United States Sends Mixed Signals on Iran

March 2025
By Kelsey Davenport

U.S. President Donald Trump announced a return to maximum pressure on Iran but reiterated his support for reaching a nuclear deal. The move to ratchet up sanctions sparked a backlash in Tehran, prompting Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to caution against negotiations with Washington.

U.S. President Donald Trump signs a national security presidential memorandum at the White House on Feb. 4 “reimposing maximum pressure on Iran.” (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

In a Feb. 4 presidential memorandum, Trump said that the United States will deny Iran “all paths to a nuclear weapon” and directed the Treasury Department to “impose maximum economic pressure on the Iranian regime.” The pressure campaign will include “driving Iran’s export of oil to zero,” the memorandum said.

Trump told reporters Feb. 4 that the memorandum is “very tough on Iran” but he was “torn” and “unhappy” about signing it. He expressed a preference for reaching a nuclear deal but did not provide any details about the possible terms of an agreement.

In response to the return to U.S. maximum pressure, Khamenei said Feb. 7 that negotiations with the United States are “not intelligent, wise, or honorable.” There should be “no negotiations with such a government,” he said. The comments appear to signal a shift away from Khamenei’s previous support for talks (see ACT, October 2024).

Khamenei did not expressly forbid President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration from engaging in talks, suggesting that there may still be space for diplomacy in Iran.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said during a Feb. 8 conference in Tehran that Iran still wants to see sanctions lifted but emphasized that negotiations cannot take place “under the maximum pressure policy.”

After signing the memorandum, Trump met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu said that the United States and Israel share the goal of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran and if maximum pressure can achieve that goal, “so be it.”

Netanyahu’s visit came amid reports that Israel is still considering military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program.

The Washington Post reported Feb. 12 that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency warned that Israel is likely to attempt a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in the first six months of 2025. According to the source referenced in the report, the agency assessed that Israeli strikes would set back Iran’s activities only by months and would incentivize Iran to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels. The attack scenarios would require U.S. support for Israeli operations, the intelligence report said.

Trump has refused to commit the United States to supporting an Israeli attack on Iran. Following the Netanyahu meeting, Trump posted on Truth Social that “Reports that the United States, working in conjunction with Israel, is going to blow Iran to smithereens ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED.” Trump said in the Feb. 5 post that he prefers a “Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement.”

Despite Trump’s comments, Netanyahu expressed confidence that with “unflinching support” from the United States “we can and will finish the job” of neutralizing the threat posed by Iran. Netanyahu made the comment during a Feb. 17 press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Meanwhile, Pezeshkian suggested that Iran will rebuild its nuclear programs if Israel attempts a military strike. He said Feb. 13 that Iran’s enemies can “hit the buildings … but you cannot hit those who build it.”

Despite Trump’s stated support for a nuclear deal, it is not clear who in his administration is the point person for talks with Iran.

Rafael Mariano Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said Feb. 14 that “we are running out of time” to reach a nuclear deal with Iran. He said talks can be concluded quickly and the IAEA “has all the information and elements” but it is up to the states to determine what is necessary in an agreement.

In addition to the risk of military strikes derailing the prospects for diplomacy, it is likely that the Western European states-parties to the 2015 nuclear deal (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) will begin the process of reimposing 
UN sanctions on Iran by mid-summer if there is no progress on a deal.

The process uses a veto-proof mechanism in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal, to reimpose UN sanctions and restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program. That mechanism, known as “snapback,” expires in October 2025.

The Trump administration, having withdrawn the United States from the nuclear deal during its first term, cannot trigger the snapback (see ACT, September 2020).

Trump’s Feb. 4 memorandum called for the U.S. ambassador to the UN to work with U.S. allies to “complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.”

Iran has threatened to withdraw from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if UN sanctions are snapped back.