In previous decades, the leaders of the largest nuclear superpowers often engaged in serious negotiations about nuclear arms control and disarmament.
October 2026
By Daryl G. Kimball
In previous decades, the leaders of the largest nuclear superpowers often engaged in serious negotiations about nuclear arms control and disarmament. Presidential summits—such as the Oct. 11-12, 1986, encounter in Reykjavik, which was held amid enormous geopolitical tension and public demand for disarmament—catalyzed high-level negotiations that produced treaties mandating massive cuts in strategic arsenals and the elimination of intermediate-range missiles.
Forty years later, the nuclear sword of Damocles still hangs over all of us. The threat has become more complex, and in the absence of new arms control breakthroughs, we are headed for an unprecedented three-way buildup of Chinese, Russian, and U.S. nuclear forces.
Nevertheless, there are currently no high-level discussions among the major nuclear powers on reducing the nuclear threat, let alone on achieving nuclear zero, as U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev considered.
To his credit, U.S. President Donald Trump has, from time to time, talked of his concern about the nuclear threat and his desire for fewer nuclear weapons. But saying something and doing it are not the same.
By all indications, Trump’s Sept. 24 summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping was another missed opportunity. The White House said the U.S. leader “advocated for trilateral arms control negotiations between the U.S., Russia, and China,” but there was no corresponding mention in the Chinese readout of the meeting. Beijing has repeatedly rejected a trilateral approach since Trump first proposed it in 2019. Instead, Beijing has proposed that nuclear-armed states negotiate a no-first-use agreement among them to reduce the risk of nuclear war.
Trump’s summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in August 2025 was another blown opportunity. With the last bilateral nuclear arms control treaty about to expire, the two were scheduled to discuss arms control but the meeting was cut short before they reached that agenda item. Weeks later, Putin proposed that the two sides continue respecting the central limits of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty after it expired to provide time for talks on a follow-on deal. Trump failed to respond to the Russian offer.
Instead, when the treaty expired in February 2026, Trump’s national security team called for a new era of “multilateral” risk reduction talks that also involves China, which is increasing its strategic arsenal to ensure it retains its nuclear retaliatory potential.
Complicating the equation, China, Russia, and the United States are pursuing new nuclear capabilities for potential use in a regional war. The Pentagon is developing new strategic missile interceptors that would make reductions in offensive weapons more difficult. U.S. officials also allege that China conducted a prohibited nuclear test in 2020. In response, Trump has threatened to resume nuclear testing “on an equal basis.” None of these developments breed trust, but they do necessitate more, not less dialogue.
U.S. State Department officials say they have been quietly holding mid-level talks on Chinese nuclear force levels and nuclear testing, aimed at nuclear risk reduction and transparency, on the sidelines of the P5 process dialogue on nuclear matters. The next meeting is set for this month in New York.
Such discussions can be very useful if they are approached as opportunities to bridge differences, not to score points. Undoubtedly, China and Russia should do more to advance global nuclear disarmament negotiations. All five nuclear-armed members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are obligated to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”
But, as the Reykjavik summit reminds us, without a bolder, more balanced, clearer U.S. strategy, progress on nuclear risk reduction and disarmament will be incremental at best.
One win-win goal for the nuclear five should be to reaffirm their commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and agree on new voluntary technical measures to ensure no state is conducting clandestine low-yield nuclear explosions. They could also begin negotiations on a binding declaration on maintaining effective human control over nuclear use and operational best practices to mitigate the risks of AI integration in nuclear and military systems.
To jump-start serious disarmament diplomacy, even more ambitious concepts should be pursued. For instance, all five NPT nuclear-armed states could agree to indefinitely freeze deployment of additional strategic launchers. As of now, Russia and the United States each have fewer than 800 total strategic launchers; China has an estimated 550; and France and the United Kingdom have a combined total of about 96.
A freeze at these levels would not affect any country’s ability to deter nuclear attack (and inflict catastrophic harm), could be confidently verified through national means of intelligence, would reduce tensions, and would create a better environment for arms reduction talks.
Reykjavik shows that significant disarmament progress is achievable with the right preparation, sustained presidential leadership, and bold ideas that can produce significant results. In the face of today’s nuclear dangers, ordinary people and government leaders the world over need to demand more from the men who lead the world’s nuclear-armed states.
By Daryl G. Kimball in Arms Control Today
Inside ACA
September 2026
Time flies when you are working to reduce and eliminate nuclear and other weapons-related dangers.
As noted in Arms Control Today, last month marked my 25th year as ACA’s executive director. It’s an honor and a joy to serve the cause of effective arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament, and to work with the many dedicated professional staff and our experienced Board of Directors.
ACA's expert panel explains the AI-nuclear weapons nexus. Watch here.
"Oppose or Condition the Flawed U.S.-Saudi Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation"
September 22, 2026
Dear Senator/Member of Congress:
We are writing to express our profound concern about the significant proliferation risks posed by the U.S.-Saudi agreement for civil nuclear cooperation. The proposed agreement abandons longstanding nonproliferation standards supported by Republican and Democratic administrations to prevent the transfer of technologies that can be used to produce weapons-grade nuclear material and to detect clandestine weapons programs.
Specifically, the deal provides a pathway for Saudi Arabia to acquire U.S. uranium enrichment technology without the more intrusive Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in violation of Nuclear Suppliers Group standards that the United States itself has championed.
Supporting Saudi Arabia’s ambition to develop a uranium enrichment program without adequate IAEA safeguards is particularly concerning given that key Saudi officials, including Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, have threatened to develop nuclear weapons to match any Iranian capability.
We recognize that U.S. civil nuclear cooperation efforts can play an important role in U.S. nonproliferation strategy, but we underscore that such engagement requires effective safeguards and limitations in all cases.
We respectfully urge you -- and all members of Congress on both sides of the aisle -- to recognize the risks and to exercise your power to reject or modify this proposed nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia. Failure to do so increases the risk of Saudi Arabia developing nuclear weapons and erodes global nonproliferation norms.
In particular, we want to underscore two major flaws of this proposed agreement:
First, the proposed Bilateral Safeguards Agreement (BSA) does not substitute for the Additional Protocol: Rather than requiring Saudi Arabia to conclude an Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, the Trump administration negotiated a separate Bilateral Safeguards Agreement. Not only is the BSA insufficient to provide assurance that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program is peaceful, but it abandons the long-standing bipartisan support for requiring states to adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol as a condition of U.S. nuclear cooperation.
The Additional Protocol, which was negotiated after it became clear by the early-1990s that Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty-required comprehensive safeguards were insufficient to detect and deter determined proliferators like North Korea and Iraq, significantly increases the IAEA’s ability to verify that a state’s nuclear program is peaceful and provide assurance that a state is not engaged in undeclared nuclear weapons-related activities.
The Additional Protocol is now recognized as safeguards best practice. Today, some 144 states have negotiated an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, including the United States.
Unlike the Additional Protocol, which requires a state to provide access to all stages of the fuel cycle and research facilities that support a state’s nuclear program, the BSA only requires the Saudis to provide additional information about, and expanded access to, sites where the U.S. is engaged in nuclear fuel cycle cooperation, like uranium conversion and enrichment.
As a result, Saudi Arabia could conduct certain nuclear activities without IAEA monitoring. For example, Saudi Arabia has already conducted some exploration of its domestic uranium resources in cooperation with China National Nuclear Corporation, which is outside the purview of its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA and would be outside the proposed BSA.
Furthermore, the Additional Protocol allows the IAEA to request complementary access to any location to ensure the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. The BSA contains no similar provision, suggesting that Saudi Arabia could refuse agency requests to access undeclared facilities.
Neither the IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi nor the Trump Administration has explained how the agreement will allow the agency to verify that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in Saudi Arabia. This should not be acceptable in the case of a country like Saudi Arabia that seeks the capabilities to produce fissile material and has threatened to pursue nuclear weapons.
The BSA also sets a troubling precedent. In negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements, other states may similarly seek bespoke safeguards arrangements that provide insufficient monitoring, rather than accepting the Additional Protocol.
Second, the agreement would likely lead to Saudi Arabia developing a uranium enrichment program using U.S. technologies. Once transferred, there is an increased risk Saudi Arabia could exploit uranium enrichment technology for weapons purposes. The transfer also sets a troubling precedent. The United States has never provided enrichment or reprocessing technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state and has pressed other nuclear suppliers to refrain from doing so since the 1970s.
Under the proposed nuclear cooperation agreement, the United States and Saudi Arabia would conduct a 2-year joint study on the commercial feasibility of enrichment. After the study is completed, the executive branch could decide to transfer uranium enrichment technology to Saudi Arabia. The proposed deal limits uranium enrichment to less than 5 percent, but it allows that limit to increase to 20 percent (a level that can quickly be enriched to weapons grade) after an additional study and written agreement from both sides.
The Trump administration claims that the transfer of enrichment technology will not “constitute an unreasonable risk” and maintains that the deal will advance U.S. nonproliferation interests.
Such claims are hardly reassuring. Once the United States has transferred sensitive technology to Saudi Arabia, it risks losing physical and/or institutional control of the equipment and associated design and engineering data associated with the facility. Critical information about enrichment technology may leak to the Saudis during the course of cooperative activities or as part of Saudi Arabia’s mandatory declarations to the IAEA.
Without an Additional Protocol in place, the IAEA will have fewer tools to follow up on any evidence that Saudi Arabia exploited U.S. technology (or technology from other suppliers) for illicit purposes.
If Congress fails to enact a joint resolution of disapproval to block the deal it may enter into force in fewer than 90 days of continuous legislative session. Alternatively, Congress could pass a joint resolution of approval that would require that certain conditions are met before the agreement can be implemented, as Congress did in 1985 in connection with the U.S.-China agreement for nuclear cooperation.
We urge you and your colleagues to act.
Sincerely,
James Acton, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*
Hans Blix, former Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
Susan Burk, former Special Representative of the President, Nuclear Nonproliferation with the rank of Ambassador
Thomas Countryman, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation
Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association
John Erath, Senior Policy Director for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Steve Fetter, Professor, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland* and former Principal Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Robert L. Gallucci, Dean and Professor Emeritus, Georgetown University, and former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
Victor Gilinsky program advisor to The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and former commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Pierre Goldschmidt, former Deputy Director General of the IAEA and Head of the Department of Safeguards.
Mark Goodman, former Senior Scientist, Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs, Department of State
Bonnie D. Jenkins, Ph.D., former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and Executive Director, Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation
Laura Kennedy, former Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Special Representative for Biological Weapons Convention Issues, and former Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy to the United Nations in Vienna and member of the IAEA Board of Governors
Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
Alan J. Kuperman, Associate Professor and coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project, University of Texas at Austin
Valerie Lincy, Executive Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
Stewart Prager, Professor emeritus of astrophysical sciences and member of Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
Laura Rockwood, former Director, IAEA Office of Legal Affairs, Non-Proliferation and Policy Making Section
Adam M. Scheinman, former Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation
Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Sharon Squassoni, research professor at George Washington University,* formerly with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the State Department, and the Congressional Research Service
John Tierney, Executive Director at Council for a Livable World, and former Chair of the U.S. House of Representatives National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the Government Oversight and Reform Committee
Bruce Turner, former Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament
Frank N. von Hippel, founding co-Director, Program for Science and Global Security, Princeton University; Assistant Director for National Security, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
*Institution listed for identification purposes only.
**Please address replies to Arms Control Association via [email protected]
Download the letter here.
