Physicists Coalition D.C. Engagement Days

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The Physicists Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction is inviting physical scientists and engineers to our inaugural Washington, D.C. Engagement Days to engage with policymakers and practitioners and encourage efforts to reduce nuclear weapons threats.

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The Physicists Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction is inviting physical scientists and engineers to our inaugural Washington, D.C. Engagement Days to engage with policymakers and practitioners and encourage efforts to reduce nuclear weapons threats.

The inaugural D.C. Engagement Days Event will kick off with a required training on Sunday, April 14, followed by two days of team meetings scheduled by the Coalition with congressional offices and executive branch officials.

Who Can Participate

Registration is open to physical scientists and engineers at any stage in their careers. All registrants should be in alignment with the mission of the Physicists Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction. We especially welcome those with a strong interest or background in advocacy for nuclear threat reduction.

For complete details and to register, visit Physicists Coalition D.C. Engagement Days.

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The Nuclear Ban Treaty Is Taking a Step Forward

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It has been just five years since the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was concluded in 2017, but the agreement is already helping to bolster the international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament architecture.

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Volume 16, Issue 1
Jan. 17, 2024

On the afternoon of the first day of December 2023, the UN conference room in New York was filled with long and powerful applause, when the state parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), known informally as the “nuclear ban treaty,” concluded the second meeting on implementation since it entered into force in January 2021.

It has been just five years since the treaty was concluded in 2017, but the TPNW is already helping to bolster the international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament architecture by reinforcing the norms against nuclear weapons use and providing a path for non-nuclear weapon states and communities and populations adversely affected by nuclear weapons to engage in efforts to advance disarmament and address the damage done by past nuclear weapons testing and use.

Since the TPNW opened for signature, the number of states parties has grown to 70. Significantly, the number of non-signatory observer states that have joined the TPNW meetings to learn more about the treaty has also grown. Their participation underscores that states inside and outside the TPNW can advance progress toward their shared goals: preventing nuclear war and moving closer to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

Given the treaty is steadily becoming a part of international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament architecture, it is imperative for the United States, nuclear-armed states and states under the U.S. nuclear extended deterrence "umbrella" to consider how they can also productively engage with the treaty and its states parties, including by participating as observers in the third meeting of TPNW states parties, which will be held in March 2025.

Impact of the TPNW Since Its Entry Into Force

When it entered into force in January 2021, the TPNW became the first international legally binding agreement to comprehensively prohibit all activities related to nuclear weapons, including possession, use, threats of use, nuclear explosive testing, production, and transfer. This treaty created a space for nonnuclear-armed states along with civil society to collectively act for nuclear disarmament, which is in line with the obligation set forth in Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The first meeting of states parties was held in Vienna in June 2022 with participation from 49 states parties, 34 observer states, and 85 NGOs. Coincidentally, the meeting was convened just a few short weeks after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its associated nuclear rhetoric.

TPNW states parties provided leadership by issuing a strong political statement condemning unequivocally nuclear weapons threats of any kind under any circumstances. The strong political declaration adopted in the first TPNW meeting accelerated the growing international effort to condemn and push back against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s implied threats of nuclear weapons use in the context of the ongoing Ukraine war.

Borrowing from the terminology of the TPNW states, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated Sep. 27, 2022, that “any use of nuclear weapons is absolutely unacceptable.” German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared Oct. 8, “We need to give a clear answer to nuclear threats. They’re dangerous for the world, and the use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable.” On Nov. 4, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the international community should “jointly oppose the use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons.” The powerful Group of 20 agreed Nov. 16 at their summit in Indonesia that threats and use of nuclear weapons are “inadmissible.”

Just as importantly, the first meeting drew up a 50-point action plan for treaty implementation, which includes, inter alia, the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Group and three informal working groups in relation to the topic of verification, victim assistance/environmental remediation, and universalization. This also led to the appointment of a focal point for implementing gender provisions of the treaty as well as facilitators to promote the TPNW’s complementarity with other treaties.

Humanitarian Perspective Remains in the Core of the Second TPNW Meeting

At the second TPNW meeting held from Nov. 27 to Dec. 1, 2023, a total of 59 states parties, 35 observer states, and representatives from 122 civil society organizations, including the Arms Control Association, participated in the week-long meeting to evaluate progress and to reaffirm their commitment to the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Since the first meeting of states parties, seven more states had signed the treaty, bringing the total number to 93 states, and five more states have ratified it, bringing the total to 70.

Like the first meeting of states parties in 2022, the second meeting produced a political statement that underscores that the TPNW is compatible with the other key elements of the nuclear nonproliferation system, including the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and nuclear weapons-free zone treaties. The 2023 statement also sought to further reinforce the unacceptability of nuclear weapons threats, as well as question the morality and sustainability of nuclear deterrence as instruments of foreign and military policy. The states parties also took tangible steps to fulfill the key parts of their 2022 action plan, specifically, their obligations under the TPNW to assist populations affected by nuclear weapons testing and use.

Mexico’s Ambassador Juan Ramón de la Fuente, who served as the president of the second meeting, allocated significant time for a thematic debate on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. In 2022, Austria chose to organize a Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons on the eve of the first meeting of TPNW states parties. This was the fourth such conference since 2014. Mexico chose to focus formal meeting time on the humanitarian impacts issue by inviting scientists from the Scientific Advisory Group, a speaker from the International Committee of Red Cross, and various representatives from NGOs and affected communities, including Australia, Kiribati, and Japan to share their perspectives and findings. This set the scene and reminded all participants of what is at stake and why progress on nuclear disarmament is so vital. The states decided at the meeting to regularize the practice by empowering “Presidents of future Meetings of States Parties shall have the option to convene thematic debates.”

Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation Discussion Underway

As was the case with the first meeting, there was significant and tangible support from both state parties, observer states, and civil society on actions to provide assistance to victims of nuclear weapons use and testing and for associated environmental remediation, as mandated by Articles VI and VII of the treaty. In order to fulfill these so-called positive obligations of the TPNW, states agreed to continue intersessional discussions on a voluntary reporting system as well as the objectives for developing proposals to establish the international trust fund to support future assistance and remediation work. This effort is reflected in the decision adopted at the meeting, as two out of five decisions are devoted to this topic.

There remain many questions still to be answered about how this process will play out, some of which are outlined in the intersessional working group’s report. These include but are not limited to who is contributing to the trust fund; who can receive such funds; what administrative structures are necessary. Kazakhstan and Kiribati, co-chairs of an informal working group on this topic are exploring how those decisions can be made.

Kazakhstan and Kiribati successfully passed a relevant resolution at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in the fall of 2023 with 171 votes in favor, six in opposition, and four in abstention. This UNGA resolution, which was later adopted at the end of 2023, calls for further international cooperation and discussion on victim assistance and environmental remediation through multiple international frameworks and support for affected populations while recognizing the responsibility of nuclear use and testing. This voting result demonstrates the possibility that this implementation framework can be creative by extending to outside of the TPNW, and also contribute to the universalization of this key treaty objective.

Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons

The second TPNW conference of state parties, like the first, issued a strong political declaration that underscores that “the continued existence of nuclear weapons and lack of meaningful progress on disarmament undermine the security of all States, aggravate international tensions, heighten the risk of nuclear catastrophe and pose an existential threat to humanity as a whole.”

TPNW states parties also decided to be more explicit regarding their concerns about the dangers of nuclear weapons and military policies based on the theory of nuclear deterrence. At the suggestion of the Austrian delegation, the meeting decided to establish a “consultative process on security concerns of TPNW states,” which aims to reframe the debate of nuclear disarmament as a necessary instrument to accommodate human security and national security for all states parties.

In parallel with the strategy of stigmatizing nuclear weapons by highlighting the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, the states parties decided to “challenge the security paradigm based on nuclear deterrence” leveraging scientific research on humanitarian consequences as well as nuclear risks.

The political declaration argues that nuclear weapons do more harm than good to the human beings. “The perpetuation and implementation of nuclear deterrence in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies not only erodes and contradicts non-proliferation, but also obstructs progress towards nuclear disarmament,” the TPNW political declaration states.

The TPNW state parties further noted that “[T]his is not only a security issue. In a world where challenges persist in meeting basic human needs, the investment of substantial financial resources in modernizing and expanding nuclear arsenals is indefensible and counterproductive as it comes at the expense of investment in sustainable development for genuine human wellbeing, as well as disarmament, education, diplomacy, environmental protection, and health.”

The Role of Scientists and Research

Another unique facet of the TPNW is its newly established Scientific Advisory Group. Following the decision taken in the first meeting to establish a group of scientists to advise and “assist States Parties in implementing the treaty and in strengthening the credibility of the implementation process,” the group was formed earlier last year. The group is co-chaired by Dr. Patricia Lewis from Chatham House and Dr. Zia Mian from Princeton University. The TPNW Scientific Advisory Group presented its first report at the meeting and is expected to play an important role in advancing the TPNW, in part because most states parties do not have as significant technical experience and capacity on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament as do the nuclear-armed states and their allies who play a more active role in other nonproliferation and disarmament treaty regimes, particularly the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Both thematic debate and the Scientific Advisory Group are bringing a “vibrant atmosphere and better collective learning,” according to Elayne Whyte, the 2017 TPNW negotiation conference president and former Costa Rican Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva.

Additional Observer States

As was the case with the first meeting, states parties welcomed the participation of 35 observer states at the second meeting, 12 of which had not attended the first meeting. Among the observer states were: Australia, Belgium, Egypt, Germany, and Switzerland. By attending the TPNW meeting as observers, these states were able to deepen their understanding of the treaty and engage with states that see nuclear weapons as a liability, not an asset.

Observers can support the TPNW without becoming a member state, by expressing their interests and sharing comments at the meeting. Switzerland and Germany, for instance, have expressed strong support for advancing the TPNW’s provisions on victim assistance and environmental remediation since the first meeting. During the intersessional period between the first meeting and the second meeting, a think tank that has close ties with the German Green Party, in collaboration with civil society, created a project titled “Nuclear Weapons and Their Humanitarian and Ecological Consequences.” Switzerland also said that it “continues to consider the humanitarian consequences as an area of work that can unite all stakeholders.”

Further, observer states can keep TPNW member states accountable for their goals. A meeting of states parties of the TPNW is not only a place to discuss how to advance the treaty, but also serves as an opportunity to ensure that member states and civil society are earnest about their commitments.

Looking Ahead

The states parties elected the next president for the third meeting of states parties, Akan Rakhmetullin, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations, and agreed that the meeting would take place in March 2025. At an event co-hosted by the Kazakh embassy in Washington D.C. and the Arms Control Association Dec. 12, 2023, Kazakhstan highlighted that their presidency will focus on victim assistance and environmental remediation; universalization of the treaty (Kazakhstan will also convene a joint meeting of nuclear-free-zones in Kazakhstan in 2024); and building mutual trust between proponents and opponents of the TPNW.

What the past two meetings of states parties with observer states have proven is that TPNW is not widening the gap between opponents and proponents. The TPNW’s approach to nuclear disarmament is not counterproductive or causing potential repercussions, as often opponents of the treaty have persistently argued, rather, it has demonstrated that states outside of the TPNW can engage in discussions while not being part of the treaty and thus contribute to the common shared goal for all: the prevention of nuclear conflict and the total, verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.

The United States, other nuclear-armed states, and some of their allies may not yet be ready to join the TPNW or engage with states parties, however, it is time for them to recognize that the TPNW is a reality. In the meantime, before the next meeting in March 2025, there are several ways for the United States can move engage with the treaty without harming the United States' or its allies’ national security interests.

First, members of Congress can and should more carefully evaluate the role of the TPNW in reducing nuclear dangers. At the second TPNW meeting, U.S. elected officials Representative Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) and Massachusetts State Representative Lindsay Sabadosa attended the meeting and parliamentary conference, where 23 parliamentarians from 14 countries including Canada, Japan, Germany, Scotland, Belgium, France, Italy, Australia, Norway, and the United States gathered. Those representatives shared “the collective sentiment that many pressing challenges underscore the urgency and relevance of the mission embodied by the TPNW” and reaffirmed their commitment to activate TPNW discussion in their respective parliaments and engage with their own governments and people, according to the joint statement.

As a result of the growing presence of the TPNW in the international nonproliferation and disarmament structure, the treaty can no longer be dismissed. In early 2023, Rep. McGovern introduced a resolution titled Embracing the goals and provisions of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to the House and gained support from over 40 members of Congress.

To move forward, members of Congress should commit to engage more substantively on how to advance nuclear risk reduction options including TPNW, to question the U.S. government on national positions on this matter, and to respond to constituent concerns about how to advance nuclear disarmament diplomacy and avoid nuclear war.

Second, the White House and the State Department need to recognize that the TPNW has become more of an asset than a liability. Despite the skepticism from the governments of the world's nuclear-armed states, the TPNW is developing into a strong new force against dangerous nuclear policies. These efforts to both delegitimize and stigmatize nuclear weapons serve as an important safeguard against rising nuclear tensions between nuclear-armed adversaries and nuclear threats from the likes of Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean strongman Kim Jong-un. The TPNW is also a reminder that the nuclear-armed states need to heed international calls for tangible diplomatic dialogue on nuclear disarmament, which they are obligated to pursue under the NPT.

More productive engagement with the TPNW state parties on the shared goal of advancing nuclear disarmament can also benefit U.S. national interest by building ties with states that share the goal of strengthening the NPT, advancing U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese dialogue on nuclear arms control and disarmament and on reducing the risk of nuclear war. The TPNW originated from the frustration of non-nuclear weapons states and dissatisfaction with the lack of progress by the NPT nuclear-armed states in fulfilling their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. As the TPNW moves forward, the United States can and should join the conversation through the meetings of TPNW states parties.

The perception gap between states that believe nuclear weapons are essential to their security and the TPNW states parties that do not is both a challenge and an opportunity. Through TPNW meetings, the United States, other nuclear-armed states, and their allies can and should seize the chance to engage with TPNW states parties to better understand the wide range of perspectives and concerns about nuclear weapons. In today’s multi-polar world, this approach can help build bridges with the many states that seek to accelerate progress toward a world without the fear of the catastrophic impacts of nuclear weapons.—SHIZUKA KURAMITSU, research assistant

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Shizuka Kuramitsu

2023 Arms Control Person(s) of the Year Winner Announced

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Workers and technicians at the U.S. Army’s Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky were selected as the 2023 Arms Control Persons of the Year.

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For Immediate Release: Jan. 12, 2024

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Tony Fleming, director for communications, (202) 463-8270 ext. 110

(Washington, D.C.)—Workers and technicians at the U.S. Army’s Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky were selected as the 2023 Arms Control Persons of the Year through a recent online contest that engaged thousands of participants from dozens of countries.  

The annual contest is organized by the independent, nongovernmental Arms Control Association. The contest has been held each year since 2007.

The workers and technicians at the two chemical stockpile depots were nominated for their successful and safe completion of eliminating the last vestiges of the United States' once-enormous declared stockpile of lethal chemical munitions as required by the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention.

Under the supervision of the U.S. Army's Office of Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, the last mustard gas munition was destroyed in June at Pueblo; Blue Grass destroyed the last missile loaded with Sarin nerve agent in July. The elimination program cost an estimated $13.5 billion.

“We applaud the highly professional work of all the people involved in the difficult destruction of the last remnants of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile," remarked Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

"Their efforts bring to close an important chapter in the decades long global disarmament struggle to verifiably eliminate an entire class of weapons considered so inhumane that their use was condemned more than a century ago," he said.

"The successful work of the people and community watchdogs in and around the Pueblo Chemical Depot and the Blue Grass Army Depot is an important reminder that even after a major treaty, like the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, is concluded, there is hard, behind-the-scenes work to be done in order to ensure full implementation and ongoing compliance,” Kimball added.

A total of nine individuals and groups were nominated by the Arms Control Association staff and board of directors for the annual Arms Control Person(s) of the Year honor.     

"This contest is a reminder of the positive initiatives—some at the grassroots level, some on the international scale—designed to advance disarmament, nuclear security, and international peace, security, and justice,” Kimball said.

The runners-up in this year’s contest were the governments of Austria and 27 co-sponsoring states that secured approval in the United Nations' First Committee of the first-ever resolution on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), advancing the possibility of binding international regulations on such weapons systems. In response to its adoption, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and International Committee of the Red Cross president Mirjana Spoljaric issued a joint call urging world leaders to launch negotiations on a new legally binding instrument to set clear prohibitions and restrictions for LAWS and to conclude these negotiations by 2026.

Online voting for the 2023 Arms Control Person(s) of the Year contest was open from Dec. 8, 2023, until Jan. 11, 2024.  A list of all of this year's nominees is available at ArmsControl.org/ACPOY/2023.

Previous recent winners of the "Arms Control Person of the Year" include: the Energoatom staff working at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (2022) and Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard and the Government of Mexico (2021). A complete list of previous winners from previous years is available here.

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Tony Fleming

If China continues expanding its nuclear arsenal and eschewing arms control with the United States, diplomatic engagement stands as one of the limited but crucial means to establish a safety net and reduce the risk of conflict.


January/February 2024
By Tong Zhao

In the lead-up to the Xi-Biden summit in San Francisco in November, China and the United States engaged in a consultation on arms control and nonproliferation, the first such effort in recent years and one that occurred amid a severe downturn in their bilateral relationship.

U.S. President Joe Biden (L) greets Chinese President Xi Jinping at the start of their bilateral summit Nov. 15 on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders meeting near San Francisco. It was the first Biden-Xi encounter in a year and marked an effort to ease growing tensions between the two countries. (Photo by Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images)Although a positive step, the consultation’s long-term impact will be contingent on the arrangement of subsequent meetings in an institutionalized setting. For these meetings to transcend symbolism and address substantive issues of concern, it will be essential to include representatives of the Chinese defense policy establishment and, ideally, military officials alongside the usual foreign
policy diplomats.

Beijing has attributed the intensifying rivalry to what it perceives as increased strategic hostility from Washington. This perception has led China to believe that expanding its nuclear capabilities is crucial to stabilizing bilateral relations and that it should avoid being lured into self-imposed restrictions. Unless this viewpoint shifts, bilateral nuclear competition probably will continue escalating. Meanwhile, diplomatic engagement stands as one of the limited but crucial means to establish a safety net and reduce the risk of conflict.

As China increasingly seeks to win the hearts and minds of the international community, the United States and other countries have an opportunity to focus on engaging Beijing in endorsing broad guiding principles for collaborative management of international security challenges rather than presenting specific arms control proposals. For example, China has taken a more active role in global discussions on artificial intelligence (AI) governance, signaling its intent to be a responsible leader in addressing the implications of such emerging technologies. Some Chinese media reports suggested that Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden would jointly declare their support for maintaining human oversight in nuclear weapons decision-making processes during their November summit.1 Although the joint announcement did not happen as reported, the concept has garnered considerable backing within Chinese policy circles.

In an era when China is resistant to specific limitations on its military growth, its endorsement of overarching principles regarding certain military conduct and emerging military technologies remains beneficial. This stance allows the United States and the international community to advocate for further operationalization of these broad principles through official and expert-level dialogues. Once China’s leadership publicly supports such overarching principles, it paves the way for more detailed engagement by Chinese officials at the working level and policy experts in crafting specific rules of behavior.

An example is China’s endorsement of the principle of human involvement in nuclear decision-making, which could lead to in-depth discussions on defining adequate human oversight in nuclear decisions at a practical level. Future dialogues could focus on shared understandings concerning safety protocols, fail-safe mechanisms, and realistic simulations to acquaint decision-makers with the capabilities and potential pitfalls of AI in supporting decisions. These conversations are crucial for adding guardrails to an intensifying Chinese-U.S. nuclear rivalry.

Policy Incoherence in China

With China experiencing significant internal transformations under Xi, the shift toward a more centralized and personalistic decision-making model has markedly heightened internal incoherence in strategic decisions, including the expansion of nuclear capabilities. The apparent sidelining of nuclear policy experts in policy discussions, the growing tendency of bureaucrats to align with and reinforce the paramount leader’s views on power politics, the reduction in the scope for internal debate, and the erosion of checks and balances have made achieving policy coherence increasingly challenging.

China is deviating notably from its long-standing nuclear policy in several aspects. These changes include a shift toward simultaneous quantitative expansion and qualitative improvement of capabilities and the development of a nuclear triad with a massive investment in silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Other changes include a transition from a relaxed posture to a “rapid response” stance with the potential adoption of a launch-under-attack doctrine and new official narratives directing Chinese nuclear forces toward achieving “strategic decisive victories.”

Along with their delegations, Chinese President Xi Jinping (L, Center) and U.S. President Joe Biden (R, Center) discuss issues of security, economics and curbing fentanyl production during a summit at Filoli Estate, near San Francisco, on November 15. (Photo by Rao Aimin/Xinhua via Getty Images) Many Chinese nuclear policy experts find themselves perplexed by the logic and rationale behind this unprecedented nuclear expansion. This confusion raises concerns that the shift in China’s nuclear policy may be more reflective of the top leader’s political instincts rather than a carefully considered strategy aligned with a clearly defined consensus goal within the policy community. In a system of open and free debate, Chinese leaders might have recognized that China’s buildup could trigger U.S. responses, potentially deteriorating China’s security environment. Yet, basic scrutiny of strategic decisions is becoming increasingly challenging.

In the United States, there is a notable underestimation of the disorganized nature of China’s nuclear expansion and the growing issue of policy incoherence within it. Consequently, U.S. strategists often presume that China’s nuclear buildup is underpinned by well-thought-out rationality, clear objectives, and strategic long-term planning. This perception gives rise to prevalent concerns that Beijing’s nuclear growth signals a shift to an offensive nuclear posture, aiming not merely for parity with Washington but possibly for nuclear superiority. Nonetheless, remarks by top Chinese officials indicate a continued preference for asymmetric deterrence, at least for the time being.

Rather than succumbing to worst-case scenario assumptions regarding Chinese nuclear ambitions, the United States would benefit from understanding better the implications of China’s growing policy incoherence for U.S. policy options. The lack of clarity and consistency in Chinese nuclear policy thinking should prompt Washington and the international community to reassess and adjust their objectives and strategies in their interactions with Beijing.

For instance, instead of focusing on arms control measures that Beijing is unlikely to adopt in the foreseeable future, Washington and the international community might be better served by shifting their focus to a new goal: stimulating and encouraging internal policy discussions and debates within China. Fostering a more vibrant internal policy dialogue can act as a safeguard against questionable policy directions and is essential for ensuring democratic, accountable decision-making. Enhancing the quality of internal policymaking has become critical for preventing destabilizing nuclear policies, benefiting China and the global community.

In this context, the United States and the international community can play a constructive role, particularly in empowering Chinese experts. By supporting extensive expert-level dialogues and exchanges, the United States and other countries can assist Chinese experts in gaining a more comprehensive, nuanced understanding of policy thoughts and practices in the United States and other nations. Such insights and expertise could bolster the influence of these experts in China’s internal policy deliberation, enabling them to more effectively challenge and refine prevailing perspectives.

U.S. research institutes and civil society organizations should place greater emphasis on bringing U.S. domestic debates into the Chinese policy arena. A prominent discussion in Washington now revolves around the U.S. response to China’s nuclear expansion. The debate centers on whether U.S. efforts to enhance its nuclear capabilities in response to the Chinese buildup will more effectively deter Chinese aggression and encourage arms control negotiations or if it will result in greater Chinese nuclear expansion.

Exposing Chinese nuclear officials and experts to these internal U.S. debates, including the diverse perspectives of U.S. strategists and how their views are shaped by historical and contemporary evidence, could help Chinese policymakers understand the serious concerns in Washington regarding China’s nuclear path and the intense pressure that the United States faces in reacting to Chinese nuclear advancements. U.S. officials and experts, particularly those advocating a tougher stance on Chinese nuclear policy, should make an active, persistent effort to engage in Chinese-U.S. Track 2 and 1.5 dialogues, which can help convey these complex dynamics and foster a deeper understanding of the strategic considerations at play in an unofficial, less formal environment.

Exposing Chinese experts more widely to this U.S. debate would help draw Chinese attention to the fact that the U.S. response to the Chinese buildup will hinge on whether the United States perceives the buildup as primarily a defensive measure to ensure deterrence or an aggressive move aimed at coercion. Greater awareness of this debate within China could motivate Beijing to offer reassurances to Washington and to elucidate the rationale behind its nuclear expansion, potentially leading to greater nuclear transparency from China.

The U.S. Differential Nuclear Policy

Given China’s strategic competition with the United States and its historical skepticism toward arms control, China is likely to play hardball even if it is somehow compelled to join arms control talks. China’s approach may be more constructive, however, on issues that align more closely with its core interests, such as the no-first-use policy and mutual nuclear vulnerability between China and the United States.

In recent months, Beijing has intensified its emphasis on no first use of nuclear weapons. Its insistence on the United States adopting such a policy toward China is in line with its overarching aim of ensuring a U.S. acceptance of a mutual nuclear vulnerability relationship with China. To Beijing, Washington’s acceptance of either a no-first-use or a mutual nuclear vulnerability stance would indicate a U.S. commitment not to use its nuclear capabilities for coercing China, which is regarded as a key precondition for upholding bilateral nuclear stability and preventing a nuclear arms race.

The United States has an unclear policy on whether to continue persuading Beijing that its development of homeland missile defense capabilities is limited, expert Tong Zhao writes. Here, an upgraded U.S. ground-based interceptor is shown during a test launch from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California on December 1. (Photo by Ryan Keith/U.S. Defense Department)The United States finds it challenging, however, to accept the concept of mutual vulnerability, such as through a mutual renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, even if such an agreement could be reliably verified. Washington harbors concerns that Beijing might exploit such an agreement to carry out strategic non-nuclear attacks that could threaten core U.S. interests. Consequently, Washington believes that it has a legitimate reason to preserve the option of nuclear first use as a deterrent and potential response to such attacks.

Conversely, Washington views the potential first use of nuclear weapons by Beijing, most likely in a conflict over Taiwan, as being driven by a revisionist agenda aimed at coercively altering the territorial status quo and thus unjustifiable. This leads to differing U.S. perspectives on the legitimacy of the potential first use of nuclear weapons by China and the United States. From China’s viewpoint, such a differential U.S. approach is discriminatory in nature and is what motivates Washington to seek nuclear superiority rather than nuclear stability with China.

In the United States, the responsibility of extending a nuclear umbrella to its allies plays a role in justifying its stance on retaining the option of first use of nuclear weapons. Even if the United States did not have this additional responsibility and needed only to ensure its own security, however, there is evidence to suggest that it would still regard its own option of first use as more justifiable than the pursuit of the same option by China, North Korea, or Russia. These countries often interpret this distinction as indicative of U.S. hegemony, whereas many U.S. experts seem to believe that the real reasons for this position are more intricate than mere double standards, stemming from the different behaviors of democratic and authoritarian systems.

The U.S. perspective holds that authoritarian countries are more inclined to initiate unjust wars and pursue revisionist objectives, more impulsive in their threats of nuclear first use, less reliable in adhering to international norms and ethical standards, and more unpredictable in their strategic decision-making. Consequently, the United States sees valid grounds for adopting a different nuclear policy standard toward authoritarian adversaries, underpinned by these perceived distinctions in governance and international behavior.

With regard to Taiwan, a critical flashpoint in Chinese-U.S. military tensions, China admittedly has shown an increasing sense of urgency to alter the territorial status quo, by coercive means if necessary. During the November summit, Xi reportedly told his U.S. counterpart that, on the issue of Taiwan, “peace is all well and good, but at some point we need to move toward resolution more generally.”2 In this context, Washington perceives Beijing’s efforts to deter U.S. nuclear first use in a large-scale conventional invasion as supporting an unjust cause and believes the United States has justifiable reasons to maintain the option of nuclear first use in such a scenario. Such perceptions contribute to the U.S. reluctance to acknowledge a mutual nuclear vulnerability relationship with China.

Besides the matter of nuclear first use, some other aspects of U.S. nuclear policy are formulated in a manner that Washington deems justifiable for itself but not for its adversaries. These include the U.S. pursuit of damage limitation through the development of counterforce strike capabilities.

This differential policy approach is becoming increasingly untenable. As China’s power expands, it is more assertively seeking equal status with the United States and has the resources to develop nuclear strategies and capabilities akin to those of the United States. As Beijing perceives the U.S. differential nuclear policy as a manifestation of U.S. hegemony, it becomes more willing to pressure Washington into recognizing a more equitable nuclear relationship through unilateral buildup. As the two sides continue down the current path, the future of their nuclear relationship becomes increasingly unpredictable.

Theoretically, the United States has three potential responses to address the consequences of its differential policy on nuclear competition with China. The first option involves Washington making a concerted effort to define more precisely the scope of two types of capabilities that it is developing: counterforce damage limitation capability and limited homeland missile defense capability. If Washington can demonstrate successfully to Beijing that its pursuit of counterforce damage limitation and homeland missile defense is genuinely limited in nature and distinctly less extensive than full-fledged capabilities that could undermine the Chinese nuclear deterrent, then China would be more inclined to accept some level of permanent capability asymmetry with the United States.

The second approach involves Washington considering revisions to its nuclear doctrine by relinquishing nuclear employment strategies that it would find problematic if adopted by its peer competitors. This could include restricting the option of nuclear first use and reducing the role of nuclear weapons as a hedge against potential threats from future non-nuclear military technologies.

If Washington is unable to eliminate the differential elements in its nuclear strategy, the third option would be to provide a clear explanation for its stance. When China perceives the U.S. differential policy as rooted in U.S. hegemonic culture, it often responds by sidelining diplomatic and arms control efforts, instead focusing on a unilateral military buildup as a countermeasure. Conversely, if Washington’s rationale is grounded in concerns about its rivals’ lack of credibility or accountability or their specific revisionist policy objectives, this should be more openly and clearly communicated.

A more tailored communications strategy could help draw Beijing’s attention to the need to acknowledge and address these underlying challenges in the bilateral relationship. By recognizing U.S. differential policy while pointing out opportunities for policy changes at the same time, Washington could incentivize Beijing to increase transparency, respond to specific U.S. concerns, and adopt a less coercive approach on regional security issues, including on the issue of Taiwan.

Near-Term Engagement Opportunities

China’s core demand for U.S. acceptance of a nuclear no-first-use or mutual nuclear vulnerability policy faces significant hurdles, intricately tied to the escalating ideological tensions between the two countries and Beijing’s pursuit of coercive security strategies. Given China’s insistence on addressing these issues as a prerequisite for broader nuclear-related security discussions, however, it remains necessary for the United States to engage China on these matters. Fortunately, there are immediate steps both sides can take to engage constructively in ways that are mutually beneficial.

A practical starting point could be to initiate a broad, generic discussion that does not focus exclusively on China and the United States or require either party to modify their existing policies immediately. On the no-first-use issue, the two sides could explore general criteria to assess the credibility of an unspecified nation’s no-first-use policy, including indicators related to its deployed capabilities, operational doctrines, and employment postures. Given the climate of mistrust, neither Beijing nor Washington is likely to be fully reassured by the other’s mere declaration on no first use unless accompanied by additional concrete measures to lend credibility to the declaration. Thus, an essential preliminary step would be to determine if both countries can concur on a set of universal standards for a credible no-first-use policy applicable to any nuclear-armed state.

Examples of potential indicators of credibility might include not deploying low-survivability weapons on rapid-delivery systems near conflict zones; maintaining clear, transparent nuclear doctrines explicitly defining and renouncing nuclear first-use actions; and providing transparency regarding the presence of domestic procedures to check the conformity of political leaders’ nuclear authorization decisions with their declared no-first-use policy. Even if reaching consensus on universal standards proves unfeasible, this exercise could enhance China’s understanding of the difficulties Washington faces in trusting a rival’s no-first-use declaration.

Similarly, on the issue of mutual nuclear vulnerability, Washington could propose to Beijing a broad, generic discussion about the meaning of mutual vulnerability and the elements that define a credible commitment to such a relationship. Comparing China’s main nuclear rivals, China is in a weaker position in the nuclear dynamic with the United States, but is the stronger party in its nuclear relationship with India. In a generic discussion that does not specify countries, China would be encouraged to reflect on the conditions of mutual vulnerability by considering perspectives from both sides of the table, which could help build a more constructive dialogue.

Beyond addressing strategic challenges in their nuclear relationship, China and the United States should strive to clear up specific technical misunderstandings. For instance, the 2023 U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress on China’s military power notes a possible Chinese interest in developing conventional ICBMs. If accurate, such development could further destabilize the Chinese-U.S. nuclear dynamic. It might prompt Washington to expand its homeland missile defense systems to counter Chinese conventional ICBMs, which are perceived as a more immediate threat to the U.S. homeland than Chinese nuclear ICBMs. Yet, the enhancement of U.S. homeland missile defenses could heighten Chinese concerns about the reliability of its nuclear second-strike capability, complicating efforts to maintain bilateral nuclear stability.

What appears to be insufficiently understood in Washington is that, since at least 2020, Chinese experts have been under the impression that the United States was arming some of its ICBMs with conventional warheads.3 This misunderstanding of U.S. policy could be a driving factor behind the reported Chinese interest in developing their own conventional ICBM capabilities.

Similarly, Chinese experts have shown misunderstandings over other specific policy issues. For instance, based on misinterpretation of statements by senior U.S. officials, they believe Washington has been “nuclearizing” hypersonic missiles. In reality, the United States has limited its hypersonic missile development to conventional warheads. Another often-heard claim by Chinese experts is that the United States has been developing space-based land-attack weapons. That is a misunderstanding that likely also has influenced China’s own thinking on the need for similar capabilities and on its overall counterspace strategy.

These misunderstandings could have considerable implications for China’s military and arms control policies. Unlike divergent perceptions about each other’s strategic intentions, however, these specific technical-level misconceptions should be more straightforward to rectify. This can be achieved through a concerted effort to utilize open-source information to clarify details and provide evidence during official and expert-level exchanges. Addressing such seemingly minor issues can go a long way in reducing the intensity of the bilateral arms competition.

 

ENDNOTES

1. Igor Patrick, Mark Magnier, and Amber Wang, “Biden, Xi Set to Pledge Ban on AI in Autonomous Weapons Like Drones, Nuclear Warhead Control: Sources,” South China Morning Post, November 11, 2023.

2. “Biden and Xi Talk Taiwan, Agree to Resume Military Communication,” NHK News, November 16, 2023.

3. Tong Zhao, “Managing the Impact of Missile Defense on U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” in Missile Defense and the Strategic Relationship Among the United States, Russia, and China (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2023), p. 9.
 

Tong Zhao is a senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, working for the Nuclear Policy Program and Carnegie China.

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