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"Though we have acheived progress, our work is not over. That is why I support the mission of the Arms Control Association. It is, quite simply, the most effective and important organization working in the field today." 

– Larry Weiler
Former U.S.-Russian arms control negotiator
August 7, 2018
Kelsey Davenport

The Impact: Iran Breaches Nuclear Deal

News Source: 
The Iran Primer
News Date: 
July 8, 2019 -04:00

Compliance with Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation Norms Is Eroding, New Study Finds

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All nuclear weapons possessor states failed to make progress to reduce their nuclear arsenals; Key states’ records in nine of 10 nonproliferation & disarmament categories have deteriorated.

For Immediate Release: July 10, 2019

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107

(Washington, DC)—A new, 80-page study published by the Arms Control Association evaluates the recent records of all the world’s nuclear-armed states, as well as several states of proliferation concern and finds that respect for key nuclear nonproliferation norms and internationally-recognized obligations and commitments is eroding.

The report, "Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 2016-2019," is the fourth in a series that assesses the extent to which 11 key states are fulfilling, promoting, or undermining 10 standards identified as critical elements of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime.

Collectively, states fared worse on the majority of criteria when compared with the prior edition of the Arms Control Association’s Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament Report Card covering the 2013–2016 period.

The study comprehensively evaluates the records of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea—each of which possesses nuclear weapons—as well as Iran and Syria, which are states of proliferation concern, from 2016 through March 2019.

“Each of the states that possess nuclear weapons is taking steps to invest in new delivery systems and several are expanding the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines," noted Alicia Sanders-Zakre, a co-author of the report. "These trends increase the risk of nuclear weapons use,” she warned.

“Our review of actions—and inactions—by these 11 states suggest a worrisome trend away from long-standing, effective arms control and nonproliferation efforts," warned Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association and co-author of the report. "By documenting the policies of these states over the last decade, we hope this report will demonstrate that support for critical nonproliferation and disarmament norms is eroding.”  

Several of the key findings include:

  • The United States and Russia: The overall grades for both the United States (C+) and Russia (C+) dropped, due partly to Russia’s violation of a key bilateral arms control treaty and the U.S. decision to withdraw from that treaty in response. Both states also expanded the circumstances under which they would use nuclear weapons and are investing in new, destabilizing delivery systems.
     
  • France and the United Kingdom: These two states received the highest overall grades (B) of the 11 states assessed, but neither country has taken steps during the period covered in this report to make additional nuclear force reductions.
     
  • China, India, and Pakistan: All three of these states are increasing the size of their nuclear arsenals and are investing in new nuclear-capable delivery systems. New missiles being developed and fielded by all three suggest that these countries are now storing warheads mated with certain missiles or moving toward that step, which increases the risk of use. China’s overall grade was a C+; India and Pakistan both scored C.
     
  • North Korea: North Korea scored the worst of the states assessed in this report with an overall grade of F. Pyongyang continues to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal and is the only state to have tested a nuclear weapon during the timeframe covered. However, North Korea continues to abide by a voluntary nuclear and missile testing moratorium declared in April 2018 and appears willing to negotiate with the United States over its nuclear weapons program.
     
  • Iran: Through the period covered by this report and until June 2019, Tehran continued to adhere to the restrictions on its nuclear activities put in place by the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal over the course of this report, despite the United States’ withdrawal from the agreement last year and its decision to reimpose sanctions in violation of U.S. commitments. Iran, however, has transferred ballistic missile components in violation of international norms and Security Council restrictions, causing its overall grade to drop to C-.
     
  • Israel: Israeli actions over the past several years in support of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty earned it a higher grade on the nuclear testing criteria, but its inaction on the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and backsliding on negative security assurances caused its overall grade to drop to a C-.

The report reviews implementation and compliance with existing internationally-recognized obligations and commitments.

“The standards and benchmarks in our report do not necessarily represent our ideal strategy for addressing the nuclear weapons threat,” noted Davenport. “New and more ambitious multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament strategies will be needed to meet to future nuclear challenges,” she remarked.

Last week, the U.S. State Department convened a meeting involving more than three-dozen countries, including the five original nuclear weapon states, to discuss steps to improve the environment for nuclear disarmament.

“We hope this report card can serve as a tool to help hold states accountable to their existing commitments and encourage effective action needed to strengthen efforts to prevent the spread and use of the world’s most dangerous weapons,” noted Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. 

“We encourage all states who are serious about strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament enterprise to commit themselves to meet and exceed the existing goals and objectives to reduce and eliminate the nuclear danger,” he urged.

The full report can be accessed at www.armscontrol.org/reports

Description: 

A new report details the extent to which 11 key states are fulfilling, promoting, or undermining 10 standards identified as critical elements of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. 

With Further Nuclear Moves, Iran Seeks to Leverage Promised Sanctions Relief | P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, July 9, 2019

With Further Nuclear Moves, Iran Seeks to Leverage Promised Sanctions Relief Iran announced July 8 that it has started enriching uranium at levels in excess of the limit of 3.67 percent uranium-235 set by the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The move is the second troubling retaliatory measure in two weeks by Iran to walk back its compliance with the JCPOA. Last week, Iran exceeded the 300-kilogram limit of its stockpile of low enriched uranium set by the JCPOA. Iran’s moves to curtail compliance with the JCPOA have long been expected. Iranian...

Trump and Kim Agree to Resume Talks | The North Korea Denuclearization Digest, July 2, 2019

Trump and Kim Agree to Resume Talks U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un met at the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating North and South Korea June 30 and agreed to restart negotiations on denuclearization and peacebuilding in the region. Trump was in South Korea for talks with President Moon Jae-in and had planned to visit the DMZ, but his invitation to Kim to meet at the border was publicly announced in a last-minute tweet June 28. It is unclear if the impromptu meeting, which included Moon, will actually put negotiations back on track. Trump and Kim said their...

Iran Violates 2015 Nuclear Deal

News Source: 
U.S. News
News Date: 
July 1, 2019 -04:00

Iran nuclear move puts pressure on EU but Israel is 'wild card'

News Source: 
The National
News Date: 
July 1, 2019 -04:00

Iran Moves Toward Breaching Nuclear Limits


July/August 2019
By Kelsey Davenport

Iran is moving closer to the limits on its nuclear program set by the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal after threatening in May to breach certain caps, but Tehran has not yet crossed those thresholds. The United States, however, has already accused Iran of violating the accord, an assertion disputed by other parties to the agreement.

Iranian workers smile at the nation’s newly opened heavy water production plant in Arak in 2006. Iran has moved closer to storing more heavy water than allowed by the 2015 nuclear deal. (Photo: Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images)Iran announced on May 8 that it would no longer adhere to stockpile limits for low-enriched uranium and heavy water set by the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The announcement was a response to the U.S. decision in May 2018 to reimpose sanctions and withdraw from the agreement. (See ACT, June 2019.)

According to a May 31 report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran’s implementation of the nuclear deal, Iran moved closer to the caps on enriched uranium and heavy water set by the deal, but did not exceed them.

The agency reported that as of May 20, Iran had stockpiled 174 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235, which is less than the 202 kilograms permitted by the JCPOA. In its previous report in February, the IAEA reported that the stockpile was 168 kilograms.

Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), said on June 17 that Iran was quadrupling its uranium-enrichment capacity and would breach the limit set by the deal within 10 days.

Exceeding the limit of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent U-235 would reduce the so-called breakout time, or the time it takes Iran to produce enough nuclear material for a weapon, but it does not pose an immediate risk. Currently, due to restrictions put in place by the nuclear deal, the United States estimates that timeline at 12 months.

Any reduction in the 12-month timeline will depend on how quickly Iran continues to enrich and stockpile uranium. Tehran would need to produce about 1,050 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas enriched to 3.67 percent U-235 to produce enough weapons-grade material (more than 90 percent-enriched U-235) for one bomb.

Kamalvandi also said that Iran was increasing its production of heavy water and would exceed the JCPOA’s 130-metric-ton cap in two-and-a-half months. According to the IAEA, Iran had 125 metric tons as of May 26.

Heavy water is used to moderate the reactions that occur in certain types of reactors, including Iran’s unfinished reactor at Arak.

The IAEA also reported that Iran had installed 33 advanced IR-6 centrifuges, of which 10 are being tested with uranium, at its Natanz plant. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced in April that Iran would install 20 additional IR-6 machines at the facility.

Past IAEA reports have not indicated the specific number of IR-6 centrifuges installed at the facility, but stated that Iran was conducting its research and development (R&D) activities using advanced centrifuges in accordance with a confidential plan submitted to the agency.

That language did not appear in the May report, which stated that technical discussions on the IR-6 centrifuges are “ongoing.”

Citing the number of installed IR-6 centrifuges, Jackie Wolcott, U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, said on June 11 that Iran “is now reported to be in clear violation of the deal.” Other countries still party to the agreement argue that Iran’s actions fall into a gray area not explicitly covered by the accord.

According to the JCPOA, Iran is permitted to conduct mechanical testing on up to two IR-6 centrifuges and can test with uranium using “single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades.” Iran cannot withdraw any enriched material from the centrifuges.

The deal does not specify what constitutes an intermediate cascade, but states that, after eight-and-a-half years, or beginning in July 2024, Iran can “commence testing” of up to 30 IR-6 centrifuges.

Additional detail is likely found in the confidential R&D plan that Iran submitted to the IAEA. Alleged copies of the plan leaked in 2016 suggest that Iran can test about 10 IR-6 centrifuges for the first four years of the deal and then move to a cascade of 20 machines until year eight and a half, when it is permitted to test up to 30.

It does not appear to be clear in either the nuclear deal or leaked copies of the R&D plan how far ahead of those time frames Iran is permitted to install the additional IR-6 machines.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on June 6 that inspectors have not found “a single violation” of Iran’s nuclear commitments.

An official from a country party to the JCPOA told Arms Control Today on June 13 that Tehran is “pushing the limits” of the deal but the IR-6 installation is not likely a violation. The official said that it is for the JCPOA Joint Commission to “resolve any ambiguities or compliance questions” and it is premature for states to make judgments on the IR-6 dispute before the commission can consider the issue.

The commission was set up to oversee implementation of the deal and resolve any compliance issues. It is comprised of the parties to the deal, so the United States is no longer a participant. The next commission meeting is scheduled for June 28.

Wolcott said the commission is “treating this issue with the seriousness it deserves.”

 

Iran Rejects Trump Outreach

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rebuffed a message from U.S. President Donald Trump in June, saying he would not send a response because Trump is not “deserving to exchange messages with.”

Trump’s message was delivered to Khamenei by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who visited Tehran on June 12-13. The content of the message has not been disclosed, but Khamenei told Abe that Iran believes that its “problems will not be solved by negotiating” with the United States and that there is no sense in talking with Washington after the United States has “thrown away everything that was agreed upon,” referring to Trump’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal in
May 2018.

During a May 27 visit to Tokyo, Trump supported Abe’s decision to travel to Tehran and said he is “not looking to hurt Iran at all” and that he thinks “we’ll make a deal.”

On June 2, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the United States is “prepared to engage in a conversation [with Iran] with no preconditions.”

Since then, tensions between the United States and Iran have increased. The United States accused Iran of attacking two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on June 13. Iran denied that it was behind the attack, and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif suggested that a foreign country might have conducted the attack and is trying to blame Iran.

Iranian officials did publicly acknowledge shooting down a U.S. surveillance drone on June 20. Iran claimed that the drone was shot down in Iranian airspace, but the United States argued that the drone was in international airspace.

Trump sent mixed messages in response to Iran shooting down the drone. He tweeted on June 20 that “Iran made a very big mistake!” Later in the day, Trump said that he found it “hard to believe” that Iran’s action was intentional. The Trump administration discussed a possible retaliatory strike, but Trump said on June 21 that he did not give final approval for military action.

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas also visited Tehran recently. In a June 9 press conference with Zarif, Maas said that Germany remains committed to finding solutions that provide Iran with the economic benefits envisioned by the nuclear deal, but admitted that “we can’t perform miracles.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said in May that Iran will return to compliance with the nuclear deal and refrain from further actions to breach the accord, currently planned for early July, if Europe, Russia, and China can facilitate oil and banking transactions.

Maas’s delegation included representatives from INSTEX, the mechanism set up by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to bypass U.S. sanctions and facilitate trade with Iran. INSTEX has yet to conduct a transaction, but a statement from the three countries after the visit said they are working to complete the first transaction “as quickly as possible.”—KELSEY DAVENPORT

Iran is increasing its stocks of enriched uranium and heavy water, nearing the limits set by the 2015 nuclear deal.

Chinese President Visits North Korea


July/August 2019
By Kelsy Davenport

China and North Korea sought to shore up their alliance at a June summit in Pyongyang between Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. It was their fifth meeting, held as U.S.-North Korean negotiations remain stalled one year after Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump met for the first time in Singapore.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (right) wave during a June 21 welcome parade Xi received on his visit to Pyongyang. The two leaders focused on their talks on economic development and cooperation.  (Photo: Korean Central News Agency)The June 20–21 summit, Xi’s first trip to North Korea, focused on economic development and cooperation between the two countries. The leaders emphasized the importance of stability in the region, but there were few explicit references in official statements from China and North Korea regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program or advancing denuclearization.

Xi spoke highly of North Korean efforts to “safeguard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and promote the denuclearization of the peninsula,” according to a June 20 statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. He also expressed his hope that talks between the United States and North Korea “will move forward and bear fruit.”

Xi praised North Korea’s “active measures to avoid tension” and expressed concern that North Korea has not received “a positive response from the concerned side,” likely referring to the Trump administration’s reluctance to pursue an incremental approach to denuclearization and peace-building.

The Chinese statement reported that Kim said North Korea is “willing to stay patient” and hopes that the United States will meet North Korea “halfway to seek solutions that accommodate each other’s legitimate concerns.”

The talks likely included discussions on sanctions relief, given North Korea’s frustration with Washington’s unwillingness to lift or waive economic restrictions before North Korea completes denuclearization. China has supported limited sanctions relief in exchange for North Korean steps toward denuclearization in the past.

Prior to arriving in Pyongyang, Xi published an article in Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of North Korea’s state party, outlining his ambitions for a “grand plan” that would lead to “permanent peace in the region.” Xi’s article appears to be the first piece by a foreign leader run by the paper, which focuses on a domestic audience.

He did not offer details on the plan or mention North Korea’s nuclear weapons or denuclearization, but said that Beijing is looking to strengthen “strategic communication” and cooperation with North Korea. He also praised North Korea for its restraint and commitment to dialogue, saying that Beijing supports Pyongyang’s “adherence to the right direction of politically solving the issues” through negotiations.

Xi’s visit to Pyongyang preceded the Group of 20 summit in Japan in late June and may have been intended to gain leverage in contentious trade talks between Washington and Beijing by reminding Trump that China has influence in North Korea, although the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied any connection between the meetings. In a June 18 phone call, Xi told Trump that he was prepared to meet with Trump during the summit, but did not say if North Korea would be a topic of discussion.

Stephen Biegun, U.S. special representative for North Korea, did not seem concerned that Xi’s visit to Pyongyang was indicative of Chinese frustration with the U.S. approach to negotiations or that Beijing would attempt to leverage its relationship with North Korea during trade discussions. “China agrees with us 100 percent” on North Korea policy, Biegun said June 19, adding that he was confident that Xi would “send constructive and appropriate messages” to Kim during the visit.

Negotiations between the United States and North Korea remain stalled, but Kim and Trump recently exchanged letters. Trump received another “beautiful” letter from Kim, he said on June 11, adding that “something will happen that’s going to be very positive.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un examines a letter from President Donald Trump in June. (Photo: Korean Central News Agency)The Korean Central News Agency reported on June 23 that Trump’s response to Kim “contains excellent content.” Photos of the letter shared by North Korean media indicate that it was dated June 12, the first anniversary of the Singapore summit.

Despite the positive characterization of Trump’s letter, North Korean media continues to criticize the U.S. approach to negotiations. (See ACT, May 2019.) In a June 4 statement, the North Korean Foreign Ministry said the United States needs to “cogitate” on the “correct strategic choices before it is too late.”

The statement said that, in the year after the 2018 Singapore summit, progress could have been made on the goals agreed by the leaders “had the United States done anything” to “help in addressing the issues on the basis of serious position and sincere attitude.”

Biegun defended the Trump administration’s approach to negotiations in a June 19 speech at the Atlantic Council. Biegun said talks with North Korea remain in a “holding pattern,” but noted “an uptick in activity” over the past week, likely referring to the exchange of letters.

Stressing the importance of flexibility, Biegun said the United States will continue to pursue agreement on the end state of negotiations before pursuing incremental steps in tandem with North Korea, an approach that Kim rejected during the second summit with Trump in Hanoi in February. (See ACT, March 2019.)

“We will never get to our destination if we don’t know where we are going,” Biegun said.

Biegun also said that his North Korean counterparts must be empowered to “negotiate on all of the issues,” adding that working-level talks must address more than peace-building and transforming relations. “We also have to talk about denuclearization,” Biegun said.

 

Kim Jong Un hosts China’s president as U.S.-North Korean talks continue to lapse.

Pentagon Warns of Chinese Nuclear Strength


July/August 2019
By Alicia Sanders-Zakre and Kelsey Davenport

China may have tested its new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in June, but Beijing has not confirmed the launch. Chinese media first reported that a JL-3 missile was tested in the Yellow Sea’s Bohai Bay on June 2. The JL-3 is an SLBM with an estimated range of more than 9,000 kilometers that is designed for China’s next-generation submarine, which is not under construction. The first test of the JL-3 took place in Bohai Bay in November 2018.

A Chinese Jin-class nuclear submarine participates in a naval parade on April 23. (Photo: Mark Schiefelbein/AFP/Getty Images)The People’s Liberation Army tweeted a photo of the June 2 test, but did not name the missile. The South China Morning Post quoted two military sources saying that the missile test was designed to check an improved guidance system on a deployed land-based ballistic missile and that Bohai Bay was closed for an unrelated military exercise.

When deployed, the JL-3 will extend the range of China’s sea-based nuclear weapons. Beijing currently uses the JL-2, which has a range of about 8,000 kilometers.

According to an annual U.S. Defense Department report released in May, China has invested significantly in its sea-based nuclear forces in recent years.

China completed construction of two more JIN-class ballistic missile submarines, up from four last year, the report says, noting that four of the six submarines are operational.

A fleet of survivable nuclear submarines could reduce China’s incentive to expand its nuclear arsenal, but it also could lead China to increase the alert level of its nuclear forces, Tong Zhao, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in an October 2018 report.

This year’s Pentagon report also finds that China has deployed more intermediate-range ballistic missiles
while developing new capabilities, such as air-launched ballistic missiles.

Titled “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” the Pentagon’s analysis found that China possesses 80 to 160 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, a jump from the 2018 estimate of 16 to 30 missiles, including nuclear-capable DF-26 missiles with a 4,000-kilometer range that were first fielded in 2016.

China’s DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) remains under development, according to the report, which reaffirmed its 2018 assessment that China is exploring road-mobile, rail-mobile and silo-based launch options for the missile. It is expected to carry multiple warheads.

The 2019 report indicates that China has now fielded the DF-31AG, an improved variant of the DF-31A ICBM.

The report asserts with more certainty that China’s H-6K bomber could have a nuclear mission, claiming that “since at least 2016, Chinese media have been referring to the H-6K as a dual nuclear-conventional bomber.”

As it did last year, the report finds that China is still developing two new air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may include a nuclear payload. Once China is able to deploy these missiles, it would possess a viable nuclear triad—the ability to launch nuclear weapons from the land, air, and sea.

China tests new ballistic missiles, part of a growing arsenal, according to a U.S. assessment.

U.S. and Iranian Actions Put Nuclear Deal in Jeopardy

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Statement by Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy
and Daryl G. Kimball, executive director

For Immediate Release: June 27, 2019

Media Contacts: Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy, (202) 463-8270 ext. 102 (print/radio only); Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107

(Washington, DC)—Iran’s announcement that it may soon breach the 300-kilogram limit on low-enriched uranium set by the 2015 nuclear deal is an expected but troubling response to the Trump administration’s reckless and ill-conceived pressure campaign to kill the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

It is critical that President Donald Trump does not overreact to this breach and further escalate tensions.

Any violation of the deal is a serious concern but, in and of itself, an increase in Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile above the 300-kilogram limit of 3.67 percent enriched uranium does not pose a near-term proliferation risk.

Iran would need to produce roughly 1,050 kilograms of uranium enriched at that level, further enrich it to weapons grade (greater than 90 percent uranium-235), and then weaponize it. Intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections would provide early warning of any further moves by Iran to violate the deal.

Tehran is not racing toward the bomb but rather, Iran’s leaders are seeking leverage to counter the U.S. pressure campaign, which has systematically denied Iran any benefits of complying with the deal. Despite Iran’s understandable frustration with the U.S. reimposition of sanctions, it remains in Tehran’s interest to fully comply with the agreement’s limits and refrain from further actions that violate the accord.

If Iran follows through on its threat to resume higher levels of enrichment July 7, that would pose a more serious proliferation risk. Stockpiling uranium enriched to a higher level would shorten the time it would take Iran to produce enough nuclear material for a bomb–a timeline that currently stands at 12 months as a result of the nuclear deal’s restrictions.

The Trump administration’s failed Iran policy is on the brink of manufacturing a new nuclear crisis, but there is still a window to salvage the deal and deescalate tensions.

The Joint Commission, which is comprised of the parties to the deal (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Iran) and oversees implementation of JCPOA, will meet June 28. The meeting is a critical opportunity for the state parties to press Iran to fully comply with the nuclear deal and commit to redouble efforts to deliver on sanctions-relief obligations.

For its part, the White House needs to avoid steps that further escalate tensions with Iran. Trump must cease making vague military threats and refrain from taking actions such as revoking waivers for key nuclear cooperation projects that actually benefit U.S. nonproliferation priorities.

If Trump does not change course, he risks collapsing the nuclear deal and igniting a conflict in the region.

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An increase in Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile above the JCPOA-mandated limits does not in itself pose a near-term proliferation risk, and it is critical that the Trump administration does not overreact to this breach and further escalate tensions.

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