A continuing resolution to fund the federal government through Sept. 30 will shift $185 million from the nonproliferation programs to weapons activities.

April 2025
By Xiaodon Liang

The U.S. Congress approved a $185 million cut to the defense nuclear nonproliferation budget managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in a March 14 continuing resolution that funds the federal government through Sept. 30, the end of the 2025 fiscal year.

Police in Lagos, Nigeria, training to use U.S.-donated detection equipment to combat the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive material in 2022. Congress has cut funding for such nonproliferation programs in the 2025 continuing resolution.  (Photo by: Emmanuel Osodi/Majority World/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

The resolution transfers those funds instead to the NNSA’s weapons activities budget, bringing it up to $19.29 billion for the remainder of this fiscal cycle.

The slashed nonproliferation funding is equal to a 7.2 percent cut. According to an analysis by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, the reduction will probably impact NNSA programs on nuclear smuggling, radiological security, export controls, reactor conversion, nuclear materials security and elimination, and research into the impacts of artificial intelligence on nuclear threats.

In a March 11 statement opposing the continuing resolution, Rep. Bill Foster (D-Ill.) said the funding cut “would substantially affect our national security, paving the way for countries like Iran, terrorist groups, and other adversaries to more easily get their hands on nuclear material.”

The continuing resolution, which President Donald Trump signed into law March 15, included several other changes to the previous year’s funding levels. The annual budget for the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program was increased to $9.6 billion, on the heels of an initial plus-up to $8.9 billion in a December short-term continuing resolution. (See ACT, January/February 2025.)

In nonbinding funding tables accompanying the new resolution, appropriators suggested that the Pentagon cut $640 million from the budget for the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program and its warhead, reflecting ongoing delays. (See ACT, September 2024.) The appropriators also suggested a $150 million budget for initial work on the nuclear-capable, sea-launched cruise missile, down from the $252 million authorized in December by Congress in the now-abandoned fiscal 2025 budget process. (See ACT, January/February 2025.)

The continuing resolution was negotiated by the House Republican majority and passed largely on a party-line vote in the lower chamber. Senate minority Democrats split on the resolution, providing enough votes to bring the measure to a vote and ensuring its passage.

Trump Rescinds Biden’s Arms Transfers Policy

April 2025

U.S. President Donald Trump rescinded his predecessor’s Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy, which was intended to encourage restraint and adherence to higher human rights standards in governmental approvals of arms transfers.

The White House offered no explanation for the decision, announced in a March 14 statement, and did not put forward a replacement policy. The United States is the world’s largest arms supplier.

President Joe Biden’s policy, embodied in National Security Memorandum 18 (NSM-18), was released in 2023. It differed from those issued by President Barack Obama and Trump, in his first term, by adopting the objective of “prevent[ing] arms transfers that risk facilitating or otherwise contributing to violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.” (See ACT, May 2023.)

Trump’s rescission of NSM-18 and the lack of a replacement could complicate U.S. arms transfer operations by leaving federal agencies to make decisions at their own discretion on the basis of laws and regulations that offer little policy guidance, arms trade experts Elias Yousef and Rachel Stohl wrote in a March 20 analysis for The Stimson Center.

All presidents have released a CAT policy since the first one was introduced by President Jimmy Carter in 1977. The administration could direct agencies to refer to Trump’s 2018 CAT policy, which integrated economic objectives into arms transfers policy, but also mentions the goal of reducing civilian harm, Yousef and Stohl suggested.

Trump also revoked National Security Memorandum 20 (NSM-20) Feb. 21. Announced by the Biden administration in 2024, it expanded on NSM-18 to require “credible and reliable written assurances” that a recipient country would use U.S. weapons “in accordance with international humanitarian law and, as applicable, other international law.”

The impact NSM-18 and NSM-20 have had on elevating human rights concerns in U.S. arms transfer decisions is disputed. In a May 2024 report required by NSM-20, the Biden administration said Israel may have violated international humanitarian law in its war on Gaza, but cited a lack of verifiable evidence as reason to continue arms transfers, Reuters reported May 10.—LIPI SHETTY

Rubio Bypasses Congress on Israel Arms Sale

April 2025

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio bypassed Congress and signed a “declaration to use emergency authorities to expedite the delivery of approximately $4 billion worth” of munitions to Israel.

Two weeks after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio bypassed Congress to sell 2,000-pound bombs to Israel, Israel bombed Gaza, breaking a ceasefire. (Photo by Abed Rahim Khatib/Anadolu via  Getty Images)

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency said that the sale included 35,529 BLU-117 2,000-pound bombs, which are among the most powerful and destructive in the U.S. inventory.

Under Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act, the president or secretary of state must notify Congress of any major arms transfer worth more than $100 million to Israel or another close ally 15 calendar days in advance before the administration can proceed with the transaction.

That section allows the president to waive the 15-day review process by informing Congress that “an emergency exists” necessitating that the sale be made immediately, if deemed “in the national security interests of the United States.” When conveying such a notification, the president is required to provide Congress with a “detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the emergency circumstances” that necessitates the waiver.

In his March 1 announcement, Rubio did not cite any specific emergency necessitating the sale or provide a detailed justification for it, saying only that the Trump administration “will continue to use all available tools to fulfill America’s long-standing commitment to Israel’s security, including means to counter security threats.”

Two-thousand-pound bombs such as the BLU-117 have been used by the Israeli military to level buildings in Gaza thought to house Hamas militants, who launched the deadly Oct. 7, 2023, raid on Israel. Whether or not such heavy bombs succeed in killing militants, they typically kill or injure many noncombatants living in or near the targeted structures. The Biden administration suspended deliveries of these munitions in May 2024, fearing that their use by Israeli forces to destroy Hamas strongholds in the Gazan city of Rafah would result in excessive civilian casualties, but the Trump administration resumed shipments Jan. 25.—MICHAEL T. KLARE

Virtual Briefing: Can Trump and Putin Agree on Nuclear Limits After New START?

Description

Without reciprocal constraints, Russia and the United States will face a new era of uncertainty after the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty agreement on Feb. 5, 2026. This webinar briefing will explore what pathways toward a new agreement exist for U.S. and Russian negotiators, as well as what the consequences of failure might mean for the global nuclear order.

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April 15, 2025

10:00 AM–11:30 AM U.S Eastern Time

The United States and Russia have not engaged in meaningful nuclear arms reduction talks in years, even though they, along with other nuclear-armed states, are obligated to do so under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Without reciprocal constraints, Russia and the United States will face a new era of uncertainty after the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty agreement on Feb. 5, 2026. The two countries, which still retain close to 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, will no longer be bound by the treaty’s central limits of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 deployed launchers. With China rapidly expanding its strategic nuclear forces as well, all the ingredients for a three-way arms race will exist.

At the same time, U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed his concern about the risks of nuclear conflict and his interest in negotiations with Russia and China on “denuclearization.” As U.S. and Russian officials engage on issues related to the future of the war on Ukraine, it is expected that they will also discuss how to manage their dangerous nuclear relationship.

This Arms Control Association briefing, featuring three leading experts in nuclear weapons and arms control policy, explored what options are available and what pathways forward might be feasible for U.S. and Russian negotiators, as well as what the consequences of failure might mean for nuclear risk and global security.

Panelists:

  • Thomas Countryman, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and ACA Board Chairman 
  • Alexey Arbatov, Head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations 
  • María Antonieta (Tonie) Jáquez, Coordinator for Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of Mexico. 
  • Daryl G. Kimball, ACA Executive Director (moderator)
 
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