Login/Logout

*
*  

"ACA's journal, Arms Control Today, remains the best in the market. Well focused. Solidly researched. Prudent."

– Hans Blix
Former IAEA Director-General
Pressroom

Top Administration Official Comments on Bush's North Korea Policy; United States, North Korea Set to Meet Later This Month

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: April 16, 2003

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, (202) 277-3478 or Paul Kerr, (202) 463-8270 x102

(Washington, D.C.): In a possible breakthrough, the United States, North Korea, and China will hold direct talks in Beijing later this month to discuss Pyongyang's nuclear program, according to press reports today. The months-long crisis began when the United States stated in October that North Korea admitted to a covert nuclear weapons program and has deteriorated to the point that North Korea announced its withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in January. Pyongyang is now on the verge of being able to resume the separation of plutonium for building nuclear weapons. The announcement of the trilateral talks is clearly a positive development, but it leaves many unanswered questions about the substance of proposals from each side, and whether they can lead to a verifiable dismantlement of Pyongyang's suspected nuclear weapons program and enhanced security in the region.

During an April 15 interview with Arms Control Today, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton described several salient elements of the Bush administration's North Korea policy.

Bolton stated that the United States has no preconditions for multilateral talks, but the administration expects the "complete verified dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons program" before bilateral talks can proceed.

When asked about the administration's verification proposals, Bolton explained that the administration is discussing the matter internally and does not "have a final package at the moment."

Bolton further indicated that the Bush administration is considering reviving a comprehensive political and economic package vis-à-vis North Korea if it dismantles its nuclear program. He said, "I think it's a possibility, but as I said-as was the case in October- they have to have the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program before that becomes possible."

Bolton also stated that the administration has not specified any particular actions that would trigger punitive actions against North Korea, saying "we haven't declared anything to be a red line." North Korea may be preparing to reprocess spent fuel rods on its territory, which could yield enough material for five or six nuclear weapons in roughly six months.

The entire interview is available on the Arms Control Association's Web site at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/bolton_may03.asp.

Excerpts from the Bolton interview will also appear in the upcoming May issue of Arms Control Today, which will also present perspectives and proposals on how to address the North Korean nuclear crisis, including:

  • Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Alan Romberg of the Henry L. Stimson Center on how negotiations between the United States and North Korea can resolve the crisis.
  • Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center on why penalizing North Korea for its pursuit of nuclear weapons is important to discourage additional countries from illicitly trying to acquire nuclear weapons.
  • Bates Gill and Andrew Thompson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies on China's perspective and future role in resolving the crisis.
  • Matake Kimiya of Japan's National Defense Academy on Japanese attitudes toward North Korea and the potential effects of the crisis on Japan's defense posture.
  • Haksoon Paik of South Korea's Sejong Institute on Seoul's effort to find a middle ground between Washington and Pyongyang.

 

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies to address security threats posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as conventional arms.

Description: 
Media Advisory

Country Resources:

Senate Approves Flawed Nuclear Treaty; Arms Experts Say U.S. and Russia Need to Do More to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: March 6, 2003

Press Contacts: Christine Kucia, Research Analyst at (202) 463-8270 x103; Daryl Kimball, Executive Director at (202) 463-8270 x107

(Washington, D.C.): The Senate today unanimously approved the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty, after two days of debate during which several proposals to strengthen the accord were withdrawn or rejected.

“Democratic and Republican senators have missed a vital opportunity to add practical conditions to the flawed Moscow Treaty to keep the nuclear risk reduction process on track,” said Daryl G. Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association. “As a result, the treaty is little more than a gentlemen’s agreement that will allow each country to continue deploying and storing thousands of nuclear warheads more than two decades after the end of the Cold War,” he noted.

Signed May 24, 2002 by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, SORT requires the United States and Russia to each reduce its number of deployed strategic warheads from today’s 5,000-6,000 to no more than 2,200 by the end of 2012, when the treaty will expire. The agreement requires that the warheads be removed from their delivery systems, but does not require their destruction, permitting both sides to keep as many warheads and delivery vehicles as they want for future use. For its part, Washington intends to store enough warheads that it could field up to 4,600 warheads in as little as three years after the treaty ends. Moscow’s plans for the warheads it will remove from service under the treaty are unclear.

Secretary of State Colin Powell acknowledged in Senate testimony last July that the accord does not limit the amount of warheads either country can possess. “The treaty will allow you to have as many warheads as you want,” Powell stated.

Moreover, the treaty provides no new verification measures to confirm that both parties are carrying out the pledged reductions. As a result, the U.S. intelligence community has determined that the United States will not be able to verify Russian compliance with high confidence.

“Under the treaty, neither country can know for certain whether the other is fulfilling its promises, nor if nuclear warheads and materials are being stored safely to prevent their illicit transfer to or theft by terrorists or unfriendly governments,” said Wade Boese, research director of the Arms Control Association.

“Given warming U.S.-Russian relations and existing concerns about Russia’s ability to properly secure its nuclear materials, the greater threat to U.S. security may well be the warheads Russia keeps in storage instead of those it deploys on its missiles, bombers, and submarines,” Boese cautioned.

In his July 2002 Senate testimony, former Senator Sam Nunn contended that the treaty by itself would not accomplish much, stating: “If it is not followed with other substantive actions it will become irrelevant at best and counterproductive at worst.”

To help remedy the treaty’s shortcomings, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee added two modest conditions February 5 to the agreement. One mandates an annual report by the administration on U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, which provide U.S. assistance to help secure and destroy Russian weapons of mass destruction. The other requires a yearly update on the status of U.S. and Russian treaty implementation, including strategic force levels, planned reductions each calendar year, and verification or transparency measures that have been or might be employed. The Senate approved both conditions today.

“While the added conditions provide some increased accountability and transparency of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the treaty still falls far short of enacting permanent, meaningful reductions in a verifiable manner that can help build the trust needed to liquidate the legacy of the Cold War, as President Bush envisioned,” said Christine Kucia, the Arms Control Association’s strategic analyst.

Recognizing SORT’s flaws, several senators offered amendments to the resolution of ratification to strengthen the pact. Senator Carl Levin attempted to amend the resolution of ratification by requiring that the Senate is informed at least 60 days in advance of any decision to terminate or extend the treaty. It was defeated 50-44. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) proposed that the intelligence community annually report on its ability to verify Russia’s compliance with the treaty. It was defeated 50-45.

Moscow deploys an estimated 4,000 tactical nuclear warheads and Washington is currently estimated to have approximately 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads. In addition to their tactical and deployed strategic nuclear arsenals, the United States is believed to have more than 5,000 nuclear warheads in spare and reserve stockpiles and Russia is estimated to have another 11,000 warheads stockpiled.

“The flaws in the Moscow Treaty require that the Bush administration pursue additional measures with Russia to reduce the dangers posed by Cold War nuclear arsenals,” Kimball stated. He suggested, “In the coming months, the United States and Russia should resume discussions on additional transparency and verification measures, methods for verifying excess warhead and missile dismantlement, and begin talks on controlling the thousands of smaller, more portable, tactical nuclear weapons.”

“SORT should be seen as a beginning—not an end—for further U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions,” Kimball said.

For more information on the SORT agreement and nuclear weapons, see the Association's Web site at http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/ussp/ or http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/sr/.

 

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Established in 1971,the Association publishes the monthly journal, Arms Control Today.

Description: 
Media Advisory

Country Resources:

Flawed Nuclear Treaty Up For Senate Review

Sections:

Body: 

Senators Hold Key to Ensuring Authentic Arms Reductions

For Immediate Release: January 31, 2003

Press Contacts: Wade Boese, (202) 463-8270 x104; Christine Kucia (202) 463-8270 x103

(Washington, D.C.): With critical concerns and questions surrounding the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) still unresolved and unanswered, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should remedy the treaty's considerable flaws and weaknesses when it reviews the treaty next week, experts from the Arms Control Association (ACA) said today.

"Agreements to reduce American and Russian nuclear arsenals are welcome, but they should be permanent reductions that are verifiable by both sides, adhere to a clear schedule, and serve as a platform for future talks about further reductions," said Daryl G. Kimball, the Association's executive director.

Signed in May 2002, the agreement requires each side to reduce its number of deployed strategic warheads from today's 5,000-6,000 to no more than 2,200 by the end of 2012, when the treaty will expire. Under the treaty each side is expected to reduce its deployed strategic forces by removing warheads from missiles, bombers, and submarines.

However, because the accord does not require any warheads or delivery vehicles to be destroyed, the United States will have the flexibility to deploy approximately 4,200 strategic warheads in as little as three years after the treaty expires. Either party may withdraw from the treaty with three months' notice.

In addition, the United States and Russia have not yet agreed upon a common definition of how to count "deployed" warheads. Moreover, the treaty provides no new verification measures for either party to be confident that the other is carrying out its pledged reductions. As a result, the U.S. intelligence community has determined that the United States will not be able to verify Russian compliance with high confidence.

"The new treaty does not significantly alter the number of existing nuclear delivery systems and therefore only marginally affects the residual nuclear potential of the United States and Russia," observed Jack Mendelsohn, an ACA board member and former member of the U.S. Strategic Arms Limitations Talks and START negotiating teams. "It creates thousands of 'phantom warheads' undercutting its own verifiability, and it contains no reduction schedule, making it difficult to predict force levels over the next decade," he added.

"Since verification of the SORT reductions will depend on the framework established by the 1991 START I agreement, the United States and Russia must enhance and extend those mechanisms, which are slated to expire in 2009-three years before SORT is to be fully implemented in 2012," said Christine Kucia, Arms Control Association research analyst. "Congress should require that the President work toward an agreement with Russia on additional transparency measures so that both sides can be assured that the arsenals are properly safeguarded and are not a proliferation risk," Kucia added.

"Given that the SORT agreement will leave enormous numbers of deadly U.S. and Russian warheads and missiles intact, it is in the nation's interest for the Senate to condition ratification on the pursuit of additional reductions of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons," said Kimball.

The United States currently deploys approximately 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads on its strategic triad of land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers. Washington is also currently estimated to have approximately 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads and more than 5,000 total nuclear warheads in spare and reserve stockpiles. Russia currently deploys an estimated 5,500 strategic nuclear warheads on its strategic triad of land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers. Russia also deploys an estimated 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons and is believed to stockpile another 11,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads.

"It is imperative that the Senate address these shortcomings, or both sides will be left with a treaty that is flawed and amounts to little more than a gentleman's agreement between Presidents Bush and Putin," Kimball said. "We encourage the Senate to approve meaningful conditions on the treaty that help ensure that the weapons are dismantled and destroyed in a mutually verifiable way and to keep the door open for further, verifiable U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions," he added.

For more information on the SORT agreement and nuclear weapons, see the Association's Web site at http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/ussp/ or http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/sr/.

 

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Established in 1971,the Association publishes the monthly journal, Arms Control Today.

Description: 
Media Advisory

Country Resources:

Former U.S. Government Official on North Korea Details Strategy for Defusing Current Crisis

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: January 15, 2003

Press Contact: Peter Scoblic at (202) 463-8270 x108

(Washington, D.C.): Joel S. Wit, a former U.S. government official who served as coordinator for the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework that froze North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear weapons program, writes in the latest issue of "Arms Control Today" that diplomacy, not isolation, will
prevent the ongoing standoff with North Korea from worsening and provide a solution to the crisis.

Noting that the Bush administration appears to be in “disarray” on how to deal with North Korea’s ejection of international arms inspectors and moves to restart its nuclear reactor, Wit argues that diplomacy is the “linchpin” to fastening a multifaceted approach to end North Korea’s dangerous moves
that imperil regional security.

Wit, now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes that the diplomatic effort should pursue three goals: stopping the ongoing slide toward confrontation; verifiably ending North
Korea’s recently revealed and illicit effort to build nuclear weapons through uranium enrichment; and creating a process through which North Korea will permanently end its bid to become a nuclear power, relax military tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and improve U.S.-North Korean relations.

Wit recommends seven steps that the Bush administration should take to accomplish these goals.

  • Place a single American official in charge of U.S. policy toward North Korea.
  • Continue implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework. Construction of light-water reactors in North Korea should not stop and North Korea should permit limited inspections. North Korea should also refrain from reprocessing its stored spent-fuel rods and restarting its reactor.
  • Win international backing to make clear that a peaceful agreement must be reached to halt North Korea’s treaty-breaking activities or it will suffer economic and political consequences.
  • Reaffirm that the United States respects North Korean sovereignty and will not attack the country.
  • Initiate talks, ideally through the International Atomic Energy Agency, to verifiably end North Korea’s uranium enrichment program.
  • Pledge a resumption of heavy-fuel oil deliveries to North Korea once it is evident that the uranium enrichment program is being dismantled.
  • Engage in broad negotiations with North Korea to improve bilateral relations.

Joel Wit can be contacted directly at (202) 887-0200. The full text of Wit’s article, “A Strategy for Defusing the North Korean Crisis,” is available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01-02/wit_janfeb03.asp. Additional information on North Korea, including a recent article by Leon V. Sigal on North Korea’s strategy, a
comprehensive timeline, and background information on the Agreed Framework and North Korea’s ballistic missile program can be found at http://www.armscontrol.org/country/northkorea/.

 

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Established in 1971,the Association publishes the monthly journal, Arms Control Today.

Description: 
Media Advisory

Country Resources:

Arms Control Association Calls on White House to Pursue North Korean Disarmament Through Pragmatic Engagement

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: January 3, 2003

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, (202) 277-3478 or Paul Kerr, (202) 463-8270 x102

(Washington, D.C.): A decade ago, North Korea challenged the nuclear nonproliferation regime by pursuing nuclear weapons in violation of its treaty commitments. Pyongyang is once again breaking its commitments under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as the 1994 Agreed Framework,
which defused the earlier crisis.

North Korea’s provocative expulsion this week of international arms inspectors and preparations to resume operation of its nuclear reactor, along with its related facilities, is a more serious and urgent proliferation threat than that posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities, particularly since international arms inspectors are now working in Iraq. The North Korean situation demands a concerted and immediate diplomatic initiative led by the United States in coordination with other countries in the region.

Because pre-emptive military action against North Korea would likely lead to a devastating conventional war, and since a nuclear-armed North Korea would undermine regional security, the Bush administration must engage in tough, direct diplomacy with Pyongyang. For two years, the Bush administration has failed to engage in meaningful talks with North Korea on steps to implement earlier denuclearization agreements and to permanently and verifiably end North Korea’s ballistic missile program.

Complicating matters, the Bush administration stoked North Korean fears that it might be the target of a pre-emptive strike when President Bush named it part of an “axis of evil” and when the Pentagon released its Nuclear Posture Review which listed a war with North Korea as one of the contingencies that the United States must be prepared to possibly use nuclear weapons.

Pyongyang has cited these actions as evidence that the United States has reneged on its 1994 pledge to pursue normalized relations and to refrain from threatening the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. Although the Bush administration has recently said that it has no intention of attacking North Korea, the administration has sent inconsistent signals to Pyongyang.

Time is not on our side. The longer the Bush administration refuses to engage in direct, formal, high-level discussions with North Korea, the closer North Korea will move toward building a nuclear arsenal. North Korea, which may already have enough plutonium for two bombs, could separate additional plutonium for six bombs in six months.

Bush officials say they will not give in to “blackmail” by agreeing to negotiate with North Korea. Such an approach is based on the misconception that nuclear proliferation is inevitable and that it is fruitless to engage with North Korea to change its behavior. However, talking to the regime in Pyongyang is anything but acquiescence. By talking with North Korea, as the United States has done in the past and as South Korea and Japan are doing now, the United States would make it clear that it will not accept the entrance of a ninth state to the nuclear weapons club and that it is genuinely interested in seeking practical solutions to prevent such an outcome. Furthermore, only through preventative diplomacy and new, verifiable arms control measures, can the United States and the international community develop the tools by which we can ensure that North Korea does not again violate its disarmament commitments.

Refusing to talk with North Korea may be morally satisfying, but it will only make a bad situation worse. Since the United States announced North Korea’s admission that it has been pursuing uranium-enrichment capabilities, the leaders in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo decided to cut off heavy fuel oil shipments to the North that were promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Further attempts at isolation will likely provoke more destabilizing actions on the part of the Pyongyang regime, such as withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

North Korea’s continued, unchecked pursuit of nuclear weapons will create a highly dangerous situation that could spiral out of control and jeopardize regional and world security. Unfortunately, the Bush administration’s high-handed approach has helped contribute to the crisis and leaves it with no meaningful way to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Rather than hope that further economic isolation will persuade North Korea to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, the White House should encourage International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) member states and the United Nations Security Council to call upon North Korea to end its nuclear weapons related activity. At the same time, the White House should initiate direct discussions with Pyongyang on issues of concern. Congressional leaders, such as Senators Richard Lugar (R-IN) and John Kerry (D-MA), and U.S. allies in Seoul and Tokyo agree on the need to engage in talks that produce new, verifiable agreements that can defuse the present crisis and eliminate the North’s nuclear capabilities.

The U.S. approach in these talks should be to link further energy assistance and aid to North Korea to visible evidence that the country’s recently revealed uranium-enrichment activities have ended and that it agrees to allow IAEA inspectors to verify that it is not trying to build nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies should offer practical proposals, such as formal nonaggression pledges, that could persuade the Pyongyang regime to roll back its nuclear and missile programs.


 

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Established in 1971,the Association publishes the monthly journal, Arms Control Today.

Description: 
Statement by Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball

Country Resources:

Subject Resources:

Arms Control Experts Warn Bush Strategy to Counter WMD Threats Sends Wrong Signal to the World

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: December 12, 2002

Press Contacts: Wade Boese, (202) 463-8270 x104 or Christine Kucia, (202) 463-8270 x103

(Washington, D.C.): The Bush administration's release Tuesday of a six-page strategy promoting a central role for nuclear weapons in countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats undercuts global nonproliferation and arms control efforts by signaling to the world that the United States is maintaining, and possibly increasing, its reliance on nuclear weapons, while at the same time urging other countries to give up or forgo such weapons, arms control experts warned.

The Bush policy, outlined in a document titled "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," indicates the United States considers itself free to employ nuclear weapons if attacked with chemical or biological arms. The strategy explicitly states that the United States "reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force-including through resort to all of our options-to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies."

"A policy that sets the United States above and apart from the rules that other states are expected to follow is ultimately unsustainable and self-defeating," Daryl G. Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association, stated. "Perpetuating U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons as a key component of protecting U.S. security will only make the acquisition of nuclear weapons more attractive to others, not less."

Previous U.S. administrations did not rule out using nuclear weapons to respond to chemical and biological-and in the case of NATO, even conventional-weapons attacks. But Washington has stated within the context of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), an accord the Bush administration claims to support, that the United States would not strike non-nuclear-weapon states with nuclear weapons unless that state joined with a country possessing nuclear weapons to assault the United States, its troops, or its allies.

John Rhinelander, a former State Department legal adviser, argued against reserving the right to use nuclear weapons to respond to chemical or biological attacks. He said, "McGeorge Bundy, a former presidential security advisor, reminded us years ago that nuclear weapons are fundamentally different. They always have been and always will be." Rhinelander described the Bush approach to deal with WMD threats as "blurring the distinction between nuclear and chemical and biological weapons, undercutting the NPT, and absolutely dead wrong because it is an invitation for others to go nuclear."

"The United States undermines its own long-term security by suggesting that nuclear weapons are an appropriate retaliation for chemical or biological weapons attacks," Jack Mendelsohn, a former arms control negotiator, declared. "The sole role for nuclear weapons, as long as they are part of the U.S. arsenal, should be dissuading or responding to their use by others," he said.

This latest Bush strategy document also reiterates the administration's emphasis on pre-emption and calls for new capabilities "to defend against WMD-armed adversaries." The Bush administration has consistently argued that new types of low-yield nuclear weapons could be the weapon of choice to destroy deeply buried and hardened targets potentially housing chemical or germ weapons.

Kimball asserted, "Using nuclear bombs for pre-emptive attacks on such targets is militarily impractical and morally wrong. The very pursuit of such weapons undermines norms against WMD and might prompt other states to follow our lead."

U.S. development of new nuclear weapons would surely entail the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing, a move that some Bush administration officials have been quietly exploring and encouraging.

Kimball pointed out that "the United States will be less secure in the future if it chooses to go down the nuclear testing path as a misguided solution for the threats it is facing today. Instead, the Bush administration should strive to bolster and expand existing arms control norms and tools, such as the Nunn-Lugar program to protect and destroy former Soviet nuclear weapons and materials, if the United States is to have any success in stemming WMD proliferation."

"The administration's 'do as I say, not as I do' strategy promises to undermine U.S. efforts to halt WMD proliferation," Kimball warned.

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Established in 1971,the Association publishes the monthly journal, Arms Control Today.

Description: 
Media Advisory

Subject Resources:

Analysis and Resources on Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: December 9, 2002

Press Contacts: Paul Kerr, (202) 463-8270 x102 or Wade Boese, (202) 463-8270 x104

(Washington, D.C.): From 1991 to 1998, United Nations weapons inspectors worked to rid Iraq of much of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which Baghdad pursued in violation of international nonproliferation agreements. But since the inspectors left in December 1998, Iraq has been free to resume its WMD programs unchecked.

UN weapons inspectors are now back in Iraq, seeking to verify Iraqi claims that it no longer has weapons of mass destruction. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 gives weapons inspectors a strong mandate to carry out their mission, including unconditional access to Iraq's previously restricted presidential sites. Washington has supported the resolution and the inspections process, but the depth of its support is unclear. The Bush administration has reserved the right to take unilateral military action in the event that it is dissatisfied with the UN process, although the administration has not yet clearly described the circumstances under which it might act. The rest of the international community is united in demanding that the inspection process be given the time to produce results and for Iraq to fully cooperate with the inspectors.

ACA Resources on Iraq

The ACA Web site includes important analysis from leading experts on options and challenges for containing Iraq's WMD programs. An online resource guide contains a series of authoritative Arms Control Today interviews with former weapons inspectors, as well as detailed news reports and commentaries dating back to 1997. These resources are available online at http://www.armscontrol.org/country/iraq/.

Some key examples of Association materials on Iraq are:

  • An October 2002 ACA press conference, "Disarming Iraq: How Weapons Inspections Can Work," featuring Robert Gallucci, dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; Jessica Matthews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Jonathan Tucker, senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The panelists discussed the successes and shortcomings of earlier weapons inspections and ways to strengthen future inspections.
  • ACA's special October report, "Iraq: A Chronology of UN Inspections in Iraq and an Assessment of Their Accomplishments." This report is a comprehensive guide to the history of inspections in Iraq from the beginning of the Persian Gulf War to present.
  • "Disarming Iraq: Nonmilitary Strategies and Options," a September 2002 article by David Cortright of the Fourth Freedom Forum and George Lopez of the University of Notre Dame. The authors call for a credible, coercive Iraq policy that consists of "continuing revenue controls, intensive diplomatic efforts to resume weapons inspections, and the creation of an enhanced containment system through strengthened border monitoring."
  • "The Inevitable Failure of Inspections in Iraq," a September 2002 article by the former deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM, Charles Duelfer. He outlines the limitations of past weapons inspection efforts, writing that "any weapons inspectors sent into Iraq under the existing UN Security Council resolutions are doomed to fail." He argues that "permanent disarmament goals imposed on Iraq were out of proportion with the inspectors' tools and the rewards and punishments the Security Council could practically impose."
  • Extensive interviews by Arms Control Today with the current chief of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Hans Blix; chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) from 1997-1998, Ambassador Richard Butler; and the first chairman of UNSCOM, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter also provided his views on the past challenges and future prospects for successful inspections in Iraq in a June 2000 article.
  • Documents, fact sheets, and news reports from Arms Control Today on key developments.

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Established in 1971,the Association publishes the monthly journal, Arms Control Today.

Description: 
Media Advisory

Country Resources:

Senator Lugar Outlines Priorities for Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction in Arms Control Today

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: December 3, 2002

Contact: Daryl Kimball, (202) 463-8270 x107 or Peter Scoblic, (202) 463-8270 x108

(Washington, D.C.): Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), the incoming chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declares in an article published this month in Arms Control Today that "enormous opportunities" now exist to secure and destroy weapons of mass destruction that could be used to harm the United States. The senator identifies ten top disarmament priorities, ranging from eliminating Russia's chemical weapons to improving worldwide nuclear reactor safety.

In his article, "The Next Steps in U.S. Nonproliferation Policy," Senator Lugar argues that although much has been achieved in the past decade, more can and needs to be done. He urges his fellow lawmakers to show leadership and act resolutely if terrorists and rogue states are going to be denied the weapons and technology that could be wielded with devastating results against the United States and around the globe.

But Senator Lugar, who cosponsored the first legislation with Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) in 1991 to help countries of the former Soviet Union guard and dismantle their lethal arsenals, warns that Congress is letting important weapons destruction opportunities slip away because of its unwillingness to devote the necessary attention and resources to such activities in a timely fashion. "The weapons and materials of mass destruction targeted by Nunn-Lugar are too dangerous to leave to the whims of congressional holds and roadblocks," Lugar writes.

The senator further states, "It is incomprehensible to me that, at a time in which our country is involved in a worldwide war against terrorism, Congress is refusing to permit the utilization of tested and proven concepts to address the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction."

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency reports that U.S. threat reductions programs in Russia, commonly known as Nunn-Lugar, have aided the deactivation of more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and the destruction of nearly 500 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), another 350 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and almost 100 bombers. Russia has at least another 7,000 warheads left to deactivate and nearly 1,000 ICBMs, 600 SLBMs, and 100 bombers awaiting destruction. In addition, Russia possesses an estimated 40,000-metric-tons of chemical weapons requiring elimination.

Yet, Senator Lugar adds that reduction activities cannot be limited to Russia, but expanded to counter potential proliferation risks around the world. "It is critical that the United States lead in establishing a global coalition capable of exerting pressure on states to cooperate with the safeguarding, accounting, and (where possible) destruction of weapons and materials of mass destruction," he says.

Lugar's article and his top ten disarmament priorities can be accessed at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_12/lugar_dec02.asp.

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Established in 1971,the Association publishes the monthly journal, Arms Control Today.

Description: 
Media Advisory

Country Resources:

Arms Control Experts Call Bioweapons Conference Outcome "Useful But Insufficient"

Sections:

Body: 

For Immediate Release: November 14, 2002

Contacts: Daryl Kimball, +01-202-463-8270 x107 or Oliver Meier +49-171-359-2410

(Geneva): The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference today agreed on a limited program of further discussions on addressing the biological weapons threat. The agreement was proposed by the chairman of the talks.

Chairman Tibor Tóth's proposal calls for annual meetings of the states-parties on national measures to implement the BWC and measures to control dangerous pathogens, as well as better international response and investigation of alleged use of bioweapons and improved surveillance of infectious diseases.

"The work-plan agreed at the BWC Review Conference is useful but insufficient," said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association.

"The process outlined by Ambassador Tóth would limit further international discussions to national and voluntary measures on bioweapons and would not allow for the development of new, legally binding measures to prevent the development and production of biological weapons," according to Oliver Meier, international representative of the Arms Control Association, who was attending the conference.

"The proposal has been crafted so as not to offend the United States, which strenuously opposes additional legally binding measures involving investigations of existing and suspected biological weapons capabilities. The agenda does not adequately address the real and growing threat of biological weapons," Meier added.

"It is regrettable that Washington was successful in blocking agreement on a stronger mechanism that would have reflected the wishes of the vast majority of states-parties," Kimball said.

"Nevertheless, the agreement is positive because, for the first time, BWC states-parties will meet annually to discuss measures to strengthen the ban on bioweapons," noted Meier.

The BWC outlaws the development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, production, or transfer of biological weapons but does not include mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance by states-parties.

Last December, the conference was suspended on its final day because of a highly controversial U.S. proposal to terminate talks on a draft compliance protocol. The protocol would have required declarations by member states on their bioweapons-capable facilities and activities, on-site visits, and investigations of suspected illicit activity.

Over the last several months, Western European states had been pushing for continued, regular talks on measures to strengthen the BWC. The United States, however, said in September that BWC states-parties should meet for less than a day for the sole purpose of agreeing to reconvene in four years for another review.


"The United States and other BWC members should keep the door open to talks on more far-reaching and effective agreements to investigate suspected noncompliance and to ensure that biodefense programs are not used to produce offensive weapons," suggested Kimball.

"On the basis of this document it remains possible that states-parties could agree on an effective enforcement mechanism for the BWC in the future," Kimball said.


ACA Resources on the Biological Weapons Convention

 

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Established in 1971,the Association publishes the monthly journal, Arms Control Today.

Description: 
Media Advisory

Arms Control Experts Urge Negotiations to Strengthen Compliance With Biological Weapons Ban

Sections:

Body: 

Governments Meeting November 11 in Geneva

For Immediate Release: November 6, 2002

Contacts: Daryl Kimball, +01-202-463-8270 x107 or Oliver Meier +49-171-359-2410

(Geneva): A leading American arms control and international security organization called upon the 146 member states of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) to strengthen measures and controls on biological weapons when they meet November 11 in Geneva. It is feared that this meeting could be a repeat of last year's review conference, which ended in acrimony with no agreements.

"It is vital that the member states work together at this review conference to conclude effective, preventative, and legally binding measures to combat biological weapons proliferation," said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association. "If BWC members fail once again to strengthen the convention, they will have abdicated their responsibility to guard against the spread and possible use of these terrible weapons," he warned.

The BWC outlaws the development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, production, or transfer of biological weapons but does not include mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance by states-parties.

Last December, the conference was suspended on its final day because of a highly controversial U.S. proposal to terminate talks on a draft compliance protocol. The protocol called for declarations by member states on their bioweapons-capable facilities and activities, on-site visits, and investigations of suspected illicit activity. The Bush administration opposed the draft protocol, which had been under negotiation for over six years, on the basis of concerns about its impact on U.S. pharmaceutical interests, biodefense efforts, and its enforceability.

Western European states are pushing for continued, regular talks on measures to strengthen the BWC. The United States, however, proposed in September that BWC members should meet for less than a day for the sole purpose of agreeing to reconvene in four years for another review.

"As an alternative to the draft BWC compliance protocol, the United States offered constructive but insufficient proposals for strengthening the norm against biological weapons," said Oliver Meier, international representative of the Arms Control Association, who is attending the conference. "Unfortunately, the United States has withdrawn earlier support for annual meetings to discuss its own alternative proposals, stiffened its opposition to other states' proposals to improve the BWC, and has once again threatened to block further talks on a compliance protocol," he noted.

"The BWC members should agree on a strong and flexible strategy to address the most urgent threats facing the biological weapons nonproliferation regime. They must improve the international community's ability to develop the means to investigate suspected noncompliance and ensure that biodefense programs are not used to produce offensive weapons," Meier proposed.

"The United States and other BWC members should also keep the door open to agreements on proposals forwarded by the United Kingdom and other countries earlier this year," added Kimball. "These include: a convention to criminalize the development, production, acquisition, transfer, or use of biological (and chemical) weapons; a convention on standardizing national regulations on the handling of dangerous pathogens; expanding the UN secretary-general's mandate to conduct field investigations of suspected bioweapons use to include investigations of suspicious facilities; and establishing an independent secretariat to implement these agreements," Kimball said.

"The biological weapons nonproliferation regime is in need of repair. In light of last year's anthrax attacks and the threat of biological weapons proliferation in places like Iraq and North Korea, it is incumbent upon the United States to become part of the solution, not part of the problem," said John Steinbruner, chairman of the Arms Control Association and director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. "At the end of the day, an effective enforcement mechanism for the BWC must include legally binding measures that apply to all states," he concluded.

ACA Resources on the Biological Weapons Convention

 

# # #

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Established in 1971,the Association publishes the monthly journal, Arms Control Today.

Description: 
Media Advisory

Subject Resources:

Pages

Subscribe to RSS - Pressroom