Nuclear Disarmament Monitor
March 20, 2025
U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a two-hour call on March 18 on the war in Ukraine, reaching a limited agreement to stop attacks on electrical infrastructure. The Kremlin mentioned in its readout of the call that the two sides had discussed cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, while the U.S. statement said the presidents addressed “the need to stop proliferation of strategic weapons.”
What is not yet clear is whether the two presidents have begun to discuss ideas regarding how to manage the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship and what arrangements might replace the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires on February 5, 2026.
Russian officials continue to indicate they are ready to discuss arms control and strategic stability more generally with the United States. Trump has by now shown that his call for “denuclearization” is not a passing interest.
Trump has said on three occasions in recent weeks he wants to engage Russia in China in talks on nuclear arms control. In January, in response to a question about China-U.S. relations, he said: “Tremendous amounts of money are being spent on nuclear, and the destructive capability is something that we don’t even want to talk about .... So, we want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible.”
But Russian spokesman Dmitry Peskov has made clear that the onus is on the United States to bring China into talks if it insists – and if it can. The Chinese foreign ministry, as recently as late February, has not deviated from the country’s traditional view that the U.S. and Russia have a “special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament.”
Thus, the clearest path forward toward keeping caps on the nuclear arms race remains a bilateral U.S.-Russian agreement to maintain New START limits until such time as a fuller arms control treaty can be negotiated.
On February 19, twenty members of Congress co-signed a letter organized by the co-chairs of the Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control working group calling on the administration to pursue such an agreement. The co-signatories included Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), the ranking member of the senate armed services committee, and Sen. Angus King (I-M.E.), the ranking member of the committee’s strategic forces subcommittee.
The letter urges the president “to work with Congress to replace New START and prevent a dangerous and costly arms race between the United States and Russia, the world’s two largest nuclear powers. We also ask that the Department of State provide a briefing on the Administration’s plan for New START in a timely manner.”
The members of Congress also wrote that: “The Trump Administration has a historic opportunity to initiate high-level talks for a new pact and, until those talks reach completion, to mutually agree to respect the limits of New START using existing technical means of verification. Given the time it would take to negotiate a new agreement, an executive understanding that both sides will adhere to New START limits would help to reduce uncertainty in this interim period. It is critical that the Administration not increase the U.S. arsenal above New START limits or resume nuclear testing, which would set back the bipartisan progress made on nuclear nonproliferation and arms control.”
—Xiaodon Liang, senior policy analyst; Shizuka Kuramitsu, research assistant; Libby Flatoff, operations and program assistant; Lipi Shetty, Scoville Peace Fellow.
U.S. Policy Uncertainty Prompts Proliferation Concerns
Less than two months after the new U.S. administration entered office, and after President Trump and his team made statements critical of European allies and partners and sympathetic to Russian President Vladimir Putin, interest in nuclear proliferation and statements of reliance on nuclear deterrence are growing across the globe, including in France, Poland, and South Korea.
On March 5, French President Emmanuel Macron said Paris would consider discussions with European allies about extending France’s nuclear deterrence to counter threats posed by Russia. Reflecting the aftermath of the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington, as well as a request from incoming German chancellor Friedrich Merz, Macron said France has “decided to open the strategic debate on the protection of our allies on the European continent through our nuclear deterrence.”
After Macron initiated a discussion about a new nuclear umbrella over Europe, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told lawmakers on March 7 that Poland is considering the French proposal. He also highlighted the need for Poland to invest in more advanced capabilities overall, with no options off the table. While welcoming the French proposal, Polish President Andrzej Duda reiterated his call for the United States to base nuclear weapons in Poland as another option. That idea had been previously rejected by the Biden administration and was met with skepticism from the U.S. vice president, J.D. Vance, during an interview with Fox News on March 13.
Proliferation discussions have been sparked not only in Europe, but also in the Indo-Pacific. Earlier, South Korea’s foreign minister, Cho Tae-yuk, speaking on February 27 before the National Assembly, said the option of developing nuclear weapons to counter North Korea is not “off the table.”
In March, reports confirmed that the U.S. Department of Energy had recently designated South Korea as a “sensitive country,” indicating potentially serious proliferation concerns.
TPNW States Meet to Review Reports, Assess Trust Fund Options
The Third Meeting of State Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) took place from March 3 to March 7 in New York. Under the presidency of Kazakhstan, the meeting produced several outcome documents, including a political declaration and package of decisions. At the meeting, working groups and other entities presented seven topical reports to highlight intersessional progress since the second meeting of states-parties.
Mexico presented a report of the gender focal point, highlighting actions carried out to address the gendered impacts of nuclear weapons in the treaty, and the meaningful participation of women in its processes. Austria presented a report on security concerns of states under the TPNW, noting the humanitarian consequences and risks associated with nuclear weapons, as well as a lack of evidence on the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Co-chairs Kazakhstan and Kiribati presented a report of the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance. The report addresses the need for, benefits of, and feasibility of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation, and offers key recommendations on its establishment. The full list of all seven reports, along with over 30 submitted working papers, can be found here.
Civil society organizations, including affected community networks, hosted over 70 side events across New York City, as a part of Nuclear Ban Week 2025.
Comments Open on Los Alamos Environmental Impact Study
On January 10, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) published its Draft Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), as required by the National Environmental Policy Act. The SWEIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts of not only continuing existing LANL operations, but also those of foreseeable operations and facilities over the next 15 years.
The draft SWEIS is open for comment for 60 days, during which the public can raise substantive and procedural transparency concerns. The deadline is April 10, 2025. The Union of Concerned Scientists is hosting a training on submitting comments on March 27.
Key issues, according to Nuclear Watch New Mexico, include expanded plutonium “pit” production, a proposed biosafety Level-3 facility, proposed tritium releases, a new transmission line across Caja del Rio, and nuclear waste cleanup. All of these pose potential public and ecological health concerns, especially in culturally sensitive areas like the Caja del Rio.
On January 21, the Trump administration issued an Executive Order (EO) called “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-based Opportunity,” which, among other measures, revoked the “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations” EO of 1994. It remains unclear how the SWEIS will be impacted by the new EO and if environmental justice issues will be represented in the final statement. 58% of the population that live within 50 miles of LANL are minorities.
China Convenes P5 Meeting
The Chinese foreign ministry confirmed in December that the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty met on December 4 in the P5 format at the expert level in the United Arab Emirates. According to the brief statement released by the Chinese foreign ministry, the five countries agreed that the “discussion was timely for the purposes of enhancing understanding of each other's nuclear doctrines and avoiding misunderstanding and miscalculation.”
In the March issue of Arms Control Today, Tom Countryman, ACA board chairman and former assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, shared his recommendations for improving the P5 process.
Countryman notes that despite its promising beginning 15 years ago, the P5 talks have become an infrequent and unfruitful channel of communication. He suggests keeping to a strict schedule of meetings, a broader list of potential topics to prioritize in talks, and a focus on building the January 2022 statement that “nuclear war cannot be won must never be fought” by reaffirming other similar statements such as the need for a de facto moratorium on nuclear testing.
Scottish Nationalist Leaders Reaffirm Disarmament Support
The Scottish National Party (SNP), a longtime supporter of the nuclear disarmament movement, has reaffirmed its opposition to the stationing of UK nuclear forces in Scotland. A former leader of the party in the UK parliament, Ian Blackford, triggered a brief controversy when he published an opinion piece in The Times of London arguing for a shift from a unilateral disarmament policy toward a multilateral approach. The Scottish Labour party was quick to take advantage of the potential SNP split, with leader Anas Sarwar calling on the SNP to endorse the UK’s Trident-based nuclear forces.
But the SNP’s spokesperson for foreign policy, Stephen Gethins, rejected Blackford’s proposal in a Mar. 9 television interview, arguing instead for the party’s current policy of pursuing a non-nuclear role within the NATO alliance. That approach was also backed by John Swinney, the current leader of the SNP in the Scottish parliament.
Disarmament Calendar:
- Mar. 1: Nuclear Remembrance Day
- Mar. 5: 55th Anniversary of Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entry into force
- Mar. 3-7: Third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
- Mar. 21: 16th Anniversary of Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia entry into force
- Mar. 27: 28th Anniversary of Treaty of Bangkok (NWFZ Southeast Asia) entry into force
- April 5: Anniversary of 2009 Obama Prague speech
- Apr. 7-25: UN Disarmament Commission, New York
- April 8:15th anniversary of (2010) signing of the New START Treaty
- April 21-22: Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, D.C.
- Apr. 25: 56th Anniversary of Treaty of Tlatelolco (NWFZ of Latin America and Caribbean) entry into force
- Apr. 28 - May 9: Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the Eleventh Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), New York
- May 12-13: Informal Consultation on lethal autonomous weapons systems, New York
- May 12-13: Informal Preparatory Meeting, for the Eleventh Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Geneva
- June 12-13: Cross-Disciplinary Conference: Paths to Disarmament in Times of Nuclear Threat, in Uppsala University, Sweden
- June 12: Anniversary of 1982 NYC “Nuclear Freeze” Rally for Jobs, Peace, and Justice
- June 24-26: NATO Summit in The Hague
In Case You Missed It:
“Life After New START: Navigating a New Period of Nuclear Arms Control,” by Mike Albertson, Arms Control Today, January/February 2025.
“Written Input to the UN Secretary-General’s analysis on the impact of the global increase in military expenditure on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals,” Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, February 12, 2025.
“Reawakening a Nuclear Legacy: The Potential Return of the US Nuclear Mission to RAF Lakenheath,” by Eliana Johns and Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, February 1, 2025.
“Making Sense of Trump’s Talk of Denuclearization,’” by Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Today, March 2025.
“Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense: Challenges to Defending the U.S.,” American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs, March 3, 2025.
“Nihon Hidankyo calls for nuclear arms abolition at UN conference,” NHK World, March 3, 2025
“Explainer: How realistic is France's offer to extend its nuclear umbrella?,” Reuters, March 6, 2025
“Nuclear Proliferation Will Haunt America First,” by Ankit Panda, Vipin Narang, and Pranay Vaddi, War on the Rocks, March 10, 2025.
“Chinese nuclear weapons, 2025,” by Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 12, 2025.
“As Trump Stirs Doubt, Europeans Debate Their Own Nuclear Deterrent” The New York Times, March 14, 2025.
“The Art of a New Iranian Deal in 2025,” by Kelsey Davenport, Arms Control Association Issue Brief, March 19, 2025.