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"I want to tell you that your fact sheet on the [Missile Technology Control Regime] is very well done and useful for me when I have to speak on MTCR issues."

– Amb. Thomas Hajnoczi
Chair, MTCR
May 19, 2021
Documents & Reports

Transcript of Opening Presentations for “The Future of the Indian Nuclear Deal: Key Issues before the IAEA, NSG and US Congress”

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Arms Control Association Press Briefing

Wednesday, July 30, 2008

National Press Club, Washington, D.C.

Panelists: Daryl G. Kimball, Sharon Squassoni, Ambassador Robert Grey


Daryl Kimball: Good morning everyone, my name is Daryl Kimball. I’m Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, and I’d like to welcome you to this morning’s briefing on the next steps relating to the proposal for nuclear cooperation with India. We, along with a coalition of dozens of other organizations here in the United States, more than 100 experts and organizations around the world from more than two dozen countries, have been working for months now, actually years, to try to adjust the terms of the proposal to exempt India from international safeguards governing nuclear trade in order to reduce what we see as the adverse impact of the proposal on the global non-proliferation system.

In two days, the International Atomic Energy Association Board of Governors will consider a proposal for an India specific safeguards agreement. Sometime thereafter, possibly as soon as the end of August, perhaps September, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group will consider a proposal to exempt India, which has not signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, from its comprehensive safeguard standard of nuclear supply. That means that India has not agreed to allow international safeguards over the entirety of its nuclear infrastructure.

So, decision time for the 45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group as well as the 35 members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA has arrived. We’re here to highlight what we see as the key problems with the proposal and to identify steps – including restrictions and conditions – on future possible nuclear trade with India that we believe should be adopted by the Board of Governors and especially the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Many of these restrictions and conditions, I would add, have been identified and mandated in the 2006 US implementing legislation on this issue, the Henry Hyde Act.

Now, this morning we have two experts, who along with me, are going to go through these issues. First, I will discuss issues relating to the decisions and issues that the IAEA Board of Governors is going to have to consider, especially in connection with the safeguards agreement. And then we’ll hear from Sharon Squassoni who is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who has followed this very carefully as an analyst with the Congressional Research Service in 2005, 2006 and part of 2007. She is going to address the issues that the Nuclear Suppliers Group has to face. And then we are going to hear from Ambassador Robert Grey, former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, about the bigger issues that are at stake here so that we don’t lose sight of what this is really all about, which is the future of US. and international efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

So, let me begin by talking about the issues relating to the safeguards agreement that is now before the IAEA Board of Governors. The agreement that the Indian government has negotiated with the IAEA Secretariat would presumably cover only about eight additional reactors and some additional facilities. However, there is no guarantee what this agreement would actually cover because the agreement does not include a declaration of the facilities that would be covered by the agreement. This is unprecedented. This is unusual. And in our view, the Board of Governors should not be making a decision on this agreement until it’s clear which facilities will be covered by the agreement.

Now, we should also keep in mind that safeguards covering only a portion of a nation’s nuclear infrastructure are of almost no real non-proliferation value especially in India’s case because India has nuclear weapons and has very large set of facilities that are devoted to the production of fissile material for weapons and the design and production of nuclear weapons.

Even more troubling, India asserts that in the preamble and combined with certain sections of the operative portion of the agreement, the agreement allows it to withdraw certain reactors from safeguards if fuel supplies are interrupted, even if fuel supplies are interrupted because India has conducted a nuclear test explosion. But in the analysis that I wrote with Fred McGoldrick, who is a former State Department official who has negotiated most of the United States’ nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries notes, this is an incorrect interpretation of the safeguards agreement. Our co-author was Lawrence Scheinman, who was former Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control Disarmament Agency. (See <http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3205>.)

More importantly, this interpretation that India is asserting would be inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards. Before the IAEA Board takes a decision on the safeguards agreement we believe it’s essential that the IAEA, India, the United States, and other Board members to clarify what the interpretation of this agreement is with regard to the possible termination of safeguards over the facilities and materials that India will be putting under safeguards. And if necessary, the IAEA Board of Governors should insist upon amending the agreement to remove any ambiguities that do still exist.

Second, another red flag in the safeguards agreement is how fuel supply assurances have been woven in the text of this agreement. Never before has a safeguards agreement been contingent upon commercial considerations. Essentially what India has negotiated in the preamble is that the application of safeguards over these facilities is contingent upon the continuation of fuel supplies by other states for India’s fuel civil reactors.

What are they worried about? They are worried about a cut off of fuel supplies in the event that India might resume nuclear testing in the future. Now, this is extremely troubling to us because the IAEA Board and NSG countries should not be complicit in helping India find ways to evade the penalties that might occur if India does resume nuclear testing. There should be a clarification about whether the countries that might be engaging in bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with India like the US, Russia and France intend to supply India with continuous supplies even if India resumes nuclear testing, or if they intend o help India amass a strategic fuel reserve that would help India overcome any future cut-off in nuclear testing.

And it’s also important to note in the context of this broader debate that this approach to the safeguards agreement and to this entire arrangement flatly contradicts provisions that were in the Henry Hyde Act that was passed by Congress in 2006, and specifically a provision that was championed and authored by none other than Senator Barack Obama.

The Hyde Act stipulates that U.S. fuel supplies to India be limited to reasonable reactor operating requirements. In other words, don’t supply India with multi-year fuel supplies that would allow India to overcome a fuel supply interruption if the US cuts off nuclear cooperation with India if they test. There is a copy of a very important exchange between Senator Obama and Senator Lugar, who was then the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from September 16, 2006 on the table in the back. It is crystal clear what Senator Obama, Senator Lugar and the rest of Congress meant in their policy language and restrictions that were put in the Henry Hyde Act.

So let me stop there. Let me turn over the podium to Sharon Squassoni who’s going to take us through the key issues that the Nuclear Suppliers Group should contemplate as the United States approaches them with the proposal to exempt India from their full-scope safeguards standard of supply. Sharon.

Sharon Squassoni: Thank you, Daryl. How many of you are familiar with the Nuclear Suppliers Group? We have an educated crowd, that’s terrific. As you know, they usually have their plenary, their main meeting, in May every year, and so what is happening right now is an effort to convene the entire Nuclear Suppliers Group at the end of August and possibly once again in September just to consider the India safeguards agreement.

You might also know that the NSG operates by consensus and so there will be tremendous pressure to lobby all the member states to agree on what the US and India want, which is a clean exemption. That is, the NSG will decide that there will be no conditions on trade with India whatsoever.

Here in the United States we tend to think, “Gee, when the nuclear cooperation agreement gets here, that’s the end-game, Congress will make a decision one way or another.” But in reality, for India, the end-game is the Nuclear Suppliers Group decision. Once the nuclear suppliers group says “yes,” India will be free to go and get mostly what it needs, which is uranium for its reactors. India will be able to trade with other states. And France and Russia will be waiting in line to supply India with nuclear trade. So that’s the end-game.

The NSG has important considerations to think about. As Daryl has pointed out, it’s in the U.S. interest and in U.S. law to cut off nuclear trade with a state that tests a nuclear weapon. But, it is also in the NSG’s interest and here’s why. India freely admits that its nuclear weapons program was born of its civilian nuclear power program. It has said this in the most recent document it gave to the IAEA. It was the 1974 nuclear test that so shocked the world that the United States lobbied to create the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

India has insisted all along that any nuclear deal not impinge on its ability to conduct future nuclear tests, even as it has promised to adhere to a unilateral test moratorium. But its emphasis on the continuity of nuclear fuel supply can only have one motivation: it does not want a repeat in the cut off of nuclear trade that it experienced in the 1970s. A nuclear test by India would prompt a response by Pakistan and thus new instability in South Asia.

NSG states really need to avoid arrangements that would enable or encourage further nuclear testing by India. Therefore, they must create a condition that would stop nuclear exports if India tests again. This is a minimum in my view.

This is analogous to a rule they adopted, I think it was two years ago, to halt countries who were not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation treaty obligations. Now obviously India isn’t a party to the NPT, so it needs a little further strengthening. Otherwise there are no penalties for future proliferation actions by India. They will simply be given a green light to import.

There’s another issue that the NSG should address and that is to restrict what we call sensitive nuclear technology transfers between NSG members and India. What this means is uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. India has such facilities but it has not placed them under international safeguards. It has one reprocessing facility which is already under what we call intermittent safeguards. Even if those facilities were safeguarded, there would be no way to prevent the transfer of know-how from the safeguarded facility to their military program because the safeguards don’t track know-how, they track material and equipment. This means that any nuclear weapons state that engages in such cooperation with India, that is on enrichment or reprocessing, even though it might be under safeguards, could potentially be violating Article I of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which says you will not aid assist encourage in any way a state in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons.

This is not an idle, abstract issue. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has struggled for the past four years with new criteria for restricting enrichment or reprocessing transfers. And every time it gets close, states balk because they don’t want to be in what’s considered the “loser category,” the category of not being able to have this technology. The best step that the NSG could take now would be to draw the line first with India, which is not a party to the NPT, and should not be benefiting from any such cooperation.

There are certainly other conditions that the nuclear suppliers group might take up. For example, conditioning trade with India upon India completing an additional protocol, which is the safeguard strengthening measures that have been adopted by many states. In fact, the United States requires this as a condition of its cooperation. But I think the two on cutting off in the event of a test and no enrichment or reprocessing technology are the main ones that it needs to consider. Thank you.

Daryl Kimball: Thank you, Sharon. Bob, if you could come up to the podium to conclude our opening remarks then we will go to your questions.

Ambassador Robert Grey:
Basically what we’re dealing with here is the United States has really given India a blank check to proceed to go around all of the safeguards agreements in the NPT and other agencies. And now it seems to me we are trying to assist them in cashing that check at another bank, the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This is not a good idea.

This is still another example, and perhaps the most egregious example, of this sort of foreign policy by unilateral fiat. The NPT has a long history. It is almost as important as a UN charter in terms of protecting non-proliferation interest. We have been a leader in this for years, and now suddenly we’re taking another stance.

It’s bad for another reason too. We are walking away from a treaty that more than 180 countries have joined, just opening a huge hole, a gap in it. The argument seems to be that some people are exempt from the rules because they’re good fellows and other guys are bad fellows and have to adhere to the rules.

So it’s a selective sort of a process which really undermines the whole series of international cooperative agreements that we’ve negotiated over the years. It’s an unmitigated disaster in terms of non-proliferation policy and the so-called rule of law.

And more importantly it seems to me that if one is going to make changes like this, that it should be a function of the entire membership of the non-proliferation community, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty signatories, not the Nuclear Suppliers Group which is a very limited number of states.

And that is why I’m deeply concerned about the future of the non-proliferation regime if this goes through. If we say the Indians are good fellows and they should get a special exemption, what’s to keep the Chinese from pushing Pakistan or somebody else? We’re just opening up the door here to Pandora’s Box in the most outrageous and egregious manner.

And frankly, whatever the Hyde Act says, if they pull this off in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, we’re going to be faced with a fait accompli, there’s not much the Congress can do about it at this stage in the game. So, in the overall interest of the United States and the investment we’ve had in this non-proliferation regime, at a time when we are dealing with other people who are potentially trying to go nuclear, this is precisely the wrong thing to do at the wrong time.

And so, I very much hope that the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other responsible countries will prevent us creating an act of folly on the part of this administration. It would be a disaster in the long term for the United States if this were to be done. We’re just flying in the face of something we’ve worked on for thirty years.

Now, the NPT is not a perfect agreement. We have to get better safeguards for the civilian side of it. We’ve got to get additional protocols and all sorts of things. But you don’t throw out a whole system that you’ve built up painfully over thirty, forty years just on a whim because you want to establish some sort of a so-called strategic relationship with a country that, frankly, which has always been very good at protecting its own national interests. And it’s not about to do anything in the international arena in the years to come that’s going to make it an ally of the United States. The Indians have a very strong tradition of acting like the British. They have no friends but they have permanent interests. I wish sometimes the United States would act like that. Thank you.

Daryl Kimball: Thank you very much, Ambassador Grey. I hope that was clear.

Let me just conclude by bringing this together and making one overall comment and then describing what we think, among other things, the Nuclear Suppliers Group should do.

First of all, we shouldn’t lose sight, as Ambassador Grey was saying, that contrary to the claims, the Orwellian claims of the advocates of this proposal, the nuclear deal fails to bring India further into conformity with the norms and standards that are expected of other states in the international community. And just two specific examples, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which 178 countries including the United States signed, and a cut-off of fissile material for nuclear weapons. If, as Prime Minister Singh said back on July 18th 2005, India would “assume the same responsibilities and practices” as other countries with advanced nuclear capabilities, I do not see why India should not be asked, urged or required as part of this arrangement to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or take on some other legally binding obligation not to test. Nor do I see a reason why India should not be urged, asked or required to stop the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons before the NSG agrees to engage in civil nuclear trade. India already has enough fissile material to make 60-100 nuclear bombs.

So what should the NSG do? To conclude and summarize, if NSG states should agree to supply fuel to India, they should:

First, establish a policy that if India resumes nuclear testing, or violates its safeguards agreements, trade involving nuclear items with India should be terminated and unused fuel supplies should be returned.

Second, NSG states should expressly prohibit any transfer of sensitive reprocessing, enrichment, or heavy water production items or technology whether that is inside or outside bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.

Third, NSG states should actively oppose any arrangement that would give India any special safeguards exemptions that would in any way be inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards over all nuclear materials and facilities. NSG states should not take any decision unless India and the IAEA conclude a meaningful additional protocol to its “umbrella” facility specific safeguards agreement.

Fourth, before India is granted a waiver from the NSG’s full-scope safeguards standards, it should join with four of the five orgininal nuclear weapons states in declaring that it has stopped fissile material production. And NSG states should insist that India transform its nuclear test moratorium pledge into a legally binding pledge, perhaps by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

So, this is a time for NSG governments to stand up and be counted in order to prevent further damage to the nuclear non-proliferation system.

We will stop there and open the floor to your questions.

Country Resources:

GOV/1620 IAEA Document on Duration and Termination of Safeguards

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Item l(b) of the provisional agenda
(GOV/1620)

SAFEGUARDS
(b) THE FORMULATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN AGREEMENTS UNDER THE
AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (1965, AS PROVISIONALLY EXTENDED IN
1966 AND 1968)
Memorandum by the Director General

Document published 20 August 1973. 

Country Resources:

India-IAEA Agreement for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities

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Posted here is a copy of the agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the application of safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities. Click on the right for the document.

Country Resources:

PRESENTATION: Political Significance of the CTBT and Perspectives of Entry into Force

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Presentation at the Cross-Regional Workshop for CTBTO International Cooperation:
“Twelve Years of the CTBT: Achievements and Perspectives”, 1-2 July 2008, Istanbul, Turkey

by Oliver Meier, International Representative and Correspondent

(See attached PDF)

Addressing the Challenges Facing the NPT

Body: 

WELCOME:
DARYL G. KIMBALL,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

SPEAKERS:
AMBASSADOR NORMAN A. WULF,

FORMER SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

SHARON SQUASSONI,
SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

ANDREW K. SEMMEL,
FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT FOR STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
Edited by the Arms Control Association

June 16, 2008

DARYL KIMBALL: Welcome and good morning, my friends. I’m Daryl Kimball; I’m the executive director of the Arms Control Association. On behalf of the staff and the board of directors, many of our board members are here, let me say thank you to the many Arms Control Association members and supporters who I see this morning. It’s been nice speaking with many of you. I want to welcome all of you to the opening of our annual meeting on “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at 40.” We’re going to be discussing the current and future challenges.

Let me just take a moment before we get started to thank our loyal and generous members and supporters; our small but loyal cadre of members and supporters keep us going. They make our work possible. These include our foundation funders, a couple of which are represented here today: The Ford Foundation, the Plowshares Fund, thank you and our other foundation supporters for your ongoing support. 

As you saw today, when you registered, we have a thank-you mug for those of you who are Arms Control Association members, to add to what must be a large mug collection at this point. But we like mugs because we drink coffee to keep us moving fast.

Well, today we have a program that’s divided into three segments. This morning’s panel of experts will focus on how we can best address key challenges facing the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  Over lunch, which will begin at about 11:30, we will hear from Ambassador Sergio Duarte on his views on making the 2010 NPT Review Conference a success. Then following lunch and beginning at 1:00 p.m., we’ve organized a special panel discussion featuring senior representatives from the presidential campaigns of Senator John McCain and Senator Barack Obama. They will be speaking about what their respective candidates will do to fortify U.S. and international efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.

For those of you who are Arms Control Association members and who have the stamina, we have a meeting at 2:45 which will take place in the conference room in the rear. We’ll be holding our formal board election and I will be providing a brief update on the association’s current and future activities.

Now, as many of you are aware but perhaps not all of you are aware, ACA was established in 1971 by several of the leading figures involved in U.S. arms control negotiations, including the negotiation of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. William Foster and George Bunn, who is out in California, can’t be with us today. It’s an honor to have a couple of the others who were part of the NPT and who were a part of the Arms Control Association at its early beginnings, including our former executive director and president, Spurgeon Keeny, and also Larry Weiler, who was at ACDA at the time of the negotiation of the NPT. We were just talking about the difficult good old days, so to speak.

Now, the goal, then, of the Arms Control Association, as now, is to create broad public appreciation of the need for positive steps toward the limitation of armaments and the implementation of other measures on the road to world peace. We’ve traveled far on the road since then, but there’s still quite a distance to go. The NPT has been a big part of that, and as Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala wrote in this month’s issue of Arms Control Today about the NPT, though imperfect in its design and implementation, the NPT has helped avoid the nightmare scenario and vision by John F. Kennedy, who foresaw a situation before the NPT of 20 to 25 nuclear-weapon states. Indeed, the NPT has made the world safer by mandating a system of international safeguards, establishing a global norm against the transfer of nuclear weapons, and extracting a commitment from the nuclear-weapon states to eliminate their arsenals.

But despite these accomplishments, as we all know, the NPT is under a great deal of stress. We’re not going to focus this morning and through the rest of the day on the problems so much as what some practical solutions might be in the next months and years ahead that could, if embraced by a bipartisan majority of politicians and leaders in Washington, could help reverse the negative proliferation trends that we’re seeing today.

So this morning, to start off the day’s events and discussion, we’ve asked three leading experts and practitioners to provide us with their perspectives and insights on three of the key sets of problems facing the NPT regime. Our first speaker is going to be Ambassador Norman Wulf, who was the president’s special representative for nuclear nonproliferation from 1999 to 2002, and served for 14 years with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department working on nonproliferation issues, including his role as head of the U.S. delegation to the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Ambassador Wulf is going to talk about, among other things, the challenge and importance of advancing progress on Article VI of the NPT, which commits the nuclear-weapon states to pursue negotiations leading to the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Then, we’ll hear from Sharon Squassoni, who is a senior associate in the nonproliferation program here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She has extensive experience as a nonproliferation specialist at the Congressional Research Service, and has served in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department on nonproliferation issues in her career. She is going to be discussing strategies designed to address the risks associated with the spread of uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology as a problem that’s complicated by Article IV of the NPT, which recognizes the right of non-nuclear-weapon states to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as well. This is also complicated by the problems created by the smuggling network of A.Q. Khan which, if you’ve been reading the newspapers this weekend, appears to be even more of a problem than we believed before. 

Sharon is going to be followed by Andrew Semmel, who’s currently a private consultant. But before joining the private sector, he was deputy assistant secretary for state for nonproliferation from 2003 to 2007 and has worked extensively on Capitol Hill, including with Senator Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana. Dr. Semmel is going to address the thorny problem of strengthening safeguards and expanding the number of countries operating under tougher safeguards, and monitoring and verification. 

Following all of their remarks, we’re going to be taking questions from you for as long as we can, before our next session begins. So with that introduction, I want to invite you, Norm, up to the podium to start us off.

NORMAN WULF: Thank you, Daryl. It’s a pleasure for me to speak to you today. I wondered, after reading through Reykjavik Revisited, if I’d anything new to say. You may wonder, when I finish, whether I’ve had anything new to say, but hopefully there’ll be a few little gems buried in my remarks.

It is not unique that, as we approach the 2010 Review Conference, just as we approached the one in 2005 and before that, that a great deal of concern is being expressed about the fate of the NPT. Attention is being called to all the stresses that are being placed upon that treaty. One of the things I want to spend a few moments on is wrestling with the questions: are things really different this time, or is this just the normal, shall we say, pre-conference hand-wringing that we’ve seen in the past? It may be that my perspective has changed because I’m no longer with government, and therefore no longer paid to be an optimist. (Laughter.) 

But my perspective is that things, indeed, are worse today. They’re worse primarily because the things that people are hoping to obtain from the treaty and they are no longer getting the satisfaction. What I would emphasize is that I think the biggest reason that countries who become parties to the NPT do so is because of the contribution it makes to their calculus of their national interest and their national security. Perhaps the largest one, obviously, is the reassurance about the intentions of their neighbors or their neighbors’ programs, and the reassurance that the treaty provides to their neighbor about their activities. 

But those, obviously, are only one set of the factors; access to peaceful uses, which Sharon will address, would be another factor. The safeguard system and the security that it provides, as Andy will be addressing, is another. Lastly, perhaps, is the contribution that countries see the NPT making to international peace and security. The whole concept is that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the danger of use, and the danger of use is something we want to avoid and therefore, by becoming part of the treaty, we add to the credibility of the entire regime. So the question is: is the treaty really meeting those needs?

I would have to say that there have been a number of events that call into question that the treaty is meeting those needs. I’m just going to cite a few examples and I’m sure everybody has other examples they could cite, but let me just cite some in no particular order. First, the treaty had a withdrawal clause, obviously, since day one, but no one’s exercised that until 2003, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the treaty. For three years, there was a deafening silence from the Security Council, one of the major institutions to which withdrawal notifications are sent. It was only after North Korea detonated a nuclear device in 2006 that the Security Council acted. What kind of message does that send about the permanence of this treaty, and whether you can rely upon this treaty?

Another example is the pending U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with India. It has been sort of assumed that the precondition for nuclear cooperation is full-scope safeguards and NPT party, in more recent years. Now all of a sudden we have an example where the United States has said the principle is no longer all proliferation is bad; the principle is now some proliferation is acceptable. In the case of India, as you know, the agreement would allow for peaceful nuclear cooperation while India continues not only to maintain its existing stockpile of nuclear weapons, but to add to it. 

I think, however, the greatest challenge that the treaty faces is the challenge of compliance or noncompliance. The most striking example, obviously, is Iran. More than five years have passed since the board of governors of the IAEA became aware that Iran was not complying. They took over three years and nine resolutions before they finally referred the matter to the Security Council. The Security Council has been wrestling with it. Four resolutions later, what’s happening? Iran is continuing to add to their enrichment capability. You got to wonder, if you’re a country out there, does this really mean that people are going to comply with this treaty and, if they don’t comply, something serious is going to be done about it.

I have to say in the 1990s, we got a false sense of optimism about compliance. We had two easy cases, the first case being Iraq after the first Gulf War in 1991. And there, their action by invading Kuwait was such a clear violation of the U.N. charter and their violation of their NPT obligation was so clear when the inspectors and others got access to Iraqi facilities. That was a very easy job, I would say, to get a Security Council resolution and get some serious Security Council action about Iraqi noncompliance. North Korea was another example where the Security Council was able to act in 1994. But the case at that time, North Korea was and remains, pretty much, an international pariah. So it’s not usually much of a challenge to get a Security Council action. Although, again, I’d note that more recently, it took three years before the Security Council was able to act, even for North Korea. So you have to wonder what the treaty is saying to the parties. Can we rely upon this instrument to deliver what it promises?

Now, lest you think that I’m going to avoid the topic that I’ve been assigned, which was Article VI, let me quickly add that, obviously, in the run-up to the 2000 review conference and, I think, just about every other time, the thing that the United States wants to talk about is noncompliance with other provisions. What other countries, the non-nuclear-weapon states in particular, want to talk about is U.S. compliance or nuclear-weapon states’ compliance with Article VI.

I think it’s fair to say that over the lifetime of the treaty and particularly over the last 15 years, there have been substantial reductions and substantial actions taken by most of the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their arsenals. We had the most recent statement by France indicating, I think, something less than 300 nuclear weapons; we had the public statements by the U.K. indicating less than 200 deployed nuclear weapons. Both of them are substantial reductions. We had substantial reductions in the stockpiles that both the United States and Russia had during the Cold War. So a lot’s been done, but—but is the big word here—a lot remains to be done. 

I think we are at the point where countries, the non-nuclear-weapon states in particular, are suspicious, concerned, and almost unbelieving about compliance with Article VI. It is, in fact, due to the end of the Cold War. Countries, perhaps, were willing to give the nuclear-weapon states, particularly the United States and Russia/Soviet Union, a pass, to some extent, about their arsenals because of the Cold War. But now that the Cold War’s over, that pass is gone and they’d like to see some, shall we say, meaningful movement.

I think adding to that pressure for meaningful movement, obviously, was the decision in 1995 to make the treaty permanent. Obviously, by making it permanent, they were not agreeing to make possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon states permanent. That was not the deal. The deal was that there would be continued progress under Article VI toward nuclear disarmament. In 2000, the nuclear-weapon states committed to the so-called 13 steps; 13 steps that, at least for the review conference in 2005 in this administration, the United States delegation, as I understand it, was not even permitted to mention, let alone respond to.

Let me say that, with respect to the compliance by the nuclear-weapon states with Article VI, I’m going to focus most of my criticism and comments on the United States. That’s not, I want to quickly add, because I think the United States bears the greatest responsibility or has been the least compliant. It is because I think this is the country that we have a chance of influencing toward a better, more positive position and, based upon those actions, of influencing the action of other nuclear-weapon states. 

Let me also be clear that the U.S. record, over the course of this administration, is not totally negative. We do have the Treaty of Moscow, also known as SORT. It has significant flaws regarding units of accounts, whether deployed or non-deployed; it is not permanent; and it is seriously deficient, or maybe I should say totally lacking, on verification. But it nonetheless represents steps and progress toward lower numbers, and there are even other activities that, in general, could indicate that there continues to be reductions in the overall stockpiles, although the actual numbers have not yet been published.

Offsetting that positive are a number of other actions: the total opposition by this administration to even considering the CTBT and the efforts to develop new roles or new emphasis on nuclear weapons, whether you’re talking about the early efforts on bunker-busters or the efforts on mini-nukes, or even the reliable replacement warhead. But what those actions have done has clearly conveyed to others that the United States continues to believe that nuclear weapons play an essential role, and will continue to play that role. That is not the dream, shall we say, or the hope or promise, of Article VI, that the nuclear-weapon states would move toward nuclear disarmament. 

Now, some argue the view that what the United States does really does not influence other countries. They also say that just because we’re not engaging in nuclear disarmament that doesn’t mean other countries are going to decide to proliferate. I think one of the real contributions of the Reykjavik Revisited publication is the following paragraph in the article by Jim Goodby and Sid Drell because I think it pretty well lays to rest that canard. They said those experts are right to believe that several impulses go into the decision-making process of would-be nuclear-weapon states, but they’re wrong to believe that expectations about future trends in the world regarding the role of nuclear weapons and international relations have no part in national decision-making. If decision-makers think the world is going to be increasingly armed with nuclear weapons, and that those are going to be seen as normal and legitimate defense postures, those decision-makers will logically lean toward keeping open the option of building a nuclear arsenal and will exercise that option when conditions seem to require it. Expectations about the actions of others have always played a large part in policymaking, and things are no different in the area of the nuclear weapons.

In short, I believe the expectations are being created for increased reliance on nuclear weapons and for an increasing number of countries that are beginning to look toward that expectation for themselves. Based upon this belief, it is not surprising that I agree with another phrase that we can owe to the Reykjavik Revisited, and that is I do think we are, in fact, approaching rapidly a tipping point; a tipping point in which we either try to recede back and keep in check nuclear proliferation, or a point at which we see many other countries joining in the race. 

Obviously, everyone here is aware of the key people behind the Reykjavik Revisited effort—Secretary George Shultz, Secretary Henry Kissinger, Secretary William Perry, and Senator Sam Nunn; I’m going to find a shorthand expression. I notice that people who don’t like what they wrote refer to them as the Gang of Four. With your indulgence, I’m going to refer to them as the Four Statesmen, and refer to their effort as the Four Statesmen’s proposal. If you think that indicates where I stand on the issue, you would be right. But their overall conclusion is that the threat of nuclear proliferation cannot be turned back without a strong global partnership. For that global partnership to be created means the United States must re-engage in a wide range of nuclear control issues, including in a treaty format and not just voluntary or parallel actions. 

So now, Daryl, I’m going to get to what you assigned me to talk about, what should be done.  Just for grins, I thought I’ll go back and see what we put in the 13 steps. Part of that was a little bit of devilment in me; because the administration didn’t even want to use the term 13 steps during the first five years, I thought I’d use it as often as possible. But secondly, and perhaps more importantly, those 13 steps probably represent the most comprehensive listing of the international community, to date, on actions that need to be taken to fulfill the requirements of Article VI. I’m not going to walk you through each of the 13 steps. I’m going to talk actually in terms of about a dozen steps; most of them, I think, you’ll find very familiar.

The first is drawn directly from the preamble to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty itself, the comprehensive test ban. The opportunity to achieve a comprehensive test ban was missed in 1963 with the Limited Test Ban Treaty, but the preamble says it’s still the objective, the goal that we’re going to shoot for. Clearly, that should be a high priority for the United States. Right into that comprehensive test ban, obviously, is maintenance of a moratorium until such time as one can bring it into force.

A fissile material production ban, another one I think that is obvious, that goes back to 1995. It was in the “Principles and Objectives” document, it was in the 2000 document, it’s in the Reykjavik Revisited document, it’s everywhere. I wish I could be really optimistic that we’re going to see real progress on the fissile material cutoff, but it has been 10-12 years now that the Conference on Disarmament has been struggling with this and they still can’t even get negotiations started. It’s hard to be optimistic. It’s equally hard to envisage another negotiating forum where you can get some countries, such as India, Israel, and Pakistan. to participate. I suspect there are interim steps that could be taken. One, I would suggest, is that perhaps we ought to look at formalizing, more than we have to date, the existing moratorium among the five nuclear-weapon states. Let’s at least start the process and, eventually, perhaps we can bring along some of the outliers. 

Irreversibility, another important concept; I guess I could ask the question if anybody here actually believes that deployed versus non-deployed meets the test of irreversibility. I certainly don’t think it does. Clearly, what was contemplated is elimination and elimination not only of delivery systems as been the standard unit of account in the past, but of warheads themselves and perhaps even more important, elimination of production facilities so that further weapons cannot be built. 

The Four Statesmen call for establishing the goal of eliminating or abolishing all nuclear weapons. This, obviously, has created excitement on one side of the political spectrum and dismay on the other side. I think the people who call them the Gang of Four are the ones who are most dismayed by the concept of eliminating all nuclear weapons. But I certainly think the Four Statesmen had it correct. If you do not have that objective in mind, even if you can’t plan on achieving it tomorrow, you do have to have that as your overall goal. A public endorsement of that by the United States as the overall goal, without all the caveats of the past, would go a long way, I think, toward starting to create that global partnership that the Four Statesmen talk about.

START II and the ABM Treaty were mentioned in 2000, and while they’re probably not as germane today, the issues that they embody are still germane, and that is further reductions in the number of nuclear warheads by the United States and Russia. It’s now become quite clear that a problem for Russia remains U.S. plans for missile defense; some movement toward agreement on how to cooperatively work on missile defense is needed. So it’s quite clear that further reductions from where we are now to a half, even, one could hope for. Hopefully this afternoon, when we have the two candidates’ representatives speaking to us, we can get some more definitive views of what their plans, their proposals, might be in this area of further reductions.

As we reduce further, verification becomes much more of important, but it also becomes much more difficult. You can no longer rely simply on counting delivery vehicles; you have to start dealing with the question of warheads. It is instructive, as was pointed out in I think the last issue, or perhaps next-to-last issue, of Arms Control Today, there was the Trilateral Initiative where the United States, Russia, and the IAEA spent a fair degree of time basically under the rubric of the Nunn-Lugar program, trying to figure out how to verify that the material that was being safeguarded was the material that came from nuclear weapons. There’s a lot of ingenious ideas, as Tom Shea points out in that article, that could be drawn upon to help us move toward what I think becomes an essential for meaningful verification in the future. It will not be easy, let me quickly add.

Transparency, increased transparency: I want to spend just a couple of my remaining five minutes on transparency, not because I don’t think the United States is transparent, but because I think China is not. I can remember very vividly spending about two hours sitting in the Chinese embassy in Geneva, in the spring of 2000, receiving a lecture from Sha Zukang of China about why China could not accept transparency under any circumstances, and how those with small stockpiles, et cetera, et cetera, can’t accept transparency. I would have been probably much better off not to have raised that issue in the Chinese mission because obviously he had to make sure that the recording devices heard his strenuous objection, and they certainly did. 

But it’s certainly true that China lags behind all the nuclear-weapon states in transparency about their program. I believe it is more then past time for the United States to begin a strategic dialogue with China about nuclear weapons. Not one where we simply go in and lecture, but one where we sit down and we talk and we listen. It is certainly true that during the years with the Soviet Union that our years of discussion led to a better understanding of each other. I think it also led to improvements in the nuclear doctrines of both countries. We need to have that dialogue. 

As long as I’m making this point, I want to go to a broader point. Article VI is not limited in its scope simply to the nuclear-weapon states. It calls upon all parties to work toward disarmament. Again, let me go back to 2000: the new agenda coalition and the United States, and some of the other nuclear-weapon states, were having some discussion in trying to figure out, as we approached the conference, how we could work our way through the conference. One time, when I was meeting solely with the New Agenda Coalition, I took them to task because while they went out of their way to name specifically the United States and Russia, and the obligations they had, they said absolutely nothing about China. Yet, at the time, China was the only country in the world that was building more delivery vehicles and more nuclear weapons. 

So, again, if we are to take these criticisms and if they’re to be taken seriously and appear to be credible, then the Nonaligned Movement itself must broaden and be more comprehensive in its approach and not simply saying, well, we know we can pick on the United States; they’re used to it. It is fair to hold us to a higher standard, no question about that. I hope the United States will always be held to a higher standard than a country like China or a country like Russia. But it is not fair, it is not right, to say well, we’re really interested in getting nuclear disarmament and then not say anything about the country that is actually building nuclear weapons.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons, this is an area that needs to be addressed. It has not been addressed. I think it is more then past time we should be examining a possible tradeoff between U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe and Russian nuclear weapons. 

Reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons; how many years did we all hear, talk about, and read in the newspaper that we have to be concerned because the Russian infrastructure for handling and dealing with nuclear weapons is deteriorating, and we really can’t trust it. Then, what do we find? The U.S. Air Force is perhaps emulating Russia. It’s clearly past time to lengthen the short reaction time, or let’s just do away with the “launch on notice” concepts that we now have. Let’s build in some real meaningful time for both leaders in the United States and Russia to think about the consequences of their actions as opposed to having them merely react. 

Diminishing nuclear weapons and security policy; I think I’ve already said enough about that and Daryl is fidgeting, so I know I need to keep moving. 

Lastly, let me say a few words about excess fissile material. Not much has been said about that topic in the last several years. Not much has been added to the excess fissile material that is being either blended down in the case of HEU or in some of the plutonium that is being put into a different status. But those activities are ongoing. There needs to be, in my judgment, additions to those stockpiles of excess fissile material and disposal of that excess fissile material. Hopefully, if we get the reductions called for earlier, we will also end up with excess fissile material that can be permanently put beyond the reach of nuclear weapons.

Let me conclude, Daryl breathes a sigh of relief now, these are the 12 steps that are among those that are necessary to show compliance with Article VI. The U.S. has long argued that the best way to achieve total nuclear disarmament is through incremental steps. I personally remain unsure that we can get to zero, but I do believe the Four Statesmen are fundamentally correct when they say that we should publicly embrace that goal and engage in a series of interim steps. As these steps are taken, I do believe it becomes clearer and clearer to determine what the next steps are and how those next steps become more achievable.

Lastly, let me say that this city, particularly this time of the year has always been treated to all sorts of ideal promises about what should happen in the next four years, and then somehow during the course of the next four years, a lot of it disappears, and we are obviously in that season again. What steps can we take now to ensure that these great ideas that hopefully the candidates will embrace are not simply lost in the bureaucracy and become yet another broken campaign promise?  How do we avoid nonproliferation and arms control from being treated as, quote, “business as usual?”

I believe that we are facing an extraordinary threat, and I believe that extraordinary threats require extraordinary means. This for me means that the president, the day after the election, should appoint a prominent individual whose job during the transition is to establish more clearly our nonproliferation and arms control objectives. Then he needs to examine how we achieve them. For me, I do not believe that these priorities can be achieved by merely adding this list of objectives to what is an already burgeoning agenda at the Department of State.

So for me, the seriousness of achieving these measures—I might quickly underscore conveying to other countries the seriousness of our purpose in seeking to achieve these—can best be accomplished by establishing an independent agency. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

KIMBALL: Thank you very much Norm. Next up is Sharon Squassoni.

SHARON SQUASSONI: Well, thank you, Daryl, for the invitation. It’s a pleasure to be here. I thought I was going to be the first speaker and I was thinking about this last night as my six-year-old participated in her very first dive meet. She is about this high and she was the very first diver up there. I asked here later, “were you nervous?” You know, what were you thinking about?” She said, “aw, Mom, I wasn’t thinking, I just dove in.” (Laughter.) But I’ve given this a little bit more thought, but I’m going to dive in here.

Daryl asked me to talk about the challenges to the NPT surrounding Article IV. It’s very fitting actually that I’m sandwiched between Norm and Andy because as everyone is well aware, non-nuclear-weapon states’ perceptions of the bargain of the NPT is influenced by obviously what happens in disarmament and also because the current withdrawal provisions largely pose no consequences for a state that has developed capabilities indigenously that they can amass a breakout capability. And that is what we’re basically talking about here when we’re concerned about enrichment and reprocessing.

Because it’s almost the 40th anniversary of the NPT, I think it’s fitting to look back briefly with a historical perspective. Then I want to focus on how the nature of the problem has shifted and to explore some of the solutions that have been proposed. I am not going to talk specifically or discuss Article IV. There are a lot of people here in this audience that can recite Article IV in their sleep. But let’s just say that the fundamental tension is how to reconcile the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with preventing states from using their nuclear technology and assets to acquire nuclear weapons. And the $64,000 question—I’m kind of dating myself, maybe it’s the $5-million question—is what is an appropriate nuclear fuel cycle, and if we knew what that was, could we agree on it.

Basically what you’re talking about is where do you draw the line in the fuel cycle. Over time, perceptions have definitely shifted. During the negotiations of the NPT, Swedish Ambassador Alva Myrdal suggested that, well, prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons was maybe a little too late in the game. The NPT never defined what manufacture was. You can see that as states ratified the treaty, particularly West Germany, Australia, and Japan, they were all eager to sort of push that line way down toward manufacture.

When ACDA Director William Foster in 1968 testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he said, “Facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show noncompliance.” Then he went on to say, well, these are the things that you can do: uranium enrichment and the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program as long as it’s under safeguards.

Well, times have obviously changed. U.S. Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders told the 2005 NPT review conference—and it’s funny because the words are so similar—“Facts indicating that the purpose of such an activity is the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show noncompliance with Article II,” and then she went on to say that examples of activities of concern include seeking certain fuel cycle facilities of direct relevance to nuclear weapons such as enrichment or reprocessing with no clear economic or peaceful justification, as well as violating your safeguards activities and having clandestine facilities.

So what is behind the change of heart? I think we’re all familiar with developments since 2001 of increased concern about possible threats from terrorists ranging from attacks on nuclear facilities to just interest in nuclear weapons and access to radiological materials. Daryl already mentioned the A.Q. Khan network, and as we discover more and more, it becomes increasingly disturbing about transfers to North Korea, Iran, and Libya, not just of this sensitive information and designs related to centrifuges but also obviously Iran’s enrichment and heavy-water production and reactor programs.

We’re equally aware of efforts to restrict enrichment and reprocessing and the offer of incentives for forgoing such capabilities since 2004. Those include President Bush’s 2004 speech while he was at the National Defense University, calling on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to restrict the transfer of sensitive technology to states with fully functioning capabilities. There also are the G8 moratorium, fuel-bank proposals, and other fuel assurances including multinational fuel cycle centers and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). 

But these have been proposed in a new context for nuclear energy. For many years, you could argue, since we had the Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents that nuclear power largely had been a kind of a sleepy issue under the technical cooperation umbrella of the IAEA. Today, you could argue that it’s the number-one issue as more and more states express an interest in developing nuclear power.

My count is more than 25 since 2005. The drivers of this are enthusiasm by major industrial states and vendors including the U.S., France, and Russia, and concern about global climate change and energy security. Now, whether or not this expansion meets the optimistic projections of its proponents, the current message, at least to me, is clear: advanced nuclear states support nuclear energy for all. So you may be asking, well, nuclear power is different from enrichment and reprocessing, what does this all have to do with each other?

When you look at expansion, you can have an expansion without reprocessing if you don’t go the fast-reactor route. But that is not what is being considered right now, at least by the United States. You cannot have expansion without more enrichment unless you are willing to entertain heavy-water reactors, which some of us might think would be a setback.

Can we keep enrichment and reprocessing to the current technology holders? I think it’s unlikely. As a matter of fact, if you look at the MIT 2003 Future of Nuclear Power projections, their high projection, which is out to 1,500 gigawatts, which is, I guess, a quadrupling, they believe that many, many, many more states would have enrichment technology.

At the same time, unfortunately, the initiatives designed to dampen demand, such as GNEP, in sensitive nuclear technologies like enrichment and reprocessing have had unintended effects. Ukraine and South Africa are now seeking a full fuel cycle. Canada desires to enrich uranium and is resisting NSG efforts to establish more detailed criteria for restrictions. Under the U.S.-Indian deal, India repeatedly insisted on full civil nuclear cooperation.

So what are our solutions? Well, there are four approaches: an ad-hoc, what I call an ad-hoc, approach; new criteria, which the NSG is considering; three, you can dampen demand; and, number four, you can come up with technical fixes on the ad-hoc approach.

Well, this has largely been done by the Nuclear Suppliers Group since the mid-1970s. They have had a policy of restraint on enrichment and reprocessing technology. This is heavily dependent on diplomacy, on sweeteners. For the most it’s worked, and you have to ask is Iran just an outlier? Are there more A.Q. Khan networks out there? But you also have to ask the question, does this work in the context of enthusiasm for nuclear energy?  What if we reach a world of 1,500 gigawatts? Who is going to be enriching? Who is going to be reprocessing? What if breeder reactors, or burner reactors, if you want to call them that, are seriously pursued? And, will a technical recycling of fuel, that is, you’re reprocessing but you don’t separate out the plutonium, solve our proliferation concerns? I’m just raising these questions.

The second approach, new criteria; the Nuclear Suppliers Group has been wrestling with this since 2004. The most recent talks on it have hit a stumbling block. What they’re seeking to do is provide more detail on paragraph six in the guidelines. Those things include things you would expect to see: additional protocol. There is something in there about no replication of technology. There are things in there about regional implications. Of course they put in something about a coherent and rational approach; I don’t know whether enrichment and reprocessing would be coherent and rational. They didn’t, I don’t think, have anything on economics in there. They’re not having a lot of success. Countries, when they’re looking at this enthusiasm for nuclear energy, they want to keep their options open. So it’s not entirely clear to me that this is going to move forward.

The third approach, dampening demand by offering incentives, include fuel banks, multilateral enrichment centers, et cetera. This only works if the target states see it as useful. It’s clear in terms of Iran that they are not interested. But other states, it’s not entirely clear. You need to build a kind of bandwagon effect and that hasn’t happened so far.

Finally, the technical fixes. The conclusion 30 years ago of earlier fuel-cycle evaluations was that technical approaches aren’t going to work so you really need an institutional approach. But now we have Urenco offering its centrifuge technology on a black-box basis. I think it’s Geoff Forden’s work that proposes we should even given Iran centrifuge technology as long as it has a hidden kind of self-destruct mechanism in there. I leave it to you as to whether we should put all of our eggs in that technical-fix basket.

Maybe it’s because I worked at the Congressional Research Service for too long or I’m inherently skeptical, you have to say, well, is this stuff necessary? Do we really need these fixes? You could say, well, enrichment and reprocessing; it’s un-economic. So don’t worry about it. States really won’t seriously pursue it. Before 2004, we really didn’t see many countries interested in getting into the enrichment game, Iran not withstanding. So you ask, well, is it economics? Is it norms? Is it defeatism because countries assume they wouldn’t be offered enrichment technology?

You have to say, well, no, you know, look at Canada or look at South Africa. These are NSG members that were in the inside group. This argument I think assumes that nuclear decisions are economic decisions, but I think we all know that that’s not always the case. The second argument against, well, don’t worry about this says, well, the nuclear renaissance is not going to happen so the pressure will be off. But when we look at what our proliferation concerns are, it’s not really quantity—well, it could be quantity—what’s happening geographically. Even if this large, rapid expansion doesn’t happen, a limited expansion in certain regions could matter. In particular, what happens with Iran matters. When you look at these states that are interested in nuclear power now, half of them are in the Middle East.

The third argument against this is, well, breakout capability is expensive and diversion is tough. States, if they’re really going to try and seek enrichment, they’re not going to do it through a declared facility; they’re going to go for a clandestine approach. Well, they could do both if they have money. A legitimate program might help mask clues of interest. 

I have a few final thoughts. It seems to me, when you look at all of this in the context of potential expansion of nuclear power, we’re going to need to manage that expansion, particularly perceptions because the last thing we want is another level of discrimination. Here we have the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states. Now we have the nuclear power states and the non-nuclear power states. 

Second, I think we have to explore different avenues of attack. One of those is getting the nuclear industry in on this, getting them to not supply countries that don’t have the additional protocol. We need to get them to develop industry codes of conduct.

Lastly, I’m going to be a little more optimistic than you, Norm, although maybe that’s because I worked so long on a cutoff in ACDA. I think we need to use renewed interest in a fissile material production cutoff treaty to steer us toward eventual multilateralization of all enrichment and reprocessing facilities. I think part of the problem we face here is that there is still national prestige associated with these sensitive nuclear facilities; more so on enrichment than reprocessing. It’s not clear to me that a whole lot of countries want to go down that reprocessing route. I’m going to stop there. Thank you. (Applause.)

KIMBALL: Thank you very much, Sharon, for boiling down a very complex subject to its essential elements. Andy Semmel is next.

ANDREW SEMMEL: Thanks, Daryl. First of all, let me say it’s a pleasure to be here to talk on behalf of myself. That’s the good news. The bad news is that when I talk on behalf of myself these days, I have to prepare my own remarks and that means I rely upon the thin veneer of my knowledge and background.

Daryl asked me to focus on the nexus between safeguards, verification, and compliance, and as they relate, obviously, to the NPT. So I’ll do that. I’ll focus on verification through the safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) because it’s the sole international mechanism for monitoring nuclear activities and commitments that are undertaken by states in conformity with their NPT obligations.

Needless to say, verification is important to the credibility and the viability of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. When states accept and implement the IAEA safeguards, this serves as a confidence-building measure in which states can demonstrate and ensure other states that nuclear energy is being used solely for peaceful purposes.

But the safeguards are also important because they can set off alarm bells when a country diverts its nuclear material away from peaceful purposes and are not in compliance, therefore, with their safeguards or their NPT obligations. Without this confidence and without the timely alarms that the safeguards and verification can provide, the credibility of the NPT can be weakened and undermined. Proliferation and nuclear terrorism become simply more likely.

The IAEA’s safeguards responsibilities have grown rapidly over the last decade or so. Over the last 15 years, the amount of nuclear material under safeguards has increased about 10-fold. This rapid growth in safeguards requirements is likely to grow even more rapidly in the future for some of the reasons that have already been discussed: the expected renaissance of nuclear energy, fuel cycle technology is becoming more accessible, climate change, and the like.

Safeguards and verification methodologies are works in progress. Some of you know this much better than I, but over the years, they’ve evolved in response to geopolitical changes that have taken place in the international system to meet new challenges. This evolution has essentially been reactive. That is to say, it’s reacted to those events that have taken place. The evolution has evolved in such a way as to make successive demands for greater transparency in states’ nuclear programs.

I won’t go into this very much in depth, but it’s useful to talk a little bit about the background. Initially, safeguards, going way back to the immediate post-1957 period of time, were really applied only at the discretion of states. In the immediate pre-NPT period after France and China joined the nuclear club in the 1960s, there was a demand for internationally, legally binding commitments to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was the first nuclear-weapon-free zone by the way, made binding IAEA safeguards a requirement for all states-parties. Then the NPT was signed the following year and approved.

The IAEA in the early 1970s then drafted a model comprehensive safeguards agreement, which obliged all non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude and enable the IAEA to verify that their nuclear materials were not being diverted toward nuclear weapons programs. This has remained the core of the IAEA’s verification activities for non-nuclear-weapon states. About 160 states right now have a comprehensive safeguards agreement. About 30 do not and this is one of the problems. 

The key event, in more recent times, was the discovery in the early 1990s that Iraq had an advanced, undetected, secret nuclear weapons program. This highlighted some of the weaknesses in the existing safeguards and verification implementation. Basically, the discovery was a catalyst for strengthening the safeguards systems to better verify not only the correctness of a state’s declaration of its nuclear material and nuclear program, but also its completeness. The strengthening of the safeguards came in the form of a Model Additional Protocol. 

The Model Additional Protocol, which was approved in 1997, gave the IAEA inspectors a number of tools that they didn’t have at the time. I won’t go into a lot of this, but part of it gave the IAEA inspectors information and access to all parts of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle. It gave inspectors short-notice access to buildings at a site, information on the manufacture of exports, information on sensitive nuclear-related materials and equipment, and information from environmental sampling.

There’s much more to it than that, but the point is that the Model Additional Protocol expanded the information base and the access of international inspectors. This greatly expanded the IAEA’s information base. The major problem is that some 11 years later, today, only less than 80 countries have actually signed onto an additional protocol and put it in force. So there are more than 100 states that are out there that have not yet put an additional protocol into force, which, of course, hampers the authority of the international inspectors to go in and verify. 

More recently, the IAEA has sought to look deeper into a state’s program, even beyond the additional protocol authorities, using what they call information-driven or the state-level approach to safeguards. In practical terms, that means the IAEA could use practically any source of information that is available to it in the public sector, the inspections, in-field monitoring, satellite imagery, environmental sampling, and the like. Now, I did that very quickly and there’s a lot more to it than I could otherwise discuss.

What happened with the Iraqi experience in 1991 and 1992 that was discovered was that they did have this advanced nuclear weapons program unbeknownst to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the international community at the time. I think we can expect that what’s going to happen now with the cumulative pressures that have developed out of the Iranian case where there has been at least two decades of undeclared experiments and activities.

Not only the Iranian case, but also the North Korean withdrawal from the NPT; the A.Q. Khan network, the secret supply network that was already discussed; and now the mysteries surrounding the Syrian reactor. These kinds of events suggest that there are inadequacies and some gaps in our safeguards and verification program at the international level. These are likely to give, and they already have, rise to new demands for additional authorities, which I want to talk about, to strengthen safeguards and strengthen verification.

Now, President Bush in 2004, as I guess has been noted by Sharon, proposed a number of things in that speech that he gave at the National Defense University. One of them was to create a committee on safeguards and verification at the IAEA. This was a committee that was designed to set up ways in which we could strengthen international safeguards by giving more authorities and more tools for international inspectors to ensure that a country is not using its peaceful programs and diverting it into nuclear weapons uses.

In short, we eventually got the Committee on Safeguards and Verifications set up at the IAEA.  Basically, it flopped. After a number of meetings, it simply atrophied because they could not get any agreements on it. But the Secretariat at the IAEA did propose about 18 different proposals which are all kind of interesting. I want to talk about some of those. There have been other studies that have been done to look at ways in which we can strengthen safeguards and verification in order to respond to the new kinds of developments with respect to Iran, with respect to North Korea, the A.Q. Khan network, Syria, and the like.

I suppose the first thing that needs to be said on this score is that probably the most significant development that would strengthen the NPT at this point in time, putting aside some of these recommendations, is if we get the Iran case resolved the right way. If it’s not resolved the right way, then I suspect that the strains in the NPT and the whole verification system are going to become even greater and the whole NPT may begin to unravel even more.

But let me talk about some of the suggestions, the ways in which we might strengthen safeguards and verification, which is what this panel is all about. There are four different areas, I think, that we can look at; four different clusters of areas that are important. First is to give the IAEA more legal authority than they have now. That’s that continuous process that goes back to the 1960s up until the present. Second is to develop new technologies for detection and monitoring that they do not now have. The third way is to strengthen the international expertise for new methods of verification and safeguards. And, finally, new sources of funding. Let me go through a couple of these very, very quickly.

In the area of new and expanding authorities, the most significant advance, I think, that the IAEA and the international inspectors and verification could take would be the universalization of the additional protocol. As I mentioned before, only about 80 countries have an additional protocol in force. That is to say, the authorities that the International Atomic Energy Agency has can only be applied or implemented in those 80 countries; 100 countries or so lack this.

What’s important here is some of the key countries that may or may not be tempted to move down the trail of developing an advanced nuclear weapons program, simply have not put the additional protocol into place. Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and North Korea are all countries that are in that category. Without universalization of the additional protocol, the IAEA’s legal authority is truncated. As long as inspectors remain—inspections remain uneven from country to country—safeguards and verification will not be fully effective and there will be a confidence deficit.

Some suggest in the area of new and expanded authorities that we move toward an “additional protocol plus” or “additional protocol II.”  That is to say, go beyond the logic of the evolution of strengthening safeguards over time. Additional protocol II would be gaining even more access to sights and information related to nuclear material, production, and so forth. I suspect this is a very premature suggestion. Let’s get through the first additional protocol before we go to “additional protocol two.” But it’s been suggested.

A second suggestion that’s been made is the right to private interviews. International inspectors ought to be able to interview key individuals that presumably have some knowledge about programs within a country. This gets very tricky; it gets very difficult for the personal security of those individuals who might be interviewed, but it would be useful to have that authority nonetheless, unfettered. The IAEA also needs more authority to investigate possible weaponization. Right now, that authority is somewhat compromised because it exists only when there is some nexus with nuclear material. 

States should be encouraged, voluntarily, to report more information to the IAEA on exports, on export denials, on sensitive technology, on suspicious procurement attempts, and the like. This would seem obvious to most of us here, but, in fact, this does not happen in any kind of vigorous way. There should also be greater willingness to share intelligence and proliferation relevant information with the agency; not just to share it, but to share it in a timely manner and to share it with some authority to use it with all of the protections of sources and methodologies. So these are a number of authorities that could be given to the International Atomic Energy Agency which are ambiguous now or which they don’t have.

Secondary, we need to improve technologies to detect and monitor. Information is the heart of verification. If the IAEA is going to be able to adjust to these new stresses and strains with Iran and the like, they need some more tools in their toolbox. There should be more research and development and investment by member states into the means to detect undeclared nuclear activities and clandestine nuclear activities through innovative technologies. This is ongoing, but some more investment ought to take place in this area.

Some of these tools can be used for remote monitoring, technologies used to provide feedback in real time to the IAEA. The agency should also modernize its forensics capabilities, both at the Seibersdorf Analytical Lab in Vienna and also the network of analytical labs that are now in about eight countries around the world. If the volume of material coming in is going to increase, then you need to increase the forensic and modernize their forensic capabilities. 

It should also encourage member states and their private industry to design and build safeguards into reactors and into other aspects of the fuel-cycle process. The U.S. labs can play a major role in this in the same way that they built safety features into reactors in the past. Why not build safeguard features into them as well? I think the member states and industry ought to bear the cost of these new designs.

A third area, staffing and expertise, is very self-evident in many ways. The agency now is understaffed. By the way, the State Department also is understaffed in safeguards capabilities, a point that some of us may want to talk about a little bit more. But the agency is understaffed in safeguards personnel. It’s aging and it’s underfunded. The pool of nuclear experts around the world is not particularly deep from which to recruit and to train and to retain the next generation of verification specialists. 

I don’t personally think that the IAEA will have to revise its own personnel policies which, in some ways, are outmoded and sometimes counterproductive. This current and next-generation of specialists will need to be educated and trained in the use of safeguards, really a technology know-how. I suspect the U.S. universities, the labs, and professional associations should all play a role in this regard. 

Finally, let me discuss the area of funding and resources. The volume of safeguards and verification are simply not only going to increase, but they’re also going to be more difficult, a point that’s been made by both Sharon and Norm. The volume is going to increase because of the growth in the number of nuclear facilities and become more difficult because of the spread of nuclear technology. And knowledge is likely to grow.

There would be a temptation, as Sharon pointed out, to fill out the nuclear fuel cycle and, in many states, to try to develop enrichment and fabrication, waste management, and so forth. This will put additional pressures on the IAEA and they’ll need additional resources to cope with that. All of this will require, as I mentioned, both additional resources, both human and capital resources. 

Some of you know that the IAEA is operated under a real, zero-real growth budget requirement since the 1980s, with one exception a few years ago, actually, when I first came into the State Department. If this continues, the IAEA will simply fall far behind the demands for effective verification. Clearly, the requirements have vastly outpaced funding availabilities. 

The IAEA now evaluates activities in about 160 states and over 950 facilities and installations with an annual budget of about 130 million euros. This is roughly the budget of a police force in a large city in the United States or, as I just found out last night, about a third of the public schools budget in Arlington County, where I live. The demands that may be placed on it without resources will simply amount to clearly an international functional equivalent of unfunded liabilities. 

A final word on the question of enforcement. The credibility of verification and of the NPT, I think, can be enhanced if violators and cheaters are not only detected and identified in a timely way, but also if there are assurances of the consequences for their noncompliance. There should be a price to pay for violators and for those who do not meet their treaty obligations. The IAEA has no independent legal enforcement authority. It has to rely on the United Nations Security Council for action. And the U.N. record, as pointed out already this morning, has been, at best, mixed, not just on the question of verification, but if you look across the panoply of issues on Darfur and Bosnia, Rwanda, and others. On Iran, we’ve had three U.N. Security Council resolutions mandating international sanctions, but Iran continues to enrich uranium.

So it’s difficult to get consensus in the United Nations Security Council, as we know. But the alternatives are not necessarily any better. The alternatives are either unilateralism or the use of force or inaction. What we’ve got right now in terms of the process of enforcement is not particularly satisfactory. Perhaps there ought to be some changes and reforms and additions to the enforcement side of verification. 

What we know is that if the IAEA is given additional authorities, as it was in the case of Iraq, and is enabled to have more access and more information, that is, to inspect anytime, anyplace, international verifiers can do a more credible job. We also know that, or think we know, that the cost and consequences of violations or cheating on the obligations ought to be automatic; that is my suggestion.

Violators should pay some penalty for their violations. By that, I mean they ought to pay some penalty for violations even if the violation is technical. This has been a suggestion made by a number of writers on this question. That is to say, if a country inadvertently violates its obligations, there ought to be some consequences even for those countries. So in the past, when Egypt and Romania and South Korea engaged in unintended, presumably unintended, technical violations, there ought to have been some response to it other than a tepid slap on the wrist.

It seems to me that this would be one very important way of hopefully deterring these kinds of technical violations, but, secondly, it would be a way of promoting a stronger compliance culture on the part of member states. One or two other quick examples. Pierre Goldschmidt had made a suggestion that the United Nations Security Council ought to pass a generic resolution that basically says that that applies to all countries. That is to say, when a country does in fact non-technically violate its NPT or safeguards obligations, there ought to be some automaticity in terms of applying some sanctions or some penalty on that country. This is a way of avoiding focusing on an individual country and avoiding the prospect of a veto by one country or significant softening of sanctions on a given country.

I recently noticed also that Senator McCain stated that countries that are in violation or withdraw from the NPT should return or dismantle whatever they received while in good standing in the NPT. Okay. Finally, let me just mention one other thing because this may come up and I think Norm has already mentioned it on the issue of withdrawal from the NPT. This was a question that was catalyzed by the North Koreans’ withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. There’s been a little bit of a growth industry, cottage industry in terms of trying to develop ways in which we can develop an understanding of Article X of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—Article X is the withdrawal article in the treaty—in such a way as to interpret it so the understanding is that countries would be deterred from withdrawing on the one hand because there are expectations of penalties and costs associated with, and, if they do withdraw from the NPT, that, in fact, the penalties and the punishment would be sure to follow; punishment in the form of returning all nuclear materials and equipment that have been accumulated while the country that has withdrawn was in good standing and cut off all nuclear supplies through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other means. The real issue here is, how do you do it? How do you enforce that once you reinterpret Article X in such a way?

So, there are a number of ways on the side of strengthening safeguards, I think, that are important for strengthening verification and thereby strengthening the NPT, as well as ways I think we can also address the question of enforcement in order to also strengthen and reinforce the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Thanks. (Applause.)

KIMBALL: Well, thank you all for your very rich and full presentations. We’ve got a lot of material to discuss. Now is your opportunity to ask the panelists your questions and there are microphones that will be brought to you if you could just please identify yourself and ask your question. We’ll start right here. Thank you.

QUESTION: Andrew Pierre, Georgetown University. Daryl, in his introduction, mentioned the weekend news, so I guess that’s fair game for discussion this morning. For anybody who missed it, yesterday’s Washington Post had an article saying that the design of compact warheads, miniature warheads, appeared on one or more computers, laptops, several years ago linked to the A.Q. Khan network and some Swiss businessmen and that it looked like that information had been transmitted to countries. David Sanger, this morning, talks in the plural, a number of countries that might have received it. I noticed Ambassador Wulf used the term “tipping point.”  Very often, in complex situations, there are a number of tipping points. I’m sure you would agree. I wondered to what extent in this nonproliferation field that we’re all so deeply devoted to, that will not be seen as a tipping point? More importantly, perhaps, to the extent that it is possible, can the arms control community and this organization in particular somehow focus itself a bit more in the past on this secretive world of warhead design and the transmission of warhead design to a number of countries which might potentially put them to use? That’s for anybody on the panel who wants to venture into this field.

KIMBALL: Maybe, Norm, if you could start. We were talking about this before we started this morning.

WULF: I think it’s an extremely good question and, obviously, an extremely troublesome development. We’ve always known, I think, in the nonproliferation field that the area of export controls was a very, very useful tool, but it’s a tool of diminishing value; diminishing value because of increasing industrialization. I have to say that I tend to have some doubts as to whether A.Q. Khan really was acting without the knowledge and authorization of his government, but I can understand why we have to pay lip service to that concept.

But with the A.Q. Khan network and the release of this kind of information, both either warhead design and enrichment technology, one has to assume that’s out there now for anybody who has got some money and maybe not even that much money. So the real question is not hiding the secret. Now the question is, can you control enough of the technology, the industrialization process, to try to prevent countries from acquiring a nuclear capability? Obviously, that becomes much more difficult as free trade puts more and more complex facilities in more and more countries. We’ve seen in the case of North Korea that one can build and design a reprocessing capability. We’ve seen in the case of Libya that Malaysia can build enrichment centrifuges. There’s a lot of, shall we say, capability out there.

So the heavy reliance we placed upon export controls has got to be bolstered; we have to find something else to refurbish the nonproliferation regime. The biggest factor needed is political will in compliance issues, for example, and setting an example, creating an example. The question then becomes, who can provide the leadership to demonstrate that political will? Who can provide the example for the other countries of the world? 

I think the answer remains, it has to be fundamentally, the United States because we have to go out, I believe, and work extremely aggressively with all of the countries in the world trying to shore up the norm of nonproliferation as an international norm to help make up for the weakening of export controls. That’s another part of the tipping point. I totally agree with you that we are at a serious point in time because of the A.Q. Khan network.

KIMBALL: Andy or Sharon, do you have some thoughts on this question? Or not?

SQUASSONI: Just briefly. Norm made the point that all of the elements of our nonproliferation regime are designed to delay, make more difficult, give countries maybe a second thought about what they are about to embark on. From an intelligence perspective, the real hurdle you’re looking at is the fissile-material production, which we’ve always considered to be the hardest part, not the weaponization. 

Weaponization everybody always assumed was six months. Is this really disturbing? Yeah. I think the more disturbing thing about the Kahn network was that it was kind of a full-service salon. It wasn’t just the information, but it was the entire network of manufacturers. I don’t know if this is a tipping point, but it’s certainly a very serious development.

KIMBALL: In listening to Andy Semmel’s presentation for the recommendations that he listed, I think this incident makes several of those much, much more relevant. Giving the IAEA the right to interview certain individuals would have been useful in 2003 when Kahn was outed. It would still be useful today and I think the United States has a responsibility to try to help the IAEA interview Kahn and some of his associates. Pakistan has a responsibility, too, because this is a qualitatively more severe form of proliferation that we’re hearing about now.

This incident makes added IAEA authority to investigate weaponization all the more important.  Of course, as Norm was saying, this makes the role of the United States in decreasing the salience of nuclear weapons and strengthening the taboo—I think there is a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons—all the more important. So those are a couple.

SEMMEL: I would just say one thing. Obviously, what this speaks to is some of the weakness of existing international controls that we have through all of the means that are available to us. As Sharon pointed out, many of the dual-use technologies and know-how are being disseminated very rapidly. If Sanger is right, if the cat is out of the bag, then we have to figure out how this would not happen again.

But one of the things this drives home to me, in my own pessimistic view of the world, is that maybe this amounts to a tipping point. It just seems to me that if one of the poorest countries in the world, North Korea, can develop a nuclear weapons programs and even set off a modest nuclear weapon, and if Iran breaks out—a country that has been subjected to close to a dozen IAEA resolutions, three U.N. Security Council resolutions mandating international sanctions, two decades or more of U.S. unilateral sanctions, international ostracism and so forth and so on; you can tack onto that as much as you want—then the system that we’ve got in place right now is simply inadequate and that there are gaps. 

We need to begin to identify those gaps and fill them as best we can. It’s very difficult in the international context. Norm is right; somebody’s got to take the leadership role. The United States certainly can do that and I would think that, in the role that I play, that there’s a lot more willingness to take these kinds of steps to fill gaps if somebody takes the lead. There’s a lot more, shall we say, reserve out there in the international community among other countries that, if somebody sort of gets to the head of the line and starts moving, that others will want to go along with long enough to address these kinds of proliferation problems. Quite frankly, we haven’t taken that leadership role in recent years.

KIMBALL: Other questions? If we could get Charles Ferguson right there. Thank you.

QUESTION: Thanks, Daryl. Charles Ferguson, Council on Foreign Relations. My question is to Andy Semmel and I really enjoyed your recommendations. I was nodding my head to all of them and I enjoyed your excellent history of the safeguard system and how it’s evolved. What probably many of us in the room realize, you’ve reminded us, is that every time the safeguard system has kind of jerked forward, it has been because of a crisis. 

I think what you’re asking in your recommendations is can we be more proactive? I think what was left out of your talk, which is the really hard thing, and I’ll pose this question to you, is who stymied further development of safeguards? What has stymied further development of safeguards? Is it bureaucracy? Is it inertia? Is it lack of political will? Is it the IAEA board of governors and how it’s made up? Is it the fact that safeguards are perceived as a burden? Is there a way to change that dynamic so it’s not looked upon as a burden, but looked upon as some type of positive thing? As you know, there’s this trade-off that when the non-nuclear-weapon states see more safeguards being applied to them, they want more technical cooperation. So it’s not the tradeoff. We have to sort of buy them off with more technical cooperation. Thank you.

SEMMEL: I think you gave an excellent response to your own question. Part of the problem is, of course, the decision-making in international organizations. In the case of IAEA, it’s very difficult to get 35 members to agree on issues which they’ve historically disagreed on because it entails, among other things at the IAEA, more funding. That is to say, each country would then be committed to providing more resources. I can tell you, for the miniscule amount of funding that this involves for a number of the countries, the intensity of the disagreements is extraordinary that take place in trying to move forward on that. 

You’re absolutely right, also, about the balance, at least in the International Atomic Energy Agency, that needs to be struck. It’s a political balance. You have to make sure that there’s enough resources devoted to technical cooperation and technical assistance to the vast number of countries, which are all really concerned about the benefits; the peaceful benefits in health and sanitation and agriculture that derive from nuclear know-how and nuclear technologies that the IAEA can funnel to them, as the case may be. The issue is how you balance that off against some of the larger nonproliferation concerns that the United States has. That’s a very, very difficult process.

It’s a little bit of all of those things. Again, unless there is somebody that jumps out and sort of grabs the reigns on this issue, in the same way that the Four Statesmen have grabbed the reigns on the issue of nuclear disarmament, it’s not likely that we’re going to see a lot of these changes.  The changes are going to be, at best, incremental. They’re not going to be any vast, giant leap-forwards, quantum leaps in terms of changes because the process is a very conservative process, very slow-moving. Only when the dangers, the kinds that we all mentioned today, are very self-evident will the international community operate. 

The United States, again, I think Norm is absolutely right. We’re in a position, even with our current disposition in the world, I think we’re in a position to take a much more aggressive leadership role. It’s in our interest to do so. It’s not that we ought to do that, but we have our own problems. You know how difficult it is just to get a little bit more funding for the United States into verification and safeguards and to the IAEA. Given the enormous costs associated with it, in the absence of this funding, it’s surprising that we have these kinds of difficulties. I’ve experienced them; some of you have experienced them first-hand as well in the bureaucracy.

So I think it’s all of those kinds of problems, Charles, but I don’t expect any rapid turnaround. As I say, the demands on improving our efforts to ensure compliance are vastly exceeding our ability to deal with them at this point in time. That’s what some of my pessimism is all about.

KIMBALL: I think Norm has a response. If you could make it brief, we are running short on time. We are going to take about two or three more questions before we make our transition to the next session.

WULF: I was just going to quickly add that when we negotiated the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, the biggest problem we had was with Europe and Japan. What broke that logjam was a letter from President Clinton to Chancellor Cole saying the United States would accept the same obligations. I think President Bush in 2001 submitted that protocol for advice and consent in the Senate. The Senate gave that advice and consent in about 2003. Legislation to implement it was passed, now, granted, it is bad legislation. Nonetheless, legislation was passed to implement it in 2006. It’s still not in force. We can’t go back to Europe and sell an additional strengthening of that protocol until we finally do what we’ve said we’re going to do all along.

KIMBALL: Okay. We’ve got Larry Weiler right here, if you’d bring the microphone quickly. Then we’ll take a couple of questions on the other side with Joel and Wayne. Thank you. Larry?

QUESTION: Two points that Norm mentioned that I would like to ask for a response on. First, he just added at the end about the need for, I gather he’s talking about, new machinery to handle all of these many things that have to be done. I think that to only set forth great goals of many things that have to be done without addressing the issue of how in the government you’re going to ever have the capability to address them is a problem. We’re missing a great bit here.

The main thing I would like to address is the question of legitimacy of nuclear weapons. If we accept that there are various strategic reasons why people do or do not go, one of the things is the political will. That has to do with whether or not they believe the world is going to be a world of nuclear weapons. For some reason, we keep going away from the idea of taking action that indicates we really do mean business this time by addressing the issue of nuclear weapons use. 

No one addresses that. We did have a gang of three a long time ago: Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy and Gerard Smith. We had one president, Johnson, who authorized a no-first-use proposal, which the public does not know about. But it seems to me that to address the issue of the de-legitimizing nuclear weapons while you’re waiting, or at least part of the beginning of addressing all of these other questions before we get to zero nuclear weapons in the world, is what is missing here.

KIMBALL: Thank you. Let’s take a couple of questions over here, please, and then we’ll have the panelists answer the set.

QUESTION: Hi, Jill Parillo from Physicians for Social Responsibility. Thank you very much today for your talks. I was really learning a lot and ready to do a lot of research with some of that. Well, first of all, I just want to add to your story, Ambassador Wulf. I was interning for the Monterey Institute at the Conference on Disarmament. We were in Geneva, but we all flew over to New York for a PrepCom in 2004 so I knew Ambassador Sanders because we were at the Conference on Disarmament together. She sent her third secretary over somewhere during the conference, and he said, “please, can you quickly write down the 13 steps to nuclear disarmament? (Laughter.) We don’t know what they are.” So I actually did have to write them down. Anyways, but my question is for all of you, actually. To receive more concessions in order to prevent the further spread of sensitive fuel-cycle technology, could you mention two or three incentives we could bring to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Thank you.

KIMBALL: Thank you. Wayne? Over here.

QUESTION: My question is for Andy Semmel. I was listening to all of the very useful steps that you outlined on verification and enforcement. It struck me that one thing that would benefit all of them was that if we had a larger pool of experts who could speak the languages of the targeted proliferating states. It seemed like it would be a relatively cheap investment to have programs in high schools, colleges, and grad schools to teach more students to speak Arabic, Farsi, and whatever other languages would be useful. Do you think that’s a useful approach?

KIMBALL: So we have three questions on the table: what to do about 2010, the no-first-use issue, and then this last question. Norm?

WULF: I’ll quickly do the no-first-use question. I think the rule of declaratory policies remains important. I would say not only should we have a no-first-use policy, but it could also be very useful to reiterate our negative security assurance that was, shall we say, revalidated, if I can phrase it that way, in 1995, prior to the extension conference.

But as important as declaratory policies are, actions are even more important. What I would like to see most of all are some real meaningful reductions in the number of stockpiles in a verifiable and irreversible manner. 

KIMBALL: Sharon?

SQUASSONI: I would say, just briefly, you asked Jill about incentives we could bring, and you can look at them as gee, should they just be focused in fuel-cycle areas or, you know, broader. Because I think you can’t forget, obviously, the disarmament part of it. I would say the U.S. should come out and say that one or two of its new centrifuge or enrichment plants will be multilateral or multinational. The other thing, we could come with is an effectively verifiable cutoff draft treaty.

SEMMEL: The last question first: on the question of the desirability of having a larger pool of specialists dealing with verification, safeguards and the like, obviously, language capabilities would amplify upon those technical skills that they might not otherwise have. Last year, I addressed a group of graduate students from the University of California system and their entire focus was on international forensics. So there are some programs, Monterey and others episodically, that are dealing with this. But I don’t think there’s any systematic effort to deal with enlarging the pool of expertise. 

I mentioned tongue-in-cheek, in my presentation, that even in the State Department, we’ve sort of drained that capability down to a handful of individuals who are very good. So internationally we lack this capability, but also internally we lack it as well. We really got to do something about this rapidly, it seems to me.

In terms of incentives for the 2010 review conference, I’ll retrace some biases here. Whenever anybody mentions the 2005 Review Conference the palms of my hand begin to sweat. (Laughter.) When you want something, you got to consider giving something; to get, you have to give. One of the things that I would have liked to have seen us do in 2005, and now we should do it in 2010, is to simply propose that we would be more forthcoming in technical assistance for the vast majority of countries that are going to be at the 2010 conference. That may or may not sort of open up the gates a little bit more. 

I think we ought to seriously think about a re-declaration of the positive security assurances that go back, as well as offering some sense of thinking about negative security assurances as well. But those are very difficult policy nuts to crack.  We ought to, this was already suggested, perhaps put much more of our excess fissile material under international safeguards, inspection, and the like. These are all kinds of things that the United States can do to indicate that we are willing to go the extra step if other countries are willing to follow the lead. From a technical standpoint and from a procedural standpoint, the nuclear-weapon states in 2010 ought to try to develop a statement, a combined statement by the five nuclear-weapon states, expressing where we stand as a unique collectivity. Hopefully, if that can be done in a positive way, this would set into motion some really positive expectations about where we’re going to go in the future of the NPT.

KIMBALL: Thank you, Andy. Norm’s presentation at the beginning reminds us that one of the other key steps the United States can take is to be in action to pursue some of those key 13 steps that were outlined in 2000, well ahead of the 2010 review conference itself.

We have time for about one more question. I see around the corner there are some smart people in the overflow area and I want to give them a chance to ask a question, even though they may have arrived just a couple minutes too late. I’m going to let our intern decide who of you will ask the question because I can’t see that way, though you can see me. So go ahead, ask your question please, and tell us who you’re directing it to because they can’t see you either. Or step forward, please.

QUESTION: My name is Morris Klein. It’s to Ms. Squassoni. At the end, she said something about national pride. I’ve heard Iranians speak and they say, why not? Why can’t we have one? Everyone else has them. So the question is, how do we discourage this line of thinking, where it’s our national right to have weapons in this world. Being a former scientist, when there is a will, there is a way. Countries will find a way to have nuclear weapons. Thank you.

KIMBALL: Thank you. That sounds like a good question to end this session on. Sharon?

SQUASSONI: That’s a great question, but I feel like this is a radio show because I can’t see you. (Laughter.) It’s a great question and it applies to, you know, how do we discourage other countries not to develop not just uranium enrichment, but nuclear weapons when we seem to hold them so dear. We would have to take, you know, a position, I think, that would be very hard for us to take. I remember Barry Blechman  once standing up at a very defense-heavy conference saying nuclear weapons: we don’t like them; they’re no good; we’re never going to use them; they’re awfully expensive; they create lots of waste; you know, let’s just be frank about it. Everyone in the audience went, oh! You know, we could get up and say uranium enrichment: it’s incredibly expensive; it has environmental consequences; you can’t really make money off of it; and a whole bunch of those things. 

But I think those are hard arguments for us to make. You can also push it further on fast-breeder reactors and plutonium in a civil fuel cycle. Nobody, the Japanese, the French, and the Russians, don’t want to say how expensive this is and how hard it is to get the technology to work. I really think the solution, therefore, is just to say let’s not do it nationally. Let’s multi-nationalize it. It’s very hard to come up with a definition of what that is in terms of ownership, management, and all of those things. I haven’t heard anybody really describe it very well. I think that’s the solution. Rather than trying to say, you know, gee, this isn’t such a great approach, we’ll say, well, let’s do it together. We’ll take the national prestige out of it that way.

KIMBALL: Either of you have any pearls of wisdom on that question?

SEMMEL: The only wisdom I would have is what I said earlier, which is that the best way is by setting the example. Sharon’s suggestion, for example, of taking one of our facilities and multi-nationalizing it would be a first good step in trying to demonstrate that this is the way to go. The other, obviously, is with the whole package of de-legitimizing nuclear possession in the first place.

KIMBALL: Please join me in thanking our panelists. (Applause.)

END

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at Forty: Addressing Current and Future Challenges

Body: 

LUNCHEON ADDRESS

WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION:
DARYL G. KIMBALL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

SPEAKER:
AMBASSADOR SÉRGIO DE QUIEROZ DUARTE,
UNITED NATIONS HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS; PRESIDENT, OF THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
Edited by the Arms Control Association

June 16, 2008

DARYL KIMBALL: Welcome to our luncheon program, thank you. As I said this morning, it’s a pleasure to see so many good friends of the Arms Control Association here today. Before I give our speaker an introduction, I want to give a few of you a chance to finish your lunch and for the wait-staff to clear it away. While they do that I wanted to once again thank our loyal and generous members, as well as our Arms Control Today subscribers who are here. You really are a loyal and generous bunch, and without your support this meeting and our work would not be possible. 

I wanted to note today that last year, on the occasion of the Arms Control Association’s 35th anniversary, we asked you, our members and subscribers, to increase your individual contributions to help increase the capacity of the organization. You responded, and we want to thank you very much for that. Some of our major funders also renewed and increased their support with multi-year grants. Members of the Arms Control Association contributed more than $16,000 in contributions above the previous year’s level. So thank you very much. (Applause.)

While our surroundings are elegant and our dinner is elegant, too, we take pride in doing a great deal with the relatively few resources that we have. As they might have said back in the 1950s, we try to deliver a big bang for the buck.

I also do want to note right now the great work of our professional and highly dedicated staff. They have responded superbly over the last several years to the challenges facing the Arms Control Association, and on the subjects that we deal with. All of them should make our members very proud. Just in the last year, this staff has produced 10 great issues of the best magazine in the field, Arms Control Today. Each one is 50-plus pages; I’m not quite sure how they do it. It’s a grueling schedule and, while the print circulation is relatively small, Arms Control Today is read and followed by many, many, more around the world and throughout the country on our website. 

We’ve held numerous press briefings over the past year, delivered dozens of presentations, met with dozens of congressional staff, congressional members, diplomats, and executive branch officials. I think we have made a small difference in some key areas, so I’m very proud of that. Keep in mind, finally, that this is all done with just eight full-time staff people and the support of our board of directors, many of which are here today. So just imagine what we can do with two more staff or one more staff person in the years ahead. (Laughter.) So keep that in mind as you go home after today.

Now, as we move forward in 2009, there will be new opportunities to get U.S. arms control nonproliferation policy back on track. The Arms Control Association and others in our community are going to have to work even harder. Ultimately, our success is going to depend on good working relationships with our elected leaders and the world’s leading diplomats on nuclear disarmament. Today’s luncheon speaker is one of these pivotal figures.

Ambassador Sérgio Duarte is currently the U.N. high representative for disarmament. Prior to this post, he was the president of the 2005 NPT review conference. When you look over his resume, he has had an amazing 48-year career in Brazil’s foreign service, going back to his role as a member of Brazil’s delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. On some other occasion, it might be fun to have a few of the active veterans and the State Department veterans from that era sit down with Ambassador Duarte and a few others, to share a few negotiation stories from that time. (Laughter.) I’m sure there are a few things we all would learn and be amazed about.

Today, we’ve asked Ambassador Duarte to share with us his views about how to make the next NPT Review Conference in 2010 a success. We’ve heard quite a bit about that this morning; about the need to initiate positive action to bring the countries of the world together around a balanced and comprehensive agenda. That pivotal NPT Review Conference is going to come only 14 months or so after the next U.S. president is inaugurated so preparation for that meeting is going to have to begin essentially on day one or at least day two.

Ambassador Duarte, I want to thank you for coming down from New York and joining us today. We look forward to your remarks. After Ambassador Duarte is finished with his remarks we’re going to be taking questions, once again, from the audience. Ambassador Sérgio Duarte. (Applause.)

AMBASSADOR SÉRGIO DUARTE: Thank you, Daryl. Thank all of you for being here. It is indeed an honor to be here and also a pleasure to see among several of you, people that I have known for many years in this field. As we continue to work, I think we should recognize the difficulties of this kind of work, but also renew our commitment to achieving results in that sphere.

Let me thank Daryl Kimball and his colleagues at the Arms Control Association for their fine work on some of the toughest problems on the international security agenda. Together, you at this organization have earned the respect of your peers in civil society as well as in governments and international organizations throughout the world. It is therefore a great honor for me to accept your invitation to speak on the prospects for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, a timely issue indeed, as the winds of political change sweep across the globe and open up new possibilities for strengthening this vitally important treaty regime.  
As some of you may know, I have been working on various NPT issues for many years, even before the treaty was opened for signature in 1968. I served as a junior member of the Brazilian delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, as Daryl mentioned, in Geneva, which deliberated and discussed the treaty drafts submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Brazil was one of the several countries that waited many years—in some cases, in several countries, decades—before deciding to accede to the NPT. Some countries believed that the agreed text did not fully satisfy the standards for a nonproliferation treaty as set forth in Resolution 2028, in which the U.N. General Assembly set up the principles that the treaty should have. Among those principles, the treaty should be void of any loop-holes, it should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities, and it should constitute a step toward nuclear disarmament. 

Others felt that the obligations of the treaty weighed heaviest on the shoulders of the non-nuclear-weapon states, while the rights and privileges fell disproportionately to those who possessed such weapons. Many noted that the nonproliferation provisions of the treaty failed to prevent the nuclear-weapon states from basing their weapons in other countries, nor did it prohibit the further improvement and expansion of existing arsenals. Indeed, throughout the treaty’s first 16 years the number of nuclear weapons had grown considerably, new weapons had been developed, and last but not least, the disarmament clause in Article VI was seen as too weak and subject to conditions that made prospects for real progress in disarmament appear bleak.
Such perspectives on the treaty, of course, were quite different from that offered by United States Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, who delivered a long statement to the General Assembly’s First Committee on April 26, 1968, just before the signature of the treaty, explaining why the treaty would indeed serve its three primary goals of nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament.

With respect to the latter, disarmament, he stated that Article VI contained its own three goals which he said constituted, and I quote his words, “a practical order of priorities;” namely “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date,” proceeding next to “nuclear disarmament,” and finally to “general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” as the ultimate goal. Ambassador Goldberg went on to say that, and then I quote from his speech, “the permanent viability of this treaty will depend in large measure on our success in further negotiations contemplated in Article VI.” That’s the end of the quotation. During my time as a diplomat I often made the same point, and I believe it is still very relevant today.

Forty years later, we can see that there has been some progress in reducing nuclear stockpiles. The numbers are down, support for nuclear disarmament is undoubtedly growing, some nuclear test sites have been closed, a nuclear-test moratorium appears to be holding up, production of fissile materials for weapons has reportedly ceased in most if not all of the nuclear-weapon states, and various warheads and delivery vehicles have been retired. These are all very welcome as necessary steps in the implementation of Article VI, but they are of course not sufficient to alter persisting concerns, from several quarters, that the treaty is facing a double crisis relating to both its effectiveness and its legitimacy.

Concerns over the treaty’s effectiveness have been raised with reference to each of the treaty’s three pillars. Various states-parties have not fully complied with their nonproliferation and safeguards commitments, as seen historically in the cases of  Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, and as reflected in concerns over Iran’s past noncompliance with its safeguards commitments and its refusal to comply with Security Council resolutions concerning its fuel cycle. Many non-nuclear-weapon states, including some that have openly expressed regret that the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, complain of ever-increasing conditions or new demands for more stringent controls on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with no comparable improvements in overseeing the process of disarmament.

While it is true that the global nuclear stockpile fell substantially from its peak Cold-War level in the mid-1980s, the reduction relative to when the NPT was signed is far less impressive. According to an estimate by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the global nuclear stockpile in 2006 was still over two-thirds the level reported in 1968. There had been a net reduction of about 12,000 warheads from around 38,000 to 26,000, approximately. Meanwhile, various weapon improvements have taken place. The reductions that have occurred have only been declaratory and not internationally verified. There is still very little transparency of the size and composition of the world’s nuclear weapon arsenals. Several hundred nuclear weapons reportedly remain deployed on foreign soil. New nuclear-weapon missions and doctrines have evolved. New delivery systems have been created. And, there are long-term plans to modernize both warheads and delivery systems.

These crude indicators suggest only one logical conclusion: while there is much talk of disarmament in the air, there is still a shortage of disarmament facts on the ground. The longer this perception persists, the greater will be the concerns over the basic legitimacy and ultimate efficacy of this treaty. I am encouraged that some of the nuclear-weapon states have in recent years been making an effort to report on their efforts in the field of disarmament, and I hope to see additional and more comprehensive efforts in this area in the years ahead.

This brings me to an important question for discussion as we contemplate the 2010 Review Conference: what will the states-parties be using as their standard for measuring success in achieving disarmament and nonproliferation goals? People of course have different views on this, but I think most would like to see the progress registered not so much in lofty words about future visions and ideals, as in down-to-earth results. After all, 40 years have lapsed since the NPT was signed. The time for invoking lofty ideals is obviously over and real results are past due.

As regards disarmament, I believe that most observers would applaud the following future actions by the nuclear-weapon states as contributing to a good faith effort to realize the treaty’s aims. These would include the launching of operation plans for achieving security without nuclear weapons. We see today concrete plans for the indefinite retention of nuclear arsenals, but no specific plans for their elimination, no timetables, and no national benchmarks for assessing progress. There has lately been considerable academic attention paid to questions related to the shape of a world without nuclear weapons.

There is still, however, a lack of thought, let alone action, on any national institutional infrastructure for implementing nuclear disarmament. By this, I would include national agencies that have specific disarmament mandates, specialized laboratories that are moving out of the nuclear weapon business into disarmament activities, military research and training programmes for security in a nuclear-weapon-free world, and legislative committees for overseeing the fulfillment of national disarmament commitments. The world is familiar with the military-industrial complex, but sees no comparably elaborate institutional complex for disarmament. Institutions for disarmament, however, are not all. There is also a need to see strong evidence of support for disarmament in national budgets, legislation, and policy priorities.

Under Security Council Resolution 1540, all states are already obligated to adopt internal control measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to additional states or non-state actors. Is it really that much to ask those states that have made international treaty commitments to nuclear disarmament to ensure that their own domestic laws and institutions are fully consistent with those commitments?   

This brings me to the question of the standards for measuring progress in fulfilling disarmament obligations. Both in the NPT and in the U.N. General Assembly, states have repeatedly stressed the importance of fulfilling certain criteria for disarmament. These include irreversibility; namely, measures to ensure that materials from dismantled warheads will not find their way into new weapons. They include verification, to enhance confidence in full compliance and to reduce the risk of strategic surprises or efforts to violate commitments. They include transparency, a criterion needed so that the world can measure progress in achieving disarmament. It does not make a lot of sense to have yardsticks with nothing to measure. They also include what might be called the criterion of bindingness. While it is possible to make progress in disarmament through unilateral efforts, disarmament requires a degree of stability and permanence that can best be achieved within the rule of law.
Though these criteria are most often cited in discussions about disarmament, surely irreversibility, verification, transparency, and bindingness are also very good standards to apply to nonproliferation as well.

Both disarmament and nonproliferation objectives would be well served by progress in bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force and negotiations to begin, at long last, on a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for use in weapons. This point was made this morning. I am sure that the international community would like to see nuclear weapons taken off high-alert status. Repeated calls to that effect have been made by several responsible voices in many countries, including within the nuclear-weapon states, and this initiative would undoubtedly remove some of the incentive to proliferate by those who perceive threats. There is little doubt that the non-nuclear-weapon states want stronger security guarantees against the threat and use of nuclear weapons. 

Then there is the issue of a nuclear-weapons convention. Malaysia and Costa Rica circulated this year in the United Nations a text that had been drafted by experts as a useful tool for developing such a treaty. I hope that states with nuclear weapons will be thinking about such a convention, discussing it amongst themselves, and laying a foundation for future negotiations. Some may say that this is premature. I would respond that it is never too soon to think or talk when it comes to disarmament.

Accompanying these steps in disarmament, NPT states-parties must also make some progress in the field of nonproliferation. These would include significantly expanding the number of NPT states-parties that have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. As a practical matter, I believe that demonstrable progress in the field of disarmament will make it easier for states to strengthen their safeguards commitments further by adopting an additional protocol. Seeking to tighten safeguards without commensurate progress in disarmament will, I fear, only aggravate perceptions that the NPT is a discriminatory and unbalanced treaty. I hope there will be a robust international dialogue on the risks and potential benefits of the nuclear fuel cycle with virtually no option left off the table that can command an international consensus, ranging from national facilities under safeguards at one extreme, to full multilateral ownership with enhanced safeguards at the other. Only two options should be excluded with respect to the fuel cycle: an unconstrained international free-for-all or any other option that would adversely affect prospects for achieving global nuclear disarmament. 

On the regional level, I would hope that the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and Central Asia would have entered into force by 2010 and that all the nuclear-weapon states would have adhered to all of the relevant protocols to all such treaties, without placing reservations or interpretations that weaken the aims of those treaties. Nuclear-weapon states might also heed the calls to review the reservations they have placed in adhering to existing protocols to such treaties. I urge all nuclear-weapon states to support the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the southern hemisphere. But most important will be some sign of serious effort on every side to pursue the implementation of the Middle East Resolution, which was adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. That resolution was an inherent part of the package deal leading to the indefinite extension of the treaty and I think it is indeed fair to say that another two years of inaction on this would not bode well for a happy outcome in 2010.

As the president of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, I must caution against blaming a review conference for failing to reach a consensus on a final substantive document. Doing this is a little like blaming a barometer for stormy weather. (Laughter.) Review conferences are essentially complex instruments that are meant to tell states-parties something about the health of their treaty. Internal procedural arrangements have never been solely responsible for the inability of past review conferences to reach a consensus. To the contrary, I would argue that intractable procedural problems are mere symptoms of deeper political and substantive disagreements among the states-parties. If we resolve those differences, the procedural difficulties will by and large solve themselves.

Next year’s important third session of the Preparatory Committee will make every effort to adopt a consensus report containing substantive recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference. It will also seek to finalize procedural arrangements for the review conference, including the all-important adoption of an agenda. Chances for success in 2010 will of course grow with some real progress at the third PrepCom, especially on adoption of the agenda. Having myself witnessed first hand in 2005 what procedural disputes can do to a review conference, I would place a heavy emphasis on the importance of reaching agreement on the agenda before the conference. We have now two important precedents, an asterisk in 2005 and a footnote in 2007. These could help us to avoid wasting over half of the time over procedural disputes. Again, I feel that prospects for reaching early agreement on an agenda for 2010 will be profoundly influenced by perceptions among the states-parties that the treaty is truly making progress in achieving its stated goals, along with the complementary goals and political commitments that were agreed at various review conferences.

The mistrust, mutual suspicions, intransigence, and perceptions of bad faith that have handicapped past NPT gatherings could of course resurface in 2009 and 2010. Yet, I believe that the closer that the states-parties consider how this could recur, the more likely they will be to recognize the most effective antidote; namely, the importance of the overall track record of compliance by all the parties with all of their commitments, coupled with well-founded perceptions of hope for new progress in the years ahead. 

Nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament are as important to the treaty as the heart, lungs, and brain are to the human body. We don’t have the luxury of choosing between which we wish to retain. They are all vital, they are all functionally interdependent, and they all must be kept in good health.

The United States—the country that introduced the first comprehensive nuclear disarmament proposal in the United Nations in 1946 and with the Soviet Union, introduced the first detailed proposal for general and complete disarmament in the United Nations in 1961—has a tremendously important role to play in this entire process. I don’t believe it’s an exaggeration to say that this country performs a leadership role, whatever it does. If it voices an intention indefinitely to hold onto nuclear deterrence and perhaps a smaller nuclear arsenal, there are real possibilities that others will follow suit, as indeed they have done before. Yet if it voices its intention to pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world and backs up such words with concrete deeds, I truly believe the world will welcome this approach and will follow on this constructive course.

Other states can of course advance this process, especially groups of like-minded countries like the New Agenda Coalition and the Norwegian initiative. I am pleased that there are several creative ideas for promoting disarmament emerging from some of the states that possess nuclear weapons. Most recently, these would include the proposal by the United Kingdom for a technical conference on verifying nuclear disarmament. 

Yet interesting, creative ideas and political influence certainly do not come only from states. The Arms Control Association is but one nongovernmental organization that is working to promote the full implementation of this important international treaty. Worldwide, countless other arms control NGOs, mayors, legislators, religious leaders, women’s groups, environmental activists, scholars, scientists, journalists, and other such groups, including former political leaders, are working for the same goals. I cannot overstate the importance of their work. I wish them the best in all their efforts and offer my willingness to work with them in achieving one of humanity’s most ambitious goals, a nuclear-weapon-free world. With states and members of civil society working together toward this goal, we will truly have our best chance for making the 2010 NPT Review Conference a success.
Thank you for your attention. (Applause.)

KIMBALL: Thank you very much, Ambassador Duarte. We have time for perhaps one or two questions; we’re running a little behind schedule. Before we start, let me encourage those of you who do have a dessert in front of you to begin eating it. We do need to get started downstairs on time at 1:00. If the microphone could come here to this gentleman, please.

QUESTION: Ambassador, thank you very much for your remarks. I’m Joe Cirincione with the Ploughshares Fund. Could you prioritize, just a little bit for us? Next year, what could President McCain or President Obama do right out of the gate to encourage a successful outcome for the 2010 conference? Is there anything that would have a powerful symbolic or practical importance?

DUARTE: Well, Joe, thank you for the question. There have been several suggestions, as we know, made by many quarters and most of them, of course, are very constructive ones. There are a number of steps proposed by the so-called knights of the apocalypse versus the horsemen of the apocalypse, and there are many other proposals. I would think that one thing is paramount and should go even before any specific proposal, and this is a clear reconfirmation of the direction in which we should go, in which nuclear-weapon states should take. If they would jointly or separately make a clear statement that they intend to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, I think that would be a very good incentive for the 2010 conference. 
Then, of course, there are many other things that can be done individually, bilaterally, and multilaterally among those states before the conference. We all know those; I don’t have to repeat all those suggestions.

KIMBALL: Excellent. Right here please.

QUESTION: Thank you. Ambassador Duarte, could you expand a little bit on your views on the fuel-cycle issue? There are a lot of good proposals out there for multi-lateralizing in one form or another, but all of them run up against the issue of sovereignty. If I’m not mistaken, Brazil has been one of the holdouts on this issue. Of course, the history of these efforts at fuel-cycle reform has not been very happy. Do you think that there are proposals that could work, and what would be needed to overcome the resistance of those who see their sovereignty violated by it? Thank you.

DUARTE: Well, I don’t speak for Brazil any longer. (Laughter.) Fortunately, I would say. (Laughter.) Brazil has been holdout before on the NPT. It has serious doubts [on fuel cycle issues] as it had serious doubts on the NPT. Not only Brazil, but many non-nuclear-weapon countries have serious doubts on the proposals that have been made because these proposals—again, I’m not justifying that; I’m just trying to analyze the question as you put it—have been made from the supply side. You don’t have proposals, at least not that I know, coming from, let’s say, the other side of the spectrum. 

I think there is, justifiably, doubt whether the so-called assurances of supply will be really observed by those who are to assure. How can countries be assured? Particularly, countries that may be in a position to develop their own fuel cycles for their own purposes, peaceful purposes, I would hope. But how could these countries be sure that fuel would be assured over many, many years when political things have a way of changing over time, including political views? I think the question that has been asked by those who resist the proposal so far can be subsumed in one question: Who would assure the assurers; who would control the controllers? 

That is a major problem. I think that the way to solve that is to really have a serious discussion about that matter. There hasn’t been. There have been proposals, but not serious discussion among those who propose and those who have doubts about the proposals. The IAEA has tried to do that, unfortunately, with very little result. But I think we should deepen that work and try to be more clear about what the real difficulties are, and in what way can countries be really sure that if they adhere to some of these proposals, that they will really have their needs fulfilled.

KIMBALL: I think we’ve got time for one more brief question and a brief answer. Anyone else? No brief questions? Larry, a brief question?

QUESTION: Yes, sir. Now, I’m not attempting to avoid U.S. responsibilities here, but what is your judgment on whether or not there could be some change in the U.N. structure for dealing with the subject? I’m old enough to have witnessed the trail from the five-power London subcommittee to the 10-nation to the surprise attack conference to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, and now we’ve got a situation where we have a conference, not a negotiating structure, operating on the principle of unanimity. So what would be the reaction, you think, in the U.N. for a proposal for really restructuring it to produce some sort of an effective negotiating body?

DUARTE: I’ll try to make a short answer. These bodies, of course, are not the U.N. The 18 nations were a committee; the current Conference on Disarmament is not really a U.N. body. It started as something outside of the U.N., then of course in the first special session, disarmament was brought into the U.N. So you need the General Assembly, again, to revamp that, to seek another way. For that you need another special session on disarmament, a fourth one. I hope that the countries that have been resisting a fourth special session would agree to sit down and discuss what could be that new machinery. Again, personally, I don’t think there’s anything wrong with the machinery. I think the problem is somewhere else, but not with the machinery. That’s my view, at least. Thank you.

KIMBALL: Ambassador Duarte, again, thank you very, very much. (Applause.) And, thank you all. 

END

How Will the Next President Reduce Nuclear Dangers? McCain and Obama Campaign Represenatives Discuss Candidates’ Strategies

Body: 

AFTERNOON SESSION

WELCOME AND MODERATOR:
DARYL G. KIMBALL,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

SPEAKERS:
JOHN D. HOLUM,
FORMER DIRECTOR,
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

STEPHEN BIEGUN,
FORMER EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MONDAY, JUNE 16, 2008

Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
Edited by the Arms Control Association

DARYL KIMBALL: Good afternoon and welcome back for this third segment of today’s Arms Control Association event addressing the current and future challenges facing the global nuclear nonproliferation system and in particular, the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  I say 1968 because that treaty was opened for signature nearly 40 years ago on July 1, 1968.

I’m Daryl Kimball. I’m executive director of the Arms Control Association, which is the sponsor of today’s events. We were established in 1971 by several of the leading players in the negotiation of the NPT and other nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agreements. Through our journal, Arms Control Today, our website, and public events like this one, we seek to fulfill our mission which is to provide independent information and analysis and practical policy solutions to address the dangers posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons.

Now, today’s events have been focusing on the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as I said, which has, over the last four decades, established an indispensable yet imperfect set of interlocking nonproliferation and disarmament obligations and standards. Rather than dozens of nuclear-armed states today that were forecast before the NPT, we have only four additional countries beyond the original five possessors having nuclear weapons today. 

The NPT and energetic U.S. diplomacy have also led several states to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. The NPT, bolstered by nuclear export controls and a safeguard system, makes it far more difficult for non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire or build nuclear weapons. Equally important, the NPT, under Article VI, commits the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Yet, as we heard in this morning’s sessions, the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation system, as a whole, is at a critical juncture. Some leading figures, including our panelists in this morning’s session, have warned that a nuclear tipping point is approaching and, if mishandled, the situation could lead to a new wave of proliferation.

Now, thankfully, there appears to be a growing recognition of the problem and a growing recognition for the need for renewed U.S. leadership on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, including from the presumptive presidential nominees of both the Republican and Democratic parties. While Senator Obama and Senator McCain have each outlined their proposed strategies on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in speeches and in legislation over the course of the past several months, in our view, the view of the Arms Control Association and many others in our community, media attention on the candidates’ proposals on the topic has been all too thin. Given the importance of the issue to U.S. security, we hope that’s going to change relatively soon.

Now, today, we have the honor to have representatives from the John McCain for President campaign as well as the Barack Obama for President campaign to discuss their respective nominees’ views and strategies about how to strengthen U.S. and international efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. 

John Holum will speak on behalf of the Obama campaign. John is the former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security and is the former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Bill Clinton administration. Steve Biegun will speak on behalf of the McCain campaign. Steve is currently a corporate officer and vice president of international governmental affairs to the Ford Motor Company. He was the national security advisor for former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and worked from 2001 to 2003 as the executive secretary of the National Security Council. 

Now, after each of them speaks for about 10 to 15 minutes, we’re going to take your questions, which I hope you’ll write on the three-by-five cards that were on your chairs. If you could pass those to the sides to our staff, they will send them forward and I would just add that we’re going to have far more questions than we’re going to have time to get to and I’m sorry about that. So we’ll do our best to put together a representative sample of questions. 

After the two speakers respond to your questions, we will then allow each speaker, toward the end, about five minutes or so to make any concluding remarks. By mutual agreement, John Holum is going to start out first this afternoon on behalf of the Barack Obama for President campaign. John, the podium is yours. Thanks for coming.

JOHN HOLUM: Thank you, Daryl. Can everyone hear? It’s a pleasure for me to be back with the Arms Control Association. I recall, with gratitude, all the good advice that many of you gave me when I was in the Clinton administration and I’m happy to return the favor and come here and give you my best advice on who should be the next president of the United States.

My own commitment to Senator Barack Obama actually was cemented when he first came under fire for saying he’d talk unconditionally to some of the world’s hardest cases – the leaders of North Korea, Iran, Cuba – and he didn’t back down. I’ll return to that in the context of laying out, briefly, three broad reasons why I think Barack Obama would be a great president, indeed a transcendent president, for the fight against the spread of nuclear weapons. Those reasons flow from what I’ve observed about what he believes, how he thinks, and who he is.

As to what he believes, the first thing to know it that he sees these issues as profoundly important. Given the demands on a president’s time, what he personally cares about can be crucial. On that score, it’s significant that from the time he first came to the Senate, he made nonproliferation a personal priority. His first overseas trip was with Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) focused on safeguarding nuclear weapons. He reached across the aisle to collaborate with Senator Lugar on initiatives to do that. 

Senator Obama and Senator Hagel (R-Neb.), another Republican, introduced the Nuclear Weapons Threat Reduction Act, which would adopt what Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Sam Nunn, and Bill Perry—Norm Wolf’s “four statesmen”—have recommended as practical steps toward a nuclear-weapons-free world, bipartisan recommendations now endorsed in concept by 17 of the most recent 24 secretaries of state and defense and national security advisors. As you would expect, Senator Obama has also made these issues prominent in his presidential campaign including in the far-reaching address last October in which he pledged to strive for a world free of nuclear weapons.

To me, three parts of his approach to that stand out. The first is an emphasis on prevention. As he has said, we face no greater security challenge than the possibility that terrorists will get their hands on a nuclear weapon or fissile materials. That’s why he stressed securing loose nuclear materials, a task which, as president, he would complete in four years, as compared to a dozen years at the current pace. Preventing nuclear smuggling is another emphasis, including: support for the Bush administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); discouraging national reprocessing and enrichment in developing countries through access to an international fuel bank; and strengthening the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to fortify enforcement. So prevention is key. 

The second element of Senator Obama’s approach is his recognition that the strong global regimes we need to fight proliferation depend upon progress in arms control. For the past seven-and-a-half years, we’ve had an administration that essentially repudiated the longstanding bipartisan consensus for negotiated arms control, practicing instead a fringe philosophy that international agreements are not only useless, but actually dangerous and that what we really need to do is just get tough. The administration pressed this view even to the point of abolishing the State Department’s Arms Control Bureau, in the process, burying the focus on nonproliferation another level down in the bureaucracy, even though they defined that as a priority.

Senator Obama will take a different course. At a minimum, we shouldn’t be heading off in the wrong direction. In the Senate, Barack Obama opposed development of new nuclear arms, lower-yield tactical weapons, and the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, which is now held in such low regard that the Bush administration no longer even requests funds for it. But the Bush nuclear weapons policy has not changed. Its doctrine has been to blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear arms and to imagine potentially new uses for nuclear weapons. 

Senator Obama has recognized that crossing the nuclear threshold is not simply passing a gradient, but plunging into a different realm. Rather than finding new ways to use nuclear weapons, we need to confirm that, in today’s world, their only utility is to deter an attack on us. And in the world he seeks, they’ll have no utility at all. As I said, last October, Senator Obama took the lead in adopting a principle that presidents often hedge. Specifically, he said, here’s what I’ll say as president. America seeks a world in which there are no nuclear weapons, period.  That goal would serve our security interests for we would all be safer in a world without nuclear weapons. We wouldn’t, for example, have to be concerned about nuclear arms going unaccounted for and weapons technology being misdirected; even in our own country, it’s happened just recently.

The nuclear-weapons-free goal is also at the heart of the nonproliferation bargain. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is what makes the spread of nuclear weapons against the law. It’s the strong international legal framework for all our nonproliferation efforts and Senator Obama understands that if we don’t take seriously our own commitments under the treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament, we’ll have an uphill battle to lead a global response when Iran and North Korea blow off their obligations or an even tougher task in seeking to strengthen enforcement. To Senator Obama, a nuclear-weapon-free world is not merely a dream on a far horizon, but an objective we should be working hard through tangible steps to achieve. 

He would work with Russia to take our arsenals off hair-trigger alert, an idea George Bush raised in 2000 but then forgot. He supports further deep, verifiable, and durable reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. He’ll seek to globalize the U.S.-Russia ban on intermediate-range missiles. He’ll resume the languishing effort to negotiate a fissile-material cutoff with strong verification and he’ll press for the earliest possible ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – not just take a look, but take the lead in getting it approved – and not just to limit testing, but to end it for all time.

The third element in Senator Obama’s approach will be to strengthen our efforts on specific challenges, most notably, the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran. Now, obviously, neither one of those lends itself to an easy or quick solution, but under the Bush administration, the U.S. approach to both has been hamstrung by a self-defeating principle: that talking with an adversary is in itself a concession. 

In the case of North Korea, you’ll recall when Secretary of State Colin Powell ventured that the Clinton administration’s contacts with North Korea would continue, he was smacked down. Instead, we saw years of diplomatic immobility while a dangerous regime separated enough plutonium for at least a half dozen more weapons and conducted a nuclear test. At last, belatedly, the principle was relaxed enough to get us back roughly to where we were under the 1994 Agreed Framework, which the Bush administration couldn’t wait to repudiate in 2002. What a dismal record.

The “negotiation-equals-concession” philosophy has been equally unproductive in Iran, where nuclear weapons potential that threatens the region and the world has continued to grow. There, as you know, the Bush position has been that we will only talk on condition that Iran agrees, in advance, to give up the activities that would be the subject of the talks. While we’ve stood still on that principle, Iran’s nuclear capability has not stood still, but has continued to grow. Not talking is the diplomatic equivalent of holding your breath until you pass out – (laughter) – employed against someone who prefers you unconscious – (laughter).

There is in that context that I heard Senator Obama respond, yes, when asked in a debate whether he would unconditionally engage in talks with adversary countries. It’s a position that’s easy to mischaracterize and demagogue as President Bush in his bizarre comments to the Israeli Knesset a few weeks ago. But the bottom line is that Barack Obama is the one who understands a basic reality, that when addressing unacceptable dangers, we cannot deny ourselves any tool. We must, instead, move comprehensively across the board through strengthened global agreements and norms, improved and credible deterrence intelligence, an unmistakable deterrent, workable defenses, broad sanctions, coalition-building, and skilled, creative, and tough diplomacy on every front and at every level, backed up by additional resources to improve our prospects for success.

Obviously, no one can guarantee that restoring diplomacy to the mix will turn the tide. What we do know, for sure, is that the absence of diplomacy has not worked and there’s no reason to believe it ever will. All three of these elements: aggressive prevention, stronger global regimes through arms control, tough and comprehensive enforcement, are ways that, as president, Barack Obama can and will serve the organizing cause of this conference. Now, beyond what he believes, I recommend Senator Obama because of the way he thinks. Let me just briefly touch on that.

You may recall that at roughly the same time as he was under attack for his willingness to talk with adversaries, Senator Obama was chastised for casting doubts on whether we would use nuclear weapons against one evil person, Osama bin Laden, and also for saying that if we had actionable intelligence on bin Laden’s whereabouts in Pakistan and our ally, Pakistan, wouldn’t act, we would. We can discuss the merits of those positions, but what I’d like to underscore here, is that Senator Obama was demonstrating a willingness to challenge conventional wisdom and to depart from time-worn talking points. 

That had a particular resonance for me because, as you may recall, I joined the Clinton administration late in 1993 and I can’t tell you how many times I encountered a policy question only to be told that it had already been settled in a presidential decision directive and it was too late. To his historic credit, President Clinton was himself willing to reexamine some of those previously decided issues, which is what made it possible to extend the NPT indefinitely and to negotiate a truly comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

Senator Obama is not only receptive to new thinking; change is what his campaign is about. Obviously, a good deal of conventional wisdom remains wise. But as a president who’s prepared to challenge old precepts and doesn’t see every issue and every player fitting into pre-defined box can make a huge difference. 

Finally, a few words on supporting Obama because of who he is. It will take at least a generation, in my view, to repair the damage to U.S. international interests inflicted by George W. Bush and ideologues whose pet theories became his lodestars. After the debacle in Iraq, hawked through exaggerated intelligence and minimized risks, we have a long struggle ahead just to regain American credibility so other nations and institutions will trust what we say. We’ll also need to rebuild alliances and coalitions fractured by the swaggering, go-it-alone mentality and forge new collective measures effectively to address challenges as diverse as climate change, radical Islam, and WMD proliferation, which even the world’s strongest nation can’t resolve by itself.

In the coming months, America and the world will come to recognize even more clearly that we have an opportunity to elect a leader who has shown sound judgment on the transcendent issues of our time, is clear-eyed about the challenges ahead, especially those of climate change and nuclear terrorism, and has laid out an ambitious and comprehensive agenda to meet them. 

Our first task, beginning next January, must be to reconnect with the world through means other than bluster and arms. The election of Barack Obama will, in and of itself, jumpstart those endeavors. His heritage and extraordinary life story will inspire people all over the world and be seen as a confirmation more powerful than any words that America has at once honored its highest ideals and turned the page to a new kind of leadership.

That’s why I believe that, in one stroke, Senator Obama’s election will lift us out of the hole the Bush presidency has dug for us and onto higher ground where we can once again engage from strength and respect. For all of these reasons – what he believes, how he thinks, and who he is – I’m immensely proud to be here as an advocate for Barack Obama for president of the United States and I look forward to our discussion. Thank you. (Applause.)

KIMBALL: Thank you, John Holum. Next, Steve Biegun.

STEPHEN BIEGUN: Good afternoon. I apologize in advance to John because, unfortunately, I’m not going to represent the Bush administration at this forum. (Laughter.) I was curious to hear that the bulk of his critique was directed at the president who will be leaving office next year. I have a newsflash; John McCain is running and he’s running against Barack Obama.

I also hope to persuade you with an open mind and a sound mind on the many reasons why John McCain really is the superior candidate for the presidency of the United States. But, first, before I do that, I’d like to go to some of the substance of the issues that you’ve been considering over the course of the day and then return back to that point just at the end.

Let me first say that my role with the campaign is as an outside foreign policy advisor. I’m not formally on the campaign team. I’ve had the opportunity to work in and out of the government over the past 20 years, for the last 20, very closely with Senator John McCain, who’s been a fixture in virtually every debate of import in U.S. national security over that period.

Senator McCain recently gave a speech in which he pulled together many ideas that are of great interest to the crowd here today. The speech was given in late May at the University of Denver and, for those of you who haven’t seen it, I would encourage you to take a look at it. While I am not the most experienced of all of Senator McCain’s advisors on proliferation issues, I count myself as one of the most passionate, through personal experience and personal concern. I am very pleased to be associated with a candidate who is willing and able, credibly, to lay out a vision of leadership on nuclear security issues, which is incomparable to anything given by the other campaign, the other candidate in this campaign. 

Senator McCain has 20 years-plus experience in the United States military, 20 years-plus experience in the United States Senate, served on the Armed Services Committee in the Senate. I do want to emphasize that his experience has put him at the center of virtually every national security debate of import over that period. He has a reputation and admirers on both the Democrat and Republican side for courageous leadership, for a willingness to buck conventional wisdom, for a willingness to go against his own party when necessary or with the other party when called for. 

Senator McCain is a proven leader. While being bound by the precepts of the past can be a convenient explanation for an absence of experience, John McCain shows above and beyond all candidates that have been in this election this year the importance of leadership. Senator McCain has proven leadership.

Senator McCain gave his University of Denver speech in late May and he laid out a vision that isn’t just a catalogue of positions on particular treaties or particular priorities. His intention was to lay out a comprehensive vision, knitting together many different trends that are happening in the world today, some of which John, I think, very eloquently defined, including America’s standing in the world, its ability and the vigor of its leadership with the international community. 

Also, Senator McCain sought to address the tie-in between the growing threat of nuclear proliferation and the growing global demand for nuclear energy. As we face an energy-constrained world, it is inevitable that civilian nuclear energy will increasingly be a choice for many nations around the world.

I’d like to address three basic issues in the context of Senator McCain’s remarks and then we’ll go ahead for questions. One is the timing; why did he do this now? Second is, what is this directional approach that he has laid out? Third, a little bit of the substance of his speech.

On the timing, there’s obvious urgency on the nuclear proliferation issue, as there has been for some time. Not only North Korea and Iran, but even our handling of our own nuclear materials in this country is a subject of great concern. We only needed to open yesterday’s Washington Post to read further affirmation that the plans for an advanced nuclear weapon were being shopped around to many countries – who knows where? – to understand the urgency of this threat.

We do have the ongoing possibility of the threat of terrorists acquiring and using a weapon of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapon and including against us. As I said, there’s an interplay. At the same time these concerns are growing, many countries around the world are seeking the development of civilian nuclear energy to answer their own domestic energy needs. So what Senator McCain laid out is a comprehensive vision that seeks to encompass all of these parts.

Now, directionally, I think one thing that, again, makes Senator Obama and his supporters uncomfortable, is that Senator McCain is not President Bush. Senator McCain openly embraces the role of allies in this process. He openly embraces the role of multilateral organizations in this process of addressing nuclear proliferation and improving nuclear security. 

He openly endorses the important role of traditional treaty-making, bilateral negotiations, verifiable measures as the means and the conduit through which we can achieve these aims. In short, Senator McCain endorses the approaches that have been successful in the past, but need some refinement, improvement if they’re going to succeed in the future. 

He also lays out the ability to call upon allies and friends with whom not only the United States, but Senator McCain personally, has invested decades in nurturing a trusting relationship with. Now, in the speech, Senator McCain lays out many different initiatives and I won’t catalogue all of them, but I would like to touch upon a few which I would consider the highlights.

First, like Senator Obama, Senator McCain has laid out an underlying philosophy on nuclear issues. In this, he chose to quote Ronald Reagan who, 25 years ago, said, “Our dream is to see a day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.” This is very much Senator McCain’s hope as well. 

Now, Senator McCain is not going to come here or come anywhere else, certainly not going to go to University of Denver, and tell you that’s going to happen during the four years of his presidential term, but he has affirmed that that is, directionally, where he wants to take the United States. In his speech, he also sought to restore some of the anathema around nuclear weapons. I completely agree with John that it’s diplomatic and strategic folly for us to erase the divide between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. There is an anathema around nuclear weapons that properly must be restored.

In his speech, Senator McCain commits to reductions. He will continue the process of studied, but forward progress on reducing the size of the nuclear arsenal of the United States of America. But likewise, he will be looking to engage Russia, to engage Russia in the reduction of its nuclear forces. Also Senator McCain separately calls for additional strategic dialogue with China to begin the process of better understanding, better recording, and, hopefully, even leading to a result where China’s strategic nuclear arsenal is constrained.

Senator McCain lays out a vision on new nuclear weapons systems. In this, here I’d want to quote directly from the text in his speech, that he would only support the development of any new type of nuclear weapon that is absolutely essential for the viability of our deterrent, that results in making possible further decreases in the size of our nuclear arsenal and furthers our global nuclear security goals. In short, he is establishing a test for any future weapons system and, in the course of this speech, he also, as Senator Obama has, opposes the deep-earth nuclear penetrator.

Third, in his speech, Senator McCain lays out some initiatives for strengthening the IAEA. As I said, Senator McCain is very eager to invigorate the international and multilateral institutions that help us constrain the spread of nuclear weapons. He calls for some specific reforms including reversing the burden of proof to put upon proliferators the necessity to demonstrate that they aren’t developing nuclear weapons programs. He calls for more automaticity in sanctioning of violators of the nonproliferation treaty. And he also calls for the return of any material assistance provided to countries under the Atoms for Peace program who subsequently withdraw from the agreement.

Lastly, Senator McCain does return to the issue of civilian nuclear energy, which he does recognize and support as an important means for the United States and other countries, not only to lessen their dependency upon non-domestic energy resources, but also very much sees its contribution potentially to the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere. Toward that end, he lays out a framework under which he would envision both international enrichment centers and international centers for the storage of spent fuels as two choke points to attempt to limit the ability of countries to use the cover of civilian nuclear energy to develop nuclear weapons programs.

As I said at the start, Senator McCain does lay out a comprehensive vision. He ties together both the energy agenda as well as the nuclear proliferation and arms control agendas. I do firmly believe, as somebody who has worked with him for 20 years, that he is not only capable of enacting this vision; he is capable of leading a global initiative to reinvigorate the fight against proliferation. He has a record of accomplishment. He has strong credibility with allies. 

Now, a couple of comments, just in passing, on what John mentioned. It was with verbal deftness that John quickly went from Senator Obama’s commitment in the first year of his presidency to unconditionally meet with leaders like President Ahmedinejad to transform that into a commitment to restore diplomacy or a willingness to talk with adversaries.

Senator McCain is not at all critical of diplomacy. In fact, he firmly supports it as the first and best opportunity for the United States to resolve issues of all natures around the world, including nuclear proliferation. But the statement by a presidential hopeful that within the first year of their presidency, with no conditions, at the highest level of government, they would meet with a leader, with a tyrant as important as President Ahmedinejad without precondition not only provides a level of prestige and recognition to a leader like Ahmedinejad, but it also had the consequence of actually doing harm to the existing diplomacy that’s underway right now. 

All President Ahmedinejad has to hold out for now is the hopeful victory of President Obama. Why should he, during the interim, have any serious negotiation with the European allies who are working so hard to bring an end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions?

Senator McCain doesn’t need to reconnect the United States to the world; Senator McCain, as a leader of the United States, is well connected to the world. Countries like Mexico and Canada, countries like Colombia, European allies to whom he has never pejoratively referred as having had U.S. diplomacy outsourced to them as if their efforts are feeble. There is no need for Senator McCain to reconnect to anyone. In the course of this campaign, in the course of his 40 years of public service, he has shown at every turn a willingness to listen to allies, a close cooperation with them. He’s traveled extensively. He’s been to the places that challenge the United States and I encourage you to reflect long and hard upon the importance of that experience, that credibility, that reputation with friend and foe alike. 

Senator McCain is the next choice for president of the United States and he would strongly welcome the support of this community as he pursues it. Thank you. (Applause.)

KIMBALL: Thank you very much to both of you. We now have time for questions. If I could just remind you, if you could pass them to the sides to the volunteers rather than getting up, that would facilitate the process. 

All right. All right. So we have a series of questions from our audience and we’re going to give each of you a chance to respond to the questions even if they’re not directed toward you and your candidate. Here is the first question:  “The next presidential administration will come into office in the middle of a six-party process on denuclearizing North Korea. What should be maintained from the current approach and what should change?” John or Steve, would you like to begin?

HOLUM: I can begin, I guess. Senator Obama has been complimentary of the Six-Party Talks and very hopeful that they’ll be successful. I think also, as a matter of principle, that it doesn’t make sense for a presidential candidate to inject himself into the middle of the details of a negotiating process that’s under way. As I said in my remarks, it’s been a very important step that the administration has overcome its allergy to talking, at least in the six-party context, with North Korea. And that’s had some impact on the process.

North Korea is still in violation of global norms on nonproliferation. I think there’s a good case to be made, a good argument to be made, that its withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was not legitimate under Article 10. But, in any event, the process should go forward. We hope very much that they’ll live up to their obligations under the agreement they’ve already accepted and that that process will succeed.

BIEGUN: Just as an aside, John, I remember one of the hang-ups early in the Bush administration and why the negotiations couldn’t begin, ironically, is that the Bush administration wanted unconditional negotiations. That is, they wanted everything on the table. It was the North Koreans who were insisting that any discussion be narrowly limited to a set of issues that they were comfortable talking about. 

As you remember, even early on, the nature of the regime, the huge Stalinist gulags that continue to exist in North Korea, the absolute lack of political liberties confounded the diplomacy. In the end, obviously, the ascendant threat of a North Korea that was not only nuclear armed, but potentially proliferating has driven the diplomacy to the front and put together the Six-Party Talks. 

Senator McCain, certainly, is well complimentary of the process of a six-party negotiation and we should be mindful, again, that there is no agreement. I think, conditionally, were this to be going on in the next administration – and I don’t think that’s necessarily, at least, who knows the state it will be by the time the next president takes – I think Senator McCain would be very interested that any agreement be complete and verifiable. As we go forward, we really do need to put the highest priority on ending and accounting for everything that North Korea has done in a nuclear area and we’re certainly hopeful that these Six-Party Talks can produce exactly that outcome.

KIMBALL: All right. Thank you. Next question is on Iran and how to deal with Iran:  “Both candidates have said that we need tougher multilateral sanctions against Iran. How can we best engage states like Russia and China, which have been hesitant to impose tough sanctions to agree to strengthen measures against Tehran?”

BIEGUN: Certainly, one of the challenges that United Nations sanctions present for us is that getting it through the Security Council empowers both China and Russia with the ability to veto the sanctions. I think it’s almost a unanimous frustration among people who want to see an end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program that the U.N. Security Council process has been so halting. We should continue to work with the U.N. Security Council. We should continue to seek every opportunity to put comprehensive multilateral sanctions on Iran. But it doesn’t need to be the sole limit of our activities either. 

Senator McCain has certainly strongly endorses the type of financial sanctions that are being discussed on a bilateral or really multilateral basis between the United States and the European Union, but also recently in a speech has called for putting together a coalition of countries to examine investment sanctions as well. It would be preferable, in all cases, to have China and Russia in support and participating in effective sanctions against Iran, but there is still a significant amount of economic pressure that can be put on the regime in Iran through simply the cooperative action of U.N. countries.

HOLUM: I agree. (Laughter.)

KIMBALL: We have a few questions relating to the subject of nuclear testing and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One of them is phrased: “Does your candidate support bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty – CTBT – into force as currently negotiated? If yes, what steps would be taken to achieve that objective?” I think you talked about that, John. “If not, how would your candidate address the CTBT and ensure that the world does not return to nuclear testing?’

HOLUM: Well, I think it’s a combination of things. First, yes, on the question of whether he supports the CTBT as currently negotiated. Senator Obama has been very clear in his October speech and elsewhere that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a priority for him. So it takes two parts. One is to submit it to the Senate. Obviously, again, another is to begin a comprehensive engagement with the Senate to make sure that the objections that led to its defeat in 1999 have been overcome. 

There have been a lot of things that have happened since 1999. The international monitoring system is largely in space: 200 monitoring stations around the world. We’ve had an additional nine years of experience under the Stockpile Stewardship Program. So we know now better than we did nine years ago that we can maintain our stockpile safe and reliably under the test ban treaty for the indefinite future. 

We have no need to test. Some senators were concerned about that in 1999. So I think a lot of the objections that were raised then have been cleared up. I think it’s important to engage in a bipartisan way on Capitol Hill, follow up on the excellent report that the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, prepared and submitted to the president in 2001 and get this treaty ratified.

BIEGUN: Senator McCain, in his remarks at the University of Denver, first, put a line underneath the current moratorium on testing that he’s committed to continuing the U.S. moratorium on testing. Second, going to the greater issue of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, he did commit in the speech in both specific as well as in generic form to take a look at this initiative and any other serious initiative for its potential not only to meet U.S. national security needs, but also, ultimately, to meet through reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation.

John laid out the two issues that were a particular conundrum to the United States Senate when the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was rejected by a majority of senators in the late 1990s. I don’t accept as confidently as John that all of those problems are resolved, but Senator McCain, in his speech, commits to taking a very serious look at exactly those points. Is the verification regime inherently more accomplished than it had been? Is there an ability to verify satisfactorily a zero-yield test ban? Those were questions around which the Senate ultimately rejected the treaty, among other issues, but certainly a willingness to look at verifiability and going forward is an important issue.

Second is the ability through modeling to maintain the safety and security of the stockpile. While there have certainly been recent developments in computing speed and a variety of other issues that potentially, certainly, I think, in the Senate would create an opportunity to revisit those issues. Again, I would not, in advance, myself, having been out of it for a few years, confidently project that we yet have the ability, absent testing, to do all of the modeling necessary to maintain the safety and security of our stockpile.

Ultimately, while Senator McCain strongly believes that we should move away from nuclear weapons and himself would hope for a day in which there are no nuclear weapons in the world, as long as there are nuclear weapons, the United States does need a reliable and usable deterrent. It’s for deterrence, not only for our security, but that of many of our allies. And to the extent that our own confidence in our deterrent is in any way eroded, not only does it have consequences for the effectiveness of that deterrent and for, ultimately, for the security of the United States, that also can have, potentially, a corrosive effect on the many countries around the world that do not pursue nuclear weapons precisely because they do have a confidence in the United States’ deterrence and the effectiveness of the United States’ nuclear umbrella.

With the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as with many of the other initiatives that Senator McCain has laid out in considerable detail in the course of his speech, one of his first stops, beyond the United States military and the Department of Defense and its strong analysis and recommendations, one of the first stops that Senator McCain will make is with our allies. All of this has to be done in concert with the other countries that depend so much on U.S. national security. 

There is much we can accomplish and I think Senator McCain agrees wholeheartedly with Senator Obama that there is much the United States must do to lead toward that end, but it also has to be done cognizant of the fact that we still live in a world in which nuclear weapons play a very important role to our security.

KIMBALL: So Senator McCain would take another look and explore the CTBT again with those issues in mind, to be clear?

BIEGUN: Specifically, what he said is that he commits to take a very serious look at the obstacles that prevented it from gaining approval in the Senate because not only will the next president of the United States have to be convinced of this – because already one president of the United States was convinced of this – the United States Senate has to be convinced of it; two-thirds of the United States Senate has to be convinced of it. So it’s not simply enough for the president to be convinced or else this treaty would have already been enforced or this treaty would have already been ratified by the United States Senate. I don’t think this treaty –

KIMBALL: There are 44 nations required to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force, including the United States and China, which also has not ratified.

BIEGUN: And a specifically enumerated set of countries which will be extremely difficult to ever get to ratify this treaty in its form. John paraphrased the question, would the next president submit the treaty or support the treaty? The question was, can this treaty, as its currently written, be brought into force. I think that’s a stretch and initiatives in the United States Congress, even among supporters of the treaty as it currently is written, are proposing changes that would alter the requirement for countries that have to be adhering to the treaty in order for it to come into force. 

KIMBALL: Well, in another area where there might be a stretch, we heard in this morning’s discussion about how to deal with the global nuclear fuel cycle and how to manage the potential spread of technologies that could make bomb material, highly enriched uranium and plutonium. This is a question directed to Steve Biegun: “If Senator McCain supports international enrichment centers as an incentive to persuade non-nuclear-weapon states not to build them, would he support demonstrating U.S. leadership by converting some of the U.S. enrichment plants to multilateral ownership or management?” And if you could also answer that, too, John.

BIEGUN: It’s not an issue that Senator McCain has taken a position on to date so I cannot speak for Senator McCain on that issue, but this goes to the conundrum of the entire NPT, which is the haves and have-nots, that some countries have nuclear weapons, some don’t. There’s a central bargain contained in the treaty by which the countries that do have the weapons commit themselves ultimately to disarmament and the ones that don’t have nuclear weapons agree to proceed with the peaceful pursuit of nuclear energy for civilian purposes with the guidelines that are in place.

I don’t think that I would be eager to take this to the next level of putting all U.S. enrichment under international supervision. I think that’s blurring the line, but, again, it runs into the same conundrum we have with nuclear-weapon states. A good first step would be to get our arms around the security and the location, geographical location, of all enrichment anywhere in the world. 

Ultimately, I would place – and I trust Senator McCain would place – a much higher premium on putting under international control or keeping under international control that enrichment which could potentially contribute to the development of a new nuclear power. The United States is a declared nuclear-weapon state. It is what it is. While there may be political benefit for another country to introduce this as a foil, it’s not one that I personally would be enthusiastic about. 

But, you know, these are the kinds of issues that, if Senator McCain is elected president, I have no doubt will be on the agenda. We’re just going to have to work our way through the inherent contradiction or the inherent conundrum of the NPT, which is that there are countries that have and countries that have not, and try to create a totality of benefits, opportunities, and punitive measures that can keep people from moving across the line from non-nuclear-weapon state to nuclear-weapon state. That’s where I would put the highest premium, if I were advising Senator McCain on that issue.

HOLUM: Well, I’m in the similar position to Steve in that I don’t have any specific guidance on this fairly detailed question. As I said in my remarks, Senator Obama has strongly endorsed the idea of international centers for enrichment and assuring countries that pursue nuclear energy that they’ll have a secure supply of fuel in which they can have confidence.

I think the important thing – and somebody touched on this in the discussion this morning – is that we need to take the mystique out of enrichment. That involves making sure that fuel supply is dependable, that countries that want to proceed with nuclear energy can know that their sources of low-enriched uranium for reactors will not be interrupted. There’s a lot of doubt about that. I think U.S. leadership can make a great deal of difference to pursue it. The first time I saw this idea it was from Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and he’s been very energetic in pursuing it and I think it’s a terrific idea.
           
The core reality underlying all of this and the one that we used when we were engaged in the effort to extend the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty indefinitely in 1995 was that the treaty is not a favor of the non-nuclear-weapon states to the nuclear-weapon states. Tom Graham and Norm Wulf and others were very effective in demonstrating why the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the bargain, is in the interest of the non-nuclear countries. The same sort of principle should apply when we engage in the process of seeking to limit national enrichment and plutonium separation programs.

The countries that will agree not to pursue those capabilities will do so because it’s in their interest, because they’ll have better confidence that their neighbors will not be doing the same thing. So I think that basic principle has to be at the core of our international diplomacy on this issue.

KIMBALL: Thank you. Well, we have a couple of questions here about how to deal with the threat of catastrophic nuclear terrorism, which the question states:  “Many experts believe that the threat of catastrophic nuclear terrorism is among the highest risks our nation faces. What specifically would your candidate do to reduce that risk in his first year in office?”

HOLUM: Should I go first?

BIEGUN: No, please.

HOLUM: The first priority that Senator Obama has laid out and that he’s pursued since he has been in the Senate is prevention, securing all the nuclear materials and nuclear weapons that are now in vulnerable sites in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Everything else pales behind that responsibility. 

It’s shocking to me that we’re still 12 years away from having those materials secured based on the current pace. What he’s pledged to do is pursue that within four years. The risk is not that a terrorist organization is going to build a bomb; the risk is that a terrorist organization is going to acquire materials from somewhere else. There’s a possibility that they conceivable could build one, but they could acquire materials or acquire a weapon that they could use.

So the first priority has to be to nail that down. The second priority, of course, in the same context is to pursue the efforts to close down the nuclear weapon operations in North Korea and Iran because those are two countries that we can’t have any confidence that they wouldn’t be prepared to transfer materials to other country; and now North Korea has enough so it could possibly transfer plutonium. So those two priorities would be at the top of Senator Obama’s list.

BIEGUN: Well, the good news is Senator McCain is not waiting until next year; he started 20 years ago. For his two decades in the United States Senate he has been a strong supporter of treaty-based arms control. He was supportive of the agendas both in the Reagan administration as well as the Bush and Clinton administrations. Senator McCain was a close ally and supporter of Senators Nunn and Lugar with the foundation of the Nunn-Lugar program and also in the early 1990s a vocal defender of the Nunn-Lugar program when it was periodically under pressure in part because of backsliding in Russian behavior, in part because of some of the administrative difficulties, particularly on the Russian side in the early stages of that program.

Senator McCain is and has been a vocal opponent of the spread of nuclear weapons and he has a long record of concern on the development of nuclear weapons capabilities not only in countries like Iran and North Korea, but Iraq – lest we forget – was rapidly moving toward the acquisition of a nuclear weapon in the early 1990s. Senator McCain cares so much about this issue that he’s made it one of the centerpieces of his national security debate in the course of his campaign.

Senator McCain is fully aware, as not only a presidential candidate but as a United States Senator and ultimately, perhaps, as the president of the United States, that in his very first moment in office, this issue, epitomized by Iran and North Korea but more broadly the growing and very serious threat of nuclear weapons, has to be at the front of the next president of the United States’ mind right from the first moment in office.

I completely agree with the premise of the question, personally, that this is a growing threat. The threat of catastrophic nuclear attack against the United States by a terrorist is certainly a plausible scenario; and it’s one that the next president of the United States – I’m actually confident, regardless of who it is – will put at the very top of their agenda. I think I’ll just leave it at that.

KIMBALL: We have several questions regarding potential plans for the United States to develop new nuclear weapons capabilities; and some of this goes back to the discussion on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One of these questions asks: “If we assume that the United States arsenal will continue to be certified as safe and reliable by the Pentagon and Energy Department, would either an Obama or McCain administration decide to pursue or commit not to pursue the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, which the Department of Energy and Bush administration have advocated?”

There is another question on a related issue; this is directed to Steve: “Senator McCain recently said in his May 27th speech that he would not support the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Program, which was a previous program advocated by the Bush administration to build an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon. He voted twice for that in 2003 and 2004. What led to the change in his position?”

BIEGUN: Why don’t I go first? Now, I’ll take the second one since it’s specific to Senator McCain and then I’ll address RRW and then pass that on to John for any comments that he has. On the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, Senator McCain did support the feasibility studies to look as this. Ultimately, he found the logic unpersuasive that we could presume to use a nuclear weapon in a non-nuclear manner and consider ourselves not having crossed the threshold, a very significant threshold, of use of nuclear weapons proved to him to be an argument that was unsupportable.

Now, the program was not requested for funding this year by the administration; that’s right. It’s not a completely dead issue; but I assure that if Senator McCain does win the presidency, it is a completely dead issue. That issue is resolved in his mind and he won’t be revisiting it.

The Reliable Replacement Warhead is a very important issue, and one that the next president of the United States will have to consider. Senator McCain doesn’t address it specifically in his May 27th speech, but he does lay an all-encompassing vision that he expects to apply to any new developments in this strategic area.

I quoted it, but I will cite it again because I think it’s an important test to direct your attention to, he said – if I could get the quote directly – he said that, “I would only support development of any new type of nuclear weapon that is absolutely essential for the viability of our deterrent, that results in making possible further decreases in the size of our nuclear arsenal, and furthers our global nuclear security goals.”

Those are carefully chosen words – well thought through – and Senator McCain, in the course of putting together his speech, consulted with some of the true lions of American national security over decades. It’s no secret that he counts among his friends some of the leading strategic thinkers across several administrations. In putting together this speech, it’s not just a speech; it is a statement that approaches presidential policy.

I think, for anyone who has read it, you can see that it goes beyond normal campaign rhetoric and in a passage like that, I can tell you – and I would apply this to the RRW as well as anything else – Senator McCain carefully chose those words there so when he becomes president, if he were to become president, that would be the test that he would apply to this.

HOLUM: I’ll just say, I just want to mention, Steve, that the notion of having come to a new position on Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator is very welcome. Very welcome, but it also cuts against a little bit the notion of being there for 20 years because Senator Obama has been against this since it was first proposed even though it’s more recent than Senator McCain’s earlier support for it.

That said, the Reliable Replacement Warhead has to be considered in the context of the U.S. leadership role in reducing the roles and risks of nuclear weapons and ultimately eliminating them, which Senator Obama has said he would pursue from day one of the new administration. So we shouldn’t be rushing to deploy a new nuclear warhead at a time when we are leading to convince the rest of the world that nuclear weapons have a diminished and an ultimately disappearing role in our security strategy and in the security strategy of other countries.

He hasn’t ruled out for all-time that concept; but he has said it’s very important not to pursue anything like this way before it’s necessary to consider it. Remember that we’ve conducted 1,000 nuclear weapons tests, far more than any other country in the world; all the weapons in our stockpile have been thoroughly tested. There are between 4,000-6,000 parts of a nuclear weapon. Very few of those parts are precluded from testing under the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

All you can’t do is test to an explosive yield. So all those mechanical and electronic and other parts can be constantly tested, and are being so, and replaced. Recent studies have suggested that the pits, the plutonium pits of our nuclear weapons, are secure for way longer than expected; as long as 80 years. So this is not something we need to rush up on.

KIMBALL: We have a set of questions regarding how the United States will relate to Russia with respect to nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. Question is: “Both candidates have spoken about deeper U.S.-Russian nuclear weapons reductions. The START I Treaty, that is the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991, is due to expire in December of 2009. How do each of the candidates propose to follow on that agreement and, specifically, pursue deeper nuclear reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals?” Either of you can start.

HOLUM: Okay, I’ll start. Senator Obama has said that he supports reductions in nuclear weapons; and that means going significantly below the levels in the current agreement of 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads. He also wants those agreements to be verifiable, either through extension of the START verification provisions or some other arrangement worked out in discussions with Russia.

He wants those limitations to be durable. This is an important point because the so-called SORT Treaty limits come into effect in 2012 and on the same day, they expire. So it’s only a moment in history when we have to be down to those levels and then either side can do whatever it wants. What we need to do is resume the negotiating process that we’ve pursued traditionally and put into effect, as I said in my remarks, deep, durable, and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons.

BIEGUN: Agreed. Senator McCain would, as a matter of approach, begin this process with a Nuclear Posture Review. It would require not only a strong advisory role for our military and our civilians in the Pentagon but also close consultation with our allies. But I trust that that would be the same for Senator Obama as well. In terms of the overall direction, no difference of opinion.

KIMBALL: Okay, now there are other issues relating to the United States and Russia and arms control, one of which has to do with the Bush administration’s plan for missile defenses, particularly the proposal to put 10 interceptors in Poland. Question is: “Does either the Obama or the McCain – let me rephrase this – would either President McCain or President Obama continue to pursue the current U.S. plan for a missile defense system in Europe. If so, under what terms, under what schedule? And would they continue to pursue a cooperative approach with Russia, which the Bush administration has begun discussing in the past year?”

BIEGUN: In regards to Senator McCain, it’s his stated intention to continue with the deployment. It’s also, as he laid out in his University of Denver speech, it is his intention to seek to continue to address Russian concerns in this context, including whether any sort of data sharing or other cooperative actions can ameliorate Russian concerns.

It is not Senator McCain’s intention to honor any request that would be judged as being premised upon the right of a country, in this case, Russia, to have a say in the security decisions of a sovereign nation that may or may not have been under its orbit at one point, when those objections are judged to largely be based upon the expression of a geopolitical sphere of influence.

If there are legitimate Russian security concerns that arise from a limited number of interceptors being based in Central and Eastern Europe to protect the territory of the North Atlantic area against a limited missile strike, largely emanating from one country but potentially others, we definitely need to have a dialogue with Russia about that. But we do not and should not have a dialogue with Russia about the sovereign decisions of Poland or the Czech Republic and what decisions they make to defend their own security in cases in which it poses no threat whatsoever to Russia.

HOLUM: I think the possibilities for working out understandings, making clear to Russia that its security interests aren’t threatened by European deployments are reasonably high. Certainly, that’s an effort that should be pursued. But I also think it’s important to put missile defenses in a broader context.

Senator McGovern–boy that’s old-speak (laughter)–Senator Obama has -

KIMBALL: You once worked for Senator McGovern, yes? (Laughter.)

HOLUM: Thirty-five years ago, good grief. Don’t I have a great memory? Senator Obama agrees with the deployments that are in place. He certainly supports the deployments that are in place in California and Alaska. But at the same time, he thinks it’s very important to proceed on the basis of workable defenses, making sure that systems are capable before we put so many resources into these systems. He also believes we need to prioritize our missile defense based on the threats. So we should be focusing on theater defenses and local defenses, and further down the list, as the technology is proven, more effective defenses; national or longer-range defenses.

He also has stressed that defenses don’t answer the threat of nuclear smuggling. The likeliest dangers that we face are not that a nuclear explosion will arrive with a return address on it and be susceptible to interception if the system could work; but in a suitcase or in a boxcar or in a shipping container where missile defenses don’t have any impact. Those are the likeliest threats. So, we really need to concentrate our attention on things like port security, securing materials as I discussed earlier, and the kinds of issues that are much more immediate.

KIMBALL: We have several questions about how the next administration will organize itself to deal with this wide range of proliferation challenges, disarmament-related challenges. One question about legislation that was signed into law in 2007, H.R. 1, which mandates a White House coordinator for preventing nuclear terrorism. The question states, and this is correct, that the Bush administration has not acted on that mandate. So the question is: “Where do your candidates stand on the issue of a White House coordinator for preventing nuclear terrorism?”

Before you jump to that question, we have another related question, which is: “How can the State Department best organize itself to address arms control in the next administration. And specifically, what do the candidates think of the idea of an independent agency for nonproliferation and arms control to elevate the issue inside the administration?”

HOLUM: I guess that question is addressed to me.

KIMBALL: Well, it’s addressed to both of you since it’s an issue both candidates need to consider.

HOLUM: First, on a White House coordinator, I don’t know that Senator Obama has addressed that question. So I can only express a personal view, and that is if we are going to have a White House coordinator of anything – this is a matter of influence and effect – the position needs to have control over resources and not just be a voice without backing. We’ve had a lot of experience with those kinds of offices and the drug czars and various others; and they tend not to work very well.

In terms of how the State Department should be organized itself, Senator Obama had nothing to do with the reorganization that was carried out in the 1990s and then again in, I think it was, 2005. But Steve Biegun and I both were involved in the first one of those. I have personally come to believe that folding the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the State Department was a mistake, essentially because of the way the State Department has treated it. Policy will vary from administration to administration. But institutions do make a difference.

So this is again a personal response; it’s not something that Senator Obama has addressed. But I think it’s something that needs to be revisited. I’ve been terribly disappointed by the further eclipsing of arms control in the State Department and by the department’s inability to welcome and promote and retain the kind of technical expertise that arms control and nonproliferation depend on. So I’d look at that question again.

BIEGUN: There’s a lot to reflect on from those years, John, when we worked sometimes together, sometimes on opposite sides of issues. One lesson I would take away – and this really goes to answer the question on organizational charts – this is nothing that is particularly wise, I don’t think – organizational charts simply are not going to guarantee any outcome. It has to be the presidential priority. In fact, the White House coordinator on nuclear terrorism has to sit at the desk. It has to be a high priority for the president of the United States, whoever he or she is. I do think that we are at that point where we can almost have certain confidence that that will be the case with the next president of the United States, whoever it is.

I also think that that message has to emanate through the organizations that are in place, whether it’s the National Security Council and the national security advisor, how that person prioritizes their time, as well as the State Department. But I’d also raise a very important area that I think needs to be energized and tremendously active is also the intelligence community. Adequate and confident intelligence in the state of nuclear weapons programs in countries around the world—our ability to efficiently and effectively share that intelligence with some of the people and organizations who need to act, like the International Atomic Energy Agency—are going to be critically important for our ability to stop proliferation.

Well, we are well past the point where the United States alone can take on this issue, if we were ever at that point. The United States has to look to gear its governmental bodies to the closest possible cooperation with allies and with international organizations around the world. That includes our diplomacy but it also includes our intelligence and, again, to repeat where I started, it includes the president of the United States making this a high priority for themselves.

KIMBALL: Thank you. We have a question about the fissile material cutoff treaty, which is the proposal that has been around for quite some time to have a global halt to the production of highly enriched uranium, plutonium that can be used to make nuclear weapons. The question is: “Both candidates have expressed support for a fissile material cutoff treaty. Senator McCain has expressed support for a fissile material cutoff treaty; Senator Obama for a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty. The question is, is this verifiable? Also, how would the next administration break the impasse on multilateral talks that have not started on the FMCT, as it is called, for some time? And how would they propose to bring in Pakistan and China and India into such a ban?”

BIEGUN: There are a variety of initiatives and opportunities on the diplomatic calendar, not limited to the FMCT, in which the United States needs to fully throw itself with its allies. My hope would be that one way to break the impasse on this would be for the United States to take an all-enveloping approach on issues of nuclear proliferation, including the agenda that we take to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference, including the FMCT, including also the leadership that the president of the United States certainly in my book, hopefully President McCain of the United States, is taking domestically, in order to demonstrate the United States’ continuing commitment to the reduction of nuclear weapons around the world.

I don’t therefore expect that peace and cooperation will break out all over the world. In fact, there are many countries, and particularly the ones that we’re most concerned about, for which no U.S. action would likely change their thinking or change their ways. That’s though ultimately not what is going to have to be the highest priority for our approach. We’re going to have to build the strongest possible international consensus. We’re going to have to invigorate not only our own leadership but support and invigorate the leadership of our allies in all of these issues.

Now, does that produce an FMCT specifically to the question? There’s a proposal on the table that I think could be easily be taken up. It really is the argument over the verifiability. But it’s one that I think the United States is going to have to weigh in the context of a broader arms control and nonproliferation approach. On the downside risks of a verification regime is that it potentially could have the ability to further spread technologies versus the upside risk of the United States gaining action on this critical priority, which is the cutoff of the flow of fissile materials. I would hope that we can resolve this quickly. Like I said, there is a proposal on the table that is very close, verifiability issues, if we can get around it. I think Senator McCain would be very eager to move forward.

KIMBALL: Steve, just to clarify that, the proposal you are referring to is the proposal the Bush administration has forwarded to the Conference on Disarmament? That’s the one you’re referring to?

BIEGUN: Yes.

HOLUM: Yeah, I think first, as to Senator Obama’s position, he’s made clear that he’s in favor of negotiating a verifiable fissile material cutoff. The countries that the questioner mentioned are crucial to that process. That in turn puts you in the context of an international negotiating forum, which has been, to say the least, very sleepy and unproductive over the last dozen years.

I think the key there—and it takes presidential leadership as well as a concentrated negotiating strategy—is to break this concept that has broken down, that has really held up the Conference on Disarmament on linkage. We want to pursue a fissile material cutoff. Other countries say, well, you can do that; but only if we start negotiations on an outer space treaty or some other pet agenda item. The way we have proceeded, for example, with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, is when the political will was exhibited, U.S. diplomacy was fully engaged and active around the world to say this has got to be a priority. You need to set aside your other pet projects. I still think it’s possible to proceed in the Conference on Disarmament with this. I think the treaty has to be verifiable or it’s not going to be trusted.

KIMBALL: Thank you. I think we’ve got time for a couple more quick questions. Then, I’ll give both of you a chance to wrap up. We have several questions relating to how the United States should deal with the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan. One question is simply: “What is your candidate’s stance on dealing with the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan?”  (Laughter.) That’s pretty straightforward.

And another question, noting that each of the two candidates voted in 2006 for final passage of the legislation for the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, that the deal is stuck because of domestic Indian disputes at the moment, and that the U.S. legislation requires that if the United States trades with India and India tests, the United States would cut off nuclear trade with India, asks: “Does your candidate support such a cutoff if India tests?”

So those are the two questions. One more broadly about how to deal with India and Pakistan, which are outside the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and are continuing to build up their arsenals. Another specifically, on the testing aspect of the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal?

HOLUM: Well, should I go first? One of the advantages of pursuing global regimes is that you have the possibility of social pressure, if you want to use a simple term, global pressure to bring in countries that have remained outside the various regimes. That’s one of the reasons why I think a fissile material cutoff that covers us as well as others can have an impact, and why the diplomacy for the test ban treaty’s ratification and entry into force has to be pressed on a global basis.

That said, India and Pakistan are linked, obviously, by geography. But they are different questions. Senator Obama, as you indicated, did support the authorizing negotiations of the peaceful nuclear cooperation arrangement with India, in significant part because he believes we need a broad strategic relationship with a fellow democracy that has not been a disseminator of nuclear technology and materials elsewhere in the world, which is a condition that obviously does not apply to Pakistan and the AQ Khan network, which has been one of the most horrendous sources of proliferation in recent years.

At the same time, he supported that authorization after his amendments were adopted to make sure that fuel supplies were limited to what would reasonably be used in civilian nuclear power reactors and connecting the agreement to a continued testing moratorium. He also supported other amendments that strengthened the nonproliferation aspects of the agreement. He hasn’t yet made a judgment on the deal. As it’s been negotiated, it may not happen that the proposal will be submitted to the Senate or to the Congress, because of the objections within the Indian government, as well as the complications in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

In the case of Pakistan, our first priority needs to be to work with them to make sure that their nuclear arsenal is protected and that the sad experience of the past in terms of technology and other transfers is not repeated. I don’t see any prospect of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan.

KIMBALL: One final question before we go to closing comments, which comes back to some of the earlier discussion at today’s Arms Control Association session on the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Both candidates have expressed an interest in pursuing the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Senator Obama has put it in other words; I can’t quite remember how he put it. But would your candidate renew the unequivocal commitment of the United States and the other nuclear weapon powers, made in 2000 at the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference on the elimination of nuclear weapons? That could be a simple yes or no answer, if you like.

BIEGUN: I don’t know the text as described. But Senator McCain is definitive in his statement that this is the direction he’ll take the United States. I’d be happy to look at the text if the person wants to show it to me. But he gave his citation quoting Ronald Reagan. So rather than quote that document, I’d rather stick with the quote that he cited in his speech. But that’s the direction he’ll go.

HOLUM: I’d take the same view with regard to Senator Obama. I hesitate to adopt something that I’ve probably forgotten the exact terms of.

KIMBALL: Well, I want to thank you both for taking that rapid-fire series of questions from our expert audience. We have a few minutes left for each of you, beginning with Steve, please, to make any closing comments or any remarks that weren’t covered in the discussion that you feel are important to explain to the audience about what a President McCain would do to strengthen the nonproliferation effort?

BIEGUN: Thank you. Thank you, Daryl, and thanks to the Arms Control Association for your leadership and your support and sometimes criticism over the years. I also thank you all for listening patiently today and giving fair thought to both John’s presentation and mine.

Let me start where I started, which is the vital importance of experience in this election and the role that experience should play in you making your choices, and the American people more importantly and more broadly making their choices. The president of the United States wears many hats. The president of the United States is the leader of a political party. The president of the United States is the president of this great country. The president of the United States is a leader, the leader of the free world. The president of the United States wears many hats and must constantly be conscious of the fact that he or she wears those many hats.

A leader of a political party has to be willing to stand up when the most activist and vocal base in the party is pushing in a certain direction, but the president of the United States knows otherwise. When Bosnians were being massacred after the collapse of Yugoslavia, it took a leader like John McCain to stand up and fight isolationist voices in his own party and call on the American people to support President Clinton, of the other party, in an important act of international intervention to end terrible slaughter. It takes courage for a leader to stand up against the prevailing wisdom or the prevailing view of their political party. But also, a leader has to be able to lead their party in the right direction.  Senator McCain has that ability in the context of the Republican Party.

The president of the United States has to be willing to look at the American people and tell them the honest truth about the difficulties and opportunities that face us in the world today. But as they are looking at that voter, whether it’s a voter who has voted, whether it’s a primary voter, whether it’s a general-election voter, they also have to be cognizant of the fact of their third role as leader of the free world, as a leader of global consequence.

When you look at voters in New Hampshire and tell them that you’ll go into Pakistan and bomb tribal areas if you have to, to get a terrorist, but you haven’t spent any time developing your relationship with the government of Pakistan to build a position of trust, to build a position of communication, to build a relationship where you can disagree or go through the pretense of disagreeing when something happens like this to preserve the political niceties of governing in Pakistan; when you leap forward like that without looking in your rear-view mirror and then the next day you want to go to that government and talk to them about the security of their nuclear weapons program, don’t expect a great result.

When you look at a voter in the state of Ohio and you promise to them within six months you’re going to pull out of NAFTA, and you haven’t looked in your rear-view mirror and noticed that that’s actually a very important agreement to our friends in Mexico, and more so to the Canadians whose support we’re going to need in every element of our national security, whether it’s border control or whether it’s pushing positions in international bodies. You have to be cognizant that you’ve got that position.

When you look a voter in the eye and you say that the Bush administration has outsourced U.S. diplomacy to those, my word, feckless Europeans on Iran, you’ve outsourced to the Europeans as if that’s somehow a fault to trust those untrustworthy Germans and Brits and French in negotiating the end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and you don’t think through that six months later, you might be sitting down with those same three countries to try to bring purpose to that negotiation, it betrays a lack of experience.

A president has to have a 360-degree awareness. It’s something that Senator John McCain has developed over a lifetime of service to the country in the armed services and in the United States Senate. When he talks to a voter, he knows he’s talking to the world. When he takes an issue like nuclear proliferation or nuclear security, he knows that he is taking an issue that isn’t just inherently important to the security of our people but to everybody around the world. If they don’t sense that their security is as important to us as our security, then we’re going to have a very hard time getting them to the table to cooperate.

Now the good news. The good news is that there is a large middle on this issues that has clearly come out, not only in the context of this discussion, but also in the context of the speeches and statements of the two candidates for the president of the United States. I’d hazard to guess that we’ve probably encompassed 90 percent of a common agenda here. It’s the 10 percent margins on the side, some of it will be process; some of it will be substance. But there is a broad agreement. I, as an American, take great comfort in that.

Senator McCain is anchored in the institutions of government. He’s not, by anyone’s definition, a captive of them. As much as the Obama campaign wants to run against George Bush, John McCain is not George Bush. Anybody who thinks so hasn’t spent time with the two gentlemen. Anybody who thinks so has to suspend belief about everything that Senator McCain has done and stood for, including his run for presidency in the year 2000.

Senator McCain knows that these ideas need collaboration inside our political system. He knows that we need to reach out to Democrats and Republicans alike. He has a proven record on issues of national consequence, of not only reaching out but of successfully achieving a result. Senator McCain doesn’t take up this task lightly. He understands the consequences of running for president; he understands the huge and awesome duty and challenges that come with that office.

He is a tremendous leader. He is someone I know personally and someone with whom I’ve, as I said, had the chance to work with for 20 years. It will give me great pleasure, and I would welcome anyone who wishes to join me, in voting for him in November. So thank you all very much.

HOLUM: In summing up, I’d just like to make two broad observations about the forthcoming campaign and election. The first is that one of the results has to be a sharp change next January in our approach to the spread of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration has had an ample chance to test its own strategy, one of rejected arms control, neglected global regimes, and defective enforcement. It hasn’t worked.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. We went to war, as you’ll recall, in Iraq over nuclear weapons, at least that’s what we thought. Famously over the smoking gun in Iraq not turning out to be a mushroom cloud; but of course, there weren’t any there. It turned out that the sanctions and inspections, however imperfect, were working.

But there are nuclear weapons right now in North Korea, a capability built up while we’ve been bogged down in Iraq. Whereas they previously had enough plutonium for one or two weapons, now they have enough to test, use, or sell. In a very few years, there might be nuclear weapons in Iran as well.

Last December, our intelligence community concluded that Iran had suspended its nuclear weapons program, leading many to believe that the danger had receded. President Bush tried to counter that impression, making the case that the threat was still growing in Iran because they were pursuing their enrichment programs and he was right. I recall Tom Friedman observing at the time that some things are true even if George Bush believes them. (Laughter.)

As you know, the technology for a crude weapon is comparatively easy. The hard part is the fissile material, which is why as both senator and presidential candidate, Barack Obama has focused like a laser on such issues as loose nukes and nuclear smuggling. On the material, Iran has been steadily moving ahead.

A world in which either of these countries had deliverable nuclear weapons would be dramatically more dangerous. It’s also not hard, of course, to imagine either of these countries transferring nuclear capabilities to other countries or to terrorists. So we simply cannot afford not to turn the page on an approach that has failed.

My second point is that for that very reason, it would be far better if this were not an issue in the 2008 presidential campaign but rather if there could be a bipartisan consensus on how to proceed. I have been encouraged that this appears to be one of those areas in which Senator McCain, despite his close relationships with the Bush administration as a senator on these issues, has as a presidential candidate been edging away from President Bush. Steve has been galloping away.

I read his recent speech on the subject closely, as I know many of you have. There are a number of points that coincide with positions Senator Obama has taken, including of course his dream that we share of a nuclear weapons-free world. Here’s an idea. What if both candidates pressed to include that position in their party platforms at this summer’s convention? It would also be great if some of the hazy areas in Senator McGovern – or Senator McCain’s speech – (laughter) –

BIEGUN: There you go again, John. (Laughter.)

HOLUM: This was a critical one. It would be good if some of the hazy areas in Senator McCain’s speech could be made more specific. For example, replacing phrases like “seriously consider” with “support,” and commit not just to take another look at the comprehensive test ban, but push for its ratification and entry into force. It would also be great if the idea of talking to such countries as Iran without preconditions could be seen not as an opening to score political points but as a potential opportunity for progress against grave national security threats.

I’ll keep watching for those developments, but in the meantime, you know in considerable detail what Senator Obama believes, how he thinks about these issues, and who he is: a leader with the unique potential to transform the nation’s international approach, capture the imagination of people around the globe, and help us confront looming dangers and achieve a safer world. 

Thank you.

(Applause.)

KIMBALL: Thanks to both of you. Thanks to both John Holum and Steve Biegun for your time and to both campaigns for making you available as representatives. This has been a really excellent discussion. I hope it’s not the only discussion we have over the next five months on these issues. Let it just be the start.

I just want to note that a full transcript of today’s events, including this one, will be available on the website of the Arms Control Association, which is www.armscontrol.org. For Arms Control Association members, we have a meeting beginning in about 10 minutes in the back room. I want to thank our audience and our speakers again. This session is closed.

END

BACKGROUND PAPER : Prospects for U.S. CTBT Ratification

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A background paper on the prospects of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with a new Senate and a new Administration by Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association.

Country Resources:

NGO Statement at 2008 NPT PrepCom

Body: 

The following statement was delivered by John Loretz of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War on 29 April 2008. It is based on an international letter sent on 7 January 2008 to governments on the NSG and the IAEA Board of Governors.

Proposal for Nuclear Cooperation with India: A Nonproliferation Disaster

Convenors: Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association; Philip White, Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group
Speaker: John Loretz, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Ladies and Gentleman:

As we mark the 40th anniversary of the opening for signature of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), global system for controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons is under severe stress. This presentation addresses a fundamental challenge to the treaty: the July 2005 proposal to carve-out a country-specific loophole in global nonproliferation norms and standards to allow a handful of nuclear supplier states to engage in nuclear cooperation with India, which is one of the few remaining NPT hold-out states.

We believe that each NPT state party has a role and responsibility to actively help ensure that any proposed nuclear cooperation with India, or with any other country outside the NPT, should be fully consistent with the treaty and all NPT Review Conference decisions, as well as United Nations Security Council resolution, the established practices of the IAEA safeguards system, and international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation agreements, principles, and norms.

This presentation represents the views of more than 130 experts and nongovernmental organizations from 23 countries, including the President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. It is based on a letter dated 7 January 2008 that was sent by these organizations and individuals to over 60 governments.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors may soon be asked to consider a new "India-specific" safeguards agreement that would cover a limited number of additional "civilianÅh reactors. Shortly thereafter, the members of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will be asked to take a position on the Bush administration's proposal to exempt India from longstanding NSG guidelines that require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply. This would open the door for the United States and others to engage in nuclear trade with India for the first time since India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 that used plutonium harvested from a heavy water reactor supplied by Canada and the United States in violation of bilateral peaceful nuclear use agreements.

Contrary to the claims of its advocates, the proposed arrangement fails to bring India further into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of other states. India's commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and norms. Consequently, the proposed arrangement would damage the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation system and set back efforts to achieve universal nuclear disarmament.

We urge your government and this meeting of NPT states parties has a responsibility to consider the full implications of the proposed agreement and to play an active role to help ensure that this controversial proposal does not:

  • further undermine the nuclear safeguards system and efforts to prevent the proliferation of technologies that may be used to produce nuclear bomb material;
  • in any way contribute to nuclear proliferation and/or the expansion of India's nuclear arsenal; or
  • otherwise grant India the benefits of civil nuclear trade without holding it to the same standards expected of other states parties of the NPT.

Please consider the following:

1) India is seeking "India-specific" safeguards over the additional facilities it has declared "civilian". Indian officials insist that the continuation of these safeguards depends upon the continued supply of nuclear fuel from foreign suppliers. India may also assert that it has the option to remove certain "indigenous" reactors from safeguards if foreign fuel supplies are interrupted, even if that is because it has resumed nuclear testing. Such interpretations would be unprecedented and should be rejected whether they might be included in the actual safeguards agreement or accompanying statements.

As part of the final document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, all NPT states parties endorsed the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. A decision by a subset of the NPT states parties - the 45-nation NSG - to exempt India from this requirement for India would contradict this important element of the NPT bargain.

It should also be noted that the several countries that are parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Treaty of Rarotonga have made further commitments not to provide any source or special fissionable material to any NPT non-nuclear-weapon state unless the recipient state is under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

We urge your government to actively oppose any arrangement that would give India any special safeguards exemptions or would in any way be inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards over all nuclear materials and facilities.

2) India pledged in July 2005 to conclude an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement. Given that India maintains a nuclear weapons program outside of safeguards, facility-specific safeguards on a few additional "civilian" reactors provide no serious nonproliferation benefits. States should insist that India conclude a meaningful Additional Protocol safeguards regime before the NSG takes a decision on exempting India from its rules.

3) The United States has put forward a draft NSG guideline that would allow NSG states to continue providing India with nuclear supplies even if New Delhi breaks its nuclear test moratorium pledge. Indian officials say they want changes to NSG guidelines that do not impinge upon their ability to resume nuclear testing. The U.S. proposal on India at the NSG would, in the case of a resumption of nuclear testing by India, make the suspension of nuclear trade optional for NSG members. Such an approach would undercut the international norm against nuclear testing and make a mockery of NSG guidelines. Nuclear supplier states should be immediately terminated if India resumes nuclear testing for any reason.

4) India is seeking exemptions from NSG guidelines and IAEA supply guarantees that would allow supplier states to provide India with a strategic fuel reserve that could be used to outlast any fuel supply cut off or sanctions that may be imposed if it resumes nuclear testing. The U.S.-India bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement includes political commitments to support an Indian strategic fuel reserve and an "India-specific" fuel supply arrangement. If nuclear supplier states should agree to supply fuel to India, they should do so in a manner that is commensurate with ordinary reactor operating requirements.

5) India is seeking and the United States has proposed an NSG guideline that would open the way for other nuclear suppliers to transfer sensitive plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy water production technology to India even though IAEA safeguards cannot prevent such technology from being replicated and used in its weapons program. U.S. officials have stated that they do not intend to sell such technology, but other states may. Foreign-assisted enrichment and reprocessing, even if ostensibly confined to the civilian program, could help India in its military programs because Indian technicians could adapt civilian assistance to the weapons program through reverse engineering. So long as India maintains an unsafeguarded weapons program, no such technologies should be transferred to India.

6) Absent a decision by New Delhi to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, foreign fuel supplies would allow India not only to continue but also to potentially accelerate the buildup of its stockpile of nuclear weapons materials. This would not only contradict the goal of Article I of the NPT, but it would also foster further nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. India's stated support for a global, verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty is welcome, but insufficient, especially given the decade-long gridlock in Geneva that has held up negotiations on the cut-off.

7) UN Security Council Resolution 1172 calls on India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and stop producing fissile material for weapons, among other nuclear risk reduction measures. Your government is bound by the UN Charter to support the implementation of this resolution and states at this meeting should reiterate their commitment to the prompt realization of its goals.

Conclusion
The initiative for nuclear cooperation with India threatens to undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime by granting India the benefits of nuclear commerce only accorded to NPT states parties, while securing no meaningful constraint on the growth of its nuclear weapons stockpile or commitment by India to accept the legal equivalent of the obligations set forth in Articles I and VI of the NPT.

We call on all NPT states parties to judge the proposal for nuclear cooperation according to the commitments they have made under the treaty and in the context of NPT Review Conferences, and according to the obligations imposed by UN Security Council resolutions passed in the aftermath of the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Rather than create exceptions to the rules of behavior expected of responsible states, NPT states parties should reaffirm the need for universal adherence to the treaty and for nuclear disarmament.

Thank you.

 

Individual Endorsements (organizations listed for identification purposes only)

Tadatoshi Akiba
Mayor of Hiroshima (Japan)

Amb. Richard Broinowski (Australia)
Adjunct Professor, School of Letters, Art and Media
University of Sydney
Former Ambassador to Vietnam, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Central American Republics and Cuba

Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)
Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
President of the 1995 NPT Review & Extension Conference (Recipient of the 2007 Intl. Peace Bureau MacBride Prize)

Amb. Robert Grey Jr., (Washington D.C., USA)
Director, Bipartisan Security Group and Former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

Fred McGoldrick (Boston, Mass., USA)
Consultant and Former Director of Nonproliferation and Export Policy U.S. Department of State

Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., Canadian Senator Emeritus and Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament

Roland Timerbaev (Moscow, Russia)
Ambassador (Ret.), Executive Board Chair
Center for Policy Studies

Leonard Weiss (USA)
Former Staff Director of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and chief architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978

Praful Bidwai (India)
Senior journalist and author
Fellow of the Transnational Institute and co-winner of the IPB MacBride Prize

Dr. Helen Caldicott (Australia)
Co-founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility
Founder of Womens Action for Nuclear Disarmament
Founder Nuclear Policy Research Institute

Prof. Kamal Mitra Chenoy (New Delhi, India)
Professor of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University

Noam Chomsky (Cambridge, Mass. USA)
Emeritus professor of linguistics and philosophy
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Joseph Cirincione (Washington, D.C., USA)
Senior Fellow and Director for Nuclear Policy
Center for American Progress

Gwynne Dyer (Canada)
Freelance journalist, columnist, broadcaster, and lecturer on international affairs

Trevor Findlay (Ottawa, Canada)
Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance
Associate Professor
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Frank von Hippel (Princeton, NJ, USA)
Professor of Public and International Affairs
Program on Science and Global Security
Princeton University

Wade L. Huntley, Ph.D. (Vancouver, Canada)
Director, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research
Liu Institute for Global Issues
University of British Columbia

Michiji Konuma
Member of The Committee of Seven for World Peace and Emeritus Professor of Keio University and Musashi Institute of Technology

Zia Mian (Princeton, NJ, USA)
Research Scientist, Program on Science and Global Security Princeton University

Dr. William C. Potter (Monterey, Calif., USA)
Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

M.V. Ramana (Bangalore, India)
Senior Fellow, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development

Ernie Regehr, O.C. (Canada)
Co-Founder Project Ploughshares
Adjunct Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo and Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation

Sharon Squassoni (Washington, D.C. USA)
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Tatsujiro Suzuki (Japan)
Member of Japan Pugwash Group
Co-founder of Peace Pledge, Japan

Tomihisa Taue
Mayor of Nagaski City (Japan)

Hideo Tsuchiyama (Japan)
Member of The Committee of Seven for World Peace
Emeritus Professor and former President of Nagasaki University

Hiromichi Umebayashi (Japan)
President, Peace Depot

Achin Vanaik (India)
Professor of International Relations and Global Politics
Department of Political Science, Delhi University
Fellow of the Transnational Institute (Co-recipient of the 2000 International Peace Bureau MacBride Prize)

Alyn Ware (New Zealand)
Vice-President of International Peace Bureau

International NGOs

Peter Becker
International Secretary
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

Regina Hagen
Coordinator
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Tomas Magnusson
President
International Peace Bureau (Recipient of the 1910 Nobel Prize for Peace)

Susi Snyder
Secretary General
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Rene Wadlow
Representative to UN, Geneva
Association of World Citizens

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (Recipient of the 1985 Nobel Prize for Peace)

Associate Professor Tilman Ruff
Chair
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) Working Group

National and Local NGOs (listed by region)

South Asia

India

Dr Mahesh Kumar Arora
Secretary
Anubhooti Society (Jaipur, Rajasthan, India)

Dr. Prakash Louis
Bihar Social Institute (Patna, Bihar, India)

Harsh Kapoor
South Asians Against Nukes (India)

Prof. E. P. Menon
India Development Foundation (Bangalore India)

N.D.Pancholi
ConvenorChampa -The Amiya & B.G.Rao Foundation (New Delhi, India).

Sandeep Pandey
Asha Parivar (India)

Medha Patkar
National Alliance of People's Movements (India)

Sukla Sen
EKTA (Committee for Communal Amity) (Mumbai, India)

S. P. Udayakumar
Coordinator
People's Movement Against Nuclear Energy (Tamil Nadu, India)

Nepal

Ram Narayan Kumar
South Asia Forum for Human Rights (Kathmandu)

Pakistan

Aslam Khwaja
Executive Director
People's Development Foundation (Pakistan)

Sri Lanka

Upali Magedaragamage
Coordinator, Asian Network for Culture and Development (Maharagama, Sri Lanka)

South Asian Diaspora

Mr. Abi Ghimire
Canadian Network for Democratic Nepal (Canada)

Hari Sharma (President) and Board of Directors
South Asian Network for Secularism and Democracy (Vancouver, Canada)

Coalition for an Egalitarian and Secular/Pluralistic India (Los Angeles, CA, USA)

EKTA Los Angeles (Committee for Communal Amity) (Palos Verdes, CA, USA)

South Asia Forum (Huntington Beach, CA, USA)

East Asia

Japan

Shingo Fukuyama
Secretary General
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin)

Akira Kawasaki
Executive Committee
Peace Boat (Japan)

Ken’ichi Okubo
Executive Director
Japan Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

Daisuke Sato
Secretary-general
NoNukes Asia Forum Japan

Yoshiko Shidara
Co-Director
Women's Democratic Club

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director
Green Action (Kyoto, Japan)

Hiroshi Taka
Secretary General
Japan Council against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikyo)

Terumi Tanaka
Secretary General
Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-bomb Sufferers) (Japan)
(Hidankyo was the recipient of the 2003 International Peace Bureau MacBride Prize)

Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

South Korea

Park Jin-Sup
Vice Director
Eco-Horizon Institute (Seoul, South Korea)

Park Jung-eun
Chief Coordinator, Center for Peace and Disarmament
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (South Korea)

Wooksik Cheong
Representative
Peace Network (Seoul, South Korea)

Europe

Austria

Heinz Stockinger
PLAGE (Salzburg Platform Against Nuclear Dangers) (Austria)

Belgium

David Heller
Coordinator
Friends of the Earth, Flanders & Brussels (Belgium)

Hans Lammerant
Bombspotting – Vredesactie (Belgium)

Finland

Laura Lodenius
Peace Union of Finland

France

Jean-Marie Matagne
President
Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire
Action of Citizens for the total Dismantling of Nukes (France)

Pierre Villard
Co-president
Mouvement de la Paix (France)
Coordinateur de la Campagne pour le Désarmement Nucléaire

Germany

Rainer Braun
Executive Director
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, German section

Wolfgang Nees
Chairman
NaturwissenschaftlerInnen-Initiative "Verantwortung für Frieden und Zukunftsfähigkeit" (Germany)

Ingrid Schittich
Director
Association of World Citizens, German branch

Bundesverband der Deutschen Friedensgesellschaft - Vereinigte KriegsdienstgegnerInnen (Germany)

Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (Germany)

International Fellowship of Reconciliation, German Branch

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, German section

Ireland

Mary McCarrick and Emily Doherty
Executive Committee Members
Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Joe Murray
Director, Action from Ireland (AFRi)

Roger Cole
Peace and Neutrality Alliance (Ireland)

Italy

Albino Bizzotto,
President
Beati i costruttori di pace (Blessed Are the Peacemakers) (Italy)

Lisa Clark,
Nuclear Weapons Working Group
Rete Italiana per il Disarmo (Italian Disarmament Network)

Nicola Cufaro Petroni
Secretary General
Union of Scientists for Disarmament (USPID) (Italy)

Netherlands

Ak Malten
Director
Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance (The Netherlands)

Norway

Stine Rødmyr
Leader of No to Nuclear Weapons (Norway)

Sweden

Anna Lisa Eneroth (President) and
Alexandra Sundberg (Secretary General)
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Swedish section

Anna Ek
President
Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society

Frida Sundberg (President SLMK) and
Gunnar Westberg (Co-President IPPNW, member of SLMK Board)
Swedish Physicians Against Nuclear Weapons (SLMK)

United Kingdom

Kate Hudson
Chair, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)

Dr. Rebecca Johnson
Executive Director
Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (UK)

Jenny Maxwell
Chair
West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Dave Webb
Chair
Yorkshire Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Middle East and Africa

Egypt

Nouri Abdul Razzak Hussain
Secretary-General
Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (Cairo)

Oceania

Australia

John Hallam
People for Nuclear Disarmament Nuclear Flashpoints Campaign (Sydney, Australia)

Don Jarrett
President, Australian Peace Committee (Australia)

Pauline Mitchell
Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament Melbourne (Australia)

David Noonan and Dave Sweeney
Nuclear Free Campaigners
Australian Conservation Foundation (Australia)

Cam Walker
National Liaison Officer, Friends of the Earth Australia

Dr Sue Wareham OAM
President
Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)

New Zealand

Dr Kate Dewes (Coordinator) and
Commander Robert D Green (Royal Navy (Ret'd))
Disarmament & Security Centre (Christchurch, New Zealand)

Barney Richards
National Secretary
Peace Council Aotearoa New Zealand

North America

Canada

Sr. Mary-Ellen Francoeur
President
World Conference of Religions for Peace (Canada)

Paul Hamel (President) and Phyllis Creighton (Secretary)
Science for Peace (Toronto Canada)

Laura Savinkoff
Boundary Peace Initiative (Canada)

Dr. Jennifer Simons
Simons Foundation (Canada)

Steven Staples
Director
Rideau Institute on International Affairs (Canada)
Global Secretariat to Abolition 2000

Jessica West
Program Associate
Project Ploughshares (Waterloo, ON, Canada)

Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)

StopWar.ca (Canada)

United States of America

Rochelle Becker
Executive Director
Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility (San Luis Obispo, Ca, USA)

John Burroughs
Executive Director, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (New York, USA)

Glenn Carroll
Coordinator, Nuclear Watch South (Atlanta, USA)

David Culp
Legislative Representative
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers) (Washington, D.C. USA)

Mary Davis
Director of Yggdrasil, a project of Earth Island Institute (Lexington, KY, USA)

Keith Gunter
Citizens' Resistance at Fermi Two (Monroe, MI, USA)

David Hartsough
Executive Director
Peaceworkers (San Francisco, CA, USA)

Alice Hirt
Don't Waste Michigan (Holland, MI, USA)

Michael J. Keegan
Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great Lakes (Monroe, MI, USA)

Daryl G. Kimball,
Executive Director,
Arms Control Association (Washington, DC, USA)

David Krieger
President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (New York, USA)

Terri Lodge
Coordinator
Arms Control Advocacy Collaborative (USA)

Michael McCally, M.D., Ph.D.
Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility (Washington D.C., USA)

Christopher Paine
Director, Nuclear Program
Natural Resources Defense Council (Washington, D.C., USA)

Jon Rainwater
Executive Director
Peace Action West (Berkeley, California, USA)

Don Richardson, M.D.
Western North Carolina Physicians For Social Responsibility (Asheville, NC, USA)

Susan Shaer
Executive Director
Women's Action for New Directions (Washington, D.C., USA)

Alice Slater (New York, USA)
Convener, Abolition 2000 Sustainable Energy Working Group

Jennifer O. Viereck,
Director, HOME: Healing Ourselves & Mother Earth (Tecopa, CA, USA)

Sisters of St. Francis Center for Active Nonviolence (Clinton, Iowa, USA)

 

Description: 

The following statement was delivered by John Loretz of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War on 29 April 2008. It is based on an international letter sent on 7 January 2008 to governments on the NSG and the IAEA Board of Governors. (Continue)

Country Resources:

Fix the Proposal for Renewed Cooperation with India

Body: 

January 7, 2008

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Minister of Foreign Affairs
c/o Nuclear Measures Subdirectorate
Pretoria, Republic of South Africa

cc: Abdul Minty, NSG Chair; Permanent Mission of South Africa to the IAEA

Dear Minister Dlamini-Zuma:
In the coming weeks the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors will likely be asked to consider a new “India-specific” safeguards agreement that would cover a limited number of additional “civilian” reactors. Shortly thereafter, the members of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will be asked to take a position on the Bush administration’s proposal to exempt India from longstanding NSG guidelines that require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply.

Contrary to the claims of its advocates, the proposed arrangement fails to bring India further into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of other states. India's commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and norms. Consequently, the proposed arrangement would damage the already fragile nuclear nonproliferation system and set back efforts to achieve universal nuclear disarmament.

We are writing to urge your government to consider the full implications of the proposed agreement and to play an active role in proposing and supporting measures that would help ensure that this controversial proposal does not:

  • further undermine the nuclear safeguards system and efforts to prevent the proliferation of technologies that may be used to produce nuclear bomb material;
  • in any way contribute to nuclear proliferation and/or the expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal; or
  • otherwise grant India the benefits of civil nuclear trade without holding it to the same standards expected of other states parties of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Because the NSG and IAEA traditionally operate by consensus, your government has a pivotal role to play. Please consider the following:

1) India is seeking unprecedented "India-specific" safeguards over the additional facilities it has declared “civilian”. Such safeguards could allow India to cease IAEA scrutiny if fuel supplies are cut off because it renews nuclear testing. Indian officials suggest that they will seek safeguards that are contingent upon the continued supply of nuclear fuel from foreign suppliers. India may also assert that it has the option to remove certain “indigenous“ reactors from safeguards if foreign fuel supplies are interrupted, even if that is because it has resumed nuclear testing. Such proposals should be rejected whether they might be included in the actual safeguards agreement or accompanying statements.

As part of the final document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, all NPT states parties endorsed the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. A decision by the 45-nation NSG to exempt India from this requirement for India would contradict this important element of the NPT bargain.

We urge your government to actively oppose any arrangement that would give India any special safeguards exemptions or would in any way be inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards over all nuclear materials and facilities.

2) India pledged in July 2005 to conclude an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement. Given that India maintains a nuclear weapons program outside of safeguards, facility-specific safeguards on a few additional “civilian” reactors provide no serious nonproliferation benefits. States should insist that India conclude a meaningful Additional Protocol safeguards regime before the NSG takes a decision on exempting India from its rules.

3) The United States has put forward a draft NSG guideline that would allow NSG states to continue providing India with nuclear supplies even if New Delhi breaks its nuclear test moratorium pledge. Indian officials say they want changes to NSG guidelines that do not impinge upon their ability to resume nuclear testing. The U.S. proposal on India at the NSG would, in the case of a resumption of nuclear testing by India, make the suspension of nuclear trade optional for NSG members. Such an approach would undercut the international norm against nuclear testing and make a mockery of NSG guidelines. If the NSG members agree by consensus to exempt India from the full-scope safeguards standard, they should in the very least clarify that all nuclear trade by NSG member states shall immediately cease if India resumes nuclear testing for any reason.

4) India is seeking exemptions from NSG guidelines and IAEA supply guarantees that would allow supplier states to provide India with a strategic fuel reserve that could be used to outlast any fuel supply cut off or sanctions that may be imposed if it resumes nuclear testing. The U.S.-India bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement includes political commitments to support an Indian strategic fuel reserve and an “India-specific” fuel supply arrangement. If NSG supplier states should agree to supply fuel to India, they should do so in a manner that is commensurate with ordinary reactor operating requirements.

5) India is seeking and the United States has proposed an NSG guideline that would open the way for other nuclear suppliers to transfer sensitive plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy water production technology to India even though IAEA safeguards cannot prevent such technology from being replicated and used in its weapons program. India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 that used plutonium harvested from a heavy water reactor supplied by Canada and the United States in violation of bilateral peaceful nuclear use agreements. U.S. officials have stated that they do not intend to sell such technology, but other states may. Virtually all NSG states support proposals that would bar transfers of these sensitive nuclear technologies to non-NPT members and should under no circumstances endorse an NSG rule that would allow the transfer of such technology to India.

6) Absent a decision by New Delhi to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, foreign fuel supplies would allow India not only to continue but also to potentially accelerate the buildup of its stockpile of nuclear weapons materials. This would not only contradict the goal of Article I of the NPT, but it would also foster further nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. Has your government conducted an independent assessment of the impact of foreign fuel supplies on India’s weapons production capacity and the security balance in South Asia?

7) UN Security Council Resolution 1172 calls on India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and stop producing fissile material for weapons. Your government is bound by the UN Charter to support the implementation of this resolution. Before India is granted a waiver from the NSG’s full-scope safeguards standard, it should join the other original nuclear weapon states by declaring it has stopped fissile material production for weapons purposes and, like the 177 other states that have signed the CTBT, make a legally-binding commitment to permanently end nuclear testing. India’s verbal commitment to support negotiations of a global verifiable fissile material cut off treaty is a hollow gesture given the fact that states have failed to initiate negotiations on such a treaty for over a decade.

Conclusion
If your government is truly dedicated to the goal of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, ending nuclear arms races, and strengthening rules governing the transfer of nuclear material and technology, it will insist upon these and other vital nonproliferation measures. We look forward to your responses to our questions and recommendations.  
Sincerely,
 
Daryl G. Kimball,
Executive Director,
Arms Control Association (Washington, DC, USA)
 
Steven Staples
Director
Rideau Institute on International Affairs (Canada)
Global Secretariat to Abolition 2000
 
Hideyuki Ban
Co-Director
Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo, Japan)
 
 Additional endorsements continue below
 

Contact Addresses:
Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group
c/o Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 Sumiyoshi-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-0065, Japan
Tel: 03-3357-3800  Fax: 03-3357-3801
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindia.html
 
Arms Control Association
1313 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20005
http://www.armscontrol.org
[email protected]

Endorsements continued (Updated January 10, 2008)

Individual Endorsements (organizations listed for identification purposes only)

Tadatoshi Akiba
Mayor of Hiroshima (Japan)

Amb. Richard Broinowski (Australia)
Adjunct Professor, School of Letters, Art and Media
University of Sydney
Former Ambassador to Vietnam, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Central American Republics and Cuba

Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)
Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
President of the 1995 NPT Review & Extension Conference (Recipient of the 2007 Intl. Peace Bureau MacBride Prize)

Amb. Robert Grey Jr., (Washington D.C., USA)
Director, Bipartisan Security Group and Former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

Fred McGoldrick (Boston, Mass., USA)
Consultant and Former Director of Nonproliferation and Export Policy U.S. Department of State

Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., Canadian Senator Emeritus and Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament

Roland Timerbaev (Moscow, Russia)
Ambassador (Ret.), Executive Board Chair
Center for Policy Studies

Leonard Weiss (USA)
Former Staff Director of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and chief architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978

Praful Bidwai (India)
Senior journalist and author
Fellow of the Transnational Institute and co-winner of the IPB MacBride Prize

Dr. Helen Caldicott (Australia)
Co-founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility
Founder of Womens Action for Nuclear Disarmament
Founder Nuclear Policy Research Institute

Prof. Kamal Mitra Chenoy (New Delhi, India)
Professor of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University

Noam Chomsky (Cambridge, Mass. USA)
Emeritus professor of linguistics and philosophy
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Joseph Cirincione (Washington, D.C., USA)
Senior Fellow and Director for Nuclear Policy
Center for American Progress

Gwynne Dyer (Canada)
Freelance journalist, columnist, broadcaster, and lecturer on international affairs

Trevor Findlay (Ottawa, Canada)
Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance
Associate Professor
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Frank von Hippel (Princeton, NJ, USA)
Professor of Public and International Affairs
Program on Science and Global Security
Princeton University

Wade L. Huntley, Ph.D. (Vancouver, Canada)
Director, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research
Liu Institute for Global Issues
University of British Columbia

Michiji Konuma
Member of The Committee of Seven for World Peace and Emeritus Professor of Keio University and Musashi Institute of Technology

Zia Mian (Princeton, NJ, USA)
Research Scientist, Program on Science and Global Security Princeton University

Dr. William C. Potter (Monterey, Calif., USA)
Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

M.V. Ramana (Bangalore, India)
Senior Fellow, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development

Ernie Regehr, O.C. (Canada)
Co-Founder Project Ploughshares
Adjunct Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo and Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation

Sharon Squassoni (Washington, D.C. USA)
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Tatsujiro Suzuki (Japan)
Member of Japan Pugwash Group
Co-founder of Peace Pledge, Japan

Tomihisa Taue
Mayor of Nagaski City (Japan)

Hideo Tsuchiyama (Japan)
Member of The Committee of Seven for World Peace
Emeritus Professor and former President of Nagasaki University

Hiromichi Umebayashi (Japan)
President, Peace Depot

Achin Vanaik (India)
Professor of International Relations and Global Politics
Department of Political Science, Delhi University
Fellow of the Transnational Institute (Co-recipient of the 2000 International Peace Bureau MacBride Prize)

Alyn Ware (New Zealand)
Vice-President of International Peace Bureau

International NGOs

Peter Becker
International Secretary
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

Regina Hagen
Coordinator
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Tomas Magnusson
President
International Peace Bureau (Recipient of the 1910 Nobel Prize for Peace)

Susi Snyder
Secretary General
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Rene Wadlow
Representative to UN, Geneva
Association of World Citizens

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (Recipient of the 1985 Nobel Prize for Peace)

Associate Professor Tilman Ruff
Chair
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) Working Group

National and Local NGOs (listed by region)

South Asia

India

Dr Mahesh Kumar Arora
Secretary
Anubhooti Society (Jaipur, Rajasthan, India)

Dr. Prakash Louis
Bihar Social Institute (Patna, Bihar, India)

Harsh Kapoor
South Asians Against Nukes (India)

Prof. E. P. Menon
India Development Foundation (Bangalore India)

N.D.Pancholi
ConvenorChampa -The Amiya & B.G.Rao Foundation (New Delhi, India).

Sandeep Pandey
Asha Parivar (India)

Medha Patkar
National Alliance of People's Movements (India)

Sukla Sen
EKTA (Committee for Communal Amity) (Mumbai, India)

S. P. Udayakumar
Coordinator
People's Movement Against Nuclear Energy (Tamil Nadu, India)

Nepal

Ram Narayan Kumar
South Asia Forum for Human Rights (Kathmandu)

Pakistan

Aslam Khwaja
Executive Director
People's Development Foundation (Pakistan)

Sri Lanka

Upali Magedaragamage
Coordinator, Asian Network for Culture and Development (Maharagama, Sri Lanka)

South Asian Diaspora

Mr. Abi Ghimire
Canadian Network for Democratic Nepal (Canada)

Hari Sharma (President) and Board of Directors
South Asian Network for Secularism and Democracy (Vancouver, Canada)

Coalition for an Egalitarian and Secular/Pluralistic India (Los Angeles, CA, USA)

EKTA Los Angeles (Committee for Communal Amity) (Palos Verdes, CA, USA)

South Asia Forum (Huntington Beach, CA, USA)

East Asia

Japan

Shingo Fukuyama
Secretary General
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin)

Akira Kawasaki
Executive Committee
Peace Boat (Japan)

Ken’ichi Okubo
Executive Director
Japan Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

Daisuke Sato
Secretary-general
NoNukes Asia Forum Japan

Yoshiko Shidara
Co-Director
Women's Democratic Club

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director
Green Action (Kyoto, Japan)

Hiroshi Taka
Secretary General
Japan Council against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikyo)

Terumi Tanaka
Secretary General
Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-bomb Sufferers) (Japan)
(Hidankyo was the recipient of the 2003 International Peace Bureau MacBride Prize)

Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

South Korea

Park Jin-Sup
Vice Director
Eco-Horizon Institute (Seoul, South Korea)

Park Jung-eun
Chief Coordinator, Center for Peace and Disarmament
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (South Korea) 

Wooksik Cheong
Representative
Peace Network (Seoul, South Korea)

Europe

Austria

Heinz Stockinger
PLAGE (Salzburg Platform Against Nuclear Dangers) (Austria)

Belgium

David Heller
Coordinator
Friends of the Earth, Flanders & Brussels (Belgium)

Hans Lammerant
Bombspotting – Vredesactie (Belgium)

Finland

Laura Lodenius
Peace Union of Finland

France

Jean-Marie Matagne
President
Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire
Action of Citizens for the total Dismantling of Nukes (France)

Pierre Villard
Co-president
Mouvement de la Paix (France)
Coordinateur de la Campagne pour le Désarmement Nucléaire

Germany

Rainer Braun
Executive Director
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, German section

Wolfgang Nees
Chairman
NaturwissenschaftlerInnen-Initiative "Verantwortung für Frieden und Zukunftsfähigkeit" (Germany)

Ingrid Schittich
Director
Association of World Citizens, German branch

Bundesverband der Deutschen Friedensgesellschaft - Vereinigte KriegsdienstgegnerInnen (Germany)

Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (Germany)

International Fellowship of Reconciliation, German Branch

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, German section

Ireland

Mary McCarrick and Emily Doherty
Executive Committee Members
Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Joe Murray
Director, Action from Ireland (AFRi)

Roger Cole
Peace and Neutrality Alliance (Ireland)

Italy

Albino Bizzotto,
President
Beati i costruttori di pace (Blessed Are the Peacemakers) (Italy)

Lisa Clark,
Nuclear Weapons Working Group
Rete Italiana per il Disarmo (Italian Disarmament Network)

Nicola Cufaro Petroni
Secretary General
Union of Scientists for Disarmament (USPID) (Italy)

Netherlands

Ak Malten
Director
Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance (The Netherlands)

Norway

Stine Rødmyr
Leader of No to Nuclear Weapons (Norway)

Sweden

Anna Lisa Eneroth (President) and
Alexandra Sundberg (Secretary General)
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Swedish section

Anna Ek
President
Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society

Frida Sundberg (President SLMK) and
Gunnar Westberg (Co-President IPPNW, member of SLMK Board)
Swedish Physicians Against Nuclear Weapons (SLMK)

United Kingdom

Kate Hudson
Chair, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)

Dr. Rebecca Johnson
Executive Director
Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (UK)

Jenny Maxwell
Chair
West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Dave Webb
Chair
Yorkshire Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Middle East and Africa

Egypt

Nouri Abdul Razzak Hussain
Secretary-General
Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (Cairo)

Oceania

Australia

John Hallam
People for Nuclear Disarmament Nuclear Flashpoints Campaign (Sydney, Australia)

Don Jarrett
President, Australian Peace Committee (Australia)

Pauline Mitchell
Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament Melbourne (Australia)

David Noonan and Dave Sweeney
Nuclear Free Campaigners
Australian Conservation Foundation (Australia)

Cam Walker
National Liaison Officer, Friends of the Earth Australia

Dr Sue Wareham OAM
President
Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)

New Zealand

Dr Kate Dewes (Coordinator) and
Commander Robert D Green (Royal Navy (Ret'd))
Disarmament & Security Centre (Christchurch, New Zealand)

Barney Richards
National Secretary
Peace Council Aotearoa New Zealand

North America

Canada

Sr. Mary-Ellen Francoeur
President
World Conference of Religions for Peace (Canada)

Paul Hamel (President) and Phyllis Creighton (Secretary)
Science for Peace (Toronto Canada)

Dr. Jennifer Simons
Simons Foundation (Canada)

Laura Savinkoff
Boundary Peace Initiative (Canada)

Jessica West
Program Associate
Project Ploughshares (Waterloo, ON, Canada)

Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)

StopWar.ca (Canada)

United States of America

Rochelle Becker
Executive Director
Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility (San Luis Obispo, Ca, USA)

John Burroughs
Executive Director, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (New York, USA)

Glenn Carroll
Coordinator, Nuclear Watch South (Atlanta, USA)

David Culp
Legislative Representative
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers) (Washington, D.C. USA)

Mary Davis
Director of Yggdrasil, a project of Earth Island Institute (Lexington, KY, USA)

Keith Gunter
Citizens' Resistance at Fermi Two (Monroe, MI, USA)

David Hartsough
Executive Director
Peaceworkers (San Francisco, CA, USA)

Alice Hirt
Don't Waste Michigan (Holland, MI, USA)

Michael J. Keegan
Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great Lakes (Monroe, MI, USA)

David Krieger
President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (New York, USA)

Terri Lodge
Coordinator
Arms Control Advocacy Collaborative (USA)

Michael McCally, M.D., Ph.D.
Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility (Washington D.C., USA)

Christopher Paine
Director, Nuclear Program
Natural Resources Defense Council (Washington, D.C., USA)

Jon Rainwater
Executive Director
Peace Action West (Berkeley, California, USA)

Don Richardson, M.D.
Western North Carolina Physicians For Social Responsibility (Asheville, NC, USA)

Susan Shaer
Executive Director
Women's Action for New Directions (Washington, D.C., USA)

Alice Slater (New York, USA)
Convener, Abolition 2000 Sustainable Energy Working Group

Jennifer O. Viereck,
Director, HOME: Healing Ourselves & Mother Earth (Tecopa, CA, USA)

Sisters of St. Francis Center for Active Nonviolence (Clinton, Iowa, USA)

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