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“For 50 years, the Arms Control Association has educated citizens around the world to help create broad support for U.S.-led arms control and nonproliferation achievements.”

– President Joe Biden
June 2, 2022
Kelsey Davenport

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Body: 
Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

The Global Partnership was formed in 2002 as a Group of Eight (G8) initiative to address “nonproliferation disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety issues,” after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The initial priorities were focused on Russia and built on the original cooperative threat reduction programs that began after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Global Partnership initial priorities carried over from these programs and included destroying chemical weapons, dismantling nuclear submarines that were decommissioned, fissile material disposition, and engagement with scientists that worked on weapons programs.

When formed in 2002, Global Partnership states pledged 20 billion over 10 years to fund work in these areas in the former Soviet Union. Half of the funding was pledged by the United States. Unlike other initiatives, the Global Partnership serves as a funding initiative that brings resources to bear on specific issues related to counter WMD-proliferation efforts.

At the May 2011 G8 meeting in France the members decided to extend the partnership beyond the original 10-year mandate, expand the priorities, and work on projects outside of the former Soviet Union. The Global Partnership laid the foundation for expanding the scope of work in 2008 at the Hokkaido summit, which recognized that since the risk of WMDs exist worldwide, the partnership will address these issues in “areas where the risks of terrorism and proliferation are greatest.”

To facilitate the expansion in 2012, the Global Partnership formed working groups to target different WMD areas, including biological security, chemical weapons security, implementation of UN Resolution 1540, nuclear and radiological security, membership expansion, and centers of excellence. Projects also extend beyond the Global Partnership’s initial focus on states of the former Soviet Union and often entail partnering with other international organizations to advance common priorities. The global partnership utilizes as ‘matchmaking’ mechanism to pair project requests with donor funding and/or expertise.

The chair of the Global Partnership rotates on a yearly basis on the same schedule as the G8 (now G7 after Russia’s expulsion in 2014). The chair sets the priorities for the year and traditionally complies a yearly report on the partnership’s activities. The Global Partnership is not limited to G7 countries, and is now comprised of 29 states. Membership is extended by invitation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Expand Membership: Given the new areas of focus of the Global Partnership, the initiative should target states that could potentially benefit from or contribute to the Global Partnership expanded agenda. In particular, the Global Partnership should look to invite countries from Africa and Latin American to broaden the geographic scope of participation.
  • Consider Strategic Plans for Working Groups: Given that the chair of the Global Partnership changes every year, a strategic plan that maps out long term priorities might help provide direction to the group’s activities. The initial limited focus on former Soviet areas dissipated after the extension sustained over a nearly a decade make considerable achievements in a core set of issues. While a geographic focus may no longer fit within the Global Partnership’s programming, thematic, goal-oriented strategic plans for the working groups could ensure greater continuity between chair rotations and more systemically address challenges.
  • Evaluate Matchmaking Projects: Matchmaking will likely continue to be an integral part of the Global Partnership. Having operated under this structure for the past several years, the Global Partnership might benefit from an assessment of past projects to guide best practices for future matchmaking projects. Such an evolution might lead to a more efficient allocation of resources.
  • Collaborate with Initiatives like PSI and GICNT: Both PSI and the GICNT create opportunities for member states to review national capacities. The Global Partnership could provide funds or matching services for states that want to enhance their application of legal instruments, require legal assistance to ensure that domestic laws and regulations meet international requirements, or plug technical gaps in areas such as detection architecture. This could be utilized for a range of issues including application of UNSCR 1540 obligations, the CPPNM 2005 Amendment, the SUA Protocol, implementation of Security Council Resolutions on North Korea, or enhancing national forensics labs.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group

Body: 
Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

Formalized in 1978 as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the NSG began as meeting of nuclear-supplier states (Canada, France, Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States) in 1975 to coordinate stricter regulations on civilian nuclear trade and dual use technologies. The prior year, in 1974, the states identified trigger list of nuclear materials, technologies, and relevant equipment for developing nuclear weapons.

The NSG expanded the original 1974 list, which was consistent with NPT restrictions, to include access to reprocessing and enrichment technologies – the means for creating the fissile material for nuclear warheads. The NSG guidelines also prohibit the third-party transfer of nuclear-related exports and required IAEA safeguards on facilities as a prerequisite for imports. The NSG guidelines are non-binding, but the member states did submit the guidelines to the IAEA in 1978. The guidelines became an IAEA document known as INFICIRC/254.

Members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Malta is also a member of the NSG, but does not appear on the map.

 

The Guidelines are comprised of two parts, each of which was created in response to a significant proliferation event that highlighted shortcomings in then-existing export control systems. Part I lists materials and technology designed specifically for nuclear use. These include fissile materials, nuclear reactors and equipment, and reprocessing and enrichment equipment. Part II identifies dual-use goods, which are non-nuclear items with legitimate civilian applications that can also be used to develop weapons. NSG members were motivated to adopt Part II in 1992 after discovering how close Iraq came to realizing its nuclear weapons ambitions by illicitly employing dual-use imports in a covert nuclear weapons program before the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

NSG states are expected to refrain from making exports identical or similar to those denied by other members. States are also suppose to notify other members when they deny an export.

At a May 2004 meeting, NSG members adopted a “catch-all” mechanism, which authorizes members to block any export suspected to be destined to a nuclear weapons program even if the export does not appear on one of the control lists. In 2010 the group revised its guidelines on the transfer for enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Prior to the revision, states were to “exercise restraint” when exporting these technologies. The agreed upon text includes criterial to be considered when deciding and export. Members also agreed to authorize exports of enrichment and reprocessing technologies only if the recipient has an additional protocol to their safeguards agreement in place or a safeguards agreement plus regional accounting and control measures.

States can apply for membership, and new states are accepted on a consensus basis. There is no formal set of criteria that a state must meet prior to bidding for membership. Member states supply materials and technologies covered by the NSG guidelines, commit to adhere to the guidelines, enforce export controls domestically, and are in compliance with the obligations of international nuclear non-proliferation treaties, like the NPT and treaties establishing nuclear-weapon free zones. States also commit to support international efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMDs.

The NSG currently is comprised of 48 members.

RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Adopt Membership Criteria Consistent with International Standards:The NSG could adopt a set of criteria that members must meet in order to apply for admission. That criteria should be based on established norms against nuclear testing and proliferation and supportive of disarmament efforts, export controls, and nuclear security practices.
  • Expand Notifications:Under current NSG guidelines, states are encouraged to notify other members when a request is denied. States are also encouraged to notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, states are not required to provide notifications of approval. Provision of this information could help member states identify patterns of technology and material acquisition that may be indicative of illicit nuclear activity. Approvals and denials could also be reported systematically to the IAEA, rather than on an ad-hoc basis by participating states.
  • Lifetime Fuel Supply Guidelines:Members that supply nuclear power reactors should consider life-time fuel supply guarantees for reactors sold to countries without enrichment capabilities. Exporting countries should also commit to take back spent fuel for disposition. These steps would remove the justification for countries to pursue domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
  • Adopt the Additional Protocol as a Precondition for Sale:The NSG guidelines call for IAEA safeguards as a prerequisite for sales of controlled items. The NSG could strengthen the guidelines to require that countries have an additional protocol in place. Expanded IAEA access to information and facilities will help ensure that nuclear programs are peaceful.
  • Coordination with the MTCR:The NSG could share information with the MTCR about denied exports. Coordination between the two bodies could increase the chances of identifying patterns in proliferation behavior or systemic attempts to circumvent export controls.

Proliferation Security Initiative

Body: 
Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was launched in 2003 as a voluntary initiative designed to disrupt and interdict WMD-related materials, technologies, and means of delivery in transit. The United States led efforts to establish PSI, in part due to the 2002 U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which identified strengthening interdictions as an area of focus, and a failed attempt later that year to interdict North Korean scud missiles bound for Yemen on flagless ship.
 
The United States, along with ten like-minded countries, met several times in 2003 to craft PSI’s Statement of Principles. The final draft, released in September 2003, did not create law or a new organization. Rather, in ascribing to the Statement of Principles, participating states agree to use existing national laws and international authorities to undertake measures unilaterally or in cooperation with other states to interdict suspected proliferation transfers and streamline procedures for sharing information about potential proliferation related shipments with other states.

Members of the Proliferation Security Initiative. A number of countries participate in this initiative that do not appear on the map. These countries are: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Liechtenstein, Malta, Marshall Islands, San Marino, Singapore, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.

The PSI is primarily intended to encourage participating countries to take greater advantage of their own existing national laws to intercept threatening trade passing through territories where they have jurisdiction to act. It also focuses on implementation of existing international and domestic legal authorities. The PSI member states are also encouraged to expand their legal authority to interdict shipments by signing bilateral boarding agreements with select countries to secure expedited processes or pre-approval for stopping and searching their ships at sea. In addition to interdicting transfers of proliferation concern, the statement of principles commits states to strengthening national authorities to facilitate interdictions and exchanging information with other states regarding suspect shipments.
 
PSI members do not meet on a regular basis.The PSI held a high-level meeting at the 10th anniversary in 2013, and a mid-level political meeting in Washington, DC in January 2016. Outside of these events, the Operational Experts Group (OEG), which is comprised of 21 member states, meets periodically to plan exercises, discuss recent activities and interdictions, and share relevant information.
 
PSI has 105 subscribing states. Membership is open to any member state that endorses the principles. While PSI membership has expanded dramatically, exercises and activities are disproportionately hosted by the original 11 states. The United States, for instance, hosted 11 of the 40 exercises that took place during the first six years of the initiative.
 

RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Expand Membership: Key states remain outside of PSI. Several of these countries, such as China and Pakistan are known to have supplied technologies for WMD and/or ballistic missile programs in the past. Others key states outside of the regime such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, and South Africa, have important roles as regional leaders or in shipping. Targeting countries with flags of convenience, like Gibraltar, Comoros, and Bremuda, for membership in PSI would also be an important step forward in strengthening the regime.
  • Strengthen National Authorities: States should be encouraged to ratify the 2005 protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), which allows ships to be boarded, with consent of the flag state, if they are suspected of carrying illicit cargo. Ratification strengthens the legal basis for interdictions, and only 33 countries have acted on 2005 protocol. PSI could encourage members with capacity to help states review and update national authorities to align with international standards.
  • Prioritize Regional Exercises Based on Proliferation Trends: Proliferation risks and illicit trafficking routes vary regionally and by state. Looking toward regionally-focused workshops and exercises driven by a needs-based assessment of domestic capabilities can help target key areas of concern. In 2005, PSI participants began examining steps necessary to develop and share analyses of key proliferation actors, networks, and financing structures. Expanding these analyses from the state level to regional level could help inform exercises.
  • Expand the OEG: Currently the 21-members that comprise the OEG are largely European and North American countries. Argentina is the only South American representative and there are no African countries in the group. Greater geographic diversity could contribute to a more regionally specific exercises and activities. Ratification of the SUA protocol could be a requirement for OEG membership, which would also reinforce and strengthen that convention.
  • Enhance enforcement of and reporting on relevant treaties and obligations: PSI could require all participating countries to enforce relevant UN Security Council resolutions related to preventing WMD-proliferation, such as UNSCR 1540 and restrictions on North Korea. While, as members of the UN, these are binding obligations, a number of countries, including PSI member states, have not reported on implementation of relevant Security Council sanctions measures.
  • Consider a UN Security Council Resolution on Interdictions: Originally the United States encouraged the inclusion of explicit interdiction authority in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). At that time some Security Council members opposed the inclusion of interdiction measures and it was eventually dropped. A separate resolution, with clear interdiction authorities, could combat concerns amongst states that are squeamish about the legality of interdictions under international law.
  • Secure dedicated funding: In some countries, including the United States, PSI does not have dedicated funding in the budget to support its activities. Dedicated funding could help ensure continuity of activities and also provide reimbursement for states that detain and interdict vessels to ensure that the cost of compliance with PSI is not overly burdensome.

North Korea Signals Interest in Talks


November 2021
By Kelsey Davenport

Recent statements by North Korea suggest that Pyongyang may be interested in restarting peace talks with South Korea despite a recent spate of missile tests.

U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Sung Kim (L) speaks to reporters outside of the State Department in Washington on October 18 as his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk (R), looks on. (Photo by Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images)In a Sept. 24 statement, Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, said that both North and South Korea want to recover “inter-Korean relations from a deadlock” and to achieve “peaceful stability as soon as possible.”

Kim, who is the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, said that if both sides show respect, “several issues for improving relations,” such as reestablishing the joint North-South liaison office, holding another summit, and declaring an end to the 1950–1953 Korean War, can “see meaningful and successful solution.”

Following Kim Yo Jong’s comments, North Korea on Oct. 5 restored its hotlines and other communications with South Korea. North and South Korea resumed using the hotlines in August after a hiatus, but Pyongyang cut off communications again shortly afterward. (See ACT, September 2021.)

Kim Jong Un said on Sept. 29 that resuming communication with South Korea is part of the effort to rehabilitate inter-Korean relations and pursue “lasting peace” on the Korean peninsula. He said Pyongyang has “no purpose or reason to provoke South Korea” and encouraged Seoul to “get out of the wild dream that it must deter North Korea’s provocations.”

In an Oct. 4 statement, the South Korean Unification Ministry said that restoring the lines of communication with North Korea provides a “foundation for recovering inter-Korean relations” and expressed hope that the two countries will “swiftly resume dialogue.”

Pursing a formal end-of-war declaration seems a particular focus for South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who will leave office next year. In his Sept. 21 speech to the UN General Assembly, Moon said he believed that ending the Korean War could lead to “irreversible progress in denuclearization and usher in an era of complete peace.”

In a Sept. 24 statement on state-run Korean Central News Agency, North Korean Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Ri Thae Song said that such a declaration would be “premature” and that there is no indication that ending the war would “lead to the withdrawal of the hostile policy” toward North Korea. But Kim Jo Yong’s comments suggest that an end-of-war declaration may still be an option.

Meanwhile, Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and a former senior policy adviser to the special U.S. envoy for talks with North Korea, observed that North Korea may be shifting the terminology it uses for describing military dynamics on the peninsula. In an Oct. 5 commentary for 38 North, Carlin said that recent statements from North Korea “reintroduced the concept of ‘balance’ and eased off references to ‘deterrence’ in its discussions of military power.”

He said that an early, partial manifestation of this new policy “seems reflected in [North Korea’s] recent, positive stance (and actions) on inter-Korean dialogue.” He also noted that a similar shift in terminology from deterrence to balancing power occurred in 2017. At that time, North Korea was accelerating missile development while signaling it was open to diplomacy with South Korea.

The United States welcomed the restoration of North-South communications. State Department spokesman Ned Price said in an Oct. 4 press briefing that the United States supports “inter-Korean dialogue and engagement as well as cooperation.” The United States will “continue to consult closely” with its allies regarding how best to engage with North Korea to achieve shared goals, he added.

Progress on inter-Korean relations in 2017 and early 2018 paved the way for diplomacy between the United States and North Korea.

The Biden administration has made clear for several months that it is willing to start talks with North Korea without preconditions and to engage in an incremental process that builds on the 2018 Singapore summit declaration. That declaration, signed by U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim, called for a transformation of U.S.-North Korean relations, including denuclearization and peace-building on the Korean peninsula.

Although U.S. officials have declined to discuss publicly what Washington is willing to offer North Korea in the first steps of a negotiation, Price said on Oct. 4 that the United States has made “specific proposals” to North Korea and hopes Pyongyang “will respond positively to our outreach.”

 

Recent statements by North Korea suggest Pyongyang may be interested in restarting talks with South Korea despite a recent spate of missile tests.

IAEA Chief Supports Iran Censure


November 2021

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voiced support for censuring Iran during the agency’s Board of Governors meeting in November, although he acknowledged that the situation could change as the agency works to resolve the “most immediate challenges” with Iran.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi spoke at an Oct. 21 event hosted by the Stimson Center during his trip to Washington to meet Biden administration officials and members of Congress. He said the trip came at a “difficult juncture” in the IAEA efforts to monitor Iran’s nuclear program and hoped he would travel to Tehran soon to discuss these issues.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom considered pursuing a resolution censuring Iran for failing to cooperate with IAEA requests at the September Board of Governors meeting, but suspended the effort after Grossi reached an agreement with Tehran to stave off a monitoring crisis. (See ACT, October 2021.)

That Sept. 12 agreement allowed inspectors to service remote surveillance cameras at sites that inspectors have not accessed since February, when Iran reduced compliance with agency monitoring. (See ACT, March 2021.) But Iran blocked inspectors from installing new cameras at a centrifuge component manufacturing site at Karaj during an IAEA visit to the site on Sept. 26. Iran removed the surveillance equipment from that facility after the equipment was sabotaged in June and said the Sept. 12 agreement does not cover that location.

Grossi told The Washington Post on Oct. 20 that if the monitoring dispute and other issues are not resolved, it will be “extremely difficult” to restore the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Although he said the IAEA is not a “main actor” in efforts to restore the JCPOA, the agency is an “essential element,” given its verification role. He said on Oct. 21 that the IAEA is doing what it can to ensure a baseline of information about Iran’s nuclear program, which is “indispensable” for any future negotiation.

U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price said Grossi and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed during their Oct. 19 meeting “the need for Iran to meet its nuclear verification obligations and commitments, cease its nuclear provocations, and return to the diplomacy it says it seeks.”

Several members of Congress, including Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho), ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, were more explicit in supporting censure. After meeting Grossi on Oct. 19, Risch called for “strong U.S. leadership in seeking accountability for Iran’s nuclear activities and pressuring Iran to fulfill its obligations to the international community.”

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said in September that action by the IAEA board would negatively impact negotiations to restore the JCPOA.—KELSEY DAVENPORT

IAEA Chief Supports Iran Censure

Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Project - Report Overview

Body: 

May 12th, 2016

Since the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, states have formed voluntary initiatives to compliment the treaty’s goals and objectives. In particular, these coalitions play a critical role in reinforcing the NPT’s efforts to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism and prevent the rise of new nuclear-armed actors.

This mapping project is designed to illustrate and explore the role that several key multilateral initiatives play in bolstering the NPT by securing existing materials and blocking proliferation. The flexibility of these voluntary initiatives and regimes to respond to emerging nonproliferation and nuclear security risks allows groups of like-minded states to address key areas of concern.

The five initiatives examined in this project include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (G7). Clicking on the icon for each initiative will show its geographic spread on the map and bring up background material and recommendations. Clicking on an individual country will show its membership across all five regimes.

These are not the only voluntary groups working to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthen nuclear security. These five regimes, however, target crucial areas of concern and offer opportunities for collaboration, which will be critical given the rise of networks of non-state actors with expressed interest in weapons of mass destruction. With the end of the nuclear security summits in 2016, these initiatives will also play an important role in continuing to advance the work of the summits and strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. This is particularly true for the GICNT and the Global Partnership, both of which were charged with carrying out part of the nuclear security summits’ agenda.

In addition to displaying the geographic scope and providing a brief background of each initiative, this resource provides general recommendations that could improve the effectiveness of each in the years ahead. These recommendations are based on open source information about the work of each initiative. In some cases, iterations of these recommendations may be under discussion, or have already been dismissed. Where appropriate, this project also puts forward options for collaboration amongst these voluntary groups to amplify impacts and results. These recommendations are meant to spur creative thinking on the role of voluntary initiatives, as such they do not provide specific pathways for adopting or implementing the ideas put forward.

By consolidating references and recommendations, this website is intended to serve as a resource to better understand the role that voluntary initiatives play in bolstering nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts. It will be updated periodically to reflect the changing membership and priorities of each initiative, as well as additional recommendations for strengthening multilateral efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and acts of nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Project - Report Overview

Body: 
Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

Since the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, states have formed voluntary initiatives to compliment the treaty’s goals and objectives. In particular, these coalitions play a critical role in reinforcing the NPT’s efforts to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism and prevent the rise of new nuclear-armed actors.

This mapping project is designed to illustrate and explore the role that several key multilateral initiatives play in bolstering the NPT by securing existing materials and blocking proliferation. The flexibility of these voluntary initiatives and regimes to respond to emerging nonproliferation and nuclear security risks allows groups of like-minded states to address key areas of concern.

The five initiatives examined in this project include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (G7). Clicking on the icon for each initiative will show its geographic spread on the map and bring up background material and recommendations. Clicking on an individual country will show its membership across all five regimes.

These are not the only voluntary groups working to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthen nuclear security. These five regimes, however, target crucial areas of concern and offer opportunities for collaboration, which will be critical given the rise of networks of non-state actors with expressed interest in weapons of mass destruction. With the end of the nuclear security summits in 2016, these initiatives will also play an important role in continuing to advance the work of the summits and strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. This is particularly true for the GICNT and the Global Partnership, both of which were charged with carrying out part of the nuclear security summits’ agenda.

In addition to displaying the geographic scope and providing a brief background of each initiative, this resource provides general recommendations that could improve the effectiveness of each in the years ahead. These recommendations are based on open source information about the work of each initiative. In some cases, iterations of these recommendations may be under discussion, or have already been dismissed. Where appropriate, this project also puts forward options for collaboration amongst these voluntary groups to amplify impacts and results. These recommendations are meant to spur creative thinking on the role of voluntary initiatives, as such they do not provide specific pathways for adopting or implementing the ideas put forward.

By consolidating references and recommendations, this website is intended to serve as a resource to better understand the role that voluntary initiatives play in bolstering nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts. It will be updated periodically to reflect the changing membership and priorities of each initiative, as well as additional recommendations for strengthening multilateral efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and acts of nuclear terrorism.

Executive Summary - Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Project

Body: 
Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

Since the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, states have formed voluntary initiatives to compliment the treaty’s goals and objectives. By allowing self-selecting states to move beyond the status quo to strengthen norms and target areas of concern, these initiatives play a critical role in addressing gaps in the existing nonproliferation and nuclear security architecture.

Five of the key regimes that support the NPT include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (G7). This resource tracks the geographic scope of each initiative, provides a state-by-state listing of participation across all five groups, and makes recommendations for growth and collaboration among initiatives.

Strengthening these voluntary initiatives that target gaps in the nonproliferation and nuclear security architecture is critical given the expressed interest of terrorist groups like the Islamic State in developing or obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the spread of non-state actor networks across the globe, and the expanding interest by states in civil nuclear programs. The flexibility of these initiatives allow states to respond more quickly to emerging threats or evolving proliferation patterns and develop practices that extend beyond international obligations defined by treaty law. They also provide a forum for groups of states to tailor specific activities to address regionally-specific proliferation and security concerns.

Additionally, several of these initiatives include participation from states, namely India, Israel, and Pakistan, that remain outside of the NPT. As such, these voluntary groups can contribute to influencing the nonproliferation and nuclear security actions of states not bound by international treaty commitments.

While the voluntary nature of these regimes is a strength, the non-binding, flexible nature of these initiatives also has drawbacks. Poor transparency, ineffective coordination, weak enforcement mechanisms, and uneven membership distribution are just a few of the challenges that these initiatives face. Additionally, once an initiative establishes a pattern of activity and decision making, it can be difficult to change course to adopt new priorities or recognize that it has outlived its usefulness and close out its work.

This resources makes initiative-specific recommendations on the world map pages, but across the board, there are lessons that can be derived from analyzing the impact of these five initiatives. In general, initiatives should consider the alignment of their priorities to current threats, the geographic representation of their members, and options for strengthening coordination and compliance.

Scope

While the flexible nature of voluntary initiatives allows for adaptability as new nonproliferation or security threats emerge, there are still gaps in the global architecture. Emerging technologies and cyber threats pose new risks to the existing regime. Strengthening controls and safeguards as technologies change will be critical, and an area where voluntary initiatives could play an important role in developing best practices and norms. Radioactive source security is another possible area of work. These materials are found in almost every country around the world and security varies widely. Given the spread of non-state actors and their willingness to use chemical weapons, a move to explosives that spread radioactive material is an increasingly likely possibility. Expanded attention to source security and preventing the theft of such materials in a dirty bomb attack could be given greater priority by voluntary initiatives.

Geographic Spread

Across theses five initiatives there is clear underrepresentation of certain geographic areas, such as Central America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific. Given the spread of non-state actor networks and the expanding problem of secondary proliferation, expanding the geographic scope of initiatives like the GICNT, PSI, and Global Partnership could prevent the emergence of, or block existing, proliferation networks. Additionally, expanded interest in civil nuclear power programs across regions like the Middle East and South Asia will necessitate enhanced nuclear security and counter proliferation efforts to prevent misuse or diversion from civil programs. Greater geographic representation can also facilitate regional approaches to emerging threats and illicit trafficking trends than might be unique to particular areas.

This is not to argue that universality should be a goal for every voluntary initiative. Membership without buy-in and capacity to support the group’s work will prevent any initiative from realizing its full potential and could undercut efforts of other member states. Additionally, given the decision making structure of some initiatives, universality or expanded membership could prove unwieldy. For regimes that rely on consensus based decision making, increasing membership can inhibit the adaptability and responsiveness of a regime. Rather these initiatives should consider enlisting key states for membership as part of a strategic plan and consider the impact of expanded participation on decision making and adaptability.

Coordination

Currently, there is little evidence of active efforts by voluntary initiatives to coordinate activities and amplify results. There are a number of areas were complimentary exercises or workshops could prove beneficial by providing a more holistic approach to address weaknesses in nonproliferation and nuclear security architecture. For instance, if exercises expose gaps in nuclear detection architecture or interdiction capabilities, initiatives like the Global Partnership that provide funding could provide funding to plug those gaps. Additionally, sharing information between states and relevant international organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency about sensitive exports could indicate a pattern of proliferation behavior that could better inform efforts to disrupt supply chains, strengthen detection networks, or deny additional exports.

Compliance

Given the voluntary nature of these regimes, there is no clear enforcement mechanism for violating the guidelines or norms established by the regime. Nor are there mechanisms to compel states to act in accordance with suggested activities. Given the voluntary nature of these regimes, punitive measures for failing to comply with initiative obligations are extremely unlikely. However, building in benefits for cooperation or provide a greater record of transparency regarding participation and implementation might entice states to take more meaningful action in support of an initiative’s goals.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Country List

Body: 

Below is a full list of countries and the respective regimes of which they are a member. Use these links to jump to countries starting with these letters.
A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V |Y | Z

Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

AFGHANISTAN

ALBANIA

ALGERIA

ANDORRA

ANGOLA

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

ARGENTINA

ARMENIA

AUSTRALIA

AUSTRIA

AZERBAIJAN

BAHAMAS

BAHRAIN

BANGLADESH

(none)

BARBADOS

(none)

BELARUS

BELGIUM

BELIZE

BENIN

(none)

BHUTAN

(none)

BOLIVIA

(none)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

BOTSWANA

(none)

BRAZIL

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

BULGARIA

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(none)

BURUNDI

CABO VERDE

CAMBODIA

CAMEROON

(none)

CANADA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

(none)

CHAD

(none)

CHILE

CHINA

COLOMBIA

COMOROS

(none)

CONGO

(none)

COSTA RICA

(none)

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

CROATIA

CUBA

(none)

CYPRUS

CZECH REPUBLIC

DPRK (NORTH KOREA)

(none)

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

(none)

DENMARK

DJIBOUTI

DOMINICA

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

ECUADOR

(none)

EGYPT

(none)

EL SALVADOR

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

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ERITREA

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ESTONIA

ETHIOPIA

FIJI

FINLAND

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GABON

(none)

GAMBIA

(none)

GEORGIA

GERMANY

GHANA

(none)

GREECE

GRENADA

(none)

GUATEMALA

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GUINEA

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GUINEA-BISSAU

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GUYANA

HAITI

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HONDURAS

HUNGARY

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INDIA

INDONESIA

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IRAN

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IRAQ

IRELAND

ISRAEL

ITALY

JAMAICA

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JAPAN

JORDAN

KAZAKHSTAN

KENYA

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VIETNAM

YEMEN

ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE

 

    The Missile Technology Control Regime

    Body: 
    Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
    GICNT
    Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
    MTCR
    Missile Technology Control Regime
    PSI
    Proliferation Security Initiative
    NSG
    Nuclear Suppliers Group
    G7
    Global Partnership

    The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary export control regime that was established in 1987 after emerging concerns about the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. The United States spearheaded the effort after imposing domestic controls over some materials and technologies relevant to missile development in 1982. The initial membership included the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States), but has since grown to 35 member states.

    In 1993 the regime was expanded to include missile systems capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons. The regime generally defines WMD-capable missiles as capable for carrying a 500-kilogram payload over 300 kilometers.

    The MTCR member states commit to establishing national export control policies for certain materials and technologies relevant to the development of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, drones, remotely piloted vehicles, and sounding rockets. The materials and technologies are listed in the MTCR annexes and items can be added to or subtracted from the lists based on consensus decisions. The annex is divided into two groups, Category I and Category II. Category I includes complete missiles and rockets, major sub-systems, and production facilities. Specialized materials, technologies, propellants, and sub-components for missiles and rockets comprise Category II.

    Potential exports of Category I and II items are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Under the regime guidelines, “there will be a strong presumption to deny” Category I transfers. MTCR restrictions for Category II exports are less severe, largely because many items in the category have dual uses, and the MTCR is not intended to hamper efforts like space exploration programs that share similar technologies to ballistic missiles.

    The MTCR identifies five factors that members should take into account when evaluating a possible export of controlled items: whether the intended recipient is pursuing or has ambitions for acquiring weapons of mass destruction; the purposes and capabilities of the intended recipient’s missile and space programs; the potential contribution the proposed transfer could make to the intended recipient’s development of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction; the credibility of the intended recipient’s stated purpose for the purchase; and whether the potential transfer conflicts with any multilateral treaty. Catch-all provisions were added in 2003.v Member states are expected to provide notifications to other MTCR members when an export is denied. There is also a no undercut provision is designed to prevent member states from fulfilling an export if that request has been denied by another member state.

    States can apply to join the MTCR, and membership is granted on the basis of consensus. Membership expanded dramatically through 1998. Since at time, only three states have been admitted for membership. Several additional states, including China, have committed to adhere to MTCR guidelines, although they are not full members.

    The MTCR is credited with hindering the ballistic missile programs in a number of states, including Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, and Syria.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    • Update Technological Parameters: The MTCR has proven successful at stemming the spread of ballistic missiles in several states, but less successful against the development of cruise missiles and unarmed-aerial vehicles. Continuing to adapt the Annex I and Annex II lists on a regular basis to take into account technologies relevant to these systems, despite the crossover with manned delivery systems, and new technologies could help control the continued spread of such systems.
    • Consider Dropping Consensus Requirements for Procedural Votes: The consensus requirement for decision making, even on procedural votes, can allow one state to hold up decisions such as expanding membership in the MTCR or updating control lists for political reasons. A majority, or vote by two thirds of the members, could be adopted to make decisions in certain areas.
    • Expanded Membership: Key states remain outside of the MTCR regime for a variety of reasons. Possible countries to target could include Pakistan and China (a voluntary adherent to MTCR guidelines since 2004), given that both possess active ballistic missile and cruise missile development programs. A criteria-based approach for membership could make for a more equitable membership process and prevent blocking applications for unrelated political reasons. While increasing membership could make consensus more difficult to achieve, a simultaneous move away from consensus-based decision making on some areas, could neutralize that potential negative implication. Additionally, expanded membership can help universalize the norm against transfers of ballistic missile technologies.
    • Encourage Timely Reporting on Export Denials: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 65 percent of MTCR members were not fulfilling their obligations for timely reporting export control denials. While this GAO study was conducted in 2002, slow or nonexistent reporting continues. Failure to provide timely information to MTCR partners could hinder attempts to identify patterns of attempts to circumvent export controls. Notifications could be expanded to approvals as well. Sharing information about approvals would allow states to better identify patterns of proliferation concern.
    • Coordination with NSG and PSI: Coordination and information sharing on approvals and denials between the MTCR and NSG could provide more information about illicit trafficking networks and coordinated efforts to circumvent export controls. If illicit trafficking networks and patterns can be sketched out, utilizing information sharing through PSI to provide trainings for targeting and identifying particular types of transactions or geographic areas of trafficking concern could provide a more efficient allocation of resources.
    • Review of National Policies and Authorities: Given the voluntary nature of the MTCR guidelines, states implement obligations to varying degrees. Encouraging all participating states to review of national controls and notification policies could help target areas of poor implementation or noncompliance, or indicate where member states need to update their export control lists.

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