June 2024
By Libby Flatoff and Shizuka Kuramitsu

A senior U.S. Republican senator appeared to suggest that Israel should consider using nuclear weapons to defeat Hamas in Gaza, drawing criticism from arms control activists and others for normalizing talk of an option that the world has long considered anathema.

During a May 8 hearing at which he faulted the Biden administration for halting the delivery of some weapons to Israel, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) demanded of top U.S. defense officials, “Would you have supported dropping bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II?…Do you think that was disproportionate?”

“You’re going to tell (Israel) how to fight the war when everybody around them wants to kill all the Jews? Give Israel what they need to fight the war. This is Hiroshima and Nagasaki on steroids,” Graham told Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Charles Brown at a Senate Appropriations subcommittee hearing.

Four days later on NBC, Graham again justified the use of nuclear weapons on Nagasaki and Hiroshima because the weapons were used “to end a war we [could not] afford to lose” and insisted, “Give Israel the bombs they need to end the war they can’t afford to lose.”

Whether Graham actually was advocating the first nuclear weapons use since World War II or not, the comments landed with a thud in Tokyo where Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa described the remarks as “not appropriate” at a May 10 press conference.

She said that Japan “has been expressing for a long time…[that] the use of nuclear weapons does not match the spirit of humanitarianism, which is the ideological foundation of international law, because of their tremendous destructive and lethal power.”

She added that Japan had reiterated this point to U.S. officials. 

On May 14, Kamikawa addressed the issue again, telling reporters that “[i]t was very regrettable that such remarks have been made repeatedly.”

The Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations, also called Nihon Hidankyo, sent a letter to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo requesting a retraction of Graham’s remarks, NHK reported on May 15. “The remarks go against international humanitarian law…. [N]ow that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has come into effect, the remarks can only be described as an anachronistic and malicious delusion,” the letter said.

In addition, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in separate press conferences on May 16, condemned Graham’s justification of atomic bombings on their cities, according to Jiji Press.

Graham’s comments “run counter to the direction we should be taking in the future toward our ideals [of a nuclear-free world],” which U.S. President Joe Biden reaffirmed in Hiroshima at the 2023 Group of Seven meeting, Kazumi Matsui, the mayor of Hiroshima, said. (See ACT, June 2023.) “With humanitarian and catastrophic consequences brought about by atomic weapons in mind, nothing can justify the use of nuclear weapons,” Shiro Suzuki, the mayor of Nagasaki, said.

Meanwhile, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, wrote on social media May 13 that “likening the situation in Gaza to Hiroshima and Nagasaki [is] utterly unacceptable” and Graham’s statements “shouldn’t be normalized.”

Graham’s remarks garnered the most attention, but other U.S. politicians expressed similar views. Appearing on Newsmax on May 14, Rep. Greg Murphy (R-N.C.) also invoked Hiroshima and Nagasaki and said, “[T]his is where Israel has every single right in the world to press this conflict further.”

Rep. Tim Walberg (R-Mich.) was caught on video at a town hall meeting on March 25 suggesting that the United States should use a nuclear bomb on Gaza to “get it over quick…. [Gaza] should be like Nagasaki and Hiroshima.”

Walberg later denied that he was calling for the use of nuclear weapons, claiming instead that he “used a metaphor to convey the need for both Israel and Ukraine to win their wars as swiftly as possible, without putting American troops in harm’s way.” But Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.), the first Palestinian-American member of Congress, criticized Walberg, saying he “is not the first member of Congress to use despicable, violent, dehumanizing language to describe their genocidal intent in Gaza and will not be the last.” 

Despite Israel’s long-standing refusal to acknowledge having a nuclear weapons program, Israeli Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyafu said on Radio Kol Barama that using nuclear weapons in Gaza was “one of the possibilities,” the Times of Israel reported on Nov. 5.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denied this possibility and suspended Eliyafu, but Eliyafu in January again “urged that Israel must find ways for Gazans that are more painful than death to defeat them and break their morale, as the [United States] did with Japan,” Middle East Monitor reported on Jan. 6.

June 2024
By Michael T. Klare

An international conference that drew more than 1,000 participants, including government officials from 144 nations, showed strong support for regulating autonomous weapons systems, but reached no conclusion on exactly how that should be done, organizers said.

There is a “strong convergence” that these systems “that cannot be used in accordance with international law or that are ethically unacceptable should be explicitly prohibited” and that all other autonomous weapons systems “should be appropriately regulated,” Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg, chair of the Vienna Conference on Autonomous Weapons Systems, said in his closing summary.

The April 29-30 conference, hosted by Austria, focused attention on the dangers posed by the unregulated deployment of these weapons systems, sometimes called “killer robots,” and on mobilizing support for negotiations leading to legally binding restrictions on such systems.

Schallenberg and other participants expressed concern that, without urgent action, these systems, which can orient themselves on the battlefield and employ lethal force with minimal human oversight, could soon be deployed worldwide, endangering the lives of noncombatants. The foreign minister spoke of a “ring of fire” from the Russian war on Ukraine to the Middle East to the Sahel region of Africa and warned that “technology is moving ahead with racing speed while politics is lagging behind.”

“This is the Oppenheimer moment of our generation,” Schallenberg said. “The preventative window for such action is closing.”

Over two days of plenaries and panels, speakers from academia, civil society, industry, and the diplomatic community addressed the dangers posed by autonomous weapons systems and various strategies for regulating them. Numerous experts warned that once untethered from human control, these systems could engage in unauthorized attacks on civilians or trigger unintended escalatory moves.

As reflected in public statements and panel discussions, there was near-universal agreement that, in the absence of persistent human control, the battlefield use of such systems is inconsistent with international law and human morality. But participants expressed some disagreements over the best way to regulate them.

The conference occurred at a watershed moment in the international drive to impose international controls on autonomous weapons systems. For the past 10 years, a UN group of governmental experts has been meeting under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to identify the dangers posed by these devices and assess various proposals for regulating them, including a protocol to the CCW banning them altogether.

During these discussions, many participants in the group of experts coalesced around the so-called two-tiered approach, which would ban any lethal autonomous weapons systems that cannot be operated under persistent human control and would impose strict regulations on all other such weapons. But because the CCW operates by consensus, progress toward implementation of these proposals has been blocked by several countries, including Russia and the United States, that oppose legally binding restrictions on these systems.

This impasse has sparked two alternative approaches to their regulation. The advocates of a legally binding instrument, having lost patience with the group of experts, have urged the UN General Assembly to consider such a measure.

In December, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution expressing concern over the dangers posed by these systems and calling on the secretary-general to conduct a study of the topic in preparation for a General Assembly debate scheduled for the fall. (See ACT, December 2023.)

An alternative approach, favored by the United States, the United Kingdom, and several of their allies, calls for the adoption of voluntary constraints on the use of autonomous weapons systems. As affirmed in a document titled “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,” released by the U.S. State Department in November, there are legitimate battlefield uses for such systems as long as they are used in accordance with international law and “within a responsible human chain of command and control.” (See ACT, April 2024.)

Based on statements by panelists and government officials, most participants in the Vienna conference appeared to favor the first approach, abandoning the CCW and pursuing a legally binding instrument, preferably through the General Assembly.

“The process at the CCW is a dead end because of the rule of consensus and the possibility of certain states, like Russia, blocking any meaningful measures on autonomous weapons,” Anthony Aguirre, executive director of the U.S.-based Future of Life Institute, said. “I think we need a new treaty, and that treaty needs to be negotiated in the UN General Assembly.”

Most of the states represented at the conference, including Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Germany, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, New Zealand, South Africa, and Switzerland, echoed Aguirre’s view, asserting support for negotiations leading to such a treaty. But other states, including Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Turkey, the UK, and the United States, indicated that the CCW remains the most appropriate forum for further discussion of autonomous weapons systems regulation.

With the conference behind them, Schallenberg and his allies are looking to preserve the convergence of views that the conference achieved and ensure that it is brought to bear at the General Assembly in September.

June 2024
By Xiaodon Liang

Russia conducted military exercises involving nonstrategic nuclear weapons in late May and framed the drills as a response to statements and actions by NATO in support of Ukraine. The invocation of nuclear options perpetuates a pattern of nuclear saber-rattling by Russia since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. (See ACT, September 2022.)

In a May 6 press release announcing the exercises, the Russian Foreign Ministry said the drills were intended to send a “sobering signal to the West.” Russia’s complaints include the delivery of French, UK, and U.S. strike missiles to Ukraine and the authorization of their use against targets in Russia. The Russian statement also referenced French President Emmanuel Macron’s May 2 interview with The Economist reaffirming that France has not ruled out sending its own troops to Ukraine.

Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian security council, stated in a May 10 social media post that, under “certain circumstances,” the response to attacks against targets on Russian territories would not be limited to Ukraine and may involve “a special kind of arms.”

France and the United Kingdom have provided Ukraine with the Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missile, known in France as the SCALP-EG, for defense against the Russian invasion. The Russian statement describes the missile as a “long-range” weapon. Manufacturer MBDA lists a 250 kilometer range, but the UK Air Force claims the missile can operate out to 550 kilometers. These missiles first arrived in Ukraine last summer, but UK Foreign Minister David Cameron’s May 2 statement that the UK would not object to Ukraine using the missile against targets in Russia provoked the Russian response.

The Russian statement also criticized the United States for developing and producing ground-launched missile systems that would have been barred previously by the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The statement said that Russia would terminate its unilateral moratorium on the deployment of these systems if the United States were to deploy such missiles in Europe or the Asia-Pacific region. (See ACT, May 2024.) U.S. intelligence believes that Russia had already deployed a weapons system barred by the INF Treaty, the 9M729 cruise missile. (See ACT, June 2019.)

The United States has not transferred missile systems to Ukraine that would have fallen within INF Treaty restrictions, but it has provided Kyiv with the Army Tactical Missile System, a ballistic missile with an estimated range of 300 kilometers, the State Department said on April 24. The Russian statement also criticized this transfer. A Defense Department spokesperson on May 6 described the announcement of the nonstrategic nuclear exercises as “irresponsible rhetoric,” adding that there was no change observed in Russia’s strategic posture.

The Russian Defense Ministry announced the first phase of the exercise in a May 21 Telegram social media post and said it involved units equipped with the Iskander missile system assigned to the Southern Military District, as well as aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces bearing the Kinzhal hypersonic missile. No end date was mentioned.

According to the ministry, the exercises involved handling nuclear warheads and pairing them with missiles, as well as maneuvers by the missile launchers and aircraft. In a Telegram post May 6, the ministry said that naval vessels would participate.

Russia often includes nonstrategic nuclear weapons in regular, large-scale exercises, but does not publicize separate drills of nonstrategic missile units. The delivery vehicles operated by these units may include shorter-range tactical missiles with a range of up to 300 kilometers, as well as longer-range missiles.

Estimates of the total number of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons are imprecise, but U.S. intelligence and independent sources place the number between 1,000 and 2,000.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko confirmed on May 9 that his country’s military forces would take part in the nonstrategic nuclear weapons exercises, Tass reported. Days earlier, the Belarusian military had ordered snap inspections of units equipped with the Iskander missile system and the Su-25 combat aircraft.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in June 2022 that Russia would provide Belarusian forces with the nuclear-capable Iskander and configure Belarusian Su-25s for a nuclear role. In March 2023, he added that nuclear weapons would be stored in Belarus.

Open-source investigations conducted by independent analysts and The New York Times confirm progress in constructing a likely nuclear weapons storage site near Asipovichy, Belarus. In March, NATO officials, including Lithuanian Defense Minister Arvydas Anusauskas, told Foreign Policy that Russian nuclear forces had redeployed into Belarus.

June 2024
By Mina Rozei

The United States has accused Russia of violating the international chemical weapons ban by using choking and riot control agents multiple times in its full-scale war against Ukraine and has imposed new sanctions as punishment.

In a May 1 statement, the U.S. State Department said that it had “made a determination…that Russia has used the chemical weapon chloropicrin against Ukrainian forces in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) [and]…has used riot control agents as a method of warfare in Ukraine, also in violation of the CWC.”

“The use of such chemicals is not an isolated incident and is probably driven by Russian forces’ desire to dislodge Ukrainian forces from fortified positions and achieve tactical gains on the battlefield,” the department added.

But on May 7, the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which oversees the CWC, released a statement saying that it had been “monitoring the situation on the territory of Ukraine since the start of the war in February 2022” and that despite allegations reported by Russia and Ukraine to the OPCW, the evidence of chemical weapons use remained “insufficiently substantiated.”

In its statement, the State Department said that, in coordination with the Treasury Department, it is sanctioning three governmental entities associated with Russia’s chemical and biological weapons programs and four Russian companies providing support to such entities. The entities include a Russian specialized military unit that the United States claims facilitated the use of chloropicrin against Ukrainian troops.

The Treasury Department is separately sanctioning three entities and two individuals involved in procuring items for military institutes involved in Russia’s chemical and biological weapons programs, pursuant to a separate weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation authority, the State Department said.

It also announced new sanctions against “more than 280 individuals and entities” connected to Russia’s energy, mining, and military sectors in an effort to stem “Russia’s ability to wage its war against Ukraine.”

On May 2, Russian spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied the U.S. accusations, saying “Russia has been and remains committed to its obligations under international law in this area.”

This is not the first time there have been reports of Russia using riot control agents on the battlefield or chloropicrin in Ukraine. In February, the Ukrainian military published a statement claiming that Russia had been using chloropicrin throughout 2023. (See ACT, March 2024.) Russia has denied these allegations repeatedly, but the Ukrainian army has claimed that at least 500 soldiers have been treated for exposure to toxic substances, including one who died from suffocating on tear gas, according to Al Jazeera on May 2.

Chloropicrin, a choking agent that causes severe irritation to the eyes, skin, and lungs, was used in World War I and is listed under Schedule 3 of the CWC as a banned agent whose use constitutes chemical warfare.

The use of riot control agents is permitted in certain circumstances. They often are used by police forces worldwide to quell protests, but they are prohibited on the battlefield because soldiers confined to trenches without gas masks are forced either to flee dugouts and trenches under enemy fire or risk suffocation.

The OPCW cautioned that the situation in Ukraine “remains volatile and extremely concerning regarding the possible re-emergence of use of toxic chemicals as weapons.” This comes after the OPCW verified chemical weapons attacks in Syria by the Syrian government in 2013 and the Islamic State group in 2018, marking an uptick in the use of chemical agents in war after decades in which they were considered taboo.

In its statement, the OPCW noted that Russia continues to deny “making use of such weapons” and said that, in order for the OPCW "to conduct any activities pertaining to allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons,” CWC states-parties would have to make a formal request. “So far, the Secretariat has not received any such request for action” in Ukraine, the statement said.

The Ukrainian parliament on April 24 ratified an additional agreement on privileges and immunities for technical assistance visits between Ukraine and the OPCW secretariat. This action creates the legal basis for Ukraine to cooperate with OPCW technical assistance visits for analyzing samples of toxic chemical agents that may have been used by Russian forces in Ukraine.

The OPCW also said that it remains open to information from states-parties and will continue to support Ukraine under CWC Article X, which provides assistance and protection to a state-party that has been attacked or threatened with attacks by chemical weapons.

 

June 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

North Korea is continuing to test new military systems and pledging to build up its nuclear arsenal further in response to U.S. and South Korean activities.

On May 18, North Korea said it tested a new ballistic missile with an “autonomous navigation system.” The state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the test verified the “accuracy and reliability” of the new navigation system.

On the same day, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited a military production facility and expressed “great satisfaction” with the work being done in “bolstering up” the “nuclear war deterrent of the country.” According to KCNA, he stressed the importance of accelerating certain production activities to further expand North Korea’s nuclear forces.

These new capabilities are driving South Korea to prepare to respond to large-scale aerial attacks from North Korea. Seoul held a drill focused on repelling North Korean projectiles, including ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. In a May 14 press release, South Korean Air Force Lt. Gen. Kim Hyung-soo said that recent conflicts overseas demonstrate that initial responses to “large-scale aerial provocations determine the success or failure of the war.”

North Korea continues to justify expanding its nuclear arsenal as necessary to respond to what it says are security dynamics and hostile U.S. policy toward Pyongyang. Pyongyang reiterated that it would expand its arsenal after Washington conducted a subcritical nuclear test in May.

In a May 20 report, KCNA described the U.S. test as a “dangerous act” and said Washington has “revealed” that its strategic goal is to “militarily control other countries with the unchallenged nuclear edge.”

The test has added “new tension” to the security situation on the Korean peninsula, the statement said. North Korea will not tolerate a “strategic imbalance” on the Korean peninsula and will reconsider its deterrence posture in response, the statement said.

In addition to showcasing new systems, North Korea conducted a military exercise designed to test the country’s preparedness for a nuclear counterattack.

According to KCNA, North Korea on April 22 tested its “nuclear trigger” command-and-control system for the first time. This system enables Pyongyang to switch rocket launchers from conventionally armed shells to nuclear armed shells. This capability “substantially” strengthens North Korea’s “prompt counterattack capacity.” The test also provided an opportunity to reexamine the “reliability of the system of command, management, control, and operation of the whole nuclear weapons forces.”

KCNA reported that rocket launchers used in the drill accurately struck their targets and that Kim expressed “great satisfaction” with the drill and noted that plans to build up the country’s nuclear forces have been “translated into reality.”

North Korea is compelled to “more overwhelmingly and more rapidly bolster up its strongest military muscle” in response to the “ceaseless military provocations” from “hostile forces,” KCNA said.

Specifically, the statement condemned recent South Korean-U.S. joint airborne exercises held in April, which KCNA described as “extremely provocative and aggressive.”

The United States continues to defend the necessity of joint military exercises. Daniel Kritenbrink, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said on May 14 at the Brookings Institution that the United States has no choice but to “double down” on military cooperation with South Korea and Japan in response to North Korea’s military developments and rejection of U.S. calls for dialogue. He said U.S. cooperation with regional allies has “reached unprecedented levels” to counter the growing threat from North Korea.

Kritenbrink also referenced the importance of enforcing sanctions against North Korea, saying that the United States is left with “no choice but to focus on these harder elements of our strategy.”

As part of the U.S. sanctions strategy, Japan, South Korea, and the United States coordinated a joint statement endorsed by 50 states condemning Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council of a resolution that would have extended the panel of experts charged with assessing the implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea. (See ACT, May 2024.) The panel’s mandate officially ended April 30.

The statement said it is “imperative” for UN member states to comply with Security Council resolutions and that states “must now consider how to continue access to this kind of objective, independent analysis in order to address [North Korea’s] unlawful [weapons of mass destruction] and ballistic missile advancements.”

North Korea responded to the statement by saying that any efforts to reestablish a panel of experts is “bound to meet self-destruction with the passage of time.” In a May 5 statement, Kim Song, North Korea’s representative to the United Nations, said that the panel of experts and the UN sanctions regime is a “tool for the hegemonic policy” of the United States.

June 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

For the second consecutive time, the UN Security Council rejected a draft Russian resolution that called on countries to ban all weapons in space, not just weapons of mass destruction.

The vote on May 20 was 7-7, with Switzerland abstaining. It was the same losing tally as when Russia, backed by China, first requested a vote on a similar resolution on April 24. The resolution requires nine votes for adoption.

The back-to-back votes reflect a political duel triggered in February by U.S. allegations that Russia is developing a space-based nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) capability in violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of “nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” in space.

Since then, U.S. suspicions about Russian activities have deepened, prompting Mallory Stewart, U.S. assistant secretary of state, to warn on May 3 that the United States will continue using its “diplomatic tools” to raise this issue bilaterally, in the United Nations, and in other multilateral forums “until Russia provides credible assurances that they have ceased these efforts.”

In an effort to discourage the Russian program, Japan and the United States in April proposed a resolution reiterating support for the treaty. But that resolution failed when Russia used its veto to block the measure on April 24. The final vote was 13-1, with China abstaining. (See ACT, May 2024.)

During debate on the May 20 vote, Robert Wood, the U.S. deputy UN ambassador, dismissed the Russian draft resolution as “the culmination of Russia’s campaign of diplomatic gaslighting and dissembling.”

“[O]ver the past several weeks, and following widespread condemnation from a geographically diverse group of member states in the General Assembly…Russia has sought to distract from its dangerous efforts to put a nuclear weapon into orbit,” Wood said.

Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzia accused states that did not support the Russian draft of favoring “a free hand for the expedited militarization of outer space.”

He emphasized that the Russian draft intended to reaffirm “states’ commitments not to use space for the deployment of any forms of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction,” and said that this “is the language that our American colleagues had refused to include in the text…from the very beginning.”

Russia’s draft was co-sponsored by Belarus, China, Nicaragua, North Korea, and Syria.

Adrian Hauri, Switzerland’s deputy UN ambassador, said his country abstained because “the spirit of flexibility and a framework of trust were lacking” and its suggestions were not taken into consideration despite its support for several elements of the Russian draft.

In her May 3 comments at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Stewart said that the Russian satellite suspected of carrying components for a potential nuclear ASAT weapon is in “unusual” orbit in “a region of higher radiation than normal lower-earth orbits, but not high enough of a radiation environment to allow accelerated testing of electronics,” which is the scientific purpose of the satellite claimed by Russia.

On May 20, Wood said that another Russian capability, a counterspace weapon, was deployed “into the same orbit as a U.S. government satellite” and it “follows prior Russian satellite launches likely of counterspace systems to low earth orbit in 2019 and 2022.” Pentagon spokesperson Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder confirmed this assessment May 21 .

Russian officials continued to deny that the country has a new ASAT capability. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov called the U.S. allegation “fake news” while Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Russia “act[s] absolutely in accordance with international law, we do not violate anything,” Tass reported on May 22.

Meanwhile, according to Pavel Podvig, a nuclear expert, and The Wall Street Journal, the satellite to which Stewart referred likely is the Cosmos-2553, which was launched Feb. 5, 2022. But Breaking Defense reported on May 22 that “as of yet…no official has publicly named Cosmos-2553 as the satellite in question.”

June 2024
By Daryl G. Kimball

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced that it had successfully carried out a subcritical experiment on May 14 at an underground facility at the Nevada National Security Site.

In a May 16 statement, the NNSA said the experiment, its 34th at the former U.S. nuclear weapons testing site, provided “valuable information to…improve our modeling and simulation capability, part of the science-based [S]tockpile [S]tewardship [P]rogram.”

The agency said “the experiment performed as predicted.” It “did not form a self-sustaining, supercritical nuclear chain reaction” and therefore was “consistent with the zero-yield standard” of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The United States, China, and Russia continue to engage in weapons-related activities at their former nuclear testing sites. Although the treaty’s International Monitoring System is operational and more effective than originally envisioned, very low-yield nuclear test explosions such as these subcritical experiments still can be difficult to detect without on-site inspections, which will not be in place until after the treaty’s entry into force.

To address concerns about activities at former nuclear test sites, NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby announced in June 2023 that her agency is “open to working with others to develop a regime that would allow reciprocal observation with radiation detection equipment at each other’s subcritical experiments to allow confirmation that the experiment was consistent with the CTBT.”

In November 2023, Corey Hinderstein, now NNSA acting principal deputy administrator, and Marvin Adams, NNSA deputy administrator for defense programs, told Arms Control Today that the agency has been investigating technical approaches to potential confidence-building measures that could be applied to subcritical experiments without revealing classified information. Adams suggested that the most reliable strategy for independent verification of the absence of a nuclear explosion would involve measuring for the absence of a self-sustained chain reaction. That would be indicated by a very rapid drop-off in the production of neutrons and gamma rays from the experiment, he said.

To date, no technical discussions on confidence-building measures relating to subcritical experiments have been held among U.S., Chinese, and Russian officials.

June 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

States met at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to discuss nuclear security challenges and opportunities, but an objection from Iran prevented the participants from adopting a ministerial declaration with recommendations for strengthening the nuclear security regime.

The ministerial-level International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS), held May 20-24 in Vienna, provided a forum for more than 130 states to discuss challenges to nuclear security, promote collaborative efforts for enhancing nuclear security, and support the IAEA’s work in this area.

In opening remarks on May 20, IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi said the IAEA is “at the forefront of adapting nuclear security to new challenges” and referenced the role that the agency is playing in supporting nuclear security in Ukraine.

Grossi emphasized the importance of nuclear security “throughout all the steps of the nuclear fuel cycle” and described nuclear security as “part of the social contract that underpins the existence and growth of nuclear power.”

This meeting is the fourth ICONS conference and the first to conclude without a ministerial declaration. The conference focused on four themes: policy and regulations for nuclear security, technology for nuclear security detection and response, human capacity building, and cross-cutting nuclear security issues, such as the interface between security and safety.

After Iran’s objection, the co-presidents of the conference issued the draft ministerial declaration as a joint statement. Most participating states endorsed the statement in plenary remarks.

David Turk, U.S. deputy energy secretary, said the meeting comes at a time of “great change, both positive and negative” for global nuclear security efforts and described the lack of a ministerial declaration as “regrettable.” In a May 24 speech, Turk called for “renewed determination to protect nuclear facilities and material” and expressed U.S. support for the joint statement.

The joint statement calls on IAEA member states to ensure that highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium are “appropriately secured and accounted for” and encourages states to “further minimize HEU in civilian stocks” when feasible.

The statement emphasizes that “any attacks or threats of attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes may compromise nuclear security” and highlights the importance of “addressing computer security risks” to protect against cyberattacks.

The statement also recognizes the challenges and benefits posed by emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, and the importance of international cooperation in addressing these issues. In addition to the commitments in the joint statement, many countries used the meeting as an opportunity to announce progress on national initiatives to strengthen nuclear security and make new commitments.

Since the ICONS meeting in 2020, the United States has assisted in the disposition of 160 kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear materials in foreign countries and hosted an IAEA mission to assess the physical security of a nuclear facility, Turk said. He noted that the United States continues to contribute to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and reiterated U.S. support for the agency’s nuclear security work.

June 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) traveled to Iran to discuss measures to enhance monitoring of Tehran’s nuclear program and a long-standing agency investigation into undeclared Iranian nuclear activities, but it is unclear if the trip will lead to any new cooperation.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi did not announce any specific measures that Iran agreed to take, but said that Tehran showed a willingness to engage in a serious dialogue and that the two sides were discussing specific, technical steps. The deaths of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian in a helicopter crash on May 19 further delayed engagement between Iran and the agency.

Grossi said he discussed the implementation of a joint statement of the agency and Iran in March 2023. It includes a commitment by Iran to expand voluntarily IAEA monitoring of its nuclear program and cooperate with the agency’s investigation into the presence of uranium detected at three undeclared locations. (See ACT, April 2023.)

After the March 2023 joint statement was concluded, Iran provided the IAEA with information about one of the sites where the agency was investigating the presence of undeclared uranium and allowed the agency to reinstall a limited number of surveillance cameras. But progress stalled by mid-2023.

While in Iran, Grossi tweeted that he proposed measures “for the revitalization” of the March 2023 agreement, which is “still valid.” Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, concurred that the joint statement is a “good basis of interaction.”

Returning from Iran on May 7, Grossi told reporters that he expects to have “some concrete results soon” and that the “present state is completely unsatisfactory.”

Grossi said that it would be good to report progress ahead of the June meeting of the agency’s Board of Governors. Although there was no agreed timetable for action, he said that Amirabdolliahan had said Tehran was “ready to engage in very concrete measures.”

In the past, Iran has pledged to take action ahead of IAEA board meetings to avoid censure. If Tehran does not follow through ahead of the June meeting, it may be difficult to determine if the delay is just more stalling or if the deaths of Raisi and Amirabdollahian disrupted the agency’s engagement with Iran.

During the most recent board meeting, in March, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom said they would pursue action against Iran in June, including reporting the country to the UN Security Council, if Tehran does not provide “decisive and substantive progress” on the investigation into the presence of uranium at the two undeclared locations where the IAEA says that it still does not have sufficient information. (See ACT, April 2024.)

Grossi also suggested that his patience is waning and that he might be forced to act if Iran does not cooperate. In a May 14 interview with The Guardian, he said that, “without meaningful engagement” and being able “to see more in Iran,” the moment may come when he could not say that all of Iran’s nuclear materials are for peaceful purposes. That would be a “critical juncture” because “the international community would have to grapple with the reality that we don’t know what Iran may or may not have,” he said.

Grossi also criticized the “loose talk about nuclear weapons” in Iran and said that language “should stop.”

In a May 9 interview with Al Jazeera Mubasher, Kamal Kharrazi, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader and a former foreign minister, said Iran has not made the decision to build nuclear weapons “but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to change our military doctrine.” He specifically noted that a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities “could lead to a change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine.” Kharrazi made similar comments on May 5.

In a May 9 press briefing, U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller called Kharrazi’s comments “irresponsible” and said the “United States will ensure one way or another that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon.

June 2024
By Daryl G. Kimball

Since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale, illegal, and brutal assault on Ukraine in early 2022, he has issued occasional threats of nuclear weapons use against anyone who might interfere. The result is a heightened risk of nuclear war between Russia and NATO in ways not seen in the post-Cold War era.

After strong international criticism of his nuclear rhetoric in the weeks and months following the invasion, Putin dialed back his threats in 2023. But last month, he publicly authorized field exercises designed to demonstrate the potential use of substrategic nuclear weapons by Russia against NATO or Ukraine. The drills were held in Russia’s Southern Military District, which includes Russian areas adjoining Ukraine and Ukrainian territory seized by Moscow.

If nuclear weapons are used in this or any conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries, there is no guarantee that the fighting would not quickly become an all-out nuclear conflagration. As U.S. President Joe Biden warned in 2022, “I don’t think there’s any such thing as an ability to easily use a tactical nuclear weapon and not end up with Armageddon.” The Group of 20 nations also underscored the dangers in joint statements in 2022 and 2023, saying the use of nuclear weapons and threats of use are “inadmissible.”

Putin’s cronies claim that Russia’s substrategic nuclear drills are a response to statements by French President Emmanuel Macron that NATO should not rule out sending ground forces into Ukraine and by UK Foreign Minister David Cameron that Western-supplied weapons could be used by Ukraine to strike targets in Russia.

The instinct of European leaders to do more to help Ukraine is laudable, and renewed Russian attempts to use nuclear coercion to block such assistance are unsurprising, but both risk escalation that could lead to a wider European war and potential nuclear catastrophe.

Given the stakes, the international community must pursue approaches that lower tensions, increase dialogue, and resist those who threaten to break the nuclear taboo.

As U.S. and European leaders continue to supply Ukraine with the weapons it needs to repel Russia, they must calibrate carefully and coordinate their military support to avoid escalation. So far, the Biden administration has designed its military aid packages wisely and delivered increasingly advanced weapons to help Ukraine defend itself in a way that does not trigger Russian attacks on U.S. or NATO forces or territory.

U.S. and NATO leaders must continue to refrain from making rhetorical threats of nuclear retaliation, avoid provocative nuclear exercises, and rule-out mirroring counterproductive Russian moves, such as the forward deployment of Russian substrategic nuclear weapons in Belarus.

The United States could help reinforce legally binding negative security assurances for many non-nuclear-weapon states against nuclear attack by finally ratifying the protocols to three nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties covering the South Pacific, Africa, and Central Asia that have languished in the Senate for more than a decade. Working through the Conference on Disarmament, the United States also could join with China to start negotiations on a global treaty to provide negative nuclear security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states.

As importantly, the world’s non-nuclear majority needs to push back harder against nuclear threats by Russia or any other state. In 2022, states-parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons issued an important statement noting that “any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law.” They also condemned “unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances.” Russia was not named in the statement, but the message was clear.

One joint statement is not enough. Whenever any nuclear-armed state attempts to engage in nuclear coercion, as Russia is doing, it is in the self-interest of all states to condemn such threats and demand that offenders refrain from provocative actions.

Resuming the suspended Russian-U.S. dialogue on nuclear risk reduction and arms control is crucial to avoiding nuclear miscalculation and competition. Non-nuclear-weapon states could help by urging Moscow and Washington to meet their nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI disarmament commitments by engaging in talks on a new nuclear arms control framework agreement before the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expires in 2026.

All states concerned about nuclear escalation also could urge the five NPT nuclear-weapon states to express support for the 1973 Soviet-U.S. Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which requires that states refrain from nuclear threats and, in times of increased risk of nuclear conflict, “immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk.”

So far, the 79-year-old taboo against the use of nuclear weapons has held, but the world cannot take it for granted. Tragically, the end of Russia’s war on Ukraine is nowhere in sight. To preserve and strengthen the consensus against nuclear weapons use and threats of use, we must sustain pressure against those who might try to break the nuclear taboo.