“[My time at ACA] prepared me very well for the position that I took following that with the State Department, where I then implemented and helped to implement many of the policies that we tried to promote.”
UAE-U.S. Nuclear Pact Gets Green Light
The congressional review period for the U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ended Oct. 17 without action by Congress to block or add conditions to the pact. The expiration of the review period paves the way for the governments to exchange diplomatic notes to bring the agreement into force.
Department of State spokesman Ian Kelly said Oct. 22 that the U.S. government has completed all the required internal procedures for entry into force. In an e-mail to Arms Control Today, a spokeswoman for the UAE embassy in Washington said that as of the end of October, the agreement was “still going through [a] pro forma process” in the UAE.
Under U.S. law, Congress does not have to vote in favor of such agreements, which are a prerequisite for U.S. nuclear trade with other countries. However, Congress must be given 90 days of so-called continuous session to review the agreements.
Although there was some criticism of the accord, particularly in the House, there was no sustained effort during the 90 days to block or modify it.
The agreement has gone through several versions under the Bush and Obama administrations. (See ACT, June 2009.) The latest version, which was submitted to Congress in May, contains what the Obama administration describes as “a legally binding obligation” on the UAE to refrain from uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.
Under Article 7 of the pact, the UAE “shall not possess sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or otherwise engage in activities within its territory for, or relating to, the enrichment or reprocessing of material.” The agreement defines a “sensitive nuclear facility” as “any facility designed or used primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, heavy water production, or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium.”
The agreement also says that the UAE must have an additional protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement in force before the United States will issue licenses for nuclear exports to the UAE. The protocol gives the agency increased inspection rights; the UAE has signed but not ratified its protocol.
Obama administration officials and congressional supporters of the agreement have highlighted those provisions, which have not appeared in previous U.S. nuclear agreements. The UAE agreement has frequently been cited by supporters as a potential model for other countries, particularly in the Middle East. At an Oct. 7 hearing on the agreement by the Senate Foreign Relations Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs Subcommittee, Vann H. Van Diepen, acting assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, said that “the idea that we want to have the best possible controls on enrichment and reprocessing technology will absolutely be part of the mix” in negotiating agreements with other countries but that “once you start getting into specific negotiations with specific countries in specific contexts, you may not be able to skin the cat exactly the same way each time.”
Critics of the agreement have pointed to the UAE’s history of serving as a transshipment point for illicit exports. At the hearing, Van Diepen said, “While the UAE still has work to do, we believe that it is taking the necessary steps to implement an effective export control system.”
At the hearing, Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) said he had “strong concerns about expanding the use of nuclear energy, particularly in this volatile region, before we have an international regime in place to ensure that countries will not export enrichment and reprocessing technologies.” He asked Van Diepen when the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was expected to approve an agreement to tighten restrictions on exports relating to enrichment and reprocessing.
NSG members have drafted a document that sets out specific criteria that countries must meet in order to be eligible to receive enrichment or reprocessing technology exports. However, some members of the NSG, which operates by consensus, have not supported the “clean text,” as it is known. The Group of Eight countries agreed at their summit in July to adopt the policies in the NSG text. (See ACT, September 2009.)
Van Diepen said he was “optimistic” that the NSG “ultimately” will approve the agreement. He said “a couple of countries” have raised objections dealing with a “kind of broad sovereignty principle at very high levels” and that “it’s going to take us some time to work around” the objections.
He added that there have been “very, very, very few” enrichment and reprocessing exports approved under the current NSG rules.
In a congressionally required report, the Obama administration said Oct. 8 that, at NSG meetings in June, two countries continued to raise “strong policy-level conceptual concerns” and that “[s]everal” other NSG members “continued to have concerns about limitations on the right of non-enrichment technology holders to receive enabling technology.” The administration said it is “working closely” with other governments to reach consensus in time for a November meeting of the NSG’s consultative group.