"Steps to Move Us Back from the Nuclear Brink"
Remarks by Daryl G. Kimball for the Japan Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
and the Japan NGO Network for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (JANA)
Public Symposium Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, September 26, 2024
Event streaming link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amfrs8WilT4
Thanks to the Japan Network for Nuclear Weapons Abolition and the Japan Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons for the invitation to speak and for your important efforts for safer world.
Over the decades, public pressure for disarmament diplomacy has helped reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, halted nuclear testing, and prevented proliferation.
But as we approach the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear risks are growing once again. Human civilization remains precariously tethered to the existence of nuclear weapons and the threat they might be used again.
As U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres warned in June: "We need to move back from the nuclear brink."
All of the major nuclear weapon states are spending tens of billions of dollars modernizing their arsenals, some are recklessly threatening nuclear first use, and the regime designed to prevent the use, testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons is under stress.
The last remaining agreement limiting the world's two largest arsenals, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), will expire on February 5, 2026.
We need to see disarmament commitments translated into action.
The nuclear weapons states must, of course, lead the way by engaging in meaningful negotiations to cap and further reduce their deadly arsenals, but all countries need to step up, including Japan.
To get back on track, responsible leaders will need to deploy new, more creative approaches to put in place new constraints and guardrails against against nuclear catastrophe.
As we commemorate the International Day for Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, I would like to share some observations and recommendations.
Today none of the nuclear armed states are meeting their legal obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to engage in negotiations to end the arms race and on disarmament.
As we get closer to the expiration date for New START, Russian President Vladimir Putin has refused to engage with the Biden administration on its 2023 offer to discuss “without preconditions” a new nuclear arms control framework to prevent an unconstrained nuclear arms race. Putin’s excuse is that such a dialogue would not be fruitful as long as Washington continues to support Ukraine as it defends itself against Russian aggression.
Meanwhile, China is building up its smaller but deadly nuclear force now estimated to consist of some 310 warheads on long-range missiles, with perhaps 500 nuclear weapons in total. Unfortunately, China’s leaders also have rejected U.S. offers for bilateral follow-up talks on nuclear risk reduction and arms control issues, citing ongoing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
If Russia and the United States exceed New START limits, it would destabilize their mutual balance of nuclear terror, increase price tag of the $1.5 trillion U.S. nuclear modernization program, and prompt China to accelerate its own nuclear buildup. Such an action-reaction cycle would be madness.
What can be done?
First, in the coming weeks, U.S. President Joe Biden and whoever is the next president-elect should reaffirm U.S. support for negotiating a new nuclear arms control framework with Russia.
Because such a deal would be difficult to hammer out and take time, the U.S. president should propose that Washington and Moscow conclude a simple, bilateral understanding promising that neither side shall increase the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads beyond the New START limits of 1,550 deployed warheads each. This would remain in force until they can conclude a more comprehensive, durable framework to limit and reduce their deadly nuclear arsenals.
As long as Russia and the United States agree to cap their strategic deployed nuclear arsenals and work to negotiate a new nuclear arms reduction framework, Washington, along with leading non-nuclear-weapon states, should call on China, France, and the United Kingdom to freeze the overall size of their nuclear arsenals and negotiate a ban on fissile material production for weapons.
Second, as China continues to decline talks with Washington on nuclear matters, it has an even greater responsibility to elevate the underperforming P5 consultation process, the dialogue on nuclear risk reduction involving the NPT’s five nuclear-weapon states, that has been underway since 2010.
China, which now chairs the group, is in a unique position to launch an ambitious program to increase the frequency of these meetings; raise the level of participation; and expand the topics of discussion, including exchanges on nuclear postures and joint pledges not to use nuclear weapons first. The group also needs to try to build on their past efforts.
For example, the five states could expand on their 2022 joint declaration that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” by adopting a statement in the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War that pledges that the nuclear powers will “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party and against other countries.”
Senior U.S. diplomats should clarify that they will not seek and will not pursue an increase in the size or diversity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal as long as Russia continues to respect the New START ceilings and China does not expand its strategic nuclear arsenal significantly, which it is not likely going to do until the year 2030 or later.
China could also explain what is driving its buildup and clarify its nuclear modernization plans. Such an approach would help Beijing avoid worst-case assumptions about its intentions and the reduce the potential for a three-way arms race.
Third, leading non-nuclear-weapon states not only need to press the United States and Russia to engage on nuclear arms control and push China to halt its nuclear buildup.
The also need to step forward and lead. For example, they should consider launching a new initiative that would lead to a series of high-level nuclear disarmament summits involving a group of 20 to 30 leaders from nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-weapon states.
As outlined in a new Arms Control Association report, such an approach could help overcome existing obstacles of disarmament diplomacy, increase public pressure action, and complement existing forums designed to advance progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Finally, Japan also has a crucial role to play. As Fumio Kishida prepares to step down as prime minister, he and his successor could help advance efforts to prevent nuclear war and nuclear arms racing by convening a landmark two-day global conference on the human health and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons next year as the world marks the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Such a conference would be consistent with Japan's history of leadership in building the global arms control and nonproliferation system. It could not only recall the devastation and legacy of the atomic bombings of 1945 and honor the Hibakusha, but underscore the devastating global effects of more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions since 1945 and the toxic legacy of nuclear weapons production.
Through his career, Kishida has helped Japan increase attention on the nuclear danger. During his tenure as a foreign minister of Japan, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs led a “Research Study on Impacts of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Various Aspects,” which was published in March 2014. He also hosted the historic 2016 visit of then-U.S. President Barack Obama to his hometown Hiroshima.
As Prime Minister, he chose Hiroshima as the location for the 2023 Group of Seven (G7) Summit. This helped to elevate nuclear disarmament on the global agenda. And Kishida also pursued initiatives to advance disarmament education and talks on a ban on fissile material production for weapons.
As Kishida said at the G7 Summit and on other occasions: "Conveying the reality of the nuclear attack is important as a starting point for all nuclear disarmament efforts."
Indeed, in this era of heightened nuclear risks, it is imperative that global leaders have a deeper appreciation and understanding of the impacts of nuclear weapons testing, production, and use.
This is all the more important as the number of Hibakusha with direct memories of the atomic attacks continues to dwindle.
Japan -- the only nation that has experienced the unspeakable horrors of a nuclear weapons attack -- is uniquely positioned to take the lead for a high-level nuclear weapons impacts conference in 2025.
A Japan-convened Nuclear Weapons Impacts conference would also energize public pressure in Japan and around the globe for further action to put us back on the path to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.
Mr. Kishida's successor can and should consider helping to advance disarmament efforts by organizing such a conference.
In this era of heightened nuclear risk, all of us must reflect on what is at stake and what each of us can do to redouble our efforts to push our leaders to take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons before it is too late.
Thank you.