Reducing the Russian Nuclear Danger: A Way Forward

December 2024
By Thomas Countryman

Donald Trump steps again into the U.S. presidency at a time when the risk of nuclear conflict remains unacceptably high, at a level not seen since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Amid rising geopolitical tensions, nuclear-weapon states are spending tens of billions of dollars to upgrade their arsenals; and the last remaining agreement limiting the Russian and U.S. arsenals, the world’s largest, will expire in 2026. What is the likelihood that he could reduce that risk, avoid a buildup of strategic nuclear arsenals, and reach new agreements with Moscow to maintain restraint on the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals?

The obstacles are many, even if Trump were to place this task higher among the many dramatic changes he proposes in domestic and foreign policy. First, nuclear negotiations are linked inevitably to the Russian war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s refusal to engage in any form of discussion with the United States as long as it supports Ukraine against Russian aggression remains the official Kremlin position. Even if Trump is able to force a ceasefire on the combatants, the road to a lasting solution will be long, and Putin is likely to perceive that a refusal to engage in nuclear dialogue could serve as leverage in the negotiations on Ukraine.

Second, any outcome in Ukraine that causes NATO allies to question the reliability of U.S. commitments will cause Europeans to continue to build their own defense capabilities against the possibility of renewed Russian imperialist expansion. There will be an incentive for the allies, in Asia as well as Europe, to pursue the development of their own nuclear “umbrellas,” which serves the interest of neither Moscow nor Washington.

Within the United States, the political impulse of many Republican national security leaders remains to expand rather than constrain the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Actors who are likely to have influence in the new administration already are pushing for new weapons types, a much larger nuclear weapons budget, and perhaps even the resumption of nuclear explosive testing. This trajectory is motivated more immediately by the rapid expansion of the Chinese arsenal than by Russia’s threatening behavior, but will have an effect on the nuclear balance with Moscow. It is also questionable whether U.S. negotiators, who most likely will be chosen on the basis of personal loyalty to Trump rather than on competence, will have the experience and skill necessary to reach new agreements, particularly with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expiring in fewer than 430 days.

Despite these headwinds, there remains room for very restrained optimism. Trump’s self-image as the best negotiator ever has driven his interest, going back 40 years, in negotiating nuclear issues with Moscow. His reported desire to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize could be the incentive to prioritize reaching a breakthrough agreement with Russia, if not with Iran or North Korea. His open admiration and imitation of Putin’s strength form a basis for personal contact that has not existed under the current administration.

There are specific opportunities, short of a sweeping new treaty, that are within reach of the two presidents. Moscow and Washington need to prepare for February 5, 2026, when New START will expire and the binding limitations on deployed strategic arsenals will become history. Both states will have the capability to expand the number of their strategic deployed warheads beyond the treaty limit of 1,550, and this could happen fairly rapidly by uploading reserve warheads onto existing delivery systems.

Yet, there is no serious analysis suggesting that either side would thus enhance deterrence of the other or improve its own national security. In addition, such uploads, not to mention an unrestrained arms race reminiscent of the 1960s, would add greatly to budget and economic pressures in both countries.

Bilateral arms control has never been solely about formal treaties. Russia and its predecessor the Soviet Union and the United States significantly reduced their arsenals by less formal agreements and by reciprocal unilateral steps, particularly the presidential initiatives of the early 1990s. Putin and Trump could reach a political agreement, in brief and clear language, that each would continue to respect New START deployment limits as long as the other side did the same. Trump could even begin the process and gain the praise that would come with it by making this a unilateral statement and inviting Putin to join him.

The two biggest nuclear powers also need to find a way to discuss all elements that bind them together in nuclear danger. It is more than unfortunate that the bilateral strategic stability dialogue ended after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, first suspended by the U.S. side then jettisoned entirely by Moscow. Even U.S. President Joe Biden’s offer of less formal “discussions” on a new nuclear arms control framework have been taken by Russia as a sign of U.S. eagerness and therefore something to be leveraged.

It should be possible to restart contacts among nuclear experts and decision-makers on both sides. To make clear that this is a fresh start, there should be no return to the grand title of strategic stability dialogue. In addition, Moscow would have to climb down from its insistence that the agenda is to formulate a new “strategic equation” that covers every conceivable security issue. That would leave a lot of room for the two sides to begin a discussion that does not exclude any topic of importance to either one. It is less important to have high-level, high-visibility events than to begin and sustain regular discussions at middle levels.

Such a discussion could uncover other areas of potential agreement. One that was too readily dismissed in the past is the possibility of addressing the risk of escalation following the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Something short of a treaty could reduce the risk and expense of a new missile race in Europe and Asia. The two sides also need to address urgently the new challenge posed by the reported Russian deployment of weapons in outer space and find a way to avoid a new arms race in this dimension.

The world witnessed a dramatic reduction in the risk of nuclear war between 1962 and 2014 as a series of leaders in Moscow and Washington took bold steps to protect the security of their people. U.S. leadership and initiative and the courage to put creative proposals on the table were key to this success at every stage. This moment demands no less. Trump’s foreign policy legacy will depend in great measure on his readiness not just to put forward meaningful ideas, but to see them through to completed agreements.

Thomas Countryman, a retired U.S. diplomat, is chairman of the board of the Arms Control Association.