Trump Ramps Up Pressure on Iran
U.S. President Donald Trump announced steps to increase pressure on Iran over its advancing nuclear program but said he was not happy about the decision and reiterated his support for negotiating a nuclear deal.
Trump’s national security presidential memorandum, issued on Feb. 4, says that the United States will restore “maximum pressure on the government” of Iran and deny “all paths to a nuclear weapon,” according to a White House factsheet. The memorandum also emphasizes that Iran should be “denied” intercontinental ballistic missiles and that its conventional weapons capabilities, including missiles, “should be countered.”
The memorandum calls for the Treasury Department to “impose maximum economic pressure,” which includes “a campaign aimed at driving Iran’s oil exports to zero” and rescinding existing sanctions waivers. The memorandum also directs the U.S. Ambassador to the UN to “work with key allies to complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.”
Three days after Trump issued the memorandum, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appeared to reverse his support for nuclear negotiations with the United States, saying talks are “not intelligent, wise or honorable.” In a Feb. 7 speech, he said negotiations with the United States “do not solve any of [Iran’s] problems” and reiterated that Trump “tore up” the 2015 nuclear deal despite Iran’s compliance. Khamenei did not, however, order Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to refrain from engaging the Trump administration, suggesting that there may still be an opening for diplomacy.
Since taking office in August, Pezeshkian has expressed support for negotiating a nuclear deal with the United States, but he did raise concerns that Trump’s return to maximum pressure signals that the United States is not interested in diplomacy. In a Feb. 7 speech, he accused the United States of trying to bring Iran “to its knees.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, however, continued to emphasize that sanctions are an obstacle to Iran’s economic growth and must be lifted through negotiations. Iran, though, will not negotiate under “the maximum pressure policy,” he said.
It is unclear to what extent the Trump administration will act on the economic restrictions called for in the memorandum. Trump told reporters during the Feb. 4 signing that he was “torn” about signing the memorandum and that he hoped the United States would not have to use it very much. When asked what kind of deal the United States will pursue with Iran, Trump said, “we’re going to see” but noted that Iran is “too close” to nuclear weapons. Although the U.S. intelligence community assessed in November that Iran is not undertaking key activities necessary for a nuclear weapon, The New York Times reported Feb. 2 that intelligence suggests that Iranian scientists are exploring options to quickly build a crude nuclear weapon. U.S. officials have suggested in the past that it could take Iran 12-18 months to develop a nuclear warhead capable of being delivered via ballistic missile.
Trump signed the memorandum on Iran shortly before meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Feb. 4. During a press conference after the meeting, Netanyahu said he and Trump “fully agree” on the goal of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran and if maximum pressure can achieve that “so be it.”
When asked previously if the United States would support an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, Trump said he would not answer the question. He said that “hopefully” Iran will make a deal, but if Iran does not, “that’s okay too.”
Trump reiterated his opposition to military action in a Feb. 5 post on social media, saying that the reports that the United States will work with Israel to “blow Iran to smithereens, ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED.” Trump said he would much prefer a “Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement” that will allow Iran to “peacefully grow and prosper.” Although Trump said work on such a deal should “start immediately” and indicated that he is willing to speak personally with Pezeshkian, he has yet to name a lead negotiator for talks with Iran.
Other U.S. policymakers have rejected diplomacy and are calling for direct strikes against Iran’s nuclear program. Senator Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.) said he will be engaging Trump on the issue of military strikes, saying now is the time to “decimate the Iran nuclear program.” He dismissed the prospects of an agreement rolling back the nuclear program but said there is a “90% chance” of degrading it through Israeli military action backed by the United States.
Araghchi said that any attack on the country’s nuclear facilities would be met with “an immediate and decisive response” but downplayed the likelihood of strikes, saying it would be a disaster for the region.
Other Iranian officials have suggested that Tehran may rethink its position on nuclear weapons if its facilities are attacked, but Pezeshkian continues to state that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine.
Speaking at Davos on Jan. 22, Javad Zarif, Iran's Vice-President for Strategic Affairs and foreign minister during the negotiations on the 2015 nuclear deal, said that if Iran wanted a nuclear weapon, the country “could have done so a long time ago.” He expressed hope that the Trump administration “will be more serious, more focused” during its second term.
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi was also at Davos and raised concerns about the risk posed by Iran’s advancing nuclear program. Grossi said that dialogue with Iran is “absolutely indispensable.” He noted that Iran’s increased production of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a level close to weapons grade, is a clear acceleration.—KELSEY DAVENPORT, director for nonproliferation policy
Europeans Raise UN Sanctions Snapback
French President Emmanuel Macron highlighted the growing risk posed by Iran’s nuclear activities and said in a Jan. 6 speech that the “acceleration of the nuclear program leads us nearly to the point of no return.”
Macron also raised the prospect of reimposing UN sanctions on Iran before the option to do so using a veto-proof mechanism, known as snapback, expires in October 2025.
His comments followed a letter the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) sent to the Security Council in December reiterating their “determination to use all diplomatic tools necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including using snapback.”
The snapback expiration in October 2025 is largely viewed as a deadline for reaching and implementing a deal with Iran. According to paragraphs 11 and 12 of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which outlines the mechanism for snapback, the Security Council must vote on a resolution to continue sanctions lifting within 30 days of a notification to the council. If a resolution is not passed during that period, previous resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program, including 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929, will be restored.
The timeframe for triggering snapback suggests that the E3 would begin the process over the summer to ensure the measures are reimposed before the October 2025 deadline. The United States cannot trigger the snapback process because it is no longer a party to the 2015 nuclear deal.
In addition to reimposing sanctions on Iran, which include a prohibition on the import and export of conventional arms and ballistic missiles, the restoration of past resolutions would include provisions requiring Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program and certain other nuclear activities.
Iran has threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) if UN sanctions are snaped back. Iran notified the EU in writing of its intention to take that step during the Raisi administration and current President Massoud Pezeshkian reaffirmed Iran’s intention to withdraw in November 2024. Iran's withdrawal from the NPT would not necessarily mean that Tehran made the decision to develop nuclear weapons, but it would increase the risk of military strikes and shift diplomatic attention to returning Iran to the treaty.
For more on the UN measures that would be reimposed in the event of snapback, see ACA's factsheet: UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran.
Iran-E3 Discuss Nuclear Issues
Iran and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) expressed support for nuclear negotiations during a Jan. 14 meeting in Geneva. Both sides described the talks as constructive, but the meetings are unlikely to yield concrete results without U.S. participation.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that talks were “aimed at exploring how to return to nuclear negotiations.” The discussions were positive and serious, he said.
Kazem Gharibadadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, said that officials discussed “certain details in the sanctions-lifting and nuclear fields that are needed for a deal.” Iran and the E3 agreed to continue talks, he said.
Enrique Mora, the European Union's lead negotiator for Iran, also participated in the talks. He described the meetings as “constructive” and said the sides explored options for a “diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue.”
Officials participating in the meetings did not address the scope of a new nuclear arrangement, but Araghchi said after the talks that the “JCPOA formula remains valid.”
Araghchi’s comments suggest that Iran is interested in focusing on the nuclear issues and trading nuclear limits for sanctions relief, similar to the 2015 nuclear deal, or JCPOA.
Iran Closes 2024 with Nuclear Expansion
Iran announced steps in late 2024 to significantly increase its enrichment capacity, including the production of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels at its underground Fordow facility.
In late November, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its intentions to install an additional 45 cascades of advanced centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium more efficiently than the IR-1 model Iran was limited to using for enrichment under the JCPOA. The announcement was a response to the IAEA Board of Governors censuring Iran for failing to comply with its safeguards obligations and a years-long investigation into uranium found at undeclared sites.
Prior to the announcement, the IAEA noted in a Nov. 19 report that Iran had 108 installed cascades of centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow, of which 78 were operational. Under the JCPOA, Iran was permitted to enrich uranium using 30 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz. An additional six cascades of IR-1 machines were permitted to remain at Fordow, but those machines could not be used for uranium enrichment.
In early December, Iran notified the IAEA that it would begin feeding 20 percent enriched uranium into two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow to produce 60 percent enriched material. The IAEA confirmed this change on Dec. 6.
The IR-6 cascades were already producing 60 percent enriched uranium, but Iran was using 5 percent enriched material as feed. As a result of the change in feed, the IAEA assessed that Iran’s monthly production of 60 percent enriched uranium at Fordow would jump from about 4.7 kilograms to about 34 kilograms.
Grossi said at Davos that Iran is “pressing the gas pedal” on enrichment and has stockpiled about 200 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent.
Uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235 poses a more serious proliferation risk because it can quickly be enriched to the 90 percent U-235 that is considered weapons grade. The consolidation of 20 percent material and 60 percent material at Fordow is also concerning, given that the deeply buried site is challenging to target with conventional military strikes.
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (E3) condemned Iran’s actions in a joint Dec. 9 statement and strongly urged Iran to “reverse these steps” and “immediately halt its nuclear escalation.” The statement reiterated that Iran’s highly enriched uranium activities have “no civilian justification.”
Iran did agree to allow more frequent IAEA inspections, as required by its comprehensive safeguards agreement, but refused to hold off on the changes until after the agency could design a safeguards approach. The agency reported on Dec. 11 that Tehran agreed to “increase the frequency and intensity” of IAEA safeguards at Fordow, and the agency implemented those measures.
Iran’s decision to expand its uranium enrichment program appears to be aimed at building leverage ahead of any negotiations with the Trump administration. Although Iran does possess an operating nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, fuel for that unit is provided under a contract with Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear energy company. Rosatom will also supply the other units being built at the Bushehr site. Iran’s operating research reactor, known as the TRR, runs on 20 percent enriched uranium. Fuel for the TRR is provided to Iran under the 2015 nuclear deal. Even if the remaining parties to the nuclear deal are currently unwilling or unable to provide Iran with fuel for the reactor, Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent material significantly exceeds its domestic needs. Iran has no civil justification for producing and stockpiling uranium enriched to 60 percent.
Iran Displays New Missile, Conducts Drills
Iran displayed a new ballistic missile, which it claims has a range of 1,700 kilometers. The missile, dubbed the Etemad, was unveiled during a Feb. 2 ceremony celebrating the country’s national aerospace day. In remarks at the event, President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Iran’s defense capabilities “aims to ensure that no country dares to attack Iranian territory.”
Iran also displayed its satellite capabilities during the event.
Iran’s unveiling of the new missile comes amidst continued tensions with Israel. In addition to displaying the Etemad, which is capable of targeting Israel, Iran began a large-scale military exercise in January that will run through mid-March and unveiled a new underground missile storage facility.
General Ali Mohammad Naeini, spokesman for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said the drills were focused on “new security threats.” The exercises included testing air defense systems around Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israeli counterstrikes against Iran damaged air defenses and targeted Irani’s missile production sites, but Naeini maintained that Iran continues to produce missiles and its “defense systems are fully alive.”
The new underground missile facility is located on the south coast of Iran and is capable of storing “hundreds of cruise missiles,” according to the IRGC. The missiles can be “operational in a very short time,” according to the IRGC.
In Case You Missed It…
- Test Diplomacy with a Weakened Iran, International Crisis Group, Jan. 30
- Nicole Grajewski and Or Rabinowitz, Will Iran and Russia’s Growing Partnership Go Nuclear? How Trump’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Could Push Tehran and Moscow Even Closer, Foreign Affairs, Jan. 28
- Sina Azodi, Only Trump Can Go to Tehran, Foreign Policy, Jan. 8
- Kelsey Davenport, U.S. Options for Iran Diplomacy in 2025, Just Security, Dec. 23
- Jamie Kwong and Nicole Grajewski, Will Iran Withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?, War on the Rocks, Nov. 1