April 2026

The Trillion Dollar War Machine: How Runaway Military Spending Drives America into Foreign Wars and Bankrupts Us at Home

William D. Hartung and Ben Freeman
Bold Type Books
November 2025

William D. Hartung and Ben Freeman uncover how the U.S. “war machine” has grown much larger than the “military industrial complex” that President Dwight Eisenhower once imagined. They present a framework to understand the war machine and offer a path toward shutting it down in order to reestablish U.S. security. This book reveals how politicians, lobbyists, Hollywood, universities, and others fuel the war machine to enrich a powerful elite at everyone else’s expense. From extensive costs to media promotion, this book exposes the real issues behind the war machine. The authors assert that relying on military spending to deliver “safety, security, and prosperity” is an outdated and misleading approach because the war machine weakens U.S. safety by pushing the country toward seemingly endless wars. They urge loosening the political grip of militarism to move toward reform. The authors highlight how the illusion of “military-fueled prosperity” stifles the ability to envision a livable world and say a new vision of U.S. foreign policy would abandon the supposed necessity of military domination. When Americans refuse to accept endless U.S. wars abroad, they take the first meaningful step toward breaking the war machine, the authors suggest. Arguing that public pressure is essential to reducing militarization, the book urges people across the political spectrum to oppose the war machine and pursue peace. They remind readers that the greatest cost of the machine is not the dollars spent, but the lives lost.—NAOMI SATOH

Eighty Years into the Nuclear Age: Where Are We and Where Are We Going? A Perspective from Mexico and Latin America

By María Antonieta Jáquez Huacuja and Abelardo Rodríguez Sumano (eds.)
The Mexican Association of International Studies (AMEI)
2025

The editors compiled viewpoints on nuclear weapons from Mexican and Latin American diplomats, academics, and civil society advocates in their book, A 80 años de la era nuclear, ¿dónde estamos y a dónde vamos? Una mirada desde México y América Latina, published in Spanish. Positing that past disarmament and security agreements were characterized by a unipolar international structure of the Cold War era that has limited development of a true balanced, multilateralist disarmament regime, Jáquez Huacuja and Rodríguez look for new, modern, multilateral solutions that include the Latin American and Caribbean regions. Throughout five sections, they make the case that the UN General Assembly should convene a new special session to “redefine guiding principles, revitalize multilateral commitment, give an effective voice to civil society, and address new strategic threats of the 21st century with a truly inclusive and transparent focus.” States in Latin America and the Caribbean “must assume leadership” to this end, they write. In an email exchange, Jáquez Huacuja told the Arms Control Association that “There are very few books on this issue in Spanish [and] with Latin American authors only, so we hope this can contribute to the reflection on nuclear disarmament issues in this very complicated time and age.”—LIBBY FLATOFF

April 2026

For 56 years, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), has been the bedrock of the system of international norms and agreements designed to reduce and eliminate nuclear risks. With 191 states-parties, it has the widest adherence to any arms control agreement. Five of the signatories—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are recognized as nuclear-weapon states and the rest of the signatories are non-nuclear-weapon states. 

Under the treaty, the first group commits to pursue complete disarmament and to eschew helping others develop or acquire nuclear weapons, whereas the second group agrees to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. The NPT’s contributions to security have been significant, but as states-parties prepare to hold their 2026 NPT Review Conference from April 27 to May 22 in New York to take stock of the treaty and agree on a future plan of action, the challenges to progress are formidable, including fractures between the United States and its allies, a Russian war in Ukraine, a U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, a nuclear buildup in several countries, and an impasse in arms control negotiations. 

Arms Control Today’s publisher, Daryl G. Kimball, and its chief editor, Carol Giacomo, interviewed Conference President Do Hung Viet, Vietnam’s UN ambassador, about his expectations for the meeting. This interview, conducted before Israel and the United States struck Iran February 28, has been edited for space and coherence.

Arms Control Today: As UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitzu recently noted, the 2026 Review Conference comes at a “moment of profound challenge for international peace and security. Multilateral cooperation, and the architecture that underpins it, is under huge strain. Geopolitical tensions are high and rising, while dialogue among nuclear-weapon states has stagnated. Decades of hard-won progress in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation—progress that has significantly contributed to global stability—are being reversed.” In your view, has the NPT succeeded in improving international peace and security? Why do you think it’s still important today, not only to the five recognized nuclear-armed states, but also to the non-nuclear-state majority?

Ambassador Do Hung Viet: I think you framed it well in saying that the NPT is the bedrock of international security. I think this is the understanding and the view of a vast majority of state-parties to the NPT. It has served us really well over the past decades. If we look at the numbers alone, when the NPT itself was adopted and ratified and came into effect, there was an expectation that the number of nuclear-weapon states would increase—the number is in the thirties. But up to now, the NPT has been quite successful in limiting that number.

Secondly, I think it has really served as a cornerstone for good-faith discussions and dialogues, and building trust within the international community that security can best be preserved by not possessing nuclear weapons, rather than [by] getting access to them. This is extremely important because it builds the trust that is needed in an atmosphere [in which] there is continuous competition among the major powers, [and] also many regional competition disputes and conflicts. And with the NPT, that has really been limited.

Thirdly, I think the NPT has been successful in facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy and science and applications. I was in Vienna a couple of weeks ago, and I visited the [International Atomic Energy Agency's] Seibersdorf lab, and really could see with my own eyes how much benefit nuclear energy can indeed bring, especially in the developing world, ranging from healthcare to environmental protection to waste management to water management and, of course, power generation. The NPT has created the framework for the use of nuclear energy in the much broader sense.

So, I think the NPT has truly succeeded. Today it is facing a lot of strain, but it is still extremely important that we work to maintain this important framework to perhaps rebuild the credibility that the NPT has and the trust that the international community has in the NPT and in a multilateral rules-based framework in general.

ACT: How do you rebuild trust? How do you think that the upcoming NPT conference can help reverse the negative trends?

Viet: Since I have taken up this job as president of the review conference, I have tried my best to really be in a listening mode, to hear the concerns, the priorities, the expectations of state-parties. I think the most important aspect of the RevCon is to create a space for state-parties to share these concerns and priorities with each other, create a space for dialogue among not only the nuclear-weapon states but between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, between developed and developing countries, between those who have access and those who do not have access to nuclear energy, to create this space for dialogue, which ultimately, I believe, enhances trust. And that basically is the virtue of multilateralism and multilateral cooperation. Now, I intend to create and facilitate such a space.

I have heard in my consultations complaints about how the process has been run in past review conferences, where some feel that they have been left out of the conversation, that there were things going on that they were not informed of or they could not participate in, not having the capacity to participate in, which led to the discussion about strengthening the review process that we have seen going on since the last review conference in 2022. So, I intend to build on those discussions, try to be a bit innovative without being disruptive, try to improve the process itself, improve how the conference is run, so as to allow all delegations, no matter how big or small, to be able to participate in all of the meetings, in all of the discussions, and to ensure that this process is run in a most efficient and transparent and inclusive manner. I think that may help us all come out of the conference with a bit more confidence in the review conference itself and the process that is run.

ACT: As you know, the benchmark for every successful NPT review conference is trying to achieve one that produces a final conference document that reviews implementation of the treaty and outlines an agreed forward-looking action plan. Why is that an important purpose of the conference?

Viet: The success of any review conference has indeed been defined by a single, or a set of, outcome documents. But in my consultations, there are also other views. Some delegates believe that we need a big document that has a review part, kind of looking back, and also the forward-looking part covering every single aspect of the treaty and what’s going on. At the other end of the spectrum, some have mentioned that we should have different metrics for success, that the success of the conference should not be defined solely by an outcome document [but perhaps by] particular outcomes—for example, some delegates are talking about the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement, which now we’re trying to get the three remaining countries to sign onto. They say that can be attributed as a success of the NPT conference.

But to me—and this message I have been trying to [convey to] all state-parties in the consultations—we do need a consensus outcome document. This is important for a couple of reasons. Number one, we have seen two consecutive review conferences without such an agreement. Of course, in today’s world, when a conference or a UN meeting [ends] with no outcome document, it won’t immediately be labeled as a failure. [But that has happened] twice already [with review conferences], and a third time without such an outcome document, I think, will send an extremely negative signal to the international community.

It may not put an end to the NPT itself, but as UN Undersecretary-General Izumi Nakamitzu has often put it, it may hollow out the NPT. We may lose the credibility of the NPT itself, and the review process. To me, an outcome document will show to the world, our constituencies, our people, that they can still rely on the NPT for their security, and that they can be confident that governments are still working towards ensuring better security for all through these dialogues and discussions and sticking to the commitments that they have.

ACT: How are you organizing your preconference consultations? You’ve had some regional workshops. Are you in consultation with the five nuclear-armed NPT members? Tell us a little bit more about your style of these consultations and what more might take place before April 27.

Viet: I started my consultations in October and I have done four regional consultations in Hanoi for the Asia-Pacific group, in Addis Ababa for the African group, in Amman for the Middle East and North African group, and most recently in Panama City for the Latin America and Caribbean group. I’ve also had my consultations in New York and in Vienna with the Non-Aligned Movement, with the East European group, with the Western European and other states group. I have also visited some capitals, including four of the five nuclear-weapon states. And I plan next week to be in Geneva, again to have these consultations with our colleagues there, and then also visit Moscow. So, again, the approach is to ensure that I understand fully the concerns and priorities of all state-parties.

ACT: As you said, achieving a final conference document is seen as important. Are you planning any approach that might be different from the past review conferences in terms of how the final conference document is put together? For instance, are you planning to put out an early draft before the conference or at the beginning? Conferences go by very quickly. Are you going to be using the tool of recruiting formal or informal friends of the chair? What are your plans to deal with the procedural mechanics of consultations at the meeting?

Viet: I mentioned earlier that I’m trying to be a little bit innovative with the structure of the conference…. I am making these proposals, keeping in mind that we all want the conference to be effective, efficient. I want to emphasize, in particular, that the conference is inclusive and transparent in its running. So, when it comes to the outcome document, I intend to prepare a draft to be presented to state-parties earlier on, maybe in the middle of the second week of the conference. That will allow the main committees to start discussions surrounding the draft outcome document and allow, basically, a bit more than two weeks for the negotiations of such outcome document. This is kind of a lessons-learned process that I’ve learned from previous conferences, including president of the last review conference, Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen [of Argentina]. The issue of the so-called group of friends has also come up several times. Now, to me, everyone is a friend.

ACT: Or you hope. [laughter]

Viet: I have to say that it is difficult to identify a smaller group that I should call friends and excluding others who may understand that they may not be seen as my friend. So, I try to avoid that track. Instead, I’m trying to make the best use of the mechanics or the institutional makeup of the conference itself. So, there is the bureau of the conference; there is the general committee, which coordinates the overall work of the conference with 34 vice presidents; and then the chairs of the main committees. There are other frameworks within the institutional makeup of the conference that I think can really be used in a more efficient manner and still, at the same time, ensure that it is representative, that it is inclusive, and basically has legitimacy, to ensure that everyone can say that they have been part of the process.

ACT: The treaty stands on three pillars—nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament—and a longstanding goal agreed to at past NPT meetings has been to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and expand the number of states that have an additional protocol agreement with the IAEA. However, since the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement and bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities last year, the IAEA has not been allowed to return to key sites in Iran. Meanwhile, some states that have shown an interest in nuclear energy, such as Saudi Arabia, do not have additional protocol agreements in place. What can be done to strengthen support for effective safeguards at this conference?

Viet: I think the overall message is a very strong support for the important role that the IAEA continues to play, as well as the safeguards and safeguards agreement. There is a very concrete outcome that we are trying to achieve, which is the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement, trying to get the remaining three countries to sign on to them. At the same time, there is a lot of concern about proliferation, not only by Iran, but also other countries that are talking about getting access not only to peaceful uses of nuclear energy but even having their own nuclear weapons programs. This is a major concern that we are hearing from countries from Asia to Europe to the Middle East. So, the discussions on these issues, I believe, will be quite heated at the review conference. Certainly, there will be state-parties expressing their concerns about the Iran nuclear program.

At the same time, I think there will be countries raising their concerns about attacks against nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. There will also be concerns raised about naval nuclear propulsion and how IAEA safeguards would apply to them, should they be treated any differently. Other issues of concern may include other regional issues, from [North Korea] to Ukraine. So, these are major issues, I believe, that will be raised and discussed at the review conference. How will they impact the final outcome of the conference will depend very much on how we frame this, and how we are able to get our heads together and find solutions, so that they do not become issues that may force one or two countries to block the outcome itself.

ACT: One other issue that may come up in 2026 is the issue that apparently derailed the 2022 conference, which took place just weeks after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and that was divisions over language relating to safety, security, and control of nuclear power stations in Ukraine. What solutions might help bridge the differences that emerged in 2022?

Viet: The situation in Ukraine continues to be of concern to the international community. Next week [editor’s note: February 24], the UN will be holding another emergency session on the fourth anniversary of the start of the conflict. So, it remains one of the issues that I think will be at the center of the review conference discussions. To me, any of the regional issues that we’ve been talking about, be it [North Korea], Iran, or Ukraine, may ultimately block the adoption of an outcome document. What I have been trying to discuss with state-parties is to find ways that we can frame these issues, not as specific conflicts or disputes, but rather as matters of principles when it comes to how countries should abide by their safeguards obligations, how nuclear facilities or IAEA safeguards must be protected and not attacked. Basically, I’m trying to find a new way to approach these issues, rather than going into the details of each situation, because if we go in that direction, it may be extremely difficult to get agreement on issues that may not be of particular relevance to the NPT itself but are much broader geopolitical issues that we have not been able to find solutions to in other multilateral frameworks.

ACT: Have you had a chance yet to engage with those states in those regions, Iran in particular, about the review conference?

Viet: I have, indeed. I had my bilateral discussion with our Iranian colleagues, and Iran was part of the consultations I held with the Middle Eastern and North African countries. So, I have heard from Iran, and I will continue to consult with them during this process.

ACT: As you prepare for this meeting, U.S. President Donald Trump is threatening a major attack on Iran if it doesn’t agree to restrict or eliminate its nuclear program. I’m wondering how you’re trying to deal with that, which is a rather volatile factor.

Viet: Yes, the NPT and the NPT review conference are not in a vacuum. They are impacted significantly by externalities of what’s going on around the world. Look at the 2022 review conference. Just a couple of months before that, we had this major statement [from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council], which was really positive and then the conflict in Ukraine happened, which many believed led to, ultimately, the conference failing to produce an outcome document. So, for this coming conference, too, I think there will be issues really beyond my control that may happen. I just need to brace myself for these unpredictabilities [sic] and try my best to work with what I have, basically, to try and reach an agreement.

ACT: Let me follow up on a regional issue that was one reason why the 2015 review conference did not reach a final outcome document: the objective of achieving a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East. There have been some developments in recent years, including an annual meeting under UN auspices of most of the regional parties. Do you anticipate this will be a major problem at the RevCon, or is this issue on a more even trajectory?

Viet: I do expect this to be a very difficult issue. This is of critical importance to our colleagues in the Middle East and they continue to emphasize how important it is for the region, in particular given what is going on there at the moment. What they have been telling me is, because of the conflict that has been going on, this issue [has increased in] importance. On the other hand, we have other colleagues who are not very keen to commit too much on this particular issue. I probably will need to see how this plays out. When it comes to the structure of the conference, I will try to frame this within the framework of nuclear-weapon-free zones rather than a regional issue so that it will be discussed together with the other established nuclear-weapon-free zones. Hopefully, with such an approach, we’ll see more lessons learned from the other regions and have some inspiration for what can be done in the Middle East.

ACT: As we discussed, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has expired. The United States has spoken in favor of pursuing arms control and disarmament on a multilateral basis. These are issues that relate to the core NPT Article 6 obligations, mainly of the nuclear-armed states to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the arms race and advance disarmament. In the current climate, keeping in mind that there also are stresses and threats to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), do you believe that states-parties, particularly the nuclear five, are in a position to recommit to their obligations? How important is progress in this area, given that there has been so little movement on disarmament for the last 10 or more years?

Viet: One of the biggest concerns that the vast majority of state-parties have shared with me is the backtracking on past commitments. So, the expectation is the conference will need to make sure that the past commitments are reaffirmed. But how to frame that and how to address that will be much more difficult in practice because how can states reaffirm commitments they made in fundamentally different security circumstances in the past?

There are already talks about potential nuclear testing, for example, allegations of one country having conducted nuclear tests, and potential testing on an equal basis. What will that mean to the commitment to their [testing] moratoria, to expediting the ratification of the CTBT? These are very difficult issues that we will need to deal with. To me, any outcome document will probably have to reaffirm the past commitments in order for it to be accepted by the vast majority of state-parties. I also hope and believe that we will need to make some particular progress, as well, when it comes to specific measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war. So, risk reductions will be an important topic. The other important topic will be transparency and accountability. Hopefully, we’ll be able to get the support needed for it to fly. I do not expect in the current circumstances to have any major new commitment, but rather very practical steps that may be achievable within the next cycle, the next five years. So, that is the direction that I’m working on.

ACT: On nuclear risk reduction, what are states discussing as potential tangible action steps? The concept of risk reduction is a broad one. There are specific things and there are general things, but are there any emerging themes from your consultations?

Viet: Not at the moment, no. There are certain groups that are preparing their working papers, proposing certain approaches, but I think probably the most important thing I have seen is the P5 process that had resumed more recently. Although still at a low level, and not only focused on nuclear weapons or the NPT per se, at least that grouping is meeting, is having NPT as part of their discussions. That is a positive step that I’ve been encouraging.

ACT: In addition to disarmament issues, the conference agenda calls for a review of negative security assurances, which perhaps have risen in importance given concerns about recent threats of nuclear weapons use by Russia and other states, and the Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. Based on your consultations, how might the conference reinforce the credibility of assurances that non-nuclear-weapon states will not be subject to nuclear threats or nuclear attack?

Viet: This issue of negative security assurances does come up in the regional consultations in the discussions I have, but we have not been able to go into that in depth on the substance. The state-parties are basically reaffirming how important it is that we continue to work on legally binding negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states and work to advance the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

ACT: You mentioned nuclear-weapon-free zones a couple of times. Many of our readers will know that they involve protocols, signed by the nuclear-weapon states, which in part extend negative security assurances to the states in the zones that they will not be subject to nuclear attack. Some states, the United States in particular, have not ratified its protocols to three zones—Central Asia, Africa, the South Pacific. Is that being discussed as one measure to reinforce the negative security assurances because once the United States does ratify those protocols, they become legally binding on all five nuclear-weapon states. Or are there other specific ideas regarding negative security assurances being floated?

Viet: Yes indeed. Many delegates have been talking about how the nuclear-weapon states should ratify the protocols, including the U.S., of course. The focus in particular has been on the Bangkok Treaty, the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, because none of the nuclear-weapon states have ratified that protocol. This is partly because the Bangkok Treaty itself does not allow for any reservation and countries in the region are still talking about how or whether they will accept any forms of reservation. Up to now, only one country has expressed its readiness to ratify the protocol without reservation, and as such may be accepted by the ASEAN states. But the issue is really to get all the others to also join. Continued consultations are being conducted on how to get around that requirement by the treaty itself.

ACT: What role can civil society play at the review conference and beyond? Is there something that civil society can do that it isn’t doing so far?

Viet: I think civil society has a very important voice and really, civil society must make its voice heard. In current circumstances, I feel that it has been quite silent probably because there are so many other day-to-day issues that are coming up. Or maybe that is my feeling, living here in the United States. But I have not been able to really hear a collective or coordinated voice from the civil society when it comes to the danger of nuclear weapons and other dangers we are facing these days. We see the so-called doomsday clock, for example, moving closer to midnight than ever before but I don’t feel like that has really caught the attention of the American public, in particular, that much. I am just hoping that the civil society can again mobilize and make their voices heard and really continue to have this impactful engagement in the process.

April 2026
By Matthew Sharp

When states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) meet in New York this month to discuss the implementation and future direction of the treaty at the 2026 NPT Review Conference, there will be as many perspectives and objectives as there are delegations. Conference President Do Hung Viet, Vietnam’s UN ambassador, will use the allotted four-week schedule to navigate that diversity of opinion and seek common ground among the states-parties.

One thing they can agree on is that Viet will have his work cut out for him. Issues that have blocked past conferences from success, such as the Middle East in 2015¹ and Ukraine in 2022,² remain outstanding. New developments are largely negative, including U.S. accusations of Chinese nuclear testing and U.S. threats to resume nuclear testing “on an equal basis,” the expiration without replacement of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and the ongoing war against Iran. An additional factor to consider as participating delegations prepare for the conference is the role that will be played by the United States, traditionally one of the most significant drivers of how such conferences unfold.

Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Christopher Yeaw said February 17 that the review conference is a “high priority for the administration, and we certainly have some things that we want to see advocated and advanced there.”³ The full scope of those things is not yet clear. U.S. objectives are doubtlessly still being finalized, and these positions will be communicated publicly at the appropriate time by U.S. diplomats. Yet clues are emerging that suggest the U.S. approach may look different from the past in important ways. Review conference delegations should consider those hints carefully in light of what they suggest for how the conference may play out.

Clues to U.S. Positions

First, a number of U.S. policy positions were made clear in October at the UN First Committee meeting, including opposition to language endorsing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or a UN role in AI-nuclear issues.⁴ References to the Sustainable Development Goals, a set of 17 objectives to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity adopted by the UN in 2015, are also in disfavor with the Trump administration, presaging division with those who have pushed at past conferences for references to the benefits of NPT implementation toward realizing those development goals. Delegations should anticipate that these positions will also hold true at this year’s review conference.

A second point that the United States made clear at last year’s First Committee meeting was its comfort with diplomatic isolation. In 2025, Washington voted against a dozen resolutions it had previously supported on topics that ranged from the CTBT to the Arms Trade Treaty to the UN Disarmament Commission. On seven of these, the United States was the only “no” vote. As countries prepare for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, they should not overestimate the value of consensus in U.S. eyes.

Third, U.S. State Department officials Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security Tom DiNanno 
and Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Christopher Yeaw spoke on NPT-relevant topics three times in February.⁵

In February 23 remarks at the Conference on Disarmament focused on China’s nuclear activities, Yeaw said that “every NPT state-party has an obligation to negotiate in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. Article VI [of the treaty] does not say that only those states with the largest arsenals have that responsibility—all five nuclear-weapon states to the NPT share the same obligation.” On February 17 at the Hudson Institute, Yeaw said of the U.S. offer of arms control talks with China, “as we head into the NPT Review Conference in April, I sincerely hope that China takes up the president’s offer.” He also made clear that getting “the countries of the world to continue to press that all nuclear-weapon states need to be involved in this” would be a U.S. priority.

Yeaw’s framing of China’s nuclear buildup and refusal to engage in arms control in terms of its Article VI obligations is noteworthy, in particular as his bureau prepares its 2025 report on compliance with arms control agreements, anticipated in mid-April. A U.S. administration skeptical of multilateral institutions may well judge the conference largely by the degree to which it calls out China’s perceived nonperformance of its obligations, thereby building multilateral pressure for China to engage.

Finally, the ongoing U.S.-Israeli war in Iran will be discussed among conference delegations, as airstrikes on nuclear facilities—based, in part, on accusations about Iran’s NPT compliance—are of direct relevance to the treaty’s implementation. Delegations should anticipate that the United States will similarly seek multilateral pressure on and accountability for Iran at the conference, pushing back on any criticism of U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

In July 2025, the State Department dismissed a number of NPT-focused staff and abolished the ambassador-level position that previously led U.S. NPT delegations, but it would be a grave mistake to assume that U.S. participation in the 2026 Review Conference will therefore be unfocused or ineffective. The U.S. head of delegation will be supported by a dedicated and experienced team of experts who remain in place, and they will articulate and implement administration positions professionally and adaptively over the course of the conference. Other delegations should thus consider carefully what these updated U.S. positions mean for their own objectives and tactics in different scenarios for the conference.

Possibilities for the Review Conference

Past review conferences have worked toward consensus on detailed documents that comment extensively on various aspects of treaty implementation and, in some instances, endorse future actions. Barriers to this outcome will be high in 2026, with well-known disagreements on such topics as Ukraine, the Middle East, the CTBT, and NATO. Past conferences have been able to negotiate diligently to close gaps, even when final agreement proved impossible. This approach may be less viable if the United States places a high value on calling out individual states—such as China and Iran, who will be present and must also join any consensus—for their inadequate compliance, and if it places a low value on consensus. In such a case, deliberations could become stalemated at the beginning of the process, rather than at the end, building frustration that could impede compromise on any outcome.

Anticipating lack of consensus on a detailed final document, commentators frequently mention a fallback solution in the form of a higher-level conference document, or a joint statement among a number of states-parties, that sidesteps disagreement on specifics and instead affirms, for example, general support for the treaty. Again, papering over unbridgeable differences—on the issue of China’s arms control obligations, for instance—could have little value for a U.S. delegation that sees calling out China as a primary goal and does not place a high value on consensus.

An approach that seeks a consensus report and then falls back in the endgame to a higher-level statement may therefore fail. For those concerned about demonstrating support for the NPT among its parties, trying and failing to secure agreement on such a high-level statement of support may be more damaging in these terms than no outcome at all. A variation on this scenario could switch the order by tabling a high-level statement at the beginning of the conference to set the stage for parallel discussion on a more detailed final document. To the extent that this variation would provide a common basis for discussing points of disagreement rather than papering over them, it might prove more broadly appealing.

Past review conferences have operated by consensus, but nothing prevents a state-party from forcing a vote on a draft final document to overcome points of unbridgeable disagreement. Whose interests would be furthered in such a case depends on the text; for example, a document adopted by vote that called out China could advance potential U.S. objectives, while a document condemning NATO would not. In this scenario, it is even more important that all delegates exercise vigilance over how drafts are being shaped by the conference president; if the protection of consensus is removed, it matters a great deal whose positions are included in the current draft.

Some anticipated U.S. positions, for example its lack of support for the CTBT, are unlikely to prevail in a vote of the conference. However, clear U.S. comfort with political isolation means there is little leverage to be gained by calling such votes. Any state considering this course should first reflect on the value of an outcome if the first NPT vote in 50 years does not include the support of the United States, a treaty originator and depositary.

Perhaps the most pessimistic outcome for a deeply divided review conference would be the failure to agree even on administrative matters. Adoption of a conference agenda is typically a pro forma exercise, but in 2005, for three of the meeting’s four weeks, states-parties were unable to agree to get past the agenda phase, paralyzing the conference before it even began. A technical impasse this year would not help a U.S. objective of holding Iran or China to account because it would deny Washington the opportunity to lay out its arguments on both issues. Similarly, this outcome would undermine the ability of any delegation to achieve its substantive goals; it would seem to be an appealing option only for those who seek chaos.

The most dramatic outcome for the review conference might be if Iran decides to follow through on its 2025 threats to withdraw from the NPT in response to the decision by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to snap back international sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Although damaging to the NPT, such a major development might advance U.S. objectives if it focuses NPT states-parties on the Iran issue and unites them in criticism of Iran’s actions. Conversely, a conference that fails to rally parties around such a significant event as NPT withdrawal cannot offer much help for any state-party’s objectives, whatever they are.

Less dramatic would be death by boredom, which is to say if the conference devolves into endless, unproductive cycles of accusations and counteraccusations: Iranian-U.S. exchanges on U.S. and Israeli attacks; U.S.-Chinese accusations of irresponsible arms buildups; EU-Russian divisions over Ukraine; China’s criticism of UK and U.S. plans to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines; or the NATO nuclear weapons-sharing debate. The large majority of participants without a direct stake in such specific exchanges could at best tune out, and at worst decide the conference has become a bad use of their time.

A U.S. delegation motivated to build pressure on China to engage in arms control may find it beneficial to take every opportunity to make this case and encourage others to do the same. In the extreme, however, a scenario in which delegations tune out would hurt U.S. priorities if it drowned them out or deprived U.S. arguments of an audience. This scenario is most unhelpful to those who prioritize unity and engagement as a barometer of support for the NPT.

A final scenario for the review conference is if parties conclude early on that consensus is not feasible on details and not valuable at the level of generalities and instead focus their attention on review process practicalities. The stage is set for this, as extensive work was done over the past years on a mechanism for treaty parties to define and contribute national reports on their actions to implement the NPT’s obligations and then engage in an interactive debate regarding the substance of those reports at NPT meetings. Such a dialogue could benefit U.S. objectives, given the enormous gap in transparency between China and the United States.

There is a distinction between building pressure on China to be more transparent and building pressure on China to engage in arms control, but progress on the first supports the second. If China has less appetite for isolation than the United States, this could be an issue on which China would block agreement, as it did during a 2023 NPT preparatory meeting. However, China has its own transparency priorities, pushing hard in a 2025 preparatory meeting for greater transparency from NATO allies into their nuclear policies. Moreover, non-nuclear-weapon states have long sought accountability for all states possessing nuclear weapons, so spending review conference time on this issue may be something in which all sides could find value.

Whichever path this month’s conference takes, it is the NPT’s legally binding obligations, written in black and white more than 50 years ago, that make it the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation and disarmament regime. A review conference can neither take that status away nor resolve the real challenges that face implementation of those obligations.

As with all treaties, however, the NPT depends on a durable sense among its parties that they benefit from its continued implementation, and that the other parties remain equally committed. It is, in this way, and following 16 years in which they have been unable to reach common ground, that the proceedings of this review conference are important. As delegations try again this month, they should take note of changes in the positions of key participants, especially the United States, and consider carefully how those positions will play out over the course of the conference.

Finding common ground, even if on technical aspects of the NPT review process, would demonstrate a shared view of the continued international importance of the treaty. The NPT, currently under strain, would be left stronger than it is today. If NPT parties instead misread the priorities and positions of key players such as the United States and talk past each other, however, an issue as fundamental to the treaty as the viability of its disarmament obligations could be at the core of another fractured conference, leaving the NPT significantly weakened.

ENDNOTES

1. Andrey Baklitsky, “The 2015 NPT Review Conference and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2015; Thomas Countryman, “Learning from the 2015 NPT Review Conference,” Arms Control Today, May 2020.

2. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “10th NPT Review Conference: Why It Was Doomed and How 
It Almost Succeeded,” Arms Control Today, October 2022.

3. Christopher Yeaw, “Hard Truths: Towards Verifiable and Enforceable Arms Control,” remarks delivered at the Hudson Institute, U.S. Department of State, February 17, 2026.

4. Shizuka Kuramitsu, “States Gather at UN Security Meeting Amid Pressure, Reforms,” Arms Control Today, November 2025.

5. Thomas G. DiNanno, “Statement to the Conference on Disarmament,” U.S. Department of State, February 6, 2026; Yeaw remarks on the end of the New START Treaty at the Hudson Institute, February 17, 2026; Yeaw, “Statement to the Conference on Disarmament,” U.S. Department of State, February 23, 2026.

Matthew Sharp worked on nuclear nonproliferation and arms control issues in several roles at the U.S. Department of State and National Security Council from 2009 to 2025.

April 2026
By Kelsey Davenport

Less than 48 hours before the U.S. and Israeli coordinated strikes on Iran began February 28, U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, met Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Geneva for a third round of Omani-mediated talks aimed at reaching a nuclear agreement.

Despite Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi’s assessment that the two sides had made “substantial progress” toward a nuclear deal during the February 26 talks and agreed to meet again March 2 for technical talks,¹ Trump told reporters that he was “not happy” with what had been achieved or the “way [Iran is] negotiating.”² The following day, the United States and Israel illegally attacked Iran, using Tehran’s nuclear program as one justification.

Subsequent statements from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director- General Rafael Mariano Grossi and U.S. intelligence officials contradicted Trump’s March 4 comment that “if we didn’t hit within two weeks, [Iran] would have had a nuclear weapon.”³ Grossi said in a March 2 press conference that the IAEA saw no sign of a “structured nuclear weapons program.”⁴ Meanwhile, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified to Congress March 18 that “Iran’s enrichment program was obliterated” by U.S. strikes in June 2025 and that “There has been [sic] no efforts since then to try and rebuild [Iran’s] enrichment capability.”⁵

Although Iran could technically use its uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235 to build a bomb, it is far more likely that it would enrich the material to weapons-grade levels, or 90 percent U-235, before converting it to the metallic form necessary for a nuclear warhead. The 2026 U.S. worldwide threat assessment, published in March, also does not indicate that Iran had made a decision to weaponize its nuclear program or restart activities necessary to build a bomb.⁶

Preconceived Decision

By the time the third round of talks ended in Geneva, Trump had likely already made the choice to go to war.⁷ It is unlikely that any outcome short of complete Iranian capitulation to U.S. demands at the negotiating table would have averted the military strikes.

Trump’s dissatisfaction and impatience with the negotiating process appear to have been fed, in part, by Witkoff’s and Kushner’s accounts of the U.S.-Iran talks. Comments made by Witkoff in two background briefings with reporters February 28 and March 3, as well as media appearances since the strikes began, made clear that Witkoff did not have sufficient technical expertise or diplomatic experience to engage in effective diplomacy. His lack of knowledge and mischaracterization of Iran’s positions and its nuclear program throughout the process likely informed Trump’s assessment that talks were not progressing and Iran was not negotiating seriously.

The Arms Control Association received recordings and transcripts from several participants in Witkoff’s two news briefings. The association has not seen a copy of the Iranian proposal from the February 26 talks but has heard descriptions of it from officials familiar with the contents. The description coincides with media reports: After a multiyear pause on uranium enrichment, Iran would resume an enrichment program based on fueling certain planned research reactors. Iran would not accumulate enriched uranium gas and would agree to broad IAEA oversight. The scope of the proposed enrichment program was based on what was likely an overly ambitious 10-year reactor plan and included enriching uranium up to 20 percent U-235 with up to 30 cascades of advanced IR-6 centrifuges.⁸

Araghchi later confirmed that Iran also offered to blend down its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235 to a level near weapons-grade (90 percent U-235) to lower levels.⁹

The Iranian proposal, as presented, did not meet the maximalist terms that the White House demanded, including no enrichment, dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear facilities, and removal of enriched uranium gas from Iran. Nor did it appear to be sufficiently restrictive from a nonproliferation perspective to be an effective bulwark against weaponization. It is unclear how Iran proposed to combine or sequence the actions it presented, and there were no detailed discussions on monitoring and verification provisions, according to an official who asked the Arms Control Association not to be identified.¹⁰

Yet the proposal showed some flexibility in the Iranian position. It was also an opening offer and unlikely Iran’s bottom line. As Grossi said in an interview with the CBS show, “Face the Nation,” that aired March 22, there was “no agreement” and “no alignment” on many issues under discussion, but “maybe” a deal was possible.¹¹ Even Witkoff said in the March 3 briefing call that Iran’s draft included some interesting features. Trump, however, appeared uninterested in a drawn-out negotiating process. This suggests Iran either misread how long the window for diplomacy would remain open or Witkoff did not make clear the U.S. timeframe.

Although further negotiations may have revealed that the gulf between the White House demands and the Iranian positions was irreconcilable, Wikoff’s failure to comprehend key technical realities suggests he misunderstood the Iranian nuclear proposal and was ill-prepared to negotiate an effective nuclear agreement or advise Trump as to whether Tehran was negotiating in good faith. The following analysis examines key misstatements and misconceptions in the post-attack briefings, conducted primarily by Witkoff.

1. Witkoff perceived the Tehran Research Reactor as a threat and a ploy. It is not clear why.

Some of Witkoff’s most puzzling and factually challenged statements during the March 3 telephone briefing with reporters centered on the Tehran Research Reactor, which is used to produce medical isotopes. The reactor, supplied by the United States, became operational in 1967. Originally, it ran on 90 percent enriched U-235 fuel, which is weapons grade, but later was converted by Argentina to run on 20 percent enriched uranium fuel.

Witkoff’s emphasis on the reactor was odd because it is not engaged in proliferation-sensitive activities, and previous statements from U.S. officials, including Trump, suggested that the United States was open to Iran continuing to operate reactors for civil nuclear and research purposes. His concern appeared to be based on assumptions that Iran would use fuel production for research reactors as a justification to move back to the threshold of nuclear weapons.

During the briefing, Witkoff claimed there was “subterfuge” at the reactor and that it was being used to stockpile uranium fuel “to bring it towards a weapons-grade enrichment level.” This assessment seemed based primarily on Witkoff’s conclusion that Iran possessed an “overabundance” of fuel for the reactor. He alleged that “the seven-to-eight years’ supply of fuel that they had been retaining at [the reactor] was being stockpiled along with all the other stockpiling that had been done at Natanz, Esfahan, and Fordow. So, the claim that they were using a research reactor to do good for the Iranian people was a complete and false pretense to hide the fact that they were stockpiling there.”

The fuel that Iran has stockpiled for the reactor is not hidden, and its existence should not come as a surprise. The IAEA has tracked the reactor’s fuel and documented in its May 2025 report on Iran’s nuclear program that Iran had 45.5 kilograms of U-235 enriched to 20 percent in fuel assemblies.¹² This amount is about a seven-to-eight-year supply for the reactor, which uses roughly 5-7 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium per year.

The stockpile size was more than what was strictly necessary for continued operations, but that is neither alarming nor surprising. Fluctuations in the fuel supply were documented by the IAEA in publicly available reports. Politically, the decision to keep a multiyear supply may have been driven in part by past challenges in obtaining fuel.¹³ Iran also imported fuel for the reactor from Russia in incremental shipments, thereby contributing to the supply.

It is unclear why Wikoff appeared to view excess reactor fuel as nefarious. From a proliferation risk perspective, the 45.5 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium in the fuel assemblies is far less than the amount of 20 percent material that is necessary to produce a bomb’s worth of 90 percent enriched uranium and was only a small fraction of Iran’s overall stockpile. According to a September 2025 IAEA report, Iran had, in UF6 gas form, as of June 13, 2025:

• 6,024.4 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 5 percent U-235,
• 184.1 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent U-235, and
• 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent U-235.¹⁴

Perhaps most importantly, enriched uranium in the form of fuel assemblies poses less of a proliferation risk than the material stockpiled in UF6 gas, the form that is necessary for further enrichment. If Iran wanted to use the 45 kilograms for weapons purposes, it would need to convert the material back to gas form before enriching it. The United States destroyed Iran’s conversion facility during the strikes last June. Presumably, Iran intended to rebuild its conversion facility as part of its February 26 proposal, but U.S. intelligence had not reported that Tehran had made any attempt to do so, as of March 2026. Thus, it is unclear why Witkoff claimed in his March 3 briefing that the stockpile of fuel meant that “the only other use it could be, would be to bring it towards a weapons-grade enrichment level.”

Witkoff also claimed that the reactor was not producing medical isotopes. The IAEA’s regular reports do not provide information about the facility’s products, but they do provide information about reactor operations, which contradict Witkoff’s claims that the reactor was a ruse. The agency noted its accountancy and monitoring of the irradiated reactor fuel assemblies, which supports the conclusion that the facility has been operating, and in several reports, such as those issued in 2023, notes when Iran has loaded new fuel assemblies into the reactor.¹⁵ Grossi did say in his March 22 interview that Iran’s use of the reactor was “limited,” which may have contributed to Witkoff’s concerns, but the reactor itself and the enriched uranium form of fuel elements do not pose a proliferation risk.

The IAEA reports do not appear to contain any recent concerns about misuse of the reactor. In 2003, Iran acknowledged conducting plutonium separation experiments at the facility that were not declared to the IAEA,¹⁶ but that does not appear to be what Witkoff is referring to, because it was more than 20 years ago and did not involve uranium enrichment.

Witkoff also made several other mistakes regarding the reactor, including saying that enrichment is going on there, which is not so. He also claimed that the IAEA “has not been able to make inspections in Iran” since Operation Midnight Hammer. Iran did suspend IAEA access to nuclear sites that were bombed in June 2025 in violation of its legally required safeguards agreement, but Iran has allowed the agency back to the Tehran Research Reactor, which was not bombed. A February 27 report from the IAEA noted that the agency inspected the hot cells at the reactor December 22, 2025.¹⁷ Inspectors did not raise concerns about the facility in that report. Grossi also confirmed to CBS March 22 that the IAEA continues to access the facility.

2. Witkoff’s suspicion of the reactor led him to prematurely dismiss the Iranian proposal.

Witkoff’s unfounded conclusion that the reactor was a nefarious ploy by Iran to stockpile 20 percent enriched fuel appeared to have negatively influenced his assessment of the proposal that Iran brought to the Geneva talks February 26. According to the March 3 backgrounder, Witkoff said Iran’s proposal for uranium enrichment was based on assessed needs for the Tehran facility and “a few other research reactors” that Iran planned to build over the next 10 years. Based on this plan, Iran determined the scope of an enrichment program, including enriching uranium up to 20 percent U-235. However, because Witkoff thought Iran was engaged in a “complete lie” about the Tehran reactor, he suggested that Iran’s proposal to enrich uranium up to 20 percent was deliberately designed to “peel off two months from the enrichment cycle.” Witkoff presumably meant Iran’s “breakout time,” or the time it takes to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb (25 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90 percent).

A limit of 20 percent enriched uranium was also unacceptable and demonstrated a lack of seriousness, Witkoff said, because it was “more than five times” what was allowed by the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which capped enrichment at 3.67 percent. Those numbers are correct, but it appears that Witkoff was overly focused on the enrichment level as an indicator of risk and made erroneous assumptions about the implications of a ceiling of 20 percent enriched uranium on proliferation risk.

It is accurate that 20 percent enriched uranium can be enriched to weapons-grade U-235 more quickly than if Iran started with natural uranium or reactor-grade enriched uranium, which is less than 5 percent U-235. As Grossi said in the March 22 interview, 20 percent U-235 “is a lot of enrichment” and the assumption in the negotiations on enrichment was “zero or something very, very limited.”

Yet, it is challenging to assess the impact of enrichment to 20 percent on proliferation risk in isolation. It is unclear how Witkoff assessed that enriching to 20 percent U-235 would take two months off the breakout time or why he fixated on that as a metric. Breakout is a technical calculation influenced by a number of factors, including enrichment capacity (the number and efficiency of centrifuges), the enrichment level of the feed, and the size of the feed stockpile.

Witkoff did not seem to take into account the implications of Iran’s offer not to accumulate enriched uranium in assessing how Iran might break out and the proliferation implications of Iran’s plan. Furthermore, accounts of the February 26 meeting suggest that the negotiators did not conduct detailed discussions on monitoring and verification provisions, which have implications for how quickly the IAEA would detect any deviations from an enrichment plan.

It would not be surprising if, in the proposal, Iran overestimated its capacity to expand its civil nuclear program and its timeframe for reactor construction. Iran has frequently announced plans to build reactors that were never constructed. Nor would it be surprising if Iran had asked for a larger enrichment program than it was willing to accept; no negotiator puts their bottom line in an initial proposal. But Wikoff appeared to dismiss the idea of engaging with Iran on the premise of a needs-based enrichment program that would become operational after a multiyear pause because he misunderstood the operation of the Tehran Research Reactor.

3. Witkoff viewed Iran’s rejection of free nuclear fuel for life as a sign that Iran was not interested in diplomacy. The rejection should not have surprised him.

Witkoff said in the March 3 briefing that, after deciding that Iran’s proposed enrichment plan was based on the Tehran Research Reactor “lie,” he offered Iran “free fuel” for its research reactors. He claimed that “if it’s really about building radioisotopes and creating medicines” Iran will take the free fuel from the United States and abandon its own enrichment program. He said Iran rejected the offer by saying that free fuel was “an assault on our dignity.” He also expressed surprise that Iran had emphasized its “right to enrich.”

Witkoff said that he “figured it out” from Araghchi’s rejection that Iran was “angry for another reason” and was trying to “divert our attention away from the fact that all they really wanted to do was enrich.” Iran’s rejection of free fuel and emphasis on fueling its reactors should not have been a surprise to Witkoff. Nor should it have been viewed as a sign that Tehran was not negotiating in good faith. On a political level, Iran views enrichment as an issue of national sovereignty, a right conferred by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy provision in Article IV of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It is consistent with Iran’s past position for negotiators to reject any nuclear agreement if the price was zero enrichment.

Furthermore, why would Iran trust the United States to follow through? Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration—formally, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—in May 2018, despite Iran’s compliance, and participated in Israel’s strikes against Iran in June 2025 while diplomacy was ongoing. It is not surprising that Iran would have doubts about U.S. credibility.

There is also no indication that Witkoff raised or acknowledged the technical and legal hurdles to providing free nuclear reactor fuel. If the fuel were to come from the United States, for instance, that would require a negotiated nuclear cooperation agreement between Iran and the United States, a deal Congress could block. There also could be technical challenges and liability issues in fueling a reactor built in Iran.

Witkoff’s comments in the March 3 briefing suggest that he tossed the offer out to Iran without thinking through how to provide any assurance about how the United States could credibly implement such a proposal. A more experienced diplomat would not have been surprised by Iran’s reaction and would have been prepared to address questions about implementation.

4. Witkoff appeared to believe Iran had been engaged in nuclear weaponization efforts since 2003.

During the March 3 call with reporters, Witkoff was asked about something Grossi told press the previous day, that the IAEA does not see a “structured program to manufacture nuclear weapons” in Iran. Witkoff suggested that Grossi misspoke and said that Iran has “tested around weapons” since 2003. In a March 10 interview with CNBC, Witkoff made a similar statement, saying that “Everybody has known that [Iran has been] testing for weaponization since 2003.”¹⁸

Until 2003, Iran had an active nuclear weapons development effort, conducted in violation of its safeguard obligations. In a 2007 unclassified national intelligence estimate, the U.S. intelligence community assessed with high confidence that the organized nuclear weapons program ended in 2003.¹⁹ The IAEA similarly assessed in 2015 that Iran abandoned its organized weapons program in 2003, that some activities relevant to weaponization continued through 2009, but that there was no credible evidence of those activities after 2009.²⁰

In its 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment, the U.S. intelligence community stated that, “We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that [Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so.”²¹

It does appear that Iran has, in recent years and after Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, taken steps that would enable it to weaponize more quickly, if the political decision were made to do so. However, as the IAEA and U.S. intelligence statements make clear, there has so far been no decision to develop nuclear weapons or “testing for weaponization.”

5. Witkoff said the United States agreed that missiles were a regional issue, then described the lack of progress as an indicator Iran did not want a nuclear deal.

Following the U.S. attack in February, Trump and other senior officials, including Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, have pointed to Iran’s ballistic missiles as an “imminent threat” to the United States. (They were not.) Hegseth went further and said March 2 that Iran’s missiles and drones would enable Iran to develop a “conventional shield” to engage in “nuclear blackmail.”²²

Witkoff made clear in the March 3 call, however, that the Trump administration made a deliberate decision to leave ballistic missiles out of its negotiations with Iran and “allow the region to talk about proxies and also to talk about ballistic missiles, because it’s a regional issue.” He said the missiles are an issue for the United States as well but addressing it at the regional level would streamline the process.

Delegating the missile issue to the other states in the Persian Gulf region to negotiate with Iran seems to undermine U.S. claims regarding the missile threat. The 2026 Worldwide Threat Assessment, published March 18, directly contradicts Trump’s claim in his recent State of Union address that Iran was developing “missiles that will soon reach the United States of America.” The intelligence community, however, assessed that Iran “developed space-launch vehicles that it could use to develop a military-viable [intercontinental ballistic missile] by 2035 should Tehran decide to do so.”²³ If the Trump administration viewed Iran’s missiles as the kind of threat that warranted an illegal preventive strike, why tell Iran that negotiations over those systems should be explored on a regional basis?

Despite this, in his March 3 briefing, Witkoff accused Iran of making no effort to convene a regional discussion on missiles. This may be true, but if Iran were not expecting to talk to the United States about missiles, because Witkoff agreed it should be handled at the regional level, Iran’s failure to “talk about missiles” during the February 26 Geneva negotiations should hardly be viewed as a surprise or as an indicator of Iran’s view of the nuclear talks.

Needed: A Top-Notch Negotiating Team

Beyond these misperceptions, Witkoff’s statements are riddled with other errors that suggest that the New York real estate developer is out of his technical depth. At one point, he expressed surprise that Iran produces centrifuges (it has for decades) and referred to Iran’s IR-6 centrifuge as “probably the most advanced centrifuge in the world” (it is not). He also called Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan “industrial reactors” (they are not).

The Trump administration’s failure to exhaust diplomacy and send a qualified team to negotiate with Iran is inexcusable, given the devastating consequences of the war that the United States and Israel have ignited. Although the attacks might set Iran’s nuclear program back, the proliferation dangers will not be eradicated through military strikes alone. At the end of this conflict, the Iranian government will retain the knowledge—and likely some of the key materials—necessary to develop and build nuclear weapons, and perhaps a greater political motivation to do so.

If there is a diplomatic opening to reach an effective nuclear deal with Iran in the future, Trump should replace Witkoff as his lead negotiator with an experienced diplomat and expert team. Witkoff’s failure to learn the nuclear file and surround himself with the technical expertise necessary to negotiate an effective deal has been a diplomatic disservice to U.S. and international nonproliferation goals.

ENDNOTES

1. Badr Albusaidi, “Full Transcript: Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi tells ‘Face the Nation’ a U.S.-Iran deal is ‘within our reach,’” Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan, CBS News, February 27, 2026.

2. Ben Johansen, “Trump says he’s unhappy with Iran negotiations,” Politico, February 27, 2026.

3. Donald Trump, “Transcript: President Trump Delivers Remarks at an Energy Ratepayer Protection Roundtable,” Senate Democrats, March 4, 2026.

4. “Press Conference with IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi,” IAEA video on YouTube, March 2, 2026.

5. Tulsi Gabbard, Opening statement in Senate committee testimony on the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 18, 2026.

6. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” March 18, 2026.

7. Mark Mazzetti, Julian E. Barnes, Tyler Pager, Edward Wong, Eric Schmitt, and Ronen Bergman, “How Trump Decided to Go to War,” The New York Times, March 2, 2026.

8. Dov Lieber, Alexander Ward, and Laurence Norman, “Why the U.S. and Israel Struck When They Did: A Chance to Kill Iran’s Leaders,” The Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2026; Email exchange between Kelsey Davenport and a European official, March 4, 2026.

9. “Transcript: Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on ‘Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan,’” CBS News, March 15, 2026.

10. Email from a European official who asked not to be publicly identified, March 4, 2026; email from a second official who asked not to be publicly identified to the author, March 17, 2026.

11. “Transcript: International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Rafael Grossi on ‘Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan,’” CBS News, March 22, 2026.

12. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” May 31, 2025.

13. Kelsey Davenport, “Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2003-2013,” Arms Control Association, October 2023.

14. IAEA, “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” September 3, 2025.

15. IAEA, “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015),” May 31, 2025.

16. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” November 10, 2003.

17. IAEA, “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” February 27, 2026.

18. “Transcript: U.S. Special Envoy for Peace Missions Steve Witkoff Speaks with CNBC’s ‘Money Movers’ Today,” CNBC, March 10, 2026.

19. National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, November 2007, p. 7.

20. IAEA, “Board of Governors Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme Report by the Director General.” 2015. 

21. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” March 18, 2025, p. 9.

22. Pete Hegseth, “Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Hold a Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of War, March 2, 2026.

23. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” March 18, 2026, p. 11.

April 2026

Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons: A Case Study of Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy
By Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf
Oxford University Press
2025

Reviewed by Chris Quillen

Syria’s CW Challenge to the Nonproliferation Regime

The Syrian government’s extensive use of chemical weapons (CW) during the 2011-2024 civil war is the most significant challenge to the international nonproliferation regime in the 21st century. This history presents a rich case study, given that it involves dozens of CW attacks with chlorine and the nerve agent sarin, stretches across the administrations of U.S. presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, and involves disparate efforts to deter Syrian CW use and to compel Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to surrender his arsenal.

Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf use this era in their book Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons to assess theories of deterrence and coercive diplomacy by focusing on three phases of the conflict. The first covers the beginning of the civil war through Obama’s “redline” statement on CW use in 2012 to the deadly 2013 sarin attack at Ghouta, in which deterrence largely failed. In the next phase, efforts to compel Assad to surrender his chemical weapons and sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) largely succeeded with Russia’s help. Finally, deterrence failed again when Assad returned to using chemical weapons despite the previous success of dismantling most of his arsenal, resulting in retaliatory strikes during Trump’s first term in an effort to restore deterrence.

This thoroughly researched and well-written book offers a timely and important contribution to the existing literature with several significant insights for policymakers. The authors demonstrate a number of weaknesses in the seemingly standard fallback position of threats of retaliation combined with occasional airstrikes—referred to as the “resolve plus bombs” formula—in efforts to deter CW use and compel CW renunciation. They correctly point out that deterrence efforts tend to overemphasize establishing the credibility of the coercer, which is important but not decisive. Instead, they argue for greater attention to the motivations of the coerced to determine their vulnerability to pressure, as well as the need to offer assurances of not being attacked if the target of coercion cooperates.

On the importance of motivations, the authors reason that the target of coercion might simply be more motivated than the coercer and thus willing to endure the threatened punishment. As a result, the credibility of the coercer matters little. In the Syria case, Assad was singularly focused on remaining in power and was willing to use CW, thus risking airstrikes by the United States in order to maintain his regime. This fact alone goes a long way to explaining many of the deterrence failures in the Assad case. According to the authors, the coercer should focus specifically on threatening the issue that motivates the target. In the Syrian case, that suggests that the United States would have had more success deterring Assad if it had threatened his hold on power.

The authors admit that this was a challenging policy to enact, given Obama’s unwillingness to directly intervene in Syria and fears of an Islamic extremist takeover in Damascus if Assad fell. Obama essentially was trapped between his political aversion to military intervention—which included U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan—and his perceived moral obligation to respond to CW use. Nevertheless, the overall argument that focusing more on the motivations of the coerced rather than the credibility of the coercer is likely to improve coercive strategies. Policymakers, however, tend to focus on enhancing their credibility, which is largely within their control, rather than determining the other side’s motivations, which are outside of their control and often inscrutable.

Regarding assurances, the authors argue for the need to reassure the coerced that adhering to the coercer’s demands will prevent any future punishment. Such a strategy will likely enhance the chances of success but is difficult to enact while balancing the need to offer credible threats. In Assad’s case, assurance meant that if he did not use CW then he would not suffer threatened airstrikes. Obama, however, was either unable or unwilling to offer Assad the assurance of staying in power—the guarantee that Assad most valued—after calling for regime change in Damascus. This failure to offer credible assurances led Assad to use CW to maintain control. He simply feared a rebel advance on Damascus more than a U.S. airstrike.

Trump, on the other hand, may have offered too much assurance by focusing on the threat from the Islamic State militant group rather than on Assad. Believing that the U.S. threat of a military response to CW use had diminished after Obama left office, Assad returned to such use until Trump established his willingness to strike. The authors argue that the only successful assurance that Assad could remain in power was due to Russian diplomacy after the sarin gas attack in Ghouta. With Russia’s backing, Assad was sufficiently confident that he could surrender his CW stocks and sign the CWC without losing power. (Although this was a significant victory for nonproliferation, it was a qualified success, given that Assad maintained some of his chemical arsenal and eventually returned to using it against his own people.) The success in compelling Assad to give up some of his chemical arsenal is a significant puzzle because compellence is generally expected to be more difficult than deterrence, but proved the more successful strategy in this case.

This inclusion of motivations and assurances alongside credibility is an important contribution from the authors but sometimes enables them to pick and choose which factor was paramount to explain any particular outcome. As a result, the real strength of this book lies in its descriptive power of the Syrian CW case more than its prescriptive power for future cases. For example, the authors point out that credibility and assurance are both on a spectrum rather than all-or-nothing propositions and can even counteract each other. The greater the credibility of the threat to attack by the coercer, the less likely the coerced will accept any assurances to avoid an attack. Thus, too much assurance can undercut deterrent threats. Although a useful conclusion, this line of argument enables seemingly credible deterrence to be dismissed due to the lack of sufficient assurance and complicates a clear understanding of which factor truly led to the failure. Undoubtedly, policymakers will continue to struggle with striking the right balance between threats and assurances to achieve their desired outcome despite the numerous insights in this analysis.

Similarly, the authors argue for a greater focus on the motivations of the target of coercion, but determining the motivations of others is notoriously difficult and it is especially challenging at the specific moment when the target of coercion feels their primary concern is under threat. In the Syria case, the authors argue persuasively that Assad’s primary motivation was maintaining his grip on power and thus anytime he felt his regime sufficiently threatened, he was willing to cross the line and use chemical weapons, including sarin, in mass-casualty attacks despite deterrent threats. Their argument sometimes appears to rest on the assumption that if Assad used sarin, then he must have felt threatened. This conclusion may be useful in explaining the times Assad crossed that line, but does not help in determining when such incidents may recur and will not enable policymakers to pre-empt such use through assurances. By analyzing three competing factors—credibility of deterrence, assurances, and motivations—the authors sometimes equivocate on which factor was most relevant to explain the outcome. Although the world is a complex place, this approach offers little in helping to understand future cases other than to remember to take all such factors into account.

To be fair, these limitations of the book reflect the challenges inherent generally in deterrence and coercive diplomacy in a dynamic situation. Multiple U.S. administrations were unclear in their approach to similar challenges due to competing demands. The United States could not ignore the use of chemical weapons on moral and nonproliferation grounds, but was unwilling to threaten invasion and feared an Islamic extremist government takeover in Damascus. Assad, meanwhile, was left wondering where the supposed redline was after his repeated use of chlorine sparked little international response. Only his use of sarin ran a serious risk of military strikes until he suffered his most significant strike from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom after his use of chlorine in Douma in 2018 killed dozens of people. These shifting international priorities seriously complicated any efforts at deterrence, coercion, or acquiescence.

Another powerful insight the authors offer involves the role of recent comparable experiences in the calculations of the key players in Russia, Syria and the United States throughout this time period. NATO’s decision to facilitate the fall of leader Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, even after he surrendered his weapons of mass destruction, raised serious questions in Assad’s mind about his future if he turned over his chemical weapons and limited the U.S. ability to offer any assurances. Russia similarly recalled regime-change experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya—all of which resulted in considerable chaos—and feared a similar fate for its ally in Damascus. Although Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin feared this track record meant that the United States was serious about possible regime change in Syria, Obama and Trump appeared to take the opposite approach. Instead, both presidents tried to avoid repeating those same mistakes and did not wish to risk the fall of Assad for fear of a humanitarian crisis or even an Islamic State takeover. Thus, Libya provided a cautionary tale for all of the key players, even if they drew somewhat different lessons.

The authors conclude their analysis in 2020, as Assad appeared to have won the civil war and, not coincidentally, stopped using his chemical weapons. Subsequent events inspired them to add a brief epilogue, however, to address Assad’s unexpected fall from power in late 2024 and his equally unexpected nonuse of CW in the end. The authors correctly argue that deterrence was probably not the cause of this CW nonuse, given the lack of deterrent threats from the United States at the time. Instead, they focus on Assad’s inability to respond due to the speed of his ouster and the weakness of his military.

Yet, this nonuse of chemical weapons fundamentally challenges the authors’ argument focusing on Assad’s commitment to regime survival as the primary reason for his CW use. If their hypothesis is true that Assad was more likely to use CW, especially sarin, when he felt most threatened, why did the Syrian leader not at least attempt to use CW again as enemy troops closed on his capital? Although beyond the scope of this book, this is an important question worthy of additional research. Hopefully, the authors will address this question in future work.

Overall, this book offers an excellent contribution to the literature with numerous insights worthy of further consideration, especially because the challenges of deterrence and coercive diplomacy will continue to bedevil policymakers in the future.