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“What's really strikes me about ACA is the potential to shape the next generation of leaders on arms control and nuclear policy. This is something I witnessed firsthand as someone who was introduced to the field through ACA.”
– Alicia Sanders-Zakre
ICAN
June 2, 2022
November 2008
Edition Date: 
Saturday, November 1, 2008
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Long-Delayed Arms Sales to Taiwan Announced

Kirsten McNeil

The Bush administration notified Congress Oct. 3 that it plans to sell more than $6.4 billion in military equipment to Taiwan, triggering sharp criticism from China, which believes that the move would violate bilateral assurances made by Washington to decrease arms transfers to Taiwan.

According to the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the bulk of the planned U.S. sale would include 330 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles and 30 Apache Longbow attack helicopters, as well as 182 Javelin guided anti-tank missiles, 32 submarine-launched Harpoon missiles, spare parts for F-16s and other fighter aircraft, and upgrades for four E-2T Hawkeye 2000 early-warning aircraft. The proposed package does not include new F-16 fighter jets or submarines, about which Beijing has been particularly concerned.

Congress has 30 days to review and possibly object to the transfers. The sales will only be finalized after formal agreements are signed between Taiwan and the United States.

China, which views Taiwan as a renegade province, protested the planned sales by canceling or postponing senior-level military visits and humanitarian exchanges with the United States and blocking U.S. military ships from entering Chinese ports. Beijing filed a formal complaint and has called for the deals to be canceled.

As with past U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, China accused the United States of violating a provision in the Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqué of 1982, which states that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will decrease in quantity, frequency, and scope based on the levels of that time. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao issued a statement Oct. 6 calling for the United States to “stop disturbing the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, so as to prevent further damage to the Sino-U.S. relations as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”

Department of State deputy spokesperson Robert Wood on Oct. 8 called the Chinese reaction to the latest announcement “unfortunate,” and the Pentagon defended the arms sales as defensive in nature. Under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the United States has stated that it is U.S. policy to provide arms for the defense of Taiwan, even though the United States has not formally signed a defense treaty with Taiwan.

By holding off on the sale of F-16s and submarines, however, the United States has avoided transferring the most lethal technologies to Taiwan and the equipment that most worried China.

The Bush administration has been trying to carry out some of the arms sales since 2001, but political wrangling in Taiwan and U.S. fears of upsetting China at a time it is playing a crucial role in nuclear talks with North Korea have helped delay most of the sales. An April 2001 package advanced by President George W. Bush included offers to sell Taiwan eight diesel submarines, 12 P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, torpedoes, missiles, helicopters, amphibious vehicles, howitzers and four destroyers. However, in 2001, Bush deferred decisions on requests from Taiwan for Aegis-equipped destroyers, Abrams tanks, and Apache helicopters.

In the seven years since the 2001 announcements, some arms sales from the United States were rejected during the political process in Taiwan because of objections from Taiwan’s parliament or judicial system. Within the Taiwan legislature, heated debates occurred over the island’s defense budget, defensive strategy, funding priorities, and differing perceptions of relations with China.

In the period between the 2001 announcement and Oct. 3 announcement, some more limited arms sales did go forward. Twenty arms sales notifications were published by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, including those related to several missile systems, early-warning radars, aircraft, and destroyers. Nonetheless, according to a Dec. 20, 2007, Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, actual deliveries of U.S. arms to Taiwan have been decreasing but are still significant. During 1999-2002, deliveries to Taiwan totaled $5.8 billion; during 2003-2006, $4.1 billion; and in 2006, $970 million.

An opportunity to move forward with some of the sales emerged after Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou took office in May 2008, ending the eight-year reign of the Democratic Progressive Party and re-establishing the historically dominant Kuomintang (Chinese nationalist) party. In contrast to his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, Ma has taken a more conciliatory approach toward Beijing and has eased tensions with China by downplaying the issues of Taiwan’s status and formal designation.

Nevertheless, in a statement released on his Web site, Ma welcomed the deal, stating, “We feel that [the Oct. 3] announcement by the U.S. administration marks an end to the turmoil in Taiwan-U.S. relations of the past eight years and also represents the beginning of a new era in peace and security, as well as mutual trust between Taiwan and the United States.”

Although the original 2001 announcements included diesel submarines (see ACT, May 2001), the most recent arms sales announcements did not. The prospect of Taiwan acquiring diesel submarines has raised strong opposition in China and debate over whether these would be considered defensive weapons systems. As noted in a 2008 CRS report, the U.S. Navy accepted a proposal from the Taiwan legislature in 2007 to “start the design phase” for these submarines. The Department of Defense also noted in its most recent annual report on Chinese military power, released March 3, 2008, that the Taiwan legislature after years of delay passed a 2007 defense budget that included “funding for a study that would produce a diesel submarine design.”

The same Defense Department report details the current status of forces surrounding Taiwan. Chinese naval and air forces have an advantage in numbers, except in coastal missile boats and fighters. China has been building up short-range missiles on the coast across the Taiwan Strait at a rate of about 100 additional missiles per year, with current force levels around 1,000 short-range missiles. Ostensibly, the 330 PAC-3 missiles could be used to provide some defense against the mainland’s short-range missiles.

Wendy Morigi, a spokesperson for Democratic presidential candidate Sen. Barack Obama (Ill.), Oct. 8 welcomed the arms sale package, calling it “an important response to Taiwan’s defense needs. This action is fully consistent with U.S. obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. The sale helps to contribute to Taiwan’s defense and the maintenance of a healthy balance in the Taiwan Strait.”

On Oct. 7, the Republican presidential candidate, Sen. John McCain (Ariz.), said the proposed sales do not go far enough because they do not include submarines or new F-16 aircraft. “I urge the administration to reconsider this decision, in light of its previous commitment to provide submarines and America’s previous sales of F-16s,” McCain said.


The Bush administration notified Congress Oct. 3 that it plans to sell more than $6.4 billion in military equipment to Taiwan, triggering sharp criticism from China, which believes that the move would violate bilateral assurances made by Washington to decrease arms transfers to Taiwan.

According to the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the bulk of the planned U.S. sale would include 330 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles and 30 Apache Longbow attack helicopters, as well as 182 Javelin guided anti-tank missiles, 32 submarine-launched Harpoon missiles, spare parts for F-16s and other fighter aircraft, and upgrades for four E-2T Hawkeye 2000 early-warning aircraft. The proposed package does not include new F-16 fighter jets or submarines, about which Beijing has been particularly concerned. (Continue)

Hill Adjusts Bush’s Proposed Military Spending

Wade Boese

As lawmakers rushed to leave Washington before November’s general elections, they passed two bills setting new Pentagon spending policies and totals for fiscal year 2009, which began Oct. 1. They also extended the previous fiscal year’s funding levels for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Those legislative moves shifted and reduced expenditures for anti-missile programs, cut spending for non-nuclear global strike weapons, and denied funding for a controversial program to research a new generation of nuclear warheads. Congress also ordered a series of reports on issues ranging from the status of Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities to U.S. space policy.

On Sept. 30, President George W. Bush signed into law the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009. That measure includes $487.7 billion in spending for the Department of Defense, but does not finance the ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have been sustained through supplemental appropriations bills. Congress, however, approved up to $68.6 billion in new funding for the two wars in the fiscal year 2009 defense authorization act signed Oct. 14 by Bush. Authorization bills establish spending ceilings and legislative guidelines for programs, while appropriations bills dole out specific funds.

The Defense Department was one of a few agencies for which Congress approved fresh fiscal year 2009 appropriations. For most agencies, including the Department of Energy and its semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which manages the nuclear weapons enterprise, legislators opted to maintain fiscal year 2008 spending rates through March 6, 2009. Democratic congressional leaders apparently calculated that delaying final fiscal year 2009 budgeting decisions until after the election could work to their advantage because Democratic candidates might win more seats in both chambers of Congress as well as the presidency, giving the party greater leverage to enact its budget priorities instead of those of an outgoing president.

Anti-Missile Projects Trimmed, Tweaked

Bush indicated in May 2000 that deploying anti-missile systems ranked high on his agenda (see ACT, June 2000), and his administration has doggedly pursued such weapons. Beginning with the fiscal year 2002 budget request, the administration has requested $67.2 billion for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). In contrast, the Clinton administration sought $26.7 billion in total funding for the MDA’s predecessor.

Congress, under Republican control for much of Bush’s two terms, generally fulfilled his missile defense budget requests and, despite shifting in November 2006 to Democratic management, largely did so again in September. Lawmakers granted approximately $9 billion in fiscal year 2009 appropriations to the MDA, a pruning of some $320 million from the initial request. (See ACT, March 2008.)

The modest cut, however, belies some avid opposition within Congress toward current missile defense programs. Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), chair of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, argued in a Sept. 12 speech that, “for eight years, the Bush administration has asked Congress to fund unproven science projects to create a layered missile defense system.”

Reflecting such discontent, the defense authorization act mandates that the secretary of defense review U.S. missile defense policy and strategy and submit a report by Jan. 31, 2010. Moreover, Congress directed the Pentagon’s weapons testing agency to enhance its annual reports on fielded and tested systems with assessments on their “operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability.”

Legislators also redistributed appropriations away from programs perceived as less mature or too futuristic. For example, Congress zeroed out the administration’s $10 million request to experiment with interceptors stationed in orbit. Lawmakers, however, appropriated $5 million to study space-based interceptor concepts. Although Congress did not approve the study in the authorization bill, Rick Lehner, an MDA spokesperson, e-mailed Arms Control Today Oct. 16 that the agency considers the study money to be “available.”

Another space-related anti-missile program that took a hit from Congress was the Space Tracking and Surveillance System, a constellation of satellites intended to gather more precise tracking data on missiles in flight. Congress reduced the administration’s request by $32.8 million to $209.6 million, asserting the system’s initial capabilities must be more rigorously assessed before moving ahead on any of the follow-on technologies that the MDA had proposed.

Similarly, Congress cut funding for the Airborne Laser (ABL), which remains untested against a missile in flight after a dozen years of research and development. The Clinton administration envisioned an inaugural 2003 intercept attempt by the ABL, a modified Boeing 747 aircraft armed with a laser, but that experiment is currently scheduled for next year. With the long delay and uncertainty about whether the ABL might work, Congress rejected putting $15.8 million toward a second ABL aircraft and shifted $3.3 million to other testing activities, leaving the program with $402 million in fiscal year 2009 funding.

In the authorization bill, Congress further prohibited any future funds from being used to procure additional ABL planes until two reports on the system are completed. One study by the Pentagon’s weapons testing agency will focus exclusively on the ABL system and is supposed to be finished by Jan. 15, 2010. Based on that report, the secretary of defense is to certify to Congress whether the system can work and if it is sustainable and affordable.

The National Academy of Sciences is to carry out a broader study into the feasibility and practicality of the ABL system, as well as other boost-phase defenses, such as the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), a fast-accelerating, land-based weapon. Boost-phase defenses are designed to destroy missiles shortly after their launch. The academy’s study is to be concluded before Oct. 31, 2010. Although often cut by Congress, the KEI budget request survived the appropriations process unscathed at $386.8 million.

Lawmakers, however, carved up some other projects. They lopped off $112 million from the MDA’s proposed $288 million special programs budget and sliced $70 million from the roughly $354 million Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program request. That latter effort aims to shrink the size of a kill vehicle, the component of some U.S. anti-missile systems that detaches from an interceptor to seek out and collide with a target. The program’s purpose is to increase the targets that a single interceptor may potentially destroy by carrying several kill vehicles. In a statement on their appropriations decisions, lawmakers described the MKV effort, as well as the ABL and space-based test bed projects, as “far-term programs.”

An urgent initiative from the administration’s perspective is the proposed deployment of 10 long-range missile interceptors to Poland and a missile tracking radar to the Czech Republic to protect against growing Iranian missile capabilities. Congress, however, reduced funding for the plan by roughly one-third to $467 million and barred construction or procurement of equipment for the two U.S. sites until the Czech and Polish parliaments approve basing agreements negotiated with the United States. A Czech diplomatic source Oct. 14 told Arms Control Today that a vote there is not expected until November or December, while a Polish official said the next day that it remains unclear when a vote might happen in Poland.

The defense authorization act also prohibits the acquisition or deployment of the 10 interceptors to Poland until they are certified by the secretary of defense as passing “operationally realistic flight testing.” The interceptor, a two-stage variant of the approximately two dozen three-stage U.S. interceptors deployed in Alaska and California, is supposed to be flight-tested for the first time next year and then tested twice in 2010 against targets.

Congress and its government investigative agency have knocked the MDA’s testing programs, including its ability to build credible targets. Rep. Terry Everett (R-Ala.), the ranking member on the subcommittee led by Tauscher, said Sept. 23 that he had concerns about the MDA’s “performance in its missile defense testing and targets program.” In addition, the joint explanatory statement accompanying the appropriations bill noted that the MDA “has established a pattern of cost, schedule and performance problems.”

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in September that found the MDA has “difficulty” in providing and developing targets and that target failures and anomalies have increased since 2006. As a result, the GAO contended there have been delays in “validating” the long-range interceptor system deployed in the United States, the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD). After canceling a GMD test in May, the MDA is planning this December to conduct its first intercept test of the system since September 2007. To date, the GMD has recorded seven hits in 12 intercept tests, although the GAO has described the experiments as “developmental.”

The GAO also reported that target problems have inhibited flight testing of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which is supposed to destroy short- to intermediate-range missiles as they near the end of their flights. The MDA recently aborted a Sept. 17 THAAD intercept test when the target malfunctioned.

Aiming to improve the MDA’s testing and target development, Congress transferred more than $200 million to those activities from other anti-missile endeavors and provided an additional $32 million for stockpiling new targets. Those moves boosted total funding for testing and target programs to $914.8 million.

Still, lawmakers maintain that the MDA’s “highest priority” should be the acquisition of THAAD and ship-based Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors to meet military calls to nearly double the MDA’s planned 2013 inventory of 147 SM-3 and 96 THAAD interceptors. To underscore its support for procuring those systems, Congress moved $57 million from Aegis system research and $65 million from THAAD research to production of both systems. In sum, lawmakers granted approximately $970 million to THAAD and $1.17 billion to the Aegis program, which is designed to counter shorter-range missiles. The sole project topping the Aegis and THAAD programs in funding is the GMD system at $1.5 billion. All told, Congress added $120 million to the Aegis, GMD, and THAAD programs above administration requests.

Status Quo for Nuclear Weapons Funding

Congress did not pass an energy and water appropriations bill, the measure that provides money to the NNSA and the nuclear weapons complex. Instead, lawmakers passed a continuing resolution that perpetuates through early March fiscal year 2008 spending levels on nuclear weapons activities. That spending totaled $6.3 billion from Oct. 1, 2007, to Sept. 30, 2008. (See ACT, January/February 2008.)

A key consequence of the congressional action was that it stifled the Bush administration’s attempt to revive the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, which involves research into a new warhead design. Because Congress zeroed out fiscal year 2008 funding for the effort, there is no financing available for it under the continuing resolution. In addition, the defense authorization act and the defense appropriations measure proscribe spending on the program.

Last February, the NNSA sought $10 million in specific RRW funding and another $30 million for affiliated activities as part of the proposed fiscal year 2009 budget. (See ACT, March 2008.) The Navy also requested $23 million for work related to the program. Advocates say it will lead to a safer and more reliable generation of nuclear warheads and permit deeper cuts to the estimated U.S. stockpile of roughly 5,400 warheads. Critics contend that existing warheads are secure and viable and that the RRW program is risky and provocative. The two sides dispute whether the RRW program will lessen or spark a return to nuclear testing, suspended in 1992 by the United States.

RRW prospects appeared dim earlier this year. The appropriations committees in both congressional chambers eliminated funding for the project in their separate preliminary versions of the energy and water appropriations bill. In a June report on its draft, the House committee noted it “strongly supports improved surety” for warheads and “supports trading off Cold War high yield for improved reliability, in order to move to a smaller stockpile…with no need for nuclear testing,” but the committee added that it “remains to be convinced that a new warhead design will lead to these benefits.”

Rather than making new warheads, lawmakers showed a preference for getting rid of older warheads. The defense authorization act approves $5 million more than the administration’s original $64.7 million request for dismantling retired warheads. Furthermore, the two preliminary versions of the energy and water appropriations bill had postulated increases of nearly $6 million and $22 million.

The NNSA asserts it is making progress on dismantlement work, recently claiming a rise in the number of warheads taken apart for the second consecutive year. In an Oct. 1 press release, the agency stated that dismantlements had increased by 20 percent over the fiscal year 2007 total, which had exceeded the previous year’s tally by 146 percent. (See ACT, November 2007.) The actual number of warheads disassembled annually has been classified since 1999, although outside experts and reports say that prior to the recent upswing, the pace had dwindled to less than 100 warheads on Bush’s watch. (See ACT, October 2007.)

The NNSA attributes the rise in dismantled warheads to “more efficient processes and techniques.” An NNSA spokesperson told Arms Control Today Oct. 16 that the current projection for when the agency will complete all scheduled dismantlements is 2022.

Prompt Global Strike Remains Controversial

As U.S. nuclear forces decrease, the Bush administration has urged the development of longer-range conventional weapons capable of hitting targets worldwide in less than an hour. But some lawmakers have resisted, primarily citing concerns that the use of such systems might cause Russia to mistakenly conclude it was under nuclear attack and launch a retaliatory blow.

Given those reservations, Congress last year barred the administration from proceeding with its preferred option of substituting conventional warheads on two dozen nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). But lawmakers provided $100 million for the Pentagon to explore other so-called prompt global strike options. In its budget request earlier this year, the administration sought a slight increase for those efforts to $117 million.

Although Congress seemed receptive to that request in its authorization bill, adding $3 million, legislators cut $43 million in the appropriations measure. In addition, they ordered the secretary of defense, in consultation with the secretary of state, to conduct a review of the various prompt global strike concepts and supply a final report to lawmakers by Sept. 1, 2009. Among other issues, the study is to delve into misinterpretation risks, potential targets, and the intelligence necessary to support potential use.

The report marks the second evaluation of prompt global strike options requested by Congress. In August, an agency of the National Academy of Sciences delivered a report supporting both the general concept and the administration’s initial SLBM conversion proposal. (See ACT, September 2008.)

Other Reports

Lawmakers also demanded reports on a range of other subjects. Congress tasked the director of national intelligence and the secretary of defense to produce a joint report on the U.S. outer space posture. Due by Dec. 1, 2009, the report is supposed to include policies, requirements, and objectives for attaining, among other things, space control and superiority. The study also is supposed to assess the effect of U.S. space policies on decisions by foreign states to pursue space-based arms or weapons for attacking objects in space.

Although the intelligence community has provided previous reports on Iran’s weapons activities, including a National Intelligence Estimate last year (see ACT, January/February 2008), Congress ordered the director of national intelligence to produce in six months the inaugural version of a new annual report on Iran’s capability to make nuclear weapons. In addition, the president is to inform Congress within 15 days of any determination that Iran “has resumed a nuclear weapons program” or “surpassed any major milestone in its nuclear weapons program.”

Beyond Iran, Congress ordered a presidential report surveying all nuclear weapons holdings worldwide, including exact types, yields, and delivery mechanisms maintained by each possessor when possible. The report, due in one year, is to offer recommendations for securing, monitoring, reducing, and disposing of the weapons.

Along similar lines, the secretary of energy is to develop a plan for establishing an international nuclear materials database and improving U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities. Such steps are seen by many analysts as a way to get states to exercise tighter control over their nuclear materials and dissuade transfers to terrorists because of concern that any leaked material could be traced to its origin, raising the stakes of possible punitive actions. (See ACT, July/August 2008.)

Finally, lawmakers waived a Dec. 1 deadline for a report commissioned last year to provide recommendations on how many nuclear weapons the United States should maintain and their missions. The 12-member commission, chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry, is to deliver its final report by April 1, 2009.


As lawmakers rushed to leave Washington before November’s general elections, they passed two bills setting new Pentagon spending policies and totals for fiscal year 2009, which began Oct. 1. They also extended the previous fiscal year’s funding levels for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Those legislative moves shifted and reduced expenditures for anti-missile programs, cut spending for non-nuclear global strike weapons, and denied funding for a controversial program to research a new generation of nuclear warheads. Congress also ordered a series of reports on issues ranging from the status of Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities to U.S. space policy. (Continue)

GNEP Membership Grows, Future Uncertain

Miles Pomper

As the Bush administration winds down, its controversial Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) continues to win additional adherents abroad, but faces ongoing opposition at home.

Bush administration officials have claimed that GNEP, which seeks to develop new nuclear technologies and new international nuclear fuel arrangements, will cut nuclear waste and decrease the risk that an anticipated growth in the use of nuclear energy worldwide could spur nuclear weapons proliferation. Critics assert that the administration’s course would exacerbate the proliferation risks posed by the spread of spent fuel reprocessing technology, be prohibitively expensive, and fail to significantly ease waste disposal challenges without any certainty that the claimed technologies will ever be developed.

Current reprocessing technologies yield pure or nearly pure plutonium that can be used in fuel for nuclear reactors or to provide fissile material for nuclear weapons. GNEP proposes eventually to build reprocessing facilities able to produce a product that would retain other elements from the spent fuel along with the plutonium, making it less attractive for weapons production than pure plutonium. But critics note that this fuel would be much less proliferation-resistant than when the spent fuel is left intact and not reprocessed. They also point out that GNEP’s near-term plans include more proliferation-prone technologies.

Ministerial Meeting

On Oct. 1, energy ministers from 23 (of 25) GNEP member countries and 27 observer states met in Paris to advance the partnership. The resulting joint statement was short on new initiatives, aside from a call to “pursue news ways to support nuclear energy projects through finance mechanisms.” The ministers did agree, however, to have their Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services working group focus on spent fuel issues while their Infrastructure Development Working Group will add a focus on the question of waste management. The members represented included four countries which had just joined the partnership—Armenia, Estonia, Morocco, and Oman.

None of the new members are major nuclear energy producers. Morocco has a research reactor and has indicated that it would like to build a nuclear power plant in the next decade. It has won nonproliferation plaudits, however, for signing in 2004 (but not yet ratifying) its version of the 1997 Model Additional Protocol. Such protocols grant the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) greater inspection authority than the comprehensive safeguards agreements required of non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as requiring the state to furnish cradle-to-grave information on their nuclear activities. Oman has little or no existing nuclear infrastructure or expertise and the IAEA only approved its application to join the agency on Sept. 29. Estonia has no nuclear power plants but may build one soon depending in part on what is done to replace a Soviet-era nuclear power plant in neighboring Lithuania that is being shut down and that supplies Estonia with much of its electricity.

Armenia inherited two Soviet-built VVER-400 reactors that were built in a seismically active region. One of the reactors was already shut down after a 1988 earthquake devastated the country. The other, which currently supplies about 40 percent of Armenia’s electricity, is slated to close down in 2016. Armenia would like to replace it with a new reactor.

In an Oct. 7 interview with Arms Control Today, a senior Department of Energy official defended the decision to invite countries with limited nuclear experience to join the partnership, in part arguing that as they learned more about nuclear power, they might opt not to pursue it.

Indeed, this summer, administration officials said that the group’s existing members had invited 25 countries to join the partnership, most of whom had little or no experience with nuclear energy. These included such countries as Algeria, Cameroon, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. (See ACT, September 2008.)

Most of these countries did not leap at the chance to join the group. Rather than sign its statement of principles and participate in the effort, some chose to observe the meeting. States that sign the statement of principles pledge to uphold basic safety, security, and nonproliferation standards and support the development of a fuel cycle that involves reprocessing spent nuclear fuel without separating pure plutonium.

The new observer states join 16 existing observers, including Germany, Egypt, Sweden, and South Africa, that had previously been invited to join the partnership, but have so far chosen not to do so.

The Energy Department official denied that the failure to enlist the bulk of the invited countries represented a lack of enthusiasm for the program or a recognition that waning U.S. political support for the program had left its future open to question.

“It’s really a matter that we ask these countries to undertake a significant commitment when they join and it’s not surprising that they would first want to come and observe it before they feel comfortable enough to join,” the official said.

The official also claimed that even without U.S. leadership the effort would continue, given the significant interest on the part of other countries and the group’s success in building a viable organization. France led the October gathering, the official noted, and China is slated to host next year’s ministerial meeting.

U.S. Domestic Developments

Still, the program remains under assault at home from the Democratic-led Congress.

In wrapping up its budget for fiscal year 2009, which began on Oct. 1, Congress passed legislation which significantly trimmed the small portion of GNEP funds (around $15 million) requested by the Bush administration for the nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts of the Energy Department. The fiscal 2009 defense authorization bill approved by Congress in late September (see page 42) limited such GNEP spending to no more than $3 million in fiscal 2009. The Senate Armed Services Committee in its May 12 report on the bill explained the cuts, saying that it “believes that the nonproliferation programs should not directly support specific future energy technologies.”

The bulk of the Bush administration’s GNEP request was included in the civil energy portion of the Energy Department budget. Earlier in the congressional session, lawmakers looked likely to pass legislation cutting that budget. Several months ago, however, they decided to effectively postpone action until next year because Democratic lawmakers believed they would be in a better bargaining position if November’s elections produce larger majorities for their party in Congress and led to the election of their standard-bearer, Senator Barack Obama of Illinois, as president.

Instead, they approved legislation that continued spending levels for fiscal year 2008 (which ended Sept. 30) through March 6, 2009. Those levels were determined in legislation Congress passed in December 2007. (See ACT, January/February 2008).

The earlier measure provided money for research but blocked any expenditures for constructing commercial facilities or technology demonstration projects. In addition, by continuing the previous legislation, Congress is likely to provide far less than the $302 million President George W. Bush requested for fiscal year 2009 for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI), the technology development arm of GNEP.. Continuing current spending patterns means that Congress will provide less than $100 million to AFCI through March. It also means that Congress did not meet Bush’s request for $20 million to go toward the development of smaller-scale reactors aimed at developing countries with “smaller and less developed power grids.”

GNEP suffered another indirect blow in September. After Russia’s conflict with Georgia in August, Bush said he no longer wanted Congress to consider a U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation agreement. The pact was seen as a major step in advancing GNEP and, after Bush’s action, the decision on whether and when to proceed has been effectively left to the next president. (See ACT, September 2008.)


Germany Convicts Khan Associate

Peter Crail

On Oct. 16, German authorities sentenced German engineer Gotthard Lerch to five and one-half years in prison for his role in aiding Libya’s nuclear program. Lerch, who was also fined $4.7 million by a Stuttgart court, shared sophisticated vacuum technology as part of a nuclear smuggling network led by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan. This network provided Iran, Libya, North Korea, and potentially other countries with technology geared toward the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. (See ACT, March 2004.)

Lerch’s sentence was the result of a plea bargain in which he reversed his initial claim of innocence and admitted to illegally exporting vacuum technology used in a uranium-enrichment program between 1999 and 2003. The Stuttgart state court that tried Lerch said Oct. 16 that he “admitted having supported the production of…piping systems for a gas ultra-centrifuge facility in South Africa,” which was being prepared by South African engineers for Libya.

Libya intended to use this technology to enrich uranium to the high levels necessary to act as the explosive core in nuclear weapons. Tripoli abandoned the effort in December 2003 following negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom and the interception of a ship carrying centrifuge parts bound for Libya in October of that year. (See ACT, January/February 2004.)

Swiss authorities arrested Lerch in 2004 and extradited him to Germany in 2005. A state court tried Lerch in 2006 but suspended the trial due to procedural difficulties, including the untimely submission of documentation and a lack of key witness testimony.

A German diplomat told Arms Control Today Oct. 22 that there were three sets of laws under which Lerch could have been tried. Those laws included one covering treason and two export control regulations: the Foreign Trade Act and the more serious War Weapons Control Act. The diplomat explained that German authorities could not try Lerch for treason because the terms of Germany’s extradition agreement with Switzerland would not allow such a charge. The German government therefore sought to charge Lerch under the War Weapons Control Act, which carried harsher penalties than the Foreign Trade Act.

The War Weapons Control Act carries a maximum 15-year sentence for serious violations, which include exporting materials related to the development of nuclear weapons as part of a group committed to such an effort or for endangering Germany’s national security or “peaceful relations among nations.” Because the German authorities could not legally prove that Lerch was involved in the Khan network or was aware that the South African facility was intended for Libya’s nuclear weapons program, Berlin could not seek the maximum charge for such a serious offense.

The diplomat indicated that Germany received little cooperation during the trial from Malaysia and South Africa, who held potential key witnesses that could provide information incriminating Lerch.

One of those potential witnesses was Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan national and Malaysian resident who admitted to serving as Khan’s middleman for selling nuclear technology to Iran and Libya. Tahir told Malaysian authorities about the involvement of several other individuals in the network, including Lerch. Tahir’s testimony to Malyaisan authorities in 2004 was considered inadmissible, however, because Lerch’s defense attorneys were not present at the time.

Malaysia sentenced Tahir to four years in prison in 2004. He was placed under house arrest following his release in June 2008.

Another potential witness was South African national Gerhard Wisser, who constructed the centrifuge plant that Lerch supplied with his vacuum piping-system technology. South African authorities sentenced Wisser to an 18-year prison sentence after he plead guilty to export control violations related to Libya’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programs.

Although the German government was unable to substantiate that Lerch was knowingly involved in Libya’s nuclear weapons program, the court did note in its Oct. 16 statement that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that the gas piping system being constructed in South Africa was intended for Libya.

Even with the five-year sentence levied by the court following Lerch’s confession, he is unlikely to do any jail time. The German authorities are expected to subtract the time that Lerch spent in custody and on trial since 2004 from the sentence, with the remaining time scheduled for probation.

Lerch’s conviction is the third punishment meted out by German authorities for individuals involved in the Khan network. In 1998, Germany convicted Ernest Piffl of violating the Foreign Trade Act for providing Khan with centrifuge parts between 1988 and 1993. In 2005, Germany sentenced Rainer Vollmerich to seven years and three months in prison for similarly providing uranium-enrichment-related technology to Pakistan.

Other convictions by European countries have resulted in more moderate sentences. Following trials in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, other known members of the network have received suspended sentences of less than a year or community service requirements and fines less than $1 million.

Moreover, like the Lerch case, efforts to try other suspected members of the Khan network have faced obstacles obtaining admissible legal evidence of willful contributions to nuclear proliferation. A Swiss case against three Swiss nationals, Friedrich, Urs, and Marco Tinner, was recently hampered by the Swiss federal government’s destruction of files belonging to the Tinners that related to their work as part of the Khan network. (See ACT, July/August 2008.) According to Bern, the government destroyed the files to prevent them from falling “into the hands of a terrorist organization.” The Swiss government’s actions raised suspicions that it was protecting collusion by the Tinners with Western intelligence agencies.

Khan himself has apparently provided little information regarding the workings of his network since the terms of his 2004 house arrest were relaxed by the new Pakistani government earlier this year. Khan gave a number of interviews with the Pakistani and international press this summer and claimed that the Pakistani government was fully aware of his activities. He also renounced his confession, stating that then-President Gen. Pervez Musharraf forced him to act as the national “scapegoat.” Pakistani authorities have continued to refuse access to Khan by representatives of other governments and the IAEA.

In February 2004, Khan confessed to providing uranium-enrichment technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, claiming that he did so without the knowledge of the Pakistani government. Musharraf pardoned Khan and placed him under limited house arrest at that time.


On Oct. 16, German authorities sentenced German engineer Gotthard Lerch to five and one-half years in prison for his role in aiding Libya’s nuclear program. Lerch, who was also fined $4.7 million by a Stuttgart court, shared sophisticated vacuum technology as part of a nuclear smuggling network led by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan. This network provided Iran, Libya, North Korea, and potentially other countries with technology geared toward the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. (Continue)

ElBaradei Warns of Nuclear Trafficking Threat

Meredith Lugo and Peter Crail

In an Oct. 27 statement to the UN General Assembly, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei warned that the potential that terrorists could acquire nuclear and radiological material “remains a grave threat.” He noted that incidents involving the theft or loss of such material “is disturbingly high.”

In sufficient quantities, radioactive material can be used as part of a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty bomb,” spreading radioactive material over a targeted area. Highly enriched uranium and plutonium pose an even greater risk as, with the necessary expertise, these can be used to form the explosive core of a nuclear weapon.

ElBaradei’s Oct. 27 statement echoed a similar warning he issued to the agency’s Board of Governors Sept. 22, when he indicated that 243 incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear or radiological material had been reported to the agency between July 2007 and June 2008, some of which may have occurred prior to that time period. Twenty-one incidents involved the theft or loss of material which was not recovered.

Since 1993, the IAEA has maintained a database of reported incidents of unauthorized activity involving nuclear or radiological material, including illegal trade and unintentional breaches of nuclear security, as well as thwarted and unsuccessful acts of trafficking or other criminal activity. The agency issued the most recent report of the Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) Sept. 26, which records a total of 1,340 reported incidents from 1993 to 2007. This figure represents an increase of 260 from last year’s 1,080 total confirmed incidents. It is unclear if this large number indicates a growth in incidents in 2007 or is the product of delayed reporting and improved detection mechanisms by participating countries.

Currently, 100 states participate in the ITDB program. Kuwait, Madagascar, Moldova, and Uganda have joined the ITDB since 2006.

Changing its practice from previous ITDB reports, the IAEA did not release the exact numbers of specific types of incidents this year. An IAEA representative indicated to Arms Control Today Oct. 20 that member states preferred that more specific annual numbers not be released. The agency did, however, provide graphs indicating an approximate number of specific types of reported incidents.

One of the most serious types of cases involves the unauthorized possession of nuclear or radiological material “and related criminal activity,” which the agency declares “could be a shortcut to nuclear proliferation and to nuclear or radiological terrorism.” The Sept. 26 report indicates that there were approximately 13 reported incidents in 2007, the lowest reported rate since 2001.

The report also demonstrated a significant shift in the number of incidents of theft or loss of nuclear or radioactive material between 2006 and 2007. Although states reported less than 20 such incidents in 2007, more than 100 were reported in 2006. (See ACT, Oct. 2007.) The agency explained in the Sept. 26 report that this decrease was due to a change in the way in which one state reported its incidents for 2006, rather than the actual number of cases. That state reverted to its original reporting practices in 2007. The IAEA also noted that some of the decline may be due to delayed reporting rather than an actual decrease in incident occurrence. The materials involved in 75 percent of theft and loss incidents since 2004 have never been recovered.

The number of incidents of uncategorized unauthorized activity, such as unauthorized disposal of materials or material recovery with no evidence of criminal behavior, has increased steadily since 1993. The 2007 rate is the highest yet, at more than 100 reported incidents. The IAEA states that these numbers “show weakness of regulatory systems” but not an indication of criminal activity or illicit trafficking.

Since its inception, the ITDB has recorded 18 incidents involving weapons-grade nuclear material. The last confirmed incidents occurred in 2005. The report noted that most incidents involved “very small quantities” of highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

The information submitted by member states is part of an ongoing analysis by the IAEA to substantiate incidents of unauthorized activity, assess threats, and identify patterns and weaknesses in detection abilities and practices. According to the September IAEA report, the information from the ITDB is shared with member states to “enhance nuclear security through preventing and combating unauthorized activities.”

While the IAEA also maintains programs to assist states in improving nuclear security, ElBaradei noted Sept. 22 that “funding for nuclear security remains a cause for concern,” adding that the agency depends entirely on extra-budgetary contributions for such work.


In an Oct. 27 statement to the UN General Assembly, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei warned that the potential that terrorists could acquire nuclear and radiological material “remains a grave threat.” He noted that incidents involving the theft or loss of such material “is disturbingly high.” (Continue)

Editor's note

Miles A. Pomper

When the new president elected this month takes office, the question of how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program will be at or near the top of his national security agenda. In our cover story, former Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser Chuck Freilich offers his views on how that country and the United States should defuse what some Israelis view as Iran’s “existential threat” to their state.

Our other two feature articles look at how the current president, George W. Bush, has dealt with Iran’s nuclear program and other nonproliferation and arms control issues. Christopher A. Ford, who served as a senior nonproliferation official for the administration, says that the administration’s contributions to arms control have been underestimated. As the years go by, he predicts, critics will come to appreciate the administration’s willingness to break with what he views as outdated thinking on arms control and nonproliferation issues.

Joseph Cirincione, who is currently president of the Ploughshares Fund, assesses the Bush nonproliferation record differently. In his view, Bush’s approach has exacerbated nonproliferation problems from Iran to North Korea and stymied arms control progress with Russia. In particular, he argues that the administration has undermined the network of treaties, nuclear export controls, and security arrangements central to global stability. He recommends that the new administration chart a new approach by taking fresh steps to move toward a world without nuclear weapons.

Our news section this month contains a special field report by international correspondent Oliver Meier on a recent exercise in Kazakhstan that tested on-site inspection procedures that could be employed under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In addition, Peter Crail provides an in-depth examination of the Bush administration’s use of financial sanctions against proliferation, particularly in regard to Iran. Wade Boese reports on how debates over issues such as missile defense and the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead program were settled in this year’s defense legislation on Capitol Hill. Kirsten McNeil reports on the Pentagon’s proposed sales of conventional weapons to Taiwan.

Brian Weeden, a technical consultant and former U.S. Air Force officer, reviews two recent books examining the future of space weaponization, which is another tough issue the next administration will have to confront.

 

Bush Administration Sets Russian Arms Talks

Wade Boese

With its time at the helm of U.S. nuclear policy dwindling, the Bush administration announced plans to discuss the expiring START agreement with Russia, which is pressing for a follow-on weapons-cutting treaty. But the outgoing Bush administration endorses a more modest approach and recently reiterated its case for revitalizing the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and developing a new generation of nuclear warheads.

The Department of State issued a statement Oct. 17 that the United States will hold talks with other START states-parties about that accord’s scheduled Dec. 5, 2009, expiration. The meeting is supposed to take place through START’s implementing body, the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, in mid-November in Geneva. The other states-parties are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, although Russia is the only former Soviet state still armed with nuclear weapons. Under the 1991 treaty, the United States and Russia slashed their deployed nuclear forces from more than 10,000 strategic warheads apiece to less than 6,000 each.

START obligates the states-parties to meet at least one year before its scheduled expiration date to discuss whether the agreement should be extended for another five years. John Rood, acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, told a May 21 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing that both Russia and the United States “do not wish to simply continue the existing START.”

Moscow and Washington, however, have been engaged in periodic negotiations for the past two years on a post-START agreement. Although the United States put those talks on hold in the wake of Russia’s August conflict with Georgia (see ACT, October 2008), the administration in mid-October apparently delivered to Russia a draft post-START proposal that is expected to be discussed at the November meeting.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Oct. 28 hinted at what a future compromise might entail. Speaking at a Washington conference, he contended a future agreement “could involve further cuts in the number of deployed warheads” and would “need…verification provisions.” He maintained that the goal should be a treaty that is “shorter, simpler, and easier to adjust to real-world conditions” than those negotiated in the past.

John Beyrle, the U.S. ambassador to Russia, told the Interfax news agency in a mid-October interview that it was “very unlikely” that the two sides would reach a new agreement before the Bush administration leaves office. But he said “we do hope to make some progress in explaining what the American position [is] and hearing how the Russian side sees the future START process in order for the new administration to be able to make as quick progress as possible on that.”

At an Oct. 10 speech in Evian, France, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said his government attaches “exceptional importance to concluding a new, legally binding Russian-American agreement on nuclear disarmament” to replace START. He further noted that “what we need is a treaty and not a declaration.”

Medvedev’s admonition stems from Russian unhappiness with the Bush administration’s apparent preference to simply continue the limits agreed to in the May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). (See ACT, June 2002.) Touted by the Bush administration for its simplicity, SORT requires Russia and the United States each to lower the number of their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by Dec. 31, 2012, which is the date that the agreement also expires. To fulfill the reductions, no weapons have to be destroyed, only removed from active service.

In contrast to the Bush administration’s position, the Kremlin is advocating deeper cuts below the SORT warhead levels as well as caps on delivery vehicles, including any future long-range systems outfitted with non-nuclear warheads. The United States is exploring conventional weapons with extended ranges as part of the so-called prompt global strike initiative. (See ACT, September 2008.)

One area of general agreement is that a post-START arrangement should include some verification measures because SORT contains none. However, concerns that START will expire as scheduled without a successor agreement in place three years before the SORT reductions are to be completed have prompted some U.S. lawmakers, such as Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), to urge the administration to reach an agreement to extend START or at least some of its verification provisions.

Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.), the Democratic presidential candidate, stated in response to survey questions from Arms Control Today that he would seek “Russia’s agreement to extend essential monitoring and verification provisions of START I prior to its expiration.” The campaign of the Republican candidate, Sen. John McCain (Ariz.), did not respond to the survey, but in a May 27 speech he supported pursuing deeper nuclear reductions with Russia and asserted that “we should be able to agree with Russia on binding verification measures based on those currently in effect under the START agreement.”

The Administration’s Nuclear Vision

The Bush administration’s public rationale for negotiating the pared-down SORT was that Russia was no longer an enemy so a Cold War-era START-style treaty was unnecessary. In its latest document setting out a future vision for U.S. nuclear weapons policies, however, the administration contends the United States must maintain “a nuclear force second to none” in part because “considerable uncertainty remains about Russia’s future course.” Medvedev noted in a Sept. 26 speech that Russia “must guarantee [its] capacities of nuclear deterrence” through 2020.

Released in September, the administration’s “National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century” is a follow-on report to a July 2007 letter sent to Congress by the secretaries of defense, energy, and state articulating the administration’s views on nuclear deterrence. Despite signing the previous letter, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did not attach her name to the recent report. A State Department official told Arms Control Today Oct. 15 that Rice “supports the paper’s conclusions” but elected not to sign it because it was more technical than the previous letter, focused on the actual force structure, and dealt with issues that she considered to be more in the purview of the secretaries of defense and energy.

Aside from a potentially more hostile Russia, the report argues the United States must maintain nuclear weapons to address “states of concern,” such as Iran and North Korea, that have developed nuclear forces or are allegedly trying to do so. In addition, the report cites the pursuit of unconventional weapons by nonstate actors as well as the modernization of China’s nuclear forces as potential challenges in which U.S. nuclear weapons might have some part. China has approximately 20 missiles capable of reaching the continental United States, while neither Iran nor North Korea has demonstrated such a capability.

Specific roles U.S. nuclear weapons play and will continue to play, according to the report, include reassuring friends and allies that they do not have to acquire nuclear weapons for their protection and deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression by adversaries. The report further recommends that U.S. nuclear forces should be kept at levels high enough to dissuade potential peer competitors from engaging in arms races and discourage countries with fewer nuclear weapons from contemplating arms buildups to try to draw even.

Still, the report contends that the future U.S. nuclear force can be “smaller and less prominent than in the past.” To facilitate that goal, the administration argues the United States must revitalize its nuclear weapons production capabilities and introduce a new generation of nuclear weapons through the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. Once that happens, the administration says, the United States can enact deeper cuts in its estimated nuclear stockpile of 5,400 warheads because there will be less need to preserve backup warheads when new warheads can be manufactured on an as-needed basis.

The RRW program, launched in 2004, is described by the administration as the “key enabler” for moving toward the so-called responsive infrastructure. Nominally, the program is supposed to produce new warheads that are safer, less vulnerable to theft, more easily maintained, and more likely to perform as planned than existing warheads. All of these goals are supposed to be achieved without breaking the U.S. nuclear testing moratorium initiated in 1992. Indeed, the administration asserts that the United States increases the possibility of having to resume nuclear testing if it stays on its present course rather than embarking on the RRW program.

But critics, including many lawmakers, remain unconvinced. They point out that current warheads continue to be certified as safe and reliable and that the current process of extending the lives of older warheads by replacing aging components is working. Moreover, critics argue that the United States should not be building new warheads until it determines how many will be needed in the future and for what missions.

The administration’s paper sought to answer those questions but apparently failed in the minds of skeptical lawmakers, who recently denied funding for the RRW program for a second consecutive year (see page 42). Although the document was released publicly in September, another version was sent several months earlier to Congress. In a June report on their preliminary funding bill for the nuclear weapons complex, House Appropriations Committee members argued they were worried that the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) “nuclear weapons programs have lost their direction.” They also observed that the United States “has the most destructive nuclear arsenal in the world, far more effective than those of all other nations combined.”

Meanwhile, the NNSA, the semiautonomous Department of Energy entity that manages the nuclear weapons complex, released Oct. 9 its preferred option for sizing and organizing future U.S. nuclear weapons activities and facilities. That plan was contained in a so-called environmental impact statement that has been subjected to public commentary and 20 public hearings since Jan. 11. The final product deviates little from the NNSA’s original concept, which does not close any of the enterprise’s existing eight facilities but seeks to consolidate nuclear materials and special operations at select sites.

One adjustment the agency made was to endorse a lower production rate for plutonium pits, the core trigger component of U.S. nuclear warheads. Instead of potentially making up to 80, the agency settled on a cap of 20 until the Pentagon completes a congressionally ordered review of the U.S. nuclear posture, which is supposed to happen next year.

The NNSA stated it plans to begin announcing incremental implementation steps for its overhaul of the complex in roughly a month, although Congress could still act to block certain moves through the annual budget process.

 

 

With its time at the helm of U.S. nuclear policy dwindling, the Bush administration announced plans to discuss the expiring START agreement with Russia, which is pressing for a follow-on weapons-cutting treaty. But the outgoing Bush administration endorses a more modest approach and recently reiterated its case for revitalizing the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and developing a new generation of nuclear warheads. (Continue)

Books of Note

Terrorism, War or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons
Edited by Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin, Stanford University Press, 2008, 328 pp.

The book’s many authors, from legal, scientific, governmental, and social science backgrounds, examine case studies of confirmed or suspected uses of biological weapons to draw lessons for governments and international organizations. The authors illustrate strategies and factors that affect the response and attribution process. For instance, knowledge of the local context of the possible threat, including information regarding the presence and history of disease and toxin in the region, environmental factors, and sociological and political conditions, is deemed vital. In her own chapter, editor Anne Clunan touts the utility of an international information network that would enable efficient sharing of information with medical professionals and health agencies around the world. The authors also encourage establishing scientific standards of evidence to bolster the legitimacy and credibility of international and domestic biological weapons investigations.


 

The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia
Edited by Muthiah Alagappa, Stanford University Press, 2008, 542 pp.

Editor Muthiah Alagappa, a distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center, brings together experts to study the larger security environment in Asia. Addressing the lack of studies on Asian nuclear issues as a whole after the end of the Cold War, the authors, from academic and nongovernmental organizations, use country-specific studies to illuminate the issues surrounding the role of nuclear weapons on the continent. They acknowledge that there is little detail available about many states’ nuclear doctrines, yet they argue that, in Asia, “[t]he danger of escalation limits military options in a crisis between nuclear weapon states and shapes the purpose and manner in which military force is used.” In particular, the authors contend that even though nuclear weapons have become ever more destructive, they have had a stabilizing effect, that is, they have deterred the outbreak of major wars and maintained the underlying strategic balance.


 

Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Mike Chinoy, St. Martin’s Press, New York, August 2008, 368 pp.

Veteran CNN reporter Mike Chinoy recounts the struggles within the current administration to address North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Chinoy describes a tumultuous Bush administration in which “hard-line” and pro-engagement factions engaged in a tug-of-war over policy influence. Although the book demonstrates that a significant shift in U.S. policy toward North Korea occurred in President George W. Bush’s second term, the story ends at a critical moment in April 2008: Washington’s negotiations with North Korea are brought into question as U.S. intelligence agencies publicly accuse North Korea of aiding a Syrian nuclear weapons program. Describing this event, Chinoy states that, during the Bush administration’s final months, “the internal battle for control of North Korea policy…showed no sign of ending.”


Are you interested in purchasing these books? You can help support the Arms Control Association by visiting one of our partners.

 

or

 

Terrorism, War or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons
Edited by Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin, Stanford University Press, 2008, 328 pp.

The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia
Edited by Muthiah Alagappa, Stanford University Press, 2008, 542 pp.

Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Mike Chinoy, St. Martin’s Press, New York, August 2008, 368 pp.

Space Weaponization: Aye or Nay?

Reviewed by Brian Weeden

Harnessing the Heavens: National Defense Through Space
Edited by Paul G. Gillespie and Grant T. Weller,
Imprint Publications, 2008, 235 pp.

The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests
By James Clay Moltz,
Stanford University Press, 2008, 367 pp.

The January 2007 anti-satellite test by China and the destruction of an ailing spy satellite by the United States using similar means a year later have brought renewed attention to the issue of space security. Two new books, Harnessing the Heavens edited by Paul Gillespie and Grant Weller and The Politics of Space Security by James Clay Moltz, make clear that military officials, strategists, and policy intellectuals have been arguing for half a century over whether and how space could and should be used in warfare and that the debate is far from resolved.

Harnessing the Heavens is a collection of essays presented at the U.S. Air Force Academy’s 21st Military History Symposium, held in 2006. Many of the top scholars in the field, including Roger Launius, William Burrows, Howard McCurdy, and David Spires, are featured on topics covering several of the important historical issues in the U.S., Soviet/Russian, and Chinese space programs, with a focus on military aspects.
What soon becomes clear is that in the past as well as today, the military has failed to understand the unique qualities of space as a battlefield, glossing over several major technical hurdles and assuming that tactics and strategies from other domains work equally well in space.

A good example of this, and perhaps the most fascinating essay in the compilation is by McCurdy, who recounts the history and obsession with military lunar bases since the 1940s and the U.S. military’s argument in particular for placing nuclear weapons on the moon. This argument saw lunar missiles as the ultimate deterrent against Soviet aggression but also warned that if the United States dallied and allowed the Soviets to seize it first, the consequences would be disastrous. This led to the U.S. Army’s Project Horizon, which came into conflict with the Air Force’s plans along the same lines. Much of this lunar military mania stemmed from applying flawed analogies of “high ground” on Earth to space and thus visualizing the moon as the ultimate high ground.

Although the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banned military installations on celestial bodies, including the moon, today’s military visions of space are nearly as flawed. Much of the military still sees space as only existing to support the war-fighter on the ground, land, and sea and considers doing “space for space reasons” a waste of money and resources. Large numbers of military leaders are still ignorant of the fundamental physics of outer space, which leads to serious discussion of fantasy ideas such as space planes dropping Marines into combat anywhere around the world.

Similarly, as Dwayne Day recalls, the military has long toyed with the idea of a military space plane. Day examines previously classified Air Force plans from their inception in 1958, before NASA and Project Mercury, to when they went underground after President Dwight Eisenhower’s mandate that NASA should assume the manned spaceflight role. The program eventually led to two threads: plans for military space vehicles and military space stations, of which only certain aspects, Dyna-Soar and Manned Orbiting Laboratory, have previously been known. Although the military years ago realized that unmanned spacecraft could do a far better and cheaper job in orbit and abandoned serious plans in this arena, the concept of a military space plane has not gone away. At least once a decade, the idea is dusted off and given new funding and rhetoric, only to result years later in failure and wasted taxpayer funds.

Everett Dolman’s essay “Astropolitics and Astropolitik: Strategy and Space Deployment” lays out one of the best arguments I have seen for the weaponization of space by the U.S. military. Whatever your ideological predilection is, this essay is perhaps the most well written and convincingly structured of any in the collection. Dolman eloquently traces the evolution of modern military strategy from its roots with Clausewitz to modern warfare and then applies these lessons and logic to space. He argues that the direct consequence of these precepts is that the U.S. military must weaponize space by placing weapons for offensive deterrence in orbit.

Although it is difficult to find fault with the logic of Dolman’s argument, three unmentioned or unresolved factors need to be seriously considered before adopting such a position, putting aside the considerable questions of technical and economic feasibility. First, although Dolman’s conclusion that orbital weapons could prove to be an effective deterrent is correct, he never defines what exactly would they be deterring: “Evil” behavior by rogue states? Conventional military actions by states around the world? Soft-power expressions counter to U.S. national interests? To work effectively, there must be a clear understanding of which actions and of which players are being deterred, otherwise the deterrence is bound to be ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. Is this space deterrence a replacement for or complementary to the existing nuclear deterrent?

A second factor to consider is what psychological effects such a space-to-ground offensive capability would have on U.S. leadership and the world in general, were the United States alone to possess it. Would having such a capability make it more or less likely that the U.S. president would use it or other military force aggressively? What would the psychological impact be on other world leaders knowing that they are under threat of attack from the United States at all times, without any warning and without much of a chance to defend themselves? Would this make unstable world leaders of rogue nations, that such a threat may be attempting to deter, more or less stable?

The final factor is perhaps the ultimate law of warfare: for every action, there is a reaction. This is the crux of the axiom “no plan survives first contact with the enemy.” Plans are developed against a static set of assumptions and facts, while an active opponent in the field is as intelligent and motivated as the attacker. As a result, occupying forces throughout history have been surprised by the ingenuity, resourcefulness, and effectiveness of a supposedly inferior enemy who refuses to submit. The same lessons should be applied to offensive space-to-ground weapons: They will not create an insurmountable advantage for the U.S. military; they will only spur other states and actors to find ways to counter such weapons or avoid their effects.

That leads to the biggest issue with the pro-space weapons movement. It is based around the ideal that a state can act unilaterally in the world and control the consequences to its advantage. Historically, that assumption has always been a false dream over the long run, and in a globalized world, it is quickly becoming false in the short run. Time after time in recent history, a state has acted unilaterally in its own self interest, and in each instance, its actions have caused unforeseen or undesired consequences. The recent Russian-Georgian conflict is a prime example. What originally looked like a clean and easy victory for Russia is now starting to show reverberations: the crash of its stock market, more European states backing U.S. ballistic missile defense, and most recently, the potential start of a Georgian insurgency in the contested regions.

In The Politics of Space Security, Moltz presents a concise yet brilliant analysis of the history of space security through the lens of the political environment that shaped it. Although fairly short compared to some of the other tomes in this field, Moltz’s book does a fantastic job of giving just enough detail to strengthen his arguments while still keeping the text flowing. The copious footnotes provide numerous rabbit holes down which readers will find themselves diving repeatedly.

Moltz divides the book into three sections. The first provides a general overview of the concepts involved in space security and the various regimes whose rule sets previous thinkers have attempted to apply to space security. The most important piece of this section is the discussion of the four main camps in the space security debate: space nationalism, technological determinism, social interactionism, and global institutionalism.

According to Moltz, space nationalists have their roots in political realism, great-power rivalry, and the lessons of the Cold War. This camp argues that conflict in space is inevitable and nations, particularly the United States, should take steps to secure their advantage in space through largely unilateral and military means.

The global institutionalists, on the other hand, are grounded in idealist political theory and see space as an arena for peace and international cooperation, with strong support for international legal regimes and bans on weaponization.

The other two schools take more nuanced, centrist positions. Technological determinists see technology, not politics, as the driving factor in space and foresee scientific cooperation and the theory of the public good as driving forces toward more cooperation and constraining conflict. Social interactionism agrees with many of the goals of global institutionalism but sees soft tools, such as rules of the road and voluntary efforts, driving actions in space instead of binding legal regimes.

This section also brings up one of the biggest issues in space security, the term “space weapons.” Simultaneously derided by conservatives as a hippy catchall for anything vaguely militaristic and loathed by liberals as tools of the imperialistic warmonger bent on world domination, the term seems to have whatever definition with which your particular ideological slant and background imbue it. Moltz starts his second chapter with a succinct but detailed discussion of this issue and proposes definition on the middle ground: “any system whose use destroys or damages objects in or from outer space.”

Most experts agree that space systems that could strike targets on the ground, such as space-based lasers or satellites equipped with metal rods for deorbiting, and space systems used to attack other satellites, such as co-orbital anti-satellites, are space weapons. Most also agree that ICBMs, which fly through space to reach their targets, are not. Beyond this, however, the various camps and parties can agree on little. Some believe that space-based and ground-based missile defense systems should be categorized as space weapons as they could easily be used against satellites. The proponents of such systems vehemently reject this classification. Others believe that any system that could possibly be used for military purposes should be classified as space weapons. The Soviet Union, for example, felt strongly that the U.S. space shuttle was a military vehicle designed to capture or destroy Soviet satellites.

As such, this is also possibly the only section of the book where readers may disagree with Moltz. Perhaps a better approach on the definition of space weapons is to avoid it altogether because there will never be a good definition for it. The term carries too much baggage, and the insistence on using it and defining it only leads to division and argument. The dual-use potential of almost everything in space means that anything, properly employed, can be used as a weapon with varying degrees of effectiveness. Rather, the debate needs to focus on what is really at the heart of the issue: actions. The issue of space weapons boils down not to objects, hardware, and capabilities but to specific actions. Those actions that could result in indiscriminate damage to the space environment or third parties, such as nuclear weapons detonations, broad spectrum radiofrequency jammers, and debris-generating kinetic impactors, should be considered for banishment.

The second section encompasses the bulk of the book and presents the 20th-century history of space security broken into four main eras: the U.S.-Soviet space race, the era of cooperative restraint, the ideological challenges posed to this restraint around the time of the Reagan administration, and finally the post-Cold War uncertainty that space security shared with many other security regimes. In each of these four eras, Moltz provides not only a chronological overview of the major events and decisions but also the geopolitical factors that influenced them. The third and final section presents recent events and decisions involved in shaping space security, particularly U.S. policy under President George W. Bush. Conservatives see these changes as essential to protecting the space-borne foundations of U.S. military and economic power, while liberals and unfortunately much of the rest of the world see them as antagonistic and hegemonic. As Moltz and others demonstrate, the essential basis of the 2006 Bush space policy is no different than that of any president since Eisenhower. The core elements of peaceful use of outer space, separation of civil and military space, use of space to enhance U.S. economic and military power, and the right to freedom of action in space are unchanged. Rather, it is the tone and nuance of the policy that is different. The right to freedom of action by the United States is coupled with a blatant warning that the United States reserves the right to deter or prevent other states from impinging on U.S. capabilities in space. Put in the larger context of the Bush administration’s handling of world events, this creates the impression that U.S. space policy has somehow radically swung toward weaponization.

At the end, Moltz returns to the four ideological camps of space security and presents their approach to the future of space security. It is here that readers will find Moltz’s analysis to be absolutely correct when he states, “Despite the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the 2006 National Space Policy, no irreversible decisions have been made regarding the deployment of space defenses. Thus, both directions for space security—unilateral and collective—are very much in play.” Perhaps this is why the topic of space security has experienced its latest resurgence. Parties on either side of the issue understand that both directions are indeed very much in play. Each side also understands the consequences for its respective agendas and outlook on the world should the chosen direction be against its core beliefs.

Adopting a unilateral security strategy, as is the current U.S. approach, does have its advantages, but one of the fundamental disadvantages is lack of engagement and influence in the actions of others that one would have through a cooperative approach. A recent example that demonstrates this clearly was the decision by European states to create their own space surveillance system. When first announced a few years ago, the U.S. position was basically to ignore the issue. When the Europeans demonstrated that they were serious and starting working to actually fund such a system, suddenly the U.S. position changed. The United States started talking about space situational awareness and cooperation within the context of NATO to try to shift European surveillance activities to that forum, where the United States is a partner and has a seat at the table and thus can exert influence more readily.

This leads to the larger fundamental truth: the rest of the world is quickly developing suites of space capability and interest. Although most states will never individually develop equal capabilities to the United States in terms of space power, technology is rapidly changing the game, as it has in every other field. Every state has the same sovereign right as the United States to fully utilize space for its own socioeconomic development and pursue its own self interests. If every state pursues the same U.S. path of unilateral action, opposition of legal regimes prohibiting or limiting their access or use of space, and reservation of the right to deny adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to their national interests, then ultimately conflict in space will happen. That conflict is likely to have lasting detrimental effects on the use of space by all states.

The debate over space weaponization should come down to three things: security, safety, and sustainability. Whatever the answer is, it should properly address all three of those elements. Space weapons, however defined, may serve some space security needs. If that comes at the cost of a reduction in the other two factors, clearly it is not a viable option. Likewise, certain proposals that have been made for international regimes and bans on weapons may in theory create safety, but if they ignore the security concerns of space-faring nations, they will ultimately be counterproductive. Only by factoring in all three considerations and working together can the world move forward with utilization of space for the peaceful benefit of all states.



Brian Weeden is a technical consultant with the Secure World Foundation. Between 1998 and 2007, he was a commissioned officer with the United States Air Force working in ICBM and space surveillance operations.


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A Review of Harnessing the Heavens: National Defense Through Space edited by Paul G. Gillespie and Grant T. Weller, and The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests by James Clay Moltz.

Defense Trade Treaties Stall in Congress

Jeff Abramson

Congress adjourned in October without acting on proposed defense trade treaties inked in 2007 with Australia and the United Kingdom. Other presidentially directed adjustments in how the Department of State administers defense trade did progress, with a new fee structure announced for license reviews.

On Sept. 17, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman and Democratic vice presidential candidate Joseph Biden (Del.) and committee ranking member Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) delivered a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice indicating that the committee could not complete its review of treaties with London and Canberra this year. In 2007 the United States submitted to the Senate separate defense trade cooperation treaties with Australia and the United Kingdom that would create licensing exemptions for preapproved defense projects and firms. Proponents argued that the pacts would be especially helpful in developing and deploying counterterrorism technology by making it easier for members of the preapproved communities to work together. (See ACT, September and October 2007.)

The Senate panel heard testimony on the treaties May 21, during which both Biden and Lugar expressed concerns about a lack of detail on how the treaties would be implemented, including changes in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that might be needed.

John Rood, acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, argued that the Senate should not need to review implementing procedures for the treaties. Instead, Rood suggested that the Senate should provide its advice and consent to the concepts outlined in the treaty and allow the administration to implement the treaties in a manner similar to how Congress passes a law and leaves it to the administration to promulgate regulations. Biden argued that the Senate should see more details because once it provided advice and consent, it could not then change the treaty.

In the Sept. 17 letter to Rice, Biden and Lugar indicated that they were still not satisified with how the treaties would be implemented. “While we support the objectives of these treaties…we have reluctantly concluded that there are too many unresolved questions in connection with the treaties to achieve their approval this year,” they wrote. The letter asserted that the delay was caused in part by late and frequently changing proposals for ITAR amendments submitted by the administration to clarify the committee’s implementation inquiries. Biden and Lugar promised to continue cooperation with the administration on the matter so that the committee can act “early” in the next Congress.

Meanwhile, the State Department made some changes to export control procedures governing arms sales. It announced a new fee structure Oct. 1 for entities engaged in the trade of certain defense articles and services. The change follows the mandate of a National Security Presidential Directive issued earlier this year aimed in part at expediting the export license approval process. (See ACT, March 2008.)

Under the presidential directive, the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) is to be up to 75 percent self-financed. The State Department has been criticized for understaffing DDTC, which the House of Representatives sought to address in the Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Reform Act of 2008 that it sent to the Senate, but which the Senate failed to approve. Whether the new financing mechanism will support staffing increases remains to be seen.

The DDTC oversees direct commercial sales of items on the U.S. Munitions List and, prior to the new rules, required all persons or entities involved to pay a flat registration fee of less than $2,000. In the new system, all registrants will pay at least $2,250 per year, with those making multiple license applications paying a higher base amount and $250 per application fee in most cases.


Congress adjourned in October without acting on proposed defense trade treaties inked in 2007 with Australia and the United Kingdom. Other presidentially directed adjustments in how the Department of State administers defense trade did progress, with a new fee structure announced for license reviews. (Continue)

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