Volume 3, Issue 13, September 18, 2012
After years of denying any need to respond to international concerns about suspected nuclear weaponization work, Iran finally engaged in discussions earlier this year with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on a plan to address its alleged weapons-related activities. After months of on-and-off talks, however, Iran has still refused to agree to the IAEA's proposal for a "structured approach" to that investigation.
In response to the impasse and to findings of the agency's latest quarterly report on Iran's nuclear program, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a resolution 31-1-3 on Sept. 13 that faults Iran for failing to address UN Security Council demands to suspend its uranium enrichment activities and to cooperate with the IAEA's investigation about its suspected weapons-related experiments.
IAEA-Iran Talks
Earlier this year, senior IAEA officials met with Iranian officials in Tehran to discuss a way forward on the issue. Since those initial January and February meetings, however, Iran has refused to allow the IAEA to begin with an initial step of visiting the Parchin military site, which is suspected to have been involved in warhead-related high explosives testing prior to 2004.
Subsequent discussions between the agency and Iranian officials have not yielded progress on the "structured approach." IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano called the lack of progress "frustrating." Iran also appears to have systematically demolished the suspected facility at the Parchin military site.
At the most recent round of discussions on August 24, Iran's Ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, said that Iran would agree to a framework if the IAEA shared documents with Tehran outlining the evidence of the alleged weapons-related activities. He also said the "structured approach" must take into account Iran's national security considerations.
What Is the "Structured Approach" and What Is In Dispute?
In a February 20, 2012 IAEA document, the agency identifies the kinds of actions Iran needs to take to address suspected weapons-related activities and ensure that there is no ongoing warhead development work. The specific topics that the IAEA wants to address were laid out extensively in the agency's November 2011 report, including:
- High-explosives experiments with nuclear weapons implications;
- Neutron initiation and detonator development;
- Work to fit a nuclear warhead on a missile, along with arming, firing and fusing mechanisms;
- And Iranian procurement activities related to its alleged warhead work.
Iran's Ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, distributed a version of the Feb. 20 document to members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that contains Tehran's suggested revisions to the IAEA's proposed work plan. In distributing the document to NAM states, Iran was apparently trying to demonstrate its how close the two side are to an agreement and how reasonable Iran is being.
A close reading of the document, however, reveals that Iran is seeking to place unreasonable limits on the agency's ability to carry out its job.
While any country would have a legitimate need to protect information that is not relevant to the IAEA's investigation, Iran's counter-proposals to the Agency's proposed work plan would place undue limitations on the agency's work that will make it more difficult to determine whether Iran has carried out or still maintains a warhead development program.
Any access that Iran is willing to provide is a step in the right direction and should be encouraged, but the international community should make clear that token measures will only drag out the investigation rather than close the case. Three issues in particular stand out in the document that Soltanieh circulated.
The IAEA Should Avoid a "One and Done" Approach
Iran's responses to the agency show that it would like to prevent the IAEA from adequately following up on any information it obtains during the course of its investigation. Iran has suggested removing a clause stating, "Follow up actions that are required of Iran to facilitate the agency's conclusions regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program will be identified as this process continues."
Iran also inserted language specifying that, after steps are taken on each issue the agency wishes to address, that issue "will be considered concluded."
Iran's proposed approach risks that, even if the agency does not receive sufficient information from Iran during its initial investigation, Tehran will try to assert that particular aspects of the case are closed and refuse to answer any follow-up questions. Iran's suggestions would preclude any efforts to go back to topics that the agency previously investigated should new information arise. Such limitations do not match up with what Soltanieh describes in his communication to the NAM states as a "proactive and cooperative approach."
Strictly Sequencing the Issues Investigated Only Delays the Process
The Feb. 20 document says that steps to address the IAEA's questions should be completed in time for the agency's June 2012 meeting, "if possible." Such a quick timeframe would be welcome, particularly as tensions over the issue increase.
But Iran's opposition to potentially addressing some of the IAEA's questions in parallel unnecessarily delays the process. If Iran's nuclear program is purely peaceful, there is little reason to drag out the investigation in such a way and rejecting any parallel investigations does nothing to address legitimate concerns about protecting access to information unrelated to Iran's nuclear program.
More importantly, because many of the activities that the IAEA is investigating appear to be interlinked, it would be natural for the agency to seek to address multiple issues at once if information it obtains is relevant to them.
Verifying the Completeness of Iran's Declarations
Section C of the Feb. 20 document details steps the IAEA requests Iran take to ensure that it has a firm grasp of all the nuclear-related activities being carried out in the country. These steps are hardly new. Most of them either stem from provisions of Iran's safeguards agreement that Tehran unilaterally suspended (a requirement to provide early design information of nuclear facilities under so-called Code 3.1), or the agency's Additional Protocol (allowing access to undeclared sites).
Unlike the rest of the document--which is focused on Iran's alleged warhead work--the actions requested in Section C are directly related to ensuring that Iran's known nuclear activities are not being diverted for possible weapons use. Achieving agreement on these steps would provide some of the most vital assurances that Iran's nuclear activities will not be misused. However, the appearance of bracketed text suggests that this section may be subject to extensive negotiation. Iran has refused to provide many of these measures for several years.
The Importance of Transparency
The November 2011 IAEA report and accompanying annexes make a convincing case that Iran was indeed involved in a comprehensive nuclear weapons program prior to 2004, some elements of which have likely continued. Iran's full and complete cooperation with the agency would likely bear this out, demonstrating that Iran's claims that it has pursued a peaceful nuclear program all along have been false.
Tehran does not appear to be ready to either make such an admission, or to be confronted with more conclusive evidence of such activities. Iran's leaders should understand that their failure to address the agency's concerns only undermines Tehran's claim that it is simply pursuing a peaceful nuclear program and it undermines the credibility of the Supreme Leader's fatwa against nuclear weapons.
The international community should also make clear that, while additional transparency on Iran's part is positive, half measures will not alleviate suspicions. The agency has a job to do, and it should continue to pursue of answers to questions raised over the course of its investigation.
At the same time, the leadership in Tehran is unlikely to decide that it can fully address the IAEA's concerns and verifiably end any ongoing warhead work absent a diplomatic process aimed at producing a comprehensive resolution to the nuclear impasse. Unfortunately, the talks between Iran and the P5+1 nations--China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States--have stalled out.
Following the U.S. election in November, both sides must be prepared to overcome the gaps in their respective positions and resume the effort on the basis of new and more creative proposals.
In the course of a renewed diplomatic dialogue, Iran must be convinced of two things: 1) that continuing down a path toward nuclear weapons will only result in increasing isolation and diminished security; and 2) that genuine and meaningful cooperation will be met by an easing of pressure, rather than an escalation. Iran should not be at risk of being punished for coming clean.
Answering the IAEA's questions will be a critical step en route to a broader, comprehensive arrangement. A deal that that allows Iran's to enrich uranium only to normal reactor-grade levels, limits its enrichment capacity and stockpile to realistic civilian purposes, and grants the IAEA more extensive access and monitoring, in exchange for a phased lifting of international sanctions related to its nuclear activities is still within reach.
Note: This Issue Brief is an updated version of ACA's March 2, 2012 Issue Brief written by Peter Crail.
###
The Arms Control Association (ACA) is an independent, membership-based organization dedicated to providing information and practical policy solutions to address the dangers posed by the world's most dangerous weapons. ACA publishes the monthly journal, Arms Control Today.