Future of Nonproliferation Treaty on the Line at the 11th Review Conference

Resources and Analysis About the April 27-May 22 Meeting at the UN 

For Immediate Release: April 16, 2026

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director (202-463-8270 x107); Thomas Countryman, Chair of the Board and former Asst. Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation and member of the U.S. NPT delegation in 2022 (via 202-463-8270 x104)

(Washington, D.C.)— Representatives from some 190 governments will convene beginning April 27 for the pivotal 11th nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference to assess progress toward implementation of the treaty's goals and objectives, reaffirm the consensus-based commitments made at the 1995, 2000, and 2010 Review Conferences, and negotiate an action plan to advance the treaty's core goals on nonproliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear technology under international safeguards, and disarmament.

The NPT Review Conference is held every five years. Unfortunately, the last two NPT Review Conferences (2015 and 2022) have failed to produce a consensus outcome document. The 2026 Conference President Du Hong Viet told Arms Control Today that another failure would further weaken the NPT. “We may lose the credibility of the NPT itself,” he warned.

Reaching agreement will be very difficult. The April 27-May 22 meeting will be held amid a multiplying array of challenges to this foundational treaty, which has been signed and ratified by 193 states. For example:

• In October, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to violate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by resuming nuclear explosive testing “on an equal basis.” And, in February, senior State Department officials accused China of conducting a nuclear test in 2020.
• In February, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expired. For the first time since 1972, there are no agreed limits on the size of the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals, the world’s largest.
• The U.S. government has called for multilateral arms control talks, but there are no negotiations between Washington and Moscow or with other nuclear armed states to limit or reduce their arsenals.
• China continues to increase the diversity and size of its smaller but still deadly nuclear arsenal.
• In response to concerns about Russian aggression against Ukraine and Europe and faltering U.S. support for European security, France announced that it will increase the size of its nuclear arsenal and increase cooperation with European allies on nuclear deterrence.
• The U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in June 2025 and their full-scale attack on Iran launched this year has complicated the task of blocking Iran's potential pathways to the bomb and resuming international inspections of Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities, while raising concerns among NPT states-parties about attacks by nuclear-armed states.

“Despite these strong crosswinds, NPT states can and must try to line up together behind the treaty and a set of core action steps to reduce the nuclear danger,” argues Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, who has participated in every NPT Review Conference since 1995.

“Many NPT delegations will press for commitments from the five nuclear-armed states to close the 'disarmament deficit,'” he predicted.  Each of the NPT's nuclear-armed states are in violation of the obligation to engage in ‘negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’ as required by Article VI of the treaty.

“An outcome document will show to the world, our constituencies, our people, that they can still rely on the NPT for their security, and that they can be confident that governments are still working towards ensuring better security for all through these dialogues and discussions and sticking to the commitments that they have,” Viet told Arms Control Today in a March interview.

For the first time, the U.S. delegation will not be led by a Senate-confirmed ambassador with prior NPT experience. As a result, “effective leadership from the United States is, unfortunately, unlikely going into this Review Conference,” noted Kimball. “This will make it important for other states, particularly non-nuclear ‘middle powers,’ to provide the leadership and solutions necessary to move the NPT conference in the right direction.”

Ahead of this critical NPT Review conference, the Arms Control Association provides the following resources for reporters, journalists, and practitioners:

• Conference Chief Seeks to Rebuild NPT Credibility: An Interview with Ambassador Do Hung Viet of Vietnam, president of the 2026 NPT Review Conference in Arms Control Today, April 2026.
• “The NPT Hangs in the Balance,” analysis/commentary by Daryl G. Kimball in Arms Control Today, April 2026.
• “States Gather for the 11th NPT Review Conference,” Arms Control Today news report by Libby Flatoff and Daryl Kimball April 2026."The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at a Glance,” an ACA Fact Sheet.
• “Timeline of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” an ACA Fact Sheet

Additional, in-depth analysis from other leading experts is available in Arms Control Today:

• “The U.S. Has Been Central to the NPT Since the Beginning. What Will It Do in 2026?” by Matthew Sharp, former U.S. Department of State and National Security Council from 2009 to 2025, working on nuclear nonproliferation and arms control issues in several roles, in Arms Control Today, April 2026.
• “The Right to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy: A Disputed Matter,” by Mark Goodman former State Department official who worked on multilateral nuclear affairs and was involved in every NPT review cycle since 1995, in Arms Control Today, March 2026.
• “South Africa and the 1995 NPT Review Conference,” by Jean du Preez who was a member of the South African delegation, in Arms Control Today, March 2026.
• “Waiting for Godot at the 2026 NPT Review Conference,” by Sara Bidgood and William Potter in Arms Control Today, September 2025.

The plenary session of the NPT Review Conference will be broadcast on UN TV.

For the official program of work, schedule, working papers and statements, see the Reaching Critical Will website at: https://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2026 Nongovernmental organizations will make presentations to the plenary on May 1.

For Immediate Release: April 7, 2026

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball and Thomas Countryman (202-463-8270 x107)

(Washington, D.C.) — President Donald Trump’s April 7 threat that he might escalate U.S. attacks on Iran so that “a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again,” should profoundly alarm every U.S. and global citizen. 

Whether Trump is threatening a massive conventional bombing campaign or making a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons to try to coerce Iran into submission, leaders of nuclear-armed states cannot, must not, threaten the end of "a whole civilization.” 

Such threats are unacceptable and following through would be a massive war crime and humanitarian disaster. In addition, an attack on Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant would risk a radiological disaster in the region.

The only type of weapons in the U.S. arsenal that could destroy "a whole civilization" in a day would be nuclear weapons. Any use by the United States of nuclear weapons against Iran would permanently damage the United States' reputation, shred its alliances, and would constitute a war crime for which everyone in the chain of command could be prosecuted.

Even if Trump is not considering the use nuclear weapons, but “only” intends to launch a massive conventional bombing against civilian targets in Iran, the effect would be the opposite of Trump’s ostensible goal: preventing Iran’s leaders from acquiring nuclear weapons. 

Rather, it would reinforce the belief that the only way a nation can deter attack from an aggressive nuclear-armed state is to possess one’s own nuclear weapons. A further escalation of this war would thus provide further incentive for Iran - and possibly other states - to develop nuclear weapons.

During the course of the nuclear age, past U.S. presidents have issued veiled nuclear threats against smaller, less powerful but very determined nations only to learn that such threats do not lead them to capitulate. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and later against China and the Soviet Union, as well as Nixon’s “madman” strategy, which involved a nuclear threat against North Vietnam and a massive strategic bombing campaign, failed to bend adversaries to U.S. goals.

We call on rational voices inside Trump’s circle of formal advisors, informal confidants, members of Congress from both parties, and global leaders to remind Mr. Trump that responsible leaders do not threaten to commit war crimes, that a further escalation of his illegal war would undermine U.S. and global security and risk the lives of innocent people in Iran and the Middle East, and that the responsible path forward and out of this war is to immediately end the hostilities.