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Former IAEA Director-General
Pakistan

Pakistan Defends Nuke Security Amid Instability

In recent months, Pakistani officials have sought to allay concerns that the deteriorating security situation in their country would allow extremist elements to acquire nuclear weapons or materials. Political instability in Pakistan has persisted over the past year, raising questions about Islamabad’s ability to protect its nuclear assets. (Continue)

Peter Crail

In recent months, Pakistani officials have sought to allay concerns that the deteriorating security situation in their country would allow extremist elements to acquire nuclear weapons or materials. Political instability in Pakistan has persisted over the past year, raising questions about Islamabad’s ability to protect its nuclear assets.

In early January 2008, Islamabad criticized Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for comments made in a Jan. 8 interview with the pan-Arab al-Hayat newspaper in which he expressed concern that “nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of an extremist group in Pakistan or in Afghanistan.” Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Sadiq characterized such comments Jan. 9 as “unwarranted and irresponsible,” stressing that Pakistan’s weapons are as secure as those in any other nuclear-weapon state.

Responding to Pakistan’s criticism, the agency issued a statement clarifying that ElBaradei was attempting to “call attention to the need to bolster nuclear safety and security measures” worldwide, not just in Pakistan. Although Islamabad has not signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it is a member of the IAEA and has placed a number of civilian nuclear facilities under the agency’s safeguards.

During a Jan. 27 briefing, retired Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, director-general of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which oversees the security of the country’s nuclear arsenal, sought to reassure foreign journalists. He argued that scenarios involving the theft or takeover of Pakistani nuclear assets were unrealistic. In addition to describing steps that Islamabad has taken to enhance its nuclear security, Kidwai asserted that “[t]here’s no conceivable scenario, political or violent, in which Pakistan will fall to extremists of the al Qaeda or Taliban type.” He also noted that “the state of alertness has gone up” in recent months since domestic tensions within Pakistan have increased.

Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division serves as the secretariat of the National Command Authority, which is headed by the president and is responsible for command and control over Pakistan’s strategic weapons and infrastructure. (See ACT, December 2007. ) Both organizations were created in 1999, a year after Pakistan tested nuclear weapons.

Pakistan is believed to have produced enough nuclear material for about 60 weapons. As a security precaution, these weapons are stored unassembled, with the fissile material core kept separately from the explosive triggers.

Following Kidwai’s briefing, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf also sought to underscore the apparent confidence that the U.S. intelligence community places in the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. In a Feb. 14 lecture at a Paris think tank, Musharraf argued that “[i]f you ask the head of [the] CIA or top officials of Western intelligence agencies, they will talk contrary to the point of view being projected by the Western media against Pakistan and its leadership.”

Musharraf’s reference to such an assessment by Western intelligence agencies followed the Feb. 5 testimony of top U.S. intelligence officials to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Although admitting to “vulnerabilities” in the Pakistani military’s control over its weapons complex, John Michael McConnell, director of national intelligence, told the committee that “the ongoing political uncertainty in Pakistan has not seriously threatened the military’s control of the nuclear arsenal.”

Officials from neighboring nuclear rival India, however, continue to cite the risk to Pakistan’s nuclear arms. During a Feb. 18 lecture in New Delhi, Indian Special Envoy Shyam Saran cited the possibility that, “[in] a situation of chaos, Pakistan’s nuclear assets may fall into the hands of jihadi elements.”

Letters to the Editor: “Trust Us” Is Not Enough in Pakistan

It is good to see Kenneth N. Luongo and Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik’s unbridled optimism about Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its nuclear arsenal (“Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” December 2007). But a more tempered approach would perhaps have been better. In thinking about how well Pakistan may be able to secure its nuclear weapons, materials, and experts, it is worth remembering that Pakistan has been unable to protect its constitution from military coups, has lost half its territory (East Pakistan, now Bangladesh) in 1971, and has failed to safeguard the lives of its most prominent political leaders in recent months. (Continue)

 

Pervez Hoodbhoy

It is good to see Kenneth N. Luongo and Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik’s unbridled optimism about Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its nuclear arsenal (“Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” December 2007). But a more tempered approach would perhaps have been better. In thinking about how well Pakistan may be able to secure its nuclear weapons, materials, and experts, it is worth remembering that Pakistan has been unable to protect its constitution from military coups, has lost half its territory (East Pakistan, now Bangladesh) in 1971, and has failed to safeguard the lives of its most prominent political leaders in recent months.

The goals of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), with which one of the authors was associated, are indeed laudable. With U.S. tutoring and funds, the SPD says it has implemented various technical precautions such as improved perimeter security, installation of electronic locks and permissive action links that require the entry of a code before nuclear weapons can explode, and implementation of a personnel reliability program. Although these increase safety against theft or unauthorized access to weapons and material, it is better to be cautious about such security given the increasingly sophisticated and violent Islamist insurgency in Pakistan and the longer-term direction and intensity of social change.

Some claims made by those in charge of Pakistan’s nukes are brash. Feroz Hassan Khan, a former SPD director, for instance told The Wall Street Journal in late November that “[t]he system knows how to distinguish who is a ‘fundo’ [fundamentalist] and who is simply pious.” If it were truly so, Pakistan need not have suffered the tidal wave of suicide bombings that has crashed through its towns and cities in recent years.

The feeling of being in total control starts at the top of the army. President Pervez Musharraf, who recently resigned from the military, was asked by Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria in January 2008 if he thought Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were safe from Islamic militants. He confidently replied, “Absolutely. [The SPD] is like an army unit. Can one rifle be taken away from an army unit? Can the bullet of a rifle be taken away from an army unit? I challenge anyone to take a bullet, a weapon, away from an army unit.”

But just two weeks later, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that Taliban militants had captured four military trucks in Darra Adamkhel on the Indus Highway. Some reportedly carried ammunition, while others were transporting 4x4 military vehicles fitted with sophisticated communications and listening technology. Another week later, the trucks were recovered, minus cargo.

There are other examples. In August 2007, the BBC reported that about 250 Frontier Constabulary soldiers surrendered to the Taliban, together with their equipment and weapons, all without firing a shot. Initially an attempt was made to deny that any soldiers had been kidnapped or had surrendered. But some weeks later, after the BBC interviewed the military officers in the Taliban’s captivity, President and then-General Musharraf criticized them for cowardice and unprofessional behavior.

Here lies the crux of the problem. In spite of the SPD’s professionalism, the fact is that procedures and technical fixes are only as good as the men who operate them. This is not just an academic question. For more than 25 years, the army nurtured Islamist radicals as proxy warriors for covert operations on Pakistan’s borders in Kashmir and Afghanistan. This produced extremism inside parts of the military and intelligence. Today, some parts are at war with other parts.

This chilling truth is now emerging. A score of suicide attacks in the last few weeks, some bearing a clear insider signature, have rocked an increasingly demoralized military and intelligence establishment. Fearful of more deadly attacks, military officers in Pakistan have abandoned use of uniforms except when on duty. They move in civilian cars accompanied by gunmen in plain clothes and no longer flout their rank in public.

The authors state that “there have not been any examples to date of systemic failure” in Pakistan’s nuclear security. But, given that there is no oversight body, how are we to know? Even the nuclear-weapon states, the United States included, have had serious problems at some point. Pakistan has the additional problem that it cannot be guaranteed that the custodians of nuclear weapons will always be responsible to the government.

One also does not know if radical Islamists can eventually hijack a weapon or acquire the technical expertise and the highly enriched uranium needed for a crude, in situ nuclear device. But it is quite certain that, having gone to the trouble of getting it, they will use it if they can. One should not assume that London or New York will be the preferred targets because Islamabad and Delhi may be just as good—and certainly much easier. In the twisted logic of the fanatics, there is little or no difference between apostates and those who are the tools of apostates. The suicide bombings inside mosques, and in Pakistan’s public places, send exactly this message.

I would like to believe Luongo and Salik that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials are safe. The problem is that, like me, they really do not know. In a matter involving enormous consequences, for them to say “trust us” is not good enough.

 


Pervez Hoodbhoy is chairman of the Department of Physics, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, and author of Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality (1991).


Kenneth N. Luongo and Naeem Salik Respond

Kenneth N. Luongo and Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik

Pervez Hoodbhoy is a longtime observer of political and nuclear developments in Pakistan, and his views are important in the debate over Pakistan’s nuclear security. Our article was a factual assessment of how Pakistan’s nuclear security has evolved over the past nine years, where it stands today, and how it might continue to evolve in the future. In fact, Time magazine characterized this piece as “the most detailed account yet of how Islamabad protects its atomic arsenal.” The article speaks clearly on the threat scenarios that exist in Pakistan and acknowledges the issue of growing religious fundamentalism in both the civilian and military sectors. It emphasizes the importance of assuring and improving personnel reliability. Further, the article makes clear that Pakistan, like all nuclear nations, has ongoing and evolving security challenges and therefore must remain adaptive and open to further improvement. That is why it continues working with the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Surprisingly, however, Hoodbhoy’s letter also introduces examples of challenges faced by Pakistan that are really tangential to the performance of nuclear security. His arguments about Pakistan’s social fragility, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, attacks against military units, and the 1971 secession of its eastern wing are in a category of political and social challenges faced by many nuclear nations. In the nuclear era, the United States has survived the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the attempts on the lives of Presidents Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan. The United States was unable to prevent the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the British government failed to prevent the London Underground bombings—all acts carried out by religious extremists. These tragic events did not translate into the inability of these nations to keep their nuclear assets safe in crisis situations just as Pakistan has been able to maintain control of its nuclear assets during the recent political crisis.

Political challenges and crises will arise. The important point is to have in place the best systems possible to ensure that nuclear assets are not at risk as a result. We, like Pervez Hoodbhoy, remain concerned with the state of nuclear safety and security in Pakistan because it is important for global security. That is why Pakistan has taken significant steps since the 1998 nuclear tests to strengthen the custodial controls of its strategic assets. This progress is important, and it needs to continue.

 


Kenneth N. Luongo is president of the Partnership for Global Security and a former senior adviser on nonproliferation policy to the secretary of energy. Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik is currently the South Asia Studies Visiting Scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.


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Questionable Reward: Arms Sales and the War on Terrorism

Rachel Stohl

In November 2007, Pakistan’s president, General Pervez Musharraf, invoked emergency rule, suspended the constitution, and arrested thousands of opponents and human rights advocates. As other countries, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, immediately suspended military aid and weapons deals, the United States, which has given Pakistan more than $10 billion in military assistance since September 11, 2001, decided it would review U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan. Washington also indicated it would likely not prevent any weapons transfers, asserting such a decision could undermine counterterrorism efforts.[1]

U.S. policy toward Pakistan is part of a larger trend of U.S. arms export policy since the September 11 attacks, whereby the United States has made the “global war on terror” its priority in determining arms transfers and military assistance. In the last six years, Washington has stepped up its sales and transfers of high-technology weapons, military training, and other military assistance to governments regardless of their respect for human rights, democratic principles, or nonproliferation. All that matters is that they have pledged their assistance in the global war on terrorism.

U.S. Arms Sales and Export Policy Before and After September 11

To be sure, the United States traditionally has used arms sales to “reward” those countries willing to support its policies. The claimed motivations of such policies have changed over time from anti-communism to democracy building to anti-terrorism. The basic notion of using arms sales as a means of promoting loyalty to U.S. goals has been consistent.

Throughout this period, the United States has dominated the global arms market and continues to do so today. In 2006, Washington concluded the largest number of new arms deals ($16.9 billion worth in 2006, 41.9 percent of the global total) and made the most actual arms deliveries ($14 billion, nearly 52 percent of global arms deliveries).[2] The United States’ closest competitors were Russia and the United Kingdom, which made $8.7 billion and $3.1 billion in new deals, respectively, and delivered $5.8 billion and $3.3 billion worth of weapons. The United States has also regained its position atop exporters to the developing world, the largest purchasers of arms. Although the total global value of arms agreements fell in 2006, the United States saw multibillion-dollar increases in the value of its arms transfer agreements worldwide and with the developing world.

Post-September 11 Policy Changes

Nonetheless, there have been important changes since the September 11 attacks, with the United States finessing its arms export policies to support its war on terrorism. The most significant changes have involved the lifting of sanctions, the increase of arms and military training provided to perceived anti-terrorist allies, and the development of new programs focused and based on the global anti-terrorist crusade. To understand and document this trend, the Center for Defense Information has analyzed military assistance data (using U.S. government data solely) for 25 countries[3] that have been identified by the United States as having a strategic role in the war on terrorism. These countries include those that reflect the counterterrorism priorities of the United States—17 are “frontline” states identified by the Bush administration as “countries that cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism or face terrorist threats themselves”—and others strategically located near Afghanistan and Iraq.

Lifting Sanctions

Immediately after the attacks of September 11, the Bush administration proposed allowing arms sales to potential anti-terrorist allies that had previously been blocked from weapons transfers because they had committed significant human rights violations, lacked sufficient democratic institutions, had been involved in acts of aggression, or had tested nuclear weapons. Congressional opposition prevented these sanctions from being lifted en bloc, and as a result, decisions to lift sanctions were made on a case-by-case basis. To date, the United States has completely lifted pre-September 11 sanctions on Armenia, Azerbaijan, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Montenegro and Serbia). Since September 11, 2001, additional military assistance restrictions to Thailand and Indonesia have been waived.

These countries have been identified as key allies in the global war on terrorism, but each has troubling recent pasts, which led to them being placed on the list in the first place. Not only is each country involved in interstate or intrastate conflicts, but India and Pakistan have been criticized for their evolving nuclear weapons programs, Pakistan’s and Thailand’s military governments attained power as a result of coups, Azerbaijan has been embroiled for well more than a decade in a shaky cease-fire with Armenia, the stability of Tajikistan remains questionable, and the human rights record of Indonesia’s military remains of great concern. Although sanctions have been removed, the conditions in these countries have not improved and in many cases have become worse. Nonetheless, arms transfers and other military assistance to all have increased. In addition, the human rights records of many of these countries have actually worsened, with increasing abuses by government and security forces. U.S. transfers could fuel these human rights abuses and continuing conflict. If the events of September 11, 2001, had never happened, these countries would likely still remain under strict U.S. sanctions.

Increasing Arms and Training to Anti-Terrorism Allies

The second policy shift has been the Bush administration’s commitment to using U.S. weapons to arm potential allies in the war against terrorism. On the six-month anniversary of the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush declared that the United States was willing to provide training and assistance to any government facing a terrorist threat, stating that “America encourages and expects governments everywhere to help remove the terrorist parasites that threaten their own countries and peace of the world. If governments need training, or resources to meet this commitment, America will help.”[4]

In addition to the six countries that have had their sanctions lifted, the United States has provided military assistance to some countries that it had not aided previously in this way. For example, Yemen has received grants to acquire U.S weaponry for the last six years, but none in the 11 years prior to 2001. Turkmenistan is now buying U.S. weaponry, and Kyrgyzstan is now permitted to make commercial purchases of U.S. weapons. Even more telling, 18 of the 25 countries in this series received more military assistance and 16 concluded more arms sales with the United States during the five years after the September 11 attacks than they had during the period following the end of the Cold War (fiscal years 1990-2001).

In the first five years following September 11, 2001, the United States sold nearly five times more weapons through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to these 25 countries than during the five years prior to that date. From fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006, FMS to these countries increased from about $1.7 billion to $5.3 billion. DCS for these 25 countries have also reached new highs, rising from $72 million during fiscal years 1997-2001 to more than $3 billion during fiscal years 2002-2006. Pakistan had the largest increase in military sales (FMS and DCS) in the five-year period, signing agreements for $3.6 billion in U.S. defense articles. Other beneficiaries of the war on terrorism arms sale bonanza were Bahrain, which saw an increase of $1.6 billion, and Algeria, which saw an increase of nearly $600 million.

In Iraq, we have witnessed some of the drawbacks of this rush to arm and equip countries. In July 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report that revealed that nearly 200,000 weapons and other military equipment that the United States had provided to Iraqi security forces had not been accounted for. Among the weaknesses noted by the GAO was that the Department of Defense, which oversees the Iraqi train-and-equip program, neglected to implement basic accountability procedures to keep track of the distribution of weapons issued in 2004 and 2005.[5] Today, the United States has not enunciated a clear plan to remedy these kinds of problems. Yet, as recently as September 2007, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, urged Washington to increase weapons sales to Iraq as soon as possible.

The United States has also viewed military training as an important aspect of its focus on fighting terrorism. A telling statement for the direction of U.S. policy was made in March 2002, when Bush emphasized U.S. reliance on training programs. He said, “We will not send American troops to every battle, but America will actively prepare other nations for the battles ahead.”[6] Since September 11, 2001, the United States has offered military training to many countries that have experienced terrorism on their own soil, are struggling with the presence of terrorist networks, or are essential to U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

The overall funding for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has grown dramatically since 2001. For the 25 countries, the IMET program grew from $39 million in the five years prior to September 11, 2001, to $93 million in the five years after the attacks. That has also meant that the 25 countries are receiving an even greater percentage of total U.S. military training funds. In 2001 the 25 countries received 15 percent of total IMET funds, but by 2006, their share had jumped to nearly 25 percent.

Although some of these countries are clearly involved with U.S. efforts to defeat al Qaeda and other terrorist networks, with others, such as those in Africa and Asia, the United States is gambling that military training will buy allies in the long run. Military training in many instances promotes the readiness, efficiency, and effectiveness of foreign military troops. It may also worsen the situation in countries plagued by terrorism if a well-armed and unaccountable military is not kept in check with human rights training and the country does not receive assistance building legal and judicial structures. Economic and social aid should also be offered concurrently to help strengthen and promote internal stability. Moreover, in some countries, such as Colombia, Nepal, and the Philippines, what is being described as counterterrorism training is in practice counterinsurgency training. The United States is involving itself in internal conflicts around the world and is in practice encouraging countries to continue their internal struggles that predate September 11, 2001. Not every insurgency is a threat to U.S. security, and some may in fact have very little to do with halting the spread of terrorism worldwide.

The Bush administration argues that professionalizing the world’s militaries will help prevent human rights abuses down the road. Yet, the Department of State reveals in its annual human rights report that “serious,” “grave,” or “significant” abuses were committed by the government or state security forces in more than one-half of the 25 countries profiled in 2006 alone.[7] In many cases, U.S. military assistance to these countries is growing at the same time as human rights conditions are worsening. Ethiopia, which is carrying out a brutal counterinsurgency campaign within its own borders, also launched an invasion of Somalia in December 2006 blamed for the deaths of scores of civilians and the displacement of at least 100,000 Somalis in indiscriminate violence in and around Mogadishu. Chad, which suffers from widespread turmoil and corruption, employs child soldiers in the ranks of its national army and is at a minimum tacitly involved in the ongoing regional conflicts in the Central African Republic and Sudan. By providing military assistance with a disregard for human rights conditions, the United States is not only giving up the opportunity to use military assistance as leverage to improve human rights conditions, but is also rewarding abusive governments for their unconscionable actions.

Moreover, in some of these countries, the military has contributed to domestic political turmoil and instability. In 2006 and 2007, Chad, Nepal, Pakistan, and Thailand dealt with pervasive and significant upheaval. Nepalese security forces opened fire on peaceful strikes and anti-government demonstrations. Chad’s government barely survived a coup attempt. Thailand’s government was taken over in a “peaceful” military coup. The Musharraf government’s continuing battle against reform and political challengers led to the imposition of emergency rule, a move that abandons any pretense of democratic principles.

Establishment of New Programs

The third significant policy shift has been the creation of new Defense Department programs that provide training and weapons for counterterrorism operations outside traditional avenues of support. The Pentagon has long sought the freedom to provide military assistance without human rights conditions or other restrictions under current U.S. law as enunciated in the Foreign Assistance Act. In fiscal year 2002, the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was created by Congress through the defense appropriations act with a mandate to provide nonlethal anti-terrorism training. In fiscal year 2004, it began offering lethal training. In fiscal year 2006, Congress authorized the Defense Department to use $200 million of its operation and maintenance funds to equip and train foreign militaries for counterterrorism operations, so-called Section 1206 authority.

Creating these parallel training authorities and funding them through the defense budget allows the Pentagon to bypass the Foreign Assistance Act and limits congressional oversight and the normally more cautious State Department from these decisions. In particular, it could help to sidestep restrictions on training or arming human rights abusers. For example, it could be argued that the CTFP essentially serves the same purpose as the State Department’s IMET program but without any of the oversight or conditions.

The newly created Defense Department programs have provided training and equipment to all but four of the 25 countries examined. These programs come in addition to the aid provided through the five traditional major military assistance programs. For example, Yemen received more than $4 million in Section 1206 funding in fiscal year 2006 and an additional $200,000 in CTFP funding in fiscal year 2005, as well as $19.6 million in the five traditional types of aid in fiscal year 2006 and $14.6 million in such aid in fiscal year 2005.

Implications of Post-September 11 Policy Changes

Although the dollar value of the increased support for these countries could be seen as relatively insignificant compared to the considerably greater military assistance given to NATO allies or countries in the Middle East, the relative shift from no or very few sales to millions or billions in military assistance in some cases matters greatly. After all, these sales are likely to mark only the beginning of U.S. military and defense industry ties with these questionable and challenging allies. The U.S. defense industry often relies on initial sales in order to encourage future sales; develop maintenance, consulting, or upgrades contracts; and set the stage for larger-ticket items down the road. Using the war on terrorism as their entrance card, these traditionally undesirable partners have gotten their feet in the door and will likely enjoy long-term military relationships with the United States. Indeed, for the most part, sales and training to these countries have grown every year. The United States must question whether these new allies and these transfers are consistent with long-standing principles and tenets of U.S. law.

Second, these transfers could pose significant risks to long-term U.S. security and stability. From the outset, much of this military assistance is inconsistent with U.S. efforts to spread peace and democracy throughout the world. Beyond the theoretical or principled contradiction, however, the reality is that once these weapons leave U.S. possession and training courses are completed, the United States cannot control how or by whom the weapons are used or the training is implemented. The situation in Iraq demonstrates this reality: U.S. weapons intended for Iraqi security forces have ended up in the hands of insurgents in Iraq and Turkey. In many cases, the countries receiving U.S. military assistance have only pledged assistance to the war on terrorism and may in fact behave in ways the United States opposes. Yet, little can be done in response beyond limiting future weapons and training.

Moreover, the United States suffers from the possibility of blowback—having these weapons used against U.S. troops, civilians, or interests down the road—a phenomenon the United States has experienced firsthand in Afghanistan and Iraq. Weapons provided to the mujahideen in the 1980s were used by the Taliban and today’s Afghan rebels. In Iraq, weapons provided to Saddam Hussein during the 1980s remain in circulation and in the hands of Iraqi insurgents. The Bush administration’s policy of arming these new allies for short-term gains could put the United States at considerable risk and result in the United States facing its own weapons as political alliances deteriorate. Because the United States has increased transfers and training to countries that have dismal records on democracy, human rights, and loyalty, it is not too far a stretch to believe that some of these new allies could turn against the United States in the future.

The track records of many of these recipients—poor human rights records, prior support for and harboring of terrorists, or consistently undemocratic regimes—have been ignored by the Bush administration in an effort to bolster the war on terrorism. In doing so, the United States loses the ability to encourage a change in these bad actors’ behavior and does not guarantee that these short-term allies will remain long-term U.S. partners. Furthermore, the instability in many of these countries also raises questions about their future allegiance.

Ironically, the provision of weapons, aid, and training to some states might even ultimately serve to undermine the U.S. goal of eradicating terrorism. Countries benefiting from new access to weapons and training may see the continuation of the war on terrorism to be in their own best interest. They may not seriously commit to fighting terrorism because an end to terrorist threats, either real or perceived, might mean a decrease in aid. Thus, the actual dedication of many of these countries to U.S. goals and policies may leave much to be desired.

Conclusion

Rather than continuing its current approach, the United States would be better served by abiding by its long-standing arms export laws to ensure that weapons exports do not undermine security and stability, weaken democracy, support military coups, escalate arms races, exacerbate ongoing conflicts, or cause arms buildups in unstable regions or are used to commit human rights abuses. Although the war on terrorism has taken center stage, these principles and values should not be given an end run. This may mean that even close allies, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Pakistan, which have worsening or no improvement in their human rights records, have their military assistance scaled back until substantial improvements are made. The United States should look at other ways of cooperating with new allies, such as economic and development assistance, and work to strengthen these partners’ democracies and institutions. More than ever, the United States needs strong partners that value human rights and the rule of law.

If arms and training are the only foreign policy tools the United States is willing to use, then they must be provided in line with U.S. law and under the strictest oversight and accountability. Programs should not be allowed to bypass U.S. law. New Defense Department programs should be scaled back and evaluated, rather than expanded, to ensure that they are upholding U.S. law. If the United States does sell weapons and provide training to questionable new allies, all effort should be taken to ensure that these weapons do not undermine U.S. security down the road.

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A Primer on U.S. Arms Export Policy

U.S. conventional arms export policy is codified in Presidential Decision Directive 34, set by President Bill Clinton in 1995. This directive guides U.S. arms exports decisions and establishes the foreign policy goals for U.S. conventional arms transfers. These include:

•  Ensuring that U.S. military forces enjoy technological advantages over potential adversaries;

•  Helping allies and friends deter or defend themselves against aggression, while promoting interoperability with U.S. forces when combined operations are required;

•  Promoting regional stability in areas critical to U.S. interest, while preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems;

•  Promoting peaceful conflict resolution and arms controls, human rights, democratization, and other foreign policy objectives;

•  Enhancing the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet U.S. defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological superiority at lower costs.

Still, the United States cannot necessarily sell weapons to any country that meets one of these conditions. Arms exports also must be consistent with three crucial laws and two implementing regulations.

The 1979 Arms Export Control Act (AECA) is one of the crucial laws. This statute stipulates the purposes for which weapons may be transferred (self-defense, internal security, and UN operations) and establishes the process by which the executive branch must give Congress advance notice of major sales. The AECA also requires a series of quarterly and annual reports from the Departments of Defense and State to Congress on overseas sales activity.

Executive Order 11958 delegates responsibility for the implementation of the AECA primarily to the State and Defense Departments. At the State Department, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls develops and updates the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which implements the AECA. These regulations contain a U.S. munitions list that covers all weapons regulated by the State Department. They also list those countries that are ineligible to receive weapons under U.S. law.

A second essential law is the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which guides provision of economic and military assistance to foreign governments. For example, this act requires that weapon exports not undermine long-term security and stability, weaken democratic movements, support military coups, escalate arms races or exacerbate ongoing conflicts. Nor are the exported weapons supposed to cause arms buildups in unstable regions or be used to commit human rights abuses.

The third major law is the 1970 Export Administration Act, which governs shipments of dual-use goods, technology and information with both military and civilian uses. The act lapsed in 1994 but has been retained under the emergency powers of the president. It is administered by the Department of Commerce through the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which govern the sales activities of exporters of these items, as ITAR does for munitions. The EAR contain the Commerce Control List, which includes certain ballistic missile production technologies, dual-use chemicals, shotguns, and police equipment.

These laws govern many different types of arms sales and military assistance programs. The largest sales programs are:

•  Foreign Military Sales (FMS): government-to-government sales negotiated by the Pentagon, in which the weapons come from existing Pentagon stocks or new production;

•  Direct Commercial Sales (DCS): arms sales concluded between U.S. weapons manufacturers and foreign clients managed by the State Department.

The largest military assistance programs are:

•  Excess Defense Articles (EDA): surplus or obsolete U.S. weapons given away for free or at a dramatically reduced cost to foreign governments;

•  Foreign Military Financing (FMF): grants to foreign governments that are used to purchase weapons, training, and other defense articles and services from the United States;

•  International Military Education and Training (IMET): grants for members of foreign governments and militaries to participate in any of more than 2,000 courses in U.S. military management and technical training.

Although much smaller in dollar value, the United States also offers military training separate from or part of other arms packages. Military training is an important foreign policy tool used to bolster support for U.S. values and interests in foreign governments and military institutions, as well as to establish common military goals, procedures, and mechanisms. The utilization of military training to build military and political relationships is part of an emerging trend that began at the end of the Cold War. In the last decade, the United States has trained more than 100,000 foreign soldiers, police, and civilians annually through these programs. Such training programs, which take place within the United States and in about 150 countries around the world, range from English-language training and counternarcotics strategies to preparation of forces for peacekeeping operations.

 


Rachel Stohl is a senior analyst at the Center for Defense Information (CDI), co-author of International Arms Trade (forthcoming), and co-author of Small Arms Trade (2006). Case studies of U.S. military assistance to each of the 25 countries discussed in this article are available at www.cdi.org.


ENDNOTES

1. Wade Boese, “U.S. Pakistani Arms Pipeline Stays Open,” Arms Control Today, December 2007, p. 29. Emergency rule lasted from Nov. 3 to Dec. 15, during which time Musharraf resigned from the military but retained his presidency.

2. Richard F. Grimmett, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006,” CRS Report for Congress, RL34187, September 26, 2007.

3. Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

4. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts,” Washington, DC, March 11, 2002  (hereinafter president’s remarks, March 11, 2002).

5. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces,” July 31, 2007.

6. President’s remarks, March 11, 2002.

7. U.S. Department of State, “2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.”

U.S.-Pakistani Arms Pipeline Stays Open

Wade Boese

Deeming Pakistan a vital ally, the Bush administration has ignored U.S. lawmaker calls to halt arms transfers to the Pakistani government following the military regime’s November crackdown on political opponents, the court system, and the media.

On Nov. 3, Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf imposed emergency rule to counter what he described as rising extremism. Musharraf, who took power in a 1999 military coup, was facing a legal challenge to his rule and growing public protests fueled in part by the October return of exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

Although condemning Musharraf’s action, the Bush administration has not penalized Pakistan by suspending U.S. aid or arms exports. John Negroponte, deputy secretary of state, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee Nov. 7 that the administration was reviewing U.S. aid, including military aid, but had found no statutory requirements mandating a freeze. He added, “[M]uch of our assistance…contributes directly to our national interests and to the counterterrorism mission.”

Since Musharraf aligned Islamabad more closely with Washington’s anti-terrorism agenda after the Sept. 11 attacks, approximately $10 billion in U.S. aid has flowed to Pakistan. In addition, the Bush administration waived some arms sales prohibitions on Pakistan.

The Congressional Research Service, which conducts studies for Congress, reported Nov. 8 that Pakistan last year signed $3.5 billion in U.S. arms contracts, an amount slightly shy of Pakistan’s $3.6 billion in total U.S. arms purchases from October 1949 through September 2001. (The collective amount has not been adjusted for inflation.) That 2006 sum included a contract for 18 new F-16C/D combat aircraft as well as upgrades for 26 older F-16 fighters that the United States is essentially donating to Pakistan. (See ACT, November 2006. )

Some U.S. legislators are backing nonbinding resolutions to restrict military sales and transfers to Pakistan unless Musharraf reverses course and allows “free and fair elections” in January.

Introduced Nov. 8, the Senate measure has seven co-sponsors, including three presidential candidates: Senators Joseph Biden (D-Del.), Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.), and Barack Obama (D-Ill.). Representatives Gary Ackerman (D-N.Y.) and William Delahunt (D-Mass.) introduced a similar resolution Nov. 14 in the lower chamber. It is unclear if or when either piece of legislation might be voted on.

Ackerman vehemently argued Nov. 7 against continuing arms transfers to Pakistan. Asserting that Musharraf had “told us to go take a hike,” Ackerman told Negroponte that the United States “should stop delivery of any further F-16s.” The president has the authority to stop any U.S. arms transfer abroad.

A spokesperson for the Pentagon’s office that manages U.S. government arms sales to foreign governments told Arms Control Today Nov. 14 that only four of the older F-16 jets have been delivered, while another 10 are awaiting proper classification for transfer. He described everything as “continuing as normal.” Laurie Quincy, a Lockheed Martin Corp. spokesperson, said in a Nov. 13 Arms Control Today interview that the company had not started production of the 18 new F-16 fighters, which are scheduled for delivery in 2010.

At the panel hearing, Negroponte implied the administration, under current circumstances, would not interfere with either process. He contended that the United States and Pakistan “cannot afford to have the on-again off-again interactions that characterized our relationship in the past.”

Negroponte was referring in part to a 1990 U.S. decision to cancel delivery of 28 F-16s to Pakistan due to its clandestine development of nuclear weapons. President Bill Clinton agreed eight years later to pay Pakistan $326.9 million and deliver another $140 million in goods to reimburse Pakistan for its advance payment on the nondelivered planes.

Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security

Kenneth N. Luongo and Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Naeem Salik

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s decision last month to declare a national emergency and suspend the constitution has ratcheted up concerns about the safety and security of that country’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistani officials have categorically rejected speculation that their grip on its nuclear assets is loose, with Musharraf stating that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “total custodial controls.”[1] Concerns remain, however, including in Western governments, that political volatility could erode the security situation.

Nonetheless, nuclear security in Pakistan has evolved substantially during the past nine years, and although improvements are still needed, both physical security and operational procedures are now stronger.

Following Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, the nuclear program emerged from the opaqueness that had surrounded it for the previous 25 years. Pakistani officials recognized that they had not been sufficiently transparent to alleviate concerns regarding proliferation threats from Pakistan and sought to convince the international community that they have taken adequate measures.

This led to the establishment of a central command-and-control system to manage nuclear infrastructure and strategic assets. The two most prominent creations were the National Command Authority (NCA), which began operation in March 1999, and the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which was established as the permanent secretariat of the NCA, although the formal announcement in this regard came in February 2000.

The creation of the NCA and the SPD also were important in changing the mindset inside the Pakistani nuclear structure, especially among individuals and facilities that previously had operated autonomously or with minimal oversight or auditing. The actions of Abdul Qadeer Khan from the late 1980s through the 1990s that resulted in the transfer of sensitive technologies to Iran and Libya, among other activities, are an example of the flaws in the previous oversight system.

Islamabad also developed a nuclear doctrine and communication systems that were integrated with intelligence and reconnaissance efforts and brought under the NCA to provide command and control during any crisis. Existing export control regulations were augmented, and safety and security procedures were reviewed and strengthened.

Concerns About Pakistan’s Nuclear Security

Pakistani officials are aware that they have not completely alleviated international worries regarding the security of its nuclear arsenal. Four key concerns continue to exist regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program, some more acute than others:

•  Nuclear assets or technology falling into the wrong hands. The Pakistani-Afghan border region is known to harbor al Qaeda and Taliban extremists, including possibly Osama Bin Laden. It is also suspected that some percentage of younger physicists and military personnel in Pakistan are more influenced by Islamic radicalism than previous generations. Two physicists from Pakistan with knowledge of the nuclear program, retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) scientists Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid, have admitted to speaking with Bin Laden, although they denied that any sensitive information was divulged. Also, the actions of Khan have been well documented. Steps have been taken to improve facility security and to screen personnel who work in the nuclear program more rigorously, but this is an ongoing challenge.

•  Islamist takeover as a result of elections or collapse of government. At the heart of the current crisis in Pakistan is the question of political elections. A serious question is whether Islamic extremist groups and Islamist political parties could gain power in Pakistan through the election process. According to the International Crisis Group, “Poll after poll has found that if fair and free elections were held under constitutional protections and monitored by national and international observers, the result would be a moderate, pro-Western, anti-extremist government in Pakistan.”[2] Extremist Islamist parties have never won more than 11 percent of the total votes in a Pakistani election.[3] Questions have also been raised about the reliability of the Pakistani military, given the ethnic diversity that exists within its ranks. The military in Pakistan has become more ethnically diverse in recent decades and contains Baluchis, Pashtuns, Punjabis, and Sindhis. This has not been a cause for concern about potential factionalism as the troops are professionally trained and have proven to be cohesive in the current political crisis.

•  Assassination attempt or elimination of key leaders leading to a loss of control of the nuclear program. Several attempts have been made on Musharraf’s life, all unsuccessful. The control system over nuclear assets, however, includes at least 10 senior officials, military and political, who are fully competent to assume responsibility for the nuclear weapons program. Ultimately, the political decision-makers control the budget and are responsible for the development and management of the nuclear program. Their actions are strongly guided by recommendations from the deep professional core of specialists that assist the political representatives with the management of the system.

•  Secondary proliferation. The discovery of the Khan covert nuclear technology proliferation network revealed serious security weaknesses, but most of his activities predated the establishment of formal command-and-control mechanisms. In the wake of that scandal, Pakistani officials declared that they would never again let anyone transfer nuclear technology to any country or entity, and actions have been taken to control individuals and facilities in the nuclear complex better.

Nuclear Weapons Assets Authority

Many of these concerns have been eased by the establishment of the NCA and the SPD.

The National Command Authority (NCA)

The NCA was established to create an institutionalized command-and-control mechanism over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs. Responsibilities of the NCA include employment and deployment aspects of the nuclear force, coordination of activities of Pakistan’s strategic organizations, arms control and disarmament issues, and oversight of the implementation of export controls and safety and security of nuclear installations and materials.

The NCA has a three-tiered structure with two committees, the Employment Control Committee and the Developmental Control Committee, constituting one tier; the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) another tier; and the three services’ strategic forces commands the final tier.

The Employment Control Committee is the NCA’s main policymaking organ. It functions as a political-military committee. It has the president as its chairman, the prime minister as the vice chairman, and the foreign minister as its deputy chairman.

The Development Control Committee is a military-technical committee that translates the policy decisions taken by the Employment Control Committee into force goals and oversees their achievement by the strategic organizations.

The Strategic Plans Division (SPD)

The SPD is tasked with daily management of Pakistan’s strategic assets, liaising with all strategic organizations, and oversight of the budgetary and administrative aspects of these organizations. The SPD also oversees a security division of 9,000-10,000 personnel who are responsible for securing all strategic infrastructure.

The SPD itself has four main directorates. The Operations and Planning Directorate, as the name suggests, carries out the operational planning. The CCCCIISR (Computerized Command, Control, Communications, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate) is responsible for developing and maintaining strategic command and communication links. The Strategic Weapons Development Directorate carries out liaison with the strategic organizations, scrutinizes their budgetary demands, and carries out audits of funds. The Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs directorate provides policy recommendations on all arms control and disarmament issues and participates in relevant bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation discussions.

There are some subsidiary organizations, such as the Consultancy Directorate, comprised of technical experts who provide technical advice on all construction projects, and the Strategic Forces Communications Planning (SFCD) cell, comprising communications experts to assist the CCCCIISR directorate. The Security Division is by far the largest component in terms of number of personnel, and its primary responsibility is to provide internal and external security to all sensitive installations and sites.

The Services’ Strategic Forces Commands

The third tier of command comprises the three services’ strategic forces commands. The primary responsibility of these commands is to exercise technical, training, and administrative control over the strategic delivery systems. The operational control, however, rests with the NCA. The army strategic force command possesses ballistic and cruise missiles, while the air force strategic command has the aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The naval strategic force command was the last to be established, and there is no public information as to whether they already have nuclear delivery systems and weapons or whether this capability is still evolving.

Security of Nuclear Weapons Assets and Facilities

The number of Pakistani nuclear weapons and the size of its fissile material stockpiles are not known in detail. It has been estimated that Pakistan has enough fissile material for about 60 weapons and has produced about 1.3 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and slightly more than one-half ton of plutonium.[4] A number of steps have been taken to protect both the weapons and components in storage as well as nuclear facilities and stockpiles.

Nuclear Weapons Security

Pakistan can deliver its nuclear weapons either by aircraft or by surface-to-surface missiles. The weapons are believed to be kept separate from their delivery systems, with the nuclear cores removed from their detonators.[5] Some estimates claim that the weapons themselves may be scattered, at up to six separate locations.[6] It may be difficult to ascertain the number of actual weapon-storage sites, but nuclear weapons certainly would be dispersed at multiple sites.

Despite their disassembled status, General Khalid Kidwai, head of the SPD, has stated that the weapons could be assembled very quickly.[7] Although not originally equipped with permissive action links (PALs), which require the entry of a code before the weapon can explode, each Pakistani warhead is now fitted with this code-lock device, according to Samar Mubarakmand, one of Pakistan’s top nuclear officials and scientists in an interview with a private TV network in 2004.[8] The employment of PALs was publicly confirmed in November 2006 by General Kidwai.[9] In addition, Pakistan follows a two-man rule to authenticate the codes that call for the release of the weapons. It may in fact be a three-man procedure in some cases. Such authentication processes are standard in advanced nuclear-weapon states.

Fissile Material Protection, Control, and Accounting

Since 1998, the SPD has been responsible for conducting external audits on all nuclear inventories and implementing regular and surprise inspections at facilities. Any nuclear or radioactive materials that enters into the safeguarded system comes under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors and tracks the movement of materials through the system until they are disposed.

Four of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, the Karachi and Chashma-1 power reactors and the Pakistan Atomic Research Reactors I and II in Rawalpindi, currently operate under IAEA safeguards. Several key nuclear weapons-related facilities are not subject to IAEA inspections. One is the Khan Research Laboratory, where weapons-grade uranium is produced. Other uranium-related facilities not under safeguards are the enrichment facilities believed to be at Golra, Sihala, and Gadwal. The Pakistani government has never officially acknowledged the existence of these facilities, and it does not provide them on the list of facilities exchanged with India on January 1 every year. Plutonium-related facilities not subject to safeguards include the Khushab research reactor, which is estimated to have a capacity of about 50 megawatts, sufficient to produce the plutonium necessary for a few nuclear weapons per year, and New Laboratories, a plutonium-reprocessing plant.[10]

Sensitive Facility Perimeter Security

Perimeter security is an integral element of all nuclear installations, civilian or military. Central responsibility for the security and physical protection of nuclear facilities resides with the SPD. There is presently a multilayered approach to perimeter security:

•  Inner perimeter. This has traditionally been the responsibility of the respective organizations, but the security in these facilities is now overseen by the elements of the coordinated security division of the SPD. This division is headed by a two-star general. These forces operate on a permanent basis and receive special training. Certain facilities are also protected by air defense elements and are designated as no-fly zones.

•  Outer perimeter. Fencing has recently been strengthened at facilities, and new technologies and electronic sensors, including closed-circuit television cameras, have been installed.

•  Third Tier. Counter-intelligence teams work on identifying external threats to facilities.

Transportation Security

Materials, such as spent nuclear fuel and high-activity radioactive sources are more difficult to defend from adversaries while in transit than when in fixed locations. The key concern in Pakistan is that armor-piercing weapons could penetrate transportation containers and release radioactive materials. Officials are therefore seeking to acquire additional specialized vehicles to prevent sabotage attempts. Pakistan ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) in October 2000 and is working to ensure it meets all the guidelines included in the convention, which covers domestic and international transportation of nuclear materials. Officials are also considering accession to the July 2005 amendments that are intended to strengthen the CPPNM.

Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)

The security clearance and screening processes of individuals for employment in the strategic organizations was a disjointed and fragmented process in the past that has now been consolidated through the institution of a personnel reliability program (PRP). This program covers all persons working in the sensitive areas of the nuclear system. The SPD has overall approval of key personnel and also retains information on all retired personnel. Since 2001, the personnel system has been strengthened and integrated into the nuclear establishment. Also, as the nuclear departments have grown, there is less of a sense of “family bonding” and more accountability. Any individual assigned to a strategic project or a sensitive task now undergoes a security clearance by Interservices Intelligence, Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, and the SPD. This is similar to the U.S. system, and lessons have been learned and adapted from the U.S. PRP. After an initial screening, there are periodic clearance rechecks every two years or when a person is transferred from one area of the program to another. Additionally, random checks can be carried out when required. This process includes complete background checks on family, educational career, political affiliations, and inclinations.

Challenges remain, however, in controlling nuclear expertise. Pakistan has re-employed scientists with potentially sensitive expertise in other areas of the nuclear program to continue to use their knowledge. Once the system becomes more saturated and more scientists leave the program, dealing with these alumni will become more of a problem. Pakistan has spoken with the United States on this issue and is exploring ideas for scientists who leave the program, including retraining them in other areas of expertise. In the United States, scientists have a permanent obligation regarding the protection of sensitive information regardless of whether they have left government employment. This issue needs to be addressed in greater detail in order to devise an effective and sustainable system for Pakistan.

Nuclear Energy and Radiation Security and Authority

The civilian elements of Pakistan’s nuclear program are overseen largely by the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) and the PAEC.

The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA)

The PNRA was established in January 2001. It is the national statutory nuclear authority responsible for regulating all aspects of radiation and nuclear energy. The PNRA issues licenses for imports and exports of radiological substances and controls, regulates, and supervises all matters relating to nuclear safety and radiation protection. Previously, the PAEC was responsible for overseeing nuclear safety and security. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the PNRA tightened its security and physical protection regime. The PNRA Ordinance of 2001 empowers the PNRA to “ensure that appropriate measures for physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials are taken by the licensee.” The federal government retains the authority to create legislation and regulations for imports and exports, and the PNRA is responsible for issuing licenses and conducting inspections of the licensees. Applications are received at the PNRA and reviewed at the Regional Nuclear Safety Directorates. The capacity and expertise of companies are evaluated, and licenses and no-objection certificates are only issued to qualifying companies. The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for issuing the import and export procedures through the chief controller of imports and exports. Customs authorities are then responsible for controlling the entry and exit of nuclear and radioactive materials.

In 2002 the PNRA streamlined nuclear disaster management by announcing a host of new measures for protecting “the plant and society from hazards that could be man-made or natural.” These measures included stricter quality control and monitoring for infrastructure and equipment, multiple physical barriers to uncontrolled release of radioactive materials, radiation protection and acceptance criteria, and disaster mitigation equipment and arrangements. The PNRA also addressed resource issues in nuclear facilities, including the division of responsibilities and quality of technical staff.

The PNRA has developed a five-year Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP) intended to enhance safety and security for all nuclear and radiation facilities and sources. The plan should ultimately boost the confidence of the nuclear energy sector and industry and the international community regarding compliance with international obligations. The key focus areas of the NSAP are:

•  Manage all sources under regulatory control, evaluate vulnerable facilities, and support their efforts. Inspections are held during use, storage, and transportation of any sources. The PNRA now conducts biannual assessments, and a follow-on process ensures that the findings are adequately implemented. The PNRA is also reassessing existing physical protection measures around facilities and providing guidance and training to strengthen these systems.

•   Establish a PNRA Nuclear Safety and Security Training Center. The center will focus on training programs related to nuclear security and physical protection of radioactive materials, emergency preparedness, detection equipment, recovery operations, and border monitoring. It will train PNRA staff and first responders, including officials from customs, border, local governments, and other law enforcement agencies. Thus far, the PNRA has been involved in training up to 200 staff.

•   Establish a National Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Center (NuSECC). NuSECC has been established in Islamabad to coordinate government agencies, including customs, border, local governments, and PNRA regional directorates, which are based in Karachi, Chashma, and Islamabad. Three additional directorates are being created, and inspectorates are yet to be established. There is currently one mobile lab, and officials wish to acquire an additional five to be stationed at the directorates and inspectorates. NuSECC will also work on a communications system and evaluate the possibility of continual tracking of high-activity sources during movement.

•  Locate and secure orphan radioactive sources. Orphan sources are defined as “sources not under regulatory control, either because they have never been under regulatory control or because they have been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or transferred without proper authorization.”[11] The PNRA has launched a campaign to locate all sources through physical and nonphysical searches and public outreach. Officials must locate, secure, and dispose of such sources to reduce the risk that they will be used to perpetrate malicious acts.

•  Provision of detection equipment at strategic points. Detection equipment is intended to help prevent illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and sources and to assist rapid response in the instance of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Equipment will be provided to local governments, emergency response personnel, customs, and rangers at selected border points. Training will also be provided on how to operate the equipment and verify information obtained.

The PNRA evaluates its credibility against a set of performance indicators. These include peer reviews conducted by the IAEA International Regulatory Review Team and the IAEA Radiation Safety Infrastructure Appraisal mission. The PNRA also draws on local universities and other external associates to assist with self-assessments and promote transparency. Results from appraisals are posted on the PNRA website. Reports submitted by Pakistan in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls for national measures to prevent nonstate actors from obtaining highly dangerous weapons, and Pakistan’s accession to international agreements, including the CPPNM, also demonstrate Pakistan’s commitment toward addressing the challenges posed by nuclear security.

Export Controls

In 2000 the SPD issued internal export control guidelines for all nuclear organizations. Before the issuance of these guidelines, organizations acted independently; and their transactions invariably caused suspicions and concerns, especially given the strategic nature of these entities. Institutions now have to follow established procedures for all exports, including seeking clearance from the SPD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Still, until 2004, Pakistan’s nuclear export control framework was largely governed by statutory regulatory orders, ordinances, and acts that supported regulations issued by the Ministry of Commerce. In the wake of the Khan scandal, many of these procedures and regulations were consolidated in 2004 in the Export Control Act, enacted to control the exports of goods, technologies, materials, and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and delivery systems.

The 2004 act also established controls over re-exports, transshipments, and transfers of goods and technologies that could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery or contribute to the threat of international terrorism.

The transfer of nuclear-related equipment and technology is not permitted except for disused radioactive sources, empty containers of these sources, equipment for repair or maintenance from these facilities, and samples for analysis or study from national nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

The jurisdiction of the act extends to the entire territory of Pakistan and to any offenses committed by a citizen of Pakistan or person in the service of Pakistan, a Pakistani national visiting or working abroad, a foreign national while on the territory of Pakistan, or any ground transport, ship, or aircraft registered in Pakistan. The control list for the act encompasses the lists and scope of export controls maintained by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group (for biological agents). The act also has a catchall clause. (A Chemical Weapons Convention ordinance had already been issued in 2000, which covered import/export requirements for the chemical industry.) The control list will be subject to periodic review, revision, and updating as and when required.

Exporters are required to maintain detailed inventories and records and to notify the relevant authority if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended to be used in connection with weapons. Offenders face tough penalties, which include imprisonment of up to 14 years, a fine of up to five million rupees, and the seizure of all assets and property.

To ensure the successful implementation and enforcement of the act, a Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) has been created. This division is housed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it is multidisciplinary and includes personnel from customs; the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and Defense; the Central Board of Revenue; the PAEC; the PNRA; and the SPD. The division will operate independently so that personnel will not face any conflicts of interest.

The SECDIV will formulate the necessary rules and regulations for its internal functioning and for the implementation of the act. It will develop structures for issuing licenses for all items as per the National Control List and develop an outreach program for industry and the media. There will also be an oversight board, headed by the foreign secretary and consisting of high-level officials who will meet periodically (possibly twice a year) to oversee implementation of the act. The procedures for the oversight board have not yet been established.

Radiological Source Security

The PNRA is tasked with protecting radiation workers, the public, and the environment against accidental or malicious acts involving nuclear materials and facilities that may result in exposure to the harmful effects of radiation. The security of radioactive sources is ensured through periodic physical verification and regulatory inspections. In recent years, the PNRA has conducted numerous, nationwide inspections of nuclear and radiation facilities, identifying weaknesses and recommending countermeasures. The PNRA has also launched an orphan-sources initiative through a public awareness and education campaign.

The PNRA continuously reviews and updates safety and security measures according to recommendations and guidance received from the IAEA. They are also committed to protecting investment in the nuclear industry by specifying stringent design and operational safety targets to help eliminate the probability of major economic loss due to an accident, incident, or malicious act.

The total number of radiological sources in Pakistan is not clear, but 65 percent of the sources are claimed to be stored and 34 percent of sources are in use. Of the amount in use, 49 percent is under the PAEC, of which 26 percent is for medical use and 74 percent for nonmedical use, and 51 percent is non-PAEC, of which 12 percent is for medical use and 88 percent is for nonmedical use. The amount of category one, two, and three radioactive materials is claimed to be limited, and once its useful life is over, it must be returned to the government. For example, in hospitals, once a source has ended its effective life, the licensee must release the source to the PNRA, which in turn hands it over to the PAEC, the only government agency equipped to dispose of such materials. The PNRA would be required at some stage to develop its own waste disposal site because the disposal of such sources is its primary responsibility.

Pakistan has been working to ensure accurate tracking of all radioactive sources imported into the country. It is very difficult to secure all of Pakistan’s borders against illicit trafficking, especially because there are more than 2,000 miles of open borders with few legal crossing points. Yet, Pakistan has taken action to control the threat of radiological terrorism better. For example, the 2004 Export Control Act includes restrictions and penalties for transshipments. Pakistan has signed the Container Security Initiative, which provided for detectors in Karachi. Officials are engaged in discussions regarding possibly joining the Megaports Initiative. Pakistan also participates in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, which allows countries to share information on incidents involving theft, loss, or pilferage of radiological materials.

Officials claim that Pakistan is working at “optimum speed” to cooperate with the U.S. Department of Energy on export and border control programs. Useful assistance for Pakistan to help meet this challenge would include providing metal detectors for border crossing points and mobile labs to identify any suspicious substances that are intercepted. Pakistani officials note that anyone bringing sources into Pakistan would find it difficult to sell such materials because there are only a small number of end users and they are known to officials, thus making it easier to identify any new sources that appear on the market.

Cooperation With the International Community

The United States and Pakistan initiated a bilateral dialogue on improving nuclear security in the wake of a visit by Secretary of State Colin Powell in October 2001. The results of the discussions have been very closely held, though not strictly secret, as references to the cooperation have been made in Western and Pakistani news media, in other expert publications, and in briefings to Pakistani parliamentarians.[12] The discussions have been conducted at the expert level and on a nonsensitive and nonintrusive basis, with Pakistan insisting on clear redlines. The scope reportedly includes export and commodity controls, PRPs, nuclear material protection, control and accounting, transportation security, sharing of best practices, training of security personnel, and the provision of equipment. According to the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the cooperation has been “in the nature of rudimentary training and ideas,” and the equipment provided for tracing nuclear materials is of a “basic nature.”[13]

This cooperation does not extend to the “safety” of nuclear weapons because of U.S. legal limitations as well as Pakistan’s insistence on nonintrusiveness and maintaining secrecy related to its nuclear weapons and their locations. Another very sensitive issue is the suggestion that the United States is engaging in contingency planning to “secure” or relocate Pakistani nuclear assets in case of a breakdown of order.[14] This is not part of the U.S.-Pakistani nuclear security dialogue. Pakistan would be very wary of continuing cooperation with the United States on nuclear security improvements should this issue become an official priority. It could raise the question of whether the United States has given up on the objective it had after the 1998 nuclear test of rolling back Pakistan’s nuclear capability. It also would raise questions about the sincerity of statements by knowledgeable current and former officials about the improved security and safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The IAEA is an important avenue for short- and long-term nuclear-security support for the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan. Pakistan is a member of the IAEA, and the IAEA has already made substantive contributions to their nuclear security efforts. Yet, although the IAEA plays an important role in verifying the implementation of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA is more than just an extension of the NPT. The IAEA was created by a statute more than a decade before the existence of the NPT. That statute states that any country can request the agency to apply safeguards to their nuclear activities, and the IAEA has already done so for four existing Pakistani nuclear reactors as well as to the Chashma-2 power plant, which is under construction.

Additionally, the PNRA, with assistance from the IAEA, has arranged a number of workshops in Pakistan to train personnel and first responders since 2005. Training is provided for many personnel, including customs officials, and is also now aimed at senior administration officials. The PNRA is currently planning additional workshops for 2008. The IAEA statute therefore provides a potentially useful tool for further cooperation in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The political crisis in Pakistan during the fall of 2007 has riveted attention on the security of the nuclear arsenal and infrastructure in that country. The main concerns are nuclear leakage and seizure of nuclear assets by radical groups or individuals.

Yet, Pakistan has significantly evolved its technical and procedural nuclear security operations since its 1998 nuclear tests. It also has willingly engaged with international partners in an attempt to further strengthen its security and control processes. The major changes over the past nine years include the creation of the NCA, the establishment of the SPD, the development of a nuclear doctrine, the improvement of export controls, the integration of the command and control system, and the employment of permissive action links on nuclear weapons.

Although the concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear security during the current political crisis raised questions about the adequacy of the system, there have not been any examples to date of systemic failure. In fact, the weapons and facilities have been secure throughout the crisis, providing a measure of assurance that the last decade’s improvements are working.

These actions should build confidence in the international community that the Pakistani government is very serious about nuclear security and reducing the possibilities for proliferation. The evolution of this security system will need to continue well into the future, but a substantial foundation now exists on which these future improvements can be built.

 


Kenneth N. Luongo is executive director of the Partnership for Global Security and a former senior adviser on nonproliferation policy to the secretary of energy. Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik is currently the South Asia Studies Visiting Scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He previously served as director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs at the Strategic Plans Division of Pakistan’s National Command Authority. This article is based in part on the first of a series of workshops on the evolution, status, and future of nuclear security in Pakistan that the authors organized in the spring of 2007. The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of Isabelle Williams in drafting the results of the workshop.


ENDNOTES

1. “Pakistan Nukes Under Control: Musharraf,” Agence France-Presse, November 13, 2007.

2. Thomas R. Pickering, Carla Hills, and Morton Abramowitz, “The Answer in Pakistan,” The Washington Post, November 14, 2007.

3. Trudy Rubin, “Worldview: Musharraf’s Dangerous Aim,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 7, 2007.

4. International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Material Report 2007,” October 10, 2007, pp. 8, 10, 14.

5. David Sanger, “So, What About Those Nukes?” The New York Times, November 11, 2007.

6. David Albright, “Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Complex,” October 2001 (report commissioned and sponsored by the Stanley Foundation for the 42nd Strategy for Peace, Warrenton, VA).

7. Landau Network, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,” found at http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf (mission carried out December 3-7, 2001).

8. Samar Mubarakmand recently retired as chairman of the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM), which was created in 2001 as an umbrella organization to coordinate and oversee the activities of several independent entities, such as the National Development Complex, the main missile production facility. The interview was aired by Geo TV in April 2004 in the wake of Khan affair. He was a member technical in the PAEC before taking over as NESCOM chairman and was leader of the team that conducted Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998.

9. Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, “Pakistan’s Evolution as a Nuclear Weapons State,” Address to the Center for Contemporary Conflict, November 1, 2006.

10. Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002).

11. Jamshed Azim Hashmi and Muhammad Khaliq, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security Action Plan” Presentation to the Workshop on Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security, April 30, 2007, found at www.ransac.org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=hashmi_pnra.pdf.

12. Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “New York Times Story on Nuclear Cooperation,” No. 281/2007, Islamabad, November 19, 2007, found at www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2007/Nov/PR_281_07.htm; Kenneth N. Luongo and Isabelle Williams, “Seizing the Moment: Using the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal to Improve Fissile Material,” Arms Control Today, May 2006; Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, RL34248, November 14, 2007; “Interview With Ambassador Robert Oakley,” Nightly News with Tom Brokaw, MSNBC, February 9, 2004; “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, November 18, 2007.

13. Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “New York Times Story on Nuclear Cooperation.”

14. Frederick W. Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon, “Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem,” The New York Times, November 18, 2007.

Negotiations Elude Disarmament Body Again

Wade Boese

Despite its claim to be the “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community,” the 65-member Conference on Disarmament (CD) recently concluded its ninth consecutive year without any treaty negotiations. A majority of members failed to persuade China, Iran, and Pakistan to support the latest proposal to revive work at the moribund conference, but many pledged to continue their efforts next year.

Since completing the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, conference members, particularly the United States and China, have clashed over negotiating priorities. Washington, Tokyo, and European capitals back the conclusion of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) to end the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes. The Geneva-based conference briefly held FMCT negotiations in 1998, but they did not produce any results, and the talks did not carry over to the following year.

Beijing and Moscow, in contrast, support negotiating a new agreement on restricting future weapons deployments in outer space, while non-nuclear-weapon states lobby for action on nuclear disarmament and assurances that they will not be attacked with nuclear arms.

After 1998, members have debated various compromises to satisfy all of the competing demands. None has won the consensus required to officially start work.

Members this year focused on a March 23 initiative as the best hope to end the negotiating dry spell. That proposal calls for FMCT negotiations and less formal talks on outer space, nuclear disarmament, and assurances for states without nuclear weapons. (See ACT, April 2007. )

Many countries quickly threw their support to the package or, like France and the United States, signaled they would not block it. Russia postponed until next year submission of a draft treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, reportedly to avoid bogging down deliberations over the March initiative.

Still, some states raised reservations or objections to the March proposal. A few of those countries, such as India, eventually and grudgingly accepted the package; but China, Iran, and Pakistan could not be swayed before the 2007 conference’s Sept. 14 close.

China, as well as Iran, contends the package does not ensure enough “substantive” work on issues other than an FMCT. Although Beijing in August 2003 dropped its insistence on outer space negotiations, it apparently wants reassurance that consenting to outer space discussions under the current proposal would not foreclose the possibility of future negotiations.

Some Western officials familiar with the conference speculate that Beijing is using the outer space issue to avoid FMCT negotiations. China is the only recognized nuclear-weapon state—the other four are France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—that has not publicly declared a moratorium on fissile material production for weapons. A senior U.S. official Sept. 20 told Arms Control Today that “if China decides negotiations on an FMCT are in its interests, Iran and Pakistan may reevaluate their position.”

Several CD diplomats interviewed in September by Arms Control Today, however, suggested that Pakistan presents the biggest hurdle to future adoption of the March package. Masood Khan, Pakistan’s ambassador to the conference, said in a Sept. 13 speech that the four core issues should receive “equal and balanced treatment.” That position is unacceptable to several countries, particularly France and the United States.

Islamabad also charges that the fissile material treaty part of the package is inadequate. The proposal states that FMCT negotiations should be conducted “without any preconditions.”

Pakistan maintains that a prescribed goal of any fissile material treaty negotiations should be an accord that is verifiable, an objective initially endorsed by the entire conference in 1995 but rejected by the Bush administration in 2004. (See ACT, September 2004. ) Administration officials say governments would waste money and time on creating verification measures that ultimately would burden lawful states and fail to deter cheaters.

The U.S. position has little support, yet most CD members, unlike Pakistan, have relented on proclaiming “verifiability” as a fixed goal of negotiations to accommodate the United States. The senior U.S. official said that Washington understands that not all governments accept the U.S. position at “face value” and therefore it is “prepared to make [its] case in the course of negotiations if others should propose a [verification] regime.” 

Pakistan also wants a fissile material treaty negotiation mandate to explicitly note that countries may explore measures on existing stockpiles of fissile material instead of focusing narrowly on halting fissile material production for weapons. Pakistan has long favored such an approach because it does not want a future FMCT to have the effect of freezing existing fissile material imbalances between it and India.

Indeed, Islamabad is pointing to a two-year-old Bush administration initiative to increase U.S. and global civilian nuclear trade with New Delhi as jeopardizing Pakistani security and justifying its hard-lines on a fissile material treaty. Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which includes President General Pervez Musharraf and Pakistan’s foreign affairs and defense ministers, warned in an Aug. 2 press release that the U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation deal would “enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons.”

Washington contends the deal is solely about aiding India’s nuclear energy growth, while critics charge it also will benefit India’s military complex by enabling New Delhi to devote more of its limited domestic resources to building nuclear bombs. (See ACT, September 2007. ) Islamabad argues that it should have been offered a similar arrangement.

Despite the stiff resistance of Pakistan to the March proposal, the CD diplomats interviewed by Arms Control Today see it as the likely starting point for discussions when the conference reconvenes Jan. 21, 2008. Sergio Duarte, the UN high representative for disarmament affairs, exhorted the conference Aug. 21 that it “stands tantalizingly one short step away from resolving its long-standing impasse.”

Some ambassadors ending their tenures at the conference used farewell speeches to express their frustration with the conference’s failure to move sooner. Speaking Aug. 16, departing Canadian Ambassador Paul Meyer argued that “[i]f the CD was a business, it would have been declared insolvent long ago and shut down,” while Italian Ambassador Carlo Trezza lamented Sept. 13 that conference diplomacy amounted to “negotiation on negotiations.”

Swedish Ambassador Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier complained sharply Aug. 30 of witnessing “an anemic stalemate with delegations resorting to recitals of ceremonious mantras, covering up the traces of their own passivity by useless finger-pointing and blame games, hiding behind the commas of the rules of procedure and shamelessly abusing the consensus rule to abort any attempt to seriously tackle difficult or sensitive issues.” Nonetheless, she concluded by saying that she left the conference “with hope and expectations.”

Then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Stephen Rademaker implied last year to the conference that if it did not initiate FMCT negotiations soon, the United States would reconsider its CD participation. The senior U.S. official declined to say if the United States would scale back its presence next year, simply saying that “Americans believe in results, not endless process games.” The United States is scheduled to be one of six countries to occupy the body’s rotating presidency next year.

U.S. Renews Fighter Exports to Pakistan

Zachary Ginsburg

The United States recently delivered two used F-16B jets to Pakistan and announced plans to donate another two dozen. In a deal announced last September, the United States is also set to sell Pakistan 18 new F-16C/D fighters for delivery in 2010 and upgrades for its current fleet of 34 F-16 combat aircraft.

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson said at a July 10 transfer ceremony at Pakistan’s Sargodha Air Force Base that the planes are “symbolic of our commitment to assist Pakistan in improving its ability to secure its territory.” Pakistani Air Chief Marshal Tanvir Mehmood Ahmed has told news agencies that he expects 10 more used jets to be delivered by the end of 2008.

A Department of Defense spokesperson told Arms Control Today July 25 that Pakistan will not pay for the used, older model F-16s, whose flying conditions vary, but will assume the costs for refurbishing and modernizing them. The U.S. government cleared Islamabad last year for about $2.1 billion of new weapons, avionics, engines, and other equipment for F-16 fighters. (See ACT, November 2006. )

In late 2005, the United States donated two F-16A fighters to Pakistan in the first transfer of fighter aircraft to that state since 1990. That year, President George H.W. Bush blocked arms sales to Pakistan because his administration would not certify under U.S. law that Islamabad did not possess a nuclear device. Seeking Pakistan’s allegiance after the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush waived the prohibitions. (See ACT, October 2001. )

Pakistan is supposed to begin receiving the 18 new, top-of-the-line F-16C/Ds in three years and has the option to purchase 18 more. Under U.S. law, Congress was notified of the possible sales, and the House International Relations Committee subsequently convened a hearing in July 2006 in which members blasted the Bush administration for not sufficiently consulting them about the deal. Legislators did not block the transaction—that would require a two-thirds supermajority—but some strongly rebuked the administration. (See ACT, September 2006. )

At the hearing, lawmakers such as Chairman Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) and ranking member Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Calif.), who is currently chairman, expressed concerns about the potential for unauthorized dissemination of sensitive technologies and for modification of the F-16s to carry nuclear weapons. Broad speculation exists that Pakistan modified previously delivered U.S. F-16s for nuclear delivery missions.

Administration officials assured Congress that the planes would be subject to more strict security measures by Pakistan and more robust U.S. oversight than in previous transfers between the two countries. “We’ve put into the deal that [Pakistan] must comply with the approved security plans before we’ll release any systems in a sale,” then-Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs John Hillen testified. These “security plans,” according to Hillen, would include “a very enhanced end-use monitoring program [and] semiannual inventories of all F-16 aircraft, equipment, and munitions, including related technical data.”

In recent interviews, neither U.S. nor Pakistani officials would provide any further details to Arms Control Today on the security arrangements.

President Bush signed into law Aug. 3 legislation that could block future F-16 transfers. The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act prohibits the sale of military equipment to Pakistan if it is not “committed to eliminating the Taliban” within its borders. However, the determination of whether Pakistan is progressing aggressively enough against the Taliban will be left up to the president, who has said he views Pakistan as a key ally.

Pakistan’s neighbor and rival, India, has publicly worried about the U.S. F-16 transfers. The Pentagon, however, noted in June 2006 that the exports “would not significantly reduce India’s quantitative or qualitative military advantage.”

Still, New Delhi is exploring the purchase of U.S. combat aircraft to fill an Indian procurement goal of 126 planes. India is eyeing both F-16s and newer F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, but it may instead opt for Russian MiG-35s.

U.S., Pakistan Seal Combat Aircraft Deal

Wade Boese

Pakistan’s air force will receive a major makeover courtesy of the United States. Under two recently finalized agreements and a pending deal, Washington will upgrade Islamabad’s fleet of existing U.S. combat aircraft and deliver up to 62 new and used fighter jets.

On Sept. 30, Pakistan signed one agreement for 18 new F-16C/D fighters with the option to buy 18 more and another contract for the modernization of 34 previously purchased U.S. F-16A/B aircraft. A third deal signed that day covers bombs and missiles, including AIM-120C missiles, which enable pilots to fire at foes before they are within visual range. Earlier cost estimates put the full package at $5 billion.

Also in the works is a transfer of 26 used U.S. F-16s to Pakistan. A Department of State official informed Arms Control Today Oct. 19 that the Pentagon is still selecting the planes.

The transactions culminate a five-year reconciliation between the United States and Pakistan after a long, bitter dispute linked to Islamabad’s nuclear arms endeavors.

During the 1980s when the United States partnered with Pakistan to combat Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Washington turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s suspected nuclear weapons program while providing conventional weapons to the country. The year after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States halted arms supplies, including F-16s, because President George H. W. Bush did not certify to Congress that Islamabad did not have a nuclear bomb.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks led to a U.S. re-evaluation of relations with Pakistan as Washington sought allies to help depose Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. President George W. Bush promptly waived U.S. arms sanctions on Pakistan, including those levied for its May 1998 nuclear tests. (See ACT, October 2001.) In March 2005, the United States announced its willingness to resume exports of F-16s, which can be modified to deliver nuclear arms.

Given that complicated history, Pakistan’s close ties to China, and the 2004 exposure of a sprawling nuclear black market run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, the United States insisted that Pakistan adopt extraordinary security precautions for the planes after receipt. These include enhanced U.S. access. The first new fighters are scheduled for delivery in 2009, although the used planes could be shipped sooner.

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Cleared for U.S. Arms Buys

Wade Boese

Key lawmakers this summer slammed the Bush administration for its handling of up to $5 billion in proposed combat aircraft sales to Pakistan, but Congress still let the weapons deals proceed. Legislators also recently assented to $9.7 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

The 1976 Arms Export Control Act requires Congress to receive notice of proposed arms sales exceeding $14 million that do not involve Australia, Japan, New Zealand, or NATO members, all of which have a higher reporting threshold and a shorter congressional review period. In all other cases, lawmakers have 30 calendar days to block a notified deal by passing a joint resolution of disapproval.

On June 28, the Pentagon detailed plans to provide Pakistan with 36 F-16C/D combat aircraft, an assortment of F-16 engines and upgrade kits, and thousands of bombs and missiles, including 500 advanced air-to-air missiles. Describing Pakistan as a “vital ally,” the Pentagon stated the arms would be used in fighting terrorists, such as al Qaeda, and “would not significantly reduce India’s quantitative or qualitative military advantage” in the region. With India, the Bush administration is pursuing closer military ties, including offering F-16s, as well as an enhanced civil nuclear trade relationship.

The United States and Pakistan have tangled for years over sales of F-16s, which can be built or modified to deliver nuclear weapons. The United States provided Pakistan with 40 F-16s during the 1980s but then halted deliveries in 1990 over Islamabad’s covert nuclear weapons program, which Pakistan unveiled to the world with nuclear tests in May 1998.

The United States resisted Pakistan’s pressure to end the F-16 freeze until President George W. Bush relented in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan. The two countries started negotiating possible sale options in 2005, and the Pentagon transferred two older-model F-16s to Pakistan in December. (See ACT, January/February 2006.)

Still, the administration’s formal announcement to deliver three dozen new F-16s to Pakistan sparked an uproar from House International Relations Committee members, who convened a July 20 hearing to upbraid a senior administration official about the deal. Although some committee members faulted aspects of the sale, much of the outcry stemmed from the administration’s failure to follow traditional procedures.

Specifically, the administration did not give the 20-day advance notice typical for formal arms sales notifications. This period is intended to allow reservations about a particular sale to be expressed and worked out privately to avoid public quarrels.

At the hearing, Committee Chairman Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) charged that neglecting the pre-notification process constituted a “deliberate and, we believe, wholly inappropriate maneuver by the State Department to diminish the Congress’ lawful oversight of arms sales.” Consequently, he said, “long-standing congressional concerns about the potential for technology diversion remain.” The Department of State administers arms sales policies and licensing, while the Pentagon helps negotiate and implement U.S. government weapons transfers to foreign governments.

Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs John Hillen defended the administration’s approach at the hearing. He contended the administration had taken “unprecedented” steps to keep Congress appraised and would require Pakistan to enact stringent measures to prevent unauthorized individuals from gaining access to or stealing U.S. technology. “The security plan greatly exceeds United States Air Force standards for our own security of these weapons systems,” Hillen claimed.

Ranking panel member Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) severely rebuked Hillen, charging that “the centrifugal force of this spin threatens to fling the facts right out the window.” He blasted the administration’s behavior as a “colossal mistake” and an “arrogant usurpation of congressional authority.”

Hyde and Lantos introduced legislation the same day that, among other things, would have codified the 20-day pre-notification practice. A congressional staffer told Arms Control Today Aug. 15 that the legislation is no longer under consideration because the administration provided assurances that the Pakistani case “was not a precedent and would not happen again.”

Some legislators objected to the sale for reasons other than procedure. Republican Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (Calif.) argued that F-16s were not the proper weapons for Pakistan because the planes are suited to fighting “sophisticated air forces, not the Taliban, not radical Islam,” and could be converted to deliver nuclear weapons.

Hillen responded that Pakistan had employed F-16s in “hundreds of missions in the global war on terror.” He further said that the F-16s to be delivered to Pakistan “will not be nuclear capable” and that Islamabad has “given no indications that they want to [modify F-16s to deliver nuclear weapons].” The Arms Export Control Act prohibits any U.S. arms recipient from using imported weapons “for purposes other than those for which furnished.”

Whether Pakistan configured previously imported U.S. F-16s for nuclear missions is uncertain. Political-military affairs bureau spokesperson Jason Greer declined to answer Arms Control Today questions on the subject. A July 6 report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), which conducts studies for lawmakers, noted that “the 32 F-16s that Pakistan already fields are believed to be nuclear capable.”

Democratic Reps. Gary Ackerman (N.Y.) and Edward Markey (Mass.) proposed separate legislation to block the sale, but neither effort garnered much support.

Markey’s bill sought to tie the F-16 sales to Pakistan halting construction of a new heavy-water reactor, which was exposed publicly July 24 by the Washington-based nongovernmental Institute for Science and International Security. Once operational, the reactor could produce enough material to build up to 50 nuclear weapons a year, the organization reported. Administration officials, who claimed Washington knew of the project for “some time,” said they are urging Pakistan not to use the reactor for military purposes, but Markey argued on the House floor July 26 that U.S.-supplied F-16s might someday be carrying nuclear bombs made possible by this uncompleted facility.

Although nearly double the value of the sales to Pakistan, the proposed weapons deals with Saudi Arabia announced in July did not provoke any notable congressional reaction. Riyadh is now cleared to acquire 24 UH-60L Black Hawk helicopters, 58 M1A2S Abrams tanks, 724 light-armored vehicles, 1,700 night vision goggles, and thousands of radio systems. The sales also include upgrades for 315 M1A2 tanks and 12 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters already in the Saudi arsenal.

Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Saudi Arabia has amassed significant quantities of foreign weaponry. An August 2005 CRS report identified Saudi Arabia as receiving nearly $55 billion in arms imports from 1997 to 2004, ranking it as the top arms importer for that period among developing world countries. This total far surpassed the second-highest tally of $13 billion for China.

 

Indo-Pakistani Talks Advance

William Huntington

Pakistan and India are nearing final agreement on a proposal to reduce the risk of nuclear accidents or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. According to a joint statement produced at the most recent round of talks on nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Islamabad April 25-26, the two nations “held detailed discussions on the draft text” of the proposal presented by India and “agreed to work towards its finalization,” possibly as early as July.

Subsequently, on April 27 India and Pakistan turned to discussing conventional CBMs and agreed to seek new accords on a number of issues, including finalizing a set of rules governing those sections of their border not in dispute. These rules would address such concerns as the setback distance for construction of facilities on either side of the border. Although most of the boundary between India and Pakistan is recognized as a legitimate international border by both sides, certain areas, most notably Jammu and Kashmir, are disputed.

Further, the two countries agreed to enhance the existing agreement barring the development of new defensive works along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, establish rules for holding meetings between sector-level military commanders, and finalize an agreement on the expedient return of “inadvertent line crosser(s).”

In addition, Pakistan presented India with a draft text on the prevention of incidents at sea.

Nuclear negotiators are set to meet again soon. Pakistani Additional Secretary for Foreign Affairs Tariq Osman Haider, who led the Pakistani delegation, was quoted by Reuters April 26 as saying that “finalization of the [nuclear] agreement would take place during the next round of foreign secretary-level talks in New Delhi in July.”

However, even as CBM talks continue, Pakistan’s National Command Authority in May said it will not only maintain its missile program but further improve its strategic capability. Islamabad claimed it was reacting in part to the pending U.S.-Indian civil nuclear deal and its potential effect on regional stability.

Four rounds of nuclear CBM discussions have taken place since 2004 as part of the “composite dialogue” framework set up between the nations to resolve contentious issues. There have been three rounds of similar conventional talks.

As recently as 2002, India and Pakistan deployed significant numbers of troops along their border during a confrontation stemming from Indian accusations that Pakistan had aided terrorist attacks on its territory. (See ACT, April 2002.)

 

 

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