States Should Affirm Support for Outer Space Treaty Despite Russian Veto

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For Immediate Release: Apr. 24, 2024

Media Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Xiaodon Liang, Senior Policy Analyst, (202) 463-8270 ext. 103

(Washington, D.C.)—Today, the Russian Federation vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution reiterating support for the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, reigniting concerns that Moscow is developing a space-based nuclear anti-satellite capability. The vote was 13 in favor, 1 opposed (Russia), with 1 abstention (China).

The resolution, originally advanced by the United States and Japan, would have reaffirmed support for the principles of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of “nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” in outer space – whether on celestial bodies or in orbit. Notably, the Security Council resolution did not single out Russia for its suspected activities in outer space.

In attempting to justify its veto, Russia complained that council members had voted down an amendment to incorporate an alternative diplomatic initiative: a new prohibition on the placement of any weapons in outer space. 

“Russia’s reasoning doesn’t hold water. The resolution in support of the Outer Space Treaty is fully compatible with Russia’s alternative approach,” said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

In February, the United States made public an intelligence finding that Russia is developing an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon that would violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

“Although Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on February 20 that his country has ‘always been categorically against, and are now against, the placement of nuclear weapons in space,’ today’s veto calls into serious question Russia’ commitment to this important norm governing use of the global commons,” said Kimball.

“Just as the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons or the resumption of nuclear testing must be considered inadmissible, the deployment of nuclear weapons in space should be seen as an unacceptable and provocative threat to international peace and security,” he added.

A nuclear detonation in space would create an indiscriminate zone of destruction, disabling not only military but also civilian satellites. The blast wave, radiation, and electromagnetic pulse generated by the explosion would endanger the more than 9,500 satellites currently in orbit. The suspected weapon, if developed, would add to Russia’s existing non-nuclear ASAT capabilities, which include both direct-ascent and co-orbital options. 

“Given Russia’s spurious excuses for its veto of the Security Council resolution, it is all the more important that other member states of the United Nations, especially the states-parties to the Outer Space Treaty, collectively express their support for the treaty,” Kimball said. 

While the Security Council has primary responsibility for peace and security within the United Nations system, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, a standing body set up by the UN General Assembly in 1959, could take up a resolution patterned on the U.S.-Japan Security Council resolution when the Committee convenes for its next session June 19-28.

States-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which will meet in July, should highlight their concerns about nuclear-armed ASAT weapons, and restate their support for keeping outer space free of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly, which will reconvene in September, can and should call upon all states to refrain from actions that would violate the Outer Space Treaty.

To date, 115 states, including Russia and the United States, have ratified the Outer Space Treaty and a further 23 have signed but not yet ratified it. Those 23 states, in addition to the countries that have not yet acceded, could clarify their support by finally ratifying the treaty. While most states do not operate their own satellites, they all share in the benefits of a peaceful space regime.

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, membership-based organization dedicated to providing authoritative information and practical policy solutions to address the threats posed by the world's most dangerous weapons.

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Engaging China and Russia on Arms Control: An Interview with Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart

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April 4, Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, and Carol Giacomo, editor of Arms Control Today, interview Assistant Secretary Mallory Stewart on engaging Russia and China on Arms Control.

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For Immediate Release: April 23, 2024

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Carol Giacomo, editor, (202) 463-8270 ext. 108

(Washington, D.C.)—Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart leads the recently renamed Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, which is charged with implementing and ensuring compliance with existing arms control agreements and negotiating new ones. 

Among other issues, Stewart and her team are working to address Russia’s nuclear behavior and options for nuclear arms control after the New START agreement expires in 2026 and jump-start nuclear risk reduction consultations with China, which has, so far, declined to continue the dialogue.

Working bilaterally and in multilateral forums, the bureau also has a goal of promoting responsible behavior with emerging military technologies, including artificial intelligence.

Carol Giacomo, editor of Arms Control Today, and Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, explored these issues in an April 4 interview with Stewart. 

Some highlights:

Regarding China, Stewart said, "we made very clear we would like to engage with [China] again, but we need to engage in a context in which we can both share concerns and take steps to substantively address those concerns."

The United States is willing to discuss China's suggestion  that nuclear weapons states negotiate a treaty on the no-first use of nuclear weapons against each other, but has many questions about it, Stewart told Arms Control Today.

"I would love to ask [Chinese officials] all of these questions and engage on this. I would love to ask them to explain how you can have a no-first-use policy if you just declare it and when everything you’re doing or developing seems inconsistent. If they want to engage in a conversation of the many questions raised by their no-first-use proposal, we would engage," she said in the interview.

"But in that same conversation, we should talk about other risk reduction proposals that we’ve put on the table that are as minimal as missile test launch notifications. This would be similar to the launch notification agreement that China already has with Russia. Those ideas are on the table, but so far have not been taken up by China," Stewart added.

Although the United States is advocating the adoption of an international  political declaration on the military uses of artificial intelligence, Washington eventually could see a role for a legally-binding agreement, Stewart said.

She said the proposal for a political declaration advocated by the United States and endorsed by 54 countries is "consistent" with the legally binding agreement favored by Austria and other states.

"The Austrian initiative, with respect to lethal autonomous weapons, says we should look at this issue more broadly. Our political declaration addresses a unique and different context, but is entirely consistent in the sense that we are building a common understanding of the potential risks of AI across the full range of military applications," she said. 

Asked if the State Department saw a place for a legally binding agreement, Stewart said: "Eventually, yes, if we can come to a consensus on the best path forward.”

"The challenge, of course, is that these emerging technologies evolve so quickly that if you lock that into a legally binding agreement without incorporating all the possible changes and iterations of how AI can manifest, you may lock yourself into a situation that evolves next week…. [W]e don’t even have a standard definition of what AI is with respect to its use. Is it machine learning, is it intelligent learning, is it something in between? Is AI a defined concept that everyone agrees on? Not right now, and we need to work to understand that before we can embed it in a legally binding treaty."

The full interview is now available online  and will appear in the May issue of Arms Control Today. 

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Enough is Enough

Inside the Arms Control Association    
April 2024

Today, nearly 80 years after the start of the nuclear age, the United States has more than 5,000 nuclear warheads, including some 1,770 thermonuclear warheads deployed on 660 powerful, long-range missiles on land and at sea, and on strategic bombers. In addition, the United States retains some 200 "tactical" nuclear bombs on shorter-range aircraft. Use of just a fraction of these weapons, most of which are deployed on a prompt launch status, would lead to catastrophic devastation on a global scale.