that option of potential weaponization on the table.

Vaez: What worries me the most is that the discourse that was taboo in Iran is becoming gradually normalized, and that has happened in parallel with a significant growth in Iran’s nuclear capabilities. That combination, even if in the short run, doesn’t imply an immediate decision to cross the Rubicon and develop nuclear weapons, but in the medium term could take the country in that direction especially if Iran comes to the conclusion that it cannot use its nuclear capabilities as leverage at the negotiating table to get out from under U.S. sanctions. This could happen if the United States fails to demonstrate that it is willing and able to provide effective and sustainable sanctions relief to Iran or if there is an administration in place that does not have an interest in a mutually beneficial agreement with the Iranian regime. This could well happen with a second Trump administration.

The second thing that could compel Iran to move in that direction is a change in its threat perception. So far, tensions in the region have remained relatively contained, but if indeed Israel engages in a conflict with Hezbollah that could result in the significant weakening of Hezbollah’s capabilities, then Iran would feel more insecure. The pinpoint attack that Israel conducted on April 18 also was a reminder to the Iranians of how vulnerable they are, especially in terms of conventional defensive military capabilities. So, if Iran’s regional deterrence is diminished, it might decide to use its nuclear capabilities as the ultimate deterrent. I think we should take this seriously, but I agree that in the immediate run, what this implies is that Iran does not want to become a Cuba and live under U.S. sanctions in perpetuity and so it is going to put pressure on the West to engage in nuclear diplomacy in a serious way.

ACT: Do you think that Iran is still interested in a nuclear deal that rolls back its program, or do you think that it sees a strategic benefit in maintaining some sort of threshold status?

Vaez: I no longer believe that a deal that would be as good as the JCPOA is achievable. I believe Iran always wanted to arrive at a point where it is right now, which thanks to President [Donald] Trump’s unwise decision [to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal] in 2018, it has been able to get to. I don’t think there is any going back from it, especially because of a high degree of cynicism within the Iranian political elite about the prospects of getting viable sanctions relief. If you look at the realities on the ground, almost everything that led to the 2015 nuclear deal no longer applies. The P5+1 [coalition of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany] no longer exists because of tensions between Russia and China on the one hand and the West on the other. The core bargain of the JCPOA is no longer relevant because of Iran’s irreversible nuclear advancement and because of the West’s proven inability to provide sanctions relief. The compartmentalization of this agreement with Iran, which was one of the reasons that the JCPOA became possible, is no longer realistic, given that Iran is, from the U.S. perspective, on the wrong side of the war in Ukraine and Gaza and of course has stepped up its repression against its own people. So, I think what the Iranians are seeking is economic incentives in return for preserving the status quo and staying a threshold state, which as you can imagine is a very unattractive prospect for the West. This is why, even in the best case scenario post-U.S. presidential elections, it is going to be excruciatingly difficult to find a mutually acceptable formula.

ACT: Are you saying that if there is a deal at any point going forward, it would not just deal with the nuclear issues, but with political issues as well?

Vaez: Yes, if you look at the deescalatory understanding that the United States and Iran had in the summer of 2023, it is quite telling because, for the first time, this didn’t include just nuclear measures but regional and ballistic missile elements as well. Iran had committed, from what we know, not to transfer ballistic missiles to Russia and not to target U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria in addition to agreeing to freeze the size of the stockpile at [uranium enriched to] 60 percent [U-235] and not installing additional advance centrifuges. That is the model that would have to be applied in the future as well. I have a hard time imagining that the West would be willing and able to reward Iran with sanctions relief if indeed there are Iranian activities that would then make justifying that economic reprieve too politically costly for Western leaders.

ACT: How do the rest of you see the prospect of diplomacy?

Toossi: I think that’s a very notable aspect of the deescalation agreement, that the Iranians agreed to tie it to these regional actions that they do and attacks on U.S. forces. From my understanding, that’s something they were averse to do in the past, in 2015. At least in my view, it kind of creates a precedent if there is a new deal. I agree that the JCPOA doesn’t work for any side anymore and that a new deal would have to be something bigger and these regional disputes would have to be included. But whether that’s viable or not, I’m inclined to agree with Ali, and I’m very pessimistic. I think, in general, the overall trajectory in Iran is, we don’t care what the West wants, we’re going to continue these relationships with our neighbors, with China, with Russia, kind of bet on that horse. Raisi’s funeral is testament to this fact that Iran’s ties have improved with a lot of its neighboring countries, the Gulf Arab states.

Another positive difference is that, in 2015, a lot of these Gulf Arab states, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, were not included in those [nuclear] negotiations and were very suspicious of them and ultimately were not supportive of that effort. Now, that may be different. They do have these better ties with Iran, and maybe that creates space for some kind of agreement at a regional level that could potentially be expanded. Long term, I do see this desire within at least certain centers of power in Iran that, in order to have a more balanced foreign policy overall and for Iran to benefit from trade even with Russia or China or India, they ultimately need the secondary U.S. sanctions gone. That camp obviously was most strong with people like former President Hassan Rouhani and Zarif, but there are also elements on the moderate conservative side that make these kinds of arguments still.

I think right now the best hope in the short term is continuation of these kinds of deescalatory models. From my understanding, the reason that deescalatory deal from last fall fell apart was partly because of Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel, but also the money that was supposed to go to Iran and South Korea went to Qatar and Iran’s access to it is still heavily restricted there. The Iranians probably point to that as another reason why the United States can’t be trusted to follow through on its commitments. The best we can hope for in the short term is putting a ceiling on escalation, on confrontation. For example, having Iran not go beyond 60 percent enrichment of U-235 in its nuclear stockpile and ending attacks in the region. The United States can commit not to escalate more on our end and just keep that status quo until the next administration when I think, if there is any potential, we have to think bigger in terms of a bigger deal that takes into account other issues.

ACT: Are you suggesting a deal including the nuclear issue? How does that factor into the regional context? Israel, which has an unacknowledged nuclear weapons capability, is unlikely to contain its program. Saudi Arabia is negotiating with the United States to have its own nuclear energy program. Doesn’t that complicate the situation?

Toossi: I think a lot of this is contingent on the trajectory of Iranian politics, the elections, supreme leader succession, whether the current status quo is going to continue, which seems likely. So again, I am pessimistic. But I think when it comes to U.S.-Iranian relations, obviously the disputes are not just on the nuclear issue but also in the region from the Red Sea to Lebanon to Persian Gulf security, energy security. The United States still has this interest in getting out of this region to dedicate more resources to China and elsewhere. There are some in Iran who still think they need to get rid of these secondary U.S. sanctions. In the United States, there are many people who would say that we need to get off a war footing with Iran and dedicate more resources elsewhere in the world. For the Iranians, I think one lesson of the JCPOA was that, after the Americans, ultimately all these other issues, such as regional conflicts, prevented the JCPOA from being successful in the region. All these other differences now make me very pessimistic about the prospects for a grand bargain, especially after everything that’s happened in the past 10 years. I think the most we can hope for in the medium term is just putting a lid on further escalation.

ACT: If there were to be any agreement on the nuclear issue, would Russia and China be part of it? What are they advising Iran to do? How are they influencing Iran’s engagement with Israel?

Grajewski: On the question of whether or not any kind of deal is plausible, one of the things that makes it much more difficult is that a lot of the knowledge gained that Iran has had with working with higher enrichment levels, with more advanced centrifuges, that can’t really be reversed. On top of that, there is the issue that part of the JCPOA’s provisions expire by October 2025. So, no longer will the snapback sanctions be enabled, and there are sunset provisions that expire then. That being said, I do think there is a will within the United States and within Iran to get to a level or at least some kind of deescalation where there is a partial restoration of the JCPOA. Whether or not Russia and China have a role in restoring the JCPOA, I’m actually not quite certain about that right now. With the relationship we see between Iran and Russia, there has been a real difficulty with any kind of discussions on the JCPOA. First, Iran’s provision of drones [to Russia] likely violated part of the embargo that expired in October 2023. On top of that is the question of ballistic missiles. I think it’s really important to say that we haven’t seen Iranian ballistic missiles appearing in the war in Ukraine, and that’s very positive if we’re thinking about the prospects of any kind of discussions of the JCPOA. Perhaps it does reflect a conscious choice on the side of the Iranians not to deliver ballistic missiles. There have been reports on ballistic missiles, but I’ve seen no evidence of them actually arriving or Iran actually making that decision.

ACT: If Iran were to provide ballistic missiles, what would be the fallout?

Grajewski: The E3 [France, Germany, and the United Kingdom] really made clear that was a redline for them. One thing that is an issue is that ballistic missile deliveries to Russia would be far more escalatory than the drone provisions. But when it comes to the negotiations with the West and Russia and China’s role, I don’t see them playing a large role or at least not a positive role. China has been acquiescing to Iran’s expansion of its program. We’ve heard that, in [U.S.] Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart’s discussions with the Chinese, there’s been some indication that China would be willing to pressure Iran not to continue with an expansion of its nuclear program. But the Chinese don’t want to assume this role as a mediator between the West and Iran.

With the Russians, there’s more of an emboldening of Iranian positions. Russian acquiescence to Iran’s kind of progression expansion has been a shift from its position prior to the war on Ukraine. This complicates the dynamics, especially when we’re thinking about it in the P5+1 context. One issue relating to Russia is Iranian support for the war in Ukraine on the side of the Russians. Right now, in the negotiations, especially within the IAEA, Russia emboldened Iran while China has taken a step back. Before the war in Ukraine, Russia was a really important and useful mediator. It pressured Iran to comply with the IAEA, either with the reinstallation of cameras or coming to the negotiation table after Raisi was elected. But that’s not the case anymore, and that complicates things. On U.S.-Iranian back channel discussions, I think Russia’s influence is looming but it’s not as present as it is within the P5+1 and IAEA contexts.

ACT: Any other comments about the Russian and Chinese regional roles? To add another question: Iran’s acting foreign minister, Ali Begari Khani, has conducted talks through Oman with the United States. What have they achieved? Could that be a possible channel or is it a continuing channel for deescalating not just political tensions but nuclear tensions going forward?

Vaez: On the first question, I think there is an element that one has to take into consideration, which is that Russia and China have a much higher threshold of tolerance in terms of Iran’s nuclear capabilities than is the case with Western countries. Now with growing, worsening great-power competition, both countries have an interest in making sure that the United States is preoccupied with concerns in the Middle East, as long as that doesn’t infringe on their own interests with Iran, especially on the Chinese side in terms of their ability to access energy resources in that part of the world. But if the United States is bogged down in the Middle East, that means that it cannot focus on China, and it’s a distraction from the war in Ukraine. Both of those things are positives for China and Russia.

In terms of negotiations that have occurred in Muscat, to the extent that we know, these are not aimed at crisis resolution but at crisis management. Iran and the United States have tried to keep a lid on the current tensions, whether it’s disagreements in the region or the nuclear standoff, rather than trying to think about what kind of future diplomatic solution could be found to address these in a more sustainable fashion. From what we know, a good part of these meetings is focused on exchanging threats and warnings of what would happen if the other side crosses certain redlines rather than engaging in a real quid pro quo bargaining aimed at resolving these issues. There is no guarantee that Bagheri Khani will become the foreign minister in the next Iranian government. If he is, by this point he has plenty of experience engaging with U.S. officials indirectly, and that could facilitate future negotiations rather than having someone who does not have such background. But we don’t know for sure that that would be the case. One element that has been introduced now, again as a result of the presidential transition in Iran, is that if there was the possibility of using the next few months before the U.S. elections in trying to lay the foundation for what comes next, that window has now been shortened because Iran would be internally focused in the next few weeks. I don’t think that the interim foreign minister or the regime as a whole would have an interest in serious engagement with the United States in this period.

Toossi: Ali knows the state of U.S.-Iranian negotiations and summarized them very well. On the China-Russia point, it was interesting that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin this week, when he was asked about Raisi, said Raisi was a very reliable partner for Russia. I think this gets to an important thing for China and Russia, and I’ve heard this from Iranians, that the kind of thinking in Tehran is that, during the Rouhani era, he was very much prioritizing the JCPOA, improving ties with the West…. We saw in the post-JCPOA era in Iran that, during that year, year and a half that we had the deal, those who sought better ties with the West were giving Western companies, European companies—Total, Airbus, Boeing—priority over Chinese and Russian ones. There are practical reasons for that, but for the Russians and Chinese, they didn’t have that assurance that Iran would be totally with them or closer to their orbits, even after Khamenei gave this kind of seminal speech during the Rouhani era, saying,  “We should prioritize the East over the West.”

With Raisi, I think they really tried to make that clear. Even with the 25-year cooperation agreement with China, from what I’ve heard the Chinese wanted that earlier with Iran, as early as 2016 when the Chinese premier went to Iran. But then, it was slow-rolled from the Iranian side toward the end of Rouhani’s administration. I think that is a factor of Raisi’s presidency, and what Khamenei has tried to do is to signal to the Russians and Chinese that we’re not really counting on the West, we’re not fundamentally trying to improve our relations with them. I think tactically this space for secondary sanctions is potentially an avenue. In terms of primary U.S. sanctions, maybe the Iranians are never going to be interested in that; and they want to be closer to the Chinese and Russian orbits; and their bet overall seems to be that, in this changing global order and the emerging multipolarity, they want to go in that direction strategically. I think that stood out to me regarding these foreign relations of Iran.

ACT: After Rouhani took office, the desire of Iran’s young population for engagement with the West seemed effusive. If Iranian leaders now say our bet is with Russia and China, can they really drag their country into the embrace of Russia and China if the population is still interested in engagement with the West?

Toossi: I would argue that, in Iran generally…they’re more interested in the West, Western culture, especially the more cosmopolitan youth. That is the kind of media that they consume, the things that they’re interested in. So, that is indeed the fissure. Strategically, the leadership wants to take the country in one direction, but the thrust of society wants to go in another direction. I think this plays into the broader potential unsustainability of the Islamic Republic and its government model. With that said, there are deepening ties between Iran and China and Iran and Russia. Especially with Russia, for example, it’s not that economically significant; but I do see, interestingly, that there are more Iranians who travel into China, that China is also working to promote its soft power within Iran. But I would say that as things currently exist and given modern Iranian history, most Iranians want normal relations with the world, want to be able to travel to Europe and the United States especially, and the Iranian diaspora is in these places as well. Those are big factors that will continue to play into this appetite, that a big part of Iranian society, as well as the Islamic Republic’s political system, do have this interest in ties with the West.

ACT: How sustainable are the current embraces between Russia and Iran, China and Iran?

Grajewski: The political embrace of Russia in particular isn’t necessarily very popular with the Iranian population, and that’s been a long-standing grievance that has been expressed on the streets and during the Green Movement and even after the invasion of Ukraine, where you heard “death to Putin” chanted in front of the Russian embassy in Tehran. That’s partly because of historical grievances toward Russia, this legacy of imperialism. China also has been subjected to a lot of popular discontent, partly because of its business practices and the view that Iran is essentially being bought out by China. But yes, there is a huge gulf between the Iranian population’s view of its foreign relations and also its domestic politics, especially among the youth and the reformists opposed to its current trajectory.

I don’t really tend to ascribe to a binary between East and West in Iranian policy because I think it’s a little more nuanced and balanced. But there is that tendency, and I think you see it a lot right now, to emphasize the East. Whenever Iran discusses the East, it also includes South America. Raisi represented in many ways the conservative disregard for a lot of popular sentiment, popular expression, and freedom of expression, and I think that this is likely going to continue. I do think that the current trajectory… and also the acrimony with the United States, the acrimony with Israel, will continue. As optimistic as we’d like to be, there’s a lot more shadow figures within the Iranian bureaucracy, such as the IRGC, which is largely disinclined to support any kind of nuclear agreement, partly because sanctions help sections of the Iranian bureaucracy or what Trump would call a deep state. But yeah, I think that you’re right though. I do think that the population doesn’t necessarily ascribe to these views. It’s a shame, and I think hopefully things change. 

June 2024
By Luisa Kenausis

In recent years, nuclear weapons have made their way back to a prominent role in popular media in the United States. The headliner has been Oppenheimer, the most feted film of the 2024 Academy Awards and the most high-profile movie depicting nuclear weapons in decades. Beyond that example, nuclear weapons have appeared repeatedly in other U.S. media products, playing roles of varying significance in fictional movies, TV and streaming series, and docuseries and documentaries.

Nuclear weapons are not a new element in cinematic culture in the United States, but it seems they are more of a focus today than they have in a generation. To understand the surge in interest, viewers must consider the societal function of storytelling, the interaction of global politics and popular culture, and the history of nuclear weapons in pop culture.It is also necessary to examine some recent and upcoming nuclear weapons-related films and TV shows, assess how they interact with prevailing Western narratives about nuclear weapons, and consider their potential impact on public opinion on nuclear weapons in the United States.

Narrative and Popular Media

Storytelling is how humans preserve and share knowledge. When a story is shared with people, its imbued meaning can be spread widely and become part of a community’s common beliefs or knowledge. In this way, stories allow people to make sense collectively of the world around them.¹

Over time, the stories that people see and hear repeatedly, especially in a popular culture context, can contribute to their worldview and become part of a shared cultural perspective. The ways that objects such as nuclear weapons are depicted in popular, typically fictional TV shows and films and the narratives that are linked to them through popular media impact how the real-life versions of those objects are perceived and discussed within a culture.

Although global events can drive trends in popular culture, interaction between the two phenomena is more complex. Popular media informs the way that global events are perceived and interpreted within a specific cultural context.² Pop culture is produced and consumed intertextually, with viewers, consciously or not, interpreting popular films and TV shows in relation to other popular works that they have already seen or that have already entered cultural consciousness. One fictional depiction of nuclear weapons may not drastically change a viewer’s personal beliefs about those weapons, but the viewer’s preexisting beliefs about nuclear weapons likely have been shaped by nuclear-related narratives that have been repeated across U.S. popular media over time.

U.S. Nuclear Cinema From 1950 to 1990

Popular films tend to reflect the beliefs, fears, and pervasive questions of their time. Within just a few years of the first nuclear detonations in 1945, U.S. filmmakers were using their films to examine nuclear weapons and nuclear war and its potentially apocalyptic aftermath thoughtfully. When public views on nuclear weapons shifted over time in response to global events, the depiction of nuclear weapons shifted as well, leading to a few distinct eras in nuclear cinema in the United States.³

Early films about nuclear weapons took seriously the task of making sense of these new weapons. Their narratives often felt heavy with anxiety, fear, and guilt, reflecting the nation’s complicated feelings about the bomb. The first Soviet nuclear test in 1949 and subsequent nuclear arms race further drove nuclear fears in the United States. In the 1950s, radiation-based monster and mutant movies reflected growing fears about the unknown impacts of radiation, nuclear testing, and atomic fallout.⁴ Science fiction films such as Godzilla, King of the Monsters! released in the United States in 1956 in a heavily modified version from the original Japanese Godzilla, Them!⁵ in 1954, and The Incredible Shrinking Man in 1957 emphasized the unknown, unpredictable dangers posed by nuclear weapons. In the same period, films such as On the Beach, released in 1959 and set in 1964, offered direct warnings to audiences that a nuclear war could lead to the extinction of humanity in the near future.⁶ These films raised questions about the atomic bomb and its effects, and their narratives centered on the unknown, potentially uncontrollable destructive power of nuclear weapons.

A few years later, Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb in 1964 took a sharper look at the dangers posed not only by the physical power of nuclear weapons, but also by reliance on nuclear deterrence to prevent a doomsday scenario. In this film, nuclear weapons are not depicted as a source of strength or protection for the nation holding them but as a vulnerability at the global level.

While the Cold War thawed from the late 1960s to 1979, nuclear weapons played relatively little role in U.S. films. This shifted following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980. A series of crises in the early 1980s, along with Reagan’s “axis of evil” speech in March 1983, again stoked fears of nuclear war among the U.S. public.⁷ These heightened fears were reflected in The Day After, a 1983 ABC TV movie in which nuclear war breaks out between the United States and the Soviet Union, destroying Lawrence, Kansas. Nuclear narratives in The Day After are reminiscent of those from the early nuclear films, with emphasis placed on the unimaginable horrors of a nuclear attack and its aftermath and the human impact of nuclear explosions.

Since the Cold War ended, the role of nuclear weapons in films has been reduced significantly, with weapons often functioning as plot devices rather than as film topics in themselves. In the 1996 blockbuster Independence Day, for example, the United States launches a nuclear-armed missile at an alien spaceship hovering above Houston, and the missile destroys the city but fails to harm the spaceship. In this film, the primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to demonstrate the alien ship’s imperviousness to human technology. No clear message about nuclear weapons themselves can be discerned from the film.

Nuclear War Rebooted

One consequence of the complex relationship between global political events and popular culture is that a viewer’s specific experience with a particular work of popular media is dependent on when and where they see it, with their viewing context being informed by current events in the world and their local news cycle. In February 2024, an audit analyzing U.S. media coverage of nuclear weapons between August 2020 and August 2023 found that coverage increased sharply following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, from a prewar average of 500 stories per month to a peak of nearly 3,000 stories in March 2022.⁸ After that, nuclear weapons coverage appears to track with key events in the Russian-Ukrainian war and threatening statements from Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Across the analyzed coverage, there appear to be broadly shared assumptions among journalists, officials, and other quoted sources that nuclear weapons are dangerous and that their use would be catastrophic and must be avoided. Perspectives diverge, however, on the question of how best to avoid nuclear war. Proponents of arms control characterize nuclear weapons as a source of risk and advocate for their reduction or elimination in order to prevent nuclear war. Those in the other camp characterize a strong nuclear arsenal as essential to deter attack. These perspectives constitute the two competing narratives about nuclear weapons in today’s media: nuclear weapons keep the world safe or put us at risk.

In recent months, there has been significant media attention paid not only to specific news events relating to nuclear weapons, but to the rising risk of nuclear war more broadly. In March 2024, The New York Times launched “At the Brink,” an interactive multimedia series that seeks to examine the current dangers posed by nuclear weapons and consider what can be done to reduce nuclear risks. In the first installment, a narrative essay is paired with interactive illustration, animation, photography, video, and audio to depict vividly a hypothetical nuclear attack.⁹ Five installments have been published so far, and the series is expected to run through 2024.¹⁰

A recent public opinion survey further illuminates the context in which the current wave of nuclear weapons media will be interpreted. In the survey, respondents report relatively low familiarity with nuclear weapons topics, but six in 10 of them indicate interest in learning more about nuclear weapons and U.S. nuclear weapons policy.¹¹ The survey was conducted a year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and five months before the premiere of Oppenheimer, making it a useful snapshot of public opinion at this nuclear moment in film and TV.

The Current Wave

The much-anticipated release of Oppenheimer in July 2023 marked the start of the current surge of nuclear weapons in popular media. Directed by Christopher Nolan, the film tells the story of physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer and his role in the creation of the atomic bomb. Although most of the film focuses on the Manhattan Project, it also depicts a contentious 1954 congressional hearing on the renewal of Oppenheimer’s security clearance.

The film uses debates among Oppenheimer and other scientists to raise some of the competing narratives about nuclear weapons. As the Manhattan Project progresses, viewers see scientists discuss whether the new weapon will make the world more or less safe, whether the bomb should be used against a nearly defeated Japan, and whether the United States should pursue development of a hydrogen bomb. Although these on-screen debates add some nuance, the primary narrative is that before the United States used nuclear weapons against Japan, its creators believed that atomic bombs would mean the end of war. In an early scene, Niels Bohr asks Oppenheimer, somewhat leadingly, if the weapon will be big enough to end “all” war. Later, Oppenheimer repeats this belief directly more than once, saying that the bomb “will ensure a peace mankind has never seen” and that after it is used, “nuclear war, maybe all war, becomes unthinkable.” Notably, his view changes dramatically by the end of the film, but his post-Hiroshima perspective on the bombs is less explored.

Oppenheimer has drawn criticism for not giving a voice to the victims of nuclear weapons.¹² Although the number of Japanese people killed by the atomic bombings is mentioned, the movie does not show the use of the bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki or the physical effects of the weapons on the human victims. Moreover, in telling the story of the Manhattan Project and the first U.S. nuclear test, called Trinity, Oppenheimer makes no mention of the downwinders, the victims of the fallout from U.S. nuclear testing. Nolan has said that the film does not show the bombings of Japan to maintain its subjectivity because Oppenheimer himself did not witness them and the film extends from Oppenheimer’s point of view.¹³ This omission may strengthen the film as a portrayal of Oppenheimer, but by leaving out the ugliest and most horrific consequences of nuclear weapons, it limits its own potential to inform its audience on nuclear weapons.

In some recent releases, nuclear weapons exist in the background. In Wes Anderson’s 2023 movie Asteroid City, for example, the film takes place in an isolated desert town, bursting with atomic kitsch imagery reminiscent of 1950s Americana. Characters comment idly on the atomic bomb tests that go off every so often. Despite the obvious proximity of nuclear weapons to Asteroid City, it is difficult to say what statement, if any, the film is trying to make about them.

Amazon Prime’s new streaming science fiction series Fallout, based on the video game franchise, reflects a similar tendency. The Fallout games are known for raising complex questions about nuclear weapons¹⁴ and, at times, offering a surprisingly accurate and powerful portrayal of a nuclear attack. In the new series, nuclear weapons serve only to explain the postapocalyptic setting in which the story takes place, and their portrayal lacks realism. In the first scene, viewers see a large-scale nuclear attack on Los Angeles, but the explosive flashes are weak, the shock waves move impossibly slowly, and the scale of destruction per detonation is far too small.¹⁵ The series explores stories in a wasteland created by a massive nuclear war, but real-world questions and concerns about nuclear weapons feel out of scope.

Fictional and dramatized films can increase viewers’ interest in nuclear weapons, but leave out key information when it does not fit the narrative of the story being told. Recent and upcoming documentaries can build on this increased awareness and allow interested viewers to learn more about the reality of nuclear weapons.

Netflix’s Turning Point: The Bomb and the Cold War is a nine-part nonfiction docuseries that looks at the development of the atomic bomb and the ensuing rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons. It links the collapse of the Soviet Union to the history of the Cold War to Putin’s ascent to power and ultimately to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Nuclear weapons are particularly relevant in the first episode, which focuses on the U.S. effort to develop the atomic bomb during World War II and the decision to use it against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

There is overlap between the timelines depicted in Oppenheimer and Turning Point, but the two productions differ sharply in that Turning Point tells the story with a focus on the victims of the bomb, including victims of nuclear testing in the United States. For example, in Turning Point, viewers learn how a girls dance camp was located only 40 miles from the Trinity test site and how all but one of the 12 girls there would die of cancer before turning 30 years old. In Oppenheimer, these girls and other downwinder victims are not addressed at all.

Turning Point continues to challenge and interrogate commonly held notions about nuclear weapons. When the narrative that using atomic bombs against Japan was militarily necessary in order to end World War II is raised, most experts interviewed challenge or flat out reject it, arguing that the decision to use the atomic bomb was driven more by concerns about the balance of power with the Soviet Union than actual military imperative. The same episode features interviews with several Japanese hibakusha as they share their memories of the atomic bombing, another group of nuclear weapons victims essentially ignored in Oppenheimer.

Upcoming Documentaries

Looking forward, a flurry of new documentaries and the seriousness with which they promise to address nuclear weapons could mark a meaningful shift in nuclear cinema. First We Bombed New Mexico draws attention to the downwinders of New Mexico who have been harmed by the testing of nuclear weapons near their communities. The film profiles Tina Cordova, leader and co-founder of the Tularosa Basin Downwinders Consortium and a cancer survivor, in the fight for justice for the many nuclear victims in her state. Directed by Lois Lipman, the film is screening in festivals. Its timing coincides with a legislative effort to renew and expand the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, which originally excluded New Mexicans and is slated to sunset on June 7. The expansion bill passed the U.S. Senate in March, but is stuck in the House of Representatives.¹⁶

Bombshell tells the story of the struggle to control the narrative surrounding the atomic  bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The documentary will examine how the United States fought to repress accurate reporting on the atomic bombings until the publication of John Hersey’s Hiroshima. The film will consider the staying power of narratives and the ways journalists and others can challenge prevailing narratives. Now in production, it is directed by Ben Loeterman.¹⁷

Finally, How to Stop a Nuclear War will adapt Daniel Ellsberg’s book The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner into a feature-length documentary that promises not only to inform its audience about the dangers inherent in U.S. nuclear war planning, but also to call the audience to action. In a promotional video, actress Kristen Stewart said the film “sounds the alarm about this threat, but also shows the solutions and steps we can take to avert catastrophe.”¹⁸ Directed by Paul Jay, the documentary is in production.

Impact and Trends

The United States may be at the beginning of a wave of pop culture products depicting or discussing nuclear weapons. The earliest and most popular project in this current era, Oppenheimer, was released less than a year ago. It is too soon to draw conclusions about the long-term impact that any of these recent or planned releases will have on public opinion about nuclear weapons, and there are no recent survey data.

Nevertheless, there are some real-time information sources that can inform this question. Reviewing Google Trends data for U.S.-based web searches for “nuclear weapons” over the last few years suggests that people tend to seek information on nuclear weapons immediately following global events that remind them of the risks of nuclear war. In particular, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s subsequent nuclear threats have led to spikes in search volume, but other recent film and TV releases that deal with similar topics have not had a similar effect. Despite Oppenheimer’s release in late July, for instance, July and August 2023 did not see a significant uptick in searches on nuclear weapons.¹⁹ There was a heavy media buzz leading up to the premiere and a healthy box office turnout, but it appears that watching the film did not spur many viewers to seek further information about nuclear weapons.

Recent and upcoming media projects dealing with nuclear weapons can be grouped into two broad categories, based on content, target audience, and intended impact on the viewer. Several dramatized and fictional properties (Oppenheimer, Fallout, Asteroid City) appeal to a relatively broad audience and aim primarily to entertain audiences. Films and TV shows in this category have the effect of increasing public awareness of nuclear weapons through viewership of the properties themselves and through media coverage surrounding their release, which can have an even bigger impact.²⁰ Yet, these projects are unlikely to move viewers to take action against nuclear weapons because they are meant primarily to entertain.

The other category is nonfictional properties, which often have a narrower audience but can dig deeper into the details of nuclear weapons topics with the primary objective of informing their audience and feeding its curiosity. Since the Cold War, the audience for documentaries and docuseries about nuclear weapons in the United States has been narrow. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, nuclear weapons unfortunately have returned to salience, offering an unusually potent opportunity to reach viewers through a documentary. The potential audience for nuclear weapons documentaries is large and growing. Most people are interested in learning more about nuclear weapons, and it appears that filmmakers are moving quickly to meet and build on this interest.

Although these recent releases and the Russian war on Ukraine have brought nuclear weapons back into public awareness, it seems likely that the U.S. audience simply does not feel equipped yet to take action. Since the Cold War, most people in the United States have spent little time thinking about nuclear weapons, and an entire younger generation has no memory of the Cold War. As a major blockbuster, Oppenheimer may have raised public awareness of nuclear weapons, but it does not offer viewers a clear understanding of the dangers that these weapons pose or a pathway for viewers to take action against them. The film could increase interest to such a degree, however, that its audience might be more likely to engage with future nuclear weapons documentaries.

In terms of potential audience impact, the documentaries now being readied for release could not come at a better time. Russia’s war on Ukraine has kept nuclear weapons in the headlines, and this topic will continue to feel unusually relevant and salient to the public. The popularity of Oppenheimer may have a priming effect on public interest that bolsters viewership and audience engagement for upcoming anti-nuclear weapons documentaries.

ENDNOTES

1. Lucas M. Bietti, Ottilie Tilston, and Adrian Bangerter, “Storytelling as Adaptive Collective Sensemaking,” Topics in Cognitive Science, Vol. 11, No. 4 (October 2019): 710-732.

2. Jutta Weldes and Christina Rowley, “So, How Does Popular Culture Relate to World Politics?” in Popular Culture and World Politics: Theories, Methods, Pedagogies, ed. Federica Caso and Caitlin Hamilton (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2015), pp. 11-34.

3. Paul Boyer, “A Life in American Cinema: The Nuclear Option,” Perspectives on History, Vol. 46, No. 8 (November 2008), https://www.historians.org/research-and-publications/perspectives-on-history/november-2008/a-life-in-american-cinema-the-nuclear-option.  ​​

4. Toni Perrine, “The Godzilla Factor: Nuclear Testing and Fear of Fallout,” Grand Valley Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1997): 19-40.

5. Steve Ryfle, Ed Godziszewski, and Yuuko Honda-Yun, Ishiro Honda: A Life in Film, From Godzilla to Kurosawa (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2017), pp. 105-106.

6. Iris Strimitzer, “On the Relationship Between Apocalyptic Films and Reality in U.S. Cold War Culture” (thesis, Universität Graz, April 2021), https://permalink.obvsg.at/UGR/AC16210730.

7. Deron Overpeck, “‘Remember! It’s Only a Movie!’ Expectations and Receptions of The Day After (1983),” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 2012): 267-292.

8. Adrienne Lynett, “Arms Control Advocates Have Increased Voiceshare, Media Audit Finds,” ReThink Media, February 12, 2024, https://rethinkmedia.org/blog/arms-control-advocates-have-increased-voiceshare-media-audit-finds.

9.  W.J. Hennigan, “The Brink,” The New York Times, March 7, 2024.

10. “New York Times Opinion Announces a New Series on Nuclear Threats,” The New York Times, March 4, 2024.

11. Dina Smeltz, Craig Kafura, and Sharon Weiner, “Majority in U.S. Interested in Boosting Their Nuclear Knowledge,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Carnegie Corporation of New York, July 2023, https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2023-07/Nuclear%20Survey%20Report%20PDF.pdf.

12. Emily Zemler, “Critics Say Omitting the Japanese Toll Makes ‘Oppenheimer’ ‘Morally Half-Formed,’” Los Angeles Times, August 4, 2023.

13. Christian Holub, “Christopher Nolan Responds to Criticism for Not Showing Hiroshima Bombing in Oppenheimer,” Entertainment Weekly, November 8, 2023.

14. Cameron Hunter, “The Ambivalent Nuclear Politics of Fallout Video Games,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 17, 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/10/the-ambivalent-nuclear-politics-of-fallout-video-games/.

15. Fallout, season 1, episode 1, “The End,” directed by Jonathan Nolan, written by Geneva Robertson-Dworet and Graham Wagner, aired April 10, 2024, on Amazon Prime Video.

16. Danielle Prokop, “RECA Expansion Passes U.S. Senate,” Source New Mexico, March 7, 2024, https://sourcenm.com/2024/03/07/reca-expansion-passes-u-s-senate/.

17. “Bombshell,” Filmmakers Collaborative, n.d., https://filmmakerscollab.org/films/bombshell/ (accessed May 5, 2024). Devon Terrill, a colleague of the author, is a consulting producer on this project.

18. Etan Vlessing, “Kristen Stewart Warns the World Is ‘Dangerously Close’ to Nuclear Catastrophe,” The Hollywood Reporter, December 15, 2023, https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/kristen-stewart-nuclear-catastrophe-warning-1235758067/.

19. Use of Google Trends highlighting Google searches from the United States from January 1, 2019, to April 1, 2024, showed spikes in search frequency for the term “nuclear weapons” that closely aligned with nuclear weapons-related global news events.

20. Stanley Feldman and Lee Sigelman, “The Political Impact of Prime-Time Television: ‘The Day After,’” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (June 1985): 556-578.

June 2024

 

When the World Ends in 72 Minutes

Nuclear War: A Scenario
By Annie Jacobsen
Dutton, 2024

Reviewed by Tom Z. Collina

Annie Jacobsen’s Nuclear War: A Scenario is a page-turning thriller about how, step by tragic step, the world as we know it might end with nuclear weapons. It is a welcome and timely reminder that “12,000 years of civilization” could be “reduced to rubble in mere minutes and hours,” as the author puts it. In her realistic narrative, it is all over in 72 minutes.

The book runs the reader through an engagingly written, painstakingly detailed scenario in which North Korea launches a “bolt from the blue” nuclear attack against Washington, D.C. and Diablo Canyon Power Plant in central California. The United States responds with a much larger retaliation, involving 82 warheads, against North Korea. Because the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) overfly Russia on their way to Pyongyang, Moscow thinks it is under attack from the United States and retaliates with 1,000 warheads. Before North Korea is destroyed, it detonates an electromagnetic pulse weapon over the United States. Finally, the United States retaliates with everything it has against Russia. Game over.

The bulk of the book is a riveting minute-by-minute account of how each step of this dizzying process plays out, starting with the launch of one warhead from North Korea. The launch is detected, analyzed, and assessed. At 3 minutes and 15 seconds after launch, the U.S. president is informed. At 9 minutes, an attempt is made to intercept the missile. It fails. At 23 minutes, after the first detonation in California, the U.S. president orders a strike against Pyongyang. At 33 minutes, the Pentagon is destroyed. At 41 minutes, Russia detects a massive nuclear attack heading its way. The dozens of expert interviews and deep research that Jacobsen conducted make the scenario feel realistic and terrifying. Along the way, the author reminds readers about some of the more troubling aspects of current nuclear policy, such as the facts that the United States or North Korea could start a world-ending nuclear war on the orders of just one person, a concept known as sole authority; that Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons are on high alert, ready to be launched at a moment’s notice, even before a reported attack has been confirmed to be real, a concept known as launch on warning; that U.S. ICBMs are highly vulnerable to attack and that their use against a nation such as North Korea would look like an attack against Russia; or that existing U.S. missile defenses stand little chance of stopping even a limited attack from North Korea.

In laying out this scenario, Jacobsen also challenges many of the questionable assertions employed by the nuclear establishment to defend the status quo. One of those assertions is that deterrence works. Well, it does until it does not. It is true that nuclear deterrence has worked so far and rational leaders seem to understand that initiating a nuclear attack against another state with nuclear weapons would be suicidal. Unfortunately, that does not mean it will keep working forever, and there are multiple ways it can fail catastrophically. As in Jacobsen’s narrative, a leader in a nuclear state such as North Korea can become irrational (a “mad king”) and launch a first strike for any reason at all. This may be a highly unlikely scenario, and some may say it is a thin reed on which to hang a whole book. Yet, that may be Jacobsen’s point: deterrence is vulnerable to factors that are out of our control.

Another questionable assertion is that a “limited” nuclear war would stay limited. Some would like everyone to believe that it is possible to have a “small” nuclear war, using just a few nuclear weapons, and that this could somehow restore deterrence before things really get ugly. Jacobsen shows just how dangerous such thinking can be. The gruesome logic of the system is biased toward quick and massive retaliation (“use them or lose them”), so limited use rapidly escalates into full-scale war even if no one intended that to happen. In the book, the United States never intends to start a nuclear war with Russia, but that is exactly what happens.

The author also makes it brutally clear that nuclear war has no winners and, as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev predicted, “the survivors will envy the dead.” Her description of what would happen to Washington after getting hit with a 1-megaton bomb is particularly chilling. “Wind rips the skin off people’s faces and tears away limbs. Survivors die of shock, heart attack, blood loss. Errant power lines whip through the air, electrocuting people and setting new fires alight everywhere,” she writes. “Never in the history of mankind have so many human beings been killed so fast.” Capitol Hill is obliterated. The animals in the National Zoo have no chance. Globally, over time as smoke blocks out the sun, billions die. Humans have gone the way of the dinosaurs.

Jacobsen writes that, “[f]or as long as nuclear war exists as a possibility, it threatens mankind with Apocalypse. The survival of the human species hangs in the balance.” She concludes that rather than the United States, Russia, China, or North Korea, “[i]t was the nuclear weapons that were the enemy of us all. All along.”

What Now

Jacobsen revealed in Mother Jones that she “wrote this book to demonstrate—in appalling, minute-by-minute detail—just how horrifying a nuclear war would be. Join the conversation. While we can all still have one.”¹ Yet, the book offers no solutions. The author has said that she did not want to step out of her “lane as a journalist and as a storyteller” and into the lane of an expert on policy fixes.

Even so, a key part of this much needed conversation is to ask what now. How can the world prevent a nuclear war that Jacobsen accurately describes as possible and catastrophic? For those who read this compelling book and are rightly motivated to get involved, what policies would prevent the very scenario she lays out?

In general, people on both sides of this debate think that nuclear war would have no winners and should be prevented. Those who support maintaining current nuclear arsenal levels, or even increasing them, justify their position on the need to have a strong nuclear force to deter an attack by others. Humanity must face the reality that even if the United States offered to eliminate its arsenal if others did so too, the others might not follow. Russia, in particular, appears to have little interest in reducing its arsenal and recently has made thinly veiled nuclear threats against Ukraine.

This creates a challenging environment for the most straightforward approach to ending the threat of nuclear war: eliminating nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the best vehicle for this approach. It has been in force since January 2021 and has been signed by more than 90 nations. Unfortunately, none of the nuclear-armed states currently support this treaty or seems likely to do so anytime soon.

Short of global elimination of nuclear weapons, the next best approach is gradual reductions. Alas, Russia has told the Biden administration that it is not interested in discussing ways to replace the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires in early 2026. If New START disappears without being replaced, there would be no legal limits on Russian and U.S. nuclear forces for the first time in 50 years. China, for its part, is increasing its nuclear forces and also is not interested in talking about reductions, although Beijing recently said it is willing to discuss an agreement to prevent the first use of nuclear weapons. As long as the Biden administration remains committed to arms control, there is reason to keep pursuing diplomacy with China and Russia, but the near-term prospects for significant arms reductions are bleak.

If arsenal reductions are not promising now, there are changes in U.S. policy that could make nuclear war less likely. One policy ripe for change is sole authority. In the book, North Korea starts a nuclear war all by itself. Presumably, the leader of that nation has the absolute authority to make this decision. Washington likely cannot change Pyongyang’s launch policy or convince it to give up its nuclear arsenal, although it should try. The United States has a sole-authority policy as well, and North Korea has no monopoly on making bad decisions. Washington could at least reduce the risk of a U.S.-initiated nuclear war by requiring that any decision to launch a first strike must be a joint decision with Congress or a subset of its members. The initiation of nuclear war should require the shared authority of the executive and legislative branches. This seems like a prudent approach, particularly in light of the upcoming U.S. presidential election.

Another potential change involves launch on warning. This policy supports the president launching U.S. nuclear weapons after a possible attack has been detected by early-warning sensors but before the reported attack is proven to be real, such as by landing on U.S. soil. In the book, the U.S. president launches nuclear weapons only after the attack on California is confirmed, so this is not an example of launch on warning. Yet, the way the fictional president is rushed into a decision, with another attack reportedly heading toward Washington, is similar. Imagine an alternative scenario where the president is first removed from Washington to a remote location where he can take time to reach a decision when more information arrives. There is no need for the president to launch quickly, within minutes. In the book, a quick launch leads to a tragic error: sending a large force of U.S. ICBMs on a flight path over Russia.

A main reason why U.S. presidents are pushed by advisers to act quickly in a scenario such as this is that the country’s ICBMs are in fixed locations and thus are vulnerable to attack. If not used quickly, they may be destroyed by the incoming attack. This leads to rushed decisions. By contrast, U.S. nuclear-armed submarines at sea are not vulnerable to surprise attack and create no pressure for quick launch. Moreover, submarine-based weapons do not have to be launched from fixed sites; unlike ICBMs, they could attack North Korea without flying over Russia. The United States would have fared far better in Jacobsen’s scenario with no ICBMs at all, and such weapons should be retired. Short of retiring its ICBMs, Washington could prohibit their use in any mission that overflies a nuclear-armed state that is not the intended target.

Some critics say that Jacobsen’s scenario is not realistic, that U.S. planners would not launch ICBMs over Russia and would instead use submarines to avoid this possibility. Yet, that may be Jacobsen’s precise point. Humans make bad decisions all the time, especially in a crisis.

As a journalist, Jacobsen’s strength is her powerful storytelling, and readers can excuse her lack of solutions, some debatable aspects of the scenario, and even a few errant facts. Nuclear War is an excellent book for anyone who wants to understand just how quickly nuclear conflict can start and how badly it can end. With its gripping narrative and timely arrival, it has the potential to start a new debate on how best to avert nuclear war. This book is a welcome addition to global efforts to reduce the risk of the ultimate disaster.

 

ENDNOTE

1. Annie Jacobsen, “America’s Nuclear War Plan in the 1960’s Was Utter Madness. It Still Is,” Mother Jones, March 27, 2024, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2024/03/nuclear-war-scenario-book-siop-weapons-annie-jacobsen/.

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Tom Z. Collina, former senior policy adviser at Ploughshares Fund, is a nuclear expert and co-author of The Button: The New Nuclear Arms Race and Presidential Power From Truman to Trump.

 

June 2024

Germany and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century: Atomic Zeitenwende?
Ulrich Kühn, ed.
Routledge
2024

The contributors to this collection have produced a valuable introduction to current nuclear debates in Germany, providing foreign readers with a first reference for deciphering recurring allusions to an independent nuclear deterrent in German political circles. Although not a comprehensive history of postwar Germany’s relationship to the bomb, this edited volume provides the context to understand a wide range of contemporary nuclear issues. The volume benefits from an impressive range of viewpoints, with highlights such as Giorgio Franceschini’s chapter explaining shifts in the Green Party’s policy on nuclear weapons and Michal Onderco’s polling of German public opinion.

Editor Ulrich Kühn and co-author Barbara Kunz explain in their chapter that a Franco-German route to a German nuclear weapon is barred by a “lack of strategic convergence” and numerous practical, legal, doctrinal, and cultural challenges. In examining Germany’s decision to give up its own latent potential, Kühn argues that the strategic considerations that led to the abandonment of nuclear technology persist to this day. The book makes clear that stray talk in the Bundestag distracts from the far more substantial and nuanced nuclear debate in Germany on the country’s role in nonproliferation, NATO deterrence, and disarmament.—XIAODON LIANG

Arms Control at a Crossroads: Renewal or Demise?
Jeffrey A. Larsen and Shane Smith, eds.
Lynne Rienner Publishers
2024

With the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expiring in 2026 and the future of arms control uncertain, this edited volume centers on the editors’ assertion that arms control is “not quite” dead and its value as a tool of statecraft remains even if it faces steep challenges ahead. The book presents 16 analyses by respected experts who probe the editors’ view that “arms control will need to adapt to the realities of a new era to remain a relevant instrument of statecraft.” It provides a comprehensive overview of international efforts to rein in nuclear weapons.

The book covers a wide variety of arms control and cooperative security topics, including the theory and contexts of arms control, the perspectives of major powers and their competitive relationships, and the future of arms control in traditional and new domains, such as cyberspace and outer space.

In a world that has grown pessimistic about containing nuclear weapons, the editors acknowledge that arms control has “lost its luster among many of the world’s political leaders.” Yet, they remain hopeful that “political leaders will one day again see the utility and value of arms control as a primary tool for managing competition.”
—SHIZUKA KURAMITSU

June 2024
By Xiaodon Liang and Shizuka Kuramitsu

China has not provided a “substantive response” to three U.S. strategic risk-reduction proposals and has declined to schedule a follow-on meeting to a November 2023 bilateral meeting on arms control and nonproliferation matters, U.S. officials said.

But diplomatic engagement continues on other tracks. Chinese and U.S. delegations met in Geneva on May 14 to begin a dialogue on strategic risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI). U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke with his counterpart, Chinese Defense Minister Adm. Dong Jun, for the first time in 18 months on May 31 on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.  U.S. officials confirmed that nuclear weapons concerns were on the agenda.

According to U.S. officials, the United States at the November meeting proposed risk reduction measures on missile launch notifications, a crisis hotline, and space deconfliction. China “has declined a follow-on meeting and has not provided a substantive response to the risk reduction suggestions we put forward,” Bonnie Jenkins, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, testified May 15 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Jenkins said that the United States would continue to “increase diplomatic pressure” on China to be more transparent about its nuclear forces. Citing the Defense Department estimate that China will increase the number of its operational warheads from 500 warheads currently to 1,000 by 2030, she said the buildup raised questions about China’s nuclear posture and strategic goals.

The United States also has urged China and Russia to mirror the unilateral U.S. statement that humans, rather than AI, always should be in control of nuclear weapons. Speaking to reporters May 2, Paul Dean, principal deputy assistant secretary of state at the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, described that commitment as “an extremely important norm of responsible behavior.”

But when asked by reporters on May 13, a U.S. spokesperson declined to confirm that nuclear command and control would be prioritized during the talks with China in Geneva. According to a summary of the talks issued May 15 by the U.S. National Security Council, the two sides discussed “respective approaches to AI safety and risk management,” and the United States raised concerns about Chinese “misuse” of AI. The Associated Press on May 15 described hints of tension between the parties and said that the Chinese delegation criticized U.S. restrictions on exports of computer hardware that are critical to research in the AI field.

Meanwhile, China has continued to reaffirm its nuclear no-first-use policy. Arriving in France for a state visit May 5, Chinese President Xi Jinping, writing in the French newspaper Le Figaro, “stressed that nuclear weapons must not be used, and a nuclear war must not be fought.”

In response to questions from Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Jenkins said she was aware of a specific Chinese no-first-use proposal but the matter would have to be taken up by the interagency process. Jenkins added that she had questions about how China’s no-first-use policy was compatible with its current nuclear weapons buildup.

Jenkins also said that, in bilateral discussions with China, the United States stressed the importance of being a responsible nuclear power and how Russian threats of nuclear use are irresponsible.

Xi “has played an important role in de-escalating Russia’s irresponsible nuclear threats, and I am confident that [he] will continue to do so,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a May 6 press statement, following talks with Xi and French President Emmanuel Macron.

On a May 16 state visit to China, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed with Xi to deepen the “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era” as they commemorated this year’s 75th anniversary of Chinese-Russian diplomatic relations, according to reports from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

June 2024
By Carol Giacomo

U.S. President Joe Biden came under fresh pressure to halt the transfer of weapons to Israel after the state launched a deadly bombardment of Rafah that killed at least 45 people.

On May 28, CNN reported that its analysis of videos and a review by explosive experts showed that U.S.-made munitions were used in the Rafah attack, which occurred May 26, two days after the International Court of Justice ordered Israel to “immediately” halt its military offensive in the southern Gaza city.

Earlier in the month, Biden threatened to suspend the delivery of some U.S.-made offensive weapons if Israeli forces entered population centers in Rafah, a refuge for civilians fleeing the fighting that is also viewed as a Hamas stronghold. U.S. laws and a U.S. presidential directive impose requirements on presidents to curb U.S. weapons transfers to countries that violate international humanitarian law or fail to avoid harming civilians.

But even after Israeli strikes killed what the Gazan Health Ministry said were dozens of people sheltering in tent camps and wounded 249 more, the White House suggested that the military offensive still had not crossed a redline that would force significant changes in U.S. support for Israel.

On May 28, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said that what the Biden administration does not want to see in Rafah is a “major ground operation” in which “thousands and thousands of troops [are] moving in a maneuvered, concentrated, coordinated way against a variety of targets on the ground.”

He said that type of operation was not happening, and “I have no policy changes to speak of,” although he called the deaths in Rafah “devastating.”

For months, the Biden administration has straddled the sensitive question of whether Israel has violated U.S. and international humanitarian law as it sought to punish Hamas for the extremist group’s brutal Oct. 7 attack that killed more than 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals.

One particular deadly attack occurred on April 1 when seven employees of World Central Kitchen, an aid group, were killed by Israeli airstrikes. The Israeli military took responsibility for the catastrophe, The New York Times reported on April 8, and said it presumed some of World Central Kitchen’s vehicles were carrying militants, raising new questions about Israel’s ability to identify and protect civilians.

On May 10, the Biden administration announced the results of its internal review of Israel’s use of U.S.-provided weapons in the war in Gaza, as called for in National Security Memorandum-20. (See ACT, March 2024.)

The report said that “it is reasonable to assess” that U.S. weapons have been used in violation of humanitarian law and that Israel has acted in ways that blocked U.S. humanitarian assistance. But it does not make a specific enough finding to trigger sanctions against Israel.

The report also found that the U.S. intelligence community “assesses that Israel could do more to avoid civilian harm.”

U.S. law, regulation, and the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy require the United States to withhold military assistance when U.S. weapons are used in contravention of international humanitarian law.

Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), who authored a proposed legislative amendment that prompted the drafting of the national security memorandum, said the report “ducks the ultimate questions that [it] was designed to determine,” according to AI Monitor.

The issue has divided the State Department, where some officials urged Secretary of State Antony Blinken to conclude that Israel has violated the terms of the memorandum and others pressed him to certify that it did not.

In early May, the Biden administration paused the delivery of a shipment of 3,500 500- and 2,000-pound bombs to Israel, Axios reported May 5, but other weapons continue to flow.

The United States provides more weapons to Israel than any other country, including $80 billion last year. Since Oct. 7, these transfers have included bombs, artillery shells, precision guidance kits, guided missiles, drones, and ammunition.

Israel’s Rafah operation has spawned international outrage and a demand for an end to the fighting, including from leaders in the European Union, the United Nations, Egypt, and China. The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has requested arrest warrants for Israel’s prime minister and defense minister, and the Biden administration has expressed concern about the lack of a clear Israeli plan for postwar Gaza.

June 2024
By Libby Flatoff and Shizuka Kuramitsu

A senior U.S. Republican senator appeared to suggest that Israel should consider using nuclear weapons to defeat Hamas in Gaza, drawing criticism from arms control activists and others for normalizing talk of an option that the world has long considered anathema.

During a May 8 hearing at which he faulted the Biden administration for halting the delivery of some weapons to Israel, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) demanded of top U.S. defense officials, “Would you have supported dropping bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II?…Do you think that was disproportionate?”

“You’re going to tell (Israel) how to fight the war when everybody around them wants to kill all the Jews? Give Israel what they need to fight the war. This is Hiroshima and Nagasaki on steroids,” Graham told Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Charles Brown at a Senate Appropriations subcommittee hearing.

Four days later on NBC, Graham again justified the use of nuclear weapons on Nagasaki and Hiroshima because the weapons were used “to end a war we [could not] afford to lose” and insisted, “Give Israel the bombs they need to end the war they can’t afford to lose.”

Whether Graham actually was advocating the first nuclear weapons use since World War II or not, the comments landed with a thud in Tokyo where Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa described the remarks as “not appropriate” at a May 10 press conference.

She said that Japan “has been expressing for a long time…[that] the use of nuclear weapons does not match the spirit of humanitarianism, which is the ideological foundation of international law, because of their tremendous destructive and lethal power.”

She added that Japan had reiterated this point to U.S. officials. 

On May 14, Kamikawa addressed the issue again, telling reporters that “[i]t was very regrettable that such remarks have been made repeatedly.”

The Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations, also called Nihon Hidankyo, sent a letter to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo requesting a retraction of Graham’s remarks, NHK reported on May 15. “The remarks go against international humanitarian law…. [N]ow that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has come into effect, the remarks can only be described as an anachronistic and malicious delusion,” the letter said.

In addition, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in separate press conferences on May 16, condemned Graham’s justification of atomic bombings on their cities, according to Jiji Press.

Graham’s comments “run counter to the direction we should be taking in the future toward our ideals [of a nuclear-free world],” which U.S. President Joe Biden reaffirmed in Hiroshima at the 2023 Group of Seven meeting, Kazumi Matsui, the mayor of Hiroshima, said. (See ACT, June 2023.) “With humanitarian and catastrophic consequences brought about by atomic weapons in mind, nothing can justify the use of nuclear weapons,” Shiro Suzuki, the mayor of Nagasaki, said.

Meanwhile, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, wrote on social media May 13 that “likening the situation in Gaza to Hiroshima and Nagasaki [is] utterly unacceptable” and Graham’s statements “shouldn’t be normalized.”

Graham’s remarks garnered the most attention, but other U.S. politicians expressed similar views. Appearing on Newsmax on May 14, Rep. Greg Murphy (R-N.C.) also invoked Hiroshima and Nagasaki and said, “[T]his is where Israel has every single right in the world to press this conflict further.”

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-Mich.) was caught on video at a town hall meeting on March 25 suggesting that the United States should use a nuclear bomb on Gaza to “get it over quick…. [Gaza] should be like Nagasaki and Hiroshima.”

Walberg later denied that he was calling for the use of nuclear weapons, claiming instead that he “used a metaphor to convey the need for both Israel and Ukraine to win their wars as swiftly as possible, without putting American troops in harm’s way.” But Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.), the first Palestinian-American member of Congress, criticized Walberg, saying he “is not the first member of Congress to use despicable, violent, dehumanizing language to describe their genocidal intent in Gaza and will not be the last.” 

Despite Israel’s long-standing refusal to acknowledge having a nuclear weapons program, Israeli Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyafu said on Radio Kol Barama that using nuclear weapons in Gaza was “one of the possibilities,” the Times of Israel reported on Nov. 5.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denied this possibility and suspended Eliyafu, but Eliyafu in January again “urged that Israel must find ways for Gazans that are more painful than death to defeat them and break their morale, as the [United States] did with Japan,” Middle East Monitor reported on Jan. 6.