"...the Arms Control Association [does] so much to keep the focus on the issues so important to everyone here, to hold our leaders accountable to inspire creative thinking and to press for change. So we are grateful for your leadership and for the unyielding dedication to global nuclear security."
– Lord Des Browne
Vice Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Kelsey Davenport

Iran, P5+1 Move to Technical Talks

Kelsey Davenport

Senior-level talks between Iran and six world powers over Tehran’s nuclear program are on hold, as the lead representatives from the two sides decided in Moscow on June 18-19 to wait to schedule a fourth round of negotiations until after a lower-level technical meeting is held on July 3.

The purpose of the July experts meeting in Istanbul is to “provide further clarification” on the proposal made by the six countries—China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—according to Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s foreign policy chief and the lead negotiator for the six powers. Speaking at a press conference at the end of the Moscow talks, she also said the technical talks will allow the six powers to “study the issues” Iran raised during the June meeting.

Iran and the six countries, known as the P5+1, have held three rounds of senior-level talks this year on international concerns relating to Iran’s nuclear program. Negotiations between the parties resumed in April after a 15-month hiatus. (See ACT, May 2012.)

A fourth round of negotiations is still possible, Ashton said at the press conference. After the technical-level meeting and “contact” between deputy negotiators, she and the lead Iranian negotiator, Saeed Jalili, would discuss “prospects for a future meeting at the political level,” she said.

Although Ashton said that “significant gaps” remained between the two parties, she stated that “critical issues” had been discussed and that Iran addressed “the substance” of the issues for the first time.

Jalili expressed optimism that the technical-level talks could narrow the differences between the two sides. In his remarks at the press conference, he said an experts-level meeting could bring the parties “closer together” and that it was an “important result” of the Moscow talks.

Views outside of Moscow, however, were mixed. U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said on June 20 that the United States did not want “talks for talks’ sake” and that the technical-level meeting is an opportunity to “close some of the gaps in comprehension.” British Prime Minister David Cameron characterized the Moscow talks as a “missed opportunity,” saying there had been a “lack of progress.” He called on Iran to return to talks “willing to negotiate seriously.”

Moscow Proposals

Two proposals were discussed during the talks, one put forward by the P5+1 and the other by Iran. Ashton characterized the exchanges over the positions as “detailed, tough, and frank.”

The P5+1 proposal was the same one that the six powers put forward during the second round of talks in Baghdad in May, according to Nuland. It focuses on suspending the enrichment of uranium to the 20 percent level, shipping Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium out of the country, halting enrichment activities at the Fordow enrichment facility, and cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return, Iran would receive fuel plates for its Tehran Research Reactor, assistance with nuclear safety, and spare parts for civilian aircraft.

Iran maintains that it needs to enrich uranium to 20 percent in order to fabricate fuel for the Tehran reactor, which produces medical isotopes. Uranium enriched to 20 percent, however, can be converted into weapons-grade material more quickly than uranium enriched to the levels required for power reactors, which Iran also produces. By suspending 20 percent enrichment, shipping the current stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium out of the country, and providing Iran with fuel fabricated elsewhere for the Tehran reactor, the P5+1 proposal would extend the time required if Iran decided to pursue nuclear weapons while still allowing Tehran to produce medical isotopes. Suspending the 20 percent enrichment at Fordow is of particular concern to the United States and other countries because the location of the nuclear facility, deep inside a mountain, would make a military strike against it difficult.

In her June 19 press briefing, Nuland described the P5+1 as “completely united” behind the proposal.

Further details on the Iranian five-point plan first presented in Baghdad emerged during the Moscow talks. A June 18 article in The Guardian outlined the five points of the Iranian plan as acknowledgment of Iran’s right to enrich uranium in tandem with the “operationalisation” of a fatwa issued by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that condemned the pursuit of nuclear weapons as forbidden in Islam; sanctions relief in return for cooperating with the IAEA; cooperation on nuclear energy and safety; confidence-building measures, including a possible limit on production of 20 percent-enriched uranium; and cooperation on regional and non-nuclear issues.

In his remarks at the Moscow press conference, Jalili’s description of the proposal was consistent with but more general than the Guardian account. He said Iran mentioned four nuclear-related points during the negotiations: “confidence building, cooperation in clarification, opposition to weapons of mass destruction, and normal nuclear cooperation.” Any future agreements would have to recognize Iran’s rights in these areas, “particularly 20 percent enrichment,” Jalili said.

Senators Call for End to Talks

Prior to the Moscow talks, a bipartisan group of 44 U.S. senators sent a letter to President Barack Obama, urging him to abandon the P5+1 talks with Iran if an agreement was not reached in Moscow. Specifically, the letter said that the “absolute minimum steps” for Iran to take include shutting down the Fordow enrichment facility, halting enrichment above 5 percent, and sending the stockpile of uranium enriched above 5 percent out of the country. If Tehran were to “verifiably implement” these actions, it would demonstrate Iran’s commitment to the negotiations and justify further talks, the letter said. The senators also called for further sanctions against Iran if a “substantive agreement” was not reached in Moscow (see next story).

In a statement made after the talks, Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), one of the organizers of the letter, said that negotiations were the “preferred forum” for an agreement, but in “their absence,” Congress will “pursue other mechanisms,” including further sanctions, to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

In a June 20 House Armed Services Committee hearing on Iran’s nuclear program, Rep. Buck McKeon (R-Calif.), the committee chairman, said the “intensive diplomatic and economic steps” taken to convince Iran to abandon “military nuclear ambitions” do not appear to have succeeded.

No Agreement With IAEA

Iran met with the IAEA on June 8 in Vienna, but the agency and Tehran failed to make progress on signing a framework agreement to resolve the IAEA’s outstanding concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.

Going into the Vienna meeting between IAEA Deputy Director-General Herman Nackaerts and Iran’s envoy to the agency, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, expectations were raised that a deal could be reached. In May, after a short-notice trip to Tehran, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano said the sides were “close” to agreement on a “structured approach” for addressing concerns over Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program. (See ACT, June 2012.) Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.

The structured approach would create a framework for agency inspections and an Iranian response to concerns the IAEA had expressed, in a report last November, about the potential military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. (See ACT, December 2011.) Some experts had speculated that a framework agreement with the IAEA may have given Iran leverage at the Moscow talks to press for some sanctions relief or a delay in the implementation of a July 1 EU oil embargo.

Nackaerts characterized the June meeting as “disappointing,” saying that there had been “no progress.” According to his statement, Iran was presented with a revised document in Vienna that addressed Tehran’s “earlier stated concerns.” Iran, however, “raised issues we have already discussed and added new ones.”

Soltanieh said the issues surrounding the discussions were “complicated” and that he hoped a venue for new discussions would be determined soon so that the parties could “conclude” the structured approach. The two sides did not set a date for their next meeting.

Just two days before meeting with Nackaerts, Soltanieh addressed the IAEA Board of Governors during its quarterly meeting, saying that Iran intended to “engage and work intensively” with the agency “with expectation of prompt closure” of the concerns over the possible military dimensions of Tehran’s nuclear program.

Senior-level talks between Iran and six world powers over Tehran’s nuclear program are on hold, as the lead representatives from the two sides decided in Moscow on June 18-19 to wait to schedule a fourth round of negotiations until after a lower-level technical meeting is held on July 3.

North Korea Urged Not to Test

Kelsey Davenport

China, Japan, and South Korea agreed not to “accept further nuclear tests or provocations from North Korea,” according to a May 13 statement by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. Lee issued the statement from Beijing at the end of a trilateral meeting in May, which included a discussion of Pyongyang’s nuclear program.

North Korea is believed to be preparing for a nuclear test at its Punggye-ri test site, following a failed attempt to launch a satellite into orbit with a Unha-3 rocket in April. (See ACT, May 2012.) It has conducted two previous nuclear tests, in 2006 and 2009.

Although Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao did not directly mention North Korea in his statement at the end of the meeting, he said that all parties in the region needed to “display goodwill” to “ease confrontation and return to the right track of dialogue and negotiations.”

Despite the ambiguity of Wen’s statement, China is reportedly working behind the scenes to urge North Korea not to detonate a nuclear device and is considering retaliatory steps if Pyongyang moves forward with the test, according to a May 16 Reuters report. The news service quoted several sources as saying that China was concerned that a third test would give the United States greater cause to increase its military presence in the region and would cause environmental damage along the Chinese-North Korean border. The sources also said that Beijing would consider sanctioning North Korea in response to a nuclear test.

According to Pyongyang’s official Korean Central News Agency, “a military measure such as a nuclear test” was not planned around the failed launch, but the country would “bolster” its nuclear deterrence for self-defense against “hostile policy.”

Some analysts predict that North Korea will use highly enriched uranium in the anticipated test to demonstrate progress in its uranium-enrichment capabilities. The earlier tests used plutonium.


China, Japan, and South Korea agreed not to “accept further nuclear tests or provocations from North Korea,” according to a May 13 statement by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. Lee issued the statement from Beijing at the end of a trilateral meeting in May, which included a discussion of Pyongyang’s nuclear program.

IAEA, Iran Close to Deal, Amano Says

Kelsey Davenport

A deal allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to pursue its investigation into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program could be signed “quite soon,” IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano said May 22.

Amano flew to Tehran on May 21 to continue negotiations with Iranian officials on a framework agreement for resolving the outstanding concerns raised by the agency in a November 2011 report to the IAEA Board of Governors. An annex to the report listed the agency’s suspicions over Iran’s suspected warhead development program. (See ACT, December 2011.) The board requested that the IAEA and Iran “intensify their dialogue” to clarify the “unresolved issues.”

During the visit, Amano met with several high-ranking officials, including Saeed Jalili, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator. Jalili characterized his meeting with Amano as “very good” and said that Iran and the IAEA would have “good cooperation in the future.”

Although Amano conceded that “some differences” remained, he said there was an “important development on the structured approach document” that the two parties had been negotiating. Neither Amano nor Jalili elaborated on the differences that remained to be negotiated or when the agreement was expected to be completed, but in a May 25 IAEA report on the status of Iran’s nuclear program, Amano invited Iran to “expedite final agreement on the structured approach.”

U.S. Department of State spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said on May 22 that the United States supports Amano’s efforts to resolve the IAEA’s areas of concern, but said Washington would be looking for “implementation” and for steps by Iran to “truly follow through and provide access” to agency inspectors.

Amano’s announcement that the IAEA and Iran were close to reaching an agreement came the day before Iran resumed talks on May 23 in Baghdad with the so-called P5+1, which includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany.

The IAEA and Iran have met on three previous occasions this year to discuss an agreement to allow further agency investigations into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. The most recent meeting was held May 14-15 in Vienna between Iran’s envoy to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, and IAEA Deputy Director-General Herman Nackaerts. Progress at the Vienna meeting is believed to have spurred Amano’s short-notice visit to Tehran. Before leaving Vienna, he said it was the “right time to reach agreement.” This was Amano’s first visit to the country since assuming the IAEA’s top position in 2009.

One of the areas of disagreement prior to Amano’s visit to Tehran was the IAEA’s request to inspect a building at the Parchin military complex where the agency was concerned that high-explosives tests may have been conducted. The IAEA asked to inspect the facility during visits to Iran in January and February of this year, but Iranian officials denied the requests. Tehran stated that a framework agreement must be in place before the IAEA conducts any visits to the site.

In the annex to the November 2011 report, the IAEA revealed that it obtained information that Iran had built a “large explosives containment vessel, or chamber” and installed it at Parchin in 2000. Such a chamber could be used for testing the explosives necessary to detonate a nuclear device. In the original work plan that the IAEA submitted to Iran on Feb. 20, Parchin topped the list of concerns that Tehran needed to address.

In the May 25 report, the IAEA indicated that it had obtained additional information on Parchin that “further corroborates” the evidence on explosive testing presented in the 2011 annex.

Tehran allowed the IAEA to visit Parchin twice in 2005, but the agency did not inspect the building that houses the chamber in question. Amano said that the agency’s interest in visiting Parchin was discussed in Tehran and would be addressed in the agreement, but he provided no specifics.

Although an agreement may be near, agency officials have expressed concern over the past several months that Tehran may be attempting to clean up evidence that could indicate the existence of a nuclear weapons program. Iranian officials dismissed the initial allegations that any such efforts were underway. In its May report, the IAEA formally documented its position. The agency said that, using satellite imagery, it had observed “extensive activities” around the areas to which it had requested access. The IAEA had not observed any such activities, which could interfere with “effective verification,” for a “number of years,” the report said.

A deal allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to pursue its investigation into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program could be signed “quite soon,” IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano said May 22.

P5+1 and Iran Claim Progress in Talks

Kelsey Davenport

Following two days of discussions last month in Baghdad, Iran agreed to meet again in June with six world powers to “expand” on the “common ground” that the two sides identified during negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, Catherine Ashton, who represented the six countries, said May 24.

Although the two sides did not reach an agreement, they said they had made progress during the May 23-24 discussions. Talks are scheduled to reconvene June 18-19 in Moscow.

The Baghdad talks originally were to last for one day, but were extended to two. Ashton, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, said it was “clear that both sides want to make progress” but that “significant differences” remain to be worked out. She also said that the six countries—China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—known as the P5+1, remain “united in seeking a swift diplomatic resolution” to international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and expect Tehran to take “concrete and practical steps… to meet its international obligations.”

Lead Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili described the atmosphere of the talks as “positive for the two sides to talk about their issues,” but said that getting the six powers to accept Iran’s “clearly irrefutable” right to uranium enrichment was an obstacle during the negotiations.

The Baghdad meetings were the second round of talks between the P5+1 and Tehran this year after negotiations broke down in January 2011. During the first round of talks, on April 14 in Istanbul, the two sides agreed on a process for moving forward in future negotiations. Ashton described it as an incremental approach with reciprocal actions. (See ACT, May 2012.) Both sides described the Istanbul meetings as positive.

Before the Baghdad meeting, Michael Mann, Ashton’s spokesman, said the P5+1 expected gradual progress rather than a final deal. After the talks concluded, White House spokesman Jay Carney said the Obama administration did not expect “breakthrough moments” during the talks and that the “expectations” for the talks, namely progress and “seriousness on the part of the Iranians,” had been met.

Baghdad Proposals

Two proposals, one from each side, were discussed at the meetings.

Iran’s enrichment of uranium to 20 percent was the focus of the P5+1 proposal and was characterized by Mann as one of delegation’s “main concerns,” according to media accounts. The proposal called for Iran to end its enrichment of uranium to 20 percent and ship its stockpile of the material out of the country. In return, Tehran would receive highly enriched uranium fabricated into fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor, nuclear security assistance, and some material incentives, including spare parts for civilian aircraft, which are scarce in Iran.

According to a report last month by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has produced a total of 145 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent, up from the 109 kilograms the IAEA reported in February. Iran says it requires the higher enrichment level for the production of medical isotopes in the Tehran reactor. In the days before the talks, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announced that it had delivered nuclear fuel plates, produced domestically at the Isfahan nuclear complex, to the reactor. The announcement said that one of the plates was loaded into the core of the reactor to begin producing medical isotopes.

The international community remains concerned that the uranium enriched to 20 percent could be further refined and used for a nuclear weapon. Although weapons-grade uranium is enriched to 90 percent, the move from 20 percent to 90 percent requires much less work than beginning with uranium enriched to a reactor-grade level.

Jalili described the P5+1 proposal as “one suggestion” on uranium enrichment and said that any cooperation by Iran on halting enrichment to the 20 percent level was dependent on the “preservation” of Iran’s right to enrichment. The United States has indicated that it is not necessarily opposed to Iran producing uranium enriched to 5 percent if the proper safeguards are in place.

Iran also objected to the lack of sanctions relief in the P5+1 proposal. Iranian officials at the talks described that language as “unbalanced” and not in line with the “reciprocal” approach agreed in Istanbul, media outlets reported. An official from another country reportedly described Jalili as “relentless” in his pursuit of sanctions relief, which Carney said provides Iran with an “impetus” to take the negotiations “very seriously.” U.S. officials indicated that the sanctions relief that Iran was seeking would come later if Tehran followed through on any initial agreement.

News reports described the Iranian proposal as a five-point plan, which offered greater international access to its nuclear facilities in exchange for the easing of economic sanctions on its oil industry and recognition of its right to enrichment. It is unclear how the Iranian proposal dealt with the 20 percent enrichment question, but when Ashton mentioned the proposal in her statement at the end of the talks, she said that Iran “declared its readiness to address the issue.”

Increased Sanctions

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton quashed any speculation that there could be sanctions relief immediately resulting from the Baghdad talks, saying May 24 that the sanctions “will remain in place and continue to move forward.”

Tougher sanctions against Iran’s oil industry and central bank are scheduled to enter into force in the upcoming month. In the United States, the tighter sanctions are part of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed into law in December 2011. (See ACT, January/February 2012.) On June 28, the United States is scheduled to begin sanctioning all foreign banks that process Iranian oil transactions through Iran’s central bank. The president can waive those sanctions if the bank’s country has demonstrated a “significant reduction” in its Iranian oil imports.

In February, the Obama administration released a report indicating that global oil needs could be met by increasing the capacity of non-Iranian sources without creating a spike in prices. Under the defense authorization act, this finding was necessary for the sanctions to begin on June 28. As a result, banks that continue to process oil transactions without a wavier after that date will be prevented from opening accounts in the United States and will have limited access to any of their existing accounts. Iranian oil sold for cash or under barter agreements would be exempt from these sanctions.

As of April, the last month for which an official list was available, waivers have been granted to 10 European countries and Japan. South Korea is believed to be in the process of applying for a waiver, and during a May visit to India, Clinton pressed New Delhi to cut its oil imports from Iran. Although India indicated that it is planning to push local refineries to cut imports from Iran by 15 to 20 percent, the administration has not yet issued a waiver. India, Japan, and South Korea are among the top purchasers of Iranian oil. China, the largest importer of Iranian oil, does not have a waiver.

Further sanctions legislation is making its way through Congress. On May 22, the Senate passed legislation that would strengthen and expand existing sanctions against Iran’s energy and financial sectors. The legislation would broaden the criteria under which companies are placed on the sanctions list, which covers foreign firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector and do business with Iranian firms involved with uranium production and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The House of Representatives passed its own version of the bill last year.

The EU’s sanctions will tighten on July 1 when its embargo on the import of Iranian oil goes into effect. After the conclusion of the Baghdad talks, British Foreign Secretary William Hague left little room for doubt that, without “urgent, concrete steps” by Iran to address the international community’s concerns about its nuclear program, EU sanctions would enter into force as planned on July 1. Hague said that if Iran failed to respond in a “serious manner,” the pressure from sanctions “will intensify.”

In addition to limiting oil imports to EU member countries, the package passed by the European Parliament in January will strengthen sanctions on Iran’s financial sector and prevent European insurers from providing protection and indemnity for tankers carrying Iranian oil. Without this insurance, any countries continuing to import Iranian oil will be forced to look elsewhere for insurance on the tankers’ contents. China and India are reported to be making such arrangements.

Following two days of discussions last month in Baghdad, Iran agreed to meet again in June with six world powers to “expand” on the “common ground” that the two sides identified during negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, Catherine Ashton, who represented the six countries, said May 24.

States Make New Nuclear Security Pledges

Kelsey Davenport

Meeting in Seoul last month for the second nuclear security summit, the leaders of more than four dozen countries pledged to take specific actions to strengthen fissile material security and prevent nuclear terrorism.

The summit communiqué, a consensus document endorsed by the 53 countries and four international organizations attending the March 26-27 meeting, encouraged participants to announce “specific actions intended to minimize the use” of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by the end of 2013. Although South Korean President Lee Myung-bak acknowledged during the summit’s closing press conference on March 27 that the statement did not impose a legal obligation, he said the setting of a deadline was of “great significance” and that the minimization of HEU use would be carried on in a “more transparent way” as a result of this agreement.

The communiqué encourages states to “consider” the timely removal and disposition of their nuclear materials if it is “consistent with national security considerations.”

According to the list in a summary document issued at the end of the meeting, six countries—Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, and Poland—declared that they would return HEU to the country of origin, with some of them specifying that they would complete their work by the end of 2013. HEU, which can be used to make nuclear weapons, has applications in research and medicine.

Belgium’s and Italy’s commitments included plutonium, another nuclear explosive material that has civilian applications.

The Seoul meeting comes two years after President Barack Obama convened the first nuclear security summit in Washington in April 2010. At that time, participating countries endorsed the goal of securing all nuclear materials within four years. (See ACT, May 2010).

During the press conference ending the Seoul meeting, Lee said the reduction of HEU and plutonium use was the summit’s “core accomplishment.” About 480 kilograms of HEU has been removed from eight countries over the past two years, he said. Ukraine accounts for about half of that total, as government officials announced in March that 243 kilograms of HEU had been removed from the country over the previous two years and returned to Russia for down-blending into low-enriched uranium (LEU).

Since the 2010 summit, Chile and Mexico also declared that they had eliminated their stockpiles of HEU. At the summit, Sweden announced the removal of its plutonium.

Speaking in Seoul, Obama said that “more of the world’s nuclear materials will never fall into the hands of terrorists” as a result of the summit process. In the statement, Obama warned against “complacency” and said that “dangerous materials are still vulnerable in too many places.”

Building Up the Framework

While renewing the political commitments from the Washington summit on strengthening nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism, the communiqué encouraged countries to take further actions to strengthen the global nuclear security framework. Lee described the communiqué as a set of “comprehensive measures” that countries should take to “prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism.”

In addition to the provisions on minimizing the use of HEU and plutonium, the communiqué recommended actions in 10 other areas, including information security, security of radiological sources, and the interface between nuclear safety and security. These issues were less prominently addressed at the Washington summit.

Beyond the actions recommended in the communiqué, 49 of the 53 participating countries offered specific national commitments at the Seoul summit that were included in the summary document. Similar commitments, also referred to as “house gifts,” were made by 30 countries in Washington in 2010. More than 80 percent of those commitments were completed prior to the 2012 summit.

Many of the national commitments made in Seoul were offered by groups of participating countries. These joint statements, or “gift baskets,” were a new feature of the Seoul summit and included pledges of cooperative action in areas such as security of radiological materials; nuclear information security; development of high-density LEU fuel, which is needed for the conversion of some reactors from HEU to LEU use; and HEU use minimization.

Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United States offered a joint statement on minimizing the use of HEU for medical isotope production. Currently, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands use HEU to produce molybdenum-99, which is a radiological isotope widely used for treatment of medical conditions such as cancer, heart disease, and brain disorders. These three countries produce nearly half of the world’s supply of Mo-99.

In their statement, the four countries pledged to support conversion of all European facilities producing Mo-99 to LEU by 2015, subject to regulatory approval. As part of the pledge, the United States said it would supply the producer countries with HEU to ensure continued production of Mo-99 until they complete the conversions.

Belgium, France, South Korea, and the United States also made a joint commitment, declaring that minimizing the use of civilian HEU advances the “ultimate goal of nuclear security.” Those four countries said they would collaborate on the development of a high-density LEU fuel powder. According to the joint statement, the United States will provide South Korea with LEU, and South Korea, using a technology developed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, will manufacture the powder. Belgium and France agreed to test the fuel in their research reactors. Experts will then assess the performance of the LEU fuel.

The four countries agreed in the joint statement that if the method proves viable, they would share information and provide “necessary assistance” to aid countries in converting reactors to use the fuel. Lee said he expected the assessment to be completed by 2016.

Thirty-one of the countries participating in the summit also endorsed the Multinational Statement on Nuclear Information Security. The statement included 13 proposed actions that countries were encouraged to take to strengthen and protect information relating to nuclear security.

In addition to the six countries’ pledges to repatriate HEU and plutonium, the summary document listed a number of national commitments offered by participating leaders in Seoul. China, Hungary, and Nigeria made commitments to convert reactors to LEU fuel use, while Russia and South Africa indicated that they would consider the feasibility of reactor conversions. Canada indicated that it would identify an “alternate method” to replace its use of HEU for medical isotope production, the document said.

A number of countries pledged to take actions that would increase the security of radiological sources. According to the document, Armenia, Brazil, Morocco, Poland, the United States, and other countries made specific commitments to pass new regulations or update existing laws to increase the security of radiological sources.

Progress Since 2010

An additional objective of the Seoul summit was to celebrate the progress made since the 2010 meeting. Although the summit process did not adopt a tracking system to monitor national progress, many participating countries highlighted their achievements in national statements and the summary document.

Completion of the national commitments included funding contributions for nuclear security activities by eight countries. Nine countries sponsored training activities, conferences, and the creation of nuclear security centers since the 2010 summit. International agreements such as the 2005 amendment to the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism were ratified by six countries acting on their national commitments.

The 2005 amendment sets legally binding obligations for member states to protect nuclear materials and facilities and expands cooperation on preventing nuclear smuggling. The Seoul communiqué set 2014 as the goal for the treaty’s entry into force. At the press conference, Lee announced that 55 of the 97 necessary ratifications of the amendment had been completed. The anti-terrorism convention criminalizes the planning or implementation of nuclear terrorism. It entered into force in July 2007.

Among the unmet commitments was the U.S. pledge to complete ratification of the anti-terrorism convention and the physical protection amendment. Argentina and France also have not fulfilled commitments to ratify treaties.

Kazakhstan and the United States pledged to convert reactors using HEU, but did not finish those efforts before Seoul. In both cases, the conversions are contingent on the development of an LEU alternative. Canada also committed to return a “large amount” of spent HEU fuel to the United States, but later indicated that the transfer was not likely to be completed until 2018.

The Netherlands will host the third nuclear security summit in 2014, and U.S. officials have indicated that it could be the final one. (See ACT, March 2012). In his statement in Seoul UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that he would “welcome discussions” of the post-2014 nuclear security summit process.

Meeting in Seoul last month for the second nuclear security summit, the leaders of more than four dozen countries pledged to take specific actions to strengthen fissile material security and prevent nuclear terrorism.

New Report Finds NSS Process on Track, But More Work To Do



For Immediate Release: March 13, 2012

Media Contacts: Michelle Cann, Senior Budget and Policy Analyst, PGS (202-332-1412); Tom Collina, Research Director, ACA (202-463-8270 x104); Kelsey Davenport, Scoville Fellow, ACA (202-463-8270, x114).

(Washington, D.C.) An independent report released today ahead of the March 26-27, 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul finds that states are on track to meet most of the national commitments they made in 2010 to improve the security of nuclear-weapons usable materials worldwide, but that more work, political will, and financial resources are still required to address the ongoing challenge of safeguarding nuclear material.

"States have made significant progress on their 2010 summit national commitments, but that is only half of the story," said Michelle Cann, Senior Budget and Policy Analyst at Partnership for Global Security (PGS) and co-author of the report.

"The commitments on the books will not get the job done. To prevent nuclear terrorism in the years ahead, the global nuclear security system must grow and adapt to new threats," she said.

"Substantial work remains if the summit process is to meet its goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials," said Kelsey Davenport, Herbert J. Scoville Peace Fellow at the Arms Control Association (ACA) and co-author of the report.

"The 2010 summit focused attention and galvanized action to better secure nuclear materials, but the actions states took on were never meant to be comprehensive. It would be a huge missed opportunity if states do not make significant new commitments and adopt higher nuclear security standards in Seoul to better safeguard vulnerable nuclear material," she said.

The report, The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of National Commitments, published jointly by ACA and PGS, concludes that approximately 80 percent of the 67 national commitments made by 30 global leaders at the 2010 summit in Washington have been completed.

The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit is expected to review states' progress on implementing their commitments and to set the course for future efforts to secure weapons-usable nuclear materials. A third summit is planned for the Netherlands in 2014.

"There is a danger that early successes of the summit process will lead to complacency," said Cann. "It is important to recognize that the nuclear security challenge will not be solved once the 2010 commitments are completed. The Seoul summit must acknowledge that nuclear material security is a long-term challenge that will require stable funding and a global commitment," she said.

"A core achievement of the 2010 summit was that the 47 nations in attendance reached consensus that nuclear terrorism is among the top global security challenges and that strong nuclear material security measures are the most effective way to prevent it," said Davenport. "As a result, vitally important progress has been achieved across the globe," she said.

The 47-page report assesses implementation of commitments by category and by country. Examples of progress made on national commitments over the last two years include:

  • Kazakhstan secured over 13 tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium;
  • Chile eliminated its entire stockpile of HEU;
  • The United States and Russia signed a plutonium disposition protocol obligating each country to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium, which is enough weapon's grade material for 17,000 nuclear weapons;
  • Russia ended plutonium production; and
  • Ukraine eliminated two-thirds of its HEU (over 100 kilograms) and is expected to clean out its remaining stockpile by the 2012 summit.

Despite this progress, major work remains beyond the commitments that have been made so far.

"The nuclear material security regime has improved over the past ten years, but it still lags behind the nuclear safety, nonproliferation, and arms control regimes," said Kenneth Luongo, President of PGS. "The 2012 summit provides a window of opportunity to begin the process of reframing the nuclear material security debate and initiating some key changes in strategy."

"We cannot wait for the current patchwork of nuclear security arrangements to fail before building a more permanent, cohesive, and comprehensive international nuclear security governance system," said Luongo.

The full report, The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of National Commitments, is available online here.



The Arms Control Association is an independent, membership-based organization dedicated to providing authoritative information and practical policy solutions to address the threats posed by the world's most dangerous weapons.

The Partnership for Global Security analyzes the convergence of the security, technological, and economic issues that are shaping the 21st century's global nuclear and biological challenges.


(Washington, D.C.) An independent report released today ahead of the March 26-27, 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul finds that states are on track to meet most of the national commitments they made in 2010 to improve the security of nuclear-weapons usable materials worldwide, but that more work, political will, and financial resources are still required to address the ongoing challenge of safeguarding nuclear material.

Subject Resources:

NNSA Budget Cuts Los Alamos Facility

Kelsey Davenport

The Obama administration zeroed out funding for construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement (CMRR) at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico in its fiscal year 2013 budget request and announced it would delay work on the facility for at least five years.

According to the budget request, the delay will save $1.8 billion from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017.

The purpose of the CMRR is to support increased production capability of plutonium cores for nuclear weapons and perform technical analysis on nuclear materials. Funding for the new Los Alamos facility falls into the section of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) budget dealing with weapons activities, which include operating and maintaining the infrastructure and facilities necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.

Despite the cut in CMRR funding, the weapons activities request of nearly $7.6 billion is five percent above the amount that Congress appropriated for fiscal year 2012. The $7.6 billion budget is, however, $53 million less than the fiscal year 2012 request for NNSA weapons activities.

Sequencing CMRR and UPF

The CMRR cut is a result of the NNSA’s decision to sequence construction of two new facilities at its national laboratories. Because of fiscal constraints, the NNSA said in the budget request, it will prioritize completion of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee and delay the CMRR. According to the NNSA’s budget justification document, the UPF will “provide new facilities and equipment to consolidate all [enriched uranium] operations at Y-12.”

The CMRR construction can be deferred because existing facilities at the national laboratories have the “inherent capacity to provide adequate support” for plutonium activities, the document said. In a Feb. 13 video, NNSA Administrator Thomas D’Agostino said that the NNSA had adjusted its plutonium strategy and would utilize existing facilities to “ensure uninterrupted plutonium operations” while focusing funding on other key modernization projects. During a conference call with reporters that day, D’Agostino emphasized that the decision was a deferral rather than a cancellation.

For fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated $200 million for the CMRR, $100 million less than the administration’s budget request. The 2012 budget request’s future-year projections estimated a $300 million request for the CMRR in fiscal year 2013 and $350 million per year in fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016. Total project costs for the CMRR already have increased markedly since 2004. At that time, the NNSA estimated that the CMRR would cost $660 million; current estimates place the cost closer to $6 billion.

As a result of the decision to sequence construction of the CMRR and UPF, the NNSA budget request reflects an accelerated building schedule for the Tennessee facility. For fiscal year 2013, the administration requests $340 million for UPF construction and project engineering and design, a $180 million increase over the enacted funding for 2012. The request is also a $150 million increase over what the 2012 budget request estimated for UPF funding for 2013.

Future-year projections for UPF construction based on programmatic requirements were not included in the fiscal year 2013 budget request, which stated that the “funding profile” for the UPF would be “updated and communicated at a later date.” The budget request did provide an estimate of $6.5 billion for the total project cost of the UPF between fiscal years 2005 and 2017. The estimate was based on fiscal year 2012 budget projections.

Some policymakers are questioning the decision to sequence the UPF and CMRR. In a Feb. 17 speech at a nuclear policy conference in Arlington, Va., Rep. Michael Turner (R-Ohio), chairman of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, criticized President Barack Obama for “abandon[ing] key commitments” to modernize the nuclear arsenal and weapons complex, including the CMRR, that the administration made in negotiations with Senate Republicans to help secure Senate approval of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in December 2010.

In a February 2011 message sent to the Senate, Obama said he intended to “accelerate, to the extent possible” the design and engineering phases of the CMRR and UPF and “request full funding” for the facilities when the phases were completed.

However, in August 2011, Congress passed and Obama signed the Budget Control Act, which sets spending caps for fiscal year 2013. During the Feb. 13 conference call, D’Agostino said the legislation led to a “very different” fiscal environment and forced the NNSA to revise its plans.

Life Extension Programs

Elsewhere in the request for weapons activities, the administration asked for nearly $2.1 billion for “directed stockpile work,” an 11.5 percent increase over the $1.9 billion that Congress appropriated for fiscal year 2012. That program is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

The rise in the request for directed stockpile work is partly the result of an increase for the B61 life extension program (LEP), which is designed to extend the lifespan of the bomb for an additional 20 years. The B61 is a gravity bomb carried by the U.S. bomber fleet and certified NATO aircraft. Funding for the B61 LEP was increased by $146 million from the fiscal year 2012 appropriation, bringing the fiscal year 2013 request to $369 million. According to budget documents, fiscal year 2013 funding on the B61 LEP will go toward systems engineering and development of components. Production of the refurbished B61 is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2019.

The increase is partially offset by a cut to the LEP for the W76, one of the two warheads deployed on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The $175 million request for the W76 LEP represents an $81 million cut from the fiscal year 2012 enacted funding. The NNSA stated in its budget documents that it would reduce the current production rate of the refurbished W76 warheads in order to increase funding for the B61.

The Obama administration zeroed out funding for construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement (CMRR) at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico in its fiscal year 2013 budget request and announced it would delay work on the facility for at least five years.

Airborne Laser Mothballed

Tom Z. Collina and Kelsey Davenport

After 16 years and $5 billion, the Airborne Laser, once touted as “America’s first light saber,” has been canceled.

The program’s laser-armed aircraft, or Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB), has been placed into long-term storage at a facility informally known as the “boneyard” at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona. Nevertheless, according to a Feb. 14 Missile Defense Agency (MDA) press release, the agency is continuing to develop electric lasers “to significantly reduce the complexity and cost of future directed energy weapons.”

The MDA’s fiscal year 2013 budget request includes plans for removing and demilitarizing the ALTB’s hardware, but no further testing or data collection is planned. The budget documents state that due to limited funding, ALTB test flights and data collection were completed in fiscal year 2012 and the aircraft was prepared for permanent storage. In a Jan. 4 e-mail to Arms Control Today, MDA spokesman Richard Lehner said that the drawdown of the program began last October.

The ALTB aircraft was designed to use two solid-state lasers and a megawatt-class chemical oxygen-iodine laser mounted on a Boeing 747-400F to track and destroy ballistic missiles in flight. It had to face numerous operational challenges, such as the need to fly above hostile territory waiting for target missiles to be launched and to focus its laser at a single point on a moving missile.

The ALTB program, which began in 1996, nearly ended in 2009 when the Pentagon scaled it back to a research program and deeply cut its funding. Then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates canceled the development of a second airplane, saying he didn’t “know anybody at the Department of Defense who thinks that this program should, or would, ever be operationally deployed.”

In February 2010, the ALTB tracked and destroyed a missile for the first time. (See ACT, March 2010.) Two subsequent tests in September and October 2010 failed to destroy the target missiles. In July 2011, the ALTB completed the first laser tracking of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

In the Jan. 4 e-mail, Lehner said that the MDA would collect key ALTB data that are applicable to a “next generation airborne directed energy system for missile defense applications.” The budget request for directed energy research stated that the MDA would shift to “the next generation Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Laser technology” and maintain the skills necessary for the “next generation directed energy platform development.”

Specifically, the Obama administration requests $44.5 million for fiscal year 2013 for directed energy research, $1.7 million below the amount that Congress provided in 2012 for the program. According to budget documents, plans for fiscal year 2013 funding include the exploration of new laser technologies for missile defense.

In a Dec. 12 speech in Huntsville, Ala., MDA Director Army Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly announced that the agency was “within a few years” of a prototype laser operated out of an unattended air vehicle.

Missile Defense Spending Down

Overall, the fiscal year 2013 budget would provide $9.7 billion for ballistic missile defense, down $700 million, or 7 percent, from the $10.4 billion that Congress appropriated for the current fiscal year. Total projected funding is $47.4 billion from 2013 to 2017. This total does not include $950 million in fiscal year 2013 for the Space Based Infrared System-High satellite program.

The missile defense budget includes $903 million for operating 30 ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles in Alaska and California as part of the Boeing-operated system to protect the United States from limited ballistic missile attacks, primarily from North Korea. The missiles failed in their last two intercept tests, in January and December 2010. The MDA has completed a Failure Review Board investigation of the causes and has recommended fixes, but has not publicly released its report. The next test, called FTG-06b, is planned for sometime in 2012. The MDA plans to have 52 GBI missiles by 2017.

The budget also includes $1.5 billion for the European Phased Adaptive Approach, designed to protect NATO allies from a potential ballistic missile attack, most notably from Iran. The Defense Department said it met its objectives for phase 1 of the European system by deploying one Aegis-equipped ship for ballistic missile defense armed with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA missiles and a land-based AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey last year. The next three phases include SM-3 Block IB deployments in Romania in 2015, SM-3 Block IIA deployments in Poland in 2018, and the addition of SM-3 Block IIB interceptors in 2020 with the capability for “early intercept” of “non-advanced” ICBMs. The MDA would continue converting Aegis-equipped ships, with 32 ships planned for conversion by fiscal year 2017, and buy almost 400 SM-3 interceptors by that year.

The Pentagon also announced that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) intermediate-range missile interceptor program would be restructured “due to changing priorities and funding constraints.” The proposed revamping reduces the total number of interceptors from 333 to 180 in fiscal years 2013-2017, cutting the budget by $1.8 billion over that period to $2.8 billion, according to budget documents.

After 16 years and $5 billion, the Airborne Laser, once touted as “America’s first light saber,” has been canceled.

British Nuclear Investment Sparks Debate

Kelsey Davenport

The announcement by the British Ministry of Defence that it plans to spend 2 billion pounds ($3.1 billion) on new facilities at the Aldermaston nuclear weapons complex has prompted a strong reaction from members of Parliament who argue that the funding pre-empts the legislature’s October 2010 decision to postpone authorizing development of a new warhead until after the 2015 elections. (See ACT, November 2010.)

In comments published Nov. 27 in The Guardian newspaper, Caroline Lucas, a Green Party member of Parliament, said the ministry’s plan made a “complete mockery of the democratic process” because the ministry had “signed off” on the spending before Parliament decided on whether a new warhead was necessary. A ministry spokeswoman told The Guardian that the decision to invest in new weapons facilities maintains “essential facilities and skills” and “the capability to design a replacement warhead” if it is required.

However, obtaining that capability is not the primary purpose of the investment, said Peter Luff, a Conservative Party member of Parliament and the minister for defense equipment, support, and technology, during a Dec. 7 debate in the House of Commons. Citing the timetable in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, he said the decision on designing a new warhead would be made “at the right time.” Luff also said that he made “no apology whatsoever” for taking seriously the responsibility for funding measures that the government deemed necessary to maintain and secure nuclear systems. The costs for the new facilities are being “closely scrutinized,” he said.

Under the plan, the government would spend 231 million pounds ($350 million) from 2011 to 2015 on a high-explosives fabrication facility. The 2016-2020 time frame includes funding for a 734 million pound ($1.1 billion) warhead assembly and disassembly facility and 634 million pounds ($980 million) for a plant where uranium components are manufactured and produced.

The British government is conducting a study on alternatives for the United Kingdom’s Trident submarine replacement program, but has said it will not publish the completed study. During the Dec. 7 parliamentary debate, Luff said that releasing the results would be “irresponsible and put national security at risk.”

The announcement by the British Ministry of Defence that it plans to spend 2 billion pounds ($3.1 billion) on new facilities at the Aldermaston nuclear weapons complex has prompted a strong reaction...

Congress Wants Options on Nuclear Subs

Tom Z. Collina and Kelsey Davenport

In the latest sign of political problems for the planned replacement of the United States’ nuclear-armed submarines, Congress has required the Navy and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to prepare a report on options for replacing the fleet.

The directive was included in the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed into law by President Barack Obama on Dec. 31. It comes at a time of increasing pressure to reduce defense spending in general and questions about the submarine replacement in particular.

The Navy currently deploys 12 Ohio-class strategic submarines, which will start to reach the end of their operational lives in 2027. The Navy wants to have a replacement submarine ready by 2029. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected in June 2011 that the new submarine will cost $6 billion to $7 billion per boat. The Department of Defense has said that it will cost nearly $350 billion to develop, build, and operate a fleet of 12 new submarines through 2075, making it the most expensive part of the Pentagon’s plan to rebuild the triad of nuclear weapons delivery systems, which also includes a new long-range bomber and intercontinental ballistic missile.

In July, Sen. Tom Coburn (R-Okla.) proposed to reduce nuclear weapons spending by $79 billion over 10 years, in part by curtailing and delaying the new submarine program. In October, 65 Democratic House members called for major reductions to nuclear weapons programs, including the new submarine. They suggested the program be delayed and scaled back from 12 to eight submarines, saying this would save $27 billion over the next 10 years. (See ACT, November 2011.)

STRATCOM Commander Gen. Robert Kehler testified at a Nov. 2 House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee hearing that although the country needs to replace the current Ohio-class submarine, “affordability has to be an issue here” and that Congress did not have to make a decision now on “what the ultimate number of submarines is that we might have to deploy.” The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has recommended that the number of new submarines be reduced to 10, although the Navy reportedly is objecting that 10 submarines are not enough to support five submarines “on station” at all times. (See ACT, December 2011.)

According to congressional staffers, the defense authorization law’s reporting requirement on the new submarine is intended to provide an in-depth review of the various options that have been suggested. It calls for an assessment of procurement and life-cycle costs associated with five options: a fleet of 12 submarines with 16 missile tubes each, as proposed by the Navy; 10 submarines with 20 missile tubes each, as proposed by OMB; 10 submarines with 16 missile tubes each; eight submarines with 20 missile tubes each, which is similar to the House Democratic proposal; and any “other options the [Navy] secretary and the [STRATCOM] commander consider appropriate.”

The report, due by the end of June, must include an assessment of each option’s ability to meet the current “at-sea requirements” and any expected changes in such requirements. This refers to the Pentagon’s policy that five strategic submarines must be at sea and deployed near potential targets at all times to allow for prompt launch of their nuclear-armed missiles. According to the Navy, supporting five forward-deployed submarines requires a total fleet of 12 operational boats, given the current rotation schedule. However, the Obama administration is now reviewing such policies as part of its Nuclear Posture Review implementation study that is expected to provide new guidance to Pentagon war planners.

The report also must assess each option’s ability to meet “the nuclear employment and planning guidance” currently in place and any expected changes in the guidance. This refers to the requirement that a certain number of nuclear warheads be deployed at sea (there are currently about 1,000) and that they be located close enough to potential targets to launch within hours. Changing these requirements would affect the number of submarines at sea and the number of missiles and warheads they need to carry.

Under the act, the Pentagon’s research and development work on the new submarine program would receive $1.1 billion, the amount the Obama administration requested.

In general, authorization bills for defense and other discretionary spending are supposed to provide guidance for appropriations bills, which set the actual spending levels.

Strategic Weapons Appropriations

On other strategic weapons, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, which Obama signed on Dec. 23, funded research and development for the Air Force’s new nuclear-capable bomber, called the Next Generation Bomber, at $297 million, $100 million more than the administration’s request. The act fully funded the $9.9 million request for developing a new air-launched cruise missile.

Missile defense programs generally received full funding. For example, the appropriations act included the $565 million the administration had requested for procurement of the Aegis ballistic missile defense system. However, several programs were funded at levels below the administration’s request.

The law approved $390 million for the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), $17 million below the requested amount. Earlier in the year, the program seemed to be headed for deeper cuts after the Army had announced plans to kill it. In the House version of the bill to fund the Defense Department, MEADS received $257 million; in the Senate Appropriations Committee’s version, the program was fully funded.

The system, jointly funded by the United States, Germany, and Italy to replace the Patriot interceptor, has faced years of delays and cost overruns. Congress reportedly funded MEADS primarily to avoid contract penalties of $800 million.

The appropriations act also provides $80 million, half of the administration request, for research and development funding for the Precision Tracking Space System, a new satellite system for tracking ballistic missiles in flight. The CBO has found that this program may not be cost effective because of the other missile-tracking capabilities the United States already has. The House’s version of the defense appropriations act provided no funding for this program while the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended full funding.

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system received $709 million of the $833 million request.

NNSA Funding

The appropriations act provided $7.2 billion for “weapons activities” in the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). That figure is $355 million below the administration’s budget request, but represents a 4.9 percent increase over the fiscal year 2011 appropriation.

Within the “weapons activities” category, the spending legislation fully funded the $224 million request for the B61 bomb’s life extension program (LEP). However, in the report accompanying the bill, Congress expressed concern over the NNSA’s “ability to execute its planned scope for the B61” under an “affordable” LEP and stipulated that only $89 million could be used until the NNSA submits to Congress the results of the so-called Phase 6.2/2A study. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended funding the B61 LEP request at $180 million in its consideration of the fiscal year 2012 Energy Department appropriation. The report stated that enhanced security measures for the warhead should “not come at the expense of long-term weapon reliability.”

As with the defense appropriations bill, the full Senate never voted on the energy and water appropriations bill.

The legislation also provided less funding than requested for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. The CMRR Project is designed to assist in manufacturing plutonium warhead cores, or “pits.” Congress provided $200 million, $100 million less than the administration request, and said that no “construction activities” for the CMRR Project would be funded for fiscal year 2012. The $160 million request for the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee was fully funded.

As part of its negotiations with the Senate over ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the administration committed itself to specific funding levels for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, including construction of the CMRR Project and UPF.

In the latest sign of political problems for the planned replacement of the United States’ nuclear-armed submarines, Congress has required the Navy and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to prepare a report on options for replacing the fleet.


Subscribe to RSS - Kelsey Davenport