December 2024
By Michael T. Klare

The Biden administration signaled that it will not restrict U.S. arms transfers to Israel despite that country’s failure to permit increased deliveries of humanitarian aid to Gaza as top U.S. officials had demanded.

Although the situation in Gaza “is a very dire circumstance,” there will be no reduction in U.S. arms assistance to Israel, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel told a news briefing on Nov. 12.

But the United States will continue to press the Israelis to expedite the flow of humanitarian aid to the embattled enclave, Patel indicated. “[W]hat we need to see is we need to see these steps acted on,” he said. “We need to see them implemented.”

In a letter to senior Israeli officials on Oct. 14, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin complained of the sharply deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza, where Israel has conducted a fierce retaliation since the Oct. 7, 2023, raid in which Hamas killed 1,200 people and took 250 hostage.

According to the letter, Israel had imposed severe restrictions on aid flows to Gaza, resulting in a 50 percent decline in deliveries over the preceding six months, drastically reducing food and medical supplies to the Palestinian civilian population.

To be assured of receiving U.S. military assistance, Israel would have to take immediate steps to eliminate those restrictions and allow more aid to reach Gaza, the letter said.

“To reverse the downward humanitarian trajectory [in Gaza] as consistent with its assurances to us, Israel must, starting now and within 30 days act on [a number of] concrete measures,” such as opening additional border crossings and lifting restrictions on aid convoys from southern to northern Gaza, Blinken and Austin wrote. A failure to do so, they indicated, could result in diminished U.S. arms aid to Israel as required by law.

Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act states that, “No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any country when it is made known to the President that the government of such country prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance.” The president can waive this restriction if he determines that doing so would be in the national interest.

Any significant reduction in U.S. arms transfers to Israel, if sustained for any length of time, would have serious consequences for that country. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States is Israel’s leading arms supplier, accounting for 69 percent of its arms imports in 2023. These include many of the weapons used by the Israelis in their war against Hamas and Hezbollah.

Despite this dependency, Israel made no visible effort to comply with the requirements in the Blinken-Austin letter. Among the demands was a requirement for daily entry into Gaza of 350 trucks carrying humanitarian aid. In late October, an average of only 58 trucks were reported to be making the crossing.

A group of scientists from the UN-affiliated Famine Review Committee said on Nov. 8 that, with food supplies rapidly diminishing, “starvation, malnutrition, and excess mortality due to malnutrition and disease are rapidly increasing” and that a deadly famine was “imminent.”

Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), a vocal critic of Israeli tactics in its war against Hamas and of the Biden administration’s military support for Israel despite serious human rights concerns, proposed three resolutions to block continued arms transfers, but they were soundly defeated by the Senate on Nov. 20. Nevertheless, 17 Senate Democrats and two independents voted for at least one of the measures, a sign of growing party divisions over Israel’s handling of the war, now entering its 14th month.

Meanwhile, on Nov. 18, Politico reported that 20 White House staff members had written a letter to their superiors calling on President Joe Biden to follow through with the threat to close the arms spigot.

December 2024
By Xiaodon Liang

As he prepares to leave office, U.S. President Joe Biden issued a policy memorandum on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for national security purposes and reiterated his administration’s stance that a human should always remain “in the loop” for informing and executing decisions on nuclear weapons use.

The national security memorandum, published Oct. 24, addresses not only the use of AI by executive branch agencies involved in national security, but also expands on the outgoing administration’s policy of promoting U.S. research into leading-edge AI models.

“We have to be faster in deploying AI in our national security enterprise than America’s rivals are in theirs. They are in a persistent quest to leapfrog our military and intelligence capabilities,” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said in a speech introducing the memorandum at the National Defense University.

The memorandum sets forth immigration, energy, resource-sharing, and rules-setting policies and practices designed to promote U.S. leadership in what the Biden administration calls “safe, secure, and trustworthy AI.”

The memorandum, prepared by the National Security Council and signed by Biden, calls for the publication of a subsidiary document, titled “Framework to Advance AI Governance and Risk Management in National Security” by the council’s deputies committee. A first version of this framework was released concurrently with the memorandum.

The framework creates three regulated categories of cases for AI use: prohibited, high impact, and those affecting federal personnel. Agencies will be required to adopt minimum risk management practices for high-impact and federal personnel-impacting cases or seek an annual waiver to avoid this requirement when it would “increase risks to privacy, civil liberties, or safety, or would create an unacceptable impediment to critical agency operations or exceptionally grave damage to national security.”

“The policy imposes few substantive safeguards on a wide range of AI-driven activities, by and large allowing agencies to decide for themselves how to mitigate the risks posed by national security systems,” the American Civil Liberties Union warned in an Oct. 24 press release. Patrick Toomey, deputy director of the advocacy organization’s National Security Project, criticized the Biden administration’s approach for lacking “transparency, independent oversight, and built-in mechanisms for individuals to obtain accountability.”

Waivers will not be available for prohibited cases of AI use. The list of prohibitions includes violations of certain civil liberties, as well as a general ban on using AI to “[r]emove a human ‘in the loop’ for actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate or terminate nuclear weapons employment.”

The framework requires that oversight and “rigorous testing and assurance” accompany the use of AI in determining collateral damage and estimating casualties before kinetic actions. Intelligence analysis and reports based “solely” on AI outputs also are permitted as long as the reader is provided with sufficient warning.

The Commerce Department will play a significant role through its AI Safety Institute in assessing the national security risks of leading-edge AI models. The institute will serve as the “primary port of call for U.S. AI developers,” according to an unnamed senior administration official speaking to journalists on Oct. 24 regarding the memorandum.

The memorandum also addresses the nonproliferation implications of AI by instructing the National Nuclear Security Administration to develop within 120 days, in partnership with the AI Safety Institute and the National Security Agency, “the capability to perform rapid systematic testing of AI models’ capacity to generate or exacerbate nuclear and radiological risks.”

By empowering and creating an AI risk assessment structure within the government, the White House hopes to accelerate 
AI research by making clear the rules of the road. “Ensuring security and trustworthiness will actually enable us to move faster, not slow us down. Put simply, uncertainty breeds caution,” Sullivan said in his speech.

“We know that China is building its own technological ecosystem with digital infrastructure that won’t protect sensitive data, that can enable mass surveillance and censorship, that can spread misinformation, and that can make countries vulnerable to coercion,” Sullivan said. Nonetheless, the United States should be “willing to engage in dialogue about this technology with [Beijing] and with others to better understand risks and counter misperceptions,” he said.

Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping renewed their commitment to the human-in-the-loop principle during a Nov. 16 meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima, according to Bloomberg.

During the U.S. presidential campaign, the Republican Party adopted a policy platform calling for the revocation of Executive Order 14110, which laid out in October 2023 the Biden administration’s AI policies and preceded the publication of the recent national security memorandum. Instead, the platform promised to “support AI Development rooted in Free Speech and Human Flourishing.”

Some parts of the Biden framework may survive a partisan transition in the White House. The AI Safety Institute has bipartisan support, and bills granting it a basis in law have passed out of House and Senate committees.

December 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

The UN General Assembly, overcoming objections from Russia, reaffirmed the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

The vote on Dec. 2 was 167-4 with 6 abstentions, a gain of 8 votes in favor of the treaty over the tally cast on Nov. 8 by the General Assembly’s First Committee, which handles disarmament and security threat issues. The committee vote was 159-5 with 6 abstentions.

 Led by Argentina, Japan, and the United States, the votes culminated an initiative that has been the subject of debate since U.S. intelligence reported on a new Russian space capability in February. (See ACT, March 2024.)

The resolution affirmed the obligation of all states-parties “to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”

It also includes a call for states-parties “not to develop nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction specifically designed to be placed in orbit around the Earth, to be installed on celestial bodies, or to be stationed in outer space in any other manner.”

Prior to the final vote in the First Committee and later in the full General Assembly, Russia submitted two amendments that were strongly opposed by the resolution sponsors. One Russian amendment would have expanded the prohibition to include “any other kinds of weapons,” not only weapons of mass destruction, and the other amendment would have called for negotiations on new legally binding agreements that are “reliably verifiable.”

Introducing the two amendments, Russia said in a statement on Nov. 5 that it “has no objection to reaffirming the obligations already contained [in the treaty]…. Nevertheless, it is unacceptable to give the impression that UN member states are prepared to limit themselves to reaffirming already existing international legal norms.”

Russia argued that “it could be interpreted” that the resolution as conceived by the authors was an “attempt to legitimize the placement of any other weapons other than [weapons of mass destruction] in outer space, which would provoke a conventional arms race in outer space.”

In a joint statement on Nov. 7, the resolution sponsors dismissed the Russian amendments as an attempt to materially alter the nature of the draft resolution.

Bruce Turner, U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), called the amendments an attempt “to hijack a resolution…[intended] to address a focused topic,” and he urged states to vote against them.

Further, he criticized Russia’s approach to negotiations on the resolution, saying that Russia repeatedly refused to engage on any opportunities for compromise. “This constitutes bad practice and a dangerous precedent,” Turner said.

Both Russian amendments were rejected by the committee. The votes were 41-66 with 49 abstentions for one amendment and 42-65 with 49 abstentions for the other.

Russia failed in trying to advance a similar amendment to a Japanese-U.S. resolution in the UN Security Council in April. (See ACT, May 2024.) Since 2008, Russia and China have been advocating at the CD to ban placement of all weapons in outer space by introducing a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects. These efforts have not drawn widespread international support.

December 2024
By Michael T. Klare

The UN General Assembly mandated new international consultations intended to advance slow-moving negotiations on a treaty or agreement that would regulate autonomous weapons systems.

In a resolution adopted Dec. 2, the assembly said informal talks among member states and nongovernmental organizations should be held in New York in 2025 to consider the dangers posed by autonomous weapons systems, often called “killer robots” by critics, and possible measures for their control.

The vote was 166-3 with 15 abstentions. It quickly followed action by the UN First Committee which approved the resolution 161-3 with 13 abstentions on Nov. 5.

The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, an umbrella organization for other civil society activists on this issue, described the resolution as a “small step” forward. It expressed disappointment that “the resolution does not reflect the clear desire of the majority of the international community to urgently launch negotiations on a legal binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems.”

In statements submitted to the UN secretary-general pursuant to a 2023 UN resolution on this topic, many governments and nongovernmental organizations expressed frustration that the group of governmental experts created by the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to develop international restraints on autonomous weapons systems has not achieved any notable progress after years of deliberation. (See ACT, October 2024.)

Meanwhile, Israel’s reported use of autonomous weapons systems and artificial intelligence (AI) tools in Gaza has “shown the devastating and unacceptable harm that can result from seeking to increase the speed of violence through AI and automation,” the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots said. The group also noted that U.S. and Russian weapons programs show “that countries are already looking to compete for military advantage through increasing autonomy in weapons systems.”

Alexander Kmentt, the director of disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation in the Austrian Foreign Ministry and a key figure in deliberations on the First Committee resolution, also expressed regret that the final text only authorized two days of consultations and lacked a more explicit focus on crafting international regulations.

But Kmentt welcomed the new venue for discussions. “I believe that the urgency about integrating autonomy into weapons systems is such that we need to really elevate the issue much higher on the political agenda,” he told Arms Control Today.

The expert group discussions “must certainly progress to negotiations on a legally binding instrument as soon as possible but, in addition to this, we also need to generate momentum for the need for regulation in other relevant forums as well, such as the UN General Assembly,” Kmentt said.

Similar to the 2023 UN directive on autonomous weapons systems, the new resolution expresses concern “about the possible negative consequences and impact of autonomous weapon systems on global security and regional and international stability, including the risk of an emerging arms race, [and] lowering the threshold for and escalation of conflicts.” (See ACT, December 2023.)

While noting that considerable international attention has been focused on these dangers by governments and civil society organizations, the resolution warned that the development of autonomous weapons systems has been occurring at a faster pace than efforts to adopt reasonable controls.

The governmental and civil society submissions to the secretary-general also raised concerns that the expert group had not adequately addressed ethical and moral issues raised by the deployment of machine combatants governed by AI with a capacity to take human lives.

To address these concerns, the resolution calls on the secretary-general to facilitate “informal consultations” next year intended to “further the international community’s understanding of the issues involved by discussing the full range of views received, including proposals and relevant aspects raised in the report that may thus far not have been discussed in detail” in the experts group.

The consultations are to be held over a two-day period.

 

December 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

The UN General Assembly First Committee authorized three new initiatives concerning nuclear weapons issues during its annual meeting as it sought to advance a commitment to international peace and security.

The committee, which focuses on disarmament and international security, met from Oct. 7 to Nov. 8 in New York amid rising geopolitical tensions and deepening polarization among states. It adopted 77 draft resolutions altogether, including the three new initiatives related to nuclear weapons.

Among the more significant resolutions was a proposal by Ireland and New Zealand to establish an independent scientific panel on the effects of nuclear war. The resolution was adopted 144-3, with 30 states abstaining, including India, North Korea, Poland, and the United States. France, Russia, and the United Kingdom voted no.

Unlike other multilateral disarmament meetings, the First Committee adopts resolutions by a majority vote, not by consensus. The independent scientific panel will consist of 21 members who will be tasked with examining the physical effects and societal consequences of a nuclear war on local, regional, and planetary scales.

“A new U.N.-mandated expert study assessing and addressing the current knowledge of the effects of nuclear war can spur a better-informed, inclusive and much-needed global debate on what nuclear war means for people and the planet,” physicist Zia Mian of Princeton University, a proponent of the study, wrote in Scientific American on Oct. 28.

“It also would help governments and people in nuclear-armed states better understand the nature, scale and severity of the many catastrophic consequences of nuclear war, not just for adversaries but for everyone, including themselves,” Mian added.

Explaining her country’s vote against the resolution, Camille Petit, France’s ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), said on Nov. 4 that the study group “would not be able to provide new elements to contribute to understanding of the effects of nuclear war” as the devastating consequences are already well known.

Likewise, David Riley, UK ambassador to the CD, said that the international community “always recognized…the devastating consequences” of nuclear war, thus they are not “persuaded of the utility of the independent scientific panel.”

Bruce Turner, U.S. ambassador to the CD, said that the United States also is “clear-eyed about the consequences of nuclear war” and “skeptical of this resolution or [that] the panel’s findings will help move us toward that goal” of no nuclear use.

Nevertheless, Turner said that the United States is “not opposed in principle to a discussion” and would “carefully consider” U.S. participation in this study group process. He stressed that the resolution mandate “must remain unbiased, evidence based…and not be politicized.”

The other new resolutions on nuclear weapons were less contentious. One, advanced by Brazil and Norway, encourages UN member states to engage in a discussion on the establishment of a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification. It was adopted 173-1 with two abstentions.

The third resolution, proposed by 46 non-nuclear-weapon states, seeks to “convene a qualified group of up to 25 experts…to prepare a new comprehensive study” on nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was adopted 172-2 with three abstentions. The two countries in opposition were Argentina and Israel.

In addition to the three new nuclear-related resolutions, others focused on the topics of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Outer Space Treaty, and autonomous weapons systems. The full General Assembly began acting on the resolutions on Dec. 2.

The First Committee was chaired by Costa Rica’s UN ambassador, Maritza Chan, who served as the committee’s first female chair. “We can only build true security by working together to address the root causes of violence. We must cooperate, not compete with each other in order to survive and thrive in our dynamic world,” she said.

Chan also spoke of the advances women have made in playing a larger role in the First Committee and disarmament generally. “Throughout the history of our work, we have seen that women and a range of diverse stakeholders have brought important insights, experiences, and knowledge for disarmament. We have also been bridge-builders, bringing people together and finding common ground,” she said.

“I hope that the trend of increasing gender perspectives in our statements and resolutions, and including women in meaningful roles within our delegations, continues to the 80th session and beyond,” added Chan.

December 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

North Korea tested a new long-range missile and ratified a mutual defense treaty with Russia as Japan, South Korea, and the United States announced a new mechanism for monitoring Pyongyang’s sanctions evasion and coordinating regional actions.

The state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) described the new North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as the “world’s strongest strategic missile” and said the Oct. 31 launch demonstrates the credibility of the country’s nuclear deterrent.

The missile, dubbed the Hwasong-19, is a solid-fueled system that is more powerful than the ICBMs North Korea tested in the past. North Korea already can target the entire continental United States with previously tested ICBMs, but the Hwasong-19 appears designed to carry multiple warheads with independently targetable reentry vehicles. The Hwasong-19, along with the previously tested Hwasong-18, will serve as the “core means” of defending North Korea by “containing the enemies’ acts of aggression and reliably protecting the national security,” according to KCNA.

North Korea launched the missile in violation of UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting its ballistic missile activities.

According to KCNA, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was present for the launch. Kim said that North Korea’s “rivals’ dangerous tightening of their nuclear alliance” highlights the “importance of strengthening our nuclear forces.”

Prior to the launch, KCNA reported that Kim visited an ICBM base to review the “operational readiness” of North Korea’s strategic missile forces. He called for modernizing missile facilities and reviewing launch procedures to ensure North Korea can “swiftly deliver strategic counterattacks against enemies at any moment.”

Although the UN Security Council met to discuss the launch of the Hwasong-19, the body failed to condemn North Korea, following a pattern of inaction in response to the country’s violations. (See ACT, July/August 2023.)

During the council meeting on Nov. 4, North Korean Ambassador Kim Song justified the test and said Pyongyang will accelerate its nuclear weapons buildup to “counter any threat presented by hostile nuclear-weapon states.” He said the test posed no threat to the region.

Japanese Ambassador Kazuyuki Yamazaki refuted that assessment, telling the council that the launch was “more threatening than ever” and that the missile splashed down in waters near Japan. He urged North Korea to refrain from further launches.

U.S. Deputy Ambassador Robert Wood also condemned the missile launch during the meeting and described it as a “direct violation of multiple Security Council resolutions.” He said that North Korea’s continued missile testing allows the country to identify and address capability gaps to advance its weapons program. Wood accused Russia and China of repeatedly shielding North Korea from “any reprisal” by the council.

Chinese Ambassador Fu Cong told the council that it should focus on “easing rather than exacerbating tensions” in the region and that further pressure will lead to escalation. The key to resolving tensions lies with the United States, he said.

During the meeting, Wood also raised North Korea’s transfer of weaponry to Russia for use in Ukraine and the presence of North Korean troops in Russia. He called North Korea’s weapons exports an egregious violation of Security Council resolutions and said that if North Korean troops “engage in combat or combat support operations against Ukraine,” they will be “legitimate military targets.”

Russian Deputy Ambassador Anna Evstigneeva denied the presence of North Korean military in Russia. She accused the United States of creating a “negative buzz” about North Korea in order to keep “ineffective sanctions measures afloat.” Evstigneeva said North Korea “has every right to apply measures to ensure the security and sovereignty of their country.”

Several days after the Security Council meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the mutual defense treaty with North Korea that Moscow and Pyongyang announced during Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June. (See ACT, July/August 2024.) Kim Jong Un ratified the treaty two days later, on Nov. 11.

The treaty includes a provision requiring Russia and North Korea to “immediately provide military” assistance if the other country is attacked. Even though Russia invaded Ukraine, it is unclear if Putin will invoke the treaty’s provisions to request additional North Korean assistance more formally.

Japan, South Korea, and the United States condemned the growing ties between North Korea and Russia in a Nov. 15 joint statement during a trilateral heads of state meeting. The three leaders announced the establishment of a new joint secretariat to coordinate actions and implement shared goals, including security on the Korean peninsula.

The statement committed the three countries to “respond resolutely to any violations or evasions” of UN Security Council resolutions and emphasized the importance of the new multilateral sanctions monitoring team.

Launched in October by 11 states, including Japan, South Korea, and the United States, the team is tasked with monitoring the implementation of Security Council resolutions on North Korea. According to an Oct. 16 press release announcing the new mechanism, the monitoring team will support implementation of council sanctions against North Korea by “publishing information based on rigorous inquiry into sanctions violations and evasion attempts.”

A UN panel of experts previously performed a similar task, but its mandate was vetoed by Russia in March. (See ACT, May 2024.)

December 2024

Investigators for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) confirmed the presence of a toxic chemical at the site of a September military battle in Ukraine, which is fighting to repel a full-scale invasion by Russia.

In a report issued on Nov. 18 after a technical assistance site visit near the village of Illinka in the Dnipropetrovsk region, the OPCW said that the toxic chemical 2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile, also known as CS, was determined to be present during a confrontation that took place on Sept. 20.

The OPCW expert team collected documentation and digital files and testimonies from first-hand witnesses and received three samples gathered by Ukraine: a grenade shell and two soil samples collected from a trench. Afterward, grenade and soil samples analyzed by two separate OPCW designated laboratories found traces of CS, a riot control agent that is prohibited from being used as a method of warfare under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The OPCW visit was requested by Ukraine under Article VIII of the CWC. It came after the Ukrainian Parliament ratified an agreement on privileges and immunities for technical assistance visits between Ukraine and the OPCW Technical Secretariat. (See ACT, June 2024.)

OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias lamented the treaty violation represented by the incident and reiterated the secretariat’s commitment to assisting CWC states-parties in upholding the norm against chemical weapons.

Ukraine asked the secretariat to make the full report public and share it with all states-parties. The report was released one week before the beginning of the annual CWC conference of states-parties, Nov. 25-29 in The Hague.—MINA ROZEI 

December 2024

Member states of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) have reappointed Robert Floyd as executive secretary for a second term through 2029. The decision was made on Nov. 11.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has helped keep a lid on nuclear testing for 28 years, but there is increasing talk in the United States and elsewhere of resuming testing.

In a Nov. 12 social media post, Floyd expressed gratitude to the member-states for their trust and support and renewed his commitment to the organization’s goals. “I am truly touched and heartened by the encouragement and confidence you have shown over the past 3.5 years,” Floyd wrote. “I look forward to continuing our work together, advancing our shared mission of a nuclear-test-free world—building a world of peace and security for this generation and generations to come.”

At the Nov. 11 meeting, Floyd shared his vision for the organization’s future and outlined several key priorities, including completion of the CTBTO International Monitoring System, carrying out an on-site inspection field exercise in Sri Lanka to help prove the CTBTO verification regime, and promoting continued diversity within the organization.

Floyd, a former head of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, has led the CTBTO since August 2021 after an unusually contentious appointment process. (See ACT, June 2021.)—SHIZUKA KURAMITSU

December 2024

The U.S. Defense Department said it “may be necessary to adapt current U.S. [nuclear] force capability, posture, composition, or size” in an “evolving security environment,” according to a report to Congress released Nov. 15.

The report on U.S. nuclear employment strategy is mandated by law and summarizes changes to the classified nuclear weapons employment guidance developed by the Biden administration in line with the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. (See ACT, December 2022.)

The report’s statement on the size of the nuclear arsenal is consistent with comments by Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation at the National Security Council, in June that U.S. nuclear forces “may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from current deployed numbers is required.” (See ACT, July/August 2024.)

The report otherwise largely adheres to the nuclear posture review and reaffirms the policy that “the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States or its allies and partners.” It also restates the U.S. commitment to ensuring that all nuclear plans must be “consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict.”

The last report on U.S. nuclear employment strategy, released in 2020 at the end of the Trump administration, did not mention a potential increase in the size of U.S. nuclear forces. The corresponding 2013 report issued by the Obama administration said that U.S. forces under the limitations of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty would be “more than adequate for what the United States needs to fulfill its national security objectives.”
—XIAODON LIANG 

December 2024
By Daryl G. Kimball

Global nuclear dangers are growing, and international peace and security are at severe risk. In January, the second presidential administration of Donald Trump will be tasked with managing a complex array of nuclear weapons-related dangers, some of which were partly of his own making and all of which will be difficult to address. Trump’s proposed solutions to these challenges were hardly explained, let alone debated, during the 2024 campaign cycle.

The war in Ukraine and the risk of escalation. Perhaps the most critical foreign policy variable will be whether and how Trump pursues his ambitious goal to impose a deal that halts the ongoing war being waged by Russian President Vladimir Putin against Ukraine but would lead to major territorial concessions to Russia. A ceasefire likely will not come swiftly, and if it does, it will shape very profoundly the European security environment for years to come.

As Putin pushes to gain additional territory ahead of any talks, he may try to employ new or more lethal weaponry and use nuclear coercion to try to gain some advantage. Trump, as U.S. President Joe Biden, should refrain from issuing nuclear threats of his own and instead join other global leaders to condemn threats of nuclear first use as inadmissible.

Heading off a three-way nuclear arms race. All major nuclear-weapon states are spending tens of billions of dollars modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Talks on nuclear arms control remain stalled. With the last remaining agreement limiting the Russian and U.S. arsenals due to expire in February 2026, an era of unconstrained nuclear competition looms.

In response, congressional Republicans and the authors of the Project 2025 plan want Washington to spend even more than the current $756 billion, ten-year price tag for nuclear modernization in order to increase the number and diversity of the arsenal. Such a buildup would reverse 35 years of Russian-U.S. reductions, is not necessary to deter nuclear attack, would divert resources from other defense and human needs, and would prompt China and Russia to match any U.S. increase.

Trump and his team have not offered a plan for constraining Russia’s strategic arsenal, and some Republicans may lobby Trump to withdraw from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Instead, Trump could try to achieve what Biden could not: a simple, informal deal with Putin pledging each side to maintain the existing caps on their strategic nuclear arsenals as long as the other does. This would allow the U.S. nuclear enterprise to focus on maintaining the existing force, buy time for formal talks to limit strategic, intermediate, and tactical nuclear weapons and the systems that carry them, and forestall a costly arms race that no one can win.

Maintaining the global test ban. No state except North Korea has conducted a nuclear test explosion in this century, the United States has not tested since 1992, and the world is more stable as a result. For the United States, nuclear explosive testing is technically and militarily unnecessary. A generously funded and proven Stockpile Stewardship Program maintains the existing U.S. warhead types.

Nevertheless, Trump’s former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien proposed a resumption of U.S. nuclear testing in Nevada, which would violate the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Project 2025 calls for reducing the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to six months or less. Any such move would be a self-inflicted nuclear policy disaster that would open the door to Chinese, North Korean, and Russian testing and blow apart global nonproliferation efforts at a time of heightened nuclear danger.

Stopping a nuclear-armed Iran. Since Trump withdrew from the successful 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Tehran’s leaders have restored their capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material and reduced access to international inspectors who are needed to guard against nuclear breakout.

Iran’s new president has offered to engage in talks that could lead to action-for-action steps to deescalate tensions, which could help move Iran further away from the nuclear threshold. But most advisers in Trump’s circle want to double down on the failed "maximum pressure" sanctions policy of Trump’s first term to force Iran to back down or help Israel try to destroy parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Such action would make Iran’s acquisition of the bomb in the future far more likely. Last month, Iran’s deputy foreign minister said Tehran would withdraw from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if the United States and others sought to snap back international sanctions through the UN Security Council before October 2025. Iran’s nuclear knowledge cannot be bombed away. Any setback in its nuclear infrastructure would be temporary and likely lead Iran to pursue a clandestine bomb program.

The risk of nuclear war, nuclear arms racing, and nuclear proliferation is already greater than at any point since the Cold War. In the months ahead, the new Trump administration will make key choices that could determine whether the situation improves or deteriorates. It will be essential that responsible members of Congress, responsible Western and non-nuclear-weapon states, and civil society campaigners help steer toward a safer course.