U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs

Contact: Xiaodon Liangsenior policy analyst, [email protected]

As of May 2026, the United States is replacing or modernizing nearly every component of its strategic nuclear arsenal while also acquiring theater nuclear capabilities that were discontinued at the end of the Cold War. 

The costs to acquire new strategic delivery vehicles – missiles, bombers, and submarines – for the armed services will reach at least $516 billion. Those systems will cost at least an additional $430 billion to operate and maintain over their lifetimes. Warheads – designed and built by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) – will cost $70 billion to acquire, not including the enormous expense associated with constructing supporting infrastructure. In total, the NNSA’s weapons activities will require an estimated $720 billion over the next 25 years.

Future foreseeable costs for U.S. nuclear forces therefore total at least $1.7 trillion. This total cost is an underestimate because it does not include supporting lines of investment in the Pentagon budget, all relevant military construction costs, and recapitalization of nuclear command, control, and communications. 

The modernization program includes:

  1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
  2. Submarines (SSBNs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)
  3. Strategic Bombers, Cruise Missiles, and Gravity Bombs
  4. Nuclear Warhead and Pit Production Facilities

(The term “acquisition costs” as used in this fact sheet includes research, development, test, and evaluation costs, as well as procurement costs. Military construction costs are only included for the Sentinel ICBM. Acquisition costs are separate from the costs to operate and maintain weapons systems, and the costs of disposing them at the end of their lifetime. Together, these cost categories are referred to as lifecycle or lifetime costs.)

1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)

The United States Air Force deploys about 400 Minuteman III ICBMs located across three wings: the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming; the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana; and the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota. U.S. nuclear-armed ICBMs are on high alert, meaning the missiles can be fired within minutes of a presidential decision to do so. The United States maintains 50 extra missile silos in a “warm” reserve status.

Today’s Minuteman weapon system is the product of almost 40 years of continuous enhancement. The Pentagon spent more than $7 billion in the 2000s and 2010s on life extension efforts to keep the ICBMs safe, secure, and reliable through 2030. This modernization program has resulted in an essentially “new” missile, expanded targeting options, and improved accuracy and survivability. A 2025 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Air Force believes that, with the overhaul of specific subsystems, the Minuteman III could serve until 2050. 

Sentinel: Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent

The Air Force is replacing the Minuteman III missile, its supporting launch control facilities, silos, and command and control infrastructure with a program known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). The new ICBM, called the LGM-35A Sentinel, was supposed to meet an initial deployment target of May 2029 but may miss that date by two years.

As part of this program, the Air Force intends to purchase over 650 new missiles, 400 of which would be operationally deployed through the 2070s. The remaining missiles would be used for test flights and as spares. After Boeing withdrew its proposal from consideration in July 2019, the Air Force awarded a $13.3 billion development contract to the sole remaining bidder, Northrop Grumman, in September 2020.

Estimates of the total cost of the Sentinel program have substantially risen over the course of the missile’s development. Early estimates from August 2016 set expected program costs at $85 billion for the acquisition of the missile and $153 billion in life-cycle operations and sustainment costs. By October 2020, those cost estimates had increased to $96 billion and $168 billion, respectively.

In January 2024, the Air Force notified Congress that the program had triggered a critical breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act, a cost-discipline provision of acquisition law. A subsequent mandatory review of the acquisition program determined that the new ICBM would cost $141 billion (in 2020 dollars) to acquire after minor revisions to lower costs. The Pentagon also confirmed that the program would be delayed by “several” years. Pentagon officials indicated in April 2026 that a new cost estimate that reflects a two-year restructuring of the program would be developed in the coming summer. 

The W78, W87, and W87-1 ICBM Warheads

Minuteman III ICBMs are currently armed with one of two warheads, the 335-kiloton W78 or the 300-ton W87. The Minuteman ICBMs that are assigned the W78 can deliver up to three independently targetable warheads but are deployed with only one. The W87 is a newer design, originally paired with the now-retired Peacekeeper ICBM. The Air Force decided to reassign the W87 to the Minuteman III to retain the Peacekeeper’s higher accuracy and improved hard-target kill capability. Approximately 200 W87s were transferred. The latest Minuteman III modernization program involved replacing the warhead fuze on the W87s; this effort entered full-rate production in 2024 and is expected to have an overall acquisition cost of $2.5 billion. The new fuze is believed to grant the Minuteman III an improved capability to destroy hardened missile silos by dynamically adjusting detonation height, taking missile accuracy into consideration.

In 2018, NNSA abandoned a proposal for a common SLBM and ICBM warhead to focus solely on replacing the W78 with a new variant of the W87. This new warhead, the W87-1, will also be fielded on the Sentinel ICBM, and the NNSA projects it to cost $16 billion. 

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2. Submarines (SSBNs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)

The Navy deploys 220 Trident II D5 SLBMs at any time, according to the last data the United States released under New START. The Navy operates a total fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) based out of Bangor, Washington, (8 boats) and Kings Bay, Georgia (6 boats). Each boat is armed with 20 SLBMs, and eight to 10 boats are deployed on patrol at any time. The Ohio-class submarines have a service life of 42 years — two 19-year cycles with a four-year mid-life nuclear refueling. The cost of the last mid-life servicing of an Ohio-class boat, the USS Louisiana, was estimated at $400 million. The Ohio-class SSBNs were first deployed in 1981 and will reach the end of their planned service lifetimes at a rate of approximately one boat per year between 2027 and 2040. 

The Navy plans to replace the Ohio-class starting in October 2030 with a new class of at least 12 ballistic missile submarines, known as the Columbia-class. In 2012, the Pentagon projected that the lead boat in the class would begin its first deterrent patrol in 2031. Despite significant shipbuilding challenges disclosed in April 2024, the Navy hopes to receive the first boat by 2028. The Navy paid for a second boat in FY 2024 and plans to procure one each year from 2026 to 2035. In April 2026, a Pentagon official revealed that the department is considering purchasing three more Columbia-class submarines, potentially bringing the total class to 15 boats.

According to Defense Department estimates from 2017, the cost to develop and buy the submarines would be $128 billion in then-year dollars, with total lifecycle costs of $267 billion. In the president’s budget request for fiscal 2027, the Navy estimated that total procurement costs for the class would be $146 billion and that R&D would cost $6.3 billion through 2031, with further R&D expenses unknown. According to a Congressional Budget Office report from October 2023, the future cost of the Columbia class remains one of the most significant drivers of cost uncertainty for the future shipbuilding budget.

Trident II D5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

First deployed in 1990, the force of Trident II D5 SLBMs has been successfully tested over 160 times since design completion in 1989 and is continuously evaluated. Each Trident ballistic missile can carry up to 8 warheads but normally carries an average of 4-5 warheads.

The Navy announced a first Trident II D5 life-extension program in 2002 that would modernize key components and allow the missile to serve aboard Columbia-class submarines until 2042. The first D5LE missiles were loaded onto submarines in 2017. The service announced in 2019 that it would pursue a second life-extension program (D5LE2) for the missiles to ensure they can operate for another 60 years, through 2084. The projected combined cost of the two life-extension programs and other upgrades to the Trident II since 2002 is at least $61 billion in R&D and procurement spending. 

W76, W88, and W93 Warheads

The D5 SLBMs are armed with roughly 1,500 W76-1, 25 W76-2, and 384 W88 warheads.

The W76-1 warhead has an estimated yield of 90-100 kilotons and completed a life-extension program in 2019 to lengthen its service life for an additional 30 years. The new W76-2 warhead, first proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Policy Review, has an estimated yield of 8 kilotons and was initially deployed at the end of 2019.

The W88 warhead entered the stockpile in 1989 and was recently life-extended. The NNSA delivered the first production unit of the W88 Alt 370 life extension program—which replaces the arming, fuzing, and firing subsystem, refreshes the conventional high explosives within the weapon, and supports future life extension options—in July 2021. Work on the last unit was completed in FY 2025.

The NNSA received initial funding for a new W93 warhead (previously known as the “next Navy warhead”) in FY 2021. The Pentagon plans to have the new warhead serve alongside the W76-1 and W88 warheads on life-extended Trident II missiles. The Navy aims to also design a new reentry body, known as the Mk7 aeroshell, to house the W93.

The NNSA’s preliminary cost estimate for the W93 is at least $24.7 billion. The Navy will spend at least $6.4 billion on R&D for the Mk 7 Aeroshell through fiscal 2031, with more costs to come after that year.

Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, Nuclear-Capable (SLCM-N)

The U.S. Navy is acquiring a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise-missile (SLCM-N) that will be deployed on attack submarines and a newly proposed future battleship. The NNSA is designing and building a variant of the W80 warhead, known as the W80-5, to arm the SLCM-N. 

The United States retired its last sea-launched cruise missile, the nuclear-armed Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile Nuclear (TLAM-N), following the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. The missiles had not deployed on submarines since the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. The first Trump administration proposed building a successor missile in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The plans were scrapped by the Biden administration but reimposed by Congress.

In the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated that the SLCM-N reach initial operational capability by 2034, while also requiring that a “limited number [be available] to meet combatant command requirements” by the end of September 2032.

The Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2021 that the SLCM-N and its warhead would cost approximately $10 billion. The fiscal year 2027 budget request indicates that the Pentagon and NNSA expect to spend $14.4 billion over the next five years on the weapon. 

 

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3. Strategic Bombers, Cruise Missiles, and Gravity Bombs

The United States Air Force operates a total fleet of 19 B-2 Spirit bombers at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri and 46 nuclear-capable B-52H Stratofortress bombers at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. As of the September 2022 New START data exchange, 10 of the B-2s and 33 of the B-52Hs were deployed. In December 2022, one of 20 operational B-2 bombers was lost after it malfunctioned in flight and caught fire after landing, bringing the total fleet down to 19.

In April 2026, the Pentagon revealed that it is conducting a bomber force structure study that will re-consider how many of the new B-21 Raider bombers are purchased and how the B-52H heavy bomber will be replaced.

B-52H Bomber

First deployed in 1961, the B-52H fleet has undergone numerous modification programs, beginning in 1989, to incorporate updates to the bombers’ global positioning system and weapons-delivery capabilities. The bomber can now carry up to 2,000-pound munitions and a total of 70,000 pounds of mixed ordnance armaments. The B-52H is no longer assigned to carry nuclear gravity bombs and instead is armed with up to 20 air-launched cruise missiles for nuclear missions. The Air Force operates a total of 87 B-52H bombers, with 46 being nuclear-capable and the rest conventional.

The B-52Hs are currently being upgraded with AESA radar, new satellite communications systems, and modern engines. The Air Force finalized the design for the new engine in 2026, and current cost projections indicate it will cost at least $17 billion through fiscal 2031. Following the upgrades, the B-52s will be redesignated as B-52Js, and the Air Force expects them to remain in service through the 2050s. The Pentagon Inspector General found in 2023 that twelve ongoing B-52H upgrade programs would cost a collective $48.6 billion.

B-2 Bomber

The Air Force continually modernizes the B-2 fleet, which first became operational in 1997 and is expected to last through 2058.

The B-2 can carry up to 16 nuclear gravity bombs, either the B61 or B83, but not cruise missiles. The bomber can also carry conventional weapons.

The Air Force announced in February 2018 that “once sufficient B-21 aircraft are operational, the B-1s and B-2s will be incrementally retired.” The B-1 bomber is no longer certified to perform nuclear missions. 

B-21 Bomber

The Air Force is planning to purchase at least 100 new, dual-capable long-range penetrating bombers that are scheduled to enter service in 2025. The new bomber is known as the B-21 Raider. Much about this long-range bomber remains classified, including its speed, payload, stealthy characteristics, and production schedule. The Air Force awarded a contract to Northrop Grumman in October 2015 to begin developing the B-21 program. The new bomber conducted its first flight in November 2023, two years behind schedule.

The Pentagon set a cost ceiling of $550 million per aircraft in 2010, which is equal to roughly $700 million in 2023 taking into account inflation. In 2021, the Pentagon estimated 30-year total acquisition and operation costs for the new bomber program would reach $203 billion. Because of the secrecy surrounding the program, it is not possible to fully reconstruct ongoing costs. As of April 2026, the unclassified R&D and procurement projections for the program through fiscal 2031 total $86 billion in then-year dollars, or about $860 million per plane. Since the plane will still be in production in 2031, that per-plane cost is an underestimate of lifetime acquisition costs. 

Air-Launched Cruise Missile and Long-Range Standoff Cruise Missile

The B-52H carries the AGM-86 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), first deployed in 1982. Each ALCM carries a W80-1 warhead, first produced in 1982.

The Air Force retains roughly 500 nuclear-capable ALCMs, of which about 200 are believed to be deployed at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota.

Some reports indicate that the reliability of the ALCM could be in jeopardy due to aging components that are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. In recent years, the Air Force has spent roughly $300 million on a service life extension of the AGM-86.

The Air Force is developing the long-range standoff cruise missile (LRSO) to replace the AGM-86 by 2030. The new missile, the AGM-181, will be carried by B-52H bombers, as well as the new B-21. The first missile is slated to be produced in 2027, and the Air Force intends to purchase more than 1,000 in total. Those that will be armed with nuclear warheads will carry the refurbished W80-4 warhead.

The Air Force announced in April 2020 that Raytheon would be the sole contractor for the development of the LRSO and was awarded a $2 billion development contract in July 2021.

In 2016, the Pentagon projected the cost of the LRSO program to be about $11 billion (in then-year dollars). According to the fiscal 2027 budget request, the total acquisition cost of the program is now expected to be at least $18.3 billion. That does not include the cost of the W80-4 warhead, which is expected to cost an additional $13.2 billion.

B61 and B83 Gravity Bombs

The B61 life-extension program, which the NNSA completed in fiscal 2026, converted the -3, -4, and -7 variants of the bomb to a new B61-12 design. Before the program began, these variants included the B61-7 and B61-11, which were strategic weapons assigned to the B-2, and the B61-3 and B61-4, which were non-strategic weapons deployed in Europe.

The NNSA believes the cost of the B61-12 program is about $8 billion. The first deployment of B61-12s to Europe likely took place in December 2022.

The B83-1 gravity bomb, a megaton-yield weapon that the Biden administration sought to retire, remains in the stockpile, although funding for its maintenance has been reduced to minimal levels.

In 2023, the Biden administration announced it would build a new variant of the B61, the B61-13. The Pentagon says the new weapon will have a yield of roughly 360 kilotons and will provide options for targeting “harder and large-area” military targets. Previously, two older weapons, the B61-7 and the B83-1, with yields of roughly 360 kilotons and 1.2 megatons, respectively, were assigned this role. The B61-7 was subsumed into the B61-12 program, and the Biden administration moved to retire the B83-1 despite some Congressional resistance. The B61-13 program will likely cost around $114 million according to preliminary NNSA estimates.

The U.S. Air Force began work on another new nuclear bomb, referred to as the Nuclear Delivery System Air-Delivered, in fiscal year 2025. According to budget documents, the weapon is designed to defeat hard and deeply buried targets, a function currently assigned to the B61-11.

U.S. nuclear gravity bombs can be deployed not only on the B-2 bomber, but also on allied and U.S. fighter aircraft. The F-16 and F-35 are flown by multiple NATO countries and therefore are certified both in the United States and in allied states to carry the B61 variants. In addition, the U.S. F-15E combat aircraft is also certified to carry B61 variants, including the B61-12.

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4. Nuclear Warhead and Pit Production Facilities

The NNSA is currently building or expanding several facilities to meet a production target of 80 plutonium pits per year. Pits are hollow shells of plutonium and a central component of the ‘primary’ of a thermonuclear device. The Savannah River Plutonium Reprocessing Facility, at which the NNSA intends to produce 50 pits per year, is likely to cost up to $25 billion dollars, according to the latest NNSA estimate. Upgrades to the Los Alamos Pit Production Facility, where the other 30 pits per year will be assembled, will cost an additional $5.9 billion. 

Weapons activities will cost roughly $720 billion dollars over the next 25 years, according to the NNSA’s own projections. That includes the warhead design, development, and production costs already discussed elsewhere in this factsheet.

Other NNSA construction projects are also costly. The Uranium Processing Facility at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which will handle and shape the enriched uranium for nuclear weapons and navy fuel reactors, is now expected to cost at least $10.35 billion. The nearby lithium facility has a $6.1 billion price tag. Both facilities will produce components used in the ‘secondary’ of a nuclear fusion weapon. 

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NPT Preparatory Committee Meets in Geneva

Nuclear Disarmament Monitor

July 25, 2024

The second preparatory committee meeting ahead of the 2026 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference is underway in Geneva. 191 states-parties to the NPT and 72 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are gathering from July 22 to Aug. 2 to review the implementation of the landmark treaty and to develop a forward-looking action plan covering the treaty’s key components: nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Breaking the Impasse on Disarmament and Implementing Article VI Obligations

Description

The joint civil society statement to the Second Preparatory Meeting for the 2026 NPT Review Conference. 

Body

NGO Statement for the Second Preparatory Meeting for the 2026 NPT Review Conference 
July 23, 2024 
Delivered by Daryl G. Kimball of the Arms Control Association
(Download PDF)

The success of the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament system and our collective efforts to avert nuclear catastrophe have always relied on effective dialogue and diplomacy between the nuclear-weapon states to reduce the role and number and salience of nuclear weapons, combined with effective leadership and pressure from non-nuclear weapon states to achieve action on key NPT nuclear disarmament initiatives.

But for more than a decade, the NPT’s five nuclear-armed states have failed to engage on disarmament and meet their key NPT Article VI commitments, and they are spending tens of billions of dollars each year to modernize, upgrade, and, in some cases, to expand their deadly nuclear arsenals as if they intend to keep nuclear weapons indefinitely.

Today, while non-nuclear-armed states are actively engaging to promote nuclear disarmament, including through the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, there is no serious dialogue between nuclear-armed states, all appear to be increasing reliance on nuclear weapons with some even threatening potential nuclear use. Nuclear dangers are growing. None of the NPT’s nuclear- armed states can credibly claim they are meeting their NPT disarmament obligations. As a result, the viability of the NPT regime and global peace and security are at severe risk.

As UN Secretary-General António Guterres said in a special message on June 7: “Humanity is on a knife's edge. The risk of a nuclear weapon being used has reached heights not seen since the Cold War. States are engaged in a qualitative arms race. Nuclear blackmail has reemerged with some recklessly threatening nuclear catastrophe."

"Meanwhile," he said, "the regime designed to prevent the use, testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons is weakening. [We] need disarmament now. All countries need to step up, but nuclear weapons states must lead the way."

We agree. If we are to repair the NPT regime and avert a new nuclear arms race, or worse, the time for action is here and now.

The Disarmament Deficit and the Risk of a New Arms Race

Since 2013, when Russia refused talks on deeper nuclear cuts with Washington, the two governments with the largest nuclear arsenals -- which constitute approximately 90 percent of the global total -- have dithered and delayed on new disarmament talks and failed to resolve disputes on successful arms control agreements that have helped ease tensions and reduce nuclear risks.

The 1987 INF Treaty is gone and the last remaining treaty limiting the world's two largest nuclear arsenals, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, will expire in less than 561days.

Sadly, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has become the Kremlin’s cynical excuse to short- circuit meaningful channels of diplomacy that could reduce nuclear risk and enhance mutual cooperation on the common threats posed by nuclear weapons.

To date, Russian President Vladimir Putin has refused to engage with U.S. President Joe Biden's administration on its 2023 offer to discuss, "without preconditions," a new nuclear arms control framework to prevent an unconstrained nuclear arms race.

Without some kind of new understanding by the United States and Russia not to build up their arsenals beyond the currentNew START limit of 1,550 nuclear warheads on long-range missiles and bombers, each side could, in theory, double the size of their currently deployed strategic nuclear arsenals within about two years by uploading additional warheads kept in reserve on existing missile and bomber systems.

Meanwhile, China has engaged in an effort to rapidly build up the size of its smaller but still deadlynuclear force, which independent researchers estimate to consist of some 310 warheads on long- range missiles and perhaps 500 in total, and there is open-source information indicating that the size of China's nuclear force may grow significantly in the coming years. Unfortunately, Chinahas formally and publicly rejected U.S. offers for follow-up discussions on nuclear risk reduction and arms control issues.

Senior U.S. officials have said that: “... we do not need to increase our nuclear forces to match or outnumber the combined total of our competitors to successfully deter them.”

But a senior White House official also said on June 7 that: “Absent a change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from current deployed numbers is required.” We disagree and reject such talk as counterproductive and unnecessary.

The use of just a fraction of today’s nuclear arsenals would lead to mass destruction on an unprecedented, global scale. Halting the cycle of spiraling nuclear tensions is in every nation's interest.

Furthermore, under Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia and the United States, along with China, France, and the United Kingdom, have a legal obligation to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” The treaty does not excuse them from their Article VI obligations because they feel disrespected or unfairly treated for some reason or another.

Refusing to engage at the negotiating table, combined with building an even greater nuclear destructive capacity, is a violation of this core NPT tenet.

Other crucial nonproliferation and disarmament agreements are being ignored or taken for granted. For example, the 1996 CTBT has effectively ended nuclear testing, but China, the United States, and six other states have failed to ratify and have held up the treaty's formal entry into force. And now Russia, in a counterproductive and cynical attempt to mirror the United States 'stance, has de-ratified the treaty.

Our civil society organizations, representing millions of voices around the globe, call on every delegation at this conference to press the NPT's nuclear five to fully respect and accelerate the implementation of their NPT disarmament commitments and to make good on your joint commitment, issued at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, to achieve the “complete elimination of nuclear weapons.”

Specifically, as you prepare for the 2026 Review Conference, we urge all states parties to come together around the following priority action steps:

  1. Demand that the United States and the Russian Federation immediately return to the nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiating table, fully implement their obligations under New START and agree on new arrangements to cap and reduce their nuclear arsenals before New START expires. At a minimum, Moscow and Washington should conclude a simple bilateral understanding that says that neither side shall increase the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons beyond the New START ceiling of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads until such time as they can conclude a more comprehensive framework agreement or set of agreements to limit and reduce their deadly nuclear arsenals.

    So long as Russia and the United States agree to cap their strategic deployed nuclear arsenals and work to negotiate a new nuclear arms reduction framework, the NPT's other nuclear-armed states, China, France, and the UK, should pledge to a nuclear freeze of the overall size of their nuclear arsenals and a fissile material production halt.

    Such an arrangement would lessen dangerous nuclear competition and create space for more intensive and wide-ranging arms control and disarmament negotiations not only between the United States and Russia, but also involving China, France, and the UK.
     
  2. Call upon all five of the NPT's nuclear-armed states to engage in a serious high-level dialogue that leads to a joint commitment not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons and to agree that none will be the first to use nuclear weapons for any reason.

    We note that earlier this year, senior Chinese officials proposed that the five should "negotiate and conclude a treaty on no first use of nuclear weapons against each other,” and we note that China published a working paper on the topic earlier this month. In response to the idea, a seniorU.S. official said in April that "If they want to engage in a conversation of the many questions raised by their no-first-use proposal, we would engage.”

    In addition, the five NPT nuclear-armed states should consider how to update, implement, and multilateralize the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which pledges they will “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.” It requires that “if at any time there is the risk of a nuclear conflict [each side] shall immediately enter into urgent consultations…to avert this risk.”

    Such a dialogue would be an overdue way to operationalize the January 2022 joint statement from the NPT's five nuclear-armed states that a "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." However, these and other nuclear risk reduction measures cannot erase the tensions that can lead to nuclear war, they cannot remove the inherent dangers of nuclear deterrence policies, nor can they prevent dangerous forms of qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms racing.
     
  3. Condemn threats of nuclear use as "inadmissible" and illegal. We condemn the recent threats from leaders of some nuclear-armed states underscoring their readiness to use nuclear weapons. Any threat to use nuclear weapons, at any time and under any circumstances, is extremely dangerous and totally unacceptable.

    We call on this conference, as the first meeting of states parties to the TPNW did in their 2022 consensus political statement to declare that “…any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations," and to "condemn unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances.”
     
  4. We also urge all NPT states-parties to constructively engage with the TPNW and if they have not already done so, to join the TPNW, which is a complementary approach that reinforces the taboos against nuclear weapons, bolsters the NPT, and creates additional pathways to verifiably cap, reduce, and eventually eliminate nuclear arsenals.
     
  5. Call upon all members of the Conference on Disarmament to agree to a work plan that allows for negotiations on a comprehensive fissile material cutoff treaty and on legally binding negative security assurances against nuclear attack for non-nuclear-weapon states. The June 14 decision to establish subsidiary bodies on these and other topics was a positive but small step forward that is not sufficient.
     
  6. Jointly reaffirm their support for the de facto moratorium on nuclear testing and call upon the remaining nine NPT hold-out states to take concrete action before the 2026 NPT Review Conference to ratify the CTBT. The last such statement from the five NPT nuclear- armed states in support of the CTBT was issued in the form of UN Security Council Resolution 2310 from September 2016. In the meantime, NPT states parties should demand that the nuclear-armed states refrain from threats to resume nuclear testing and actively press them to agree on new technical measures to build confidence that any ongoing nuclear experiments at their former test sites are fully compliant with the zero-yield CTBT.

Work to advance these and other disarmament goals must continue well beyond this meeting and be pursued at the UN General Assembly, at the UN Security Council, and at the highest levels in bilateral and multilateral meetings, and beyond.

All nuclear weapons make us all less secure. Embarking on a safer path through disarmament diplomacy is imperative. Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association

Melissa Parke, Executive Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Rebecca Eleanor Johnson, Dr. Director, Acronym Inst. for Disarmament Diplomacy

Peter Wilk, M.D., Administrative Chair, Back from the Brink Coalition (USA)

Thomas Countryman, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Arms Control, Chair of the Board of Directors, Arms Control Association

Oliver Meier, Policy and Research Director at the European Leadership Network*

Hans Kristensen, Director, Nuclear Information Project, Federation of American Scientists, and Associate Senior Fellow to SIPRI*

Götz Neuneck, Prof. Dr. rer. nat., Chairman, Federation of German Scientists (VDW)*

Bridget Moix, General Secretary, Friends Committee on National Legislation

John Holum, former Director of the U.S. Arms Control Disarmament Agency and ACDA Director Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security

John Hallam, People for Nuclear Disarmament, Human Survival Project (Australia)

Bernard Norlain, Général dare aérienne (2S), Président, Marc Finaud, Vice President, and Blaise Imbert, Treasurer, Initiatives pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (IDN)

Ulrich Kühn, Head of Arms Control and Emerging Technologies Program, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg*

Tobias Fella, Dr., Project Head, Challenges to Deep Cuts, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH)*

Lucian Bumeder, Researcher, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH)*

Margaret Beavis, Dr., Co-Chair, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Australia

Jean-Marie Collin, Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, France

Michael Christ, Executive Director, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), and, Chuck Johnson, Director, IPPNW-Geneva Liaison Office

Hideo Asano, Secretariat Staff, Japan Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Yayoi Tsuchida, Assistant General Secretary, Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs

Angela Kane, former United Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

David Cortright, Professor Emeritus, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame*

Deepshikha Vijh, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Francesco Lenci, retired Research Director at the National (Italy)Research Council (CNR) and current Research Associate

Benetick Kabua Maddison, Executive Director, Marshallese Educational Initiative

Aaron Tovish, Senior Adviser, NoFirstUse Global*

Jay Coghlan, Executive Director, Nuclear Watch New Mexico

Valeriia Hesse, Non-Resident Fellow, Odesa Center for Nonproliferation (OdCNP)

Bill Kidd MSP, Co-President, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (PNND), Scottish Parliament*

Kevin Martin, President, Peace Action

Akira Kawasaki, Executive Committee member, Peace Boat (Japan) Brian Campbell, Executive Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility

Denise Duffield, Associate Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles

Shaghayegh Chris Rostampour, Policy and Communications Coordinator, Physicists Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction

Frank von Hippel, Senior Research Physicist and Professor of Public and International Affairs Emeritus at Princeton University

Frederick K. Lamb, Research Professor of Physics and Astronomy and Core Faculty Member, Program on Arms Control and Domestic and Intl. Security, University of Illinois*

Norman Solomon, National Director, RootsAction.org

Jennifer Allen Simons, Dr., The Simons Foundation Canada

Tomohiko Ashima, Executive Director for Peace and Global Issues, Soka Gakkai International

Carlo Trezza, former, Italian Ambassador for Disarmament, Chairman of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board for Disarmament Affairs, and Chairman of MTCR

Scott Yundt, Executive Director, Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment (USA)

Tara Drozdenko, Director, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists

Colleen Moore, Director of Peace With Justice, The United Methodist Church — General Board of Church and Society

Elena K. Sokova, Executive Director, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation*

Noah Mayhew, Senior Research Associate at Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non- Proliferation*

Sean Arent, Nuclear Weapons Abolition Program Manager, Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility

Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation

Elayne Whyte, Ambassador, and President of the TPNW negotiations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies*

Darien De Lu, President, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, U.S.

David Swanson, Executive Director, World Beyond War

*Institution listed for identification purposes only.