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“Right after I graduated, I interned with the Arms Control Association. It was terrific.”

– George Stephanopolous
ABC News
January 1, 2005
PressRoom

Experts Make Case for Modification of U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal

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For Immediate Release: October 4, 2005

 

Press Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director (202) 463 8270 x107

(Washington, D.C.): Three leading nonproliferation experts write in an Arms Control Today article this month that if the United States implements a presidential proposal for wider U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation "without significant modification, it will have given the Indians a great deal--acknowledgment as a de facto nuclear-weapon state and access to the international nuclear energy market--in return for largely symbolic concessions in the nonproliferation area."

On July 18, President George W. Bush pledged to seek changes in U.S. and multinational policies that would allow the United States to revive more robust civil nuclear cooperation with India for the first time since its 1974 detonation of a nuclear device using technology acquired for "peaceful" purposes. Spurred by that test explosion, the authors note, the United States enacted the 1978 Nonproliferation Act which "required that, in order to receive future nuclear exports from the United States, non-nuclear-weapon states such as India needed to place all of their peaceful nuclear activities under...full-scope safeguards."

In return for Bush's pledge, India declared support for some modest nuclear restraint commitments and said it would declare certain nuclear facilities as civilian and others as military and place civilian projects under IAEA safeguards, which are mechanisms designed to deter and detect the diversion of any civil nuclear technologies for illicit weapons purposes.

The Bush administration has said it will seek congressional approval for changes to U.S. nonproliferation laws and the consent of allies and friends to exempt India from the export rule of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that requires a potential nuclear trade recipient to have full-scope safeguards, meaning that the importer's entire nuclear apparatus is subject to international oversight. India is not a member of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not allow for full-scope nuclear safeguards.

Fred McGoldrick, Harold Bengelsdorf, and Dr. Lawrence Scheinman write in the October issue of Arms Control Today that "The key question is whether the United States could have accomplished its geo-strategic objectives by strengthening ties with India in the economic, scientific, and military fields without having compromised important principles of its nonproliferation policy." They add, "It is open to serious doubt whether the proposed Indian concessions were significant enough to justify the accommodations promised by the United States and whether the steps the United States and India agreed to take in the civil nuclear area will, on balance, be supportive of global nonproliferation efforts."

McGoldrick and Bengelsdorf are partners in a Washington-based consulting firm and Scheinman is a professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. All three authors have decades of experience working on nonproliferation matters for the U.S. government and the IAEA.

The authors note that India could ask the IAEA to apply facility-specific safeguards to declared civilian facilities that would last in perpetuity and preclude their use for the production of fissile material--plutonium or highly enriched uranium--for bombs. Alternatively, India could enter into "largely symbolic" voluntary safeguards agreement similar to those of the original nuclear-weapon states, which would allow it to withdraw safeguarded nuclear facilities or material for military purposes at any time. Most of India's current nuclear facilities are unsafeguarded.

"India pledged to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). Yet India has been supporting the negotiation of such a treaty for some time, so this is not a new concession," the experts note. "Moreover, it is not clear how meaningful this action will really be because the United States itself has thrown the prospects for concluding this treaty into some confusion by asserting that an FMCT cannot be adequately verified. In the meantime, India will remain free to produce fissile materials for its nuclear weapons program," they write.

The trio further argues that peaceful nuclear cooperation with India must occur only under certain basic conditions. "India needs to bring an early halt to the production of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives...[and] New Delhi must accept safeguards in perpetuity on its civil nuclear facilities," they recommend.

The authors also express concern about the impact of the proposed deal on NSG efforts to curb the spread of sensitive nuclear weapons-related technologies to other states. "If some suppliers try to exploit the U.S. initiative for commercial purposes to pursue previously off-limit markets, it could wreak serious damage to the nonproliferation regime," they warn.

The United States is pressing fellow group members to hold an extraordinary plenary session to discuss nuclear trade with India on the margins of an Oct. 17 NSG meeting. The administration has told Congress that it is still considering what combination of legislative changes and/or waivers to existing U.S. nonproliferation law it will seek.

At a Sept. 16 Arms Control Association briefing, Scheinman said, "Congress has an opportunity to shape the future, to shape development in ways that can help to push outcomes...reinforcing nonproliferation principles and set a sufficiently high bar for exceptions of this kind to mitigate--not prevent but mitigate--the damage that will be done to the [nuclear nonproliferation] regime."

The full article is available on the Arms Control Association's Web site: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/OCT-Cover.asp. Arms Control Today encourages reprints of its articles with permission of the Editors.

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

 

 

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Arms Control Today Article Reports: New Nuclear Plan Falls Short of Bush Pledge

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For Immediate Release: September 12, 2005

Press Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director (202) 463 8270 x107; Hans M. Kristensen (202) 513-6249

(Washington, D.C.) A draft Pentagon doctrine calls for maintaining an aggressive nuclear posture with weapons on high alert to strike adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), pre-emptively if necessary, according to an article by Hans Kristensen published September 6 in Arms Control Today, the monthly journal of the Arms Control Association.

Nearly four years ago, the Bush administration unveiled its nuclear posture review, claiming that it would significantly change U.S. nuclear policy and reduce the role of nuclear weapons. Yet, as Hans M. Kristensen writes, "the new U.S. nuclear doctrine falls far short of fulfilling the administration's publicly stated goals. Instead of replacing the role of nuclear weapons, the new doctrine merely calls for conventional forces and missile defenses to complement them."

The doctrine, the first formal update since the Bush administration took office, is entitled "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" and has been strongly influenced by the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and other directives published by the Bush administration since 2001. A final version is expected later this fall. The draft doctrine and editing comments were freely available on the Internet until recently, providing a rare glimpse into the secret world of nuclear planning in the post-Cold War era.

The full article is available on the Arms Control Association's website: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/Kristensen.asp. Arms Control Today encourages reprints of its articles with permission of the Editor. The doctrine and related documents are available at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/jp.htm.

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

 

 

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Scientists Say Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Still Unnecessary, Uneconomic, and Risky

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For Immediate Release: September 6, 2005

 

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x104; Frank N. von Hippel, (609) 258-4695

(Washington, D.C.): Two leading scientists warn in an Arms Control Today article this month against embracing the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel as a solution for dealing with accumulating stockpiles of U.S. nuclear waste. Nearly three decades ago, the United States swore off reprocessing because it cost too much and put plutonium-a key material for building nuclear weapons-into circulation, leaving it vulnerable to theft. The authors argue that these rationales remain just as valid, if not more so, today.

In May, the House of Representatives called on the Department of Energy to prepare "an integrated spent fuel recycling plan for implementation beginning in fiscal year 2007, including…reprocessing." Supporters, led by Rep. David Hobson (R-Ohio), chairman of the House Appropriations Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, say the need is imminent. They contend that, in the absence of reprocessing, the amount of spent fuel discharged by U.S. power reactors will soon exceed the legislated storage capacity of a spent fuel repository being built under Yucca Mountain in Nevada.

Steve Fetter and Frank N. von Hippel, however, point out that this is not the case. "Reprocessing does not eliminate the need for a repository, and there is no urgent need for additional repository capacity," they write. Fetter is a professor and dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and von Hippel is a professor of public and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.

The two scientists further maintain that implementing the proposed reprocessing plan would be far more expensive than storing the spent fuel. They calculate that reprocessing the spent fuel for existing U.S. reactors would add roughly $2 billion annually to the cost of U.S. nuclear-generated electricity. This extra sum would have to be borne by the ratepayers or taxpayers if the federal government underwrites the project. In addition, Fetter and von Hippel estimate that the price of a kilogram of uranium would need to climb 12 times as high as it is today to make reprocessing cost effective. Uranium is currently the main material used in fueling U.S. nuclear reactors.

Reprocessing would also increase the amount of plutonium available that terrorists might try to steal. And a U.S. move toward reprocessing would undercut current efforts to stop the spread of reprocessing capabilities to additional countries. As Fetter and von Hippel note, "A continued U.S. stance that reprocessing is neither necessary nor economic is likely to be more influential than a policy of 'Do as I say, not as I do.'"

The authors say that lawmakers have "plenty of time" to explore more viable solutions for disposing of nuclear waste and urge them against rushing toward reprocessing because it invites more problems than it fixes.

The full article is available on the Arms Control Association's website: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/Fetter-VonHippel.asp. Arms Control Today encourages reprints of its articles with permission of the Editor.

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. It publishes Arms Control Today.

 

 

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Arms Control Experts Urge UN Members to Resist U.S. Effort to Weaken Arms Control and Disarmament Commitments

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For Immediate Release: August 26, 2005

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107

(Washington, D.C.): World leaders will meet Sept. 14-16 at the United Nations in New York to address critical challenges confronting international peace and security. But the Bush administration, led by Ambassador John Bolton, is jeopardizing the meeting's chances of success by seeking to dilute and eliminate a raft of commitments to reduce the dangers posed by biological, chemical, conventional, and nuclear arms from the UN meeting's draft final document. The nonpartisan Arms Control Association and other nongovernmental organizations are encouraging governments to preserve essential nonproliferation and disarmament commitments from the U.S. axe.

Reportedly, the administration's hit list includes declarations of support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) to end the production of key materials for building nuclear arms, the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, small arms regulations, and nuclear-weapon-free zones, which are regions where countries forswear nuclear weapons. Most troubling is the administration's move to strip away all references to disarmament obligations, say the experts.

The 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) codified a deal in which countries without nuclear weapons would not seek them and nuclear-armed states would progress toward eventually giving them up. Although the administration supports retaining a call in the draft UN document for all countries to adhere to the NPT, it is seeking to cut more explicit language spelling out the actual disarmament obligations of the treaty.

"Ignoring one half of the NPT equation jeopardizes the other half," warns Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association (ACA). ACA joined with Greenpeace International, the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, and New York-based Reaching Critical Will project in sending letters August 17 to all UN member states recommending they conclude an outcome document that would "recommit the nuclear-weapon states, and all states, to the fulfillment of their nuclear disarmament obligations."

The organizations also urged states to maintain a nuclear testing moratorium pending the CTBT's entry into force. Referring to the administration's opposition to the accord, the organizations wrote, "If one or another state cannot at this time endorse this goal, that state should not be allowed to silence the vast majority that do."

"The upcoming UN meeting represents an excellent opportunity to bolster international efforts to counter the threat posed by dangerous weapons, but the Bush administration is on the verge of sabotaging it," stated Kimball. He added, "Other governments should avoid becoming accomplices and instead stand up for a meaningful nonproliferation and disarmament outcome."

The text of the draft outcome document is available at http://www.un.org/ga/59/hlpm_rev.2.pdf. The text of the August 17 letter to UN missions is available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com05/NGOlettertoGovernments.html. For more information on the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, see http://www.NPT2005.org.

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

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Top European Official Discusses Solving the Iranian Nuclear Dilemma and Other Arms Control Matters

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For Immediate Release: August 11, 2005

 

Press Contacts: Miles Pomper, (202) 463-8270 x108; Oliver Meier, in Berlin +49 171 359 2410

(Washington, D.C.): "Arms Control Today's" international correspondent Oliver Meier sat down recently with EU nonproliferation chief Annalisa Giannella to discuss Europe's nonproliferation and security policies and future directions. The interview came as the European Union and three of its member states geared up for a new round of negotiations with Iran. "Arms Control Today" is published by the Arms Control Association.

On Iran, Giannella notes that if Iran's actions were to lead to a referral to the UN Security Council, it would not necessarily mean immediate sanctions. She states, "The Council, of course, is a new process. Everybody knows that the Security Council can adopt sanctions, but also the Security Council can decide to encourage...negotiations. The Security Council is a process. It's not a one-shot event."

Still, she says that Iran would be worse off if the present European-Iranian negotiations collapse. "The negotiations that are underway are, in my opinion, a very good chance for Iran to get out from the difficult situation. So, Iran should not underestimate the fact that if it misses this opportunity, everything will be more difficult," Giannella warns.

The EU nonproliferation chief further notes that the EU proposal takes Iran's position into consideration. She explains, "We take into account the fact that Russia has already concluded a contract with Iran for the supply of fuel for Bushehr I. We also take into account the possibility that Russia would supply Iran with a Bushehr II reactor. On the other hand, we understand that Iran does not necessarily want to depend exclusively on one country and would like to have other guarantees in order to have a power generation program that is totally safe."

In addition to tough negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, the EU has also been at the eye of a storm on arms sales to China. Beijing is pressing the EU to lift its 1989 arms embargo on China, while Washington is insisting that the EU retain the ban. Giannella indicates that the EU's intention is to lift the arms embargo, but says that the EU would place the previously voluntary measures contained in an arms sales code of conduct in a legally binding document and adopt "transparency measures and mutual controls that will apply to exports to countries previously under embargo." She adds, "We have been making a lot of improvements, for ourselves, but also to reassure our partners."

Giannella further notes that the EU is pursuing joint efforts with other countries to bolster their compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements. She states, "We have agreed now to conduct specific consultations in the field of compliance...maybe closer cooperation in the field of compliance can help us in allaying the concerns of our American friends. And maybe we'll have more cooperation in the area of disarmament as well."

Giannella has served in her current position since October 2003 and previously served as the European Council's director for security and defense policy and the head of the Council's division for security issues.

A full transcript of the interview is available on the Arms Control Association's Web site: http://www.armscontrol.org/interviews/20050724_Giannella.asp.

For more on the Iranian nuclear program and EU nonproliferation policy, see the forthcoming September 2005 issue of "Arms Control Today."

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

 

 

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The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective

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For Immediate Release: May 31, 2005

Press Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107; Wade Boese, (202) 463-8270 x104

Washington, D.C. -- Today, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hosted several foreign ambassadors to commemorate the 2 nd anniversary of the administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). While PSI is a promising adjunct to the international nonproliferation regime anchored by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the initiative’s actual impact on halting the worldwide spread of deadly weapons remains unsubstantiated.

PSI aims to improve countries’ capabilities to intercept shipments of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as well as related materials and delivery vehicles, at sea, on land, and in the air. For more information on PSI, visit the Arms Control Association’s subject resource page on the initiative at <http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/cppsi/#psi>.

Although the administration asserts that the initiative has been a huge success, it says that the sensitive nature of PSI prevents discussion of its specific accomplishments, except for the much publicized October 2003 interdiction of the BBC China transporting nuclear contraband to Libya.

Yet, some foreign government and former U.S. officials dispute this assertion, arguing that the BBC China interdiction was not a PSI operation. These claims will be detailed further in a forthcoming article in the monthly journal Arms Control Today, which is published by the Arms Control Association.

The interdiction of dangerous cargo was not novel to PSI and it does not legally empower countries to do anything that they could not do before. All actions under the initiative are completely voluntary.

The administration’s high-profile support for PSI contrasts sharply with its recent participation at a month-long international conference dedicated to reviewing and strengthening the NPT. Neither President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, nor Rice attended the once-every-five-years conference in New York, and it concluded without any agreements on how to improve international efforts to stop nuclear proliferation. This outcome resulted, in part, from the administration’s refusal to own up to past U.S. disarmament commitments. For additional information on the NPT and U.S. participation at the conference, visit <http://www.NPT2005.org>.

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

 

 

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Experts Call for Pragmatic Leadership and Positive Action to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

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U.S. and Iranian Delegations Have Misused Procedure to Block Progress

For Immediate Release: May 20, 2005

Press Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 ext 107; Joseph Cirincione (202) 441-9825; Rebecca Johnson (646) 675-1436

 

(Washington, D.C.)—As a month-long international conference on curbing nuclear weapons dangers moves into its final week, behind-the-scenes maneuvers by a small minority of delegations, including the United States and Iran, have frustrated progress on strengthening the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Today, several leading nuclear and security experts called on member states to seize the chance to produce a strong action plan to update and strengthen the 35 year-old treaty.

"The NPT is not broken, but it must be strengthened if past successes are to be preserved and if today's and future proliferation threats are to be rolled back. The NPT's future success depends on universal compliance with tighter rules to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, more effective regional security strategies, and renewed progress toward fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon states' disarmament obligations," said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association and co-chair of the Campaign to Strengthen the NPT.

"Tragically, practical proposals to strengthen compliance and implementation of the NPT across the board are being stymied because a small number of states have chosen to play procedural games and try to rewrite history, seriously delaying the adoption of the agenda and working groups," said Rebecca Johnson of the London-based Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, presently covering the NPT in New York.

"Now very little time is available to seek common agreement on important ideas contained in the substantive working papers that could help the international community strengthen the nuclear test ban, reduce nuclear dangers, and promote further action on nuclear disarmament," said Johnson.

During the first two weeks, the conference could not agree on an agenda because the United States sought to block discussion of nuclear disarmament-related commitments and decisions from the 2000 and 1995 NPT Review Conferences. At the same time, Iran has been trying to block discussion and criticism of its advanced uranium enrichment program, which could be used to produce nuclear bomb material. This week, agreement on the organization of working groups for key agenda topics was delayed, in part, by U.S. opposition to proposals from Iran and other non-nuclear-weapon states to discuss assurances against attack or threat of nuclear attack. The conference, which involves representatives from over 160 of the nearly 190 treaty parties, generally operates by consensus.

The NPT codifies one of the most important international security bargains of all time: states without nuclear weapons pledge not to acquire them, while nuclear-armed states commit to give them up and move toward disarmament. At the same time, the NPT allows for the peaceful use of nuclear technology under strict and verifiable control.

"The U.S. delegation argues that the United States commitment to fulfill its Article VI disarmament commitments is 'unassailable,' but a closer examination of the Bush administration's nuclear stockpile numbers and actions make it clear that it has failed to move beyond Cold War-era nuclear force structure and strategies," noted Kimball.

"The administration's selective presentation of its record at the NPT conference does not hide the fact that it has taken actions contrary to U.S. disarmament commitments and obligations established by the NPT and the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, including its publicly stated opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty, its pursuit of new nuclear weapons, and its failure to agree to deeper, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear weapons reductions," Kimball noted. (See http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2005/20050510_ArmsControl_Gurus.asp for a detailed analysis.)

Some U.S. and French officials have even suggested that their 2000 NPT Review Conference commitments on specific disarmament measures are no longer relevant. Former U.S. disarmament Ambassador Robert Grey has called the current U.S. stance "a radical departure from past American practice" that is a dangerous invitation for other states to ignore commitments made at previous review conferences, not the least of which is the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995.

"As a result, the majority of countries do not believe the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states intend to live up to their NPT-related nuclear disarmament commitments, which, in turn, erodes the willingness of other states to fulfill their own treaty obligations, much less take strong action to condemn the transgressions of North Korea and Iran," noted Joseph Cirincione, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and co-chair of the Campaign to Strengthen the NPT.

"Iran for its part, has mischaracterized concern about its advancing nuclear program as an assault on developing states' Article IV 'right' to peaceful nuclear energy production," noted Kimball. "In reality, the right of states to pursue peaceful nuclear technologies must be balanced against the treaty's core mission to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference can and should reaffirm the right of all states to energy security, while at the same time agree to freeze construction of new plants capable of producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium, which are needed for weapons but are not necessary for nuclear energy production," Kimball argued.

"There is still an opportunity to reach agreement on a balanced and comprehensive plan to strengthen compliance and implementation with the NPT," said Cirincione. A review of the national statements from the first two weeks of the conference reveal that the vast majority support a range of concrete steps that would advance both nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. (See http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements.html for the statements.)

"The best chance for success would be for the United States and other states to embrace the common European Union (EU) position, which balances the views of the two European nuclear-weapon states, France and the United Kingdom, with the goals of the 23 EU non-nuclear-weapon states. The EU strategy action plan reaffirms the goal of nuclear disarmament, the need for new measures to control the spread of technologies that can be used to produce nuclear weapons material, while also endorsing tougher inspections and new mechanisms to deter and punish states that withdraw from the treaty to build nuclear bombs," Cirincione argued. (The EU strategy is available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/Luxembourg-EU.pdf.)

"The 2005 NPT Review Conference is a vital opportunity for the United States and the international community to recommit to the treaty's goals and agree to a comprehensive program of action to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the nuclear danger. It is an opportunity that we cannot afford to squander," urged Kimball.

For more information and updates on the NPT and the Campaign to Strengthen the NPT, visit: http://www.npt2005.org. For further analysis of key issues, see: http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/NPTRevConf2005_MajorProposals.pdf and for updates on the conference proceedings, see http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/index.htm.

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The Arms Control Association (ACA) is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. The Campaign to Strengthen the NPT is a joint project of ACA and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"Arms Control Gurus" Clarify Bush Record on Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation

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For Immediate Release: May 10, 2005

 

Press Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107

(Washington, D.C.): Last week as the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference opened in New York, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher dismissed recommendations in a report by the independent Arms Control Association (ACA) that the United States could do more to cut its nuclear arsenal and reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons. He remarked, "I know the arms control gurus can debate these numbers all day long." Echoing statements and presentations by the U.S. NPT delegation, Boucher asserted that "we are indeed meeting our [Article VI] commitments under the [NPT] to reduce nuclear weapons."

A closer examination of the Bush administration's nuclear stockpile numbers and actions make it clear that the administration has failed to move beyond Cold War-era nuclear force structure and strategies. The administration's selective presentation of its record at the NPT conference also ignores the fact that it has taken actions contrary to U.S. disarmament commitments and obligations established by the NPT and the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, undermining the credibility of U.S. leadership to strengthen the treaty.

Strategic Nuclear Reductions: U.S. representatives at the month-long NPT conference cite the May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with Russia and the June 2004 decision to cut the total U.S. nuclear stockpile almost in half by 2012 as evidence of U.S. fulfillment of its Article VI nuclear disarmament obligations. Boucher defended current U.S. nuclear reductions and policies as "pretty impressive" and serving as "an example to others that these weapons are not necessary."

If fulfilled, these two commitments would leave the United States with an arsenal of approximately 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and at least another 3,000 stored nuclear warheads by 2012. That is a step in the right direction, but an arsenal of more than 5,000 nuclear weapons more than 20 years after the Soviet Union's collapse is still excessive. Alas, the Bush administration's nuclear plan remains predicated on deterring and defeating Russia's military forces.

In an April ACA report, What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, Stanford physicist Sidney Drell and Ambassador James Goodby urge the Bush administration to commit to reducing the U.S. strategic nuclear stockpile faster and more deeply—to 1,000 warheads by 2010—and abandon research on new or modified types of nuclear weapons for new missions.

Dramatic Reductions? Despite its declared intentions, the Bush administration has yet to finalize its plan for reducing nuclear deployments and U.S. strategic reductions have slowed to a crawl. According to the State Department's own fact sheets, the number of U.S. "accountable" warheads under the 1991 START accord have only decreased by two in the last year to 5,966. This is larger than the 5,949 "accountable" warheads the United States declared in December 2001 as fulfilling its START obligations. "Accountable" warheads are calculated on counting rules that attribute a certain number of warheads to each specific type of deployed submarine, heavy bomber, and intercontinental ballistic missile.

The United States and Russia agreed under START to destroy delivery vehicles as a way to limit the amount of nuclear warheads that could be redeployed. In its May 2002 agreement with Russia, the Bush administration opposed such requirements, providing both sides with the flexibility to remove warheads from storage and return them to service. The administration also declined to pursue measures to mandate destruction of warheads even though the United States and Russia agreed to explore this goal in 1997.

Other vestiges of Cold War-era U.S. nuclear policy include the maintenance of thousands of nuclear warheads on high alert status, thus enabling their launch in a matter of minutes, as well as the stationing of over 400 tactical, or "battlefield," nuclear weapons at bases in six NATO countries in Europe. Some European leaders and lawmakers are calling for the removal of these obsolete remnants of the Cold War.

Reducing Nuclear Weapons Roles and Missions? In presentations and materials distributed at the NPT Review Conference, the U.S. delegation claims that the United States is not developing, testing, or producing any nuclear warheads and has not done so in more than a decade. This may be the case now, but the administration supports exploring new and modified nuclear weapons for new missions. This year, the administration requested $8.5 million for research on modifications of the high-yield B-83 bomb to test the feasibility of creating a new nuclear earth penetrator, and it has said another $14 million would be needed to complete the research.

The administration is also hawking a new program to replace existing warheads with new nuclear components and possibly new designs that it says would improve the reliability of the nuclear arsenal. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) chief Linton Brooks said the goal is to develop and produce a "small build" of the new warheads by 2012-2015 without resuming nuclear testing. He also claims the program does not aim to create new nuclear weapons capabilities. Yet, in a revealing comment last month, Brooks' deputy said "[T]hat's not the primary objective, but [it] would be a fortuitous associated event."

Test Ban Treaty Amnesia: When asked by a reporter about the administration's interpretation of its legal position as a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Mr. Boucher said his memory did not go back that far. The record shows that following the Senate rejection of the treaty in October 1999 after a brief and highly partisan debate, the Clinton administration declared in November 1999 that the United States would continue to respect its obligations as a signatory to the treaty not to test, pending its entry into force.

The Bush administration says it has no plans at this time to resume nuclear testing, but it has refused to support the CTBT. According to the May 12, 2002 edition of The New York Times, officials at the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, and at the National Security Council discussed whether President Bush should renounce the U.S. signature of the accord in late 2001.

Agreement on an agenda for the NPT conference has been blocked, in part, because of U.S. unwillingness to discuss the CTBT or past review conference commitments. A timeline titled Progress in Arms Control Disarmament and Nonproliferation distributed by the U.S. delegation at the conference fails to note the fact that President Bill Clinton was the first leader to sign the CTBT in September 1996 and it fails to note the occurrence of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and its outcomes.

The ACA report is available online at http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/USNW_2005_Drell-Goodby.pdf. For more information on U.S. nuclear weapons policies and the NPT, visit: http://www.armscontrol.org.

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

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Prestigious Award Won by Authors of New Arms Control Association Report on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

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For Immediate Release: May 2, 2005

Press Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107

(Washington, D.C.): Stanford physicist Sidney D. Drell today was announced as the latest recipient of the Heinz Award for Public Policy for his decades-long effort to reduce nuclear dangers. With former Heinz Award honoree Ambassador James E. Goodby, Drell recently wrote a report urging the Bush administration to accelerate and expand its currently planned nuclear reductions to help lessen the reliance on nuclear weapons worldwide. The report, "What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations For Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces," was published last week by the Washington-based Arms Control Association (ACA).

The annual $250,000 Heinz Award for Public Policy is bestowed upon individuals who make a positive impact on the process of public policy. Teresa Heinz, who is chairman of the Heinz Family Foundation, said in a press release today, "[Drell's] scientific insights laid the foundation for an impassioned advocacy, championing a doctrine that reduced the threat of nuclear war while ensuring U.S. security."

"Now more than ever, we must ensure that our policies toward nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation are sound, scientifically based, and reflect the principles of our nation," Drell said in response to the award.

These notions are embodied in the ACA report released last week. Drell and Goodby write that the Bush administration needs to be more ambitious in moving the United States beyond its lingering Cold War-era nuclear weapons policies and make clear that nuclear weapons are truly weapons of last resort.

The authors argue that current U.S. and Russian plans to cut their operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to less than 2,200 warheads apiece by 2012 fall well short of realizing the goal that Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin set in 2002 of reducing their strategic nuclear forces to the "lowest levels" possible. Drell and Goodby recommend that the United States could safely rely upon a much smaller force posture of 1,000 total warheads, of which only 500 would be readied for rapid use.

Underlying their proposal is the authors' findings that missions for nuclear weapons have diminished since the Soviet Union's collapse. Consequently, they argue Washington should make its nuclear stockpile smaller and more reliable without developing new nuclear weapons or increasing their role in U.S. security policy.

"The Heinz Award is a well-deserved recognition of Sid Drell's dedication to making the United States and the world safer," ACA Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball said today. He added, "The Bush administration would be wise to follow the advice of Drell and Goodby in their report."

The full report is available online at <http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/USNW_2005_Drell-Goodby.pdf>. For more information on U.S. nuclear weapons policies and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty visit <http://www.npt2005.org/>.

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

 

 

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New Report Recommends Faster and Deeper U.S. Nuclear Reductions And Diminished Roles for Nuclear Weapons

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For Immediate Release: April 28, 2005

Press Contacts: Sidney D. Drell, (650) 926-2664; James E. Goodby, (202) 691-4272; Daryl G. Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107

(Washington, D.C.): The Washington-based Arms Control Association published a report today urging the Bush administration to accelerate and expand its currently planned nuclear reductions to help lessen the reliance on nuclear weapons worldwide. The proposed action plan aims to move the United States beyond its lingering Cold War-era nuclear weapons policies and make clear that nuclear weapons are truly weapons of last resort. Two eminent nuclear experts with decades of scientific and diplomatic experience, Stanford physicist Sidney D. Drell and Ambassador James E. Goodby, authored the report, What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations For Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces.

The report's release comes on the eve of a May meeting of the nearly 190 states-parties to the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the cornerstone of international efforts to control and eliminate nuclear weapons. Drell and Goodby write that more ambitious U.S. and Russian efforts to lower their nuclear holdings could reinforce the treaty. Article VI of the NPT requires nuclear-armed states, as well as all other countries, to pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons. "Bold actions by the two powers that still possess more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear warheads would be a powerful stimulus toward preserving and further strengthening a nonproliferation regime that is under severe strain," the authors state.

The United States possesses approximately 10,000 nuclear warheads and Russia reportedly has roughly twice as many. The two sides have committed to reducing their operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to less than 2,200 apiece by December 2012, but no limit exists on how many weapons each may retain in storage.

Drell and Goodby argue that current U.S. and Russian plans fall well short of realizing the goal that Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin set in 2002 of reducing their strategic nuclear forces to the "lowest levels" possible. They argue the United States could preserve its security with a much smaller force posture of 500 operationally deployed warheads and 500 more in reserve that are not ready for instant or rapid use.

Underlying the report's recommended course of action are the authors' findings that plausible missions for nuclear weapons have diminished since the Soviet Union's collapse. In addition to Moscow's ongoing transition from foe to partner, Drell and Goodby argue that Washington requires significantly fewer nuclear weapons because present and potentially foreseeable dangers, including a possible souring in U.S. relations with China, do not require additional nuclear weapons above those for hedging against a resurgent, hostile Russia. Moreover, conventional arms can accomplish most military tasks, according to the authors.

They also argue that a robust U.S. nuclear arsenal by itself does not dissuade other regimes or terrorists from trying to acquire nuclear arms. "U.S. nuclear weapons have not been useful in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states determined to have them and will clearly not dissuade al Qaeda from attempting to make or steal them," the authors warn. They state, "The best way of blocking nuclear-armed terrorism is to prevent nuclear weapons or materials from escaping the control of responsible governments."

"Nuclear weapons are unique in their terrifying potential for massive destruction on an unprecedented scale," Drell and Goodby write. This reality, the two experts maintain, should make U.S. policymakers very cautious about explicitly threatening the use of nuclear weapons in response to a biological or chemical weapons attack. "The United States only diminishes its own advantages and strengths by pursuing nuclear weapons policies that boost the perceived value of biological and chemical weapons in the eyes of others," the authors assert. Current U.S. policy is to maintain "calculated ambiguity" about whether U.S. retaliation for a biological or chemical weapons attack would include nuclear weapons.

The report further contends that the Bush administration should abandon research into new or modified types of nuclear weapons, including so-called bunker busters, because such activities send the wrong message to the rest of the world. "If the United States, the strongest nation in the world, concluded that it could not protect its vital interests without relying on a newly developed nuclear weapon, it would be a clear signal to other nations that nuclear weapons are necessary for their security purposes too," the authors state. "Recognizing existing U.S. military capabilities, including high-yield nuclear warheads, and the likely harmful impact of such an initiative…on international efforts to preserve and strengthen the nonproliferation regime, the additional capabilities of new nuclear bunker-buster weapons are not worth the high costs," Drell and Goodby write.

The authors also take exception to the new proposal advanced by Bush administration officials that the Department of Energy's Reliable Replacement Warhead program might be used to produce new, more durable warheads to replace existing U.S. weapons. Drell and Goodby maintain, "It takes an extraordinary flight of imagination to postulate a modern new arsenal composed of such untested designs that would be more reliable, safe, and effective than the current U.S. arsenal based on more than 1,000 tests since 1945."

Noting that U.S. nuclear weapons complex "decision making is still being driven by the nuclear weapons structure put in place over the past 50 years," Rep. David Hobson (R-Ohio) said Feb. 3, "I think the time is now for a thoughtful and open debate on the role of nuclear weapons in our country's national security strategy." Hobson, who chairs the appropriations subcommittee in the House of Representatives that is responsible for nuclear weapons funding, was speaking at an event hosted by the Arms Control Association (ACA).

"This new report is an important contribution to the dialogue that Congressman Hobson has called for," ACA Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball said today.

The full report is available online at <http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/USNW_2005_Drell-Goodby.pdf>. For additional information on the Bush administration's nuclear weapons policies see <http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/usnw/>. For more resources on the NPT visit <http://www.NPT2005.org>.

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The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.

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