SPECIAL SECTION: New START II and ABM Documents

The following special section provides the full text of select documents. In addition to the two START II documents presented below, the United States and Russia issued a Joint Agreed Statement that will allow the United States to "download," or remove, warheads from its Minuteman III ICBMs any time before December 31, 2007. Also not included in this section is an agreement signed by the five SCC parties on regulations governing the operation of the commission.

Protocol To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Russian Federation On Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms Of January 3, 1993

The United States of America and the Russian Federation,

Reaffirming their commitment to the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Desiring to enhance the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of January 3, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows: Article I

1. In paragraph 1 of Article I of the Treaty the words "seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty" shall be replaced by the words "no later than December 31, 2004."

2. In paragraph 3 of Article I of the Treaty the words "January 1, 2003" shall be replaced by the words "December 31, 2007."

3. In paragraph 5 of Article I of the Treaty the words "seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty" shall be replaced by the words "December 31, 2004."

4. Paragraph 6 of Article I of the Treaty shall be formulated in the following way:

"The Parties may conclude an agreement on a program of assistance for the purpose of facilitating implementation of the provisions of this Article, including for the purpose of accelerating such implementation." Article II

In paragraph 1, paragraph 6, and paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty the words "January 1, 2003" shall be replaced in each case by the words "December 31, 2007." Article III

1. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall remain in force for the duration of the Treaty.

DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Letter From Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov To Secretary of State Madeleine Albright On Early Deactivation¹

Dear Madame Secretary:

On behalf of the Government of the Russia Federation, in connection with the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of January 3, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose that agreement be concluded between our Governments on deactivation of certain strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Under this agreement our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty, the Russian Federation and the United States of America shall deactivate, by December 31, 2003, all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under the Treaty, by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles or taking other jointly agreed steps.

Immediately upon entry into force of the Treaty, experts of the Parties will begin work simultaneously both on the understandings concerning methods of deactivation as well as parameters of an appropriate program of assistance of the United States of America in the implementation of the deactivation mentioned above. Practical steps to implement deactivation will be undertaken on the basis of these understandings.

Taking into account the supreme national interests of the country, the Russian Federation proceeds from the understanding that well in advance of the above deactivation deadline the START II Treaty will be achieved and enter into force.

This letter together with your response shall constitute agreement between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United STates of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Please accept, Madame Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration. Memorandum Of Understanding Relating To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

The United States of America, and the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to for purposes of this Memorandum as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Successor States,

Recognizing the importance of preserving the viability of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, with the aim of maintaining strategic stability,

Recognizing the changes in the political situation resulting from the establishment of new independent states on the territory of the former USSR,

Have, in connection with the Treaty, agreed as follows: Article I

The United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, upon entry into force of this Memorandum, shall constitute the Parties to the Treaty. Article II

The USSR Successor States shall assume the rights and obligations of the former USSR under the Treaty and its associated documents. Article III

Each USSR Successor State shall implement the provisions of the Treaty with regard to its territory and with regard to its activities, wherever such activities are carried out by that State, independently or in cooperation with any other State. Article IV

For purposes of Treaty implementation:

(a) the term "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" shall mean the USSR Successor States;

(b) the terms "national territory" and "territory of its country" when used to refer to the former USSR shall mean the combined national territories of the USSR Successor States, and the term "periphery of its national territory" when used to refer to the former USSR shall mean the periphery of the combined national territories of those States; and

(c) the term "capital" when used to refer to the capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article III of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, shall continue to mean the city of Moscow. Article V

A USSR Successor State or USSR Successor States may continue to use any facility that is subject to the provisions of the Treaty and that is currently located on the territory of any State that is not a Party to the Treaty, with the consent of such State, and provided that the use of such facility shall remain consistent with the provisions of the Treaty. Article VI

The USSR Successor States shall collectively be limited at any one time to a single anti ballistic missile (ABM) system deployment area and to a total of no more than fifteen ABM launchers at ABM test ranges, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and its associated documents, including the Protocols of July 3, 1974. Article VII

The obligations contained in Article IX of the Treaty and Agreed Statement "G" Regarding the Treaty shall not apply to transfers between or among the USSR Successor States. Article VIII

The Standing Consultative Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, shall function in the manner provided for by the Treaty and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, as well as by the Regulations of the Commission, which shall reflect the multilateral character of the Treaty and the equal legal status of the Parties in reaching decisions in the Commission. Article IX

1. This Memorandum shall be subject to ratification or approval by the signatory States, in accordance with the constitutional procedures of those States.

2. The functions of the depositary of this Memorandum shall be exercised by the Government of the United States of America.

3. This Memorandum shall enter into force on the date when the Governments of all the signatory States have deposited instruments of ratification or approval of this Memorandum and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

4. Each State that has ratified or approved this Memorandum shall also be bound by the provisions of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972.

DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

First Agreed Statement Relating To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

In connection with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, reached agreement on the following:

1. Land based, sea based, and air based interceptor missiles, interceptor missile launchers, and radars, other than anti ballistic missile (ABM) interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, respectively, shall be deemed, within the meaning of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty, not to have been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and not to have been tested in an ABM mode, if, in the course of testing them separately or in a system:

(a) the velocity of the interceptor missile does not exceed 3 km/sec over any part of its flight trajectory;

(b) the velocity of the ballistic target missile does not exceed 5 km/sec over any part of its flight trajectory; and

(c) the range of the ballistic target missile does not exceed 3,500 kilometers. 2. The Parties have additionally agreed on reciprocal implementation of the confidence building measures set forth in the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997.

3. This Agreed Statement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972.

DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Common Understandings Related To The First Agreed Statement Of September 26, 1997, Relating To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

I

The term "interceptor missile," as used in the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, shall refer to any missile subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty if such a missile:

(a) has been developed by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or

(b) has been declared by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or

(c) has been tested by a Party even once with the use of a ballistic target missile. With respect to subparagraphs (a), (b), or (c), such a missile shall be considered an interceptor missile in all its launches. II

The provisions of paragraph 1 of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, do not supersede or amend any provision of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, and do not alter the meaning of the term "tested in an ABM mode" as that term is used in the Treaty, including the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978.

III

The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of an interceptor missile as well as the velocity of a ballistic target missile shall be determined in an earth centered coordinate system fixed in relation to the Earth.

IV

The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of space based interceptor missiles shall be considered to exceed 3 km/sec.

These Common Understandings shall be considered an attachment to the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, and shall constitute an integral part thereof.

Second Agreed Statement Relating To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

In connection with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty,

Expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security,

Emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms,

Recognizing the fundamental significance of the Treaty for the above objectives,

Recognizing the necessity for effective systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles,

Considering it their common task to preserve the Treaty, prevent its circumvention and enhance its viability,

Relying on the following principles that have served as a basis for reaching this agreement:

the Parties are committed to the Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability;

the Parties must have the option to establish and to deploy effective systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, and such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the Treaty;

systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles may be deployed by each Party which will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another Party and which will not be tested to give such systems that capability;

systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles will not be deployed by the Parties for use against each other; and

the scale of deployment¾in number and geographic scope¾of systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles by any Party will be consistent with programs for ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles confronting that Party;

Have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles with interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory, hereinafter referred to as systems covered by this Agreed Statement, reached agreement on the following:

1. Each Party undertakes that, in the course of testing, separately or in a system, land based, sea based, and air based interceptor missiles, interceptor missile launchers, and radars, of systems covered by this Agreed Statement, which are not anti ballistic missile (ABM) interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, respectively:

(a) the velocity of the ballistic target missile will not exceed 5 km/sec over any part of its flight trajectory; and

(b) the range of the ballistic target missile will not exceed 3,500 kilometers. 2. Each Party, in order to preclude the possibility of ambiguous situations or misunderstandings related to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy space based interceptor missiles to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, or space based components based on other physical principles, whether or not part of a system, that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

3. In order to enhance confidence in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties shall implement the provisions of the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, hereinafter referred to as the Confidence Building Measures Agreement, with respect to systems covered by this Agreed Statement and not subject to the Confidence Building Measures Agreement on the date of its entry into force. Each such system shall become subject to the provisions of the Confidence Building Measures Agreement no later than 180 days in advance of the planned date of the first launch of an interceptor missile of that system. All information provided for in the Confidence Building Measures Agreement shall initially be provided no later than 30 days after such a system becomes subject to the provisions of the Confidence Building Measures Agreement.

4. In order to ensure the viability of the Treaty as technologies related to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles evolve, and in accordance with Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties undertake to hold consultations and discuss, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, questions or concerns that any Party may have regarding activities involving systems covered by this Agreed Statement, including questions and concerns related to the implementation of the provisions of this Agreed Statement.

5. This Agreed Statement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972.

DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Common Understandings Related To The Second Agreed Statement Of September 26, 1997, Relating To The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems Of May 26, 1972

I

The term "interceptor missile," as used in the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, shall refer to any missile subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty if such a missile:

(a) has been developed by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or

(b) has been declared by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or

(c) has been tested by a Party even once with the use of a ballistic target missile. ith respect to subparagraphs (a), (b), or (c), such a missile shall be considered an interceptor missile in all its launches.

II

The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of an interceptor missile as well as the velocity of a ballistic target missile shall be determined in an earth centered coordinate system fixed in relation to the Earth.

III

The Parties have agreed that for the purposes of the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of space based interceptor missiles shall be considered to exceed 3 km/sec.

IV

For systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles with interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory, that become subject to the Confidence Building Measures Agreement in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the Parties understand that, in connection with the provisions of paragraph 2(b) of Section IV of the Confidence Building Measures Agreement, detailed information on such systems shall be provided in a form and scope as agreed upon by the Parties.

These Common Understandings shall be considered an attachment to the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, and shall constitute an integral part thereof.

Agreement On Confidence Building Measures Related To Systems To Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

The States that have signed this Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to promote reciprocal openness, greater trust between the Parties, and the preservation of strategic stability,

Declaring their intention to implement, on a reciprocal basis, confidence building measures with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles,

Have agreed as follows:

I. General Provisions

1. Systems subject to this Agreement shall be: for the United States of America—the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System and the Navy Theater Wide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Program, known to the other Parties by the same names; for the Russian Federation—the S 300V system, known to the United States of America as the SA 12 system; for the Republic of Belarus—the S 300V system, known to the United States of America as the SA 12 system; for Ukraine—the S 300V system, known to the United States of America as the SA 12 system; and other systems as agreed upon by the Parties in the future.

2. The Parties shall conduct an initial exchange of information and notifications, as provided for in this Agreement, no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Agreement, reflecting the status as of the date of its entry into force, and update this information annually, unless otherwise agreed. Information shall be updated reflecting the status as of January 1 of each year and provided no later than April 1 of each year.

II. Notifications

1. Each Party shall provide notifications to the other Parties of test ranges and other test areas where launches of interceptor missiles of systems subject to this Agreement will take place. Notifications of test ranges and other test areas shall include the names of ranges (test areas) and their locations. Such notifications shall be provided either within 30 days after entry into force of this Agreement, or no later than 90 days in advance of the first launch of an interceptor missile of a system subject to this Agreement at each test range (test area).

2. Each Party shall provide notification to the other Parties of each launch of an interceptor missile of systems subject to this Agreement, if during that launch a ballistic target missile is used. In this connection:

(a) an interceptor missile launch notification shall specify the name of the test range (test area) where the interceptor missile launch will take place; the type (designation) of the interceptor missile; the planned date of the interceptor missile launch; the planned launch point of the interceptor missile (geographic coordinates; for air based systems the geographic coordinates of the projection of the planned launch point of the interceptor missile onto the Earth's surface shall be specified); the planned launch point of the ballistic target missile (geographic coordinates);

(b) each interceptor missile launch notification shall be provided no later than 10 days in advance of the planned date of the interceptor missile launch and shall be effective for seven days beginning with the planned date of that launch; and

(c) if the launch of the interceptor missile will not occur or has not occurred within the specified 7 day period, the Party that planned to carry out the launch of the interceptor missile shall provide a notification thereof no later than 24 hours after the expiration of the 7 day period. Such a notification shall state that the interceptor missile launch has not occurred and shall either specify a new launch date, which will establish the beginning of a new 7 day period, or state that a notification of a new launch date will be made in accordance with the procedure specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph.

III. Demonstrations of Systems and Observations of Tests

Any Party may on a voluntary basis arrange, for any other Party or Parties, a demonstration of its systems or their components subject to this Agreement or an observation of their tests. In each specific case, the participating Parties shall agree in advance on the purpose of, and the arrangements for, such demonstrations and observations.

IV. Assurances

Each Party shall provide assurances that it will not deploy systems subject to this Agreement in numbers and locations so that these systems could pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another Party. The measures used to provide such assurances shall include:

1. Each Party shall provide to the other Parties, in a form and scope as agreed upon by the Parties, an assessment of the programs with respect to the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles, other than strategic ballistic missiles, confronting that Party.

2. For each of its systems subject to this Agreement, each Party shall provide the following information:

(a) the name, type (designation), and basing mode of the system as well as of its interceptor missiles, launchers, and associated radars;

(b) the general concept of operation; the status of plans and programs; and, in addition, for systems in testing, the number of systems it plans to possess; the information shall be provided in a form and scope as agreed upon by the Parties;

(c) the class and type of basing platform: (i) for land based systems: the number of launchers in a battalion;

(ii) for sea based systems: the class and type of each ship, and the number of launchers on a ship of that class capable of launching interceptor missiles of each type;

(iii) for air based systems: the type of each aircraft, and the number of interceptor missiles each aircraft is capable of carrying; (d) the number of interceptor missiles of a fully loaded launcher. 3. For components of each of its systems subject to this Agreement, each Party shall provide the following information:

(a) for a completely assembled interceptor missile: the number of stages, the length, the maximum diameter, the type of propellant (solid or liquid), maximum velocity demonstrated during launches, and the length and diameter of the interceptor missile launch canister;

(b) for the interceptor missile launcher: the maximum number of interceptor missiles of a fully loaded launcher; and

(c) for the radar: the frequency band (in designations adopted by the International Telecommunication Union) and potential, expressed as a value that is not exceeded by the radar's potential. The potential of a radar shall mean the product of its mean emitted power in watts and its antenna area in square meters.

V. Additional Voluntary Measures

Each Party may provide on a voluntary basis any other information or any other notifications not specified elsewhere in this Agreement. The topics, amount, and time frame for such information and notifications shall be such as each Party determines.

VI. Implementation of the Agreement

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission established in accordance with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, shall consider:

(a) issues concerning implementation of the obligations assumed under this Agreement, as well as related situations which may be considered ambiguous; and

(b) amendments to the provisions of this Agreement and other possible proposals on further increasing its viability. 2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center channels or the equivalent government to government communications links for providing the notifications and for exchanging the information provided for in Sections II, IV and V of this Agreement.

VII. Confidentiality

Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information provided pursuant to this Agreement except with the express consent of the Party that provided such information.

VIII. Entry into Force and Duration

This Agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and shall remain in force so long as either of those Agreed Statements remains in force.

DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Joint Statement On The Annual Exchange Of Information On The Status Of Plans And Programs With Respect To Systems To Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles

1. The Parties understand that in implementing the provisions of paragraph 2(b) of Section IV of the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, each Party will provide information annually on the status of its plans and programs with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles that includes:

(a) whether or not that Party has plans before April 1999 to test, against a ballistic target missile, land based, sea based or air based interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory;

(b) whether or not that Party has plans to develop such systems with interceptor missiles whose velocity over any part of their flight trajectory exceeds 5.5 km/sec for land based and air based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea based systems; and

(c) whether or not that Party has plans to test such systems against ballistic target missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles. 2. The Parties understand that should any Party have questions or concerns regarding activity related to any change in the statement on plans of any other Party, the Parties will, in accordance with Article XIII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty, and Section VI of the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, conduct consultations, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, to discuss such questions or concerns, as well as possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty, including possible proposals to amend the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997.

Statement by the United States of America On Plans With Respect To Systems To Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles²

The United States of America states that, with regard to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, it has no plans:

(a) before April 1999 to test, against a ballistic target missile, land based, sea based or air based interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory;

(b) to develop such systems with interceptor missiles whose velocity over any part of their flight trajectory exceeds 5.5 km/sec for land based and air based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea based systems;

(c) to test such systems against ballistic target missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

NOTES:

1. Albright's letter to Primakov is nearly identical except for the paragraph on START II, which reads: "The Government of the United States of America notes the statement of the Russian Federation position on the issue of START III entry into force." [Back to text]

2. The Republich of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine each issued the same statement. [Back to text]