Farrah Zughni

Delegates gathering at the United Nations this month to negotiate a treaty regulating the international arms trade will have to resolve a number of issues concerning the pact’s objectives and scope that remain unsettled since the UN General Assembly decided in 2009 to convene the conference, representatives from a broad range of countries said in June interviews and earlier statements.

The negotiations, which are scheduled to run July 2-27, are supposed to produce a global arms trade treaty (ATT) to set common standards for international transfers of conventional weapons and requirements for all states-parties to set up national control systems to regulate such transfers.

The countries will aim to reach consensus on a final treaty text largely on the basis of a working paper produced by Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, the chair of the preparatory committee, after three years and four preparatory committee sessions involving states that supply and buy conventional arms. (See ACT, January/February 2012.)

Although García Moritán’s text from July 2011 “has no formal status,” it “does represent a range of issues” that have been raised since 2010, said Jo Adamson, British permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament, in a June 20 e-mail to Arms Control Today. Therefore, “we aren’t starting from scratch,” said Adamson, who is the United Kingdom’s lead ATT negotiator. “We look forward to receiving a revised paper in due course to help to guide us through this next critical stage of the negotiations,” she said.

To succeed, the negotiators will need to balance a number of competing forces and political demands. Many weapons suppliers envision an ATT that will affirm trade in conventional weapons as “a legitimate commercial activity,” albeit “one that states have the obligation to regulate,” as Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Thomas Countryman put it in describing U.S. policy on the treaty in an April interview with Arms Control Today.

Many countries want to ensure the treaty augments their security and does not infringe on their ability to procure weapons for their defense. “The ATT should be an instrument which enhances the collective security of states, rather than detracting from it. In this respect, a mainstay of the ATT must be to uphold the right of states to acquire arms in order to defend themselves,” said an Israeli delegate Feb. 13 during the final preparatory committee.

Many other states, however, argue that an ATT must provide meaningful protections against illicit arms transfers that undermine human security (the security of individuals and communities) as well as human rights.

“It is often argued that national security interests need to be duly taken into account in the negotiation of the Treaty. However, from the Austrian perspective, human security is of equal importance and must appropriately resonate in the Treaty,” Alexander Kmentt, director for disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation in the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, said in a June 21 e-mail to Arms Control Today.

An ATT, argued Kmentt, should prevent the illicit trade of arms, diversion of legal arms to the illicit market, and transfers “that contribute to serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, human suffering, armed conflict, transnational organized crime and terrorist acts.”

According to a report published in May by Oxfam, more than $2.2 billion worth of arms and ammunition have been imported since 2000 by countries operating under 26 UN, regional, or multilateral arms embargoes in force during this period.

Treaty Scope

To date, states have not reached agreement on a list of arms and activities that should be covered by an ATT. Most states agree that all of the weapons covered by the categories used in the UN Register of Conventional Arms should fall under the scope of the treaty. These include tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters, warships, and missile systems. Most states, including the United States, are also in agreement that small arms and light weapons should be included in the treaty. The United States does not currently support the inclusion of ammunition within the scope, although many states do.

Some proponents of a more comprehensive treaty have pushed for clear definitions for the categories of weapons that most member states agree should be covered by the pact. Some also have suggested that specific weapons be listed in an ATT. Others point out that a detailed list of weapons would require that an ATT be regularly updated and refined to remain abreast of technological developments and that the time it would take to agree on specific definitions for that process could encumber the four-week-long negotiating conference.

“This is an arms trade regulation document, not a disarmament document, so there is no need for an extensive framework or extensive definitions to make it work,” Countryman said in an address at the Henry L. Stimson Center on April 16. “The outcome of the conference ought to be a good, short document that spells out principles of what states must do in implementing an effective [system of] arms export control.”

According to a tabulation by researchers with the nongovernmental organizations Control Arms Alliance and Reaching Critical Will, all but a handful of the more than 140 countries that have made statements on the issue support expanding the treaty’s scope beyond the UN register’s seven categories to include small arms and light weapons, such as revolvers, machine guns, portable anti-tank guns, portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems, and mortars of calibers less than 75 millimeters.

“Many African countries have suffered from conflicts perpetuated by illicit trade and proliferation on small arms and light weapons,” Patrick Mugoya of Uganda said at the second preparatory committee session on March 1, 2011. “These conflicts result in loss of lives, cause untold suffering to the people, and negatively impact economic and social development.”

According to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, most present-day conflicts are fought predominantly with this category of weapons.

Only a few countries, including China, Egypt, and Iran, have voiced reservations over the so-called 7+1 proposal because they say that it would be difficult to monitor trade in small arms and light weapons. A number of other states, however, have said the absence of this category of arms from the final agreement is a deal breaker.

“Small arms and light weapons will have to be in the treaty. If not, there won’t be a treaty,” said a delegate from a Latin American country in a June 13 interview.

A 7+1+1 formula, which would include ammunition in the treaty’s scope, is also on the table for the negotiating conference. More than 100 countries strongly support the measure, according to the nongovernmental groups’ tabulation.

“It is the bullet and not the weapon that kills. Marking of ammunition is technically feasible and should not serve as an excuse for exempting ammunition on allegedly practical grounds,” argued Kmentt. “Given the robustness and longevity of certain types of these weapons, a continuation of unregulated trade in ammunition would further their use as the real ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in contradiction of the objectives of an Arms Trade Treaty.”

Nevertheless, major suppliers Russia and the United States have expressed doubt that ammunition can be adequately tracked following their sale. U.S. officials have said that they are open to suggestions on how to address this concern.

The United Kingdom, which for years has been a strong supporter of an ATT, has worked to forge a middle ground on this issue. “On ammunition, the UK favours its inclusion in the ATT as the weapons are useless without it,” said Adamson in the June 20 e-mail. “But we recognise that this is going to be a subject of negotiations. Monitoring ammunition is a difficult issue. Making ammunition subject to controls would be an important first step, without prejudice to whether it is covered in detail in Reporting under an ATT.”

In addition to the criteria that should be addressed in considering a transfer, the types of transfers to be regulated are also in question. UN General Assembly Resolution 64/48, which was adopted in December 2009 and mandated the ATT negotiation this month, calls for “a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms.” A key point of controversy in the run-up to the July meeting is what the term “transfer” encompasses.

Most delegations have argued that an ATT should cover arms brokering. The United Kingdom, for instance, says transit and transshipment, loans, and gifts as well as temporary imports and exports for demonstration and exhibition should be included under the treaty’s scope. Of the world’s 192 governments, only 52 have laws regulating arms brokers, and less than half of these have criminal or monetary penalties associated with illegal brokering, according to an October 2011 Oxfam briefing paper.

“These are the main types of activity where diversion into the illicit market can occur. Controlling these forms of entry into the illicit market ensures that the treaty regulates the entire arms trade process without leaving any gaps which can be exploited,” Adamson said.

In the run-up to the negotiating conference, China and Iran have expressed objections to this proposal.

Criteria for Transfers

A key question in the negotiations will be whether the treaty will require states to withhold a transfer if their export control review determines there is a substantial risk that it could lead to human rights violations or whether an ATT will simply require states to “take into account” such potential risks but still allow a transfer authorization to proceed if the supplier state determines that, on balance, larger economic or security concerns merit the transfer.

Some countries favor strong language that would require states not to authorize transfers that would lead to human rights or humanitarian law violations or could circumvent internationally recognized arms embargoes.

“The ATT should establish clear, objective and non-discriminatory norms to prevent the transfer of arms when there is a clear and reasonable ground to believe that such weapons will be used in violation of international human rights law or international humanitarian law,” said delegations from nine countries, including Argentina, Chile, and Colombia, in a joint statement on July 21, 2010. Some countries also want potential sales to be considered in light of their impact on a recipient country’s socioeconomic development and corruption.

Critics of this position argue that implementing such criteria is neither an objective nor straightforward process. “There are ranges of what people think are human rights,” Ann Ganzer, director of the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction, said at the April 16 Stimson Center event. “I attended a meeting a day after someone was executed in Texas and had several Europeans accuse me of representing a country that was a human rights violator,” she recalled.

Tom Z. Collina

Deepening long-held suspicions about a sensitive aspect of German-Israeli military cooperation, Der Spiegel magazine reported in its June 4 issue that Israel has deployed nuclear-armed cruise missiles aboard submarines built and subsidized by Germany.

Israel, which does not officially admit it has any nuclear weapons, is widely believed to have produced up to 200 warheads and bombs. Israel has operated a nuclear reactor and an underground plutonium-separation plant in Dimona since the 1960s. In 1991, as the Persian Gulf War was getting under way, Germany approved the subsidized sale of two Dolphin-class diesel-powered submarines to Israel; a total of six has been ordered so far, three of which have been delivered.

There has been speculation that Israel would put nuclear-armed missiles onto the German submarines but little firm evidence.

The magazine article, drawing on sources in Germany, Israel, and the United States, says the new evidence “no longer leaves any room for doubt” that Israel has a sea-based nuclear deterrent. “From the beginning, the boats were primarily used for the purposes of nuclear capability,” one German ministry official told the magazine. In addition to revealing that the submarines are nuclear armed, the article also states that senior German leaders knew that the boats, built at a shipyard in Kiel, would be used for this purpose.

Sources told Der Spiegel that the Israeli defense technology company Rafael built the sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) for the submarines, based on the Popeye cruise missile, which is estimated to have a range of around 1,500 kilometers with a warhead weighing up to 200 kilograms. The only public evidence of the nuclear version of the missile was a single test conducted off the coast of Sri Lanka, the article says. This missile test was first reported by London’s Sunday Times in June 2000.

According to the article, the newest Dolphin submarines are equipped with fuel cell propulsion, which allows for quieter operation and longer periods between refuelings. Earlier Dolphin submarines had to surface every few days to run the diesel engine to recharge its batteries. The new boats will be able to travel underwater at least 18 days at a time. The Persian Gulf coast of Iran is no longer out of the operating range of the Israeli fleet, the article says.

Israel is known to have nuclear-capable aircraft and land-based missiles. The addition of nuclear-armed submarines would mean that Israel now has a full triad of land-, air-, and sea-based nuclear delivery systems and that, for the first time, some of its nuclear forces would be invulnerable to a nuclear first strike by an adversary. No other state in the Middle East is known to have nuclear weapons, although Iran in particular is suspected of seeking them.

Iranian Sub Plans

Meanwhile, Iran said June 12 that it is planning to build a nuclear-powered submarine, which could theoretically give Tehran a non-weapons rationale to produce weapons-grade uranium. Iran’s semiofficial Fars news agency quoted Rear Adm. Abbas Zamini, the deputy commander of the Iranian navy for technical affairs, as saying, “Right now, we are in the initial phases of manufacturing atomic submarines.”

Iran, which says it is not pursuing nuclear weapons, states that it is enriching uranium to a level of about 5 percent to produce nuclear power and to 20 percent to run a research reactor in Tehran to make medical isotopes. Uranium enriched to a level below 20 percent is known as low-enriched uranium (LEU). Nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to about 90 percent, known as weapons-grade. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty bars enriching uranium for use in weapons, but it does not forbid enrichment for use in naval reactors.

According to Princeton University professor Frank von Hippel, U.S. and British naval reactors are currently fueled with 93 to 97 percent-enriched uranium, Russian naval reactors are fueled with 40 to 90 percent-enriched uranium, and French naval reactors are fueled with LEU. India’s prototype naval reactor is reportedly fueled with uranium enriched to the 40-percent range, Brazil’s prototype is to be fueled with LEU, and China’s naval reactor is reportedly fueled with LEU, von Hippel said.

Zamini did not indicate what level of enrichment Iran would use for its naval reactors.

Farrah Zughni

Amid ongoing concerns about the fate of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, officials in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East are making plans to secure it once the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad falls.

The U.S. military has “finalized its assessment” and completed “initial planning” for operations in Syria, including securing the country’s chemical weapons, in the event of a regime collapse, according to a June 14 CNN article. The network also reported that the United States contacted a number of states for possible collaboration in this effort.

Earlier this year, a number of U.S. legislators called on the Obama administration to prepare to address “potential proliferation” if the country’s internal security dissolves. Popular uprisings in Syria, which began early last year, have been met with violent government retaliations. (See ACT, April 2012.)

Syria has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the size of its chemical weapons arsenal is not publicly known. In March testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta described the situation in Syria as “100 times worse” than the challenge of securing weapons in Libya after the fall of Moammar Gaddafi’s regime last year.

As part of its Syria planning, the U.S. military decided on the number of troops, types of units, and funding required to perform specified tasks, the CNN report said. Officials told CNN that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have been “discussing contingency scenarios, potential training and sharing of intelligence about what is happening in Syria with neighboring countries including Jordan, Turkey and Israel.”

On June 17, the European Union imposed sanctions on exports of luxury and dual-use goods to Syria. The list includes a number of chemicals that may be used as “precursors for toxic chemical agents” and “chemical manufacturing facilities, such as reaction vessels and storage tanks,” that could be used to create chemical weapons.

“In the current situation, the EU must keep up the pressure on the Syrian regime. EU sanctions target those responsible for the appalling repression and violence against the civilian population,” EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said in announcing the sanctions June 15.

Last month, a number of Israeli defense officials spoke out about Syria’s chemical stocks. Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Yair Naveh called Syria’s chemical stocks “the world’s largest” and warned that the Assad government would “treat us the same way they treat their own people,” according to a June 11 article in The Times of Israel. Maj. Gen. Yair Golan said Israel needed to continue to gather intelligence on Syria’s weapons stocks but also consider options for possible proliferation scenarios, including whether it would be “wise” or “nonsense” to attack “convoys carrying sophisticated and advanced Syrian weaponry if they are detected ahead of time,” according to a June 4 article in The Jerusalem Post.

Although Syrian resistance forces recognize the need to secure the country’s chemical weapons stockpiles once the Assad government falls, planning for that effort is only in the early stages, Brig. Gen. Akil Hashem, who retired from the Syrian army in 1989 after 27 years, said in a June 12 interview.

Rebel forces have begun to look into the issue, but have not fully developed a plan, said Hashem, who spent four months, ending March 1, as a military adviser for the Syrian National Council, a coalition of opposition groups. “Putting together a plan to secure chemical weapons is not simple. It needs a lot of discussion and work,” he said. “According to my understanding, the Syrian National Council didn’t address this so far.”

His account is at odds with a May 28 article in Haaretz that cited an anonymous former Syrian officer as saying the opposition leadership has plans “to take control of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons depots and secure them in the first hours after the regime collapses.”

Asked to respond to Hashem’s comments, Lt. Col. Wesley Miller, a U.S. Department of Defense spokesman, said in a June 14 e-mail to Arms Control Today that the United States was “closely monitoring Syria’s proliferation-sensitive materials and facilities.” The Defense Department believes Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles remain secure, and it has seen “no credible reporting” that the Assad regime has used or transferred chemical weapons, he said.

By Kelsey Davenport

Additional U.S. sanctions targeting Iran’s banking and oil sectors went into effect June 28, further restricting Iran’s ability to export oil and isolating the country from the international financial system.

The U.S. sanctions, which are intended to pressure Iran to address international concerns about its nuclear program, are part of the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed into law Dec. 31. (See ACT, January/February 2012.) The provisions of the law that went into effect June 28 prevent foreign banks from accessing existing accounts or opening new accounts in the United States if they process oil-related transactions with the Central Bank of Iran. The president can waive the sanctions on countries that continue to import Iranian oil after he has certified that they have “significantly reduced” their purchases from Iran. Waivers are granted for six-month periods, but can be renewed.

The day the sanctions went into effect, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced China and Singapore had met the significant-reduction standard and were eligible to continue importing oil from Iran without penalty.

The last-minute exemption for China did not come as a surprise. Clinton hinted on June 20 that a waiver could be in the works, saying that Beijing was “slowly but surely” taking actions to reduce its oil purchases from Tehran.

In response to the granting of the waiver, Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), one of the authors of the sanctions legislation, said in a June 28 statement that Clinton had assured him that China “met the significant reduction standard.” However, he said that China must also be “mindful” that under the terms of the law such a reduction is required every 180 days for renewal of the waiver and that this would be expected from all countries to “qualify for future exemptions.”

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), in a June 28 press release, described the Chinese waiver as “a free pass to Iran’s biggest enabler” and called on Congress to “strengthen sanctions” against Tehran.

With China and Singapore, the Obama administration certified that 20 countries would be exempt from the sanctions. Earlier in the month, Clinton announced that seven countries—India, Malaysia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Turkey—had received waivers and can continue to import Iranian oil without penalty. The June 11 announcement was the second such determination. In March, Japan and 10 EU countries were granted waivers. The EU countries, however, will not be able to continue importing Iranian oil under the waiver after July 1, when an EU embargo on Iranian oil goes into effect. In a June 25 press release, the Council of the European Union reaffirmed that oil import contracts with Iran must be “terminated by July 1.”

In the June 28 statement, Clinton cited figures from the International Energy Agency, which found that Iran’s average daily oil exports dropped from 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to a current average of approximately 1.5 million barrels per day. This represents nearly $8 billion in lost revenues every quarter, and is a “clear demonstration” to Tehran of the “enormous economic cost” of continuing to violate “international nuclear obligations,” she said. She urged Iran to take “concrete steps” to resolve the nuclear issue or face “continuing pressure and isolation.”

Insurance Ban

In addition to banning imports of Iranian oil, the EU decision that will take effect July 1 prohibits companies in EU member countries from insuring tankers transporting Iranian crude oil to any country. Tankers are unable to transport crude oil without protection and indemnity insurance coverage. As a result, even if countries receive a waiver from the United States allowing them to purchase Iranian oil without financial sanctions, some may be prevented from continuing imports if they cannot obtain other insurance guarantees to cover the tankers.

Some countries are arranging alternative means to cover the loss of insurance after July 1. In June, Japan passed a law that allows the government to provide the necessary insurance guarantees for the oil tankers. India is allowing state-run oil refineries to import oil on Iranian tankers insured by state guarantees from Tehran, and China was reportedly looking into similar measures. The South Korean government, despite receiving a waiver from the United States to continue importing Iranian oil, said it will stop the imports on July 1 and is not pursuing sovereign guarantees. These four countries are among the top purchasers of Iranian oil.

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius indicated that the European Union could adopt further sanctions. In a statement following negotiations in Moscow between Iran and six world powers over Tehran’s disputed nuclear program (see page 27), he said that sanctions will “continue to be toughened” if Iran “refuses to negotiate seriously.”

New U.S. Sanctions Urged

With no agreement coming out of the Moscow talks, members of Congress have indicated that further sanctions designed to isolate Iran could be passed.

In a bipartisan effort, 44 senators called on the administration to take additional steps against Tehran if it failed to address certain concerns about its nuclear program. In the June 15 letter to President Barack Obama, the senators called for “significantly increasing the pressure” on Iran through sanctions if no “substantive agreement” was reached during the June 18-19 talks in Moscow.

The letter also stated that unless Iran complied with International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and UN Security Council resolutions, it should not be relieved of any current sanctions or those that went into effect June 28.

In a June 19 statement, Ros-Lehtinen called on the United States and other countries to take further measures, saying the countries need to impose “game-changing sanctions” that would “compel” Iran to “abandon its nuclear program now.”

Ros-Lehtinen has authored legislation that would strengthen existing sanctions against Iran’s energy and financial sectors. The legislation passed in the House in December, and a slightly different version passed the Senate in May.

By Kelsey Davenport

Additional U.S. sanctions targeting Iran’s banking and oil sectors went into effect June 28, further restricting Iran’s ability to export oil and isolating the country from the international financial system.

The U.S. sanctions, which are intended to pressure Iran to address international concerns about its nuclear program, are part of the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed into law Dec. 31. (See ACT, January/February 2012.) The provisions of the law that went into effect June 28 prevent foreign banks from accessing existing accounts or opening new accounts in the United States if they process oil-related transactions with the Central Bank of Iran. The president can waive the sanctions on countries that continue to import Iranian oil after he has certified that they have “significantly reduced” their purchases from Iran. Waivers are granted for six-month periods, but can be renewed.

The day the sanctions went into effect, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced China and Singapore had met the significant-reduction standard and were eligible to continue importing oil from Iran without penalty.

The last-minute exemption for China did not come as a surprise. Clinton hinted on June 20 that a waiver could be in the works, saying that Beijing was “slowly but surely” taking actions to reduce its oil purchases from Tehran.

In response to the granting of the waiver, Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), one of the authors of the sanctions legislation, said in a June 28 statement that Clinton had assured him that China “met the significant reduction standard.” However, he said that China must also be “mindful” that under the terms of the law such a reduction is required every 180 days for renewal of the waiver and that this would be expected from all countries to “qualify for future exemptions.”

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), in a June 28 press release, described the Chinese waiver as “a free pass to Iran’s biggest enabler” and called on Congress to “strengthen sanctions” against Tehran.

With China and Singapore, the Obama administration certified that 20 countries would be exempt from the sanctions. Earlier in the month, Clinton announced that seven countries—India, Malaysia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Turkey—had received waivers and can continue to import Iranian oil without penalty. The June 11 announcement was the second such determination. In March, Japan and 10 EU countries were granted waivers. The EU countries, however, will not be able to continue importing Iranian oil under the waiver after July 1, when an EU embargo on Iranian oil goes into effect. In a June 25 press release, the Council of the European Union reaffirmed that oil import contracts with Iran must be “terminated by July 1.”

In the June 28 statement, Clinton cited figures from the International Energy Agency, which found that Iran’s average daily oil exports dropped from 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to a current average of approximately 1.5 million barrels per day. This represents nearly $8 billion in lost revenues every quarter, and is a “clear demonstration” to Tehran of the “enormous economic cost” of continuing to violate “international nuclear obligations,” she said. She urged Iran to take “concrete steps” to resolve the nuclear issue or face “continuing pressure and isolation.”

Insurance Ban

In addition to banning imports of Iranian oil, the EU decision that will take effect July 1 prohibits companies in EU member countries from insuring tankers transporting Iranian crude oil to any country. Tankers are unable to transport crude oil without protection and indemnity insurance coverage. As a result, even if countries receive a waiver from the United States allowing them to purchase Iranian oil without financial sanctions, some may be prevented from continuing imports if they cannot obtain other insurance guarantees to cover the tankers.

Some countries are arranging alternative means to cover the loss of insurance after July 1. In June, Japan passed a law that allows the government to provide the necessary insurance guarantees for the oil tankers. India is allowing state-run oil refineries to import oil on Iranian tankers insured by state guarantees from Tehran, and China was reportedly looking into similar measures. The South Korean government, despite receiving a waiver from the United States to continue importing Iranian oil, said it will stop the imports on July 1 and is not pursuing sovereign guarantees. These four countries are among the top purchasers of Iranian oil.

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius indicated that the European Union could adopt further sanctions. In a statement following negotiations in Moscow between Iran and six world powers over Tehran’s disputed nuclear program (see page 27), he said that sanctions will “continue to be toughened” if Iran “refuses to negotiate seriously.”

New U.S. Sanctions Urged

With no agreement coming out of the Moscow talks, members of Congress have indicated that further sanctions designed to isolate Iran could be passed.

In a bipartisan effort, 44 senators called on the administration to take additional steps against Tehran if it failed to address certain concerns about its nuclear program. In the June 15 letter to President Barack Obama, the senators called for “significantly increasing the pressure” on Iran through sanctions if no “substantive agreement” was reached during the June 18-19 talks in Moscow.

The letter also stated that unless Iran complied with International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and UN Security Council resolutions, it should not be relieved of any current sanctions or those that went into effect June 28.

In a June 19 statement, Ros-Lehtinen called on the United States and other countries to take further measures, saying the countries need to impose “game-changing sanctions” that would “compel” Iran to “abandon its nuclear program now.”

Ros-Lehtinen has authored legislation that would strengthen existing sanctions against Iran’s energy and financial sectors. The legislation passed in the House in December, and a slightly different version passed the Senate in May.

Kelsey Davenport

Senior-level talks between Iran and six world powers over Tehran’s nuclear program are on hold, as the lead representatives from the two sides decided in Moscow on June 18-19 to wait to schedule a fourth round of negotiations until after a lower-level technical meeting is held on July 3.

The purpose of the July experts meeting in Istanbul is to “provide further clarification” on the proposal made by the six countries—China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—according to Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s foreign policy chief and the lead negotiator for the six powers. Speaking at a press conference at the end of the Moscow talks, she also said the technical talks will allow the six powers to “study the issues” Iran raised during the June meeting.

Iran and the six countries, known as the P5+1, have held three rounds of senior-level talks this year on international concerns relating to Iran’s nuclear program. Negotiations between the parties resumed in April after a 15-month hiatus. (See ACT, May 2012.)

A fourth round of negotiations is still possible, Ashton said at the press conference. After the technical-level meeting and “contact” between deputy negotiators, she and the lead Iranian negotiator, Saeed Jalili, would discuss “prospects for a future meeting at the political level,” she said.

Although Ashton said that “significant gaps” remained between the two parties, she stated that “critical issues” had been discussed and that Iran addressed “the substance” of the issues for the first time.

Jalili expressed optimism that the technical-level talks could narrow the differences between the two sides. In his remarks at the press conference, he said an experts-level meeting could bring the parties “closer together” and that it was an “important result” of the Moscow talks.

Views outside of Moscow, however, were mixed. U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said on June 20 that the United States did not want “talks for talks’ sake” and that the technical-level meeting is an opportunity to “close some of the gaps in comprehension.” British Prime Minister David Cameron characterized the Moscow talks as a “missed opportunity,” saying there had been a “lack of progress.” He called on Iran to return to talks “willing to negotiate seriously.”

Moscow Proposals

Two proposals were discussed during the talks, one put forward by the P5+1 and the other by Iran. Ashton characterized the exchanges over the positions as “detailed, tough, and frank.”

The P5+1 proposal was the same one that the six powers put forward during the second round of talks in Baghdad in May, according to Nuland. It focuses on suspending the enrichment of uranium to the 20 percent level, shipping Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium out of the country, halting enrichment activities at the Fordow enrichment facility, and cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return, Iran would receive fuel plates for its Tehran Research Reactor, assistance with nuclear safety, and spare parts for civilian aircraft.

Iran maintains that it needs to enrich uranium to 20 percent in order to fabricate fuel for the Tehran reactor, which produces medical isotopes. Uranium enriched to 20 percent, however, can be converted into weapons-grade material more quickly than uranium enriched to the levels required for power reactors, which Iran also produces. By suspending 20 percent enrichment, shipping the current stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium out of the country, and providing Iran with fuel fabricated elsewhere for the Tehran reactor, the P5+1 proposal would extend the time required if Iran decided to pursue nuclear weapons while still allowing Tehran to produce medical isotopes. Suspending the 20 percent enrichment at Fordow is of particular concern to the United States and other countries because the location of the nuclear facility, deep inside a mountain, would make a military strike against it difficult.

In her June 19 press briefing, Nuland described the P5+1 as “completely united” behind the proposal.

Further details on the Iranian five-point plan first presented in Baghdad emerged during the Moscow talks. A June 18 article in The Guardian outlined the five points of the Iranian plan as acknowledgment of Iran’s right to enrich uranium in tandem with the “operationalisation” of a fatwa issued by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that condemned the pursuit of nuclear weapons as forbidden in Islam; sanctions relief in return for cooperating with the IAEA; cooperation on nuclear energy and safety; confidence-building measures, including a possible limit on production of 20 percent-enriched uranium; and cooperation on regional and non-nuclear issues.

In his remarks at the Moscow press conference, Jalili’s description of the proposal was consistent with but more general than the Guardian account. He said Iran mentioned four nuclear-related points during the negotiations: “confidence building, cooperation in clarification, opposition to weapons of mass destruction, and normal nuclear cooperation.” Any future agreements would have to recognize Iran’s rights in these areas, “particularly 20 percent enrichment,” Jalili said.

Senators Call for End to Talks

Prior to the Moscow talks, a bipartisan group of 44 U.S. senators sent a letter to President Barack Obama, urging him to abandon the P5+1 talks with Iran if an agreement was not reached in Moscow. Specifically, the letter said that the “absolute minimum steps” for Iran to take include shutting down the Fordow enrichment facility, halting enrichment above 5 percent, and sending the stockpile of uranium enriched above 5 percent out of the country. If Tehran were to “verifiably implement” these actions, it would demonstrate Iran’s commitment to the negotiations and justify further talks, the letter said. The senators also called for further sanctions against Iran if a “substantive agreement” was not reached in Moscow (see next story).

In a statement made after the talks, Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), one of the organizers of the letter, said that negotiations were the “preferred forum” for an agreement, but in “their absence,” Congress will “pursue other mechanisms,” including further sanctions, to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

In a June 20 House Armed Services Committee hearing on Iran’s nuclear program, Rep. Buck McKeon (R-Calif.), the committee chairman, said the “intensive diplomatic and economic steps” taken to convince Iran to abandon “military nuclear ambitions” do not appear to have succeeded.

No Agreement With IAEA

Iran met with the IAEA on June 8 in Vienna, but the agency and Tehran failed to make progress on signing a framework agreement to resolve the IAEA’s outstanding concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.

Going into the Vienna meeting between IAEA Deputy Director-General Herman Nackaerts and Iran’s envoy to the agency, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, expectations were raised that a deal could be reached. In May, after a short-notice trip to Tehran, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano said the sides were “close” to agreement on a “structured approach” for addressing concerns over Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program. (See ACT, June 2012.) Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.

The structured approach would create a framework for agency inspections and an Iranian response to concerns the IAEA had expressed, in a report last November, about the potential military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. (See ACT, December 2011.) Some experts had speculated that a framework agreement with the IAEA may have given Iran leverage at the Moscow talks to press for some sanctions relief or a delay in the implementation of a July 1 EU oil embargo.

Nackaerts characterized the June meeting as “disappointing,” saying that there had been “no progress.” According to his statement, Iran was presented with a revised document in Vienna that addressed Tehran’s “earlier stated concerns.” Iran, however, “raised issues we have already discussed and added new ones.”

Soltanieh said the issues surrounding the discussions were “complicated” and that he hoped a venue for new discussions would be determined soon so that the parties could “conclude” the structured approach. The two sides did not set a date for their next meeting.

Just two days before meeting with Nackaerts, Soltanieh addressed the IAEA Board of Governors during its quarterly meeting, saying that Iran intended to “engage and work intensively” with the agency “with expectation of prompt closure” of the concerns over the possible military dimensions of Tehran’s nuclear program.