Iran’s president-elect Masoud Pezeshkian called for improving ties with the West and expressed support for nuclear negotiations during his campaign but said that Tehran cannot be pressured into rolling back its nuclear activities. It is not clear, however, how much space the Supreme Leader will give Pezeshkian to pursue engagement over the country’s nuclear program.
Pezeshkian, a member of parliament since 2006 and a former health minister, beat the hard-line, former nuclear negotiator and deputy foreign minister Saeed Jalili in a July 5 runoff. Pezeshkian was the sole reformist amongst the six candidates cleared to run and his victory was a surprise.
In the lead-up to the election, Pezeshkian called sanctions a “serious detriment” to Iran and said he aims to “normalize relations with the world.” He also defended the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
After his election, in a July 12 op-ed in the Tehran Times, Pezeshkian said that “Iran’s defense doctrine does not include nuclear weapons.” His assertion comes amid an uptick in comments from current and former officials suggesting that Iran will rethink its nuclear doctrine and pursue a nuclear deterrent if the security environment shifts.
Pezeshkian also wrote that the United States “unlawfully withdrew” from the JCPOA and “deliberately chose to escalate hostilities.” Washington needs to recognize that Iran “does not—and will not—respond to pressure,” he said and urged the United States to “learn from past miscalculations and adjust its policy accordingly.”
While he did not explicitly discuss negotiating with the United States, Pezeshkian said in the op-ed that the Iranian people “have entrusted me with a strong mandate to vigorously pursue constructive engagement on the international stage.” He also expressed an interest in “engaging in constructive dialogue with European countries to set our relations on the right path.”
It is unclear, however, how much latitude Pezeshkian will have to shape Iran’s relations with the West after he takes office in August. It is unlikely that the country’s nuclear policy, which is determined by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, will shift significantly from its current trajectory, which appears focused on cementing Iran’s status as a state on the threshold of nuclear weapons.
Before Pezeshkian’s election, however, comments from Iranian officials suggested that Tehran is interested in de-escalation with the United States and does not seek a broader conflict. Furthermore, Khamenei allowed the Raisi government to negotiate an informal understanding with the United States in 2023 to lower tensions, which included a commitment by Tehran to take limited steps to roll back some of its more proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
This suggests there may be some political space in Tehran for Pezeskhian to maneuver on the nuclear front to fulfill his campaign pledge to reduce sanctions pressure and improve the economy.
Even if Pezeshkian does have space domestically to negotiate, he will likely face constraints on the U.S. side. Following the election, Biden administration officials cast doubt on Washington’s willingness to negotiate with the new Iranian president and, with the U.S. presidential election looming in November, the political will may not exist to engage.
In a July 8 press briefing, U.S. National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby stated bluntly the United States is not ready to resume talks with Iran, citing Iran’s support for terrorist groups and Russia’s war in Ukraine.
However, U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said in a July 8 press briefing that while the United States has “no expectations” that Pezeshkian’s election will lead to “fundamental change in Iran’s direction or its policies,” if Pezeshkian has the authority to “make steps to curtail Iran’s nuclear program” those actions would be welcome.
The Biden administration continues to see diplomacy as “the most effective way to achieve an effective, sustainable solution with regard to Iran’s nuclear program,” but that “we are far from any kind of meaningful diplomatic resolution” given Iranian escalations, Miller said.
Although Kirby made clear the United States is not negotiating with Iran, the Biden administration is in contact with Tehran. According to a July 17 report by Axios, the United States sent a message to Iran in June raising concerns about certain suspicious activities conducted by Iranian scientists that could be relevant to weaponization. In its response, Iran explained the activities and reiterated that the country is not developing nuclear weapons. A U.S. official quoted in the Axios piece said that the intelligence community continues to assess that Iran is not undertaking key activities relevant to developing a nuclear weapon.—KELSEY DAVENPORT, director for nonproliferation policy
Iran Installs Additional Centrifuges
Iran responded to a June censure from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Board of Governors by announcing plans to install additional advanced centrifuges at its Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities.
The June 5 censure reaffirms language from the board’s November 2022 resolution, which decided it is “essential and urgent” for Iran to clarify “all outstanding safeguards issues,” including providing the agency with “technically credible explanations” for the presence of uranium at two locations in Iran that were not declared to the IAEA. The resolution also calls on Tehran to provide the agency with design information for new nuclear facilities, as required under Modified Code 3.1 of Iran’s legally binding safeguards agreement.
Iran described the resolution as “hasty and unwise.” In a June 5 statement, Mohsen Naziri Asl, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, said the resolution would “severely affect” efforts between Tehran and the agency to address outstanding issues.
The June 5 resolution was the fourth censure passed by the board since the agency began its investigation into past undeclared nuclear activities in 2019. The measure passed 20-2, with China and Russia voting against it and 12 states abstaining.
Russia and China joined Belarus, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe in a June 5 joint statement criticizing the resolution before the vote. The states called the approach “unconstructive and confrontational.” They called on all states to provide the IAEA and Iran “with the necessary time and space to take further constructive efforts.”
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were the driving force behind the resolution, after having threatened in March to pursue a censure during the June board meeting if there was no progress on the safeguards investigation.
Asl said the Europeans will “bear responsibility” for Iran’s actions in response to the resolution.
The United States was initially opposed to the European plan to pursue the resolution but did vote for it during the meeting. In a June 5 statement expressing U.S. support for the censure, Laura Holgate, U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, said that the resolution must be “tied to a broader strategy.” It should be a “first step” toward “achieving a sustainable, effective solution to Iran’s nuclear program that includes full cooperation with the IAEA,” Holgate said.
Although the censure was expected after IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi reported no progress on the safeguards investigation in his May 27 report, Iran did not immediately announce retaliatory steps.
The following week, however, the IAEA reported that Iran notified the agency of its intention to install an additional 18 cascades of IR-2 centrifuges at the fuel enrichment plant at Natanz and an additional eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant. Although the IAEA report did not mention if Iran would be using the IR-2 and IR-6 centrifuges to enrich uranium, the installation still poses a risk as it significantly expands Iran’s enrichment capacity. The IR-2s and IR-6s enrich uranium more efficiently than the IR-1 model, which Iran was limited to using for 10 years under the 2015 nuclear deal.
The installation of additional IR-6s at Fordow is particularly concerning because of the location of the facility. Deeply buried in the mountains near Qom, Fordow would be difficult to strike with conventional weapons. Furthermore, Iran is already enriching uranium to 60 percent at the site using previously installed IR-6 machines that are configured with modified subheaders, which allow Iran to switch between enrichment levels more quickly.
Iran had previously threatened to expand capacity at Fordow. Tehran announced in November 2022 its intentions to install an additional eight cascades of IR-6s and IR-1s at the site but did not deploy any new machines until after the June resolution.
On June 11, the IAEA verified that Iran had completed the installation of two of the six cascades at Fordow and that installation of the remaining four cascades was underway. In a subsequent report June 28, the IAEA verified that Iran completed the installation of two additional cascades of IR-6s at Fordow.
The speed at which Iran installed the IR-6s indicates that Tehran had already produced the centrifuges. Iran's ability to quickly install the machines highlights the risk posed by monitoring gaps on Iran's nuclear activities. The IAEA does not know how many centrifuges Iran possesses and where the machines are stockpiled.
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom raised particular concern about Fordow expansion in a June 15 statement, saying that “Iran’s decision to substantially increase its production capacity at the underground Fordow facility is especially concerning.”
The statement also noted that it is “not acceptable” for Iran to present its action as a response to a censure resolution calling for Iranian cooperation in meeting its legally binding safeguards agreement.
U.S. State Department spokesperson Matt Miller said in a June 14 press release that Iran’s nuclear expansion has “no credible peaceful purpose” and that the United States will respond “if Iran implements these plans.”
Security Council Holds Contentious Meeting on Iran
The United States and Russia clashed over Iran’s nuclear program during a biannual discussion on the implementation of Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal.
During the June 24 meeting, representatives from Iran, Russia, and China continued to express support for the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, whereas the United States and Europe raised concerns about Iran’s advancing nuclear program.
U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the UN Robert Wood accused Iran of expanding its nuclear program into areas that have “no credible civilian purpose.” He said the United States still prefers to resolve the nuclear crisis diplomatically but reiterated that Washington will take whatever means necessary to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia accused the United States of making empty promises to return to the JCPOA. Some states are “doing everything possible to continuously rock the boat” and “jettisoning opportunities” for reimplementation of the accord, he said.
Iran’s Ambassador to the UN, Amir Saeid Iravani, said that the JCPOA’s revival remains the “best option” and said Tehran will reverse its nuclear advances if sanctions are “lifted fully and verifiably.”
The biannual meeting included a presentation of the secretary-general’s report on the implementation of Resolution 2231.
The report referenced a June 3 letter from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom noting Iran’s “extensive violations” of the JCPOA’s commitments and arguing that “Iran’s nuclear escalation has hollowed out the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, significantly reducing its non-proliferation value.”
The letter also said that Iran’s nuclear advances make it more difficult for Tehran to return to full implementation of the JCPOA. During the meeting, the E3 also raised concerns about Iranian statements that the country has the technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons.
In a June 5 response to the letter, Iran refuted the E3 claims and said its nuclear advances were taken in compliance with the JCPOA. The letter accused the E3 of failing to meet their commitments under the accord.
Iran Expands Missile Production Facilities
Iranian officials confirmed to Reuters that the country is expanding its missile production facilities at the Modarres military base and the Khojir missile production complex after U.S. analysts detected changes in satellite images of those sites.
One of the analysts who discovered the expansion, Jeffery Lewis from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, told Reuters that the construction at Khojir began in August 2023 and Modarres in October. The construction includes more than 30 new buildings and berms associated with missile production activities.
According to one of the Iranian officials quoted in the July 8 Reuters piece, the expansion will enable Iran to double its drone manufacturing capabilities.
Ballistic missiles and drones play a significant role in Iran’s national security and in recent years the country has invested in new systems.
Furthermore, Iran is supplying Russia with drones for use in Ukraine and has discussed the transfer of ballistic missiles. UN provisions prohibiting Iran from selling missiles and drones expired in October 2023, but U.S. and European officials have warned Iran against transferring ballistic missiles to Russia. Prohibitions on selling missiles to groups such as the Houthis remain in place under separate resolutions, but Tehran consistently violated those restrictions.
Further Evidence Suggests Iranian Interest in Niger Uranium
Iranian talks with Niger to purchase 300 tons of refined uranium ore, referred to as yellowcake, are advancing, according to French media reports. Iran may also be seeking a uranium mining license.
Niger is one of the largest exporters of uranium, particularly to the European Union but its relationship with Europe and the United States has soured since a military junta took control of the country in a July 2023 coup and began aligning more closely with Russia.
According to reporting in The Wall Street Journal in March, U.S. concerns about Iran’s interest in Niger’s uranium contributed to the junta severing its counterterrorism ties with Washington and ordering U.S. troops out of the country. In April the junta rejected accusations that it had reached a deal with Iran and accused the United States of manufacturing the allegations.
In June, the junta revoked a permit for Orano, a French company that was developing one of the world’s largest uranium mines in northern Niger. Niger’s Ministry for Mining said that Orano’s development plan did not meet the country’s expectations and that the mine would be returned to the “public domain.”
Iran operates domestic uranium mines, but the output is limited. The IAEA monitored Iran’s uranium mines under the 2015 nuclear deal but no longer has access to those sites. The agency has raised concerns about the challenges in verifying Iran’s stockpiles of uranium ore concentrate given the monitoring gaps. The challenges in reestablishing a baseline for uranium ore down the road could be amplified if Iran imports yellowcake from Niger.
In Case You Missed It…
- Kelsey Davenport, Constraining Iran’s Nuclear Potential in the Absence of the JCPOA, Arms Control Association Policy White Paper, July 2025
- Ali Vaez, Will Pezeshkian’s Win Lead to a Thaw in U.S.-Iran Relations?,Foreign Policy, July 12
- Ellie Geranmayeh, Managed reform: What Iran’s new president means for European diplomacy, European Council on Foreign Relations, July 10
- Eric Brewer, Iran’s New Nuclear Threat: How Tehran Has Weaponized Its Threshold Status, Foreign Affairs, June 25
- Toby Dalton and Ariel Levite, Iran’s Nuclear Threshold Challenge, War on the Rocks, May 23