Mexico’s $10 billion lawsuit against U.S. gun producers had been dismissed previously by a lower court.
March 2024
By Chad Lawhorn
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has revived Mexico’s $10 billion lawsuit against U.S. gun manufacturers, which previously was dismissed by a lower court.
The suit accuses six companies, including Smith & Wesson and Sturm, Ruger & Co., of negligent practices that facilitate the trafficking of more than 500,000 guns annually to Mexican drug cartels, exacerbating gun violence in that country.
Despite the broad immunity granted to gun-makers by the U.S. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, the Boston-based appeals court unanimously found that Mexico’s lawsuit “plausibly alleges a type of claim that is statutorily exempt from the [act’s] general prohibition,” Reuters reported on Jan. 22.
Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, the lawyer leading the lawsuit for the Mexican government, told El País in an interview on Jan. 25 that the decision to revive the case was “historic.”
“Not only will we have the opportunity to present our evidence, we will be able to ask the defendant companies to share their evidence with us…. That’s the kind of information we’re going to get in litigation. It could be a gold mine,” he said.
The appeals court decision overturns a lower court’s 2022 dismissal, which found that foreign governments cannot sue under U.S. law. It marks a significant legal advancement for Mexico, supported by U.S. gun control advocates.
Mexico has argued that the actions of gun manufacturers have contributed directly to the violence within its national borders.
The lawsuit seeks financial damages and aims to hold these manufacturers accountable for their role in international arms trafficking and related harms, such as declining investment and economic activity in Mexico.
Other companies named in the suit are Beretta USA, Barrett Firearms Manufacturing, Colt’s Manufacturing Co., and Glock Inc. All have denied wrongdoing.
The U.S. law typically shields gun manufacturers from liability for the improper use of their products. The gun companies have argued that Mexico does not have legal standing to sue. (See ACT, September 2022.)
The lower court agreed with the immunity argument, ruling that the law prohibits legal action brought by foreign governments. The appeals court determined that the law was designed only to protect lawful firearms-related commerce and not the problem Mexico identified, namely, companies accused of aiding and abetting illegal gun sales by knowingly facilitating the trafficking of firearms into the country.
According to Celorio Alcántara, the gun-makers unsuccessfully attempted to distance themselves from the issue of gun trafficking by describing the scale and scope of supply chains and the number of individuals involved in those processes.
Mexico, on the other hand, focused on the U.S. law and why it did not apply. “We pointed out that [it] has no extraterritorial effect, that there is a direct violation of the machine gun export ban, and that the defendant companies violate state and federal laws,” Celorio Alcántara said.
The decision to revive the case could pave the way for other litigation against gun manufacturers on similar grounds, potentially affecting how firearms are marketed, distributed, and regulated within the United States and internationally.
“Other countries will surely be able to analyze whether this decision…gives them a window to sue, such as Jamaica, Canada, or other countries that are suffering from the same problem,” Celorio Alcántara said.
As the Mexican case proceeds, it likely will encounter more legal and political hurdles given the power of the gun lobby, contentious gun control debates in the United States, and intricate legal arguments surrounding the law.
From the politics of the television industry to the world stage, David Craig leaves no stone unturned in examining how the movie made it onto millions of television screens and its influence on ending the nuclear arms race.
March 2024
The Power of Movies, Then and Now
Apocalypse Television: How ‘The Day After’ Helped End the Cold War
By David Craig
Applause Books
2023
Reviewed by Vincent Intondi
“It was a movie like no other movie.” “Most of you who watched are probably still feeling just a little numb right now.” The film “leaves you wondering about life, about the world, about what you would do if in fact nuclear missiles were on their way here.”
These are not descriptions of Christopher Nolan’s 2023 blockbuster movie “Oppenheimer.” Forty years before Nolan’s masterpiece, another film made millions think about the nuclear issue and the future of the world; that is the focus of David Craig’s new book, Apocalypse Television: How ‘The Day After’ Helped End the Cold War.
In his book, Craig takes the reader on a journey from the inception of “The Day After” to the U.S. reaction following its release in 1983. From the politics of the television industry to the world stage, the author leaves no stone unturned in examining how the movie made it on to millions of television screens around the nation and its influence on ending the nuclear arms race.
From examining “Schoolhouse Rock” and “Brian’s Song” to describe the state of television to reflecting on the constant fear of nuclear war, the book is a trip down memory lane for anyone who lived through the 1980s. Craig begins the story introducing readers to all the players involved in making “The Day After” a reality. Brandon Stoddard, head of ABC’s movie division and Circle Films, who was perhaps best known for creating “Roots,” conceived “The Day After” after watching the 1979 fictional nuclear disaster film “The China Syndrome” and reading John Hersey’s Hiroshima. One thing that Stoddard kept returning to was not creating a film that would simply scare the public and make them “catatonic.” He wanted to “make people decide for themselves what they were going to do about it.”
During this time, the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979 was still fresh in people’s minds. Coupled with more than 130 books focused on nuclear disarmament that were published between 1979 and 1983, President Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric about a winnable nuclear war, and the emergence of MTV, which featured nuclear weapons imagery on the hour, the nuclear issue seemed to be everywhere. Indeed, a year before “The Day After” premiered, one million people flooded the streets of New York City demanding an end to the arms race, and Randy Forsberg’s nuclear freeze initiative was sweeping the nation. Much of this history has been examined in other works.1 Craig provides a valuable service by adding to this scholarship with an entire book dedicated to a television film that became a nationwide event and indeed played a role in ending the Cold War.
One benefit is that Craig takes the reader behind the curtain of network television. From producing to funding, distribution, and promotion, he puts the reader in the room when decisions were made, disagreements occurred, and consensus was reached. Why did those involved choose Lawrence, Kansas, as the location for the film? Why did they not use well-known actors? Would and should race play a role in casting decisions? How would they actually make the nuclear explosion for television? Craig examines the careful consideration that went into answering these questions and the meaning behind each decision.
Throughout the book, the author returns repeatedly to the politics of the nuclear issue. Was the film meant to be political in any way? Was it pro-Russia, anti-Reagan? Those involved with the film’s production offered differing opinions on these questions. It also raises the age-old question, “Is not all art political?”
Although anti-nuclear organizations sought to capitalize on the film, “pro-nuclear” advocates and the religious right vehemently opposed the movie, arguing that it would weaken the West and lead to compromises with the Soviet Union. As did the nuclear freeze initiative and the June 12, 1982, rally that was the largest anti-nuclear weapons demonstration in history, the Reagan administration attempted to co-opt the film to push the president’s agenda and make it look as if he was on the right side of the issue. Yet, as Craig notes, Reagan wrote in his diary that he was “deeply affected” after watching the film.
In many ways, what viewers watched after the film was even more important in terms of educating the public about the dangers of nuclear weapons. Immediately following “The Day After,” ABC aired “Viewpoint,” a panel discussion led by Ted Koppel. Koppel’s job was to moderate a “civil debate with some of the most notable public intellectuals of the time” discussing nuclear war and what viewers could do about it. This obviously was a difficult task for Koppel, and one wonders if it could be repeated in today’s world of punditry, divisiveness, and social media.
Was “The Day After” a success? That depends on the definition of success. When millions of people are watching the same television movie about nuclear war and it is still being discussed 40 years later, would that not constitute success? Combined with the June 1982 rally and the nuclear freeze movement, Reagan clearly was aware of and affected by these developments, which in part motivated him to change course, sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, and argue that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Moreover, there are no clearer examples of the success and legacy of “The Day After” than the fact that we are all alive right now and that the second meeting of the states-parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons recently concluded.
Even so, the nuclear threat remains; there is a new nuclear arms race; and the world is closer to nuclear war than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis. Similar to the 1980s, there also has been an increase in films about nuclear war and the end of the world, from “Oppenheimer” to “Don’t Look Up.” With the release of these films, it is reasonable to ask if the pro-disarmament community has missed opportunities to educate and organize the public around these films in the way that it was done in the 1980s.
If “The Day After” was released today, would we have panel discussions, organize 1-800 hotlines about the issue, and have celebrity public service announcements as they did in 1983? Would we clamor to write think-pieces criticizing the film in any way possible, all in an effort to simply gain followers and clicks? Examining the reaction to “Oppenheimer,” the answer is undoubtedly the latter. Perhaps this was on Craig’s mind when writing the book. “Swap out Reagan with [U.S.] presidents before or after, and [Russian President Vladimir] Putin with any Soviet leader. Swap out TV with YouTube and many of the basic contours of the stories in today’s world are the same,” he concludes.
It seems that things have come full circle. Nick Meyer, director of “The Day After,” first learned about nuclear weapons as a child when he found himself at Thanksgiving dinner with Albert Einstein and J. Robert Oppenheimer. Meyer made clear his disgust of Reagan’s initial claims that nuclear war is winnable, and he hoped the film would help unseat Reagan. Recently, Academy Award-nominated actress Kristen Stewart voiced alarm over the threat of nuclear war. “We’ve grown so accustomed to the looming threat of nuclear annihilation that it barely registers in our daily lives. … But when some new crisis or close call startles us out of our slumber for just a brief moment, we truly grasp the insanity of living on a hair trigger to what could be a real-life Armageddon,” she said.2 Stewart’s fiancé is Dylan Meyer, Nick’s daughter.
Whether readers are curious about media or nuclear studies, popular culture or Cold War history, this book belongs on every shelf. It offers an education about an important time in history, sheds light on a film that continues to inspire audiences today, and is a reminder of the power that art has in changing the world.
ENDNOTES
1. Vincent J. Intondi, Saving the World From Nuclear War: The June 12, 1982, Disarmament Rally and Beyond (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023); Henry Richard Maar III, Freeze! The Grassroots Movement to Halt the Arms Race and End the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022); William M. Knoblauch, Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War: The Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2018).
2. Etan Vlessing, “Kristen Stewart Warns the World Is ‘Dangerously Close’ to Nuclear Catastrophe,” The Hollywood Reporter, December 15, 2023, https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/kristen-stewart-nuclear-catastrophe-warning-1235758067/.
Vincent Intondi, a professor and historian, is the author of African Americans Against the Bomb and Saving the World From Nuclear War.
Risks associated with Iran’s nuclear program are heightened by “complexities” in the Middle East, the IAEA chief said.
March 2024
By Kelsey Davenport
Iran’s failure to provide full transparency into its nuclear program is increasing risk, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned.
IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi said on Feb. 13 that Iran is “not entirely transparent” regarding its nuclear activities, which “increases dangers,” particularly given the “accumulation of complexities” in the Middle East.
In addition to seeking answers about undeclared uranium activities at two sites from the pre-2003 period, when Iran had a nuclear weapons program, Iran is not providing the IAEA with design information about new nuclear facilities, as required by its safeguards agreement, or following through on a voluntary commitment in March 2023 to enhance agency monitoring at sites that support the country’s nuclear program but do not hold fissile materials.
Grossi, speaking at the World Governor’s Summit in Dubai, also referenced an uptick in “loose talk about nuclear weapons” in Iran and said a “very high official said…we have everything” to make a nuclear weapon.
Grossi’s remarks appeared to refer to a comment by Ali Akhbar Salehi, former foreign minister and head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) from 2013 to 2020. Asked if Iran has the capability to produce nuclear weapons in a Feb. 11 interview with Nasim TV, Salehi said that the country has crossed “all the scientific and technological nuclear thresholds” necessary to build a weapon.
Salehi’s declaration that Iran has a nuclear weapons capability is not surprising. The U.S. intelligence community has long assessed that Iran has the technical and scientific capacity to build a nuclear weapon if the political decision is made to do so.
Iranian officials, including the current head of the AEOI, Mohammad Eslami, continue to say Iran is not interested in nuclear weapons. In a Jan. 13 interview with Ofogh TV, Eslami said that nuclear weapons are not part of Iran’s defense and security strategy. He said Iran can build a nuclear arsenal but “we do not want to do it.”
Regardless, clashes between the United States and Iranian-backed forces in the region increase the risk that Tehran could determine that the benefits of pursuing nuclear weapons outweigh the costs.
Iran’s nuclear advances since U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in May 2018 would allow Tehran to produce enough weapons-grade fissile material for five bombs in about four weeks. U.S. officials have suggested that the weaponization process could take another six to 12 months.
The speed at which Iran could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon is due largely to Iran’s growing stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent uranium-235, a level just shy of the 90 percent-enriched U-235 that is considered weapons grade.
The IAEA reported in December that Iran accelerated the production of 60 percent-enriched U-235 after a decrease in production from June through November. But in a Feb. 19 interview with Reuters, Grossi said Iran had again decreased the rate of production.
He said Iran’s recent changes to the rate of production of 60 percent-enriched U-235 “does not alter the fundamental trend,” which is a “constant increase in inventory” of highly enriched uranium.”
Iran does not have any practical need for uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235. The country’s sole operating nuclear power reactor, at Bushehr, runs on uranium enriched to less than 5 percent U-235, and Russia provides that fuel. Iran operates a research reactor with fuel that uses uranium enriched to 20 percent U-235, which Tehran imports.
Iran recently announced the start of construction on several new reactors but none of the units will require fuel with 60 percent-enriched U-235.
On Feb. 5, Eslami said Iran began pouring the foundation for a new research reactor at Esfahan that will be used to produce isotopes for medical treatments and industrial purposes.
The previous week, Iran began constructing a new nuclear power plant. The site, located on Iran’s east coast, will include four reactor units and take nine years to build, according to Eslami.
Iran did not notify the IAEA when it began construction of these facilities, as required under its safeguards agreement. Iran maintains that it suspended the safeguards provision, known as modified Code 3.1, that requires it to notify the agency when the decision is made to construct a new nuclear facility. Iran says it will abide by the previous requirements, which stipulate that a country must notify the IAEA 180 days before nuclear material is introduced into a facility.
The IAEA argues that Iran cannot unilaterally suspend modified Code 3.1. The agency changed the notification requirements to give inspectors a longer lead time to develop effective safeguards.
While in Davos for the World Economic Forum in January, Grossi emphasized the importance of Iran providing more transparency regarding its nuclear program. He also said it is “unacceptable” for Iran to “hold the IAEA hostage” over “political disputes with others.” Specifically, Grossi said Iran is punishing the agency because of actions taken by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States that Iran’s leaders consider to be objectionable.
He called for diplomacy to prevent the “situation deteriorating to a degree where it would be impossible to retrieve.”
A high school teacher in my hometown Hiroshima once shared with me a quote from David Krieger, “Some view Hiroshima from above mushroom clouds, whereas some are under the clouds.”
Belarus Updating Nuclear Military Doctrine
March 2024
Belarus is in the process of adopting a new military doctrine that would allow for the use of nuclear weapons by Russia.
Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin announced the decision at a meeting of the country’s Security Council on Jan. 16, saying that Belarus “will put forth a new military doctrine that for the first time provides for the use of nuclear weapons,” the Associated Press reported on Jan. 17.
At the same meeting, Aleksander Volfovich, the Security Council secretary, said that “statements by our neighbors, in particular Poland…forced us to strengthen” the military doctrine and that “the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus is intended to deter aggression from Poland, a NATO member,” AP reported.
In late April, the doctrine will go to the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly for approval. The assembly works in parallel with the parliament, and its approval is needed before the doctrine becomes official, according to Russian state media RIA Novosti.
Belarus pushed forward the new doctrine as neighboring Baltic states signed an agreement to reinforce their borders with Belarus and Russia.
“The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of the Republic of Belarus is considered an important measure of the preventive deterrence for potential adversaries from unleashing armed aggression against the Republic of Belarus,” Khrenin said at a briefing on Jan. 19, according to CNN.
In March 2023, as Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine intensified, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that he could transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, a close ally. By the end of the year, news reports suggested that the shipments were completed. (See ACT, May 2023.)
Since that time, Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko repeatedly has said that he would not hesitate to order the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons if Belarus faced an act of aggression.—SHIZUKA KURAMITSU
Analysts also say the purge could slow Beijing’s military modernization drive.
March 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu
China has purged nine generals from its national legislative body in a sweeping move that analysts say exposes corruption in the senior army ranks and could slow President Xi Jinping’s campaign to modernize the military.
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s national legislative body, announced on Dec. 29 the dismissal of nine senior military officials of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Some of those affected were senior members of the PLA Rocket Force, which is responsible for overseeing the country’s conventional and nuclear land-based missiles.
Beijing did not explain the move, but on Jan. 6, Bloomberg attributed the purge to “widespread corruption [that] undermined [Xi’s] efforts to modernize the armed forces and raised questions about China’s ability to fight a war.”
Citing an unidentified U.S. intelligence source, Bloomberg reported that the corruption scandal involved nuclear missiles that were filled with water instead of fuel and lids for missile silos that do not function properly, thus undermining the effective launch of missiles.
“The corruption inside China’s Rocket Force and throughout the nation’s defense industrial base is so extensive that U.S. officials now believe [that] Xi is less likely to contemplate major military action in the coming years than would otherwise have been the case,” the source told Bloomberg.
On Jan. 15, in its first bulletin of 2024, the Standing Committee explained that the reason for the purge is due to “suspected serious violations of law and discipline,” a commonly used phrase to refer to corruption. Further, the bulletin reported that the ousting of four members, including the former chief of the Equipment Development Department and former commanders of the Rocket Forces, took place Sept. 26 and Dec. 5.
This purge is part of a trend under Xi’s regime. Not even two years after a big reshuffle of high-ranking officials in 2022, China has dismissed even more of them in 2023, including PLA Rocket Force head Li Yuchao in June, Foreign Minister Qin Gang in July, and Defense Minister Li Shangfu in September.
The most recent target is Li Guangchang, a former nuclear fuel director at China National Nuclear Corp., the country’s sole supplier of nuclear fuel. Li is under investigation due to “suspected serious violations of law and discipline,” The South China Morning Post reported on Feb. 4. It said that the Chinese “[C]ommunist Party’s top corruption watchdog says he is undergoing disciplinary inspection and supervision,” but no details have been provided.
In October, the U.S. Defense Department said in its annual China military power report that China had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads in May 2023, compared to 400 warheads in 2022. The department projected that China will possess in excess of 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and will accelerate development of its intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. (See ACT, November 2023.)
If there are flaws with Chinese nuclear missiles as described in the Bloomberg report, “these flaws would compromise missile operations, calling into question China’s nuclear force readiness and overall capabilities,” Jon Wolfsthal, director of global risk at the Federation of American Scientists, wrote in an open letter to U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Jan. 10. Wolfsthal asked if the department was aware of this allegation and whether it would affect the department’s projections.
The department report serves as a basis for U.S. nuclear policies. Because “[t]he growth and reported capabilities of China’s nuclear arsenal are being used increasingly to justify current and potentially additional increases in U.S. nuclear capabilities and spending…the accuracy of [department] documents with regard to China’s nuclear capabilities are central to informing these debates in Congress as well as among security experts and the broader public, and thus, ensuring they are accurate and complete is essential,” Wolfsthal wrote.
But Heather Williams, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued that “the recent news questioning the reliability of China’s missiles should not change anything about current U.S. policy.”
In an essay on Jan. 25, she wrote that “the intent of the silos was always unclear, and if anything, Xi has indicated a clear intent to move forward with making them operational and expanding China’s arsenal.”
At the Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2022, Xi emphasized his determination to build a world-class military with strategic deterrence capability. But “it will take some time for China to clean up the mess and restore confidence in the Rocket Force’s competence and trustworthiness,” Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, told Reuters on Dec. 31.
Meetings at the Pentagon were the first formal in-person talks since 2020.
March 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu
China and the United States resumed military-to-military contacts with a series of recent meetings, delivering on a decision by their leaders at a November 2023 summit.
Two days of meetings, called the China-U.S. defense policy coordination talks, took place Jan. 8-9 at the Pentagon. It was the first formal in-person encounter between the two militaries since January 2020.
The meetings were co-chaired by Michael Chase, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and Maj. Gen. Song Yanchao, Chinese deputy director of the Central Military Commission Office for International Military Cooperation.
The two sides discussed Chinese-U.S. defense relations and regional and global security issues, including Ukraine, North Korea, and the South China Sea, according to the U.S. Defense Department, which added that it “will continue to engage in active discussions with [Chinese] counterparts about future engagements between defense and military officials at multiple levels.”
In a Jan. 10 news release, the Chinese Defense Ministry said that its delegation expressed a willingness at the meeting “to develop a sound and stable military-to-military relationship with the U.S. side on the basis of equality and respect and work together.”
Meanwhile, on Dec. 21, two weeks before the Pentagon meeting, China and the United States conducted a video teleconference involving teams led by U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Air Force Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. and Chinese Gen. Liu Zhenli, the chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Staff Department.
The two sides discussed a number of global regional security issues, the U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said afterward. It also reported that the U.S. delegation reiterated “the importance of working together to responsibly manage competition, avoid miscalculations, and maintain open and direct lines of communication” and “the importance of the [PLA] engaging in substantive dialogue to reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings.”
The Chinese delegation also shared a similar viewpoint, that “the two sides exchanged candid and in-depth views on implementing the important military-related consensus reached between the two heads of state in San Francisco and on other issues of common interest,” Senior Col. Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Chinese Defense Ministry, told a press conference on Dec. 28.
“The video call yielded positive and constructive outcomes,” Wu said. “Going forward, we expect the U.S. side to work with us in the same direction and take concrete actions on the basis of equality and respect to promote the sound and steady development of [the] China-U.S. military-to-military relationship.”
Bilateral military-to-military contacts broke down after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022. Many analysts increasingly have been concerned that Beijing’s and Washington’s inability to communicate directly courts danger if a crisis erupts over Taiwan or some other major flashpoint.
But even after the recent meetings, tensions and differences between China and the United States remain evident. For example, Wu complained that the United States “has been intensifying its military deployment in the Asia-Pacific, which is full of Cold War mentality.”
“We urge the [United States] to abandon the outdated security vision and zero-sum Cold War mentality, view China and China’s military development in an objective and rational light, instead of being obsessed with the pursuit for hegemony,” Wu said.
Similarly, a Chinese Defense Ministry news release on Jan. 10 urged the U.S. side “to take seriously China’s concerns and do more things that contribute to the growth of the mil-mil relationship.”
Both sides seem determined to maintain the restored lines of communication. On Jan. 25, Wu confirmed that, “[w]ith the concerted efforts of the two sides, mil-to-mil dialogues and consultations have been steadily resumed on the basis of equality and respect. Currently, the Chinese military and the U.S. military are maintaining communication and coordination on exchange programs.”
Following the November summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden and the two sets of military-to-military meetings in December and January, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Bangkok on Jan. 26-27.
Given that 2024 marks the 45th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations, China said that the two countries “should work together toward mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation, finding the way for China and the United States to get along with each other,” according to the Chinese Embassy in Washington.
The U.S. Embassy in Beijing reported that, in his meeting with Wang, Sullivan “stressed that although the United States and China are in competition, both countries need to prevent it from veering into conflict or confrontation.”
Both sides also “recognized recent progress in resuming military-to-military communication…noted the importance of maintaining these channels...[and] discussed next steps on a range of areas of cooperation [including on] holding a U.S.-China dialogue on [artificial intelligence] in the spring,” the embassy said.
It added that the “two sides held candid, substantive and constructive discussions on global and regional issues, including those related to Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Middle East, [North Korea], the South China Sea, and Burma” and that Sullivan “underscored the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”
Further, the U.S. embassy said that the two sides “committed to maintain this strategic channel of communication and to pursue additional high-level diplomacy and consultations in key areas.”
China and the United States also held long-awaited talks on nuclear arms control on Nov. 6 in Washington D.C., the first such meeting in nearly five years.
Speaking to the Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group on Feb. 8, Mallory Stewart, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, deterrence, and stability who led the U.S. delegation to the arms control talks, admitted that “we didn’t see much substantive progress from this first engagement” with China’s representative Sun Xiaobo.
“But the idea that we would make the substantive conversation from the very first engagement that we have not had for many years on our arms control, strategic stability and risk reduction is not realistic,” she said. (See ACT, December 2023.)
“I think the key is to encourage them to appreciate why we need to share our questions and they need to share their questions, and we work together to get to a place where we address each other’s specific understandings,” added Stewart.
But the Biden administration sees no immediate threat of a North Korean attack.
March 2024
By Kelsey Davenport
North and South Korea exchanged threats after the North Korean leader abandoned the goal of unifying the peninsula and labeled South Korea a hostile country. Despite the rising tensions, the Biden administration assesses that there is no immediate threat of a North Korean attack.
In December, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un forsook a long-standing policy of achieving unification with South Korea at some point in the indefinite future. (See ACT, January/February 2024.) As a result of the shift, Kim said on Feb. 8 that North Korea can legally “annihilate” South Korea now that it is defined as a “hostile country.”
He said North Korea has adopted a “national policy to occupy and pacify” South Korea “in case of emergency.” North Korea’s military advances and weapons development give the country the capability to implement that policy, he added.
South Korea still supports unification, but the administration of President Yoon Suk Yeol has threatened to respond to North Korean provocations and is taking steps to increase military readiness.
In a Jan. 13 speech, Yoon called the Kim regime “irrational” and said that a “sensible regime would give up nuclear weapons and find a way for its people to live.” He said that Kim’s comments and the country’s recent military drills “constitute a provocation and threat.”
Yoon also accused North Korea of conducting “psychological warfare and activities” against South Korea and said that South Korea expected provocations from North Korea, including at the border between the two countries, over the course of the year.
South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said during a Jan. 24 visit to an air force facility that the military must be prepared to respond to North Korea, including quickly eliminating the “enemy leadership” if Pyongyang decides to go to war.
Despite the rhetoric coming from Pyongyang and Seoul, the Biden administration dismissed suggestions that North Korea is preparing for war.
Jung Pak, the senior U.S. official for North Korea at the State Department, said in a press briefing on Feb. 15 that the United States does not see any signals of “an imminent or direct attack at this point.”
Pak said Kim’s posture has not fundamentally changed, despite the decision to abandon unification.
But North Korea is continuing to develop weapons systems that are more difficult to defend against and conducting live-fire exercises, including near the Northern Limit Line, the maritime boundary between North and South Korea.
Yoshimasa Hayashi, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, said on Feb. 15 that North Korea’s testing of missiles “from various platforms” strengthens the country’s “surprise attack capabilities.”
In January, North Korea tested new missiles, including a solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile, a strategic cruise missile, and a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). The systems tested are more difficult to intercept using missile defenses and are nuclear capable, according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). The cruise missiles also give North Korea more launch options, which makes it more difficult to preemptively target the country’s systems.
The strategic cruise missile contributes to North Korea’s “rapid counterattack posture,” KCNA said in a Jan. 31 statement.
After the SLCM launch on Jan. 28, KCNA said that Kim oversaw the launch and emphasized that “nuclear weaponization of the navy is an urgent task” and a “core requirement for building the state nuclear strategic force.”
The intermediate-range ballistic missile, tested on Jan. 14, included a maneuverable reentry vehicle, which uses a technology that can be used to make the missile more challenging for missile defenses to shoot down.
KCNA said the test successfully verified “the gliding and maneuvering characteristics of intermediate-range hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead and the reliability of newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines.”
The North Korean missile test had “nothing to do with the regional situation,” KCNA reported.
Although the Biden administration assesses that North Korea’s missile advances and rhetoric are not signs of an imminent attack, Pranay Vaddi, the U.S. National Security Council senior director for arms control, warned that the “nature of North Korea as a threat in the region could drastically change over the coming decade.”
Vaddi, speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Jan. 18, said that the “unprecedented level of cooperation in the military sphere” between Russia and North Korea could improve the North’s capabilities.
The United States and South Korea must continue to ensure that U.S. extended deterrence remains credible as the threat evolves, Vaddi said.
The accusations of North Korean involvement came from the United States, which promised to respond by imposing additional sanctions.
March 2024
By Kelsey Davenport
The United States accused Russia of launching North Korean ballistic missiles at Ukrainian targets and warned that Pyongyang will benefit from seeing how the missiles perform.
In a Jan. 4 press briefing, John Kirby, the National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, said that Russia attacked Ukraine using North Korean ballistic missiles with a range of about 900 kilometers on Dec. 30 and Jan. 2.
The White House said in October that North Korea transferred armaments to Russia in September in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, but it appears that the Dec. 30 attack was the first time Russia used North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine. (See ACT, November 2023.)
The United States and its partners will impose additional sanctions on entities that facilitate the transfers of weapons and will call public attention to the arms deals, Kirby said.
He did not reference a specific North Korean ballistic missile, but experts and Ukrainian officials say missile fragments suggest Russia is using the short-range Hwasong-11A. Ukraine also accused Russia of using two Hwasong-11A missiles in a Feb. 7 attack on Kharkiv.
At a UN Security Council meeting on Jan. 10, Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia disputed the allegation and accused the United States of spreading “deliberately false information.”
During the meeting, South Korea, which joined the Security Council for a two-year term beginning in 2024, raised concerns about the knowledge North Korea will gain from providing the systems to Russia. Ambassador Hwang Joon-kook said the launches “provide valuable technical and military insights” and that Moscow’s use of the missiles will encourage Pyongyang to export missiles to other states to “rake in new revenue to further finance” its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.
Although the Security Council did not take action against Russia, more than 50 states signed a Jan. 9 statement condemning North Korea’s export of missiles to Russia. The states said the “transfer of these weapons increases the suffering of the Ukrainian people, supports Russia’s war of aggression, and undermines the global non-proliferation regime.”
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency said Russia’s decision to cut staff at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant compromises safety.
March 2024
By Kelsey Davenport
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has raised concerns that Russia’s decision to cut staff at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is compromising nuclear safety and security.
IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the facility on Feb. 7, a week after Russia announced that workers employed by Energoatom, the Ukrainian nuclear energy company, would no longer be allowed to work at the site.
After Russia illegally attacked and occupied the Zaporizhzhia complex in March 2022 as part of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it brought in employees from Rosatom, the Russian state-run nuclear company, to operate the nuclear power plant and pressured Ukrainian employees to sign contracts with Rosatom. Until Feb. 1, 120 Energoatom employees were still working there. Following the announcement, Russia informed the IAEA that it had sufficient personnel to run the facility without the 120 Energoatom staffers. Russia said it was necessary to bar Energoatom employees from the site to operate the plant in line with Russian regulations.
After his visit, Grossi said the number of staff is “significantly reduced” from prewar levels and warned that even though the reactor units are in shutdown mode, “the plant still requires sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to conduct both operational tasks and to ensure that equipment important for nuclear safety and security is properly maintained.”
Prior to visiting the Zaporizhzhia plant, Grossi met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and various Ukrainian officials, including Petro Kotin, the head of Energoatom. Grossi said his agency is working to “assess the operational impact of this [Russian] decision.” There is “absolutely no place for complacency” regarding the security and safety of the facility, he said.
In January, the IAEA team at the Zaporizhzhia complex notified the agency that Russia mined the area between the internal and external fences surrounding the site. Russia previously had placed landmines in that zone, but removed them in November 2023.
In a Jan. 19 statement, Grossi said the use of landmines is inconsistent with IAEA standards for nuclear safety.
Russia defended its decision in a Jan. 31 statement to the IAEA, saying that landmines “do not pose any threat to personnel” at the Zaporizhzhia plant and that their use “does not contradict any IAEA recommendations.”
Russia said that landmines are necessary “to deter potential saboteurs.” It argued that deterring sabotage “corresponds” to the five IAEA principles for ensuring the safety and security of the plant, specifically that all structures at the facility must be “protected from attacks or acts of sabotage.” Grossi introduced the five principles at a UN Security Council meeting in May 2023 and continues to reiterate their importance. (See ACT, June 2023.)
In addition to staffing and landmines, Grossi raised additional concerns about nuclear safety and security during a Jan. 25 briefing to the Security Council. He said that the IAEA expert team at the Zaporizhzhia site “has not had timely access to some areas of the plant” and stressed that access is necessary to “effectively conduct” assessments of safety and security.
After the Feb. 8 visit, Grossi emphasized that IAEA personnel must be able to ask questions about conditions at the site. He said that “there were situations where there were suggestions that [agency experts should] look but not talk.” Preventing questions “is not good,” Grossi said.
