September 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

North Korea deployed launchers for nuclear-capable missiles along its southern border after South Korea and the United States announced new guidelines for strengthening U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden announced the new guidelines for responding to North Korean threats during a July 11 meeting in Washington. The joint statement described the guidelines document as providing a “solid foundation” for enhancing South Korean-U.S. cooperation on extended nuclear deterrence.

The guidelines were crafted by the Nuclear Consultative Group, a body Biden and Yoon established in 2023 to increase South Korean participation in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence decision-making. (See ACT, May 2023.)

Although the presidents did not go into detail about the nature of the guidelines, a U.S. Defense Department press release on July 11 said the document will “provide principles and procedures to assist alliance policy and military authorities in maintaining effective nuclear deterrence policy and posture.”

Yoon said that, as a result of the guidelines and the work of the consultative group, U.S. nuclear assets will be “specifically assigned” to Korean peninsula missions. He described the move as an upgrade to the alliance.

Vipin Narang, the acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for space policy and co-chair of the consultative group, said on July 16 that the guidelines will allow the group to “evolve with the threat environment.”

Narang, speaking to VOA Korean Service, said that South Korea and the United States approach extended deterrence as “equal partners,” but reiterated that only the U.S. president will be able to authorize the use of nuclear weapons.

In their statement, Biden and Yoon also called for the consultative group to make further progress on several issues, including South Korean conventional support for U.S. nuclear operations “through conventional-nuclear integration” and “nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies.”

North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on July 13 described the announcement as a demonstration of South Korean and U.S. “sinister intentions to step up preparation for a nuclear war” with North Korea. Its statement said that Seoul and Washington are driving Pyongyang to “further improve its nuclear deterrent readiness and add important elements” to its nuclear arsenal.

Several weeks later, North Korea announced the deployment of the 250 missile launchers to military units stationed near the border with South Korea.

In an Aug. 4 speech marking the delivery, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un described the systems as “new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers” for the military’s “new core offensive weapon.” He said that North Korea is “attaining [its] first-stage goal of building missile forces in the first line units on the front” with South Korea.

Images from the event suggest that the launchers are designed for the Hwasong-11D, a short-range ballistic missile that North Korea says is nuclear capable. Each launcher can carry four missiles. Independent assessments of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal suggest that the country has assembled an estimated 50 warheads.

Kim blamed U.S. military activity for North Korea’s decision to deploy the launchers. He said that as the “U.S.-led alliance” evolves into a “nuclear-based military block, the military security environment surrounding” North Korea is changing drastically and that Pyongyang cannot “rest content with its current level of war deterrent.” He said that South Korea has “grown reckless enough” to want to share U.S. nuclear weapons.

North Korea later accused the United States and South Korea of using joint military exercises as “preparation for a war.” An Aug. 18 commentary in KCNA rejected the U.S. description of the annual exercises as “defensive” and described the drills as “offensive and provocative.”

South Korea and the United States announced previously that the annual August drills, called Ulchi Freedom, would not include responding to a North Korean nuclear attack. But South Korea announced separate plans to hold its own nuclear response training during the joint exercise.

The South Korean unilateral exercises also included responding to “gray zone provocations,” such as the trash-filled balloons that North Korea sends over the border and false information spread by “anti-state forces” within South Korea, and defending infrastructure from attacks, Yoon said in an Aug. 19 speech.

Yoon raised similar concerns about divisive propaganda during an Aug. 15 speech laying out South Korea’s new strategy for unification with North Korea.

Yoon reaffirmed South Korea’s commitment to “peaceful unification based on freedom and democracy,” even though North Korea abandoned the goal of unification last year. (See ACT, January/February 2024.)

To achieve unification, Yoon said South Korea must pursue “three key undertakings” of building the capabilities to pursue “freedom-based unification,” fostering a “strong desire for unification” among the North Korean people, and acting in solidarity with the international community.

September 2024
By Xiaodon Liang

China confirmed that it has rejected the U.S. offer for more nuclear arms control talks as a follow-on to a dialogue held Nov. 6. (See ACT, June 2024; December 2023).

At a July 17 press conference, Lin Jian, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, criticized the U.S. decision to continue selling arms to Taiwan. “Consequently, the Chinese side has decided to hold off discussion with the [United States] on a new round of consultations on arms control and nonproliferation,” he said.

Lin said that China “stands ready to maintain communications” on international arms control but only if the United States respects China’s “core interests and create[s] necessary conditions for dialogue and exchange.”

In response, U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said on July 17 that the Chinese decision to entangle nuclear arms control talks with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “undermines strategic stability” and “increases the risk of arms race dynamics.” He added that the United States remains open to “developing and implementing concrete risk-reduction measures.”

Since the meeting last November, the United States has announced the approval of several foreign military sales packages for Taiwan. Approvals of these packages do not always result in arms contracts or arms deliveries.

In December 2023 and February 2024, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced that the State Department had approved the transfer of two bundles of various military electronics and related support services to Taiwan worth $300 million and $75 million, respectively. Contracts for these items will be tendered by the United States.

On June 5, the agency announced the potential sale of $300 million in F-16 spare and repair parts for Taiwan’s air force, to be taken out of U.S. Air Force stock. On June 18, the agency announced the approval of a transfer to Taiwan of $360 million in loitering munitions and unmanned aerial vehicles.

These transfers are administered by the U.S. government. The Taiwanese government negotiates commercial arms purchases directly from U.S.-based contractors, but data on approval of these transfers are published by the State Department on an annual basis only.

In April, Congress approved and President Joe Biden signed into law a supplemental foreign military aid package that included an appropriation of $2 billion in foreign military financing for Taiwan. This sum, which may be used for loans and loan guarantees, supplements a $300 million fund created as part of regular fiscal year 2024 State Department appropriations.

Congress authorized military financing for Taiwan in the fiscal year 2023 defense authorization act, but did not appropriate funds in the same budget cycle.

Last August, the Biden administration notified Congress that it would offer $80 million in military financing support for an arms transfer to Taiwan for the first time, Reuters reported. The program normally is used for sovereign states.

September 2024
By Garrett Welch

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited the nuclear power plant in the Kursk region of Russia as threats to the facility grew because of the Russian war against Ukraine.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi told a news conference after the Aug. 27 site visit that the plant was extremely fragile because it had no protective dome. “The danger or possibility of a nuclear accident has emerged near here,” he said according to Reuters.

Grossi said the plant was still operating very close to normal, but this meant the security situation was even more serious, the news agency reported.

Russia has accused Ukrainian forces, which recently launched a ground assault into the Kursk region, of repeated attacks on the plant. Reuters reported on Aug. 27 that Ukraine has not responded to the allegations.

The IAEA has said it was informed by Russia on Aug. 22 that the remains of a drone had been found within the plant. The same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Ukraine of trying to strike the Kursk facility in an overnight attack.

Tensions rose in recent weeks after Ukrainian forces launched a ground assault and pushed into Russian territory for the first time since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began in 2022. As of Aug. 27, Kyiv claimed to control roughly 1,263 square kilometers of Russian territory in the Kursk region and advanced to within 40 kilometers of the plant.

The nuclear facility contains six reactors, of which two are fully operational, two are shut down, and two are under construction. According to photos obtained by the BBC, Russian forces appear to be constructing defenses and digging trenches near the facility. Russia has since accused Ukraine of planning to attack the facility and blame it on Russia, which Ukraine denied as “insane” propaganda.

For months, Grossi also has warned about potential damage to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, which Russia occupied early in the war and has been attacked by drones. “These reckless attacks (against both plants) endanger nuclear safety at the plant and increase the risk of a nuclear accident. They must stop now,” Grossi said in an Aug. 11 statement.

The IAEA team on-site at Zaporizhzhia reported that a fire broke out at one of the facility’s cooling towers on Aug. 11. The agency statement said the team “witnessed thick dark smoke coming from the northwestern area of the plant.” The team also reported hearing an explosion, and the Russian operators at the facility reported that “a drone had allegedly struck one of the plant’s two cooling towers.”

The fire has been contained, but Zaporizhzhia personnel suggested that the cooling tower may need to be dismantled. The IAEA statement confirmed that there was no immediate impact on nuclear safety.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Aug. 12 blamed Russian forces for starting the fire in an attempt at “nuclear blackmail,” while Zaporizhzhia’s Kremlin-installed governor blamed Ukrainian shelling.

The IAEA inspected photos of the cooling tower and did not report any visible foreign objects among the debris. Grossi said the evidence gathered suggests that the fire did not start at the base of the cooling tower.

Russia previously accused Ukraine of conducting drone strikes on June 19 and 21 that cut power to residents of Enerhodar, near the Zaporizhzhia plant, which the IAEA condemned as “unacceptable.” (See ACT, July/August 2024.) The IAEA, in an Aug. 17 statement, confirmed that a drone strike hit a road around the plant’s protected area that day.

In an Aug. 9 statement, Grossi called on both parties “to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid a nuclear accident.” He reiterated that “any military action taken against the plant represents a clear violation of the five concrete principles for protecting the facility,” established by the UN Security Council in 2023. These five principles seek to ensure nuclear safety and security, including prohibitions on an attack of “any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel.”

Prior to the latest round of escalations, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding that Russia immediately return full control of the Zaporizhzhia plant to Ukraine.

September 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

Japan and the United States have reaffirmed and expanded their commitments to maintain peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, where extended deterrence is becoming a significant component of alliance and regional cooperation.

At the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting, known informally as 2+2, on July 28 in Tokyo, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defense Minister Minoru Kihara held talks with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on regional security in Asia and on Japanese-U.S. alliance cooperation. The last such meeting was in Washington in January 2023.

According to a joint statement, the officials “reaffirmed their intent to implement new strategic initiatives…including upgrading alliance command and control, deepening defense industry and advanced technology cooperation, and enhancing cross-domain operations.”

During a joint press conference, Austin emphasized that the upgrade of the “U.S. Forces Japan to a Joint Force Headquarters with expanded missions and operational responsibilities…will be the most significant change to [the command] since its creation and one of the strongest improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years.”

Following the 2+2 meeting, which focuses on alliance security cooperation generally, the four officials attended the first Japanese-U.S. ministerial meeting dedicated specifically to deterrence. In those talks, the officials focused on the U.S. commitment under the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to extend deterrence to Japan by guaranteeing the use of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear forces, to counter enemy threats. The credibility of these assurances is a central issue in alliance policy, especially given rising regional tensions.

The United States and another extended deterrence partner, South Korea, already upgraded their consultative body, the Nuclear Consultative Group, which issued guidelines earlier in July.

Japan and the United States have conducted the extended deterrence dialogue at the working level since 2010. Although that format will continue as a primary platform, Kihara emphasized the importance of the new ministerial initiative, stating that, “[i]n view of the severe security environment, including nuclear, it was extremely meaningful that the first ministerial meeting dedicated [solely] to extended deterrence was held [and] where intensive discussions took place.”

In a second joint statement, the officials said that they “shared assessments of an increasingly deteriorating regional security environment” related to China, North Korea, and Russia. As a result, “the United States and Japan reiterated the need to reinforce the alliance’s deterrence posture, and manage existing and emerging strategic threats through deterrence, arms control, risk reduction, and nonproliferation.”

The officials also reaffirmed their “commitment to close consultations on U.S. nuclear policy and posture, as well as the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear military matters within the [a]lliance.”

“Our commitment to Japan’s defense is unwavering, and that includes extended deterrence by providing the full range of our conventional and nuclear capabilities. This commitment is at the heart of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and our alliance has never been stronger,” Austin said.

The meetings followed Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s official visit to Washington in April and are aimed at realizing a “free and open” Indo-Pacific region.

Japan is increasing its reliance on U.S. extended deterrence, but worldwide nuclear disarmament remains a national goal.

Speaking in Hiroshima on Aug. 6, the anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of that city, Kishida noted that “[t]he widening division within the international community over approaches to nuclear disarmament, Russia’s nuclear threat, and other concerns make the situation surrounding nuclear disarmament all the more challenging.”

But “no matter how arduous this path towards a world without nuclear weapons may be, we must continue moving forward along that path,” he said.

Kishida, who represents Hiroshima’s 1st legislative district, has a reputation for a strong political interest in nuclear disarmament. He recently announced that he would not run for the upcoming party leadership vote in September, meaning that Japan is expected to have new prime minister later that month. Before he steps down, he plans a last trip to the UN headquarters in New York.

September 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

With the future of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in the balance, states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are persisting in efforts to manage divisions and preserve the regime.

At the second meeting to prepare for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, the 118 states-parties showed that although chronic tensions over core nuclear weapons issues continue and deepen, there is still serious interest in salvaging the NPT regime.

The preparatory committee meeting was held July 22-Aug. 2 in Geneva to review implementation of the landmark 1968 treaty and develop a plan for making progress on its key components of nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These preparatory committee meetings are intended to lay the groundwork for the NPT review conferences, which usually are scheduled every five years.

“The impact of the current contentious geopolitical environment has put the NPT under enormous strain. But lapsing into cynicism and inaction cannot be permitted; the stakes are too high,” said Izumi Nakamitsu, UN undersecretary-general and high representative for disarmament affairs, at the opening session.

Amid growing nuclear risks and geopolitical confrontations, delegates diverged on many issues such as the implementation of key treaty obligations and Iran’s nonproliferation commitments.

One particularly contentious topic was nuclear sharing arrangements, including the recent deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus. (See ACT, May 2024.) In a joint statement, Belarus and Russia said that the current international strategic environment is not favorable for disarmament and they justified the deployment by arguing that “such arrangements have been practiced by NATO members.”

Responding to international criticism, the Russian delegation said that the deployment “does not change the strategic situation at all because [the weapons] cannot reach the United States.”

Differences over the Russian deployment and NATO’s nuclear weapons policy led to the intense exchange of views among Belarus, Russia, Iran, the United States, and other NATO members. Italy, for example, echoed other allies in arguing that NATO nuclear sharing arrangements are legally compatible with the NPT and “have prevented proliferation…. No one objected to these arrangements for decades” until Russia’s “illegal annexation of Crimea,” an Italian delegate said.

Many states, including within the Non-Aligned Movement and New Agenda Coalition, voiced concerns regarding nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and extended deterrence more generally because they rest on threats of nuclear weapons use. These states-parties urged all countries to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies.

The NPT process has long considered the ideal outcome of preparatory committee meetings to be a formal consensus agreement on the draft rules of procedure and provisional agenda, along with a formal summary by the meeting chair and recommendations for the review conference.

But because of intense divisions, no meeting since 2002 has adopted a chair’s factual summary by consensus. Instead, meeting chairs normally issue their factual summary as a working paper on their own authority. This is meant to put on record what states discussed during the meeting and serve as a blueprint for further discussion.

At last year’s first preparatory committee meeting, Iran, backed by Russia and Syria, challenged this practice and refused to list the chair’s summary even as a working paper, claiming that the summary favored Western states. Due to the objection, that meeting concluded unprecedently without a chair’s summary. (See ACT, September 2023.)

By contrast, the latest preparatory committee meeting listed the chair’s summary as a working paper in the meeting’s report, but with another unprecedented ending. On the last day, Russia asked the chair to insert a footnote to the summary to clarify that the document “represents solely the views of the chairman” and to add that “it is not agreed upon by the delegations and it does not fully reflect the positions of the delegations. This document shall not be considered as a basis for future work within the NPT review process.”

Austria, Germany, Mexico, and the Netherlands questioned this suggestion, but the meeting accepted Russia’s footnote and succeeded in leaving a chair’s summary in the record.

As the session concluded, the chair, Akan Rakhmetullin, Kazakhstan’s deputy foreign minister, admitted that, “undeniably, this meeting took place in extremely difficult challenging circumstances.” But he insisted that he “witnessed rich and active exchanges of positions which demonstrated the persistent interest of states-parties and the unquestionable relevance of this treaty.”

The third preparatory committee meeting is set for April 9-May 9, 2025, in New York and will be chaired by Harold Agyeman, Ghana’s UN ambassador.

September 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

The conflict in Gaza cast a shadow on the recent memorial ceremony recognizing the 79th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Representatives of Canada, France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union skipped the ceremony in Nagasaki on Aug. 9 after Israel was disinvited.

The annual ceremony is designed to honor the victims of the U.S. atomic bombing on August 9, 1945; renew a commitment to nuclear disarmament; and honor a long-standing vow never to let such a tragedy happen again. It is estimated that, by the end of 1945, 75,000 people died from the bombing on Nagasaki. The bombing of Hiroshima three days earlier killed an estimated 140,000 people.

The ceremonies are hosted by the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and their respective mayors have authority to decide who should receive invitations. Since 2022, Belarus and Russia have been the only countries to be disinvited from both ceremonies. This year, Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui invited Israel, and Nagasaki Mayor Shiro Suzuki did not.

On Aug. 6, after attending the Hiroshima memorial ceremony, Julia Longbottom, the UK ambassador to Japan, told journalists she would not attend the Nagasaki ceremony because disinviting Israel “created an unfortunate and misleading equivalency with Russia and Belarus,” the only other countries not invited to this year’s ceremony, according to multiple Japanese media sources.

On the following day, U.S. Ambassador Rahm Emanuel announced his absence from the Nagasaki ceremony, saying “the mayor of Nagasaki politicized the event by snubbing Israel.” White House spokesperson Karine Jean-Pierre declined to comment on Emanuel’s decision, but State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said on Aug. 8 that “[n]o country should be singled out, not to be invited for a celebration.”

That same day, Nagasaki’s mayor told a press conference that “the decision to disinvite Israel was not for a political reason.” He confirmed that he received a joint letter from Group of Seven (G7) and EU ambassadors on July 25, stating that “it would be difficult for us to have high-level participation” in the ceremony if Israel were excluded.

Suzuki told reporters on Aug. 8 that it was regrettable that the ambassadors could not understand that “the reason why we did not invite Israel was solely because we wanted to conduct the ceremony smoothly in a peaceful, solemn atmosphere.” After Hiroshima invited Israel to its ceremony this year, its decision was met with public criticism and protests, resulting in more security installations.

Yoshimasa Hayashi, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, declined to comment on the controversy at an Aug. 8 press conference, saying that Nagasaki hosted the ceremony, not the Japanese national government. Meanwhile, Asahi newspaper reported on Aug. 9 that the Japanese government privately warned Nagasaki city officials that uninviting Israel “could develop to a diplomatic issue.”

Tamashii Honda, a president of Nagasaki A-Bomb Bereaved Families Association, told Yomiuri News on Aug. 8 that he “wanted the [G7] ambassadors to visit the A-bombed city and feel Nagasaki’s desire for peace especially because the war is still ongoing.” It is “very regrettable that the ambassadors will not be attending,” Honda said.

Billionaire businessman Elon Musk fueled more controversy on Aug. 13 when he described Hiroshima and Nagasaki as “bombed but now…full cities again” during a live streaming interview with former U.S. President Donald Trump on X. “It is not as scary as people think, basically,” Musk said of nuclear war. (See ACT, June 2024.)

September 2024
By Mina Rozei

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) conducted its first technical assistance visit in Ukraine on July 2-3 as a response to months of alleged illegal chemical weapons use by Ukraine and Russia. (See ACT, June 2024.)

Ukraine requested the visit after the country signed an ad hoc privileges and immunities agreement with the OPCW on May 24. As part of the agreement, OPCW experts delivered 70 devices that detect gas and vapor threats and conducted training on how to use them for 20 experts from the Ukrainian State Emergency Service, including first responders.

After long accusing Russia of using chemical weapons since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kyiv provided evidence for its claim at the OPCW Executive Council meeting July 9-12 in The Hague. In a report to the council, Ukraine alleged that Russia used various weapons containing hazardous chemical agents more than 3,000 times between February 2023 and June 2024.

The documentation offered, including evidence prepared by the Ukrainian armed forces commander, contained photos and detailed analysis of the types of munitions found on the battlefield, alleging that “most of the munitions (82 percent) used were hand gas grenades of the K-51 and RG-VO types…which are riot control agents and are prohibited for use as means of warfare” under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Riot control agents are permitted in certain circumstances by the CWC, but are prohibited under Article 1 when used “as a method of warfare.”

Ukraine warned that the lack of international response to Russia’s unlawful weapons use means that the risk of recurrence is increasing. It said that there would be follow-up to the OPCW July visit to Ukraine, with “more such activities…scheduled throughout the year.”

It is unknown whether this report will provide the necessary “specific substantiated request” required of at least one CWC state-party for the OPCW to formally begin any OPCW activities related to the use of chemical weapons.

The issue is expected to be raised at the next CWC conference of states-parties in The Hague on Nov. 25-29. Nicole Shampaine, U.S. ambassador to the OPCW, told Arms Control Today that the United States “will join many other countries in ensuring this issue is at the top of the agenda at the OPCW in order to hold Russia accountable for its actions.”

The technical assistance visit came after the OPCW issued a statement May 7 that it is monitoring the situation in Ukraine and open to requests from member states for formal investigations. Both Ukraine and Russia have made allegations of chemical weapons use on the battlefield, reflecting the struggles to ensure CWC compliance that have dogged the OPCW since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012.

“The norm against the possession or use of chemical weapons embodied in the [CWC] is being challenged due to repeated violations by a small number of countries,” Bonnie Jenkins, the U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, told Arms Control Today.

September 2024
By Daryl G. Kimball

For more than a decade, the five nuclear-armed states recognized under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have failed to engage in constructive nuclear disarmament and risk reduction diplomacy. Instead, they are spending tens of billions of dollars annually to modernize, upgrade, and in some cases expand their deadly arsenals.

To get back on track, leaders in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington will need to deploy new, more creative approaches to put in place new constraints and guardrails against a dangerous arms race in which everyone loses.

Although the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire in 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin has refused to engage with the Biden administration on its 2023 offer to discuss “without precondition” a new nuclear arms control framework to prevent an unconstrained nuclear arms race. Putin’s excuse is that such a dialogue would not be fruitful as long as Washington continues to support Ukraine as it defends itself against Russian aggression.

Meanwhile, China is building up its smaller but deadly nuclear force now estimated to consist of some 310 warheads on long-range missiles, with perhaps 500 missiles in total. Unfortunately, China’s leaders also have rejected U.S. offers for follow-up talks on nuclear risk reduction and arms control issues, citing ongoing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

If Russia and the United States exceed New START limits, it would destabilize their mutual balance of nuclear terror, strain the already costly and behind-schedule U.S. nuclear modernization program, and prompt China to accelerate its own nuclear buildup. Such an action-reaction cycle would be madness.

What can be done? First, in the coming weeks, U.S. President Joe Biden and whoever is the next president-elect should reaffirm U.S. support for negotiating a new nuclear arms control framework with Russia. Because such a deal would be difficult to hammer out and take time, the president should propose that Washington and Moscow conclude a simple, bilateral understanding promising that neither side shall increase the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads beyond the New START limits. This would remain in force until they can conclude a more comprehensive, durable framework to limit and reduce their deadly nuclear arsenals.

As long as Russia and the United States agree to cap their strategic deployed nuclear arsenals and work to negotiate a new nuclear arms reduction framework, Washington, along with leading non-nuclear-weapon states, should call on China, France, and the United Kingdom to freeze the overall size of their nuclear arsenals and negotiate a ban on fissile material production for weapons.

Second, if China continues to decline talks with Washington on nuclear matters, it has an even greater responsibility to elevate the underperforming P5 consultation process, the dialogue on nuclear risk reduction involving the NPT’s five nuclear-weapon states, that has been underway since 2010.

China, which now chairs the group, is in a unique position to launch an ambitious program to increase the frequency of these meetings; raise the level of participation; expand the topics of discussion, including exchanges on nuclear postures and joint pledges not to use nuclear weapons first; and build on past success.

For example, the five states could expand on their 2022 joint declaration that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” by adopting a statement in the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War that pledges that the nuclear powers will “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party and against other countries.”

In the context of these discussions, senior U.S. diplomats should clarify that they will not seek and will not pursue an increase in the size or diversity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal as long as Russia continues to respect the New START ceilings and China does not expand its strategic nuclear arsenal significantly, which is not likely until the year 2030 or later.

China could explain what is driving its buildup and clarify its nuclear modernization plans. Such an approach would help Beijing avoid worst-case assumptions about its intentions and the potential for a three-way arms race.

Finally, leading non-nuclear-weapon states not only need to press the United States and Russia to engage on nuclear arms control and push China to halt its nuclear buildup. They seriously should consider launching a new initiative that would lead to a series of high-level nuclear disarmament summits involving a group of 20 to 30 leaders from nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states. If designed properly, such an approach could help overcome existing obstacles of disarmament diplomacy, increase pressure for action, and complement existing forums designed to advance progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

If the world is to halt and reverse the cycle of spiraling nuclear tensions, it will require new, bolder global leadership and sustained public pressure in the weeks, months, and years ahead.