2025 Arms Control Person(s) of the Year Nominees Announced
For Immediate Release: December 12, 2025
Media Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director (202-463-8270 x107)
(Washington, D.C.)—Since 2007, the independent, nongovernmental Arms Control Association has nominated individuals and institutions that have, in the previous 12 months, advanced effective arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament solutions and raised awareness of the threats and the human impacts posed by mass casualty weapons.
"In a field that is often focused on grave threats and negative developments, our Arms Control Person(s) of the Year contest aims to highlight several positive initiatives—some at the grassroots level, some on the international scale—designed to advance disarmament, nuclear security, and international peace, security, the protection of civilians in war, and/or the rule of law," noted Daryl G. Kimball, executive director.
"We’ve witnessed tremendous setbacks to international peace and security in 2025. But these nominees and their outstanding efforts during the past year illustrate how many different people can, in a variety of creative and sometimes courageous ways, contribute to a safer world for the generations of today and tomorrow," he added.
This year's nominees are listed below and a link to the online ballot is available at ArmsControl.org/ACPOY/2025.
Voting will take place between Dec. 12, 2025, and Jan. 12, 2026. Follow the discussion on social media using the hashtag #ACPOY2025.
A full list of previous winners is available at ArmsControl.org/ACPOY/previous.
The 2025 nominees are:
- The director, Kathryn Bigelow, and screenwriter, Noah Oppenheim, of the Netflix feature-length film, "A House of Dynamite" for providing millions of viewers a realistic, inside look at the dangerous paradoxes and flaws of the system of nuclear deterrence as it might play out in one of the several potential crises that could erupt in the present day. The film shows how, in a real-world nuclear crisis, the answers are never clear, decisions are all always rushed, and the options are all very, very bad.
- The UN Delegation of Mexico and 5 other co-sponsoring states for successfully introducing and advancing a first-ever United Nations First Committee resolution A/C.1/80L/L.56 on “possible risks of integration of artificial intelligence into command, control and communication systems of nuclear weapons.” It was approved 115-8 with 44 abstentions. The resolution seeks to diminish this risk by encouraging member states to jointly explore the unique dangers created by the integration of AI into nuclear launch systems. It also calls on the nuclear-armed states to take immediate steps to ensure that humans, not machines, exercise ultimate control over the use of nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia were among the handful of "no" votes. Many experts, including former military officials, have warned that the unrestrained integration of AI into nuclear command and control systems could result in the “poisoning” of nuclear decision-making systems by false or corrupted data, leading to hasty or misguided nuclear launch decisions. (See ACT, September 2025.)
- The Nevada State Legislature for its unanimous approval on May 22, 2025, of a bipartisan resolution in support of the U.S. nuclear test moratorium and the CTBT. Amid calls from some in Washington to resume nuclear explosive testing, Assembly Joint Resolution 13 calls on the federal government to maintain a 33-year U.S. test moratorium. Beginning in January 1951, Nevada was the site of 928 of the United States' 1,054 nuclear test explosions. The strong bipartisan support shows that Nevadans across the state, no matter their party consider resumed testing is a threat to the state’s economy and environment, the health of its residents, and national and global security.
- Catholic Cardinals and Bishops from Japan, South Korea, and the United States for their pilgrimage of peace to Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombings of the two cities in August. The U.S. delegation included Cardinal Blase Cupich of Chicago; Cardinal Robert McElroy of Washington, D.C.; Archbishop Paul Etienne of Seattle; and Archbishop John C. Wester of Santa Fe, New Mexico. The pilgrimage was coordinated by the Partnership for a World Without Nuclear Weapons to help encourage many other bishops, religious, dioceses, parishes and organizations to join in work for a more peaceful world without nuclear weapons. In Hiroshima, Cardinal McElroy noted: "Deterrence is not a step on the road to nuclear disarmament, but a morass. That is why the Church could not continue to tolerate an ethic which de facto legitimates possession." See: https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/265637/catholic-bishops-to-join-pilgrimage-of-peace-to-japan-on-anniversary-of-atomic-bombings
- Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and more than two dozen other Senators for seeking to enforce the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act by pressing for a vote and for voting for a resolution of disapproval to block offensive arms sales to Israel. Sanders and his colleagues cited longstanding U.S. laws and its own policies, which require suspension or limitation of U.S. arms transfers to states, that fail to allow humanitarian assistance to civilians in conflict or that engage in acts that violate international humanitarian law. Two measures were debated and voted on in July. The first, which would block the sale of tens of thousands of assault rifles, failed 70-27. The second, which would block the sale of $675.7 million of bombs and other materiel to Israel, failed 73-24.
- Twenty-four Japanese high school students serving as "peace messengers" advocating for the abolition of nuclear weapons presented about 110,000 signatures for world peace to the United Nations during their visit to the U.N. headquarters in Geneva in September. As the number of surviving hibakusha diminishes over time, the leadership of young activists in recalling the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and pressing for nuclear disarmament becomes more important. See: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/09/03/japan/students-signatures-peace-un/
- National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine study group that produced the June 2025 report, "Potential Environmental Effects of Nuclear War." The report found that U.S. government "studies reflecting very large exchanges of tens of thousands of warheads with multi-megaton yields are no longer reflective of current worldwide nuclear stockpiles. In the same vein, scenarios that reflect an informed mix of nuclear weapon employment on both targets within urban areas and military targets outside urban areas, versus only in urban areas, would likely better reflect military strategies and outcomes." In other words, the study found that the Department of Defense, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and Department of Homeland Security analyze some (but not all) of the consequences of nuclear detonations.
The government of Oman for declaring the completion of clearance of antipersonnel mines in June 2025. Oman was contaminated by antipersonnel and anti-vehicle landmines as a result of an internal conflict from 1964–1975. In 2015, Oman reported that all of its hazardous areas had been cleared before it joined the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, but that those areas were in the process of being “re-inspected” based on a workplan to clear all mined areas by a treaty-mandated deadline of February 2025. There are currently no confirmed mined areas in Oman. Oman's progress was one of the lone bright spots in the global campaign to ban and eliminate landmines. As the most recent Landmine Monitor Report indicates, cutbacks in U.S. aid for landmine clearance and the withdrawals from the 1997 Landmine Convention by five states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Poland) have set back efforts.
VOTE NOW
Honorable mention: The “hero” rats of APOPO helping with the urgent task of demining in Cambodia.
China Signals Continuity in Nuclear Policy Paper
Nuclear Disarmament Monitor
December 11, 2025
The CTBT, the Global Nuclear Test Moratorium, and New U.S. Threats to Break the Norm
Three decades after the conclusion of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty has near universal support and has established a global norm against nuclear test explosions.
December 11, 2025
By Daryl G. Kimball
Executive Director, Arms Control Association
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| Download PDF |
SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS
- The CTBT has been a central goal of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) states-parties since the NPT was opened for signature in 1968.
- The 1996 CTBT has brought the era of nuclear testing to an end and established a global norm against any kind of nuclear test explosion.
- The door to nuclear testing remains open as the treaty has not entered into force due to the treaty’s onerous Article XIV provisions, which require ratification by 44 specific states.
- Despite the fact that the United States has signed the CTBT and the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory directors and the National Nuclear Security Administration have determined that nuclear explosive testing is not necessary to maintain the reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the Trump administration has declared that it will not seek Senate advice and consent for U.S. ratification and, in October 2025, Trump suggested that he would order the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing “on an equal basis.”
- Pending CTBT entry into force, the P5 should engage in technical talks to develop confidence building measures to resolve real or potential concerns about very low-yield, supercritical nuclear test detonations at former nuclear test sites.
- NPT states parties should approve stronger language in support of the global moratorium on nuclear testing and the CTBT, and the P5 should issue their own joint declaration in support of the global moratorium on nuclear testing and the CTBT ahead of the 2026 NPT Review Conference.
2025 Arms Control Person(s) of the Year

(Washington, D.C.)—The Arms Control Association is dedicated to providing authoritative information and promoting practical solutions to address the dangers posed by the world's most dangerous weapons.
Every year since 2007, we nominate and select individuals and institutions that have advanced effective arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament solutions and/or raised awareness of the threats posed by mass casualty weapons to become the Arms Control Person(s) of the Year.
Voting will take place between Dec. 12, 2025, and Jan. 12, 2026. Follow the discussion on social media using the hashtag #ACPOY2025.
A full list of previous winners is available at ArmsControl.org/ACPOY/previous.
VOTE NOW
The 2025 nominees are:
The director, Kathryn Bigelow, and screenwriter, Noah Oppenheim, of the Netflix feature-length film, "A House of Dynamite" for providing millions of viewers a realistic, inside look at the dangerous paradoxes and flaws of the system of nuclear deterrence as it might play out in one of the several potential crises that could erupt in the present day. The film shows how, in a real-world nuclear crisis, the answers are never clear, decisions are all always rushed, and the options are all very, very bad.
The UN Delegation of Mexico and 5 other co-sponsoring states for successfully introducing and advancing a first-ever United Nations First Committee resolution A/C.1/80L/L.56 on “possible risks of integration of artificial intelligence into command, control and communication systems of nuclear weapons.” It was approved 115-8 with 44 abstentions. The resolution seeks to diminish this risk by encouraging member states to jointly explore the unique dangers created by the integration of AI into nuclear launch systems. It also calls on the nuclear-armed states to take immediate steps to ensure that humans, not machines, exercise ultimate control over the use of nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia were among the handful of "no" votes. Many experts, including former military officials, have warned that the unrestrained integration of AI into nuclear command and control systems could result in the “poisoning” of nuclear decision-making systems by false or corrupted data, leading to hasty or misguided nuclear launch decisions. (See ACT, September 2025.)
The Nevada State Legislature for its unanimous approval on May 22, 2025, of a bipartisan resolution in support of the nuclear test ban. Amid calls from some in Washington to resume nuclear explosive testing, Assembly Joint Resolution 13 calls on the federal government to maintain a 33-year U.S. test moratorium. Beginning in January 1951, Nevada was the site of 928 of the United States' 1,054 nuclear test explosions. The strong bipartisan support shows that Nevadans across the state, no matter their party consider resumed testing is a threat to the state’s economy and environment, the health of its residents, and national and global security.
Catholic Cardinals and Bishops from Japan, South Korea, and the United States for their pilgrimage of peace to Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombings of the two cities in August. The U.S. delegation included Cardinal Blase Cupich of Chicago; Cardinal Robert McElroy of Washington, D.C.; Archbishop Paul Etienne of Seattle; and Archbishop John C. Wester of Santa Fe, New Mexico. The pilgrimage was coordinated by the Partnership for a World Without Nuclear Weapons to help encourage many other bishops, religious, dioceses, parishes and organizations to join in work for a more peaceful world without nuclear weapons. In Hiroshima, Cardinal McElroy noted: "Deterrence is not a step on the road to nuclear disarmament, but a morass. That is why the Church could not continue to tolerate an ethic which de facto legitimates possession." See: https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/265637/catholic-bishops-to-join-pilgrimage-of-peace-to-japan-on-anniversary-of-atomic-bombings
Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and more than two dozen other Senators for seeking to enforce the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act by pressing for a vote and for voting for a resolution of disapproval to block offensive arms sales to Israel. Sanders and his colleagues cited longstanding U.S. laws and its own policies, which require suspension or limitation of U.S. arms transfers to states, that fail to allow humanitarian assistance to civilians in conflict or that engage in acts that violate international humanitarian law. Two measures were debated and voted on in July. The first, which would block the sale of tens of thousands of assault rifles, failed 70-27. The second, which would block the sale of $675.7 million of bombs and other materiel to Israel, failed 73-24.
Twenty-four Japanese high school students serving as "peace messengers" advocating for the abolition of nuclear weapons presented about 110,000 signatures for world peace to the United Nations during their visit to the U.N. headquarters in Geneva in September. As the number of surviving hibakusha diminishes over time, the leadership of young activists in recalling the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and pressing for nuclear disarmament becomes more important. See: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/09/03/japan/students-signatures-peace-un/
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine study group that produced the June 2025 report, "Potential Environmental Effects of Nuclear War." The report found that U.S. government "studies reflecting very large exchanges of tens of thousands of warheads with multi-megaton yields are no longer reflective of current worldwide nuclear stockpiles. In the same vein, scenarios that reflect an informed mix of nuclear weapon employment on both targets within urban areas and military targets outside urban areas, versus only in urban areas, would likely better reflect military strategies and outcomes." In other words, the study found that the Department of Defense, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and Department of Homeland Security analyze some (but not all) of the consequences of nuclear detonations.
- The government of Oman for declaring the completion of clearance of antipersonnel mines in June 2025. Oman was contaminated by antipersonnel and anti-vehicle landmines as a result of an internal conflict from 1964–1975. In 2015, Oman reported that all of its hazardous areas had been cleared before it joined the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, but that those areas were in the process of being “re-inspected” based on a workplan to clear all mined areas by a treaty-mandated deadline of February 2025. There are currently no confirmed mined areas in Oman. Oman's progress was one of the lone bright spots in the global campaign to ban and eliminate landmines. As the most recent Landmine Monitor Report indicates, cutbacks in U.S. aid for landmine clearance and the withdrawals from the 1997 Landmine Convention by five states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Poland) have set back efforts.
Honorable mention: The “hero” rats of APOPO helping with the urgent task of demining in Cambodia.
VOTE NOW
Dec. 2025 Pentagon News
Pentagon, Congress Push Military Acquisition Changes
By Xiaodon Liang in Arms Control Today
Dec. 2025 - U.S.-South Korea News
U.S. Supports South Korean Enrichment, Reprocessing
By Kelsey Davenport in Arms Control Today
Dec. 2025 Saudi-U.S. News
U.S., Saudi Arabia Announce Nuclear Cooperation
By Kelsey Davenport in Arms Control Today
December 2025 Digital Magazine
December 2025 Digital Magazine
With two months left before the treaty expires, a quick-fix does not require negotiations, just a commitment by Russia and the United States to continue abiding by the New START limits.
December 2025
By Rose Gottemoeller
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, after mysteriously disappearing from the public eye for a few weeks, reemerged November 9 to give an interview to Russian news service RIA Novosti. He took a question about whether Moscow has proposed a meeting with Washington to discuss President Vladimir Putin’s offer to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) limits for one year beyond February 5, 2026, when the treaty goes out of force. With an exasperated edge, his specialty, Lavrov answered,

The constructive initiative put forward by President Vladimir Putin in the post-New START context speaks for itself. It contains no hidden agenda and is perfectly clear for understanding. Its practical implementation would not require any special additional efforts. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to hold in-depth discussions on this proposal.… So far, there has been no substantive response from Washington.1
In past times, the two sides could be expected to be engaged in sustained, even urgent, negotiations to determine the future of their nuclear relationship and the treaty that imposes the last remaining limits on their strategic arsenals, which together contain roughly 10,000 nuclear weapons.
But since Putin announced September 22 that Russia is “prepared to continue observing the … central quantitative restrictions” of New START for one year after its expiration if the United States “acts in a similar spirit,” there has been no formal U.S. response, just President Donald Trump’s off-the-cuff comment to reporters Oct. 5 that “it sounds like a good idea to me.”2
One Right Thing
Yet, Lavrov has one thing right: Putin’s proposal does not require any negotiation. Both Putin and Trump could simply declare their intention to continue to abide by the New START limits: 1,550 warheads, 700 delivery vehicles, 800 launchers.3 This handshake arrangement could hold until one side declared its intention to leave the limits, or started building up beyond the agreed numbers and the other side noticed through its national technical means of verification, which involve overhead satellites and other national monitoring assets.
Further, while the treaty remains in force, both presidents can actually do better than that—and still not need to negotiate.
Putin stopped implementing New START in February 2023 because he objected to the continuing U.S. assistance to Ukraine.4 The United States, for its part, quite correctly held Russia accountable, stopped implementing the treaty on a reciprocal basis, and pushed Russia to change course. For that reason, Russia and the United States no longer exchange New START data twice a year, nor do they exchange notifications about the movements of their strategic nuclear forces on a nearly daily basis. Similarly, the treaty-mandated short-notice, on-site inspections are on pause, depriving both sides of valuable and stabilizing insights into each other’s nuclear forces.
But even in this situation of suspended implementation, the treaty itself remains in force. That means implementation can easily be resumed until February 5, 2026. Trump could improve Putin’s offer by proposing that both sides resume implementation measures and do so quickly. This would allow each party to have up-to-date knowledge about the status of the other’s strategic nuclear forces when the treaty does go out of force in just over two months’ time. Our mutual knowledge would be “level set” after a period when Moscow and Washington had to depend only on national technical means for monitoring the other’s forces. The result is bound to be a mutual improvement.
The two sides would not have to negotiate; they only have to flip the implementation switch back on. Both countries have a legal obligation under the treaty to fulfill these measures which are clearly laid out in treaty protocols and procedures; notification formats, for example, are well-understood on both sides, and are transmitted by experienced teams at the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington and Moscow. The data exchanges also are conducted in a well-practiced way by the center staffs.5
As for inspections, they were suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic but were ready to resume in 2023. Although in many instances, U.S. sanctions and visa requirements can impact work with Russia, in this instance, the treaty itself solves the problem. It obligates the parties to accept each other’s inspectors. As with the data exchange, there is “muscle memory” here, too; both sides have experienced inspectors who know how to navigate the procedures. The technical implementation teams were set to meet in the fall of 2022 to chart a post-COVID resumption of inspections— just when Putin ordered the cessation of contact.6
Simple and Fast Implementation
As a result, Russia and the United States could resume full implementation of New START before February 5, 2026. It could be simple and it could be fast. All it requires is that both sides resume implementing the treaty that remains in force until February. This “re-baselining” of insight into their nuclear forces would be a powerful complement to a handshake to abide by New START limits for one year after the treaty expires.
For the United States, the benefit of this move would be buying more time to decide what to do about the ongoing Chinese buildup without having to worry simultaneously about new Russian deployments. It also would permit the U.S. triad modernization program to proceed, unimpeded by new requirements: any decision to re-open that program would add to its already high cost and ever lengthening schedule.
For Russia and the United States, benefits would spring from restored predictability about each other’s nuclear forces, and from the renewed lines of communication that would pay dividends in mutual confidence. With effort, trust may be restored to a level sufficient to make progress on larger strategic stability topics, a process interrupted by the war in Ukraine.
After a nearly four-year pause, Russia and the United States have crucial questions to wrestle with in the strategic stability space, including what to do about the proliferation of drones and missiles at all ranges. One approach would be to ban nuclear weapons on missiles and drones in the short to intermediate ranges. This would challenge the boundaries of what has previously been agreed at the negotiating table but is well worth considering because of the widespread nature of the proliferation. Russia and the United States could look together for ways to propose such limits to other states possessing nuclear weapons. It should be in no one’s interest to face, in the future, a nuclear weapon amid a drone swarm.7
Moscow and Washington also could begin what should become a wider conversation about the need that all states will have to defend against drones and missiles—what is known as integrated air and missile defense—and sustain a balance between strategic offensive deterrence and missile defense. The preamble to New START was succinct on that point,
Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties…8
Defending Against Drones and Missiles
Now the parties must think hard about how to build defenses against drones and missiles in multiple ranges, while ensuring that their strategic triads remain a viable means to deter nuclear attack on their homelands. It is a common problem, once again, that affects all states deploying strategic offensive forces, not just Russia and the United States. With long experience addressing this vital balance, the two largest nuclear powers can perhaps together lay the groundwork for a broader consideration, amid rampant missile proliferation, of the offense-defense relationship among all states possessing nuclear weapons.
The United States, of course, also must address the Chinese nuclear buildup, which will be a long-running challenge in the 21st century. The Chinese are fiercely reluctant to engage on the issue, not wanting to limit or reduce their nuclear forces until an uncertain point in the future. Either they want to build up to the levels of Russia and the United States, thus creating the two-nuclear-peer problem that so worries Washington, or they want to wait until Russia and the United States reduce their arsenals down to China’s level, Beijing’s canonical talking point.
Although China refuses to discuss limits or reductions, it seems more open to conversations about constraining nuclear risks. For that reason, the twin challenges of missile proliferation and defense necessity perhaps will be one way to open a conversation with Beijing about controls on nuclear weapons, such as a ban on nuclear weapons on short- and intermediate-range missiles. If Russia and the United States can advance the issue, then at a minimum, China might be ready to listen to what they have accomplished, perhaps in the context of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the so-called P5.9 The P5 process, which also includes France and the United Kingdom, could be a practical place to discuss integrated air and missile defense and how it relates to the viability of strategic offensive deterrence.
By contrast, one place where China and the United States could take the lead is in fleshing out the meaning of the statement agreed by U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping at their Lima summit meeting in November 2024.10 The two leaders, discussing the security implications of AI, agreed that there should always be a human in the loop for nuclear command and control decision-making, but what precisely that means has yet to be determined. As the countries leading AI innovation on a global basis, China and the United States are in a good position to begin this conversation, with a view to expanding it apace to the rest of the P-5.
Because the level of geopolitical tension is so high, such ideas may seem outlandish, but it is important to stress that they are all on a sound foundation. Russia and the United States first tackled the offense-defense balance in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and that long-ago experience can inform current discussions, even if no one wants to negotiate another ABM Treaty. China, as standoffish as it has been on nuclear negotiations, has already agreed at the highest level that AI and nuclear command and control decision-making must be treated with supreme caution. This, too, is a sound basis for fruitful discussions.
Extending the limits of New START by one year would build momentum toward such engagements. Exercising the treaty now—while it remains in existence—is a positive and achievable step. And it does not require negotiation, just the flip of a policy switch.
ENDNOTES
1. “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with RIA Novosti, Moscow, November 9, 2025,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, November 9, 2025.
2. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Kremlin welcomes Trump’s comments on Putin’s offer to extend the New START nuclear arms pact,” Associated Press, October 6, 2025.
3. Under the New START Treaty, operationally deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers assigned to nuclear missions are limited to 700. Deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and bombers are limited to 800. Operationally deployed warheads are limited to 1,550.
4. Vladimir Putin, “The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, February 21, 2023.
5. Rose Gottemoeller and Dan Zhukov, “Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: A Stable Channel in Unstable Times,” Stanley Center for Peace and Security, October 2023.
6. Mike Eckel, “How Bad Are Things Between Russia and the U.S.? They Can’t Even Agree To Discuss Nuclear Weapons Inspections,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 2, 2022.
7. Rose Gottemoeller, “The US and Russia can lead the way in banning nuclear-armed drones,” The Financial Times, October 30, 2025.
8. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Ex. Rept. 111-6 - Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (The New START Treaty),” Congress.gov, October 1, 2010.
9. Thomas Countryman, “The Potential of the P5 Process,” Arms Control Today, March 2025.
10. “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” The White House, November 16, 2024.
Rose Gottemoeller, William J. Perry Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and a Hoover Institution Research Fellow at Stanford University, was chief U.S. negotiator for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and a former NATO deputy secretary-general. Paul Dean was senior legal advisor to the U.S. New START Treaty delegation and a former deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for implementing the treaty. He assisted Gottemoeller with this article.
