May 2024  
By Kelsey Davenport

A drone strike on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant did not compromise safety and security at the site, but the attack represents a dangerous new stage in the Ukraine war, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned on April 11.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi reported during an emergency meeting of the agency’s Board of Governors that drones struck several buildings at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear complex on April 7, including a “direct hit on the reactor dome of Unit 6.” The attack is the first direct targeting of the Zaporizhzhia plant since November 2022, he said. 

The drone strike resulted in minimal damage and “did not compromise nuclear safety in a serious way,” according to Grossi, who warned that the attack is “an ominous indication of an apparent readiness” to continue strikes on the facility “despite the grave dangers they pose to nuclear safety and security.”

Russia and Ukraine requested that the board meet after the April 7 strike on Zaporizhzhia and traded accusations over the source of the strike. Russia has occupied the plant illegally since the early days of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The board has called on Russia to withdraw from the facility and return control to Ukraine. 

Mikhail Ulyanov, Russian ambassador to the IAEA, accused the agency of being “afraid” to say Ukraine was behind the attack. During a press briefing following the board meeting, he said that failing to accuse Kyiv is creating “an atmosphere” that “essentially encourages the Ukrainian side to commit reckless actions.” He expressed hope that there will be “no new attacks” on the complex and the opinion that “shooting at nuclear facilities is completely unacceptable.” 

During the IAEA meeting, Ukraine accused Russia of deliberately creating threats to the nuclear security and safety of Zaporizhzhia. 

Laura Holgate, U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, told the board that the United States condemns “all such actions regardless of who the culprit is,” but noted that the “root cause of all events threatening the safety and security of the Zaporizhzhia plant is Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its forcible seizure” of the nuclear facility. She called on Russia to “unconditionally withdraw its military and civilian personnel” from Zaporizhzhia and return control of the nuclear facility to Ukraine. 

The UN Security Council also met to discuss the drone strike. 

Grossi told the Security Council on April 15 that the “attack sets a very dangerous precedent of the successful targeting of the reactor containment.” Other drones struck targets in “close proximity to the main reactor buildings and resulted in at least one casualty,” Grossi said.

Sergiy Kyslytsya, Ukrainian ambassador to the United Nations, called the drone strike a “well-planned false flag operation” by Russia. He dismissed arguments that Ukraine was behind the attack, saying that Kyiv would not risk creating another Chernobyl-like nuclear accident by attacking the facility. Only returning the Zaporizhzhia complex to “the full control of Ukraine” can guarantee nuclear safety, Kyslytsya said. 

During the Security Council meeting, Robert Wood, the U.S. alternative representative to the UN for special political affairs, said that every member of the council should agree on the “fundamental point” that it is “imperative that we avoid a nuclear incident” at Zaporizhzhia. 

Wood also raised concerns about Russia’s targeting of critical Ukrainian infrastructure, which “directly threaten[s] the stability of external power to the [nuclear] site.” He said this poses an “unacceptable nuclear safety risk.” 

The IAEA team stationed at the Zaporizhzhia complex reported that the facility lost connection with its only backup power line on April 4. Reliable power is necessary to cool the reactors and for safety and security. 

All six reactor units are now in cold shutdown, reducing the risk of a nuclear accident, but Russia has suggested that it will try to restart at least some of the units. It is not clear if Russia has the technical capacity and enough personnel to bring any of the reactors online.  

 

May 2024 
By Kelsey Davenport

Russia ended the mandate for a UN experts panel that assesses implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea by vetoing a Security Council resolution extending the panel’s mandate. The United States responded to Russia’s veto by announcing that Washington will find an alternative mechanism to investigate and report on North Korea sanctions enforcement. 

The panel was established in 2009 under Security Council Resolution 1874 and comprises eight members appointed by the secretary-general. It assists the North Korea sanctions committee, known as the 1718 Committee, by analyzing information on sanctions noncompliance submitted by UN member states, making recommendations for more effective implementation of sanctions, and identifying individuals and entities for sanctions designations. The panel shares these findings in annual reports. 

The mandate for the panel formally ended April 30, although the 1718 Committee will continue to operate and states still are legally required to implement Security Council sanctions on North Korea. 

At the United Nations, Russian Ambassador Vasily Nebenzia defended the veto, accusing the West of trying to strangle North Korea using sanctions and describing the pressure-centric approach as “disconnected from reality.” He said that the panel has been “reduced to playing into the hands of Western approaches” and spreading “biased information.” 

Russia supports “updating the sanctions regime” against North Korea, Nebenzia said. 

Russia’s veto of the panel’s extension was not a surprise. Although the mandate generally has been renewed without controversy, Russia raised concerns about the panel during last year’s extension and sought to curtail its scope of work. Furthermore, Russia’s veto follows its blocking of Security Council action against North Korea for the past several years, despite Pyongyang advancing its nuclear and missile programs in violation of council provisions. (See ACT, May and July/August 2023.) 

In a March 28 joint statement, France, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States said that Russia’s veto of the resolution is “an attempt to silence independent, objective investigations” into violations of council resolutions. The statement accused Russia of ending the panel to prevent it from reporting on “Moscow’s own violations of Security Council resolutions” as it seeks North Korean military support for its “illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.” 

North Korea is transferring weapons, including ballistic missiles, that Russia is using in its illegal war against Ukraine. (See ACT, March 2024.) UN sanctions prohibit North Korea from exporting arms. 

The statement also asserted that ending the panel makes it “easier for [North Korea] to pursue nuclear weapons and their delivery systems” and emboldens Pyongyang to “continue its unlawful activity with a sense of impunity.” 

Russia proposed changes to the draft resolution extending the mandate, which included a yearly renewal for sanctions provisions, but the United States opposed the proposal, saying Moscow insisted on “completely unacceptable conditions” and would not compromise. 

China supported the Russian proposal, but abstained from voting on the resolution to extend the panel. 

Nebenzia said that Russia will put forward an alternative resolution with an “update to the sanctions parameters.” But comments from U.S. officials suggest that Washington does not expect the proposal to pass the Security Council and is looking for alternative options for monitoring sanctions implementation. 

U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, speaking to reporters during a trip to South Korea on April 17, said Russia continues to protect North Korea “from being held accountable” and that she does not expect Moscow to “cooperate or agree with any efforts to find another path” to monitor UN sanctions. Russia’s opposition will not stop the United States from working with partners to find an alternative to the panel, she said. 

Thomas-Greenfield said the United States is looking at options “both inside and outside of the UN system” because the panel’s work cannot be allowed to “lapse.” She did not provide any details on the alternative mechanism that the United States  
is considering. 

She also pushed back against Russian accusations that sanctions are not effective. She said sanctions have “hampered” North Korea’s ability to “accomplish their goals.”

In its most recent report, the panel assessed that North Korea has “increased its self-sufficiency in the manufacture of equipment and components for the production of ballistic missiles.” But the March report concluded that Pyongyang still relies on illicit imports to obtain certain materials to advance its missile programs. 

On April 2, North Korea tested a solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile that it claimed carried maneuverable warheads. According to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the missile was a “new-type intermediate-range solid-fueled ballistic missile loaded with a newly-developed hypersonic glide vehicle.” KCNA reported the test as a success.

According to KCNA, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attended the test and said it demonstrated the “absolute superiority” of North Korea’s military technology. The test proved the “three principles of building missile armed forces for rapidly, accurately and powerfully striking any enemy target” worldwide, Kim said. 

Solid-fueled systems can be fired more quickly than those using liquid fuel, and maneuverable warheads are more difficult to intercept. 

But manufacturing solid-fueled rocket motors comes with challenges. The March report from the UN experts panel noted that Pyongyang “will need solid-propellant materials in great volumes.” The panel assessed that North Korea may be able to produce some of the required materials but “likely remains dependent on foreign procurement” for others. It recommended that member states “redouble their efforts in preventing the supply” of certain prohibited items. 

Following the April missile test, the United States, South Korea, and Japan staged a joint military exercise that included nuclear-capable bombers.

May 2024            
By Chris Rostampour

Communities adversely affected by U.S. nuclear testing and weapons production activities in the early years of the nuclear age and their congressional representatives are urging the House of Representatives to reauthorize and expand an expiring federal program that compensates victims of nuclear radiation.

The Democratic-led Senate voted 69-30 on March 7 to approve a stand-alone bill to extend and expand the 30-year-old program, called the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA). 

“After decades of work and tireless advocacy, we are the closest we have ever been to providing justice and compensation for those who have suffered at the hands of our country’s national security,” Sen. Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) said in a statement following the vote. 

Supporters are now trying to convince the Republican-led House to take action before RECA expires June 7.

“We need to make sure they understand this is a nonpartisan issue,” Tina Cordova, a cancer survivor and longtime advocate for expanding the law, said in an interview with Source New Mexico. 

“For House members from places like Utah, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and Montana, [it is important] that they understand voting against this is voting against people impacted in their states,” she said.

RECA was first passed by Congress in 1990 to offer one-time compensation packages to people in certain western counties and states who unknowingly were exposed to radiation fallout from past atmospheric nuclear test explosions, federal workers who participated in Manhattan Project-era nuclear weapons activities, and certain uranium miners. 

But the program had several limitations and did not consider other communities and individuals in the United States impacted by U.S. nuclear testing and development, including “downwinders” in New Mexico affected by the first nuclear test explosion, called “Trinity,” in July 1945. (See ACT, January/February 2024; September 2023.) 

Last September, senators added an amendment to the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act that would have extended RECA for two decades and significantly expanded its geographical coverage. 

But the House leadership omitted this amendment in its version of the defense bill. In response, RECA advocates in each chamber, including Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), worked to trim the amendment so that it would cost less. This limited version was also rejected. Co-sponsors  of the bill blamed Republican leaders in the House and Senate for this failure. (See ACT, January/February 2024.) 

RECA reauthorization supporters are seeking to attach the bill approved by the Senate in March to a legislative vehicle in the House. The proposal would reauthorize the program for an additional six years. 

Additionally, it would expand coverage to include thousands of New Mexicans around the Trinity test site; people from Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Guam; and affected people in all counties in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah, not just select counties in those states, as the original legislation allowed. The new bill also would cover certain communities in Alaska, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee where Cold War-era nuclear waste has contaminated the environment and uranium miners who started their jobs after 1971. 

The proposed legislation is estimated to cost about $50-60 billion. Since 1990, the program has provided approximately $2.6 billion in compensation for claims.

On March 7, Luján urged House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) to bring the legislation for a vote. On March 11, a bipartisan group of four members of Congress led by Rep. Ann Wagner (R-Mo.) wrote a letter to Johnson and other House and Senate leaders, saying that “it is imperative that [RECA] be attached to the upcoming fiscal year…2024 appropriations package.” 

“There is broad bipartisan and bicameral agreement that the United States must compensate American citizens who have gotten cancer and other diseases as a result of reckless government actions that exposed them to dangerous levels of radiation,” the lawmakers wrote.

But Johnson confirmed on March 21 that the RECA reauthorization legislation would not be included in the appropriations bill, saying, “I understand her position, and I look forward to working closely with Ann as we chart a path together for the House to move forward with evaluating and acting on a reauthorization measure.”

Hawley, who co-sponsored the Senate bill, blasted its exclusion from the House measure in a social media post the same day. “Politicians have talked like this for decades,” he wrote. “While doing nothing. The time to talk is over. The time to ACT is now. Put RECA on the floor and vote on it. Stop screwing around with Missouri.” Wagner, Hawley, Luján, and others continue to explore options for attaching the Senate version of the RECA reauthorization bill to another legislative vehicle in the House. 

Meanwhile, President Joe Biden in March reiterated his support for the bill, signaling that he would sign it into law if it reached his desk. From 1945 to 1963, the United States conducted 215 atmospheric nuclear tests.

May 2024  
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced plans to strengthen and expand significantly their countries’ alliance with military, space-related, and other projects as a hedge against China and Russia.

In a joint statement and at a press conference at the White House during Kishida’s state visit April 10, Biden reiterated the U.S. “unwavering commitment…to the defense of Japan under Article V of the [Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security], using its full capabilities, including nuclear capabilities.” 

He said this commitment includes the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea that are claimed by China, Japan, and Taiwan. 

At the press conference, Kishida said that “Japan is determined to strengthen our defense force through [the] position of counterstrike capabilities, increase our defense budget and other initiatives, and was reassured by President Biden of his strong support for such efforts.”

The two leaders stressed a sense of urgency driven by concerns that China “could unilaterally change the status quo” in the East China Sea by force or coercion and that Russia continues waging a “brutal war of aggression against Ukraine.”

A day later, they met with Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. at the White House, underscoring the widening web of regional alliances intended to serve as a bulwark against Chinese activities in trade, technology, and military aggression.

At the April 10 press conference, Biden described the expanded Japanese-U.S. cooperation as “the most significant upgrade of our alliance since…it was first established.” 

It was the first official visit by a Japanese leader to the United States since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was hosted by President Barack Obama in 2015 and comes as Biden faces reelection in November and Kishida is expected to face a political test later this year.

Kishida cast the international community as standing at “a historical turning point.” 

He said that, “in order for Japan, the [United States], the Indo-Pacific region and…the whole world to enjoy peace, stability, and prosperity lasting into the future, we must resolutely defend and further solidify a free and open international order based on the rule of law.”

Among the steps being taken to strengthen defense and security cooperation, Biden said the allies are modernizing command-and-control structures, increasing interoperability, and planning for their military forces to work together “in a seamless and effective way.”

For the first time, Japan and the United States, working with Australia, will create a networked air, missile, and defense system. Japan and the United States will conduct trilateral military exercises with the United Kingdom and explore how Japan can cooperate with Australia, the UK, and the United States in their AUKUS defense partnership, Biden said.

Kishida hailed a space cooperation agreement that includes plans for two Japanese astronauts to go to the moon on future Artemis missions for NASA.

The prime minister’s weeklong visit to the United States included an address to Congress on April 11 in which he highlighted how, as a native of Hiroshima, he has devoted his political career to realizing a world free of nuclear weapons. “For years, I have worked to revitalize the [nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] regime so that we can gain momentum in pursuit of the aspiration,” he said.

The Japanese-U.S. joint statement stressed that the two countries are resolved to achieve a world without nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the value of the NPT regime, as well as a series of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives advocated by Kishida.

Despite such efforts, “there exists an imminent danger of nuclear weapons proliferation in East Asia.… Ukraine of today may be East Asia of tomorrow,” Kishida warned.

Focusing on China, he said its “current external stance and military actions present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge, not only to the peace and security of Japan but to the peace and stability of the international community at large.” 

Kishida also called attention to North Korea’s nuclear and missile program and Russia’s continued threat of nuclear weapons use.

In the face of such security challenges in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, “close coordination between Japan and the [United States] is required more than ever to ensure that the deterrence our alliance provides remains credible and resilient,” he said, adding that “the deterrence that our alliance provides is stronger than ever, bolstered by U.S. extended deterrence for Japan.”

The trilateral summit with Marcos reflected efforts to further expand partnerships in Asia. In a joint statement, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States voiced concerns over China’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea” and “the militarization of reclaimed features and unlawful maritime claims” in the region. 

They also announced plans to conduct a sea-based trilateral exercise and establish “a trilateral maritime dialogue to enhance coordination and collective responses to promote maritime cooperation.” 

In response, Chinese officials summoned Japanese and Philippine diplomats to complain about what Beijing considered “negative comments” about China, Reuters reported on April 12.

At a press conference that same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning expressed China’s opposition to the “manipulation of group politics” by Japan, the Philippines, and the United States and “the establishment of closed and exclusive small circles in the region.”

Calling the joint statement and trilateral cooperation “the wonton smear attack” against China, Mao said that “they should not introduce confrontation between camps into the region, let alone engage in trilateral cooperation at the expense of harming the interests of other countries.”

May 2024     
By Xiaodon Liang

The Defense Department is planning programmatic and posture adjustments so that it can afford the proposed $440 billion nuclear acquisition bill and accommodate delays in two of the three legs of the triad, senior officials said. 

Speaking to reporters at an April 5 media roundtable, John Plumb, assistant secretary of defense for space policy, said the Pentagon is examining force posture changes “that don’t break the bank.” The military is not considering a life extension program for the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), but rather how to manage the transition to its successor, the Sentinel ICBM, he said. 

The Sentinel program, which has a $117 billion acquisition price tag, according to the latest Air Force budget request, triggered a critical breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act in January when officials disclosed a 37 percent cost overrun. (See ACT, March 2024.)  To continue the program, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin must certify an updated cost estimate and attest to the Sentinel’s necessity later this summer. The act also requires Austin to confirm that the ICBM is a higher priority than other programs that will be cut to pay for the cost increases. 

In testimony April 9 to the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin said the service is “actively supporting the process triggered by the Nunn-McCurdy breach” and that he expects a decision in July. 

Speaking at an aerospace industry event the same day, Air Force Lt. Gen. Richard Moore, the deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, indicated that the service’s next-generation tanker and airlifter programs likely will be postponed until after the nuclear modernization program is fully funded. The commander of U.S. Transportation Command, Air Force Gen. Jacqueline Van Ovost, told the House Armed Services Committee on April 11 that the air refueling fleet could be the “most stressed fleet” under wartime conditions. Emphasizing the need for a next-generation recapitalization program, Van Ovost noted that the KC-135 aircraft, which make up most of the Air Force’s tankers, are on average 67 years old. 

Separately, the Navy confirmed on April 2 that construction of the first Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine was 12 to 16 months behind schedule and would likely miss its 2027 delivery target. The disclosure was included in a review of ship construction requested by Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro in January. Speaking on April 10 before the House Appropriations defense subcommittee, Del Toro blamed the delays on late delivery of the submarine’s turbine generator by contractor Northrop Grumman, as well as recruitment and retention problems at the shipyards. But USNI News reported on April 10 that slow completion of the bow dome of the submarine also has contributed to delays.

Del Toro said during testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s defense subcommittee on April 16 that the Navy is studying whether Ohio-class submarines can serve additional deployments past their intended retirement date. The secretary disclosed that five Ohio-class boats have already been identified as safe for at least one additional patrol at sea.

The Navy’s other submarine construction effort, the Virginia-class attack submarine program, is three years behind schedule, according to the review. Service officials attributed this extended delay to prioritization of the Columbia-class submarine. 

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said during April 9 testimony before the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee that the unit cost of the B-21 bomber, another major component of the nuclear triad modernization effort, was lower than previously expected due to successful price negotiations with contractors. 

The Air Force, in its budget for fiscal year 2025, lowered its annual procurement request for the B-21 to $2.7 billion from a projection of $3.9 billion in fiscal 2024. 

Because the B-21 program does not disclose the number of bombers purchased in each year, it is not possible to verify if the reduction is due solely to unit cost savings or also a decrease in the number of planes on order. 

A U.S. Air Force representative told Bloomberg News that the lower request reflected “no material reductions in program quantities or scope.”     

 

May 2024  
By Xiaodon Liang

For the first time, the United States deployed to a foreign country ground-launched missiles previously barred by the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. A U.S. Army task force equipped with the new Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile system participated in the two-week Salaknib 2024 military exercise in the northern Philippines in mid-April. 

The MRC system, called the Typhon, launches the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) multipurpose interceptor. (See ACT, January/February 2021.) Each battery is equipped with mobile missile launchers, an operations center, and additional support vehicles. The Army has activated two MRC batteries and intends to field a total of five such systems. The current deployment in the Philippines is a temporary one and will last only for the duration of the exercise. 

The inclusion of an MRC battery in the annual U.S.-Philippine exercise signals U.S. intentions and ability to deploy long-range missiles to the first chain of islands off mainline China in the event of a conflict. From the northern Philippines, the MRC capability could contribute to anti-ship missions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, as well as attacks against fixed Chinese targets. 

The battery deployed for Salaknib 2024 was airlifted from Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state, but the Army previously has said that the Typhon would be deployed outside of the continental United States, Breaking Defense reported in December. Such comments have contributed to predictions that the MRC capability will be located in Guam, a U.S. territory, during peacetime. The Army has not confirmed this basing plan. 

The U.S. military first deployed sea- and air-launched variants of the Tomahawk missile in the 1980s. With an estimated range of more than 1,600 kilometers, a ground-launched variant of the modern Tomahawk cruise missile would have been prohibited under the INF Treaty. That treaty barred the Soviet Union, the Soviet successor states, and the United States from producing, testing, and deploying ground-launched missiles with a range of 500-5,000 kilometers. It also required the United States to destroy an older ground-launched nuclear-armed variant of the Tomahawk, the BGM-109G cruise missile. 

According to the president’s fiscal year 2025 budget proposal, the Army will purchase more than 330 of the newest Block V variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile for its MRC batteries over the next five years. The Navy concurrently is implementing incremental upgrades to the Block V Tomahawk to improve its anti-ship capabilities.

In 2016, the Navy announced it would modify the SM-6 missile, originally designed as an anti-aircraft and missile interceptor with a range of up to 370 kilometers, to provide it with an anti-ship capability. The decision to modify the SM-6 came in the context of concerns that Chinese anti-ship and land-attack missiles had significantly longer ranges than U.S. options. 

The U.S. military could soon deploy in Asia other ground-launched missiles with capabilities that would have placed them under the INF Treaty. The Marines already have integrated launchers for the Tomahawk missile with two types of ground vehicles. In addition, the Army received in December the first deliveries of the Precision Strike Missile, a surface-to-surface missile that is compatible with existing mobile ground launchers. An October 2021 test of this missile established a maximum range beyond the design target of 499 kilometers, and the Army has awarded two early-stage contracts to develop an advanced variant of the missile with a 1,000-kilometer range. In January, the Army announced that it had tested an anti-ship seeker for the missile. 

The United States withdrew from the INF Treaty in August 2019 citing Russian development of the 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile, leading Moscow to suspend its treaty obligations. 

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Kommersant on April 11 that Russia would withdraw its offer of a moratorium on the deployment of missiles with ranges falling under INF Treaty specifications, first floated by President Vladimir Putin in 2019, if the United States stationed the missiles in Europe and Asia. (See ACT, November 2020.) The moratorium would bar the deployment of these missiles outside the national territories of Russia and the United States, as well as in parts of each country where the missiles could threaten the other’s territory. 

The United States only cited Russian violations of the INF Treaty as grounds for withdrawal in September 2019, but Trump administration officials made clear that concerns about the need for longer-range missiles in maritime Asia to match Chinese capabilities also informed the decision. (See ACT, September 2019.)

The announcement of the deployment of the MRC system and its anti-ship missiles to the Philippines comes shortly after a trilateral summit in Washington with the United States, Japan, and the Philippines. In an April 13 joint statement, the leaders of the three countries expressed concern about China’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.” Japan and the Philippines have territorial and maritime disputes with China. 

China and the United States have held several bilateral meetings on arms control and defense issues in the past six months. (See ACT, March 2024.) The latest conversations include an April 2 telephone call between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping and an April 16 video conference between U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Adm. Dong Jun. According to the U.S. account of the Biden-Xi call, the two sides welcomed ongoing efforts “to manage the relationship through high-level diplomacy.”

May 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have affirmed a treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space, fueling fresh concerns that its government is developing a space-based nuclear anti-satellite capability.

Russia cast its veto April 24 on a resolution proposed by Japan and the United States reiterating support for the principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of “nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” in outer space, whether on celestial bodies or in orbit. 

The vote was 13-1, with China as the sole abstention. Russia is one of five permanent members of the Security Council with veto power, along with China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The resolution was proposed after the United States in February made public an intelligence finding that Russia is developing an anti-satellite weapon that would violate the Outer Space Treaty, which has been ratified by 115 states, including Russia and the United States. (See ACT, March and April 2024.)

A nuclear detonation in space would create an indiscriminate zone of destruction endangering more than 9,500 military and civilian satellites now in orbit.

Russian Ambassador Vasily Nebenzia justified Moscow’s veto by dismissing the resolution as insufficient and an attempt by Japan, the United States, and their allies to “camouflage their lack of interest in outer space in principle being free from any kinds of weapons.” 

With China, Russia proposed an amendment to the Japanese-U.S. draft that called on all countries, especially those with major space capabilities, to go even further and ban all weapons in space, not just weapons of mass destruction. The vote was 7-7 with one abstention, meaning the amendment failed because it failed to get the minimum nine votes.

Reacting to the Security Council action, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reiterated in a statement on April 25 that “the United States assesses that Russia is developing a new satellite carrying a nuclear device.”

“We have heard [Russian] President [Vladimir] Putin say publicly that Russia has no intention of deploying nuclear weapons in space. If that were the case, Russia would not have vetoed this resolution,” he said.

U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield called Wednesday’s vote on the resolution “a real missed opportunity to rebuild much-needed trust in existing arms control obligations” and stressed that “in no way does this vote undermine the obligations Russia, or any other state-party, continues to have under the Outer Space Treaty,” AP and Axios reported.

Thomas-Greenfield accused Russia of undermining global treaties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, irresponsibly invoking “dangerous nuclear rhetoric,” walking away from several of its arms control obligations, and refusing to engage “in substantive discussions around arms control or risk reduction,” AP reported.

Chinese Ambassador Fu Cong, explaining his country’s abstention, said that the Japanese-U.S. resolution was “incomplete and unbalanced and does not reflect to the fullest extent common interest and shared call of 193 member states on the issue of outer space security.”

May 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

The State Department expressed concern about the activities of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia in its latest annual report on compliance with international arms control and nonproliferation agreements.

The report, released in April and covering activities in 2023, highlighted Iran’s continued efforts to expand its stocks of enriched uranium after the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and Iran’s failure to fulfill its reporting obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about new nuclear facilities. (See ACT, October and December 2023.) 

Recalling last year’s finding about Iran’s “continued failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA’s ongoing safeguards,” this year’s report determined that those “concerns have increased over time as Iran continued to fail to provide the cooperation” required under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the agency.

In June 2023, for instance, Iran disclosed that it “had decided on locations for the construction of new nuclear facilities…[but] failed to provide the IAEA with preliminary design information as required” under the safeguards agreement, according to the report.

In response to the IAEA request for preliminary design information, Iran declared its unilateral suspension of a section of the safeguards agreement even though such an “implementation obligation cannot be suspended or unilaterally modified by Iran,” the report stated.

The report also said that “outstanding concerns remained” regarding Iran’s “possible undeclared nuclear material and activities…as evidenced by the IAEA’s ongoing safeguards investigations.” Nevertheless, the report concluded that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities…necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”

The report reiterated its previous assessment that North Korea “remains subject to IAEA safeguards obligations irrespective of its 2003 notice of withdrawal” from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and “is in violation of its IAEA safeguards obligations in 2023.” 

Quoting IAEA assessments, the report noted North Korea’s continued effort to produce fissile material and indications of “possible testing” of the country’s experimental nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, which were observed to be “more frequent” and “for longer duration than previous years.”

Regarding Russia, the report cited Moscow’s withdrawal from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the fact that it “has repeatedly used (riot control agents) as a method of warfare across the frontlines in Ukraine,” which violates Article 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention. (See ACT, March 2024.)

The report identified no new compliance issues pertaining to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Even so, the State Department expressed concern about the adherence by China and Russia to their respective testing moratoriums “due to lack of transparency with regard to their respective nuclear testing activities and previously identified adherence issues.” 

To address these concerns, the United States will continue to engage with China and Russia and to highlight the need for increased nuclear weapons-related transparency, as it did in a meeting with China in November, the report stated. (See ACT, December 2023.)

May 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

India claimed a successful second night launch of its latest medium-range ballistic missile, the Agni-Prime (Agni-P), which it said can strengthen the country’s deterrence capabilities. 

In an April 4 press release, the Indian Defence Ministry announced that, on the night of April 3, “Strategic Forces Command (SFC), along with Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), conducted the successful flight-test of New Generation Ballistic [Missile].” 

The test missile, launched from Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Island in Odisha, “met all the trial objectives validating its reliable performance, as confirmed from the data captured by a number of range sensors deployed at different locations,” the release said.

Indian Defense Minister Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh was quoted as saying that “the successful development and induction of the missile will be an excellent force multiplier for the Armed Forces.”

The first night launch of the Agni-P was conducted in June 2023 after three developmental trials. It is a canister-launch missile with a warhead that is mated and stored with the missile, thus giving India the operational flexibility to store the missile for a longer period and reducing the time required for preparation and launch. (See ACT, July/August 2023; September 2021.) 

The Defence Ministry has said that the Agni-P “incorporates new propulsion systems and composite rocket motor casings as well as advanced navigation and guidance systems,” The Economic Times reported on April 4. Because the missile is fueled by a solid propellant and is “the smallest and lightest among the entire Agni series of ballistic missiles,” this system “will further bolster the country’s strategic deterrence capabilities once it is inducted after a few more tests,” the news outlet said.

In June 2021, the Agni-P was tested with two decoys, indicating that India possibly would develop and deploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Last month, India conducted the first flight test of its indigenously developed Agni-5 missile with such MIRV capability. (See ACT, April 2024.)

May 2024

During an era when nuclear weapons threats are growing, Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart is among the top U.S. officials working to increase stability, prevent conflict, and preserve and advance effective arms control and disarmament measures. The office that she leads, recently renamed the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, is charged with implementing and ensuring compliance with existing arms control agreements and negotiating new ones. A current focus is pressuring Russia to return to compliance with and identify a follow-on agreement to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires in 2026 and is the last remaining treaty limiting the two largest nuclear arsenals. So far, Russia has refused to engage until the United States withdraws its support for Ukraine, where Russia has waged an all-out war since 2022. Stewart’s bureau also is working to jump-start nuclear risk reduction consultations with China, which has a fraction of the nuclear weapons possessed by Russia and the United States but has greatly accelerated its nuclear weapons program. Working bilaterally and in multilateral forums, the bureau also has a goal of promoting responsible behavior with emerging military technologies, including artificial intelligence. Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, and Carol Giacomo, editor of Arms Control Today, explored these issues in an interview with Stewart on April 4. This transcript has been edited for clarity and length. 

ARMS CONTROL TODAY: Russia has rejected the U.S. proposal for talks to identify an arms control framework after New START expires in February 2026. What is realistically possible before the next administration takes office? 

Assistant Secretary Mallory Stewart: Certainly, we’ll continue to reinforce what National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said last June, which is that we’re willing to engage with Russia and China without preconditions. But he was very clear to point out that engagement without preconditions doesn’t mean engagement without accountability. We have made good faith efforts toward this end, including in our September 2023 diplomatic note to the Russians suggesting possible paths forward toward this post-New START era. The Russians rejected it three months later, tying it specifically to U.S. support for Ukraine in its defense against Russia’s illegal and continuing invasion. 

This refusal to engage on arms control is deeply irresponsible of Russia, which has a commitment to the international community, just as the United States does, to not only fulfill its Article VI obligations of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but also pursue risk reduction, global stability, strategic stability, and all of the requirements that the international community expects of us as the two largest nuclear-weapon states under the NPT. We’ve tried to make clear to Russia that these are responsibilities that we share, regardless of Putin’s ambitions to take over Ukraine. We understand that we can’t force them into an arms control discussion, but what we can do is try to work with the rest of the multilateral and international community to make the case for pursuing risk reduction measures and building an increased appreciation for why it is in Russia’s interest to engage in arms control conversations.

We’ve been trying to take a twofold approach in that endeavor. First, we are working to combat the disinformation that Russia persists in purveying and, unfortunately, that some countries agree with, that somehow the invasion of Ukraine by Russia was justified. That narrative is factually incorrect and doesn’t reflect how we were very actively engaged with Russia prior to the invasion of Ukraine. We addressed every element of their proposed treaties to the United States and NATO and explained why it wasn’t realistic to suggest the United States was going to be able to turn back time to 1997 or to take other actions with respect to other sovereign governments to prevent this invasion. It’s unfortunate that many governments blame NATO and the West for what Russia was intending to do when the U.S. government specifically engaged with Russia to try to prevent this invasion. We even warned Russia in that conversation that if they invaded Ukraine, NATO presumably would expand because NATO is there to protect and defend against illegal aggression. 

We’re also correcting the disinformation with respect to Russia’s illegal suspension of New START. The Russians prevented the bilateral consultative commission from meeting. That commission is specifically included in New START to address the concerns of either party regarding verification and implementation. We had been making progress prior to the COVID-19 pandemic on addressing concerns of both sides. Russia then saw it as in its interest to try to leverage our desire and our responsibility to continue New START as some sort of blackmail to try to get us and our partners and allies to stop supporting Ukraine. There was no justification for their suspension of New START, and it is deeply irresponsible.

Second, the plan going forward is to continue to work with the multilateral community in order to enhance transparency, demonstrate responsible behaviors, reduce the chance of misunderstanding and miscalculations, and prevent unintentional escalation. Russia must uphold its international obligations and engage in risk reduction and arms control-oriented discussions. We will also continue with the P5 [the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the NPT] expert discussions on risk reduction, hopefully getting some substance out of all P5 member states toward discussing nuclear doctrine, clarifying misunderstandings and avoiding miscalculation, and discussing risk reduction possibilities. 

ACT: What are your concerns if February 2026 comes along, New START expires, and there’s no agreement on a follow-on framework? 

Stewart: The concerns are what we face right now, only worse. Our intelligence community was able to confirm its belief that Russia did not, as of the end of last year, exceed the caps set by New START. Russia has said it will abide by New START caps, and we feel that we’ll be able to respond in a reciprocal way. But without New START, we’re not able to perform the verification procedures and feel as confident in our compliance assessments. 

So, the concern, come 2026, is that we will have no guardrails in place, thus risking misunderstanding and miscalculation. Quite frankly, the biggest risk is an unbridled, unconstrained nuclear arms race, which no one wants, no one needs, and the international community should be outraged that we’re now stumbling toward that eventuality. 

ACT: You mentioned the P5 process. What is possible at the NPT preparatory committee meeting in July given that the P5 group is just meeting at the experts level and Russia is the current chair?

Stewart: We have to engage and strive toward risk reduction. Russia may not be inclined to agree with us on that, but we will keep trying because in those P5 conversations, we explain why it’s in their interest to prevent misunderstanding and miscalculation and why risk reduction, which they fundamentally have understood since the Cold War as in their interest, is still in their interest and is something that the P5 owes the international community. We should demonstrate that we can all be responsible actors. 

Hopefully, we also can make some progress toward sharing nuclear policies to at least correct misunderstandings. This was the hope we had in engaging with China as well. The P5 is a good process to say we can address your questions, please address our questions, let’s move forward on that basis. So, the fact that the P5 is still going forward under Russia’s leadership is a good sign, but we are pushing for more substantive results from these conversations. The international community expects that of us. 

ACT: In February, the Biden administration warned that Russia is believed to be pursuing an anti-satellite (ASAT) program that would violate the Outer Space Treaty and could involve a nuclear explosive device. On March 18, the United States and Japan announced that they were pursuing a UN Security Council resolution to reinforce the treaty. What else is the United States doing to build support for the treaty? 

Stewart: The Security Council process is really important. In that context, we’ve provided a lot of information as to why this resolution is important now. There are questions from Security Council members, and we’re addressing them. As much as possible, we’re talking to other governments about our concerns and about how irresponsible, destabilizing, and really catastrophic a placement of a weapon in orbit would be for the future of the spacefaring generation, given that going forward every single country is going to rely on space more and more. We are sharing as much information as we can. Even if Russia is denying the weapon’s existence, it does make sense to go forward in the multilateral arena and reconfirm commitments to the Outer Space Treaty. 

ACT: Related to that, what is the status of the U.S.-led initiative on prohibiting ground-launch kinetic intercept tests? 

Stewart: We have large, broad consensus. Some 155 countries signed on to the resolution in the UN General Assembly, but we have 37 countries that also have made a national statement or passed some type of domestic implementation legislation. We are continuing to push that forward so that more countries can join the United States in turning this high-level, multilateral political commitment into a domestically legally binding commitment. 

ACT: What end state does the United States seek to attain with this initiative? 

Stewart: Ultimately, if we can get as many countries as possible to enforce this legally in their domestic capacity, it can make it easier when we talk with the broad multilateral community about what is possible in the legally binding arena. 

In all of our efforts on risk reduction, especially with respect to emerging technologies with strategic effects, there’s been a misnomer that somehow the United States is pushing back on legally binding instruments. We’re not. We’re trying to lay a general understanding as to what is possible, verifiable, and achievable. We hope to come to consensus on what should be prohibited, as a means to define either responsible or irresponsible behavior. Ultimately, many countries want something that is legally binding. We are sympathetic, but we need to be in a place where saying something is verifiable or accountable through legal means reflects an ability to ensure compliance. 

We’ve seen where countries propose treaties, such as the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space treaty that Russia and China have pushed for many years, without even an accepted common definition of what a “weapon” in space is. There is an inconsistent appreciation for what the terminology of weapons in space means right now, and there is no way to verify compliance or to even verify steps taken that are consistent with that treaty. They haven’t come to a common understanding of the definitions of these principles, and if the multilateral community signed on to a treaty without a common understanding of what the terms mean, it is unenforceable. 

So, the U.S. position is, Why not start from developing a general understanding of the things that we agree are harmful to international security, such as direct-ascent destructive ASAT testing, and build from that? The good thing about this effort is that it is to a large degree verifiable. You can see a direct-ascent destructive ASAT capacity come from earth and create debris in space. So, by trying to build on those concepts, ultimately, in a better world with more security, stability, understanding, and agreement, we can get to a legally binding instrument where we have the parameters of common terminology, an agreement on definitions, and some way to ensure that that treaty is being complied with. 

ACT: In November, you met your Chinese counterpart for arms control talks. What is the status of the U.S. effort to engage China on risk reduction and arms control? What obstacles are you seeing, and what specific outcomes are you trying to achieve? 

Stewart: The Biden-Harris administration has talked a lot about our desire for preventing unintentional escalation, misunderstanding, and miscalculation—the classic desires and end goals that we strive for in the arms control arena. We made very clear we would like to engage with [China] again, but we need to engage in a context in which we can both share concerns and take steps to substantively address those concerns. We also need participation in this conversation that reflects the best expertise to address the concerns of both sides. It’s why the United States was very specific in bringing an interagency group to our November 6 meeting. The Chinese side did have, to a certain degree, different agencies involved on their side; but going forward, we really need to have substantive engagement and ideas that we can put into place to reduce the potential for misunderstanding and demonstrate that we’re moving toward our obligations in the international community. 

A large part of the obstacles we are facing is fundamental disagreement over basic concepts. From the U.S. perspective, we see transparency as stabilizing. We are very forward leaning to be as transparent as possible, especially with those governments with which there may be a decrease in trust. In the P5 expert conversations, we try to demonstrate clarity and answer questions with respect to our nuclear policies. We see this as positive for U.S. security and also for our relationships with other governments.

We’ve heard the recent statements from [China] that there is desire in Beijing to engage in a conversation on no first use, and I have a lot of questions about that. When we talked to the Chinese, we wanted, and we still very much hope, to engage in risk reduction, and part of that included proposals that would expand and enhance transparency. The reason we need to do that is to build toward what China has acknowledged is a trust deficit. We need to build toward them understanding our policies and us understanding what the international community sees as potentially not explained in their policies with respect to their massive nuclear buildup. 

Our questions to China are, Help us understand how your nuclear buildup is consistent with your no-first-use policy, help us understand how what we’re all watching, which is this launch-on-warning capacity, is consistent with China’s statement from 2019 that they don’t need such a capacity and that it would be inconsistent with their no-first-use policy. We don’t want to assume the worst, but again, in this sort of trust deficit environment, the assumption will not be positive, and so that’s why we need to engage on these questions and have these conversations. 

ACT: You noted the Chinese talk of a mutual no-first-use agreement. They seem to describe that as a risk reduction approach. Whether it is or it isn’t, is the United States willing to substantively engage on that idea? Your description of their response is confusing. Isn’t that a signal that China is interested in talking about risk reduction options, even if their approach differs from what the United States is proposing? 

Stewart: I would love to ask them all of these questions and engage on this. I would love to ask them to explain how you can have a no-first-use policy if you just declare it and when everything you’re doing or developing seems inconsistent. If they want to engage in a conversation of the many questions raised by their no-first-use proposal, we would engage.

But in that same conversation, we should talk about other risk reduction proposals that we’ve put on the table that are as minimal as missile test launch notifications. This would be similar to the launch notification agreement that China already has with Russia. Those ideas are on the table, but so far have not been taken up by China. 

ACT: To clarify, you held a first arms control meeting with China. You had questions. They had proposals. Were the Chinese just not being forthcoming? 

Stewart: To be clear, there weren’t any proposals that they gave to us. But we had questions, and they had questions, and it was the first round in several years. I thought it was a constructive step to demonstrate that our questions are legitimized by openly available information. They had questions of us, and I encouraged those questions. The more we can answer, the better. 

I think that the reason that there is a desire now for more substantive engagement is that there were many questions we had that couldn’t be answered by China…. The reason we want to take steps to move toward risk prevention or reduction before we can even talk about something in the legally binding arena is because we have to develop that what we say and what they say matches what we’re both doing. 

ACT: Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said that the Chinese are refusing to engage substantively. Have you asked them to schedule another arms control meeting? Was there any discussion of these issues when U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke recently on the phone? 

Stewart: The specifics on engagement were left to sort out for a future discussion, but in the official Biden-Xi readout, there was a discussion of additional conversations on our issues. At the highest level, there is support for a continued conversation. We have made clear that we are willing to engage, and we would like to engage…. But we also need these engagements to be substantive and to reflect that we both fully appreciate the ability to ask questions but also to answer questions. 

ACT: Did the Chinese say, “We don’t want to put proposals on the table,” or did they just not answer yours? What exactly is the state of play?

Stewart: We’ve put some positive proposals on the table, and we also welcome their positive substantive proposals. This is why I think we should be willing to ask questions and engage because if they have a risk reduction proposal that would require first the development of a level of trust, appreciation, or understanding, then let’s figure out how we develop that trust, so we can get to something that would work in the risk reduction arena…. But I haven’t seen any actual [Chinese] proposals aside from hearing of this no-first-use proposal.

ACT: The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva remains deadlocked on negotiations over a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) and other issues. At the UN Security Council meeting on March 18, the United States and Japan proposed a Friends of FMCT group to move the proposed treaty forward. How could that change the dynamics? 

Stewart: The United States is very proud to support the Japanese initiative on the Friends of FMCT. The initiative reflects strong support for an FMCT and the need to address it because of the challenges we face. From the U.S. perspective, we have tried to demonstrate flexibility with respect to some of the deadlocks in the process at the CD. For example, we are open to discussing negative security assurances, which is something that a lot of countries deem as very important. In return, we have asked that those countries be open to the initiation of FMCT discussions. 

I certainly can’t say that we’re overly optimistic, but we are trying to engage new partners and new conversations and show flexibility on what have traditionally been hold-ups for the United States. We want to demonstrate that we are willing to engage in these conversations, raise our concerns, hear other states’ concerns, and try to move beyond the politics, and that’s been one of the biggest problems. I hope the Friends of FMCT will be a positive opportunity for broader conversations, with maybe even new voices, not just the traditional voices that have deadlocked so adamantly in the CD. We can only try our best, and we will continue to do so. 

ACT: In 2018 the Trump administration declared that it will not seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Biden administration has made clear that it has no need or any plans to test and that it is committed to working to achieve CTBT entry into force. But will it seek CTBT ratification? 

Stewart: The Biden-Harris administration supports the CTBT and is working to bring it into force. However, the environment is getting even worse internationally with Russia withdrawing its ratification from the CTBT. What we are happy about is that the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) is nearing completion, thanks in large part to a lot of resources and expertise from the U.S. government. We need to build appreciation for the IMS capacity to detect explosions and for a concept that the Biden-Harris administration deeply appreciates, which is that the CTBT in force is better for the entire global community. 

We are encouraging China to continue to push forward on the monitoring stations in its own country, as well as encouraging the international community to explain to Russia that its withdrawal was not the right approach and not a responsible action. On our part, there is no U.S. interest, desire, willingness, or support for testing. It’s not necessary, it’s not helpful, it’s deeply destabilizing, and it’s not something the U.S. government will do. 

ACT: In order to improve its credibility, isn’t it necessary for the administration to state unequivocally that it still intends to ask the Senate to provide its advice and consent for ratification of the CTBT because the United States is one of the 44 countries that must ratify for the treaty to enter into force?

Stewart: This administration has been very clear. We support the CTBT, but we can’t ratify the treaty just as a sole executive decision. So, we need to work with our congressional partners and within our political system to foster better understanding of why this is a valuable treaty and how it protects our national security. If we just lean in right now without any further change, we’re going to have the same stalemate that we’ve had on this treaty for years on end. 

ACT: The State Department has been developing support around a political declaration on military uses of artificial intelligence (AI). Other people are pushing a legally binding agreement. Are these approaches compatible? Why not work for a legally binding format? 

Stewart: I actually see them all as consistent. We supported the Austrian resolution at the United Nations. We support the conversation in the UN group of governmental experts going forward on lethal autonomous weapons. The Austrian initiative, with respect to lethal autonomous weapons, says we should look at this issue more broadly. Our political declaration addresses a unique and different context, but is entirely consistent in the sense that we are building a common understanding of the potential risks of AI across the full range of military applications. 

Whether in human resources decisions or weapons systems, AI could carry risks across the board if you don’t appreciate in advance that there are advantages but also potential challenges it could bring into the system. The political declaration is one unique context for concrete development of ideas and actions for governments on the larger issue. We are now up to 54 countries endorsing the political declaration and 14 observing states attended the recent plenary meeting, and we’re hoping to build that out. 

Austria is one of our working group chairs, and we’re really excited about that. The United States is also chairing a working group with Bahrain on assurance, covering technical measures to establish justified confidence in the reliability of AI capabilities, and Portugal and Canada are chairing a working group on accountability measures. These three working groups will be used to push forward on concrete steps to develop greater understanding, appreciation, and actions we can take with those countries to minimize risk. 

We hope more countries join us. We look forward to making progress in understanding how we can ensure that AI operators actually have some ability to understand context, understand risk, and implement training at a knowledge level that prevents those risks. 

ACT: So, you see a place for a legally binding agreement?

Stewart: Eventually, yes, if we can come to a consensus on the best path forward. The challenge, of course, is that these emerging technologies evolve so quickly that if you lock that into a legally binding agreement without incorporating all the possible changes and iterations of how AI can manifest, you may lock yourself into a situation that evolves next week.

To compare, we’ve seen the need to update the schedules on chemical weapons, and it’s great that the Chemical Weapons Convention allows for states to do that. But we don’t even have a standard definition of what AI is with respect to its use. Is it machine learning, is it intelligent learning, is it something in between? Is AI a defined concept that everyone agrees on? Not right now, and we need to work to understand that before we can embed it in a legally binding treaty. 

ACT: What kind of things is the political declaration intended to prevent? It was reported recently that Israel has been utilizing an AI-enabled system called Lavender to identify targets in Gaza that is not being reviewed carefully by humans to determine whether there are errors in the system, thus possibly creating additional casualties. The political declaration contains principles to avoid the risk of automation bias. I’m not asking you to judge whether the reporting on the Lavender system is accurate, but isn’t this kind of automation bias what the political declaration on AI says should be avoided?

Stewart: Automation bias is an example of a situation that we would hope countries can take steps to prevent in their use of AI. I cannot speak specifically to reports regarding the Lavender system, but from what we’ve discussed already and the principles in the political declaration, we should be able to understand the appropriate usage of AI and the risks that AI brings in and take steps to prevent those risks. 

One basic concept that’s in the political declaration is related to a scenario where a military might design AI for a certain use, but then through the course of operation, switch it to a different deployment context without changing anything about the AI. This is a risky situation because you’re now putting AI into an entirely different environment that it was not designed for or you’re not adapting the AI system to parameters that can exacerbate some of the challenges that AI and autonomous functions bring to the situation. These are the kind of things that we have been discussing, and we look forward to figuring out how we take steps to prevent.