NOTES
1. James R. Clapper, “Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 31, 2012, p. 6, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf.
2. Ibid.
3. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment,” February 3, 2011.
4. Abbas Milani, “The Shah’s Atomic Dreams,” Foreign Policy, December 29, 2010.
5. IISS, “Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities.”
6. Ibid.
7. U.S. Department of Defense, “Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” April 2010.
8. U.S. Department of Defense, “Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” April 2012.
9. “Iran Will Never Seek Nuclear Weapons: Leader,” Press TV, February 22, 2012.
10. International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director-General,” GOV/2014/28, May 23, 2014; David Albright et al., “ISIS Analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,” ISIS Report, May 23, 2014, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/ISIS_Analysis_IAEA_Safeguards_Report_23May2014-finaldoc.pdf.
11. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director-General,” GOV/2014/28, May 23, 2014.
12. The United States originally supplied Iran with the Tehran Research Reactor in 1967. At that time, the reactor operated using highly enriched uranium fuel enriched to more than 90 percent uranium-235. In 1993, conversion of the reactor to use fuel targets enriched to just under 20 percent was completed. Argentina facilitated the conversion and provided 115 kilograms of 20 percent-enriched uranium for the reactor. IISS, “Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities.”
13. William C. Witt et al., “Iran’s Evolving Breakout Potential,” ISIS Report, October 8, 2012, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Irans_Evolving_Breakout_Potential.pdf.
14. David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond, “Critique of Gregory Jones’s Breakout Estimates at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP),” ISIS Report, September 20, 2011, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Critique_of_Greg_Joness_analysis_20Sept2011.pdf.
15. William C. Witt et al., “Iran’s Evolving Breakout Potential.”
16. Robert J. Einhorn, “Iran’s Heavy-Water Reactor: A Plutonium Bomb Factory,” Arms Control Association, November 9, 2006.
17. IISS, “Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities.”
18. Ibid.
19. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011 (hereinafter IAEA 2011 Iran report).
20. Ibid.
21. Tabassum Zakaria and Mark Hosenball, “Special Report: Intel Shows Iran Nuclear Threat Not Imminent,” Reuters, March 23, 2012.
22. IAEA 2011 Iran report.
23. Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2011.”
24. “AEIO Chief: Iran Entitled to Enrich Uranium to 90% Grade,” Fars News Agency, April 14, 2014.
25. Assuming a minimum construction time of five to six years.
26. Robert J. Einhorn, “Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran: Requirements for a Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement,” Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series, No. 10 (March 2014).
27. Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Hossein Mousavian, and Frank von Hippel, “Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-State Strategy,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2014.
28. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 1, 2011.
29. Ali Akbar Salehi, interview, Press TV, February 5, 2014.
30. Ali Ahmad et al., “A Win-Win Solution for Iran’s Arak Reactor,” Arms Control Today, April 2014.
31. David Albright, Oli Heinonen, and Andrea Stricker, “Five Compromises to Avoid in a Comprehensive Agreement with Iran,” by David Albright, Oli Heinonen, and Andrea Stricker,” ISIS Report, June 3, 2014.
32. Ibid.
33. IISS, “Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities.”
34. For more ideas on phasing out sanctions relief, see International Crisis Group, “Iran and the P5+1: Solving the Nuclear Rubik’s Cube,” Middle East Report N 152, May 9, 2014.
35. For further discussion, see Kelsey Davenport, “What the UN Security Council Resolutions Say (and Don’t Say) About Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Arms Control Now, December 4, 2013, http://armscontrolnow.org/2013/12/04/what-the-un-security-council-resolutions-say-and-dont-say-about-irans-nuclear-program/.
36. UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “UK Explanation of Vote and E3+3 Statement on UN Security Council Resolution 1929 on Iran,” June 9, 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-explanation-of-vote-and-e3-3-statement-on-the-security-council-resolution-1929-on-iran-9-june-2010 (statement by Mark Lyall Grant).
37. Wendy Sherman, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 4, 2014.
38. “Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran,” The Iran Project, July 2012, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/IranReport_091112_FINAL.pdf.
39. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” August 22, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.
40. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Senate Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing on Worldwide Threats,” January 31, 2012.
41. Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008): 117.