MEDIA BACKGROUNDER: Trump, Putin, Xi Trilateral "Denuclearization" Talks at APEC

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This week's planned trilateral meeting between Presidents Trump, Xi, and Putin — the leaders of the states with the largest and most devastating nuclear arsenals — to discuss pathways toward “denuclearization” should be welcomed as an important new opportunity to begin to take the steps necessary to reduce and eliminate the nuclear danger. 

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For Immediate Release: November 16, 2026

Media Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext 107

In previous decades, the leaders of the largest nuclear superpowers often engaged in serious negotiations about nuclear arms control and disarmament. Presidential summits have sometimes catalyzed high-level negotiations that led to the end of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, the bedrock 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and treaties mandating massive cuts in strategic arsenals and the elimination of intermediate-range missiles.

Despite these and other diplomatic successes, the nuclear sword of Damocles still hangs over all of us as nine states still possess some 12,000 nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons threat has become more complex. In the absence of new arms control breakthroughs, we may be headed for an unprecedented three-way buildup of Chinese, Russian, and U.S. nuclear forces as there are currently no high-level discussions among the major nuclear powers on reducing the nuclear threat, let alone on achieving nuclear zero.

To his credit, U.S. President Donald Trump has, from time to time, expressed his concern about the nuclear threat and his desire for fewer nuclear weapons. But saying something and doing it are not the same and Trump has squandered numerous opportunities to make progress since his first term in office.

Nevertheless, this week's planned trilateral meeting between Presidents Trump, Xi, and Putin — the leaders of the states with the largest and most devastating nuclear arsenals — to discuss pathways toward “denuclearization” should be welcomed as an important new opportunity to begin to take the steps necessary to reduce and eliminate the nuclear danger. 
 
At the same time, we need more than diplomatic theater and photo opportunities between Xi, Putin, and Trump at APEC. And one meeting will not likely produce dramatic breakthroughs. At best, this could be the start of a process that leads to sustained, formal bilateral or multilateral nuclear risk reduction, arms control, and disarmament negotiations. 
 
Other issues will likely come up. It is vitally important that President Trump does not allow Mr. Putin to try to use the meeting attempt to negotiate an end to his illegal, almost five-year war against Ukraine. Talks on ending Russia’s war on Ukraine must involve Ukraine. Any talks on broader European security matters must also involve Europe’s many other states. The United States (and China) should advocate and support an outcome that ends Russia’s attacks and secures Russia’s withdrawal from Ukrainian territory.
 

The Disarmament Deficit

All five of the nuclear-armed states who are party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty are legally obligated to engage in good faith negotiations to end the arms race and on nuclear disarmament, but there has been no progress on nuclear disarmament diplomacy for more than a decade.

  • In 2013, former President Barack Obama proposed talks with Russia on a further one-third reduction in U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear stockpiles but Putin rejected the offer. Since then, the United States and Russia have failed to negotiate a successor to the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limited them to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads each. In recent years, China increased the size of its smaller but still deadly arsenal to ensure it retains a survivable nuclear retaliatory force.
  • In his first term Trump proposed and failed to get “trilateral” arms control talks underway and refused to extend the 2010 New START leaving it to Biden and Putin to do so in 2021.
  • Late last year, as New START was due to expire again, Trump ignored a Russian proposal that would have had both parties agree not to increase their strategic nuclear weapons deployments while they negotiate a new framework agreement. As a result, there are no agreed limits on the arsenals of the world’s major nuclear-armed states today.
  • For their part, Chinese leaders has insisted for years that “It is neither fair, reasonable nor realistic to ask China to join the so-called trilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations at this stage.” China, which has rapidly expanded its nuclear arsenal in the last several years, probably to ensure it retains a nuclear retaliatory force that can withstand a first nuclear or conventional strike, is reluctant to enter into open-ended talks on numerical nuclear limits with Washington and Moscow, each of whom still retain nuclear arsenals more than five times larger than China’s. Instead, China has proposed that the five NPT-nuclear armed states negotiate a joint “no first use” agreement to reduce nuclear risks, which is an idea worth exploring but is one that the U.S. has, so far, chosen not to engage with China about.
  • In his second term, Trump has continued to talk about “trilateral” nuclear talks, but the State Department has said it wants to pursue risk reduction and transparency talks involving all the five nuclear-armed NPT states through the “P5 Process,” which has been underway since 2010 and involves informal talks on nuclear postures and terminology. 
If Trump is serious and wants to make tangible progress on “denuclearization” in his final two years, it will take more than vague statements and wishful thinking. He and his team will need to develop more realistic, balanced, and pragmatic proposals. To date, they have not done so. Despite Trump’s occasional talk about “denuclearization” talks, at no point since New START expired has the United States defined what it would like to achieve through a “trilateral” nuclear arms control process.
 

What Could Be Achieved in a Brief, Trilateral Heads-of-State Meeting at APEC and Beyond to Reduce Nuclear Risks?

As the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev summit at Reykjavik and other past U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control successes remind us, serious progress on nuclear risk reduction and disarmament takes time, it requires bold ideas, and it requires some alignment of interest between the negotiating parties. The following are practical options they might consider:

  1. Presidents Xi, Putin, and Trump could direct their senior negotiating teams to launch formal, sustained bilateral and/or multilateral talks to try to reach new agreements to cap and reduce their deadly nuclear arsenals.  A top priority for all three leaders should be to head off a costly, escalatory nuclear arms race involving the further build-up of nuclear forces and the resumption of nuclear testing by any state.

    To do so,  the United States, Russia, and China, along with the UK and France could agree to indefinitely freeze deployment of any additional strategic nuclear launchers (i.e. long-range missiles and bombers). As of now, Russia and the United States each have fewer than 800 total strategic launchers; China has an estimated 550; and France and the United Kingdom have a combined total of about 96. A nuclear freeze at these levels would not affect any country’s ability to deter nuclear attack (and inflict catastrophic harm), could be confidently verified through national means of intelligence, would reduce tensions.

    A mutual freeze along such lines would create a better environment for sustained bilateral arms reduction talks, including a new U.S.-Russian framework agreement addressing not only strategic nuclear arsenals, but also tactical nuclear weapons, intermediate range nuclear capable missiles, and missile defense systems that can affect strategic stability.

    If China is not prepared to engage in multilateral talks or trilateral talks on “denuclearization” with Russia and the United States, Trump should pursue bilateral talks with Russia and continue to try to engage bilaterally with China. In October, President Putin said the Kremlin is ready to resume a nuclear arms control dialogue with the White House.

  2. To sustain momentum, the U.S., Russian, and Chinese leaders could also agree to meet again on the subject of nuclear disarmament and they could agree to provide regular joint reports on their discussions and their negotiations on their respective proposals on nuclear risk reduction and disarmament to the UN Security Council. From time to time, the Security Council has served as a forum for developing consensus around a common action plan on nonproliferation and disarmament.

    For example, in 2010, the U.S. working with the permanent five and other members of the Council agreed to Resolution 1887, which expressed the Council's resolve to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons and endorsed a balanced set of nonproliferation, disarmament, and nuclear material security initiatives ahead of the May 2010 NPT Review Conference.

  3. Another win-win outcome that could emerge from the APEC trilateral is if the U.S, China, and Russia reaffirm their commitment to the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (which all three have signed but have not ratified) and agree to initiate technical talks on new voluntary technical measures to ensure no state is conducting clandestine, low-yield nuclear explosions before the treaty formally enters into force.

    The subject of augmenting verification and compliance with the CTBT was on the agenda of the “P5 Process” dialogue meeting in New York in October. From a U.S. and global perspective, launching such talks would be far more productive way to address concerns about clandestine nuclear testing than a resumption of U.S. nuclear testing “on an equal basis” as President Trump has threated to do.

  4. The three leaders also have a common interest in reducing the risks posed by new technologies, specifically the integration of AI in their nuclear command and control and communications systems, which will complicate the already precarious balance of nuclear terror (a.k.a nuclear deterrence).

Although they each have, in different ways, said they want to ensure that “a human remains in the loop” regarding decisions about nuclear weapons use, such statements are insufficient to guard against the risks. As a next step, they could agree to a common, binding declaration on maintaining effective and meaningful human control over decisions relating nuclear weapons use and, very importantly, launch technical talks on operational best practices to mitigate the significant risks posed by AI integration in the nuclear and military systems of all three countries. 

-Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association

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