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"I actually have a pretty good collection of Arms Control Today, which I have read throughout my career. It's one of the few really serious publications on arms control issues."

– Gary Samore
Former White House Coordinator for Arms Control and WMD Terrorism
Kelsey Davenport

Biden Victory May Save Iran Nuclear Deal


December 2020
By Kelsey Davenport

President-elect Joe Biden’s victory in the U.S. presidential election increases the likelihood that the United States and Iran will quickly return to full compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal, but Tehran says any formal U.S. reentry into the deal will need to be negotiated.

Vice President Joe Biden visits members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2015 to discuss the Iran nuclear deal. As president, he may seek to reverse the U.S. withdrawal from the deal, but the agreement does not contain provisions for such a move. (Photo: Alex Wong/Getty Images)In May 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and reimposed sanctions on Iran. (See ACT, June 2018.) Iran was abiding by the agreement’s nuclear restrictions at that time, but took steps beginning one year later to breach certain JCPOA’s limits in response to the U.S. sanctions campaign. (See ACT, June 2019.)

Although the Trump administration claimed its maximum pressure campaign was designed to push Iran to negotiate a new deal that addressed Tehran’s nuclear program and a range of other activities, Biden has stated a clear preference for restoring the JCPOA.

In a Sept. 13 CNN commentary, Biden wrote that “[i]f Iran returns to strict compliance with the nuclear deal, the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.”

Iranian officials have rejected Trump’s push for negotiations on a new deal, but have said consistently that if Washington returns to full compliance with its obligations under the JCPOA, Iran will do likewise.

After Biden was projected the winner of the election, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Iran “has always adhered to its commitments when all sides responsibly implement” their JCPOA obligations.

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif offered more detail on the Iranian position on Nov. 17, saying that a return to full implementation by the United States and Iran can be “done automatically” and “needs no negotiations.” However, Zarif said that if the United States wants to rejoin the JCPOA, Iran will be “ready to negotiate how” Washington can reenter. U.S. reentry, however, is “not a priority,” Zarif said.

The nuclear deal does not contain any provisions detailing what, if any, steps a state must take to rejoin the deal.

Zarif’s comments appeared to imply that Iran would be satisfied in the short term with Washington and Tehran fully implementing their obligations under the JCPOA without the United States being a state party and that Iran may try to impose conditions to a formal U.S. return.

Formally rejoining the JCPOA would give the United States certain privileges, such as participating in meetings of the Joint Commission, which oversees the agreement’s implementation, and having the power under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 to unilaterally trigger a reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran in the event of a violation.

Zarif’s comment about negotiating a return to the JCPOA may be motivated in part by concern that the United States would abuse the UN snapback privilege in the future. The Trump administration attempted to snap back sanctions on Iran earlier this year, despite having withdrawn from the JCPOA, but was opposed because the United States was no longer a participant in the nuclear deal. (See ACT, November 2020.)

It appears that each Biden and Rouhani have the authority to return their respective countries to compliance with the JCPOA, but some of the details and determining the sequencing may pose challenges.

For the United States to return to full compliance with the accord, the Biden administration would need to waive sanctions reimposed when Trump withdrew from the accord and determine if any of the additional sanctions imposed on Iran since May 2018 should be waived.

Iranian officials have called for all of the sanctions put in place by Trump since May 2018 to be lifted, including those imposed for non-nuclear issues, such as support for terrorism.

Nothing in the JCPOA prohibits the United States from imposing sanctions on Iran for non-nuclear activities, but Trump administration officials have indicated that some of these sanctions were put in place to complicate any future return to the JCPOA, suggesting that some of the designations may not have been made in good faith.

Despite this, the Biden administration may face opposition from Congress if it lifts designations on individuals and entities sanctioned under executive orders designed to prevent terrorism, for example.

The Biden administration may also need to make clear that it views Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA and helps implement it, as intact. The Trump administration attempted to use a provision in Resolution 2231 to reimpose all prior UN sanctions on Tehran lifted as a result of the JCPOA in order to prevent the UN arms embargo on Iran from expiring in October. While Security Council members rejected the U.S. argument that it was entitled to snap back the UN sanctions, the Trump administration maintains that the measures were reimposed.

Rouhani appears to have support from Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to return to compliance with the JCPOA, if the United States does likewise.

Saeed Khatizbadeh, spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, summarized Khamenei’s thinking about the future of the nuclear deal, noting that the United States must accept that it made mistakes, end its “economic warfare” against Iran, “implement [its] commitments” and then “compensate for the damages.” It is not clear what compensation Iran will seek, but the order of Khamenei’s steps and Zarif’s comments suggest that Tehran may seek compensation in the negotiations over U.S. reentry into the JCPOA, rather than as a condition for returning to compliance.

For Iran to return to compliance it will need to reverse its violations of the JCPOA. Most of the steps necessary could be accomplished quickly and must include shipping out or blending down uranium enriched in excess of the JCPOA’s limit on 300 kilograms of uranium-235 gas enriched to 3.67 percent, halting enrichment above 3.67 percent, halting enrichment at Fordow and removing all uranium from that location, and dismantling advanced centrifuges installed and operating in excess of JCPOA limits.

Former U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz told Axios on Oct. 30 that Iran could take those steps in about four months.

A potentially more challenging question is how to address new advanced centrifuges Iran installed over the past year that are not covered by the JCPOA. The JCPOA allows Iran to introduce new centrifuges with permission of the Joint Commission, the body that oversees implementation of the JCPOA, but Iran did not seek such approval.

It is unclear if the parties to the JCPOA will ask Iran to dismantle the new machines or if Iran will be permitted to test them in restricted numbers.

President-elect Joe Biden has indicated his support for the 2015 nuclear deal, but going back may be complicated.

Iran’s Accumulation of Enriched Uranium Slows

Authored by Kelsey Davenport and Julia Masterson on November 13, 2020
Although the troubling growth of Iran’s uranium enrichment stockpile continues, the most recent report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicates that Tehran’s accumulation of enriched uranium slowed over the past quarter. It is concerning that Iran continues to breach limits set by the nuclear deal, but the slower stockpile growth and no indication of new violations suggests Tehran is showing restraint so as not to cross any red lines that might imperil a U.S. re-entry into the nuclear deal and return to full compliance by all parties down the road. Iran’s stockpile of...

U.S. Threatens to Sanction Iran Arms Sales


November 2020
By Kelsey Davenport

The Trump administration reiterated its threat to sanction any individual or entity that engages in arms trade with Iran after UN Security Council limits on transfers of conventional weaponry to and from Iran expired Oct. 18.

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif attends a meeting at Russia's Foreign Ministry on Sept. 24. He soon after praised the lifting of a UN arms embargo as a "momentous day for the international community." (Photo: Russian Foreign Ministry/Flickr)The lifting of the arms embargo was a “momentous day for the international community,” which was achieved in “defiance of the U.S. regime’s efforts,” said Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in an Oct. 18 statement.

But he said that Iran will not go on “a buying spree of conventional arms” because that has “no place in Iran’s defense doctrine.” He noted that Tehran will continue to rely on “indigenous capacities and capabilities” to maintain its “strong defensive power.”

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo did not acknowledge the expiration in an Oct. 18 State Department press release, but said that arms trade with Iran is still illegal under UN Security Council measures.

Pompeo said the United States is “prepared to use its domestic authorities to sanction” anyone that contributes to the sale or transfer of arms to and from Iran and those that provide training and financing for sales.

The United States has claimed that it reimposed all UN sanctions lifted or modified by Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorses and helps implement the 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). (See ACT, October 2020.)

But the Security Council rejected the U.S. attempt in September to reimpose the sanctions in order to prevent the arms embargo from expiring. Members of the Security Council, including U.S. allies and JCPOA parties France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, argued that the United States is no longer a party to the nuclear deal and therefore not entitled to use the mechanism in the resolution that allows for participants in the nuclear deal to reimpose UN sanctions in a way that cannot be vetoed.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres said in September that he will take no action to implement the Security Council sanctions the United States claims are reimposed, but it is unclear how many states will be willing to risk engaging in arms trade with Iran because U.S. sanctions on Iran were not lifted or modified by the JCPOA and EU restrictions on arms sales also remain in place.

Russia suggested in September that it would be willing to sell conventional arms to Iran after the embargo is lifted, but the two countries did not immediately announce any sales, and it is unlikely that many other countries will follow suit.

In an Oct. 18 tweet directed at Pompeo, Dmitry Polyansky, Russian ambassador to the United Nations, said, “[W]e are doing and will be doing business with Iran,” and it is not up to the United States “to tell us or others what they can or can’t do.” The tweet did not reference any arms sales.

A separate tweet by Polyansky urged the United States to stop provoking Tehran, refrain from selling arms to the region, and change its vocabulary to focus on dialogue and engagement, not sanctions and punishment.

Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Amir Hatami said on Oct. 18 that Iranian arms sales will far exceed purchases. He said that Iran has had discussions with a number of countries over the past year regarding arms sales and that Tehran will support efforts by states to defend themselves.

As part of its “maximum pressure” campaign, the Trump administration also announced sanctions against 18 additional Iranian banks on Oct. 8.

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement that day that the sanctions will continue until “Iran stops its support of terrorist activities and ends its nuclear programs.” He said that humanitarian exemptions will not be affected by the designation.

The U.S. designations were reportedly opposed by Washington’s European allies over concerns that cutting off additional Iranian banks would make it more difficult for Tehran to pay for humanitarian goods and services.

European officials have raised concerns about the effectiveness of U.S. humanitarian exemptions in the past.

 

The Trump administration boosted its unilateral sanctions against Iran as a UN embargo on arms trade with Tehran expired.

North Korea Parades New Missile


November 2020
By Kelsey Davenport

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un boasted in October that Pyongyang’s strengthened nuclear deterrent is sufficient to address threats posed by hostile forces. His comments were bolstered by the display of a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during an Oct. 11 parade in Pyongyang.

North Korea displays its Hwasong-16 missile at an Oct. 11 military parade. (Photo: KCNA)The missile, dubbed the Hwasong-16, is significantly larger than the ICBMs North Korea has displayed and tested in the past. Its inclusion in the parade does not come as a complete surprise, as Kim previewed the existence of a “new strategic weapon” in an address during the plenary meeting of the Workers Party of Korea in December 2019.

In his parade remarks, Kim said North Korea has built “a deterrent with which we can satisfactorily control and manage any military threats that we are facing or may face” and that he will “enlist all our most powerful offensive strength in advance to punish” any forces that infringe on the country’s security.

It is unclear if Kim was referring to the new ICBM or the missiles tested in 2017. Although Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 missiles are technically capable of targeting the United States, their reliability would be questionable given that Pyongyang has conducted so few tests and none on a standard trajectory. (See ACT, January/February 2018.)

Pyongyang has not announced plans to test the Hwasong-16. North Korea has displayed long-range missiles in the past that have not been tested, raising questions about whether the missile is intended for deployment or only for propaganda.

Similar to the Hwasong-15, the new system appears to be a two-stage, liquid-fueled ballistic missile that would be powerful enough to target the entire continental United States. Unlike the Hwasong-15, analysts suggest that the Hwasong-16 is large enough to carry several warheads.

Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said in an NK News briefing on Oct. 11 that it is “logical” for North Korea to invest in a missile capable of carrying multiple warheads because the approach is less expensive than fielding more missiles.

North Korea may be interested in a multiple-warhead capability to overwhelm U.S. homeland missile defenses, which have about a 50 percent success rate against a single incoming ICBM. North Korea has never successfully tested a reentry vehicle, but a missile with multiple warheads would increases the chances of warheads evading missile defenses.

Kim also said that North Korea’s nuclear deterrent “will never be abused or used as a means for preemptive strike.”

Despite North Korea’s weapons display, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo continued to assert on Oct. 14 that U.S. negotiations with North Korea in 2018 and 2019 “certainly led to reduced risk.”

He emphasized the importance of ensuring North Korea cannot test its missiles to make sure they are “actually functional.”

North Korea declared a voluntary long-range missile and nuclear testing moratorium in April 2018. Kim declared an end to the moratorium in December 2019, but the country has not tested a long-range missile. It has resumed testing of shorter-range systems, including several new systems that were included in the Oct. 11 parade.

Contradicting Pompeo, former National Security Advisor John Bolton told CNBC on Oct. 14 that U.S. President Donald Trump’s “failed diplomacy” with North Korea “wasted a lot of time,” allowing the country to perfect its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.

Bolton, who participated in meetings between Trump and Kim in February 2019 in Hanoi, said the situation is “more dangerous now” because of the progress North Korea has made over the past several years.

In the parade, North Korea also demonstrated advances in its ability to deploy its ICBMs. The Hwasong-16 was carried by an 11-axle transport erector launcher (TEL), making it the largest road-mobile ICBM in the world.

The size of the TEL is notable because North Korea’s other ICBMs require eight- or nine-axle vehicles to transport them.

North Korea is known to have purchased six eight-axle TELs from China in 2010 in violation of UN sanctions. North Korea’s ability to launch a nuclear attack using its ICBMs and the size of its ICBM arsenal is generally thought to be limited, in part because it possesses so few TELs large enough for the missiles.

Melissa Hanham, deputy director of the Open Nuclear Network, noted in an Oct. 11 article for the BBC that the parade was the first time that North Korea has displayed more than six ICBM TELs. She said that the TELs were heavily modified and concluded that North Korea has built up its ability to manufacture and produce its own TELs and procure parts for the vehicles despite sanctions.

Hanham, a North Korea expert, described this development as an “immediate concern” because one of the “major constraints of North Korea's ability to engage in nuclear warfare is the number of launchers they have.”

Kim also drew attention to the modernization of North Korea’s military and said the country would continue to strengthen its “war deterrent” or to “contain and control” the threats posed by hostile forces, including the “aggravating nuclear threat.”

He said the country’s military capabilities are changing “in its quality and quantity…in accordance with our demands and our timetable.”

Kim may have been referring in part to the new short-range ballistic missiles that North Korea has introduced and tested since negotiations with the United States broke down in mid-2019. North Korea displayed those missiles in large quantities at the parade.

Former South Korean nuclear negotiator Chun Yung-woo told reporters that the solid-fueled, short-range missiles pose “the most serious threat our security.” He said North Korea is focused on developing capabilities to attack South Korea while Seoul is “absorbed in a peace campaign.”

Solid-fueled ballistic missiles pose a greater threat than liquid-fueled systems, which must be fueled on site prior to launch, which increases the likelihood of early detection.

North Korea also displayed a new variant of its solid-fueled medium-range Pukguksong missile during the parade. North Korea has tested land-based and sea-based variants of the Pukguksong in the past.

The new system, dubbed the Pukguksong-4, is likely intended for deployment on a submarine Pyongyang is building and may have a longer range than the 1,900-kilometer Pukguksong-3 that North Korea tested in 2019.

 

In displaying a new ICBM, North Korea appeared to show progress on threatening the entire United States with a nuclear attack.

UN Restrictions on Iran’s Arms Trade Expire

Authored by Kelsey Davenport and Julia Masterson on October 28, 2020
UN Restrictions on Iran’s Arms Trade Expire Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif described the expiration of UN restrictions on Iran’s conventional arms trade as “momentous,” but said Tehran will not go on a weapons “buying spree.” The UN arms embargo ended Oct. 18 under the terms of Resolution 2231 , which endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and modified UN sanctions on Iran. The United States sought to prevent the expiration of the UN measures by snapping back Security Council sanctions on Iran using a provision in Resolution 2231 that cannot be blocked by veto. However, the Security...

Joe Biden says under Donald Trump, Iran’s uranium stockpile has grown tenfold. It has.

News Link: 
https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/sep/17/joe-biden/joe-biden-says-under...
Submitted by Anna Kim on Wed, 2020-10-28 02:51
News Date: 
September 17, 2020 -04:00

U.S. prepares to reimpose U.N. sanctions against Iran despite objections from most other countries

News Link: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-iran-sanctions-un/2020/09...
Submitted by Anna Kim on Wed, 2020-10-28 02:50
News Date: 
September 17, 2020 -04:00

Trump’s 'maximum pressure' peaks just before election

News Link: 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/19/trump-iran-maximum-pressure-418225
Submitted by Anna Kim on Wed, 2020-10-28 02:46
News Date: 
September 19, 2020 -04:00

WEBINAR: "The Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal and the NPT"

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Thursday, October 1, 2020
11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. U.S. Eastern Time
via Zoom webinar 

The Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has led Iran to retaliate by exceeding key nuclear limits set by the deal. The U.S. strategy has hobbled but not unraveled the agreement and increased tensions with Iran and the international community. Unless Washington and Teheran return to compliance, however, the deal could collapse entirely creating a serious new nuclear crisis in the region.

In this edition of the “Critical NPT Issues” webinar series sponsored by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Arms Control Association, our panelists reviewed the benefits of the JCPOA, the current status of noncompliance, pathways to repair the situation, and the potential effects on the global nonproliferation system and the upcoming 10th Review Conference of Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Panelists:

  • Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association;
  • Ellie Gerenmyah, Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa Program and Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations; and
  • Emad Kiyaei, Director, Middle East Treaty Organization (METO)

Our next webinar in the Critical NPT Issues series will address steps to fulfill Article VI of the NPT. We encourage you to sign up to receive invitations to future webinars and other updates from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Arms Control Association.

RESOURCES

For more information on the JCPOA, subscribe to the P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert from the Arms Control Association, which provides periodic news and analysis on the negotiations and implementation of the nuclear deal. 

If you want to follow discussions on nuclear weapons during the 2020 session of the UNGA First Committee, subscribe to the First Committee Monitor, a publication of WILPF’s disarmament programme Reaching Critical Will, or visit their resource page for more information.

 

Description: 

In this edition of our “Critical NPT Issues” webinar series, we will review the benefits of the JCPOA, the current status of noncompliance, pathways to repair the situation, and the potential effects on the upcoming NPT Review Conference.

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U.S., Allies Spar Over Iran Sanctions


October 2020
By Kelsey Davenport

The United States threatened to sanction any country that does not enforce UN restrictions on Iran that the Trump administration claims were reimposed last month, but the UN secretary-general said he will not take any steps to implement those measures, and other states dismissed U.S. claims as invalid.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell speaks to the media in Brussels on Sept. 21. He indicated that month that the United States has no standing to demand the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran. (Photo by Thierry Monasse/Getty Images)UN sanctions on Iran were lifted or modified in 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the seven-party deal that limited Iran’s nuclear activities. Recently, the Trump administration asserted on Sept. 19 that the sanctions had been restored after the United States initiated a so-called snapback mechanism, created by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which contains language allowing participants in the nuclear deal to reimpose UN sanctions in a manner that cannot be vetoed. The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 has created a dispute over U.S. standing to demand the return of UN sanctions under the terms of Resolution 2231.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Sept. 19 that the United States expects “all UN member states to fully comply with their obligations under these reimposed restrictions.” Pompeo said failure to do so would result in the United States using “domestic authorities to impose our consequences for those failures.” He later threatened that “no matter who you are, if you violate the UN arms embargo on Iran, you risk sanctions.”

But Reuters reported on Sept. 19 that UN Secretary-General António Guterres told the Security Council in a letter that due to “uncertainty” over the status of the UN sanctions, he will not take any action to implement the measures. Guterres said that “it is not for the secretary-general to proceed as if no such uncertainty exists.”

The same day, Majid Takht Ravanchi, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, tweeted the U.S. “illegal and false ‘deadline’ has come and gone” and that Security Council “member states continue to maintain [the] U.S. is NOT a JCPOA participant, so its claim of ‘snapback’ is null and void.”

The United States issued a snapback notification to the Security Council president and Guterres on Aug. 20, but Security Council members, including the presidents in August and September, rejected the Trump administration’s claim that it was entitled to use the mechanism in Resolution 2231 to reimpose UN sanctions. The Trump administration took that step after it failed to pass a Security Council resolution to extend the arms embargo on Iran, which is set to expire in October according to the terms of the nuclear deal and Resolution 2231. (See ACT, September 2020.)

The United States argues that it is still listed as a participant in the nuclear deal under Resolution 2231, despite having withdrawn from the accord. The Security Council presidents and other Security Council members, including the remaining parties to the nuclear deal, have argued that the United States lacks the standing to trigger a snapback, despite still being listed as a JCPOA participant.

In a Sept. 18 letter to the Security Council, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom said the U.S. snapback is “incapable of having any legal effect” due to Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA.

France, Germany, and the UK, along with Russia and China, are all parties to the JCPOA and sit on the Security Council.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, who coordinates the group of JCPOA participants known as the P4+1, said on Sept. 19 that “sanctions-lifting commitments under the JCPOA continue to apply.” He also referred to a Sept. 1 statement after a meeting of the P4+1 and Iran, which noted that the United States has not participated in JCPOA-related activities since it withdrew in May 2018 and “therefore could not be considered as a participant state.”

Russia’s ambassador to the UN tweeted more bluntly “Is Washington deaf?” and noted that “we all clearly said in August that U.S. claims to trigger snapback are illegitimate.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani expressed his appreciation at the UN General Assembly for the Security Council’s “decisive and resounding” rejection of the U.S. attempt to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran. The United States is in “self-created isolation,” he said on Sept. 22.

Despite the widespread rejection of the U.S. claim that UN sanctions were reimposed, the Trump administration issued a Sept. 21 executive order aimed specifically at sanctioning entities that engage in conventional arms trade with Iran. The order stated that “transfers to and from Iran of arms or related materiel or military equipment represent a continuing threat to regional and international security.”

It is unclear why the Trump administration issued the order, as existing U.S. authorities already allow the president to sanction arms transfers to and from Iran.

Iran views UN sanctions relief, specifically the expiring arms embargo, as one of the few remaining benefits of continued participation in the nuclear deal after the United States withdrew and reimposed U.S. sanctions in May 2018.

But given the U.S. sanctions on Iran’s arms sales, which remained in place even when the United States was a participant in the JCPOA, the EU embargo on Iranian arms sales, and other UN measures that prohibit arms sales to Lebanon and Yemen, Iranian arms transfers will still face a number of restrictions once the UN embargo expires in October.

The United States also announced on Sept. 21 specific sanctions against individuals that are “directly involved” in Iran’s production of enriched uranium in excess of the nuclear deal’s commitments and individuals involved in Iranian-North Korean missile cooperation.

Iran initially threatened to retaliate if the UN snapped back sanctions on Iran, but did not immediately announce any new steps to violate the accord or ratchet up existing nuclear activities in response to the Trump administration’s actions. The near-universal rejection of the U.S. attempt to reimpose the UN measures appears to have mollified Tehran.

Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations on Sept. 21, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif underscored Iran’s continued commitment to the nuclear deal and its willingness to return to full implementation if all parties do the same.

Iran will “absolutely not” renegotiate the JCPOA, he said, but a “more for more” deal may be possible if the United States commits under the nuclear deal “that it will not violate it again, that it will not make demands outside the scope of the deal, [and] that it will compensate Iran for the damages.”

The Trump administration has failed to win support for its effort to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran.

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