December 2023
By Michael T. Klare

The First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which is responsible for international security and disarmament affairs, has adopted a draft resolution calling for the secretary-general to conduct a comprehensive study of lethal autonomous weapons systems.

The measure was approved on Oct. 12 by an overwhelming 164-5 vote, suggesting that it will be adopted by the full assembly before it adjourns in December. Eight UN member states abstained.

The committee action marked the first time that the UN has addressed the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems, which are governed by artificial intelligence (AI) rather than human operators.

In conducting the study, the secretary-general is instructed to consult the views of member states and civil society “on ways to address the related challenges and concerns they raise [regarding the use of autonomous weapons] from humanitarian, legal, security, technological and ethical perspectives.”

A final report is to be readied for the 2024 session of the General Assembly, where further action on these systems
is expected.

“The objective is obviously to move forward on regulating autonomous weapons systems,” Alexander Kmentt, director of disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation in the Austrian Foreign Affairs Ministry, told Arms Control Today in an email. “The resolution makes it clear that the overwhelming majority of states wants to address this issue with urgency.” Austria was one of the lead sponsors of the proposed measure.

In calling for the study, the resolution notes that considerable disquiet has arisen among UN member states over the ethical, legal, and humanitarian implications of deploying machines with the capacity to take human lives. Concerns also have emerged over the “impact of autonomous weapon systems on global security and regional and international stability,” the resolution states. In seeking the views of member states and civil society on the use of such systems, the secretary-general is specifically instructed to solicit feedback on those concerns.

Although the resolution would not impose any specific limitations on the use of these systems, as some governments and civil society organizations have demanded, it demonstrates the desire of many states to create options for more vigorous UN action on the topic.

Until now, international efforts to control the development and deployment of autonomous weapons systems have centered largely around negotiations in Geneva to ban such systems in accordance with the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). That treaty is designed to prohibit or restrict the use of munitions that cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or indiscriminately affect civilians.

Civil society organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, have joined with representatives of Austria, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and numerous other governments to press for the adoption of an “additional protocol” under the CCW restricting the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems or banning them altogether. But because decisions at meetings of the treaty’s state-parties are made by consensus, Russian and U.S. opposition to binding measures in this area has stymied these efforts. (See ACT, April 2023.)

In light of this impasse, proponents of a ban or restrictions on these systems have turned to the General Assembly as a potential arena for achieving progress on the issue because decisions there are made by majority vote, not consensus, and support for such measures appears to be strong, given the lopsided vote in favor of the Oct. 12 resolution.

“Unfortunately, some states seem intent on continuing discussions in Geneva but not to allow progress towards negotiations of a legally binding instrument,” Kmentt observed. “Even if we can’t reflect any substantive progress in the discussions in Geneva, UN member states now have this other avenue to clearly reflect and express what they think ought to be done on this extremely crucial issue.”

Kmentt also noted that the resolution calls for a wider discussion of lethal autonomous weapons systems and the risks they pose than has been conducted at the negotiations in Geneva. “Humanity is about to cross a major threshold of profound importance when the decision over life and death is no longer taken by humans but made on the basis of pre-programmed algorithms, [raising] fundamental ethical issues,” he wrote in his email. “The resolution and the mandated report will hopefully broaden the international debate.”

December 2023
By Mohammadreza Giveh

Israel used its Arrow-3 missile defense system to shoot down a ballistic missile, marking the system’s first combat interception. The ballistic missile was launched at Israel from the direction of the Red Sea on Nov. 9, presumably by Houthi militants in Yemen.

Produced by Israel Aerospace Industries in collaboration with the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, the surface-to-surface Arrow missile defense system, considered the top tier of Israel’s multilayered air defenses, is focused on incoming ballistic missiles and consists of the Arrow-2 and the Arrow-3 variants.

The more advanced Arrow-3 is intended to defend against longer-range missile threats and the Arrow-2 to defend against regional short-range or medium-range threats. The Arrow-2 system had its first successful intercept on Oct. 31.

The Nov. 9 interception came as Israel and Hamas militants were waging war in Gaza. It was the Arrow-3’s “first operational interception since its operational deployment in 2017…[and] follows the recent success of the first operational interception” by the Arrow-2 the prior week, according to a joint statement by the Israeli Defense Ministry and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Breaking Defense quoted the IDF as saying the missile on Nov. 9 came from the Red Sea region, presumably meaning that Houthi militants launched that attack.

The Arrow-2 interception happened outside the atmosphere at an altitude of approximately 60 miles, making it the first instance of space combat, The Jerusalem Post reported.

“Our armed forces launched a large batch of ballistic and winged missiles and a large number of drones at various targets of the Israeli enemy,” a Houthi spokesperson said in claiming responsibility for the Oct. 31 attacks, according to CNN.
 

December 2023
By Kelsey Davenport

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) strongly condemned Iran’s decision to reject experienced agency inspectors and continued failure to fulfill its safeguards obligations. Despite these concerns, the agency’s Board of Governors took no action against Iran during its quarterly meeting in November.

States are permitted to reject IAEA inspectors, but IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi told the board that Iran’s actions are “unprecedented and contrary to the cooperation that is required” to effectively implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

In a Nov. 22 press conference following his statement to the board, Grossi said that the inspectors that Iran de-designated in September include some of the agency’s most experienced experts on uranium enrichment. He said that excluding these inspectors is a “very serious blow” to the agency’s efforts to implement safeguards in Iran. The IAEA and Iran are discussing reinstating the inspectors, Grossi said.

The head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Mohammad Eslami, defended Iran’s decision to reject the inspectors. He said in October that the inspectors in question had “politically oriented agendas.”

Grossi also reported that implementation of an agreement reached on March 4 between the agency and Iran on addressing outstanding safeguards issues and voluntarily enhancing monitoring has “come to a standstill.” He said that there has been no progress on additional transparency since May and no further cooperation on the agency’s investigation into previously undeclared nuclear activities. (See ACT, June 2023.)

According to an IAEA report on Nov. 17, Eslami told Grossi during a September meeting not to expect progress on the March 4 agreement until sanctions are lifted. The report did not specify which sanctions, but Eslami likely was referring to U.S. and European sanctions that should have been lifted under the 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Although Iran is not legally obligated to provide further monitoring, it is required to meet its safeguards obligations, which include addressing IAEA questions about uranium detected at two locations not declared to the agency. (See ACT, July/August 2021.) The undeclared uranium activities took place prior to 2003, according to samples taken by the agency, but the IAEA is still obligated to determine if the material involved is accounted for.

The IAEA also is looking into a discrepancy in uranium accountancy at Iran’s conversion facility. Iran’s initial responses regarding the discrepancy did not address the agency’s questions, but the IAEA noted in a Nov. 17 report that it is reviewing additional information provided by Iran on Nov. 8.

Grossi reminded Iran that all safeguards issues “need to be resolved” for the agency “to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear [program] is exclusively peaceful.”

Laura Holgate, U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, told the board on Nov. 22 that Iran’s “inadequate cooperation with the agency overall is unacceptable.” She said that Iran “should take actions that build international confidence, rather than undermine the [a]gency’s essential assurances.”

Holgate said that “Iran argues it is treated unfairly…[but the] reality remains that Iran continues to single itself out through its actions.”

In a Nov. 13 report, the IAEA provided updates on Iran’s uranium-enrichment activities. It said that Iran continued to produce uranium enriched to 60 percent uranium-235 at a reduced rate. The stockpile of uranium enriched to that level grew by nearly seven kilograms, to 128 kilograms. That quantity is about enough material for three nuclear weapons if it were enriched to weapons grade, or 90 percent-enriched U-235.

The IAEA report noted that the number of centrifuges Iran used to enrich uranium remained unchanged. Since the last quarterly report was finalized in August, Iran did install one additional cascade of IR-4 centrifuges at its Natanz uranium-enrichment facility, but did not begin operating it.

There were no changes to the number of centrifuge cascades at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, despite Iran’s commitment in November 2022 to increase the number of cascades from eight to 16.

Holgate said Iran’s nuclear expansion has “no credible peaceful purpose” and called on Tehran to halt production of 60 percent-enriched U-235.

The United States also warned Iran against transferring ballistic missiles to Russia. Tehran has support the Russian invasion of Ukraine by transferring drones to Moscow in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and restricted Iran’s ability to import and export certain missiles, drones, and related technologies. Those UN restrictions expired in October.

The Biden administration expressed concern in a Nov. 21 statement that Iran is considering providing Russia with short-range ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have warned Iran that it could face a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions, including the missile restrictions that expired in October, if it provides Russia with ballistic missiles. Iran has threatened to withdraw from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if UN sanctions are reimposed.

A provision in Resolution 2231 allows for the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran. The reimposition cannot be vetoed.

December 2023
By Kelsey Davenport

Top defense officials from 18 countries condemned North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and pledged to respond jointly to any attack that threatens South Korea’s security.

In a Nov. 14 statement, the states said that they “will be united upon any renewal of hostilities or armed attack on the Korean peninsula” that challenges UN principles and the security of South Korea.

The 18 states were South Korea and 17 of the 22 member states that contribute military personnel to the UN Command, the multilateral forces established by the UN Security Council in 1950 to restore peace on the Korean peninsula. The UN Command continues to monitor the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea and enforce the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War.

South Korea is not a member of the UN Command, and the Nov. 14 meeting in Seoul was the first high-level defense meeting between UN Command members and South Korea. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol prioritized holding this meeting as part of his strategy to bolster South Korea’s defense against North Korea.

In a speech opening the meeting, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said that if “North Korea again commits an illegal invasion of the South,” it would be a “serious act of betrayal” against the United Nations and “inevitably lead to strong punishment” by the UN Command and the international community.

He said that any country that assists North Korea in an attack “will face the same punishment.”

According to the joint statement, the officials also discussed “the utility and necessity of dialogue” for achieving peace on the Korean peninsula and the important role that all UN member states must play in implementing Security Council resolutions targeting North Korea’s illicit nuclear and missile programs.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin participated in the meeting and said in a keynote speech that the UN Command “helps maintain deterrence by assuring that we can sustain our forces” in the event of a conflict.

Austin noted that since the UN Command was created, there have been “major changes in the regional security environment,” including North Korea’s nuclear, missile, and cybercapabilities, and that the “shared commitment to the defense” of South Korea remains vital. He also expressed concern that Russia and China are helping North Korea evade sanctions and expand its military capabilities.

The North Korean Foreign Ministry called for the dissolution of the UN Command and referred to the body as
a “U.S.-led multinational war tool” that endangers the “security in the Asia-Pacific region.”

In a Nov. 13 statement published by the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the Foreign Ministry said the meeting proves that the United States plans to “occupy the whole Korean peninsula by force of arms” and is creating the conditions “for igniting the second Korean war.”

Prior to the UN Command meeting, Austin met with Shin to discuss the South Korean-U.S. alliance. The U.S. Defense Department said in a Nov. 13 press release that Austin and Shin agreed on three key priorities for the future: deterring strategic attacks, modernizing South Korean and U.S. capabilities to strengthen the “combined defense architecture of the alliance,” and strengthening security cooperation with partners in the region.

Austin and Shin also updated the 2013 Tailored Deterrence Strategy, which outlines U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitments to South Korea.

According to Shin, the revisions are necessary to take into account North Korea’s advances over the past decade. He said the document outlines how South Korea will provide conventional assistance to support U.S. nuclear operations and states that the United States will use its full range of conventional and nuclear capabilities to defend Seoul from a nuclear attack by Pyongyang.

In a press conference following the meeting, Austin also said the United States will use its “full range of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities” to defend South Korea and that the recent deployment of U.S. strategic assets to the region demonstrates the “ironclad” U.S. commitment to South Korea. He said the United States is now “more forward deployed and more capable to respond.”

The North Korean National Defense Ministry said in a Nov. 16 statement in KCNA that the new deterrence strategy is “aimed at a preemptive nuclear strike” on North Korea and accused the United States of aggravating tensions by bringing strategic assets to the region.

Austin and Shin also met virtually with Japanese Defense Minister Mioru Kihara. Shin said the three countries discussed a previous commitment to share information about North Korean missile launches in real time and agreed to activate the mechanism to enable the information sharing in December.

The launch of the mechanism will enhance the “detection and assessment capabilities” of all three countries, according to a South Korean Defense Ministry statement.

Austin’s visit followed a joint U.S.-South Korean military exercise on Oct. 25 aimed at responding to “Hamas-style surprise artillery attacks,” referring to the Oct. 7 terrorist attack where Hamas fighters crossed into Israel and killed an estimated 1,200 people, mostly civilians.

The three-day drill was aimed at detecting a surprise attack and preemptively striking North Korea’s long-range artillery, which can target Seoul.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also traveled to Seoul in November. After meeting South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin, Blinken said that the military relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang is “growing and dangerous” and that Washington will continue to track and expose military transfers between the two countries. In October, the Biden administration accused North Korea of shipping military equipment and munitions to Russia. (See ACT, November 2023.)

In a Nov. 11 statement in KCNA, the Foreign Affairs Ministry said that the United States should become “accustomed to the new reality” of North Korean-Russian relations, which “will steadily grow stronger.”

The statement said that if the United States is concerned about the relationship, it should “abandon the hostile policy toward the two countries” and “withdraw political provocations, military threats and strategic pressure” directed at North Korea and Russia.

One area where North Korea expressed interest in Russian assistance involves satellite launches. After failed launches in May and August, North Korea attempted to put a military reconnaissance satellite into orbit on Nov. 21 using the Chollima-1 space launch vehicle.

KCNA described the satellite launch as a success in a Nov. 22 statement and said that North Korea now has “eyes overlooking a long distance.”

The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed that the satellite entered orbit in a Nov. 22 press release but said it is too soon to say if it is functional.

It is unclear the extent to which Russia assisted North Korea with that launch.

December 2023
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

China and the United States held long-awaited talks on nuclear arms control on Nov. 6, the first such meeting in nearly in five years.

Although the meeting in Washington produced no specific result and no specific date for follow-on talks was announced, U.S. officials said the discussion, which occurred amid rising nuclear and geopolitical tensions, was worthwhile simply because it took place.

In separate statements issued shortly after the meeting, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the U.S. State Department described the discussion between Sun Xiaobo, Chinese director-general of arms control, and Mallory Stewart, U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, and compliance, as candid, in-depth, and constructive.

The State Department said the issues under discussion “related to arms control and nonproliferation as part of ongoing efforts to maintain open lines of communication and responsibly manage the [bilateral] relationship.”

The United States, it said, “emphasized the importance of increased [Chinese] nuclear transparency and substantive engagement on practical measures to manage and reduce strategic risks across multiple domains, including nuclear and outer space,” and “the need to promote stability, help avert an unconstrained arms race, and manage competition so that it does not veer into conflict.”

The Chinese Foreign Ministry said the officials discussed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, cooperation among the five nuclear-weapon states, nuclear security, nonproliferation and export control, compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and outer space security and regular arms control.

According to Reuters, a senior U.S. official said on Nov. 7, “I wouldn't say we learned anything new from them or that they delved into a great amount of detail in terms of their own nuclear force, their buildup and whether or not their policy or doctrine could be shifting over time.”

The meeting occurred as Beijing and Washington sought to reengage after a prolonged estrangement and to find a way to manage their way forward as major competitors in an unstable world. The last bilateral meeting on arms control issues took place in 2018 in Beijing when Chinese and U.S. officials “exchanged views” on their respective nuclear policies and on mutual cooperation on nonproliferation, among other topics, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Among Washington’s major current concerns is Beijing’s nuclear weapons buildup and its refusal to allow more transparency into the country’s nuclear program.

In its latest report on China’s military power, the U.S. Defense Department estimated that China will possess in excess of 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and will accelerate development of its intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. (See ACT, November 2023.)

“Compared to the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army] nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity,” the report said. Regardless, China’s arsenal is dwarfed by those of Russia, which has 4,500 warheads, and the United States, which has roughly 3,800 warheads.

Biden has long called for China to join in arms control talks. The United States is ready to “engage China without preconditions, helping ensure that competition is managed and that competition does not veer into conflict,” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told the Arms Control Association annual forum on June 2.

“It’s our hope that…Beijing will be willing to include substantive engagement on strategic nuclear issues, which
would benefit the security of both of our countries and the security of the entire world,” Sullivan said.

During the Stewart-Sun meeting, the U.S. delegation “highlighted the need to promote stability, help avert an unconstrained arms race, and manage competition so that it does not veer into conflict,” the State Department statement said. Beijing, on the other hand, “emphasized that China and the United States should carry out dialogue and cooperation on the basis of mutual respect,” according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

China also “stressed that the two sides should adhere to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security [in order to] realize lasting peace and universal security in the world.”

The meeting between Stewart and Sun preceded the Nov. 15 meeting in San Francisco between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden and followed other recent high-level bilateral engagements, including between the U.S. secretary of state and the U.S. national security advisor with their Chinese counterparts.

According to a readout by the White House on the Xi-Biden talks, the leaders agreed that their teams will follow-up their discussions in San Francisco with “continued high-level diplomacy and interactions, including visits in both directions and ongoing working-level consultations in key areas, including on…arms control and nonproliferation.”

The State Department reported that the two leaders agreed to resume military-to-military communications and to continue their bilateral engagements “in key areas, including on commercial, economic, financial, Asia-Pacific, arms control and nonproliferation, maritime, export control enforcement, policy-planning, agriculture, and disability issues.”

In 2014, Xi told U.S. President Barack Obama that “the Pacific Ocean is broad enough to accommodate the development of both China and the United States and our two countries to work together to contribute to security in Asia.” When he met Biden, Xi told him that “planet Earth is big enough for the two countries to succeed.”

December 2023
By Mohammedreza Giveh and Daryl G. Kimball

The United States and its NATO allies will suspend participation in the landmark Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, following Russia’s decision earlier this year to withdraw from the pact.

The North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s principal political decision-making body, announced the decision Nov. 7, stating that the allies “will suspend the operation of their obligations to the treaty” effective Dec. 7.

“We concluded that we should not continue to be bound by a treaty to which Russia is not bound,” the U.S. State Department said in a statement. “Suspension of CFE [Treaty] obligations will strengthen the [a]lliance’s deterrence and defense capacity by removing restrictions that impact planning, deployments, and exercises.”

In its announcement, the council said that, with this “decision fully supported by all NATO allies,” the alliance intends “to suspend the operation of the CFE Treaty for as long as necessary” as a consequence of Russia’s withdrawal.

The decision was described by U.S. officials as a “suspension of all legal obligations” under the treaty that allows individual states to comply with certain provisions, such as data exchanges, on a voluntary basis.

At some point, states that have suspended participation might resume full, legally binding participation. Since Nov. 7, several NATO states have issued national statements outlining the provisions that they will voluntarily continue to meet.

The treaty, often described as the cornerstone of European security, was signed in 1990 and put equal limits on the quantity of conventional weaponry deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. It eliminated the Soviet Union’s quantitative advantage in conventional weapons in Europe and more than 72,000 pieces of NATO and Soviet military equipment.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, its withdrawal from the CFE Treaty, and now the decision by NATO states to suspend participation in the accord puts the conventional arms control system in Europe, which was painstakingly built over decades, into near total collapse.

The United States withdrew from the 1990 Open Skies Treaty in 2020 over a compliance dispute, and Russia followed suit in 2021. (See ACT, July/August 2021.) This leaves the Vienna Document, a confidence-building mechanism by which participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe agree to inspections and data exchanges to increase the transparency of their conventional forces, as the only remaining piece of the post-Cold War conventional arms control security architecture. U.S. officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Arms Control Today that the United States intends fully to participate in and comply with the terms of the Vienna Document.

The dispute between Russia and NATO over the CFE Treaty dates back nearly a quarter century. After the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the expansion of NATO in the 1990s, efforts were made to revise the agreement to replace the bloc-to-bloc and zonal limits with a system of national and territorial ceilings reflecting the new geopolitical reality.

During the 1999 treaty summit in Istanbul, treaty members signed an agreement known as the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty to update the CFE Treaty structure. Russia also pledged to withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia and to show restraint in its deployment near the Baltics. (See ACT, November 1999.)

But the United States and its allies did not ratify the adapted treaty, citing the ongoing deployment of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia. Russia disagreed and complained that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia were not subject to CFE Treaty limits. Moscow also wanted constraints eliminated on how many forces it could deploy on its southern and northern flanks. (See ACT, January/February 2008.)

In 2007, Moscow declared its “suspension” of the original treaty in reaction to the ongoing delay of the adapted treaty’s entry into force, thereby halting Russian implementation of treaty-related transparency commitments and conventional force ceilings.

In May 2023, Russia announced that it would withdraw formally from the pact in objection to NATO countries “fueling the Ukraine conflict” and embracing Finland and Sweden as new alliance members. (See ACT, June 2023.) The withdrawal will not have any impact on Russia’s military posture.

At a briefing on Nov. 8 for nongovernmental experts, U.S. officials reaffirmed public statements that the United States and its NATO allies remain committed to effective conventional arms control as a critical element of Euro-Atlantic security.

The officials also said that the allies will continue to pursue measures with responsible partners that aim to bolster stability and security in Europe by reducing risk, preventing misperceptions, avoiding conflicts, and building trust. They did not elaborate on specific measures that would be pursued.

December 2023
By Shannon Bugos

Russia said it will consider and respond to the formal written arms control proposal from the United States, which announced the proposal in June but did not transmit it until September.

The Wall Street Journal first reported on Nov. 1 that Washington sent Moscow a proposal in September. A senior Biden administration official told the newspaper that the United States awaits a response but hopes to initiate “a conversation on what a framework after New START could look like,” referring to the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expiring in 2026.

The proposal reflected U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s speech in June at the Arms Control Association annual meeting and “added additional details,” Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation at the U.S. National Security Council, told the Russian newspaper Kommersant on Nov. 3. (See ACT, July/August 2023.)

“Russia has not responded to it, but [Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei] Ryabkov said Russian authorities are working on a response,” Vaddi added.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has expressed skepticism that Russian-U.S. nuclear arms control talks would occur. “Dialogue is unequivocally necessary,” he said on Nov. 8. “But so far, the actual situation has not changed in any way.” Moscow repeatedly has stated that, as a precursor to any nuclear arms control talks, Washington must first withdraw support from Ukraine. (See ACT, April 2023.)

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have boasted about having what they called a superior Russian nuclear arsenal. No one “in their right mind would consider using nuclear weapons against Russia,” Putin said on Oct. 5.

A month later, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev touted that, “[f]or the first time in the history of the existence of nuclear weapons, our country is ahead of its competitors in the [nuclear] domain.”

Russia launched its annual nuclear exercise, known as Grom, on Oct. 25, but it proved relatively scaled down compared to exercises in previous years.

“Putin led a training exercise that involved the forces and resources of the ground, sea, and air components of Russia’s nuclear deterrence forces,” the Kremlin said in a statement.

“The exercise included practical launches of ballistic and cruise missiles,” it added.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that this year’s exercise involved “delivering a massive nuclear strike by strategic offensive forces in response to an enemy nuclear strike.”

Meanwhile, NATO held its annual exercise for 10 days beginning Oct. 16. Known as Steadfast Noon, the exercise included the participation of 13 allied countries and more than 60 aircraft taking part in training flights over Italy, Croatia, and the Mediterranean Sea.

“The exercise involves fighter aircraft capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but does not involve any live bombs,” the alliance said in a statement on Oct. 13. “The exercise is not linked to current world events and the bulk of the training is held at least 1,000 kilometers from Russia’s borders.”

After the exercises ended, Shoigu warned of “the threat of a direct military clash between nuclear powers,” laying blame on the United States for its “steady escalation” of conflict and its destruction of “the foundations of international security and strategic stability,” including arms control agreements.

December 2023
By Kelsey Davenport

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned that strikes against nuclear power plants must be avoided after an explosion damaged a nuclear power plant in Ukraine. Two days after the Ukrainian facility was targeted, Moscow alleged that Kyiv attempted a drone strike on a nuclear facility in Russia.

The Khmelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant is located in northeastern Ukraine and includes two reactors, one of which is shut down for maintenance. There was no direct strike on the nuclear power facility, but ancillary buildings at the site suffered damage from the shockwaves after Ukraine shot down two drones in the vicinity of the power plant.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi said in a press release on Oct. 25 that the explosion shattered windows and temporarily cut power to external radiation monitors but did not affect nuclear safety and security at the facility.

Grossi said the incident underscores “the extremely precarious nuclear safety situation in Ukraine, which will continue as long as this tragic war goes on.” He warned that “hitting a nuclear power plant must be avoided at all costs.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the attack on the Khmelnitsky plant shows Russia’s willingness to “target nuclear power stations and other critical facilities” and demonstrates that the “pressure on the terrorist state is insufficient.”

Zelenskyy also said that his country will “not only defend ourselves, but also respond” to attacks on critical infrastructure.

An IAEA press release on Oct. 27 noted that Russia reported drone activity in the vicinity of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant in western Russia near the Ukrainian border. The Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement that it thwarted a Ukrainian attempt to carry out a “terrorist attack” against the nuclear facility that same day.

According to the ministry, none of the three drones caused any damage to the facility, but one exploded near a building used to store spent nuclear fuel.

Russia also said it shot down nine Ukrainian drones near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant on Nov. 2.

Ukrainian nuclear energy company Energoatom continues to operate the Zaporizhzhia complex, but the site has been occupied by Russian forces since Moscow attacked it in violation of international law during the early days of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. (See ACT, April 2022.)

In October, Grossi said that Zelenskyy “personally assured” him that Ukraine will not directly bomb or shell the Zaporizhzhia plant but that “other options are on the table” as Ukraine tries to retake the facility.

Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, accused Ukraine of attempting to disrupt the IAEA’s rotation of staff stationed at Zaporizhzhia and of “carrying out criminal and irresponsible provocations.”

Despite the drone attack, the IAEA confirmed in a Nov. 3 statement that a new team of agency experts was able to rotate into the Zaporizhzhia complex.

Grossi said that the IAEA presence at the site is “vital for efforts to keep this major nuclear facility safe and protect people and the environment in Ukraine and beyond.”

Two of the six units are in hot shutdown to generate steam to heat the nearby city of Enerhodar, where many Zaporizhzhia plant personnel live, and to run the power plant. The other four units are in cold shutdown.

According to the IAEA statement, Russia is still blocking agency access to three of the reactor rooftops. Earlier this year, Zelenskyy accused Russia of planting explosives on the rooftops of the reactors. (See ACT, September 2023.)

An IAEA expert mission was able to access the roof of one of the reactors in October and could observe parts of the rooftops of two other reactors. Grossi said in an Oct. 11 statement that agency experts did not see any mines or explosives, but he emphasized the importance of visiting all six rooftops “one after the other.”

Grossi said the agency will continue to request access to assess adherence to the five principles for ensuring the safety and security of the Zaporizhzhia complex that he presented to the UN Security Council in May. The principles include refraining from using the power plant to store heavy weapons or station military personnel and refraining from attacks “of any kind from or against the plant.” (See ACT, July/August 2023.)

The IAEA also said its experts “need access to all six turbine halls together” and have only been granted partial access to three of the turbine halls.

Grossi said the agency will continue to maintain an expert presence at the Zaporizhzhia site “as long as it is necessary.”