March 2024
By Libby Flatoff and Daryl G. Kimball

Russian leaders have rejected a formal U.S. proposal to resume talks “without preconditions” on a new arms control framework to succeed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that expires in two years.

If the decision holds, it means that the only remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement limiting the world’s largest nuclear weapons arsenals will expire on Feb. 5, 2026, along with its strict verification provisions.

In a written response to the United States on Dec. 2 obtained by Arms Control Today, the Russian Foreign Ministry said, “The proposal of the U.S. Side to launch a bilateral dialogue ‘to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework’ is unacceptable to us. Such ideas are completely inappropriate and absolutely untimely for they cannot be considered adequate to today’s realities and to the state of Russia-U.S. relations.”

Citing NATO and the “acute conflict around Ukraine,” the Russian diplomatic note also said, “At the moment, the U.S. Side does not demonstrate any interest in a mutually acceptable settlement of the current crisis [Ukraine], does not show readiness to take into account Russia’s security concerns…. Thus, there is no visible basis for a constructive and fruitful dialogue with the United States on strategic stability and arms control.”

The U.S. proposal was first announced by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the annual meeting of the Arms Control Association last June. Sullivan said that the United States is ready to engage in nuclear arms control diplomacy with Russia and with other nuclear-armed members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) “without preconditions.”

“Rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework,” he said. Three days later, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov described Sullivan’s comments as “important and positive.” (See ACT, July/August 2023.)

But by August, Russian officials at the preparatory committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference had already started signaling that, in their view, nuclear arms control talks “cannot be isolated from the general geopolitical and military-strategic context,” which includes the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The United States followed up Sullivan’s June speech with a written proposal to Russia that was transmitted in September. (See ACT, December 2023.)

On Jan. 17, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov elaborated on Russia’s written response to the U.S. proposal, saying that “amid a ‘hybrid war’ waged by Washington against Russia, we aren’t seeing any basis, not only for any additional joint measures in the sphere of arms control and reduction of strategic risks, but for any discussion of strategic stability issues with the United States.”

Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control at the U.S. National Security Council, said at an event hosted by Center for Strategic and International Studies on Jan. 18 that the rejection “linked other politics to arms control in a way that has not been done in the post-Cold War era…[and] as a result, we don’t have a conversation to be had.”

Vaddi expressed disappointment that Russia had not even offered a counterproposal on nuclear arms control and disarmament. In failing to do so, “Russia is minimizing their obligations under the NPT” and not even attempting “to pursue negotiations in good faith” as required by Article VI of that treaty.

Shortly after Russia’s rejection of the U.S. proposal became public, the U.S. State Department on Jan. 31 released its annual report to Congress on the implementation of New START. It said that the United States had 1,419 warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, below the limit of 1,550 deployed warheads permitted by the treaty.

The report said that Russia’s decision to pause New START inspections in 2022 and its failure to provide data on its strategic nuclear forces since it suspended implementation of the treaty in early 2023 “negatively affects the ability of the United States to verify Russia’s compliance” with the New START deployed-warhead limit.

Despite the verification obstacles, the report assesses that Russia “likely did not exceed” the treaty’s deployed-warhead limit in 2023 and “that there is not a strategic imbalance between the [United States] and [Russia] that endangers the national security interest of the United States.”

But the report noted that “due to the uncertainty generated by Russia’s failure to fulfill its obligations with respect to the [t]reaty’s verification regime, the United States was unable to verify that [Russia] remained in compliance throughout 2023 with its obligation to limit its [number of] deployed warheads…to 1,550” on delivery vehicles subject to the treaty.

Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said in an interview with RIA Novosti on Jan. 22 that, “for now, we are focusing on the task of maintaining the quantitative indicators of strategic offensive weapons at the levels established by the treaty on the condition that further destabilizing steps by Washington will not make such a task meaningless for us.”

March 2024
By Mina Rozei

Ukraine has accused Russian ground forces in Ukraine of multiple instances of using riot control agents against Ukrainian infantry positions this year in a manner prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Russia used K-51 grenades filled with chloropicrin, a World War I-era chemical substance, 229 times since the beginning of January, according to a Feb. 9 statement from the Armed Forces of Ukraine published via the Ukrainian Army’s Telegram channel.

In a televised statement on Jan. 30, a Ukrainian military spokesperson said Ukraine also has documented incidents from 2023 in which Russia used grenades and drones filled with chloropicrin and more recently with 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile gas, commonly known as tear gas, both of which are classified by the CWC as riot control agents.

These agents, which are used widely by domestic police forces around the globe, are banned by the CWC for use by militaries on the battlefield. Article 1 of the treaty specifically obligates states-parties “not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”

The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Tavria military group, Col. Oleskandr Shtupun, said on Jan. 30 on Ukrainian national television that each case of alleged use of these agents is being investigated separately. “Appropriate analyses are made, and then the results are submitted to international institutions,” Shtupun said, according to The Kyiv Independent.

The Russian Embassy to the Netherlands denied the charges in a Jan. 26 statement on social media. “All allegations that Russia is using grenades with chloroacetophenone banned by the Geneva Convention are based on unconfirmed data. There are no chemical weapons in the stockpiles of the Russian army, as confirmed by international investigations,” according to the post.

But in November, Mallory Stewart, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, deterrence, and stability, said that “Russia’s problematic behavior has now expanded to Ukraine.”

Speaking to the CWC conference of states-parties, she noted that “reports shared by our Ukrainian colleagues and aired on Russia’s own state media suggest Russian armed forces are using [riot control agents] against Ukrainian forces.”

“We call on Russia…to immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Ukraine and to comply with its CWC obligations, including refraining from using [these agents] as a method of warfare,” Stewart said.

At the same conference, Ukraine’s representative, Kateryna Bila, said her government is in contact with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) “on the threat of chemical weapons use and assistance and protection support from the [secretariat] as well as from [CWC] states-parties.”

The OPCW Executive Council will meet March 5-8 in The Hague, but the alleged use of riot control agents in Ukraine is not on the provisional agenda posted by the OPCW secretariat. Russia lost its elected seat on the council in a contentious vote in November.

March 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

Italy has identified new priorities for a multilateral initiative aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including a focus on the nexus between climate change and chemical security and counterproliferation financing.

As chair of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction for 2024, Italy is responsible for setting priorities for the 31-member initiative. The Global Partnership, which was established in 2002 by the Group of Eight industrialized countries, works to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.

According to a January statement, Italy aims, during its presidency, to improve the “common understanding of well-known and emerging” WMD challenges among member states.

Specifically, Italy said it intends to “increase awareness on chemical safety and security” given the “huge impact of major adverse climate changes and natural disasters associated with the accidental release of chemical material.” Italy said the Global Partnership will focus on enhancing preparedness to respond to such events.

Italy also identified proliferation finance as a priority for 2024 and said it would look to build on domestic experience to “renew a strong commitment on counter-proliferation financing” and focus on countering states that use “a variety of illicit activity and sanction evasions schemes” to fund nuclear and missile programs.

Furthermore, the initiative will look at the impact of disinformation on policy responses in the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear domains, Italy said.

In addition to the new priorities, Italy said the Global Partnership will continue biosecurity work prioritized under Japan’s leadership in 2023, including efforts to “address emerging and ongoing biothreats by building capacities” in Africa, and will pay special attention to WMD risk reduction efforts in Ukraine. (See ACT, January/February 2024.)

One of the mechanisms that the Global Partnership uses to achieve its goals is a match-making process that pairs states with funds and expertise with recipients looking to implement projects that align with the initiative’s mission.

In 2023, Global Partnership members provided funding and expertise for 319 projects across 96 states, according to an activity report released by Japan.

In addition to promoting biosecurity projects in Africa and WMD risk reduction in Ukraine, Japan prioritized the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires states to implement measures to prevent WMD proliferation to nonstate actors.

According to the report, projects funded in Ukraine included a multiyear project to bolster public health and crisis response capabilities in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident. Other projects related to Ukraine focused on providing expertise and funding for nuclear security, including rebuilding security at the former Chernobyl nuclear plant and strengthening the security of radioactive sources.

In the biosecurity space, Japan reported “meaningful progress” in all areas of the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa, including projects aimed at “strengthening international capacities to prevent, detect and respond to deliberate biological threats.”

Consistent with Resolution 1540, the Global Partnership’s members provided “extensive support” to states and regional organizations aimed at strengthening capacities to “prevent, detect, and respond to [WMD] terrorism.” For example, Mexico partnered with Chile and Brazil to conduct a trilateral peer review of national legal frameworks for implementing the resolution.

Global Partnership member states also supported projects to mitigate WMD threats beyond the specific priorities articulated by Japan.

The report noted several projects aimed at building capacity to implement UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea and to prevent the reemergence of chemical weapons in Syria.

March 2024

U.S. prosecutors have charged an alleged member of the Japanese mafia with trafficking nuclear materials.

The superseding indictment against Takeshi Ebisawa of Japan and co-defendant Somphop Singhasiri of Thailand on charges of “conspiring with a network of associates to traffic nuclear materials from Burma to other countries” was made public Feb. 21 by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.

According to a news release from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Ebisawa and his conspirators allegedly attempted to traffic nuclear materials from Myanmar between early 2020 and February 2022. In the course of the operation, they showed samples of nuclear materials to an undercover agent from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, who was posing as a narcotics and weapons trafficker. Ebisawa thought he was selling nuclear materials to an Iranian general for use in a nuclear weapons program and aimed to purchase military-grade weapons “on behalf of an ethnic insurgent group” in Myanmar, according to the indictment.

The press release reported that Thai authorities assisted U.S. law enforcement investigators in transferring the nuclear samples to the United States and “a U.S. nuclear forensic laboratory later analyzed the samples and confirmed that the samples contain uranium and weapons-grade plutonium.”

“In particular, the laboratory determined that the isotope composition of the plutonium found in the nuclear samples is weapons-grade, meaning that the plutonium, if produced in sufficient quantities, would be suitable for use in a nuclear weapon,” the release added.

In April 2022, Ebisawa, Singhasiri, and one other Thai national were arrested, indicted, and charged with trafficking in drugs and weapons including surface-to-air missiles. Ebisawa is detained in New York awaiting trial. The new charges are an addition to the existing ones.

Although the Justice Department believes Ebisawa is “a leader within Japanese Yakuza, transnational organized crime syndicate,” Japanese police told Yomiuri Shimbun on July 27, 2022, that there was no confirmed information that Ebisawa was a leader or had a connection to Japanese domestic organized crime.

“It is chilling to imagine the consequences had these efforts succeeded and the Justice Department will hold accountable those who traffic in these materials and threaten U.S. national security and international stability,” Matthew G. Olsen, U.S. assistant attorney general for national security, said in the press release.

There was no specific information given regarding how the defendants may have acquired or produced nuclear materials.—SHIZUKA KURAMITSU

March 2024

The U.S. Navy has taken official control of the Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Poland with the aim of making the system fully functional under NATO command as early as this spring.

The Aegis system was deployed to the Redzikowo Air Base in the north of Poland, about 93 miles from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, and transferred to the control of the Navy on Dec. 15. The base originally was intended to begin operating in 2018, but the project experienced delays.

“The acceptance of the Aegis Ashore site in Poland, like its sister site in Romania, is an important step in our efforts to get [the system] ready to protect against the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles launched from Iran,” U.S. Naval Forces in Europe said in a Dec. 18 statement.

The system represents a significant development in NATO's missile defense capabilities. It is part of the structure to protect NATO allies from ballistic missile threats called the European Phased Adaptive Approach, which was conceived during the Obama administration.

The Aegis system is designed to detect enemy missile launches by using satellite systems. Once identified, Standard Missile-3 interceptors are launched from sea or land at the missile, destroying it in space.

The system in Poland is undergoing a planned maintenance period for upgrades and is expected to be fully integrated and operational under NATO command by the summer, the Navy said.

In addition to the Polish air base, the Aegis architecture includes a base in Romania, a radar facility in Turkey, a command center in Germany, and U.S. Navy ships.

According to BBC News, Russia has raised concerns about the Aegis site, arguing that the system in Europe threatens its strategic deterrence. At a press briefing last March, Vice Adm. Jon A. Hill, director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, pushed back, saying that the Aegis system “is not designed to go after Russian missiles. It is really about outside of the European sphere.”—CHAD LAWHORN

March 2024

Under the Cap of Invisibility: The Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant and the Texas Panhandle
By Lucie Genay
University of New Mexico Press
2022

This book explores how the Texas Panhandle has shaped “the cap of invisibility” covering a key U.S. nuclear weapons production site. For nearly 50 years, Pantex has been the sole U.S. nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facility. Yet to most people, Amarillo, home to Pantex, suggests oil and gas, cattle ranching, country western songs, and the place where you can eat a 72-ounce steak, well before thoughts of nuclear weapons. In Pantex’s first decades of operation, the surrounding community referred to it as the “soap factory” because the first site contractor was Procter and Gamble. Not until 1969 did the local newspaper clearly disclose the Pantex role in the nuclear weapons enterprise. Perhaps more than at other nuclear weapons sites, secrecy and invisibility have been cultivated here.

The book tells rich stories of the people who have tried to penetrate this invisibility, bringing moments of scrutiny and tension to Pantex. Challenges from some community religious leaders, sick workers, neighboring ranchers, and activist groups have brought into question the morality of Pantex weapons activities, its safety and health impact on workers, and its environmental impacts on the ranching industry. Efforts to expand and develop new Pantex missions, largely unsuccessful, also have brought controversy to the facility. As attention to these efforts has now subsided, invisibility is returning. The book sheds light on how new attention could be drawn to the facility, particularly by those who are interested in addressing nuclear weapons human and environmental harms.—KATHY CRANDALL ROBINSON

Death Dust: The Rise, Decline, and Future of Radiological Weapons Programs
By William C. Potter et al.
Stanford University Press
2024

Death Dust is an in-depth exploration of the history and development of radiological weapons. The authors meticulously analyze why, despite their destructive potential, these weapons did not proliferate as other weapons of mass destruction did. Radiological weapons are defined as devices that spread radioactive substances without a nuclear blast.

The book examines programs in Egypt, Iraq, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It thoroughly analyzes the technical obstacles and reduced military effectiveness that caused the discontinuation of radiological weapons programs. It also explores the role of science fiction in shaping the development of radiological weapons, drawing parallels between fiction and actual governmental strategies.

The authors explain why radiological weapons are obscure in historical literature and attribute this situation to such factors as the short lifespan of these programs and the shift in focus toward nuclear weapons. They emphasize the potential future relevance of these weapons and the need for international efforts to prevent their resurgence.

By providing a comprehensive study that blends historical facts with contemporary concerns, the book is a valuable addition to international security literature. It is a thought-provoking must-read for those interested in the history of weapons development and arms control issues.—CHAD ALLAN LAWHORN

March 2024  
By Jenny Town

There is a hot debate underway in international policy circles about how to interpret increased talk of war preparations in North Korean rhetoric.

Some analysts suggest a “decision has been made [in Pyongyang] to go to war,” but what a contemporary war on the Korean peninsula would look like is unclear.¹ Other analysts refute this prospect of an all-out war. At the same time, they resign themselves to the notion that some kind of limited conflict or overly provocative behavior is likely in the near term, which is to say, actions that could easily escalate into a devastating conflict and potential nuclear use.²

In most of these scenarios, there tends to be an underlying acceptance that this dynamic is too advanced to stop. Despite the Biden administration’s multiple attempts to invite North Korea back into nuclear talks, the U.S. proposals have gone unanswered. In the meantime, South Korea and the United States have bolstered their cooperation not only in conventional capabilities but also in nuclear consultation and planning. They have doubled down on deterrence messaging and drills, demonstrating their combined firepower and reminding Pyongyang of the dire consequences of any kind of attack.

North Korea’s consistent response has been reciprocal deterrence messaging and drills. This power-for-power dynamic has made it difficult for either side to back down or even ease off without looking as if it has ceded ground to the other. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that there are no operative diplomatic channels of communication to clarify, convey, or choreograph deescalatory actions.

With both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) emphasizing the need to be ready for war, the question is, Has war become inevitable? This obviously is not the first time tensions have risen to turbulent heights on the Korean peninsula. The last frenzy was in 2017, when North Korean advancements in intercontinental ballistic missile technologies were met by threats of “fire and fury” from U.S. President Donald Trump.³ Although the fury was evident in the various exchanges and insults that characterized that era, fire did not follow.

The flashy diplomacy that came next was dashed in a dramatic fashion, with the failure to secure a first-phase agreement between North Korea and the United States that would kick off a denuclearization process and move the two countries toward more normal relations. Since then, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has implemented new policies, plans, and laws that demonstrate fundamental changes to his calculus about his nuclear weapons program and his country’s place in an evolving geopolitical landscape.

The level of conviction and decisiveness Kim is showing today raises questions about his endgame. What makes the situation different from 2017 or other moments in history when tensions flared? Does it make “fire” more or less likely in the near future? More importantly, instead of just hunkering down for the fight, what can be done on the diplomatic side to prevent it?

The Shifting Geopolitical Context

The consequences of not making a deal in 2019, when Kim was still willing to negotiate over his nuclear weapons program, have been more serious than after previous negotiations. In the past, agreeing to a first step, even if small, would have laid the foundation for more productive relations and for continued negotiations as progress was made. It also would have created the mechanism for both sides to test each other’s resolve—how far were they willing to go to reap the benefits of better relations? Moreover, with the support of key players, especially South Korea, China, and Russia, the potential for enhancing regional security and stability, establishing confidence-building and security measures, and moving further down the denuclearization path seemed promising.

That moment, however, has passed. At the end of 2019, Kim made clear his disillusionment with dangled promises that relations with the United States could change enough for North Korea to gain benefits. Since then, North Korea has undergone major policy shifts that demonstrate a fundamental change in its worldview. In 2021, for instance, North Korea embraced the suggestion that a “new Cold War” was emerging and quickly got on board.⁴ As South Korean-U.S. relations grew deeper, North Korea worked to expand its relations with China and Russia on the other side of the ideological paradigm.

By 2022, the North Korean defense minister pledged to undertake “strategic and tactic[al] coordinated operations” with China’s People’s Liberation Army, and Kim touted a level of “strategic and tactical cooperation” with Russia.⁵ The inclusion of tactical cooperation was new in both instances, going well beyond the historical parameters of their “friendships” over the previous 30 years. In the case of Russia in particular, this change has been consequential.

Within this new Cold War-like alignment, North Korea’s political support has been reciprocated as China and Russia have blocked the passage of new punitive measures against North Korea in international forums. Economic trade and cooperation have resumed and apparently food and medical aid as well, helping boost the North Korean economy as it emerges from its pandemic isolation. Military cooperation with Russia also creates opportunities for quick infusions of hardware and technology to help modernize North Korea’s conventional and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities.

Moreover, although North Korea may be a problematic partner for China in particular, increasing tensions on their shared border with continued weapons testing and deployment exercises, North Korean actions still fit within a Chinese geopolitical narrative. China’s own concerns about a growing buildup of U.S. military and strategic assets in the region and deepening U.S. alliance cooperation with South Korea and Japan cultivate strategic empathy for Pyongyang’s situation in Beijing.

Reframing North Korean Nuclear Weapons

One of the most significant changes that North Korea has announced since 2019 is how it views its nuclear weapons program. Historically, descriptions of the country’s nuclear weapons were consistently framed as contingent on the United States maintaining its hostile policy against the North, thus leaving the door open to negotiations. In September 2022, when announcing a new nuclear law, however, Kim denounced future negotiations to this end and said that “[w]e have drawn the line of no retreat regarding our nuclear weapons so that there will be no longer any bargaining over them.”⁶

This new law described the country as a “responsible nuclear weapons state” and laid out five conditions under which it would consider nuclear use, three of which included preemptive clauses. There also is a clause that compels automatic nuclear use in case of leadership decapitation.⁷ Although much public attention has been focused on the troubling inclusion of potential preemptive nuclear use, there is strong deterrent messaging in the law and an emphasis on how clarity of strategy can help prevent miscalculation by other states with nuclear weapons.

In 2023, Kim announced a new constitutional amendment that “ensures the country’s right to existence and development, deter war and protect regional and global peace by rapidly developing nuclear weapons to a higher level.” He stressed the need for “exponentially boosting the production of nuclear weapons and diversifying the nuclear strike means and deploying them.”⁸

Enshrining the nuclear weapons strategy and the mandate to continue developing weapons of mass destruction in law has significant implications for future negotiations with North Korea. First, it means that getting back to any kind of denuclearization agenda is going to be enormously more difficult than in the past and will not be even remotely possible until there are major changes in the broader geopolitical environment. These definitive measures will not be reversed easily, especially while other countries in the region continue to build up and modernize their own military capabilities.

It also means that there is no longer any low-hanging fruit to use as a starting point in future negotiations. In the last round of negotiations, for instance, North Korea declared a unilateral moratorium on long-range ballistic missile and nuclear weapons testing to create the right environment for negotiations. It was an easy concession to make. Going forward, even freezes of nuclear testing or actual development activities will require a high price for Pyongyang to justify violating its constitution. Although it is not impossible that the right scenario could prove appealing enough for Kim to take such steps, it certainly will not be the kind of easy concession it has been previously.

South Korea as Principal Enemy

One of the newest policy shifts involves how North Korea views its relations with South Korea. At a recent meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim announced a fundamental change in the handling of North-South relations and rejected the notion that peaceful reunification could be achieved.⁹ Since then, a series of moves and statements have rebranded South Korea as the North’s principal enemy and reassigned the management of relations under the rubric of foreign policy rather than being treated as intra-Korean affairs.

The exact goal of such a policy shift remains unclear. Some analysts suggest it makes it easier to justify taking military actions against South Korea in the future, including the use of nuclear weapons. Yet, North Korea always has had South Korea in its sight when building its nuclear weapons program, long before it developed strategic-range delivery systems, and has rarely hesitated to threaten their use against Seoul.

Subsequent rhetoric and actions relay a strong sense of disillusionment that North-South relations ever could move forward independent from the North’s broader international relations. The recent decision to revoke the law on inter-Korean economic cooperation, for instance, cuts at the heart of the matter. The North-South joint tourism zone at Mount Kumgang has been shut down since 2008, when a South Korean tourist was shot and killed by a North Korean guard for straying into a restricted zone. The Kaesong Industrial Complex, where several South Korean companies once employed around 55,000 North Korean workers, has been closed since 2016 due to political tensions. The revival of these initiatives has been a goal of both Koreas for several years, but sanctions remain an obstacle to resuming business.

The North-South joint railroad project, which South Korean President Moon Jae-in hoped to revive under the Panmunjom Declaration in 2018, never received the sanctions exemptions that it needed to make any substantial progress. Throughout 2018 and 2019, Kim urged Moon not to let external forces interfere in Korean affairs. Moon’s failure to convince the international community to carve out space for inter-Korean affairs to move forward seems to have reinforced North Korea’s perception of South Korea as a U.S. puppet state.

Designating South Korea as the North’s principal enemy certainly helps further justify building up arms against it, especially when Seoul is expanding its defense budgets, enhancing its conventional capabilities, and strengthening its extended deterrence capabilities against Pyongyang’s growing WMD stockpile. Moreover, preserving special relations made sense when there was a shared vision of unification, such as the one defined in the Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000, which made space for both governments to coexist in a confederation model.¹⁰ Yet, this is no longer the case. On many occasions, South Korea has talked about a vision of unification under a liberal democratic government, which by default poses an existential threat to the Kim regime.

Reframing relations with South Korea at this time also facilitates Kim’s domestic agenda. Eliminating institutions dedicated to inter-Korean cooperation enables Kim to redirect national resources from perceived lost causes to initiatives that are a higher priority and have a higher chance of success within his ambitious economic goals, especially in year four of a five-year plan.

Implications for Diplomacy

In the near term, there does not seem to be a real window of opportunity for restarting a North Korean-U.S. dialogue, especially not without a major recalibration of the U.S. approach toward Pyongyang. If the United States intends to maintain a denuclearization-centered approach, meaning that eventually eliminating the nuclear program is the ultimate purpose of negotiations, then the window for diplomacy is closed. North Korea has enshrined its nuclear program and the continued development of weapons of mass destruction into its domestic laws in a way that will not be reversed easily. Furthermore, the current geopolitical environment affords Pyongyang ample political cover and other beneficial relationships to stay on its current course and still grow stronger.

Moreover, even approaches that broach the concept of arms control or risk reduction—concepts that North Korea might have entertained in the past—are now likely to fall on deaf ears. The potential for North Korea to agree to any kind of limitation or reduction of its arsenals will first require drastic changes to the broader geopolitical environment toward a more positive, more stable, less conflict-prone security situation. Such an environment is unlikely to be brokered without reciprocal military concessions from other key actors, especially South Korea, either alone or within the context of its alliance with the United States. The days of military concessions from North Korea in exchange for symbolic gestures such as food aid are gone for now, given all that it is able to secure from more like-minded states.

North Korea’s robust cooperation with Russia also is a major new obstacle for reviving talks with the United States. Kim’s open and consistent support for the full-scale Russian war in Ukraine has paid off. In addition to reciprocal political support at the United Nations and in other international forums, Russia appears to see a role for North Korea in its broader war against the West, where Chinese support tends to waver. This includes using North Korea as an arms supplier for Russia’s current war-fighting in Ukraine and as a military partner against the Western or U.S.-led world order.

Russia appears willing to do more than buy North Korean weapons with cash or via barter. Russia is investing in bolstering North Korea’s overall military capabilities, keeping U.S. attention divided, ensuring that the stakes for South Korea’s further involvement in Ukraine remain high, and guaranteeing that Russia consistently has a nuclear-armed partner at its side.

Moscow’s willingness to provide military cooperation, technology transfer, and deepening economic cooperation makes it the ultimate partner for Pyongyang and currently its top foreign policy priority. How long that priority lasts will depend on how long Russia is willing to engage in the same level of cooperation as now. If or when Russia’s favor fades, North Korea’s attention is likely to pivot back toward China or other options, depending on where opportunity is most abundant. In the meantime, no other country is going to be willing to offer as much as what Russia is doing now, especially the military cooperation, which limits room for further diplomacy, because North Korea will focus its resources, including diplomatic resources, where it sees greatest value.

The U.S. presidential election year is also an obstacle to cultivating a new diplomatic opening with North Korea. Even if the Biden administration were willing to make major changes to its approach, there is no credible reason to believe that any new strategy would be sustainable if President Joe Biden is defeated and a new administration takes office.

Although Pyongyang may seem to favor a return of Trump to the White House, this does not mean that Kim will come running back to negotiations with him either. The level of risk Kim was willing to take in 2018 and 2019 to meet with Trump multiple times and build up domestic expectation for success was enormously high, and his failure to secure an expected breakthrough agreement was consequential.

Since then, the shifts in North Korean policies reflect a more risk-averse strategy, directing resources and diplomatic efforts where tangible results can be brokered quickly with little to no political risk. The perception of risk for trying to secure some level of sanctions relief through negotiations with the United States will probably remain high regardless of whether it is a second Biden or Trump term. Any agreement on sanctions relief will surely require concessions on North Korea’s nuclear program. This may be too politically costly for Kim, especially when North Korea has had successes in cultivating deeper relations with states that will disregard or blatantly violate the sanctions regime while continuing to advance its nuclear goals.

A Way Ahead?

In the past, the United States used to describe its policy approach as working to narrow North Korea’s choices. The fact remains that Pyongyang still has choices, but more often than not, these choices push it further away from the kind of behavior and relationships that the international community would like to see. As North Korea’s commercial trade opportunities have been restricted, for instance, its cybercrime and cryptocurrency schemes have increased. Although these illicit efforts have been enormously successful for Pyongyang, with estimated revenues of $3 billion in 2023, this income comes with no social benefit.¹¹ The North Korean government coffers have ample resources for weapons development and other priority initiatives, but textile workers, fishermen, and other laborers suffer without paid work.

Restarting diplomacy with North Korea will require more than open invitations to negotiate. As politically risk adverse and transactionally minded as North Korea tends to be, a new approach will need to build confidence that there is actually a reason to negotiate. That means demonstrating that results are possible.

In the past, when North Korea was still willing to negotiate, subtle, unilateral gestures might have signaled a new opportunity. Such actions could have included elevating the role of the U.S. special representative for North Korea back to a full-time position to strategize about new approaches, liaise with the policy community, and coordinate interagency efforts and be proactive in trying to create diplomatic openings with the North. Other initiatives could be meaningful, such as lifting the restrictions on U.S. citizens’ travel to North Korea; clearing out obstacles to informal and humanitarian engagement, such as those outlined in the Enhancing North Korea Humanitarian Assistance Act; refraining from reactive South Korean-U.S. joint military exercises and overly aggressive demonstrations of power; and moderating U.S. messaging about extended deterrence to avoid excessive and expletive language.

Although none of these moves in isolation were likely to jump-start diplomacy, together they could have worked to signal that U.S. policy is agile and adaptive and that Washington was prepared for diplomacy on multiple levels if and when the opportunity arose. Unfortunately, none of these options were pursued.

These are all still useful measures to consider in any new policy formation, but they are not nearly enough to build North Korea’s confidence that there is a reason to return to negotiations with the United States. Under the current conditions, creating new diplomatic opportunities will require political bravery and leadership to take steps that are not predicated on North Korean actions but that will reestablish an inclination toward more positive choices within North Korea’s calculus.

For instance, rather than trying to completely cut off North Korea’s revenue streams, there is value in restoring some of the commercial activities, such as textile or seafood exports, that provide inherent social benefit to the North Korean people in the form of jobs. To make this politically more palatable, policymakers could consider a sanctions swap arrangement: lifting one or two sanctions on legal, commercial activity while imposing new sanctions on illicit cyberactivities. Doing this would show that sanctions can be lifted and results are possible in future negotiations and are not meant to hurt the North Korean people, while the international community works to crack down on North Korea’s illicit behaviors in a targeted way.

Such an approach would provide Kim with pathways and incentives to move back toward more normal trade activity and perhaps give him a reason to reengage in economic reform attempts. Such a move also could help build cooperation with China and perhaps Russia, meeting them halfway on their previous attempts to broker sanctions relief for North Korea for humanitarian purposes. Finding common ground with Beijing at least could be a first step in developing a more coordinated strategy toward North Korea that enables more productive choices for all the parties involved.

The international community is always quick to react to every provocative action North Korea takes, but it remains relatively silent when North Korea demonstrates acts of goodwill. Although they may be few and far between, these acts should be highlighted in a more prominent way when they happen, to meet goodwill with goodwill and capitalize on the moment. For instance, the recent return of U.S. Army Private Travis King without incident took diplomatic coordination involving multiple stakeholders and was the best possible outcome for all parties involved.¹² North Korea made no condition for his return, but the lack of a public, positive acknowledgment or act was a missed diplomatic opportunity.

Another productive approach would involve developing a better understanding within U.S. alliances about where there is and is not room for concessions in the future. Although it may be difficult to imagine now, any kind of denuclearization or arms control negotiation will require reciprocal security-related measures, most likely from South Korea and the United States. Regular discussions within the alliance about where there may be redlines and where there is room to maneuver could help prevent them from fearing uncoordinated offers or actions during future negotiations with North Korea.

In the long run, the United States will need to come to terms with the broader challenge that North Korea poses, that is, how to deal with a nonpeer nuclear adversary in a coherent way across the various instruments of national power. If the goal is simply to manage the threat, then perhaps the current approach has merit: Washington and its allies have responded to Pyongyang’s increasing capabilities with their own increasing capabilities and cooperation.

If the goal is to reduce the threat or encourage disarmament, however, then this approach has failed because North Korea’s nuclear program today is robust with strategic and tactical capabilities. Relying on deterrence messaging and reminding the North of the overwhelming power of the United States and its allies combined has not had the desired effect. Instead, it has continued to feed into the North’s justification for continued development.

Rebuilding diplomacy with North Korea is necessary to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula, whether intentional or accidental, and to curb endless arms racing in this vital, dynamic region. To realize such a goal and carry it forward will take creative, concerted, and persistent efforts and a hefty dose of political leadership.

ENDNOTES         
 

1. Robert L. Carlin and Siegfried S. Hecker, “Is Kim Jong Un Preparing for War?,” 38 North, January 11, 2024., https://www.38north.org/2024/01/is-kim-jong-un-preparing-for-war/.

2. Markus V. Gralauskas, “The Rising Threat of Kim Jong Un’s North Korea,” Newsweek, January 30, 2024.

3. Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against North Korea If It Endangers U.S.,” The New York Times, August 8, 2017.

4. Rachel Minyoung Lee, “The Real Significance of North Korea’s Recent Military Activities,” 38 North, November 2, 2022, https://www.38north.org/2022/11/the-real-significance-of-north-koreas-recent-military-activities/.

5. Ibid.

6. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at Seventh Session of the 14th SPA of DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency, September 10, 2022, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/15f336993bdcb97a22f50fa590e6bc72.kcmsf.

7. “Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated,” Korean Central News Agency, September 9, 2022, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/5f0e629e6d35b7e3154b4226597df4b8.kcmsf.

8. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at 9th Session of 14th SPA,” Rodong Sinmun, n.d., http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyMy0wOS0yOC1IMDA1QA== (accessed February 13, 2024).

9. Ruediger Frank, “North Korea’s New Unification Policy: Implications and Pitfalls,” 38 North, January 11, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/01/north-koreas-new-unification-policy-implications-and-pitfalls/.

10. “2000 Inter-Korean Summit,” KBS World Radio, n.d., https://world.kbs.co.kr/special/northkorea/contents/archives/summit/summit_2000.htm?lang=e (accessed February 13, 2024).

11. Michelle Nichols, “Exclusive: UN Experts Investigate 58 Cyberattacks Worth $3 Bln by North Korea,” Reuters, February 8, 2024.

12. Chantal Da Silva, “American Soldier Travis King Arrives Back in the U.S. After Being Expelled From North Korea,” NBC News, September 28, 2023.

March 2024
By Keith Luse

In the 1964 nuclear thriller “Fail Safe,” a squadron of U.S. nuclear bombers destroy Moscow when the aircraft inadvertently were ordered to bomb the Russian capital.

Although U.S. and Soviet forces were sent to intercept the bombers, launched by accident due to a fault in the electronic system, they failed. The U.S. president, portrayed by Henry Fonda, simultaneously ordered the destruction of New York City in a desperate move to prove that the U.S. attack was a mistake and thus prevent all-out nuclear war between the two nuclear-armed countries.¹ In the end, New York and Moscow were obliterated, and millions of people died. Despite a hotline that allowed the U.S. and Soviet leaders to talk to each other, they were ultimately unable to prevent Armageddon. It was a haunting, if fictional, case of war by accident.

Such fiction may become reality on the Korean peninsula, which is now a hot spot with verbal volcanic ash spewing from both sides of the 38th parallel. Due to these tensions, which began to build after the failed 2019 Hanoi summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and later intensified following the election of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, the prospect of war resulting from accident or miscalculation has increased. By all indications, however, this rising threat has been lost on the international community. Global leaders appear numb to the festering crisis, much like the frog that remains in the pot of steadily heating water until it boils to death.

Provocative Behavior

For anyone paying attention, there is no lack of evidence that leaders in North and South Korea are acting provocatively. A prime example is Kim Yo Jong, the North Korean leader’s sister, who has emerged as an authorized, key spokesperson for her brother, channeling his sentiments by offering unceasing, critical assessments of South Korean and U.S. leaders.

A case in point was her 2022 reference to South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook’s statement about his country’s capability to launch a preemptive military strike if there were indications of a potential North Korean missile attack on the South. Kim Yo Jong was quoted as dismissing the minister as “the senseless and scum-like guy [who] dare mentioned the ‘preemptive strike’ at a nuclear weapons state, in his senseless bluster, which will never be beneficial to South Korea, either.”² On the prospect of new sanctions targeting North Korea, she also lashed out, calling Yoon “a running wild dog gnawing on a bone given by the U.S. and his government idiots.”³

Not to be outdone in raising the regional temperature, the Yoon administration in 2022 “reinvigorated military planning for preemptive and retaliatory strikes against the North Korean leadership under the so-called Kill Chain and Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation…strategies, respectively.” Killing the North Korean leader is a priority.⁴

Although eliminating an enemy leader may be a traditional component of military strategy, in this case, South Korea’s personalization of its intent has not been lost on the North Koreans. Yet, rather than intimidating the North Korean leadership, the publicly announced assassination plan, which was conceived years earlier and revived during the Yoon administration, has boomeranged.

The North Koreans reacted by enacting a law that calls for “automatic” nuclear launches if the country’s leadership or command and control systems are threatened, underscoring leader Kim Jong Un’s concern for a so-called decapitation strike. As North Korea enshrined the right to use preemptive nuclear strikes to protect itself, Kim warned that the law makes the country’s nuclear status “irreversible” and bars denuclearization talks.⁵

If the North Korean leader were eliminated or Pyongyang concluded that enemy actions directly threatening its leadership were in play, institutional buttons automatically will be pushed. There will be no need or opportunity for a North-South hotline conversation to cool tensions. Missiles will be launched, and among other offensive military actions, full-force cyberattacks will be unleashed by North Korean cyber warriors operating from home, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, and perhaps elsewhere.⁶

Meanwhile, emboldened by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, angered by the failed Hanoi summit, and determined to strengthen his country’s defenses, Kim is rapidly advancing his missile and other military capabilities and putting them on full display. Gone is the day when Russian President Vladimir Putin would warn Kim that making threats of “preventive nuclear strikes” could create a legal basis for military action against North Korea.⁷ Now, Putin is more apt to buy North Korean weapons than act as a check on Kim’s excesses. As North Korea closes in on achieving the capability of hitting a U.S. city with a missile, Kim’s lingering angst over the summit may be defused. It is possible that he will conclude that he will restore the reputational “face” that he felt he lost at the summit only when he has the power to strike the U.S. homeland and can look eye to eye with U.S. President Joe Biden or Biden’s successor as the leader of a nuclear-armed state. As one U.S. analyst noted, in Hanoi, the North Korean leader appeared particularly upset because the results seemed different from what he had been led to believe would occur.

If this is the analysis in Pyongyang, the North Korean leader is being ill-advised by his inner circle. The U.S. president is undoubtedly briefed on the status of North Korea’s progress toward developing a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of striking New York or anywhere else in the United States. As the North Koreans get closer to achieving this goal, some Biden administration officials or their successors almost certainly will press for preemptive strikes on Pyongyang to protect the U.S. population.

There is another possible destructive outcome as the North Korean leader seeks to achieve his fullest satisfaction and reclaim his self-esteem after the summit debacle. Kim may be compelled to extract a pound of flesh such as happened in 2010 when the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan sank and nearly 50 sailors died after an attack that Seoul blamed on Pyongyang. The North Korean leader may be planning another surgical strike, mistakenly believing that any South Korean or U.S. response would be limited and manageable.

Even as Kim has been energized by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and his symbiosis with Putin, Yoon too has been emboldened by his meetings with Biden and their joint emphasis on a policy of deterrence that is intended to tame North Korea. The Yoon administration has demonstrated a robust response to North Korean actions, including intensifying military drills, pulling a larger U.S. military presence into the region, and touting the plans to kill the North Korean leader. In December, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won Sik reminded North Korea that “[t]raining for decapitation strikes to take out North Korean leader Kim Jong Un remains an option for South Korea’s military.”⁸ It is unclear if Seoul is conducting assessments to determine whether specific U.S.-South Korean deterrent actions could trigger further provocations by Pyongyang or even trip the wire of war.

Meanwhile, citing the Russian war on Ukraine, many South Koreans are questioning the credibility of the United States as an ally and advocating Seoul’s development or acquisition of its own nuclear weapons arsenal. If that occurs, North Koreans would protest publicly; privately, there would be smiles and toasts among the military elites in Pyongyang. Their analysis would include the premise that South Korea’s nuclearization would reduce significantly any pressure on North Korea to eliminate its own nuclear program, which is estimated to have produced sufficient fissile material for 50 or more nuclear bombs, according to nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker.

Ignoring Risk Reduction

Despite the tensions and hardening attitudes, risk reduction does not appear to be a priority of either side. A casual negligence in addressing this brewing storm is palpable in Washington, Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, and other capitals where officials should understand how catastrophic another war on the Korean peninsula could be.

One example of this indifferent attitude is the fact that many South Koreans ignored an air defense drill held in August and did not bother to take shelter.⁹ Perhaps international leaders, discouraged by the tight Putin-Kim embrace, have sidelined thoughts about how to engage North Korea. The North Korean leader, however, astutely leverages his timing and interventions with peers in the international community. Why is there no obvious urgency or determination to develop creative exit-ramp options that might be considered by both Koreas and defuse the gathering crisis?

Given the Ukraine war, the October attack on Israel by Hamas, Israel’s far-reaching response, and the myriad of other global hotspots, the U.S. international to-do list is overloaded. For members of Congress who usually are eager to underscore any sign of North Korean aggression, recent moves by Pyongyang showcasing its advancing missile, submarine, and drone capabilities may simply prompt a resigned sigh. For lawmakers who steadfastly support the U.S.-South Korean alliance, worries about the situation on the Korean peninsula getting out of hand are tempered by the confidence that the Yoon government can be relied on to deal with North Korea as need be. Many in Congress may be unaware of the extent to which South Korean leaders are stoking the embers that could become flames of war.

Although the U.S. president has the lead in managing foreign policy, Congress also has a major role to play, and its response to international crises over many years offers important lessons for this situation. Should a nuclear weapons exchange occur on the Korean peninsula, for instance, multiple House and Senate committees would convene oversight hearings with officials from a range of government departments and agencies called to testify publicly and explain what happened. Classified hearings and briefings also would be held. Depending on legislative rules, testimony might be sought from officials of South Korea and Japan, both U.S. allies, and from representatives of emergency relief organizations. Some individual lawmakers would reach out to the Chinese embassy in Washington, inquiring as to why that government allowed developments on the peninsula to evolve into war.

Besides public and classified congressional hearings, members would demand copies of cables and other communications by officials throughout the U.S. executive branch in Washington and those stationed throughout Northeast Asia. The second-guessing would be fast and furious. What questions would be asked by Congress? That depends in part on whether Seoul and Pyongyang continued to exist or were leveled to the ground. There will be much for which to answer. The impact of nuclear strikes on the Korean peninsula would have global implications.

As U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) stated in a February 2006 address to the UN Security Council, “Does anyone believe that proposals for advancing standards of living, such as expansions in education for our children, stronger protections for the environment, or broader health care coverage, would be unaffected by the nuclear obliteration of a major city somewhere in the world? They would not. The immediate death toll would be horrendous, but the worldwide financial and psychological costs might be even more damaging to humanity in the long run.”¹⁰

Here is a sampling of possible hearing questions that foreshadow the devastation and instability that such a war would unleash. It would be better to consider such questions now as a motivator for governments to search for a solution that could prevent a debacle.

Questions for U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency officials. What action or combination of events tripped the wire that started the conflict? Do the South Korean and North Korean governments still function and, if so, in what way? Are any of the leaders still alive? Although we know that a few million people are dead in South Korea, what are your estimates of North Korean casualties? As emergency health care workers in Seoul and Pyongyang and other impacted areas were largely eliminated in the catastrophe, who will provide health care services to survivors in both countries? Are discussions underway with the Chinese and the United Nations on developing a strategic plan for how China, the United States, and the UN might provide emergency assistance on the peninsula without getting in each other’s way? Have there been any communications between Washington and Moscow following the nuclear attack on Seoul and Pyongyang, between Pyongyang and Seoul, between Pyongyang and Washington?

In addition, how many U.S. Defense Department ships are available to provide offshore medical services? What other countries are qualified to assist in addressing the challenges associated with this catastrophe? Given Japan’s experience with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, will the Japanese government be consulted on recovery operations? Have reports been confirmed that Russian ships are headed toward the peninsula? Were mutual defense treaties in place between Moscow and Pyongyang and Beijing and Pyongyang? Even though Pyongyang and Seoul are destroyed, do you anticipate an attack by Russia or China on U.S. interests in Northeast Asia or elsewhere? Did U.S. and South Korean officials actively attempt to work with North Korea on exit-ramp options to reduce tensions? Did the Chinese make any effort to assist? Did South Korea and the United States put in place any fail-safe mechanism to prevent the unthinkable that has now occurred?

Questions for UN officials, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and nongovernmental organizations involved in humanitarian assistance. Are the deaths concentrated in Seoul and Pyongyang or spread throughout both countries? Given the large number of U.S. citizens, including military personnel and civilian, living in South Korea, it appears that U.S. casualties may be in the tens of thousands. What medical assistance is available to U.S. military and embassy personnel in addition to those U.S. civilians who survived? Do the human remains examined so far reveal whether weapons of mass destruction in addition to nuclear weapons were utilized? What food and medical supplies are available? Were blood supplies protected during the attacks? Given the radioactive fallout, how many years need to pass before the citizens of Seoul and Pyongyang could return?

The Legacy of Conflict

It is unclear whether most citizens of Seoul or Pyongyang realize that war could be imminent. If it happens, people in both capitals would die after an attack as they walk or shop, take kids to school, or sleep. Older members of the North Korean leadership circle certainly remember the U.S. carpet bombing of their country during the Korean War, including blanketing the civilian population with napalm as skin fell from the bodies of children and adults. As U.S. Air Force General Curtis LeMay, head of the Strategic Air Command during the Korean War, told the Office of Air Force History in 1984, “Over a period of three years or so, we killed off…20 percent of the population.” Dean Rusk, a supporter of the war and later secretary of state, said the United States bombed “everything that moved in North Korea, every brick standing on top of another.” After running low on urban targets, U.S. bombers destroyed hydroelectric and irrigation dams in the later stages of the war, flooding farmland and destroying crops.¹¹

Despite this gruesome history, some North Korean elders, especially those who survived the Korean War, may welcome a conflict now even knowing that their deaths would be sealed by a U.S. response to a North Korean nuclear first strike. The revenge of spilled U.S. blood would usher in their long-sought personal peace. For this reason, the conventional wisdom among some national security experts in the United States and South Korea that North Korea is unlikely to launch a preemptive attack on South Korea or on U.S interests in the region is farcical.

Both sides have a national memory bank overflowing with deposits of death and destruction caused by the other. Beyond the pain of the Korean War, the older generation of South Koreans will recall, for example, how North Korean agents bombed the South Korean presidential delegation that visited Rangoon, Burma, in 1983. South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan survived, but 21 people perished, including four cabinet-level officials. Even before this, North Korean agents made numerous, unsuccessful efforts to kill South Korean President Park Chung-hee. In 1974, a North Korean sympathizer assassinated South Korean First Lady Yuk Young-soo.

If an attack occurs on either or both capitals in the months ahead, victims could die rapidly or linger for days or years, depending on whether the weapons used are chemical, biological, incendiary, or nuclear. Both North Korea and South Korea have been holding defense drills. In the South’s case, it was the first time in six years.¹²

The attitude of too many experts and veteran Korea watchers that “we’ve been here before and the situation will cool down” is less than convincing. It sends a deceptive message to all who live on the Korean peninsula, masking an urgent situation. Without more awareness and a new determination among leaders to find a new equilibrium, this time the boiling water may not be turned off before the frog dies.

ENDNOTES

1. “Fail Safe,” Turner Classic Movies, n.d., https://www.tcm.com/tcmdb/title/4556/fail-safe#synopsis (accessed February 4, 2024).

2. Mitch Shin, “What to Make of Kim Yo Jong’s Verbal Attack of South Korea’s Defense Minister,” The Diplomat, April 4, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/what-to-make-of-kim-yo-jongs-verbal-attack-of-south-koreas-defense-minister/.

3. Hyung-jin Kim, “Kim’s Sister Makes Insulting Threats to Seoul Over Sanctions,” Associated Press, November 24, 2022.

4. Ankit Panda, “South Korea’s ‘Decapitation’ Strategy Against North Korea Has More Risks Than Benefits,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 15, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/15/south-korea-s-decapitation-strategy-against-north-korea-has-more-risks-than-benefits-pub-87672.

5. Josh Smith, “Kim Jong Un’s ‘Decapitation’ Fears Shine Through in New North Korea Nuclear Law,” Reuters, September 9, 2022.

6. Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, “Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe,” press release, February 17, 2021,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and.

7. Sarah Malm, “Putin Warns Kim Jong Un That Making Threats of ‘Preventive Nuclear Strikes’ Could Create a Legal Basis for Military Action Against the Rogue State,” Daily Mail, March 9, 2016, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3483581/Putin-warns-Kim-Jong-making-threats-preventive-nuclear-strikes-create-legal-basis-military-action-against-rogue-state.html.

8. Jeongmin Kim, “Drills on Assassinating Kim Jong Un Remain an Option, ROK Defense Chief Says,” NK News, December 19, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/12/drills-on-assassinating-kim-jong-un-remain-an-option-rok-defense-chief-says/.

9. Hyonhee Shin and Ju-min Park, “South Korea Holds Rare Air Raid Drill but Many Citizens Ignore It,” Reuters, August 23, 2023.

10. “Address to the UN Security Council,” February 6, 2006, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/60473.htm (address of Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)).

11. Blaine Harden, “The U.S. War Crime North Korea Won’t Forget,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2015.

12. “South Korea Conducts First Civil Defence Drills in 6 Years,” The South China Morning Post, August 23, 2023.

March 2024
By Ankit Panda

In the last decade, as North Korea has made tremendous qualitative progress in its nuclear and missile programs, non-nuclear South Korea has responded by shoring up its own precision strike arsenal.

Beginning in 2021, North Korea explicitly stated an intention to develop tactical nuclear weapons, sharply intensifying the perceived threat in South Korea. Since then, Pyongyang has developed an array of new short-range nuclear delivery systems, rendering its ambitions more credible. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, meanwhile, has indicated that many of these short-range systems will be deployed with so-called frontline units of the Korean People’s Army. Although Kim remains the sole authority on nuclear weapons use in North Korea, he has indicated further that there may be conditions under which the authority to use nuclear weapons could devolve to military commanders. One such condition, outlined in a September 2022 law, could be the degradation of North Korea’s nuclear command-and-control systems in a conflict or the death of the country’s leader. Either circumstance could prompt an “automatic and immediate” nuclear retaliatory attack.¹

North Korea’s adoption of such a fail-deadly posture for its nuclear forces is largely a response to South Korea and the United States. The advanced capabilities available to that alliance, including an array of long-range, non-nuclear strike options supplemented by U.S. nuclear capabilities, present a threat to the survivability of North Korean nuclear forces. More important, however, is the renewed public emphasis on preemptive disarming attacks and decapitation strikes by the conservative government in Seoul, which was inaugurated in May 2022.

Cumulatively, these developments in recent years have contributed to a sharply heightened risk of nuclear war. The two Koreas are mired in an intense security dilemma, which could cause future crises between them to spiral quickly into a possible, large-scale war. In turn, this likely would precipitate North Korean nuclear use, with devastating consequences.

To cope with North Korea’s advancing capabilities, South Korea has become a pioneer in what might be dubbed a strategy of conventional counterforce, namely relying on its advanced non-nuclear capabilities to hold at risk Pyongyang’s nuclear forces. The two Koreas remain stuck in a fierce asymmetric arms competition marked by an action-reaction cycle.

Since the administration of South Korean President Park Geun-hye, from 2013 to 2017, Seoul has spent considerable resources developing a “three-axis” system, which includes a preemptive strike plan known as the “Kill Chain,” an air defense component known as “Korea Air and Missile Defense,” and a retaliatory decapitation plan known as “Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation.”² The first and third components of these plans are underwritten by Seoul’s growing array of conventional missile capabilities.

North Korean Missile Modernization

Despite acute resource constraints in North Korea, Kim, like his father and grandfather, has ensured that the country’s military readiness remains high. Since taking the reins of power in late 2011, he has made the development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery a major priority. Between 2013 and 2017, Kim pursued a major nuclear development campaign that culminated in the testing of two different types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a thermonuclear device in 2017.

Following the inaugural flight test of an ICBM known as the Hwasong-15, in November 2017, Kim declared his nuclear deterrent “complete” and pivoted by early 2018 to diplomacy with South Korea and the United States. Although this diplomacy temporarily resulted in a pause in North Korean missile testing activity and quickly kept tensions from boiling over as they might have in 2017, it ultimately proved unsustainable. Kim found himself empty-handed after the North Korean-U.S. summit in Hanoi in 2019 when U.S. President Donald Trump rebuffed his demands for sanctions relief in exchange for concessions on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing at the Yongbyon complex.

Since the collapse of diplomacy in 2019, North Korea has doubled down on its nuclear force development efforts. The hallmarks of its ongoing nuclear modernization program center on tactical nuclear weapons, improved responsiveness, and force dispersal. The two latter components represent Pyongyang’s chosen path to a broadly survivable nuclear deterrent, designed to be robust against South Korea’s conventional counterforce strategy.

The diversity of North Korea’s nuclear forces reached breathtaking levels as of early 2024. Pyongyang has indicated that it is actively pursuing everything from lake-submerged, short-range ballistic missile launchers to fixed silos to an autonomous, underwater, nuclear-armed torpedo to rail-mobile missile launchers to submarine-launched cruise missiles.

Kim likely does not yet possess the requisite weapons-grade fissile material to produce a sufficient number of warheads to enable the deployment of this wide range of delivery systems at scale, but he has articulated a goal of increasing fissile material output in an “exponential” manner in the coming years. Kim’s ambition should be taken seriously if not literally. North Korea likely possesses sufficient fissile material to enable the manufacture of 60 to 80 nuclear warheads today.

Given the apparent entry into operation of a new, suspected, experimental light-water reactor; efforts to continue plutonium reprocessing at the old gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon; and unconstrained uranium enrichment, North Korea slowly is shoring up its stocks of weapons-grade fissile material. Over time, Kim’s ability to flesh out his tactical nuclear forces will grow, and additional nuclear testing likely lies ahead under the ongoing military modernization campaign.

Instability, Arms Control, and the Risk of War

Circumstances between the two Koreas today manifest a clear-cut example of crisis instability risks. Thomas Schelling once described this as the problem of the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack,” in which even if neither side wants a war, the benefits of shooting first in a crisis are perceived as so great for each that both have strong incentives to do so, fearing that the other might act instead.³

North Korea expects to seek tactical surprise and strategic advantage in a crisis by resorting to an early, large-scale nuclear attack to degrade the ability of South Korea and the United States to prosecute a war. Kim has described the purpose of his nuclear forces as twofold: to “deter” and, should deterrence fail, then to “repel” an attack with nuclear use.⁴

The latter would include nuclear use to destroy ports, airfields hosting fifth-generation stealth fighters, command-and-control nodes, radars, and missile defense systems. South Korea, meanwhile, plans to prevent precisely such an attack by shooting the proverbial archers in North Korea by destroying as much of the mobile missile and strike complex as possible with precise, conventional weapons.

As each side publicly communicates these sets of goals, the other’s belief in the advantages and the necessity of shooting first grows. Failing to shoot first comes to be seen as fatal in a crisis. Neither appears to see any benefit in walking back from this fundamental orientation toward preemptive attack.

Critically, the powerful nature of the incentives to attack under mutual postures of preemption is most likely to manifest in escalation even when neither side has an interest in escalation as such. It is the fear that the adversary may preempt that could drive one to consider escalation rational in the course of what might otherwise have been a limited crisis.

Given the poor state of political relations between the two Koreas and the lack of any interest in diplomacy, conditions are hardly propitious for any formal arms control initiatives in the near term. What little remained in the form of confidence-building measures also has largely disintegrated as tensions flared between Seoul and Pyongyang in recent years.

The Comprehensive Military Agreement, agreed by Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in during their summit in Pyongyang in September 2018, has been scrapped completely by North Korea. South Korea too has started to resume proscribed activities, such as flying military helicopters along the Military Demarcation Line separating the two sides.⁵

Although limited in scope, the agreement was built on an important premise, namely that accidental clashes could spark serious crises that could quickly propel the two sides into a general war. The agreement sought to prohibit a range of activities within the immediate vicinity of the demarcation line that could increase perceived threats.

In Seoul’s assessment, North Korean violations of the agreement had been ongoing since late 2019.⁶ With the arrival of the Yoon administration, violations increased in frequency and severity. In December 2022, for instance, North Korea flew multiple drones into South Korean airspace in precisely the sort of action that could be interpreted as a precursor to a major armed attack.⁷

South Korea retaliated in kind, sending drones of its own into North Korean airspace. The UN Command, which oversees the implementation of the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War, assessed that both Koreas violated the armistice with these actions.⁸

This South Korean propensity for disproportionality has manifested acutely under the Yoon administration, which has come to espouse a philosophy that holds that only resolute shows of force can contribute to deterring North Korea. Beyond the drone incident in December 2022, at least two other incidents are evocative of this tendency. In November 2022, a North Korean missile for the first time transgressed the maritime delimitation between the two Koreas. In response, the South Korean side launched three air-to-ground missiles across that same threshold, upping the ante threefold. In the first few days of January 2024, meanwhile, South Korea responded to North Korea’s firing of 200 artillery rounds near the inter-Korean demarcation line by firing 400 rounds of its own.⁹

Worsening prospects for engagement, North Korea’s newfound strategic partnership with Russia in the aftermath of the latter’s brutal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine is likely to raise Kim’s confidence in unconstrained competition with South Korea. Pyongyang’s decision to reject its decades-long objective of unification with South Korea may be in part a reflection of this.

Political Courage and Military Organizational Change

Although arms control continues to be a useful tool for practically reducing the risk of unwanted war on the Korean peninsula, it will require a willing counterpart. North Korea’s post-2019 political and diplomatic recalibration has resulted in a fundamental lack of interest in reciprocating any external overtures from South Korea or the United States.

Although the conditions for proactive arms control and cooperative risk reduction could again manifest on the Korean peninsula at some point, there is an urgency today that demands attention. Policymakers in South Korea and the United States should recognize that even without North Korean reciprocity, they can take measures to reduce the risk of unwanted war and escalation from a conventional war to a nuclear war that do not necessarily require Pyongyang’s involvement.

Such measures would not require compromising general deterrence of North Korea. Instead, South Korea and the United States should recognize that even as North Korea postures its own forces offensively and irresponsibly, some of their own policies and military plans exacerbate the risk of escalation within a conventional war and the risk of nuclear conflict. Unilateral policy change by South Korea and the United States could reduce these risks and lead to a long-term adjustment in North Korean threat perceptions that could be propitious for an eventual return to negotiated, cooperative measures like the 2018 agreement.

Two such measures are easily identified. First, South Korea’s current emphasis on preemption as a matter of its core national defense strategy for dealing with North Korea contributes to escalation risks. To preserve deterrence while reducing escalation pressures, Seoul could adapt its strategic communications toward Pyongyang to emphasize that it would not seek to attack North Korean nuclear forces massively and preemptively early in a war.

Eliminating this source of use-it-or-lose-it pressures for Kim is likely to reduce significantly the risk of nuclear escalation. South Korean policymakers recognize the nuclear risks that manifest on the Korean peninsula as a result of North Korea’s stated intention to resort to the early use of nuclear weapons in a war to mitigate its conventional military vulnerabilities. Yet, preemption continues to be a preferred strategy in Seoul.

Second, the United States can eliminate a prominent source of use-it-or-lose-it pressures for North Korea. Under the Trump administration, the United States publicized a counterproductive effort to seek “left-of-launch” techniques that could disable North Korean missiles prior to their launch in a conflict.¹⁰ Although the precise nature of such capabilities remains obscure and perhaps exaggerated, North Korea is likely to take this seriously. The Biden administration’s 2022 Missile Defense Review retains a commitment to “comprehensive missile defeat,” which John Plumb, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for space policy, clarified involves a continued reliance on measures to left and right of launch.¹¹ This comprehensive approach includes nonkinetic measures, such as possible offensive cyberattacks on North Korean nuclear command and control.

In addition to precise South Korean missiles seeking to preempt his nuclear forces, Kim would have to concern himself with the possibility that an exquisite, undisclosed U.S. offensive cybercapability could sever him from his nuclear forces. Command and control, the central nervous system of any nuclear force, has been considered a unique vulnerability since the 1950s. Yet, as the United States and the Soviet Union discovered early in the Cold War, threatening to hold an adversary’s ability to use its nuclear weapons at risk creates powerful incentives to escalate in ways that may actually undermine a defender’s interests.

The United States and its allies have an interest in depriving Kim of such incentives. Although it would have been ideal for the Biden administration to include these sorts of assurances on interference with nuclear command and control in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review or Missile Defense Review, it still would be a useful to convey this intention today. Such a statement need not be specific to North Korea, but could apply to all nuclear-armed adversaries of the United States, inclusive of North Korea.

These various measures can be implemented without compromising deterrence of North Korea. Kim will continue to understand that nuclear use can be met with appropriate punishment by the United States and South Korea and that nuclear use will not automatically confer strategic or tactical benefits disproportionate to the costs North Korea is likely to incur.

To preserve deterrence messaging without needlessly contributing to nuclear risks with threats of nuclear force preemption, leadership decapitation, and possible interference in nuclear command and control, the allies should hew closely to the declaratory policy that they articulated in the Washington Declaration from 2023, which simply notes that North Korean nuclear use would be met with a “swift, overwhelming, and decisive” response.¹² What that may mean in practice is left as an exercise in ambiguity for Kim.

Implementing these changes is worthwhile as a means of nuclear risk reduction on the Korean peninsula that does not depend on a change in current political circumstances. Although cooperative arms control and risk reduction efforts are no doubt desirable, North Korea’s unwillingness to pick up the proverbial phone should not be a deterrent to the allies taking matters into their own hands where possible.

Unfortunately, a change of this sort will require political courage in Washington and Seoul, where national leaders must come to terms with the unsustainability of the status quo and thus chart a new path. This is easier said than done. Under U.S. President Joe Biden, North Korea has never topped the U.S. geopolitical agenda. Insofar as his administration has a strategy for the Korean peninsula, it has been one of deepening U.S.-South Korean cooperation and accelerating trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan.

For South Korea, meanwhile, the fundamental disposition toward North Korea under the Yoon administration is one of competition paired with the “audacious initiative,” which seeks to lure the North away from its nuclear weapons with promises of economic benefits. Yoon’s initial North Korea policy efforts appeared to be driven substantially by the experiences of several prominent officials who had served in the Lee Myung-bak administration, from 2008 to 2013. In particular, veterans of the twin crises of 2010, when North Korea sank the South Korean naval ship Cheonan and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing scores of South Koreans, reentered government with the determination to convey resolute strength at all costs to Pyongyang. As a result, Seoul is reluctant to consider any measures that could be perceived as undermining the projection of strength, even if they might contribute to a reduced risk of a confrontation with North Korea.

For the United States, South Korea’s disposition toward disproportionate retaliation, paired with its significant autonomous conventional counterforce capabilities, are a source of concern.¹³ The Biden administration has undertaken significant efforts to reconcile several countervailing interests with Seoul. On the one hand, it has undertaken new forms of nuclear reassurance at a time when an increasing number of South Koreans view an independent nuclear deterrent for the country as desirable. On the other hand, it has started to seek better operational coordination with Seoul to ensure that South Korea does not escalate crises with North Korea in ways that could be detrimental to U.S. interests. Both of these elements are addressed in the Washington Declaration, which established a new Nuclear Consultative Group while setting up an effort to “closely connect” the existing alliance Combined Forces Command with South Korea’s planned Strategic Command, which will oversee many of the country’s conventional counterforce capabilities.

Seoul and Washington should quietly, candidly, and privately begin exploring the sorts of risk reduction measures that would advance their own interests. This could entail the adoption of the recommendations above in addition to proposing proactively to North Korea potential future cooperative efforts, up to and including formal arms control.

As much as it will be a bitter pill for the allies to recognize that their long-standing objective of a fully denuclearized Korean peninsula is unlikely to manifest soon, focusing on near-term risk reduction is a core interest. Simply put, lowering the risk of nuclear war is worth the trade-offs that come with deprioritizing denuclearization diplomacy with Pyongyang. Doing so does not require any sort of formal recognition of North Korea’s status as a nuclear-weapon power, but simply accepting the reality that is plainly clear on the Korean peninsula.

Coexistence with a nuclear North Korea can be unbounded, unconstrained, and dangerous as it is today. Alternatively, it can be managed. U.S. and allied interests will be better served by turning toward alternatives.

ENDNOTES

1. “Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated,” Korean Central News Agency, September 9, 2022, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/5f0e629e6d35b7e3154b4226597df4b8.kcmsf.

2. Josh Smith, “Analysis: South Korea Doubles Down on Risky ‘Kill Chain’ Plans to Counter North Korea Nuclear Threat,” Reuters, July 26, 2022.

3. Thomas C. Schelling, “The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack,” RAND Corp., January 1, 1958, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1342.html.

4. Kelsey Davenport, “North Korea Passes Nuclear Law,” Arms Control Today, October 2022.

5. Chad O’Carroll, “ROK Choppers Spotted Near DMZ After Collapse of Military Deal With North Korea,” NK News, December 6, 2023.

6. Ankit Panda, “South Korea Expresses ‘Regret’ at North Korean Violation of 2018 Military Agreement,” The Diplomat, November 26, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/south-korea-expresses-regret-at-north-korean-violation-of-2018-military-agreement/.

7. Choe Sang-Hun, “South Koreans’ Steely Nerves Are Shaken by North Korean Drones,” The New York Times, December 28, 2022.

8. Josh Smith, “Both North and South Korea Violated Armistice With Drone Flights, U.N. Command Says,” Reuters, January 26, 2023.

9. Hyung-Jim Kim, “South Korea Says the North Has Again Fired Artillery Shells Near Their Sea Border,” Associated Press, January 6, 2024.

10. Ankit Panda, “The Right Way to Manage a Nuclear North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-11-19/right-way-manage-nuclear-north-korea.

11. “The 2022 Missile Defense Review - A Conversation With John Plumb,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 4, 2022, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/ts221114_Plumb_Defense_Review.pdf.

12. “Washington Declaration,” The White House, April 26, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/.

13. Ankit Panda, “Indo-Pacific Missile Arsenals: Avoiding Spirals and Mitigating Escalation Risks,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023, pp. 21-25, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Panda_Indo-Pacific_Missiles_final_1.pdf.

March 2024
By Daryl G. Kimball

Russia is pursuing a new and more advanced anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons system that would violate the Outer Space Treaty, according to Biden administration officials.

National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan briefed select members of Congress on new U.S. intelligence about the system on Feb. 15, and later that day, White House spokesperson John Kirby confirmed to reporters that the system is “related to an anti-satellite weapon that Russia is developing.”

Although it is not an “active capability that has been deployed,” Kirby said that the new system “would be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, to which more than 130 countries have signed up to, including Russia.”

Article IV of the treaty expressly prohibits countries from deploying “in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install[ing] such weapons on celestial bodies, or station[ing] such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”

Kirby said that “our general knowledge of Russian pursuit of this kind of capability goes back many, many months, if not a few years. But only in recent weeks has the intelligence community been able to assess with a higher sense of confidence exactly how Russia continues to pursue it.”

“We found out there was a capacity to launch a system into space that could theoretically do something that was damaging,” President Joe Biden told reporters at the White House on Feb. 16. “Hasn’t happened yet, and my hope is it will not.”

According to a CNN report that same day, officials familiar with the intelligence assessment confirmed that the Russian ASAT system under development involves a nuclear explosive device that would produce not only a massive nuclear-driven blast wave and a surge of radiation, but also a powerful electromagnetic pulse that could destroy, blind, or disable other satellites in orbit over a wide zone.

Such a weapon could pose a threat to U.S. and allied military communications, early-warning, and intelligence-gathering satellites if it were to become operational. It also would pose a threat to thousands of other space-based assets in orbit operated by dozens of other countries and commercial entities.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States experimented with various types of ASAT weapons systems concepts, including the use of nuclear explosions to destroy objects in space and the production of beams of directed energy to destroy or disable enemy satellites.

Between 1958 and 1962, the United States carried out a handful of very high-altitude nuclear detonations, including the massive 1.4-megaton Starfish Prime test that occurred 250 miles above the Pacific Ocean and demonstrated the potential of nuclear detonations as ASAT weapons. The Soviets conducted a series of high-altitude nuclear test explosions over Kazakhstan between 1961 and 1962.

These test explosions produced a surge of free electrons that created X-rays capable of severely damaging electronic components and computer systems on the ground and in low earth orbit, an electromagnetic pulse that can disable unprotected electrical components on satellites, and a nuclear flash that can blind optical sensors on reconnaissance satellites. The Starfish Prime nuclear test explosion also produced radiation belts that lingered for months, disabling eight of the 24 satellites that were in orbit at that time, according to a 2022 report by the American Physical Society.

In 1963, U.S. and Soviet negotiators concluded the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, and in 1967 the Outer Space Treaty.

As Jaganath Sankaran wrote in Arms Control Today in 2022, Russia has been pursuing a range of ASAT system capabilities for more than a decade, including co-orbital ASAT weapons capabilities in the geostationary orbit where most military command-and-control satellites operate, as well as ground-based lasers and a range of satellite jamming systems to deny and degrade the capacity of weapons that rely on satellite-enabled information.

In 2021, Russia conducted an ASAT weapons test on one of its own satellites, breaking it into more than 1,500 pieces of debris, which can pose a serious threat to other objects in orbit. China, India, and the United States also have demonstrated ASAT missile capabilities.

But none of these systems involved nuclear explosive devices. Today, there are approximately 9,500 active satellites in orbit and two crewed, orbiting space stations. One or more nuclear weapons explosions in orbit would create far more indiscriminate damage than the 1962 Starfish Prime nuclear test, and the loss of satellite services would affect significant commercial, military, communications, and navigations systems on Earth.

On Feb. 15, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dismissed the claim that Russia was pursuing a nuclear-armed ASAT weapons capability as a “malicious fabrication," but on Feb. 16 he told RIA Novosti that Russia is ready to discuss the issue “if there are such initiatives from the American side.”

On Feb. 15, Kirby said, “We are in the process with engaging with Russia about this.” He said that Biden “has directed a series of initial actions, including additional briefings to congressional leaders, direct diplomatic engagement with Russia, with our allies and our partners as well, and with other countries around the world who have interests at stake.”

On Feb. 20, Russian President Vladimir Putin commented on the topic of nuclear weapons in space during a working meeting in Moscow with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

“Our position is clear and transparent: we have always been categorically against, and are now against, the placement of nuclear weapons in space,” Putin said, according to Kommersant. “On the contrary, we call for compliance with all agreements that exist in this area and proposed to strengthen this joint work many times over.”