Volume 17, Issue 1
March 19, 2025
The long-running Iranian nuclear crisis is reaching a tipping point. Since his re-election in November, U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently expressed support for reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran, but his administration’s rhetoric toward Tehran sends mixed signals about U.S. diplomatic intentions. The lack of clarity around U.S. objectives for an agreement, combined with threats to use military force against Iran over both regional and nuclear issues, could stymie diplomatic efforts before talks begin and strengthen factions in Tehran that oppose negotiating with the United States.
Although recent comments from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei cast doubt on Tehran’s willingness to negotiate, comments from other officials suggest there is still space to test diplomacy. It is imperative that the Trump administration moves swiftly to demonstrate it is serious about reaching a mutually beneficial diplomatic deal that prevents a nuclear-armed Iran. To do this, Trump needs to clearly articulate realistic U.S. objectives for a nuclear deal, distance himself from calls for the complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program, and articulate how Tehran will benefit from an agreement. Furthermore, Trump and his senior officials should refrain from making counterproductive threats of the use of military force against Iranian nuclear sites, and press for immediate, direct talks.
Failure to take advantage of the limited window for diplomacy risks escalating an already precarious situation. Absent concrete progress toward an effective deal by mid-2025, it is highly likely that the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) move to restore UN Security Council sanctions on Iran that were lifted by the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran’s threat to retaliate by withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will only further escalate the crisis and increase the risk of military strikes against the country’s nuclear infrastructure, a situation that could drive Iran to formally decide to develop nuclear weapons.
The best option to prevent this crisis from escalating is to reach an effective, verifiable nuclear agreement. The complexity of Iran’s nuclear advances and the short time frame will require the Trump administration to focus on quickly implementable measures that maximize transparency and roll back Iran’s most proliferation-sensitive activities, in exchange for tangible benefits to Iran. But to get to that point, Trump must first signal to Iran that he is serious about a mutually beneficial deal and distance himself from the unrealistic demands that members of his administration continue to articulate.
Abandoning Unrealistic Nuclear Objectives
Trump has repeatedly expressed his preference for reaching a diplomatic understanding with Iran over its nuclear program but has not yet articulated the broad goals for such an agreement. Officials in his administration, however, have suggested that the only acceptable deal with Iran must include complete dismantlement of the country's nuclear program, a demand Tehran views as a non-starter for negotiations.
National Security Advisor Michael Waltz told Fox News in a Feb. 16 interview that the United States will talk to Iran only if they “give up their entire [nuclear] program.” Waltz reiterated on March 16 that Iran will need to “hand over and give up” its nuclear program, including enrichment, as part of a deal or “face a whole series of other consequences.”
From a nonproliferation standpoint, the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program is ideal, particularly given Iran’s illicit attempt to develop nuclear weapons in the past, but it is not realistic. As a member of the NPT, Iran is legally obligated not to acquire nuclear weapons, but it is allowed to develop nuclear technology for energy and other civil purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Iran, like some other states, interprets that to include the right to enrich uranium. Negotiations on the 2015 nuclear deal, for example, only progressed after the United States acknowledged that Iran could retain a uranium enrichment capacity.
Continuing to demand zero enrichment and complete dismantlement as a starting point for talks sends a message to Tehran that the United States is not serious about diplomacy. Iran is highly unlikely to forgo its NPT rights. Furthermore, Tehran is unlikely to dismantle its entire nuclear program, particularly its uranium enrichment capability, amid legitimate concerns about U.S. commitment to a deal and in a security environment where Tehran is attempting to use its nuclear threshold status as a deterrent. Iran will want to retain a guarantee that it can quickly restore leverage if the United States fails to follow through on its commitments under a deal, just as Washington can quickly move to restore pressure if Iran violates its nuclear obligations.
Waltz’s formula demanding a commitment to dismantlement is also reminiscent of the so-called “Libya model,” which refers to Muammar Gaddafi’s 2003 agreement to give up the country’s illicit nuclear weapons program for sanctions relief, only to be overthrown later by Western-backed forces. Allusions to implementing the “Libya model” for Iran risks sending a message to Tehran that the regime will be more vulnerable if it gives up its nuclear program. Given that Tehran is already attempting to use its nuclear weapons-threshold status to deter future attacks, the government will likely view references to the Libya model, or a similar approach, as a threat to its security.
Furthermore, zero enrichment and a dismantlement of the nuclear program up front is not necessary for a nonproliferation agreement that effectively prevents Iran from acquiring the bomb. Despite Iran’s nuclear advances, a combination of limits and monitoring can adequately reduce proliferation risks.
If Trump wants to demonstrate to Iran that he is serious about talks, it will behoove him to make clear that Washington is not demanding zero enrichment or complete dismantlement and acknowledge that Iran can operate a limited, highly monitored nuclear program under a negotiated deal. Failure to do so risks Iran rejecting a negotiating process.
Evaluating a New Deal
In addition to communicating to Iran the broad objectives for a deal, the Trump administration should be developing a draft framework for an effective nuclear agreement that can be used to jumpstart the negotiating process when the talks begin. From a political and technical standpoint, the 2015 nuclear deal, which Trump unilaterally withdrew from in 2018, is no longer a viable framework. Since that time, Iran has acquired more knowledge from investing in enrichment to near weapons-grade levels, operating and producing advanced centrifuges, and experimenting with centrifuge cascade designs. These activities have permanently altered proliferation risk. Even if Iran significantly rolls back its most proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, the knowledge it has gained would allow Tehran to reconstitute its nuclear program far more quickly if a decision were made to develop nuclear weapons or move to back to threshold capacity.
Despite these irreversible gains, it is still possible to negotiate an effective nonproliferation agreement. If properly focused, a deal can still put time back on the "breakout" clock, or the time to produce enough weapons-grade material for a bomb, and provide greater assurance that any move toward nuclear weapons or deviation from declared nuclear activities will be quickly detected. Although the specific technical parameters will need to be negotiated, any agreement should significantly increase monitoring, reduce the immediacy of the proliferation risk by limiting uranium enrichment activities, and prohibit weaponization-relevant activities. In combination, the restrictions and increased monitoring should provide greater assurance that Iran is not engaged in covert nuclear activities and that diversions will be detected swiftly enough that the international community will have to respond before Iran breaks out.
Increased Monitoring
The United States should aim to maximize monitoring and transparency in a new nuclear agreement with Iran. Ideally, an agreement will give inspectors access to all facilities in Iran that are part of or support the country’s nuclear program and allow the IAEA to use additional tools to ensure rapid detection of any attempts to divert materials for a covert program or deviate from declared activities.
The monitoring and verification provisions could include a range of options, but re-implementation, and ideally permanent ratification, of the additional protocol to Iran’s nuclear agreement should be a key priority. The additional protocol provides the IAEA with access to facilities that support Iran’s nuclear program, such as centrifuge manufacturing workshops, and additional tools and information to verify that Iran’s nuclear declaration is complete and correct. The additional protocol includes short-notice inspections at declared nuclear facilities. Furthermore, although the additional protocol is not legally required, it is widely acknowledged as a best practice for safeguards. By ratifying an additional protocol, Iran would be joining more than 140 states that have adopted this more effective safeguards arrangement.
Beyond the additional protocol, a new nuclear agreement should also incorporate tools that provide the agency with additional verification and monitoring mechanisms. This could include online enrichment monitoring, which would provide assurance that any increase in enrichment level would be rapidly detected, and continuous surveillance at key facilities.
Additionally, the agreement should include a plan for Iran to work with the IAEA to close gaps in the agency’s knowledge about the country’s nuclear history that arose from Tehran’s decision to suspend the additional protocol and JCPOA-specific measures. An agreed-upon plan with specified time frames for Iran to provide information to the agency will help the IAEA reconstruct a history of Iran's activities and provide greater assurance that key materials, such as centrifuges, are fully accounted for and documented.
Restrictions on Enrichment
Iran’s irreversible nuclear advance prevents the reconstitution of a breakout timeline similar to the 12 months achieved by the JCPOA. But an effective agreement does not have to roll the clock back to 12 months. It does, however, need to increase the current, near-zero breakout to a half-dozen bombs’ worth of weapons-grade uranium. Multiple factors contribute to breakout calculations; key amongst them are enrichment levels, the amount in the stockpile (and what form it is in), and the centrifuge capacity.
Currently, Iran is enriching uranium up to 60 percent (weapons-grade is 90 percent) and expanding its uranium enrichment capacity. As of a February 2025 IAEA report, its combined stockpile of 60 and 20 percent enriched uranium in gas form is nearly 900 kilograms, and it has installed about 118 cascades of centrifuges, of which 76 are more advanced efficient machines that Iran was prohibited from using under the JCPOA.
An effective deal could increase breakout by combining restrictions and limitations in these three areas. Iran is unlikely to accept draconian cuts in all three activities. After seeing how quickly the United States can restore sanctions in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran will likely seek to retain a guaranteed route to a more rapid escalation of its own, such as retaining more of its uranium enrichment capacity or stockpile in country.
One option for an agreement could be to focus on limiting enrichment levels and stocks, while allowing Iran to retain some of its advanced centrifuges. Eliminating the stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium and limiting enrichment to reactor-grade, or less than five percent, would reduce the immediacy of proliferation risk while allowing Iran to retain some of its enrichment infrastructure as a guarantee. If subject to intrusive monitoring, the international community would have time to respond if the IAEA detected that Iran engaged in undeclared nuclear activities.
Furthermore, Iran has no practical need for 60 percent enriched uranium. Allowing Iran to retain a stockpile that it will not use poses more of a proliferation risk, particularly in the near term when the IAEA cannot necessarily account for all of Iran’s centrifuges. The stockpile could be quickly enriched to weapons-grade levels using a fraction of Iran’s centrifuges or diverted to a covert facility. Given these factors, allowing Iran to keep a larger uranium enrichment capacity under strict monitoring would pose less of a risk.
Weaponization Prohibitions
In a March tweet, Iran’s mission to UN suggested Tehran is open to talks if a deal is focused on preventing weaponization, not the dismantlement of the country’s nuclear program. The focus on preventing weaponization suggests that Tehran would be open to restrictions on certain activities relevant to developing the explosive package and fabricating weapons-grade uranium into the metal components necessary for the core of a bomb. This list could include a ban on uranium metal production and the weaponization-relevant activities prohibited under Section T of the JCPOA.
Verifying the absence of weaponization-related activities is challenging. The short-time frame likely precludes negotiating verification mechanisms to ensure the absence of these activities. Regardless, there is still value in prohibiting them in a deal: Iran will have to explain any evidence of violations. To prevent any stalling, the agreement could require Iran to respond to any evidence of violations within a certain time period.
Maximizing the Chance for an Effective Deal
Different permutations of these factors—weaponization restrictions, monitoring provisions, and enrichment limits—can produce an effective, verifiable nuclear deal. But there is a risk that Trump’s interest in a breakthrough diplomatic deal results in an accord that fails to include adequate guardrails to Iranian weapons development. This risk is compounded by the limited time period for reaching a deal and key vacancies within the Trump administration.
To help deliver a strong agreement in the short time frame available for diplomacy, the Trump administration should consult with the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) about the technical parameters of an effective deal. The E3’s current engagement with Iran on both nuclear and sanctions-lifting issues will provide valuable insights and technical expertise regarding the scope and objectives of a deal.
The Trump administration should also prioritize retaining U.S. nonproliferation expertise within the government to provide technical assessments of any proposals under negotiation and building a dedicated team to lead U.S. efforts to engage Iran. Furthermore, the complexity and urgency of the risk necessitate designating a senior point person within the administration to coordinate U.S. efforts, preferably one who is not simultaneously trying to tackle other complex diplomatic challenges. Picking someone to lead U.S. efforts will also make clear to Iran who they can communicate with regarding nuclear talks.
Situating a Nuclear Deal Within A Regional Strategy
Iran’s attempts to use its threshold status to deter further attacks on its territory solidified the linkage between nuclear and regional security concerns. In dialogue with the E3, Iran has suggested it does not want to address regional security within the framework of a new nuclear deal. The U.S. position is not yet clear. Trump’s threats to strike Iran if the Houthis, an Iranian-backed group fighting for control of Yemen, continue attacks against U.S. interests and partners in the region, however, suggest that the regional environment could be a spoiler for nuclear negotiations.
Furthermore, reducing regional security tensions will remove a driver of Iran’s threat to weaponize, which could increase the sustainability of an agreement. Including regional issues within a deal, however, would complicate negotiations at a time when the window for reaching a deal is short. The United States and Iran also cannot resolve key sources of tension between states in the region. But both sides could commit to exploring a broader set of security issues in parallel, but not directly connected to, nuclear negotiations. This could include U.S. support for regional security discussions between Iran and GCC states.
The region could also play a role in reducing nuclear tensions. In addition to supporting U.S-Iran nuclear negotiations and providing economic incentives to Iran as part of a nuclear deal, the region can support additional nuclear transparency and the redirection of proliferation-sensitive activities toward programs that provide civil benefits and pose less risk.
Cooperative regional nuclear activities could have the added benefit of providing assurance that other states in the region will seek to match Iran’s nuclear weapons capability. Although no other country in the region poses an immediate proliferation risk, states are considering developing nuclear programs for energy and research applications. Saudi Arabia, which is looking to develop a domestic uranium enrichment program, also threatened to develop nuclear weapons if Iran does so.
To build transparency and confidence in the peaceful nature of Iranian and Gulf nuclear programs, regional states and Iran could consider a range of cooperative nuclear activities. This could include commitments to jointly develop and test best practices for regional nuclear security, coordinate training for personnel operating nuclear power facilities, or share investment in cooperative research activities that provide regional benefits. This latter basket could include nuclear applications for agriculture and medicine, areas that multiple states in the region, including Iran, have identified as beneficial.
Cooperative regional nuclear activities cannot replace an effective nuclear deal, but building ties between expert communities and investing in shared resources provides insight into the trajectories of nuclear programs, enhances transparency, and creates channels for de-confliction if proliferation concerns emerge.
The Time Factor
Negotiating an effective, verifiable nuclear agreement that addresses the new proliferation risks posed by Iran’s advancing nuclear program while providing Tehran with tangible benefits will not be easy. These challenges are amplified by the short frame for diplomacy. If the United States and Iran do not make significant strides toward an effective agreement by mid-2025, E3 will likely move to restore UN Security Council sanctions and restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program using a veto-proof mechanism, known as snapback. Snapback expires in October 2025 as part of Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal. The United States, having withdrawn from the JCPOA, cannot trigger it, but Trump included instructions for the U.S. mission to the UN to work with the Europeans on snapback as part of his Feb. 4 national security memorandum on restoring maximum pressure.
If snapback is triggered, it will reimpose mandatory Security Council sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program and an arms embargo. Snapback will also restore Security Council prohibitions on uranium enrichment, further reactor development, and ballistic missile activities. Even though the sanctions will have minimal practical effect, given the breadth of U.S. and EU measures already back in place, Iran will reject the notion that its nuclear program constitutes a threat to peace and security. It is highly likely that Tehran will follow through on its threat to withdraw from the NPT in response.
Withdrawal from the NPT would not be immediate. Once Tehran notifies the Security Council of the “extraordinary events” that have “jeopardized the supreme interests of its country” as required by Article X of the treaty, there is a three-month period before withdrawal from the NPT is finalized. That three-month window could inject the necessary momentum into diplomatic efforts, but only if snapback is pursued as part of strategy. That strategy should include having a proposal ready to jump-start talks and steps to mitigate the risk of military action during and immediately after the three-month period ends.
When the three-month withdrawal period is over, it is not clear if Iran will retain IAEA safeguards. In this scenario, Tehran will no longer be obligated under the NPT to implement a safeguards agreement. However, Iran’s nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia may obligate the country to retain some IAEA presence.
According to the 1992 nuclear cooperation agreement between Moscow and Tehran, “nuclear material, equipment, special non-nuclear-material, and related technology” as well as nuclear materials produced by the result of transferred technology “shall be under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards” during their “entire period” of stay in Iran. The agreement further stipulates that these materials “shall be used only for declared purposes that are not connected with activities of manufacturing nuclear explosive devices” and “shall not be used to carry out activities in the field of nuclear fuel cycle” that are not under IAEA safeguards.
This agreement suggests that Iran will have an incentive to retain an IAEA presence even if it withdraws from the NPT and that Russia may have an economic interest in encouraging Iran to do so. Regardless, part of the snapback strategy should include efforts to encourage Iran to retain an IAEA presence to provide some assurance that the country's nuclear program remains peaceful and to reduce the threat of military action against its nuclear infrastructure.
However, even if Iran does implement safeguards after NPT withdrawal, the risk of military strikes targeting the nuclear program will increase. To date, Trump has rightly refrained from committing the United States to supporting an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear program, but he has reiterated the long-held U.S. policy that all options are on the table, including military action, to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
The United States could certainly set back Iran’s nuclear program by directly striking its facilities, likely for longer than the estimated weeks to several months if Israel strikes alone. But any rollback will still be temporary, increasing the the risk that Iran will rebuild its program and weaponize to deter future attacks. For example, Iran has taken steps to harden and disperse its nuclear facilities, making any military effort to destroy its existing facilities more difficult. Iran could also rebuild much more quickly now as compared to 2013, before the JCPOA was negotiated, due to its uranium enrichment advances and the gaps in IAEA monitoring. Tehran may have already diverted certain materials, such as advanced centrifuges, to covert sites. The IAEA has not been allowed to access certain facilities, including centrifuge workshops, since 2021. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi has even acknowledged that the IAEA cannot provide assurance that Iran’s centrifuges are accounted for. If Tehran can preserve even a small number of advanced centrifuges in the event of an attack on its nuclear infrastructure, it will be better positioned to quickly build back its program following a military strike.
Furthermore, if Iran withdraws from the NPT after an attack, particularly if there is no evidence of weaponization, it may garner more sympathy from partner states and make it more difficult to isolate or pressure Iran in the future.
Moving Forward
Trump’s instinct to reject military strikes and focus on diplomacy is the right one. But expressions of support for an accord is insufficient to convey to Tehran that Washington is serious about negotiating a mutually beneficial deal. Trump needs to focus on articulating realistic objectives for an accord and developing a framework for an effective deal that can be quickly and verifiably implemented--and soon. Time is short, but these steps are possible if the Trump administration acts swiftly to engage Iran and abandons inflammatory rhetoric. Failure to do so risks an escalating crisis that could end in an Iranian nuclear program no longer constrained by the NPT, or a broader conflict to prevent it.