Login/Logout

*
*  

"[Arms Control Today] has become indispensable! I think it is the combination of the critical period we are in and the quality of the product. I found myself reading the May issue from cover to cover."

– Frank von Hippel
Co-Director of Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
June 1, 2018
Daryl Kimball

Pompeo Must Seize the Diplomatic Opportunity with North Korea

Sections:

Body: 


The stage is set for U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to jump-start the stalled denuclearization and peace negotiations with North Korea. As outlined in the Sept. 19 North-South Pyongyang Summit Declaration, Kim Jong-un has said he is willing to permanently dismantle the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, as the United States takes corresponding measures, such as supporting a joint political declaration on the end of the Korean War.

The Yongbyon complex is North Korea's major nuclear weapons production site. It includes a 5-megawatt research reactor that produces spent fuel; a reprocessing plant that separates weapons-usable plutonium; and a uranium enrichment facility, among other facilities.

A verifiable shutdown of Yongbyon would make it harder for North Korea to further expand its fissile stockpile which could be enough for 16 to 60 nuclear warheads, create momentum for further action-for-action steps, and help buy time for the long and difficult negotiations on further steps on the road toward denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula.

As the foreign ministers of Japan, Australia, the European Union, and dozens of other states suggested in a joint statement last week, North Korea should take another denuclearization step: signing and ratifying the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and allowing experts from the CTBT Organization to visit the Punggye-ri test site to confirm its closure.

A joint end of war declaration would ease tensions, build confidence and in no way adversely affect the very strong U.S.-South Korean political and defense alliance, or the ability of U.S. forces in South Korea to deter and defend from any North Korean military provocation.

Hesitation on the part of either side at this point could collapse the fragile diplomatic opportunity that currently exists.

For further information, see the Arms Control Association’s Oct. 3 edition of the “North Korea Denuclearization Digest” available online at https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2018-10-03/inaugural-issue-north-korea-denuclearization-digest-october-3-2018

Description: 

Hesitation on the part of either side at this point could collapse the fragile diplomatic opportunity that currently exists.

Country Resources:

North-South Summit Eases Korean Tensions


October 2018
By Daryl G. Kimball

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, following talks in Pyongyang, reiterated their shared desire to see the Korean peninsula “turned into a land of peace that is free of nuclear weapons and nuclear threats.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (R) and South Korean President Moon Jae-in walk together during a visit to Samjiyon guesthouse on September 20, during their summit held in Pyongyang. (Photo Pyeongyang Press Corps/Pool/Getty Images)In their Sept. 19 joint statement, the two leaders agreed on the need to take tangible steps toward resolving the nuclear issue, stating that “substantial progress toward this end must be made in a prompt manner.”

Moon’s diplomacy puts additional pressure on North Korea and the United States to resolve their diplomatic impasse over the terms for Kim giving up his nuclear arsenal on a short timetable. At the same time, Moon’s active efforts to lower tensions and expand cooperation contrasts with U.S. President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, including sanctions intended to squeeze the Kim regime economically.

To advance steps intended to remove “the danger of war” and move toward “a fundamental resolution” of hostile relations, the defense ministers of North and South Korea signed a document committing the two sides to a series of military confidence-building measures. Further high-level bilateral talks are planned, including a visit to Seoul by Kim this year for what would be the first visit to the South by a North Korean leader.

Moon met Sept. 24 with Trump at the UN to discuss next steps with North Korea. Moon, speaking through an interpreter, flattered Trump by saying “thanks to your bold decision and new approach, we’re in the process of solving a problem that no one has been able to solve in the decades past.”

The Kim-Moon meeting on Sept. 18–20, officially the third inter-Korean summit, follows the June summit between Trump and Kim in Singapore, at which U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Sept. 20 that Kim agreed to “rapid denuclearization” by 2021. The exact nature of that understanding has been unclear, and a follow-on visit to Pyongyang by Pompeo, planned for August, was abruptly canceled by Trump, who cited a lack of progress on denuclearization.

Although the Pyongyang summit builds on the agreements and commitments made through the prior Moon-Kim summit held in Panmunjom in April, it is not yet clear whether the latest meeting will lead to tangible progress between the United States and North Korea on denuclearization and peace on the peninsula.

Aside from an offer to allow “experts from relevant countries” to observe the dismantling of a missile testing facility at Dongchang-ri, North Korea did not commit to any new denuclearization steps. Before the Singapore summit, North Korea voluntarily announced a moratorium on nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests and destroyed tunnels at a site used for nuclear testing. Since that summit, Pyongyang has begun dismantling facilities used for rocket and missile engine tests and launches at Dongchang-ri.

In the Korean summit statement, Kim said North Korea is willing to take additional measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, “as the United States takes corresponding measures in accordance with the spirit” of the Kim-Trump statement in Singapore. That statement linked progress on denuclearization to further “efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime,” and North Korea has since called on the United States to agree to a joint political declaration on the end of the Korean War.

The verifiable decommissioning of Yongbyon, the site of North Korea’s main nuclear weapons material production complex, would be a major breakthrough. The facilities there, including a five-megawatt research reactor, a spent fuel reprocessing facility, and a uranium-enrichment facility, are still being used to produce bomb-grade nuclear material. North Korea is believed to operate at least one other uranium-enrichment facility.

Ahead of his visit to Pyongyang, Moon had expressed concern about the stalled U.S.-North Korean talks. North Korea “is willing to denuclearize and therefore willing to discard existing nuclear weapons,” and the United States “is willing to end hostile relations with the North and provide security guarantees,” Moon said Sept. 13. “But there is a blockage as both sides are demanding each other to act first,” he said, adding that he thinks they “will be able to find a point of compromise.”

In postsummit remarks to the news media Sept. 20, Moon said that Kim “expressed his wish that he wanted to complete denuclearization quickly and focus on economic development.” Kim said he hoped that Pompeo would visit North Korea soon and that a second summit with Trump would take place in the near future to advance the denuclearization process, according to Moon.

In his Sept. 20 remarks, Moon urged Trump to pursue a second summit with Kim, and he urged all parties to declare the end of the war as soon as possible. A peace treaty would be sealed, as well as normalization of North Korean-U.S. relations, after the North achieves “complete denuclearization,” he added.

Trump, in a Sept. 20 tweet, called the results in Pyongyang “very exciting!” Pompeo issued a formal statement Sept. 21 praising the outcome and offering to resume the bilateral dialogue based on North Korean commitments.

“This will mark the beginning of negotiations to transform U.S.-[North Korean] relations through the process of rapid denuclearization…to be completed by January 2021, as committed by Chairman Kim, and to construct a lasting and stable peace regime” on the Korean peninsula.

Trump administration officials have not explained how they define “rapid denuclearization,” and it remains unclear whether such steps can be achieved in the next 27 months. It also does not appear that there is a common understanding between North Korea and the United States on what denuclearization would involve.

With Pompeo now planning to travel to Pyongyang in October, Trump eased previous demands for "rapid" denuclearization, assuming North Korea doesn't resume nuclear and missile tests. Trump said he doesn't want to get into a "time game," and the United States will maintain sanctions. "If it takes two years, three years, or five months, it doesn’t matter," he said.

Even as U.S. officials say they are open to further talks, the Trump administration is seeking to tighten implementation of international sanctions on North Korea. Pompeo chaired a foreign ministerial-level session of the UN Security Council on Sept. 27 focused on North Korea.

A UN panel of experts monitoring sanctions compliance reported that there is ample evidence that North Korea is still managing to sell arms illicitly, secure prohibited fuel shipments, and engage in financial dealings to help sustain its economy.

 

The terms and timing for denuclearization remain uncertain.

The Case for a U.S. No-First-Use Policy


October 2018
By Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director

Stanley Kubrick’s classic 1964 film “Dr. Strangelove” delivers an eerily accurate depiction of the absurd logic and catastrophic risks of U.S. and Russian Cold War nuclear deterrence strategy, but for one key detail: President Merkin Muffley was wrong when he said, “It is the avowed policy of our country never to strike first with nuclear weapons.” But it should be.

A scene from Stanley Kubrick's classic 1964 film “Dr. Strangelove.” (Photo credit: Sony/Columbia Pictures)Fortunately, the nuclear “doomsday machine” has not yet been unleashed. Arms control agreements have led to significant, verifiable reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the two countries have ceased nuclear testing, and they have tightened checks on nuclear command and control.

But the potential for a catastrophic nuclear war remains. The core elements of Cold War-era U.S. nuclear strategy are largely the same, including the option to use nuclear weapons first and the maintenance of prompt-launch policies that still give the president unchecked authority to order the use of nuclear weapons.

Today, the United States and Russia deploy massive strategic nuclear arsenals consisting of up to 1,550 warheads on each side, as allowed under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. These numbers greatly exceed what it would take to decimate the other side and are far larger than required to deter a nuclear attack.

Worse still, each side maintains the capability to fire a significant portion of its land- and sea-based missiles promptly and retains plans to launch these forces, particularly land-based missiles, under attack to guard against a “disarming” first strike. U.S. and Russian leaders also still reserve the option to use nuclear weapons first.

As a result, President Donald Trump, whom Defense Secretary Jim Mattis reportedly described as having the intellect of a “fifth- or sixth-grader,” has the authority to order the launch of some 800 nuclear warheads within about 15 minutes, with hundreds more weapons remaining in reserve. No other military or civilian official must approve the order. Congress currently has no say in the matter.

Continuing to vest such destructive power in the hands of one person is undemocratic, irresponsible, unnecessary and increasingly untenable. Cavalier and reckless statements from Trump about nuclear weapons use only underscore the folly of vesting such unchecked authority in one person.

Making matters worse, the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review expands the range of contingencies and options for potential nuclear use and proposes the development of “more-usable” low-yield nuclear weapons in order to give the president the flexibility to respond quickly in a crisis, including by using nuclear weapons first in response to a non-nuclear attack.

The reality is that a launch-under-attack policy is unnecessary because U.S. nuclear forces and command-and-control systems could withstand even a massive attack. Given the size, accuracy, and diversity of U.S. forces, the remaining nuclear force would be more than sufficient to deliver a devastating blow to any nuclear aggressor.

In addition, keeping strategic forces on launch-under-attack mode increases the risk of miscalculation and misjudgment. Throughout the history of the nuclear age, there have been several incidents in which false signals of an attack have prompted U.S. and Russian officials to consider, in the dead of the night and under the pressure of time, launching nuclear weapons in retaliation. No U.S. leader should be put in a situation that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons based on false information.

Retaining the option to use nuclear weapons first is fraught with unnecessary peril. Given the overwhelming conventional military edge of the United States and its allies, there is no plausible circumstance that could justify legally, morally, or militarily the use of nuclear weapons to deal with a non-nuclear threat. Even in the event of a conventional military conflict with Russia, China, or North Korea, the first use of nuclear weapons would be counterproductive because it likely would trigger an uncontrollable, potentially suicidal all-out nuclear exchange.

Some in Washington and Brussels believe Moscow might use or threaten to use nuclear weapons first to try to deter NATO from pressing its conventional military advantage in a conflict. Clearly, a nuclear war cannot be won and should not be initiated by either side. The threat of first use, however, cannot overcome perceived or real conventional force imbalances and are not an effective substitute for prudently maintaining U.S. and NATO conventional forces in Europe.

As the major nuclear powers race to develop new nuclear capabilities and advanced conventional-strike weapons and consider using cybercapabilities to pre-empt nuclear attacks by adversaries, the risk that one leader may be tempted to use nuclear weapons first during a crisis likely will grow. A shift to a no-first-use posture, on the other hand, would increase strategic stability.

Although the Trump administration is not going to rethink nuclear old-think, leaders in Congress and the next administration must re-examine and revise outdated nuclear launch policies in ways that reduce the nuclear danger.

Shifting to a formal policy stating that the United States will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack would be a significant and smart step in the right direction.

 

 

Stanley Kubrick’s classic 1964 film “Dr. Strangelove” delivers an eerily accurate depiction of the absurd logic and catastrophic risks of U.S. and Russian Cold War nuclear deterrence strategy, but for one key detail: President Merkin Muffley was wrong when he said, “It is the avowed policy of our country never to strike first with nuclear weapons.” But it should be.

Pages

Subscribe to RSS - Daryl Kimball