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"I find hope in the work of long-established groups such as the Arms Control Association...[and] I find hope in younger anti-nuclear activists and the movement around the world to formally ban the bomb."

– Vincent Intondi
Author, "African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement"
July 1, 2020
January/February 2005
Edition Date: 
Saturday, January 1, 2005
Cover Image: 

Caught in the Middle: The United Kingdom and the 2005 NPT Review Conference

William Walker

Although it may feign confidence, the British government is viewing with trepidation the approach of the 2005 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. It is anxious about the treaty’s health, even less able than usual to predict how the conference might unfold, and uncertain how to position itself diplomatically.

London is hoping that an atmosphere of cooperation will somehow be established at the conference, the treaty will emerge intact, and an agreement will be reached on some next steps even if there is no final document. Nevertheless, it recognizes that the British government may find itself unable to sustain a consensus within the European Union and marooned between the United States and that country’s critics, with diminished prestige and little influence in any direction. Avoiding such a diplomatic fate is as important to the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair as seeing its preferred policies taken up at the conference.

From its inception, the NPT has been regarded as vital to London’s political and security interests. The treaty has conferred on the United Kingdom the prestige of a nuclear-weapon state and has helped it to avoid the costs and instabilities arising from nuclear proliferation. Equally important, the cooperative international order represented by the NPT is seen as crucial to the United Kingdom’s security and its position in the world. At no time have British governments worried that the treaty might unduly constrain their security policies. On the contrary, the United Kingdom has generally welcomed the prospect of a strong NPT that progressively tightens its grip on state behavior even to the extent of drawing all states, itself included, toward nuclear disarmament. London does not have the history of ambivalence that one finds in Beijing and Paris.

During the 1990s, London attached still greater significance to the NPT and to multilateral arms control. Successive British governments shared the U.S. concept of a “new international order” resting on wide attachment to international norms and laws and welcomed the U.S. and Russian commitments to treaty-bound nuclear arms reductions. Further, unlike the shift in Washington, London’s attachment to multilateralism did not wane or become a battleground. On the contrary, the Labour government that took office in 1997 placed great weight on multilateral arms control when it published its 1998 Strategic Defence Review. Eager to avoid the divisions on nuclear weapons policy that had earlier caused such electoral damage to the Labour Party, Blair’s government sought a new consensus around the maintenance of a true minimum deterrent and active promotion of multilateral restraint.

The United Kingdom, therefore, had a good story to tell at the 2000 NPT Review Conference about the actions it had taken to meet its Article VI obligations. Its nuclear deterrent was being reduced to one weapon system (Trident) operated by one armed service (the British navy) with a ceiling of 200 operational warheads that were being taken off high alert.

Furthermore, the Blair government had secured Parliament’s ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), had ended production of fissile materials for weapons, was keen to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), and was bringing all British nuclear reactors and enrichment and reprocessing facilities under international safeguards. London also had expressed a strong preference for the retention of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and negotiation of a third post-Cold War U.S.-Russian strategic arms treaty (START III).

Consequently, the United Kingdom did not hesitate to support the stronger commitments to nuclear disarmament expressed in the 1995 Principles and Objectives and 2000 Final Document. These agreements were consistent with its security goals and were regarded in London as natural outcomes of states-parties’ obligations to implement the treaty and to reinforce nonproliferation and disarmament norms. There was little suggestion, then or now, that these decisions were tactical moves that could later be ignored, as Paris and Washington have recently implied.

With the arrival of President George W. Bush’s administration, the Blair government found itself in a much less comfortable position. It was dismayed by U.S. moves away from multilateral arms control. Indeed, there was anger at U.S. undermining of arms control initiatives in which the United Kingdom had invested heavily (the Bush administration’s attempted destruction of the verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention being a notable example). London did not allow its displeasure, however, to upset its close relations with Washington. A pattern of behavior developed. While adopting a stance on arms control and on multilateralism at variance with Washington’s, the alliance with the United States was preserved even when the United Kingdom’s and its European partners’ multilateral objectives were being thwarted. The judgment had formed in Downing Street that the U.S. government could not be deflected from its chosen course. Opposition would therefore damage the transatlantic relationship without bringing tangible benefits. This judgment would lead the United Kingdom down the road toward siding with the United States in the Iraq war, despite grave misgiving in various parts of Whitehall.

After the shock of 9/11, however, the British perspective on proliferation shifted in the U.S. direction. The Blair government recognized that new actors had emerged with potential to cause untold damage if they gained access to weapons of mass destruction and that existing measures were insufficient to prevent the diffusion of relevant capabilities. Indicative of this shift was the Foreign & Commonwealth Office’s Non-Proliferation Department’s change of title in 2002 to the Counter-Proliferation Department. This was accompanied by an increasing openness in London, induced partly by the desire to keep in step with Washington, to the use of all instruments of power to shift the behavior of aberrant actors, even if the United Kingdom continued to emphasize the role of diplomacy rather than war (Libya and Iran being held out as examples of what might still be achieved).

Still, the British government remained deeply uneasy, in private if seldom in public, with the aggressive and unilateral approach taken by the Bush administration. It disapproved of its unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty and abandonment of the START process, and its unease extended to the intransigent stance taken by the United States at the NPT Prepcom in April 2004.

A general election is expected to be held in the United Kingdom in May 2005 against the background of widespread public disillusion over the transatlantic relationship. Sensitive to electoral risks, there have been signs of some shift in Downing Street’s declared handling of relations with Washington. Efforts are being made to establish “clearer blue water” between British and U.S. policies and to demonstrate that Blair’s close association with Bush has yielded genuine influence over U.S. behavior. This has led in recent weeks to renewed emphasis on the differences between U.S. and British environmental policies and to Blair’s attempts to draw Bush into a stronger commitment to the Middle East peace process.

On nuclear policy, however, the Blair government is still reluctant to oppose the United States, notwithstanding the United Kingdom’s cooperation with France and Germany in striking a deal with Iran to freeze that country’s uranium-enrichment program.[1] Such reluctance was exemplified by the British government’s recent abstention in the UN First Committee’s vote on a verifiable FMCT,[2] a position taken despite strong objections within Whitehall to the verification-less FMCT that the United States now advocates. This decision displays the pitfalls of the British approach: although adopted on the grounds that “some FMCT is better than no FMCT,” it risks reinforcing the impression in other capitals that London is in thrall to Washington and can be used by the United States to divide the opposition.

The Likely Approach
Given its past history, its present diplomatic dilemmas, and the signals coming out of London, a likely British approach to the 2005 Review Conference can therefore be surmised.

Rather than advocating what other countries might do, London can be expected to stress its own Article VI achievements and commitments. Although its major initiatives were launched before 2000, there has been no retreat from the policies announced at the 2000 Review Conference. Attention also will be drawn to studies of disarmament verification techniques conducted by the British Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, although probably without advocating their replication by the other nuclear-weapon states. A bolder government might sense an opportunity here; the Blair government, however, is unlikely to embarrass its fellow members of the nuclear club.

In an attempt to avoid confrontation with any of its key allies, London can be expected to encourage a spirit of compromise among states-parties, beginning with the major groupings to which it belongs. In particular, it will try (preferably in cooperation with France) to steer in a common direction the stances adopted by the nuclear-weapon states and by the European Union. It recognizes that consensus will be hard to achieve in either grouping. There may be particular difficulty reconciling the obviously conflicting interests and perceptions of the now 25 member states of the European Union, containing among them strongly pro-disarmament governments (including Ireland and Sweden) and a French government that has become increasingly allergic to any talk of disarmament. Shaping a consensus within Europe before the conference has begun could be the United Kingdom’s most significant diplomatic contribution.

London will highlight areas of policy on which there is already broad agreement, such as implementation of the 1997 Model Additional Protocol strengthening NPT safeguards, just as it may discourage proposals on which it sees little possibility of agreement, such as the strengthening of negative security assurances or creation of new institutional machinery to oversee the treaty.

In the time remaining before the 2005 Review Conference in May, London will support efforts to develop common proposals on vital but contentious issues. Among the proposals it would like to see are those governing the transfer of fuel-cycle technologies that can produce fissile materials. It would like such proposals to require verified compliance but not institute blanket denials of trade in such technologies. It does not favor the retreat from Article IV obligations recently advocated by the U.S. government.

Although London will try to focus attention on a forward-looking policy agenda, British diplomats can be expected to emphasize that they are not abandoning old agendas. On the status of the 2000 Final Document, for instance, they will probably emphasize that the document exists and deserves respect but that states-parties should not dwell on recommendations that have been made obsolete by events (the ABM Treaty being an example).

In all of its pronouncements, the British government can be expected to stress the need for unity of purpose in preserving this most vital of security treaties. It will not support the U.S., French, or any other government’s attempt to narrow that purpose or downplay the need for unity across a range of issues. Although the United Kingdom may have embraced the U.S. counterproliferation agenda, it will not welcome a diversionary strategy that focuses the main attention on noncompliant states. The British government holds to the view that the NPT is founded on reciprocal obligation and that its legitimacy will drain away if the treaty’s various provisions and bargains are not respected by all states.

Behind London’s increasingly troubled diplomacy lies a hard security reality: the British government wishes to keep open the medium- and long-term options either to sustain its nuclear deterrent or to discard it so that scarce resources can be used for other purposes. It has recently announced that discussions of Trident’s replacement will begin in the next Parliament. Although the government may lean toward replacement rather than elimination, the disarmament option is bound to be examined carefully and may find a surprising degree of support in a Ministry of Defence for which nuclear weapons are increasingly viewed as an expensive luxury. There is thus genuine political and military interest in London in achieving a stronger NPT-centered security order, partly so that it can at least contemplate nuclear disarmament. Yet, this interest cannot be openly expressed in the United Kingdom, let alone at the 2005 Review Conference, for fear of damaging the first option (maintaining the deterrent) and of setting various political hares running.

Furthermore, it is protection of that first option that places the United Kingdom in such a diplomatic pickle, for it knows that a nuclear force can only be retained at a tolerable cost if the U.S. president and Congress continue to sanction transfers of technology, including nuclear weapons know-how under the recently extended U.S.-UK Mutual Defense Agreement. Thus, sustaining the deterrent often drives the British government toward supporting U.S. policies even when it considers them antithetical to its political and security interests.

ENDNOTES

1. Paul Kerr, “Iran Agrees to Temporarily Suspend Uranium-Enrichment Program,” Arms Control Today, December 2004, pp. 26-28.

2. Wade Boese, “UN Nuclear Disarmament Debate Stalled,” Arms Control Today, December 2004, p. 39.

 

The United Kingdom on Key Nuclear Issues

Nuclear Warhead Arsenal: Fewer than 200 nuclear warheads total.

Latest Nuclear Force Developments: The United Kingdom announced in 1998 that it intended to maintain a minimum deterrent of four nuclear-armed submarines, of which only a single one would be on routine patrol at any given time.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signed September 24, 1996. Ratified April 6, 1998.

Fissile Material Production for Weapons: London announced in April 1995 that it no longer produces fissile material for weapons purposes. A longtime supporter of an “effectively verifiable” fissile material cutoff treaty, the United Kingdom, along with Israel, abstained from a vote calling for such an agreement at the 2004 UN First Committee.

Nuclear Use Doctrine: In May 2000, the United Kingdom reaffirmed a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty subject to certain conditions regarding their behavior and alliances. The United Kingdom is a member of NATO, which reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict, although the 26-member alliance deems the possibility of nuclear use as “extremely remote.” London has stated it would only consider employing nuclear weapons in “extreme circumstances of self-defence.”

—COMPILED BY WADE BOESE

Sources: Arms Control Association, Institute for Science and International Security, Natural Resources Defense Council, and national governments.



William Walker is a professor of international relations at the University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom, and heads its School of International Relations. His Adelphi Paper, “Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order,” was published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in December 2004.

China: A Crucial Bridge for the 2005 NPT Review Conference

Li Bin

China’s unique nuclear philosophy, nuclear arsenal, and attitude toward nuclear nonproliferation mean that Beijing is likely to play a critical role at the 2005 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, serving as a vital bridge between the nuclear “haves” and the “have-nots.”

Among the five recognized nuclear-weapon states, China has the longest and deepest commitment to nuclear disarmament. For decades, Beijing has pressed for “a complete and thorough elimination of nuclear weapons” and consistently stressed the illegitimacy of the permanent existence of these arms, insisting that they will disappear if all the people in the world strongly oppose them.[1]

China has also sought to minimize the role of nuclear weapons in its military planning and diplomacy, contending that nuclear weapons have little military significance and the sole legitimate role of nuclear weapons should be the prevention of nuclear blackmail. For this reason, China has unconditionally committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and has repeated the pledge at the preparatory meetings for the review conference.[2] Indeed, until recently, the Chinese government even challenged the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, and it still criticizes the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons. And even though China has the smallest and least sophisticated arsenal of the five declared nuclear powers, China’s leaders have largely contended that efforts to significantly improve the quantity and quality of its nuclear weapons were not warranted.

China’s doctrine and practice in many ways echoes demands that non-nuclear-weapon states have long made: that the nuclear-weapon states need to do more to meet their commitments under Article VI of the NPT to make good-faith efforts toward disarmament. China’s doctrine also reflects the country’s unique status as the least wealthy member of the nuclear five and its sympathy to countries not aligned with either the United States or the Soviet bloc.

At the upcoming conference, the non-nuclear-weapon states, as they have done at every previous review conference, are sure to raise questions about how much the nuclear-weapon states have done to meet their Article VI commitment. If the nuclear “have-nots” are not satisfied with the explanations offered by the nuclear “haves,” their interest in abiding by and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime might waiver. Coupled with technical and economic developments that have made it far easier to acquire nuclear capabilities, the possibility of widespread nuclear proliferation might become more likely.

On the other hand, if the five nuclear-weapon states are able to convince the non-nuclear-weapon states that they have indeed been meeting their commitments, a successful conference could ensure strengthening support for nonproliferation norms. China’s credibility with the non-nuclear-weapon states in this regard could play a crucial role in tipping the conference’s outcome toward success.

To be sure, China is still likely to feel some heat at the conference, even if the conduct of its nuclear weapons program is highly defensible. For example, China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 but has yet to ratify the treaty. China’s hesitancy stems less from technical than political obstacles. Chinese lawmakers would like to follow the example of the U.S. Congress in the late 1990s when it provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and approved implementing legislation. During consideration of that treaty, the U.S. Congress approved some treaty reservations and conditions that convinced Beijing that similar cautions might not be a bad idea when it comes to the CTBT.

China’s lack of transparency about its nuclear weapons program will certainly prompt some scrutiny. But China’s behavior is not without cause as it is in a more difficult position than some of the other nuclear powers: its small and lightly deployed nuclear force makes an easy target for an enemy armed with the right intelligence. This is why China is nervous about nuclear transparency, particularly public declarations about the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal or the locations in which they are deployed. In the not-too-distant future China might be able to tackle this problem head on; efforts to make China’s nuclear force less vulnerable to a first strike through increased mobility may soon allow China to offer more quantitative transparency.[3]

Nonetheless, at the conference China will surely be pressed to explain whether its nuclear modernization program is aimed at building a large force with strong offensive and war-fighting capabilities—including multiple types of weapons with the ability to launch quickly—or retaining a small force while enhancing its safety and survivability. At the preparatory sessions for the review conference, China indicated that it had chosen the latter course and claimed that the Chinese nuclear program has been cut in the last decade. Such transparency is certainly welcome; as China has emerged in recent years as a major economic power, international concern has risen that it will devote substantial resources to boosting the size of its nuclear arsenal. China’s recent announcement that it has reduced its nuclear program, however, indicates that the size of China’s force is being dictated by political rather than economic judgments.

China’s emergence on the international stage is reflected in the evolution of some of its views on nuclear nonproliferation. China used to take a quite radical position on nuclear nonproliferation. Although it has been defined by the NPT as a nuclear-weapon state for decades, China did not accede to the treaty until 1992, calling it discriminatory for establishing a distinction between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states.

In 1995, at its first NPT review conference after its accession, China began to coordinate its positions with the other nuclear parties. Since then, China’s nonproliferation policy has evolved. On the one hand, China still shares most views with the non-nuclear-weapon states on nuclear issues and supports almost all of their proposals in various disarmament and nonproliferation forums. It has also offered support for various nuclear-weapon-free zones. On the other hand, China has begun to feel that it is part of the nuclear club. It is now quite eager to join various export control regimes, which it previously labeled as unfair. It joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in January 2004 and is seeking admission to the Missile Technology Control Regime. One likely side effect of this change is that China can no longer be expected to take the lead in pushing for some radical disarmament measures. For example, China will likely not press for nuclear disarmament within a particular timeframe, which could embarrass the other nuclear-weapon states.

At the conference, China can be expected to restate its traditional support for complete disarmament, its no-first-use pledge, and its assurances that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. The fifth traditional policy is opposition to the weaponization of outer space.

But China can also be expected to advance some positions different from those it advocated at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. A significant change is that in 2003 China agreed on the establishment of the ad hoc committees at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a multilateral, nondiscriminatory and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. If the United States had not concluded in July 2004 that effective international verification of a fissile material cutoff treaty could not be realistically achieved, there would now be a great opportunity to bring the CD out of a deadlock that has stalled progress in that forum for many years.

In the documents issued by China and the speeches presented by Chinese officials, there appear new offers of nuclear disarmament. One is China’s opposition to tactical nuclear weapons and, indirectly, U.S. research on low-yield nuclear weapons. In a Chinese working paper,[4] China suggested that “no state should research into and develop low-yield easy-to-use nuclear weapons.” The above statement is the first time China formally and explicitly expressed its position on this matter and also represents a major step toward nuclear transparency.

China also has sought a ban on new nuclear weapons designs. At a 2003 conference aimed at bringing the CTBT into force, the head of the Chinese delegation, Ambassador Zhang Yan, suggested that the nuclear-weapon states should refrain from conducting research on new weapons designs.[5] At a NPT-related workshop in April 2004, Liu Jieyi, director general of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, was more explicit.[6] He called on nuclear-weapon states “not to research into or develop new types of nuclear weapons.” China clearly is open to accepting a constraint over new nuclear weapons design, should the other nuclear-weapon states agree, or accepting such an interpretation of the CTBT.

Another proposal is China’s support for de-alerting nuclear weapons. In its working paper, China suggested that “the nuclear-weapon states should take all necessary steps to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches.” China did not specify how this would be done, but a rational way to do this is by de-alerting nuclear weapons. This is also in compliance with China’s nuclear philosophy. If China’s appeal receives positive feedback from the other nuclear states, it is possible that China would go further to issue a more explicit statement about its own nuclear weapon readiness.

China’s unique nuclear philosophy imposes some limitations. For example, China cannot join phased quantitative nuclear reductions. Since it already has a very small nuclear force, it does not make much sense to cut its arsenal step-by-step even if it has the political will to do so. For China, a more feasible approach might be to set a ceiling to be later followed by complete elimination. Still, China’s unique history—and future—means that its views and actions might prove important to making the 2005 NPT Review Conference a success rather than a failure.

ENDNOTES

1.. For discussion of China’s nuclear philosophy, see Cai Lijuan, “On Mao Zedong’s Nuclear Strategic Thought,” Masters Degree Dissertation, Tsinghua University, 2002.

2. “Fact Sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament,” April 27, 2004. (For this and other statements see China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng)

3. Li Bin, “China's Nuclear Disarmament Policy,” Harold Feiveson et al., eds., “The Nuclear Turning Point—A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons,” Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 1999, pp. 325-332.

4. Working Paper submitted by China, “On the Issue of Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War,” April 28, 2004.

5. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Zhang Yan, Head of the Chinese Delegation at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” September 4, 2003.

6. “Statement by Mr. Liu Jieyi, Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament Department, Foreign Ministry of China, on Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances,” April 6, 2004.

 

China on Key Nuclear Issues

Nuclear Warhead Arsenal: Up to 400 warheads total.

Latest Nuclear Force Developments: China is engaged in a slow-paced, long-standing modernization of its strategic nuclear forces. U.S. intelligence assesses that China is developing mobile land-based, long-range ballistic missiles and is working to replace liquid-fuel ballistic missiles with solid-propellant models. The Pentagon estimated in May 2004 that China’s current estimated force of roughly 20 ICBMs could triple by 2010.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signed September 24, 1996. Chinese government officials have stated they fully support the treaty and are waiting on the National People’s Congress to approve the accord.
Fissile Material Production for Weapons: China has reportedly ceased production of fissile material for weapons purposes, although it has made no official announcement. China publicly supports negotiation of an “effectively verifiable” fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). In October 2004, a high-ranking Chinese arms control official said Beijing was “studying in a serious manner” the U.S. proposal to negotiate an FMCT without verification mechanisms.

Nuclear Use Doctrine: China is the sole nuclear-weapon state to declare publicly that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

—COMPILED BY WADE BOESE

Sources: Arms Control Association, Institute for Science and International Security, Natural Resources Defense Council, and national governments.



Li Bin is director of the Arms Control Program at the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China.

EU Retains China Arms Embargo

Wade Boese

The European Union Dec. 8 rejected a Chinese bid to end a 15-year-old arms embargo, delighting the United States. Yet, Beijing’s disappointment and Washington’s satisfaction could be short-lived as the embargo’s eventual end appears likely.

In a joint statement issued at the end of the EU-China summit held at The Hague, the 25-member EU declared its “political will to continue to work towards lifting the embargo.” China “welcomed the positive signal” but also stated that the embargo “should be immediately removed.”

The EU’s main decision-making body Dec. 17 indicated it wanted to make a final decision on the embargo within the next several months. The result “should not be an increase of arms exports from EU Member States to China, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms,” the European Council stated.

With a wholesale military modernization program underway, Beijing has pressed the EU to drop its prohibition on arms sales originally imposed in reaction to the Chinese government’s ruthless 1989 crackdown on peaceful demonstrators at Tiananmen Square. Beijing contends its human rights record has improved and labels the embargo an anachronism of the Cold War.

Some European capitals share Beijing’s view that the embargo is outdated and an impediment to improving ties between Europe and China. Paris and Madrid are lobbying hard for abolishment of the embargo, as is German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, whose position is not supported by his own Social Democratic Party.

Nevertheless, one European diplomat from a country favoring the embargo told Arms Control Today Dec. 15 that momentum is building for the eventual lifting of the embargo, but when that will happen “is uncertain.”

U.S. officials expressed similar resignation. In a Dec. 15 interview with Arms Control Today, a Department of State official said the United States, which also bans arms sales to China, was “pleased” with the summit’s conclusion, but conceded the issue “is not a problem that is going to go away.” A congressional staffer interviewed the same day predicted a European reversal could come in a matter of months.

The State Department official argued that the host of summit agreements between the European Union and China, including commitments to cooperate on nonproliferation and arms control issues, reveals that it is “possible to have a good relationship with China and still have an arms embargo.” The official further warned that a renewed arms trade relationship between China and European countries could prompt the United States to impose greater restrictions on arms and technology sold to Europe. “Congress will spank [the Europeans] on this,” the official added.

The congressional staffer affirmed this assertion. Concerns about U.S. technology leaking to China via Europe would likely sour congressional support for cross-Atlantic ventures on major weapons systems, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, the staffer said. An EU decision to lift the embargo, according to the staffer, would most likely produce an “overreaction by Congress.”

U.S. support for preserving the embargo reflects unease with the possibility that Beijing could turn the weapons against its own people or Taiwan, which China covets and the United States has pledged to help defend. Additional qualms stem from China’s past proliferation record of selling arms to purchasers hostile to the United States.

Some EU countries say U.S. fears are exaggerated and that waiving the embargo will not result in a splurge of European arms sales to China. European weapons deals, they argue, will be constrained by a 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports that sets out criteria—such as a potential arms buyer’s human rights record—that are supposed to be taken into consideration before any export occurs. U.S. critics counter that the code, which EU members are considering revising, is nonbinding and not much of an obstacle to determined sellers.

 

 

 

Reactor Suspension Extended; North Korea Nuclear Talks Stall

Paul Kerr

With six-party talks designed to resolve a two-year-old North Korean nuclear crisis stuck in limbo, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have opted to renew the year-long construction freeze of two nuclear reactors promised to Pyongyang as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

The executive board of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), charged with implementing the agreement, announced Nov. 26 that it will extend its suspension of the project. The Agreed Framework diffused an earlier crisis over Pyongyang’s plutonium-based nuclear weapons program. It called for North Korea to suspend operation of its graphite-moderated nuclear reactor, as well as the construction of two larger reactors, in return for two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and 500,000 metric tons of heavy-fuel oil from KEDO as well as other benefits. It is more difficult to use LWRs to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.

KEDO’s board—which is comprised of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union—said it would continue to suspend construction of the reactors for another year, beginning Dec. 1. The suspension first took effect Dec.1, 2003. The board had suspended the fuel oil shipments in November 2002 following the U.S. announcement that North Korea had admitted to having a prohibited uranium-based nuclear program. (See ACT, December 2003.)

The announcement came at a time of diplomatic uncertainty, with Pyongyang indicating that it was still assessing President George W. Bush’s second-term plans. Pyongyang “intends to follow with patience the course of policy-shaping by the second-term Bush administration,” according to a Dec. 14 statement from Pyongyang’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

In September, North Korea refused to attend a round of talks, and no further discussions have been scheduled. Since then, the other members, including the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China, have continued diplomatic efforts to induce North Korea to return to the talks, including Nov. 30 and Dec. 3 low-level U.S.-North Korean meetings in New York. The talks, however, appear to have made little progress.

Whether reactor construction will ever resume is unclear. The KEDO statement said the project’s future “will be assessed and decided by the executive board before the expiration of the suspension period,” but the Bush administration has repeatedly stated that it does not want the project revived. The United States did not fund KEDO’s administrative budget in fiscal year 2004 and did not request funds for fiscal year 2005.

For now, KEDO will continue “the preservation and maintenance work” associated with the project, the statement said.

Even if the reactor project is terminated, however, KEDO might still have a future. A Bush administration official told Arms Control Today in June that the organization could play a role in implementing a U.S. proposal which was presented during the last round of six-party talks held that month. Part of the U.S. proposal would provide incentives for North Korea to freeze and then dismantle its nuclear facilities, including the formulation of proposals to provide Pyongyang with non-nuclear energy assistance. (See ACT, July/August 2004.)

North Korea has still not given a formal response to the U.S. offer. Instead, KCNA has continued to issue statements blaming the United States for the stalemate and reiterating North Korean complaints that the United States has a “hostile policy” to bring down the regime. (See ACT, December 2004.)

Perhaps attempting to address North Korea’s concerns, Bush and several U.S. officials reiterated in December that Washington does not intend to overthrow the North Korean regime but rather wants Pyongyang’s leadership to change its behavior.

Secretary of State Colin Powell further dismissed reports Dec. 3 that the North Korean government has become increasingly unstable, emphasizing that the United States wanted to continue the six-party talks.

Washington has repeatedly said that it has no intention of attacking North Korea, but the Bush administration’s North Korea policy has been characterized by disagreements about the correct mix of pressure and engagement. (See ACT, July/August 2004.) The June proposal offers a provisional multilateral security guarantee that U.S. officials have said could serve as the basis for a future permanent peace agreement on the Korean peninsula.

 

 

 

Superseding U.S.-Russian Nuclear Deterrence

Alexei Arbatov

Over time and left unchecked, nuclear deterrence and proliferation are likely to follow Frederick Hegel’s dialectical notion of history in which a historical development generates its opposite, or antithesis, and eventually both give way to a new reality or synthesis. Nuclear deterrence (as a policy of leveraging nuclear weapons for political aims) must inevitably give rise to proliferation, as more countries strive to take advantage of the fruits of deterrence to achieve their interests.

As this circle of countries possessing nuclear weapons grows, deterrence will become ever more ambiguous, unstable, and contradictory. States will find it more difficult to resolve such basic strategic questions as how deterrence affects the possibility of a first use of nuclear weapons, whether deterrence can be viewed as a rational approach for policymakers, and what constitutes a country’s appropriate command and control responsibilities.

In the past, arms control efforts succeeded in slowing down this historical trend. Now, we are fast approaching the final stage of proliferation and the final contradiction of deterrence: nonstate actors (terrorist organizations) gaining access to nuclear weapons. At that point, deterrence will be effectively finished as a strategy for leveraging nuclear weapons to protect national security. Nuclear deterrence is not effective against terrorists, and terrorists are interested in nuclear weapons solely for direct use and blackmail.

To rein in these terrorist organizations, a Cold War level of cooperation will not suffice. All new threats, as well as new opportunities, urgently require a qualitatively higher level of cooperation among the major world powers. The cooperation required is comparable to that achieved in such alliances as NATO or the Warsaw Pact, but in some spheres, even greater cooperation is required. Nevertheless, better relations are not possible while the United States and Russia base their military and strategic relations on the principles and the material base of mutual nuclear deterrence. Changes are needed both in specific arms programs and the two nuclear superpowers’ approach to arms control and disarmament.

Deterrence and Arms Control
Arms control was born out of the desire of the leading powers to stabilize mutual deterrence within acceptable limits. At an early stage in the arms control process, after the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the end of nuclear proliferation began to be viewed as a mandatory condition for progress in nuclear disarmament. After the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed, the powers signed a number of bilateral arms control treaties, from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), along with multilateral accords such as the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 1997 Model Additional Protocol granting greater inspection powers to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Yet, these treaties did not fully stop nuclear proliferation, as some countries (India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea) acquired nuclear weapons.

To defend itself from such rogue proliferators, the United States (and likely other powers in the not-too-distant future) has initiated the development and perfection of a missile defense system and undertaken research into the possibility of using a new generation of nuclear weapons preemptively against terrorist bases or rogue nations. This will likely further undermine the foundations of stable mutual deterrence between the main powers and of the arms limitation and disarmament regimes: already the CTBT, ABM Treaty, START II, and planned START III agreements have fallen victim.

Such moves will also be viewed as not conforming to the spirit of the NPT. That treaty calls in part for the nuclear-weapon states to take steps toward nuclear disarmament in return for non-nuclear-weapon states forgoing such weapons.

A New Approach
It is clearly becoming less productive to depend on deterrence as the main guarantee for preventing a nuclear war. The nuclear powers, the largest non-nuclear states, and the countries supplying nuclear materials and technology must develop a new approach for preventing proliferation and, even more importantly, convincing countries to disarm (as in Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Iraq, and Libya).

As a first step, the great powers, primarily the United States and Russia, must improve their military and political relations in the area of nuclear weapons. Not enough has been done to minimize the mutual suspicion and ambiguity that exist between the major nuclear powers, even if only latently. This has been reinforced and continually perpetuated under the mutual nuclear deterrence paradigm, especially as a result of the disruption of the system of agreements dealing with arms limitation and reduction. This lack of trust seriously impairs deep cooperation between the powers in all aspects of nuclear nonproliferation.

During the Cold War, full-fledged cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation was impaired by confrontation and global rivalry between the two superpowers, which undoubtedly predominated over other individual links of cooperation. The cessation of the Cold War in principle removed the main impediment to cooperation between the two countries. Nevertheless, rather than turning to further disarmament steps, the United States, no longer worried about the Soviet threat, has turned its attention instead to such pressing concerns as new states pursuing nuclear weapons and the discovery of a nuclear black market.

Both Russia and the United States share blame for this failure. The Bush administration’s policies have been viewed by many in Moscow as arrogant and unilateralist. Yet, the Kremlin can also be blamed for weakness, inconsistency, and significant errors.

In addition to changing their bilateral dialogue, both countries have to take steps to cut their nuclear arsenals, recognizing that their disarmament actions are more likely to influence countries than their statements on nonproliferation. Such steps would not only provide good role models, but they would avoid setting bad examples for other nuclear states, as well as for those that are blatantly or secretly on the nuclear threshold. It is by no means certain that if the nuclear powers were to carry out a radical cut in their arsenals other countries would abandon their own nuclear weapons programs, considering their real motives for acquiring them. It is, however, completely clear that the unwavering reliance of the nuclear powers on nuclear weapons as the most important means for ensuring their own security creates additional stimulus for other countries to acquire these weapons, thus providing terrorists with greater access to such arms.

In terms of the NPT, progress by the great powers in meeting their Article VI commitments does not guarantee that the nuclear nonproliferation regime will survive and thrive—many other actions are needed to accomplish this goal. Not meeting these obligations, however, quite certainly guarantees future nuclear weapons proliferation and will demand ever more energetic efforts in order to cut it off, including the use of force. Given the current experience in Iraq, this is surely a fate the nuclear-weapon states would like to avoid.

To make nuclear weapons less attractive to would-be nuclear powers, large cuts in the numbers of nuclear weapons held by the United States and Russia—at least as long as their warhead stocks remain in the thousands—are not as important as the role of nuclear weapons in their military policies, their views on the practical applicability of nuclear weapons, their nuclear force modernization plans, and their attitudes toward arms limitation and reduction agreements.

The trend in recent years has not been encouraging, primarily in the approach taken by the United States, but also by Russia and other nuclear-weapon states. It is not an exaggeration to assert that the great powers bear the main responsibility for the failure in not achieving a wider acceptance of the norm of nonproliferation.

New U.S.-Russian Steps to Stem Proliferation

Bilateral
There are steps that the United States and Russia can take to reverse this trend and hopefully reverse proliferation. To begin with, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) should be transformed into a full-scale treaty like START I governing the reduction of strategic weapons. This would mean spelling out the corresponding counting rules for warheads reduction, schedules and procedures for dismantling weapons, verification measures, and extension of the terms of the treaty to the year 2017 (currently, the treaty expires in 2012 upon completion of the arms reductions).

Negotiations should begin immediately on a SORT II, which could lead to the reduction of each country’s strategic nuclear arsenal by 2017 to the level of no more than 1,000 warheads. These cuts would be coupled with a gradual lowering of the operational readiness of at least half of the strategic nuclear forces. This would include sharp reductions in the number of nuclear-armed submarines on patrol, the basing of heavy bombers separately from their nuclear weapons, and the removal and separate storage of the nose cones of the larger portion of the ICBMs capable of carrying multiple warheads and of the warheads of single-warhead ICBMs.

This treaty should include broad measures for transparency in the two countries’ strategic nuclear forces. The treaty should also include gradual integration of the Missile Attack Early Warning System and the two countries’ command and control systems, including liaison officers at each other’s strategic command centers as is the current practice with Russia and NATO. Subsequent measures should be directed toward a verifiable reduction in the alert rate of an ever-increasing portion of each country’s strategic nuclear forces (bringing it down to 90 percent) and an increase in the time, visibility, and cost of the reconstitution capabilities of both sides.

Based on the 2002 document covering new principles for strategic relations between the United States and Russia, it is time for a full-scale treaty on cooperation in the ABM area, delineating the spheres of joint and individual development and deployment and presenting guarantees that the two countries’ ABM systems will not be directed against each other. These might include, for example, prohibition of space-based interceptor devices; freedom to conduct tests of any ABM systems, provided there is mutual monitoring of the tests; and limitations on the numbers of anti-missiles of various types allowed.

The two countries should also initiate negotiations on limiting nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These talks would be aimed initially at ensuring that these weapons were not deployed in central and eastern Europe, including the Kaliningrad Oblast. Eventually, the negotiations should be aimed at removing them from Europe, as defined by the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. Weapons outside Europe, that is, the non-European part of Russia, should be stockpiled only in centralized storage facilities under mutual monitoring. This would indirectly bring about a significant downsizing of Russia’s nonstrategic warhead modernization program.

Unilateral Measures
In addition, some unilateral steps would be useful, such as getting rid of or severely limiting those systems and programs that cannot be justified by any other mission except targeting each other.

The United States should abandon any efforts to develop new nuclear weapons, cancel plans to install W-87 warheads from the Peacekeeper missile on the Minuteman III ICBM, and make a commitment not to resume production of the W-88 warhead for the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

Russia should alter its nuclear modernization program. Emphasis should be placed on the mobile Topol-M ICBM and survivable control systems and Missile Attack Early Warning System. The Kremlin should stop construction of additional new class 955 (Borey-Yuriy Dolgorukiy) nuclear submarines and their new Bulava-30 nuclear missiles.

Multilateral
A number of multilateral agreements are also needed, but they only stand a chance of entering into force if the United States and Russia take the lead.

The United States should ratify the CTBT, which the U.S. Senate rejected in 1999. A common position between the great powers would ensure that India, Pakistan, and Israel, which do not belong to the NPT but have nuclear weapons, join the pact. Thus, a limit would be established for improvements and, to a significant degree, production of nuclear weapons in the nations that have already created them, and a serious barrier would also be established to the creation of nuclear weapons by other countries. Nuclear nonproliferation efforts would be further buttressed with the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for military purposes (see page 25).

The United States and Russia should seek to convince other nuclear powers to accept similar limitations on their strategic nuclear forces. For example, there might be an equal number of SLBM warheads in the forces of Russia and the total forces of the United Kingdom and France or equal numbers of warheads in silo-based ICBMs for Russia, China, and the United States. They should seek to convince all NPT nuclear-weapon states to pledge that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against NPT member nations or, alternatively, commit to no first use of any type of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). They might also seek to abandon the concept of a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack strike, switching to a concept of delayed second strike.

Aside from the mistaken ideas of political and military leaders, as well as the incapability of the political leaders to assert their control over the military establishments and lobbyists of the defense industry, there are no objective security interests of the great powers or real strategic or military technical circumstance that would interfere with taking these steps.

Even more than nuclear weapons themselves, it is the maintenance of the nuclear heritage of those decades and the ensuing military relations among the powers that are the true relics of Cold War, even if they presently only form the background of diplomacy. Now, more than a decade after the end of Cold War, it is time to disassemble its heritage of deterrence in a practical manner and eliminate the burden it imposes on relations between nations and the boundaries it sets on international cooperation. It is time to move forward together to confront today’s problems of WMD proliferation, terrorism, extremism, local instability, and conflicts. By doing so, we will fortify the legal and conceptual core upon which the NPT is built as well as the commitments and mechanism of nonproliferation policy.

Russia on Key Nuclear Issues

Nuclear Warhead Arsenal: Approximately 19,500 warheads total. As of July 2004, Russia claimed a total of 4,959 deployed strategic warheads under the terms of the START agreement.

Latest Nuclear Force Developments: President Vladimir Putin has publicly boasted about Russia’s development of new strategic capabilities. Moscow is known to be working on a mobile version of its Topol-M land-based ballistic missile and on a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the Bulava, to update its aging long-range missile forces. In the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, Moscow and Washington agreed to field less than 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads each by the end of 2012.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signed September 24, 1996. Ratified June 30, 2000. Fissile Material Production for Weapons: Russia halted all production of fissile material for nuclear arms in 1994. However, Russia is still operating three plutonium production reactors for civilian purposes that it initially pledged in 1994 to shut down by 2000. Moscow voted in favor of a 2004 UN First Committee resolution supporting an “effectively verifiable” fissile material cutoff treaty.

Nuclear Use Doctrine: Russia abandoned in 1993 the Soviet Union’s pledge of no first use. Moscow reaffirmed in May 2000 its past pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but in recent years it has also warned that it would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons to “repulse armed aggression” if other responses failed. Due to the deterioration of its conventional forces since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has increased its emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons in protecting Russia’s security.

—COMPILED BY WADE BOESE

Sources: Arms Control Association, Institute for Science and International Security, Natural Resources Defense Council, and national governments.

 



Alexei Arbatov is head of the Center for International Security at Moscow’s Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Scholar-in-Residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center, and a member of the Blix Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction. He previously served as deputy in the lower house of the Russian parliament, the State Duma.

News Analysis: U.S.-Russian Nuclear Rivalry Linger

Wade Boese

In signing an arms control treaty with Russia two years ago, President George W. Bush said the simple, less than 500-words document reflected a new spirit of cooperation and trust between the two former foes based upon the recognition that they were no longer enemies.

“This treaty liquidates the Cold War legacy of nuclear hostility between our countries,” Bush said at the May 24, 2002 signing of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in Moscow.

Yet, it appears that when it comes to nuclear weapons, old habits die hard. In closing the deal on SORT, the two countries also agreed to establish a new forum to discuss matters related to their nuclear forces. But competing agendas blocked talks in this forum over the past year.

There “hasn’t been a lot of energy in this process,” a U.S. government official told Arms Control Today Dec. 8, because neither side is happy with what the other wants to talk about.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin—harkening back to the days of its superpower competition with the United States—is boasting about its development of new offensive strategic capabilities designed to render ineffective anti-missile systems such as those being developed by Washington.

The Bush administration touts the SORT agreement as one of its major disarmament achievements. The accord requires Washington and Moscow to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to less than 2,200 apiece by the end of 2012. But it does not require the destruction of any weapons, establish a schedule for the reductions, or include verification measures to ensure each side is following through on the agreement. Because of the absence of verification provisions, the U.S. intelligence community has informed the Bush administration that it would be unable to verify with high confidence Russia’s compliance with the treaty, according to a Dec. 20, 2004 Knight Ridder report.

The United States possesses almost 6,000 deployed strategic warheadsroughly 1,000 more than Russia. Both countries also store thousands of nondeployed strategic warheads that are not limited by SORT or other previous bilateral treaties.

In conjunction with SORT, the two sides established the Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS) as the “principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest.” In short, the group, which is chaired by the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers, is responsible for working out nuclear weapons issues that SORT does not address. The two governments later formed separate CGSS working groups on missile defense cooperation and offensive transparency.

These working groups met several times in 2003, but the offensive transparency working group did not meet in 2004. A meeting of this group might occur in late January, according to U.S. government officials. Washington would like to use the talks to win Moscow’s support for increasing personnel exchanges, tours, and briefings in the event a matter of concern arises.

The United States is also seeking greater information on Russia’s tactical nuclear warheads, which are those designed for battlefield use. Neither SORT nor previous U.S.-Russian/Soviet arms control agreements limit tactical nuclear warhead stockpiles. Russia is estimated to possess thousands in undisclosed locations, and the United States stations 480 in six European states. (See ACT, November 2004.)

Moscow has shown little interest in the U.S. proposals, according to the U.S. official interviewed Dec. 8. Instead, Russia wants to discuss issues that it raised regularly during the Cold War, such as heavy bomber deployments, submarine operations, and sea-launched cruise missile limits.

To be sure, the two countries did hold some meetings in 2004 on fulfilling existing treaty commitments. U.S. and Russian officials met twice through the Bilateral Implementation Commission to discuss progress in carrying out SORT, although they did not have much to say since neither side has finalized plans for implementing the treaty. Washington has mapped out reductions to 3,500-4,000 operationally deployed strategic warheads by 2007, while the U.S. official described Moscow’s plans as “very vague.”

Despite a recent boost in Russian revenue from high oil and gas prices, Russian forces are projected to decline to 1,500 or fewer deployed strategic nuclear warheads over the next decade due to budget constraints and retirement of aging nuclear delivery systems.

Still, the influx of funds has enabled Moscow to try and preserve some parity with Washington by allowing Russia to resume activity on strategic weapons programs previously slowed or shelved because of financial strains. Some of the projects date back to the Soviet period.

Amid what it claimed were its largest military exercises in two decades, Moscow announced early last year a successful test of a new weapon capable of high-speed maneuvers. Few details have emerged about the system, which a top Russian military official described as a hypersonic glide vehicle.

Russia also touted progress on two new types of long-range ballistic missiles: a road-mobile Topol-M and the submarine-launched Bulava. Moscow reported a fourth successful test of the road-mobile missile on Dec. 24 and intends to start deploying the single-warhead missile as early as 2006. Russia has fielded 40 silo-based Topol-Ms since 1997.

Moscow has notified Washington of its intention to deploy the Bulava, but when that would happen is unclear as it is still in the very early stages of testing and the new submarines that are being developed to carry the missile are still under construction.

The value of these new systems, according to Russian statements, is their ability to penetrate missile defenses. While Russian officials avoid saying their arms are developed with the United States in mind, the Bush administration champions missile defense as a top priority. The administration asserts that its anti-missile systems are not for military advantage vis-a-vis Russia but for protection against emerging missile powers and terrorists.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said Feb. 18, 2004, “as other countries increase the number and quality of their arms and military potential, then Russia will also need to ensure it has new generation arms and technology.” He later declared in November that Russia is pursuing arms that have no equal.

Bush administration officials say they are not worried about Russia’s arms developments because it is no longer an enemy. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker told a Washington audience Dec. 17 that the United States is not concerned about Russian claims that their new missiles are capable of evading missile defenses.

The U.S. official interviewed Dec. 8 deemed much of Russia’s rhetoric as being geared for domestic consumption. Yet, the official added that the “sense of competition is very much alive” in Russia because it “tends to view the world as we did 15 years ago.”

The Bush administration has expressed little interest in conducting any further nuclear weapon negotiations with Russia. After completion of SORT, Bush’s National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said in an interview with PBS, “We believe that [SORT] is a transitional measure to a day when arms control will play a very minor role in U.S.-Russian relations, if a role at all.”

 

Russia Speeds Chemical Weapon Disposal

Michael Nguyen

The destruction of Russia’s massive Soviet-era chemical weapons stockpile has been proceeding glacially, but recent actions by Russian and U.S. leaders may allow this pace to be accelerated substantially.

With slightly more than 40,000 metric tons, Russia has the world’s largest declared stockpile of chemical weapons but is the furthest from completing the destruction process among the six states that have pledged to eliminate declared stockpiles under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Russia has been given multiple interim-deadline extensions and has been granted in principle the one-time, five-year extension to the final deadline of 2007, but U.S. officials doubt it will meet the extended deadline either. By the end of 2004, Russia had destroyed less than 3 percent of its stockpile.

To speed up destruction, President Vladimir Putin signed the 2005 federal budget approved by the Duma and Federation Council into law Dec. 24 providing $400 million for chemical weapons destruction, more than twice the $186 million allocated in 2004. Russian officials attributed the large increase to an effort to make up for what they said was disappointing support from international donors.

Col. Gen. Victor Kholstov, head of the Russian chemical demilitarization program, and other officials have pointed to a report from the Russian government that found that only 30 percent of the funds designated by the United States for Russian chemical weapons disposal activities were being given to Russia; the rest was being used to monitor the use of the funds. However, when pressed as to whether the Kremlin had counted U.S. funding used to purchase equipment in the United States, Kholstov admitted that the 30 percent figure included only what had been transferred to Russia’s Federal Agency on Industry.

In the United States, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) plans to reintroduce legislation next year that would eliminate six conditions placed by lawmakers on U.S. funding of a major chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. (See ACT, December 2004.) In the past, these stipulations have suspended or delayed the flow of such funds to Russia. Since 2002, President George W. Bush has had and used the authority to waive the conditions on national security grounds, but it has been necessary for Congress to renew the waiver authority each year.

The most recent defense authorization bill granted the president waiver authority through December 2006. The president signed a waiver of these stipulations Nov. 29, releasing U.S. funding through the end of the 2005 calendar year. The fiscal 2005 defense authorization bill earmarks $158.4 million through September toward the construction of the chemical weapons destruction plant at Shchuch’ye.

Two conditions have been particularly difficult to meet, making a waiver necessary. One requires that Russia develop a practical plan for nerve agent destruction, while the other requires that Russia destroy all nerve agents at a single location. In a 2001 agreement, Russia pledged to complete the destruction process of all nerve agents at the Shchuch’ye facility.

Patrick Wakefield, deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for chemical demilitarization and threat reduction, told a Moscow audience in November that Russia and the United States had recently agreed to a more realistic plan to complete construction by July 2008 and begin destruction in mid-2009. Russia had been insisting that the facility would be ready by 2006.

The Shchuch’ye requirement, however, remains a sticking point.

The original intent of the requirement to destroy all nerve agents at one location was to protect the U.S. investment in the Shchuch’ye facility, where the United States expects to spend $1 billion over the course of the project—a hefty price tag for a location that only has 13.6 percent of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile.

The stipulations have generated resentment on the Russian side, with one Russian official telling a U.S. audience late last summer that the requirement was setting Russia up for failure because there was not enough time to destroy all the nerve agent at one facility. The requirements would also require Russia to transport chemical munitions and agent, or caustic reaction mass (the by-product of the neutralization process), over several hundred miles by rail.

The Russians have pointed out that, by contrast, the United States plans to construct destruction facilities at each of its present chemical weapons storage locations and that plans to transport the reaction mass ran into significant opposition by local communities.

A report completed last April by the General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) agreed with the Russian assessment, noting that, if the Shchuch’ye plant operated at its full destruction capacity of 1,700 metric tons per year, Russia would not complete the destruction of its nerve agent stockpile until 2027.

Russian nerve agents are stored at five different locations, including Shchuch’ye, and Russian officials have suggested that it may decide to construct disposal facilities at all locations. Several countries have committed funding for additional nerve agent destruction facilities. Although additional international donors were welcomed, one U.S. official cautioned that Russia may turn around and blame new donors for future delays.

The original agreement with the United States allows Russia to perform some neutralization on-site but required all nerve agent reaction mass to be transported to Shchuch’ye and destroyed. Russia has not finalized its plans and could choose to finish the neutralization process at each location or set the reaction mass aside for use in commercial industrial processes. Either option would violate the agreement with the United States and the conditions imposed by Congress.

U.S. Says it Will Complete Russian Nuclear Security Upgrades by 2008

Claire Applegarth

A high-level Bush administration official told a gathering of nuclear experts Dec. 14 that the United States had accelerated its efforts to secure approximately 600 metric tons of fissile materials in Russia and was on track to complete this work by 2008.

Paul Longsworth, deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), rebuffed charges by former Democratic presidential nominee Sen. John F. Kerry (Mass.) that such security upgrades would not be completed until 2013 as “simply not true.”

Longsworth said that Kerry had erred in using the wrong standard to assess the progress of the Department of Energy effort. Kerry judged progress by the percentage of fissile materials secured rather than the number of sites that had received security upgrades, a figure that puts the Bush administration’s progress in a better light.

A Dec. 10 NNSA press release said that upgrades were completed at nearly 70 percent of Russian sites and anticipated that “close to 80 percent” would be secured by the end of 2005.

Kerry’s criticism was based on a Harvard University report by Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier entitled “Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action,” in which the authors explained that the amount of nuclear materials receiving comprehensive security upgrades had only increased from 17 percent to 22 percent during fiscal year 2003 and that the overall pace of installation for security upgrades had slowed after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

The Energy Department’s fiscal year 2005 budget request, released nearly a year ago, reported a similar assessment, concluding that slightly more than one-quarter of Russia’s weapons-usable material would be secured by September 2004. Nevertheless, that budget report still held that the upgrade would be completed by 2008.

NNSA officials said the difference between the two sets of numbers stemmed from the order in which the sites were secured. The most vulnerable sites were secured first, but these sites also were smaller and contained less fissile materials. As progress continues on security upgrades, larger sites will be targeted, and greater amounts of nuclear materials will be secured “with roughly the same amount of time and effort as previously completed sites.”

NNSA announced Dec. 10 that two more nuclear facilities had received complete security upgrades: the Electrochemical Plant at Zelenogorsk, which blends highly enriched uranium (HEU) down to low-enriched uranium (LEU) and also produces LEU for commercial use, and the Urals Electrochemical Integrated Plant, which enriches uranium for commercial fuel. A third facility, the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant, received a security upgrade in September.

The Bush administration also announced in mid-December that it had waived human rights-related restrictions on threat reduction funds to Uzbekistan that will aid that country in securing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction-related materials. Meanwhile, the United States and Kazakhstan signed an amendment to the cooperative threat reduction program on biological weapons Dec. 8, raising the level of funding allocated to those projects by roughly $35 million, and allowing for expanded cooperative efforts between the two countries on bioterrorism.

In another threat reduction endeavor Dec. 22, a collaborative mission between the United States, the Czech Republic, and Russia succeeded in secretly returning 6 kg of HEU from a research reactor near the Czech capital of Prague to a secure facility in Russia.

Iran-EU Nuclear Negotiations Begin

Paul Kerr

Foreign ministers from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom met Dec.13 with Hassan Rowhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to open negotiations toward a long-term resolution of concerns surrounding Tehran’s nuclear programs. The United States offered cautious public support for the talks.

In a Dec. 16 interview, a European diplomat described the initial high-level discussions, which also included Javier Solana, the European Union’s high representative on foreign policy and security issues, as “more symbolic than substantive,” adding that no negotiations took place. The ministers left substantive issues to be hashed out by three working groups.

The working groups are tasked with developing proposals for cooperation on nuclear and non-nuclear technical projects as well as political and security issues. The groups will report to a steering committee, which will review the groups’ progress after three months. (See ACT, December 2004.) The groups have devised a rough schedule for monthly meetings, according to U.S. and European officials. Two working group meetings already took place in December.

The meeting was the result of a negotiating framework agreed to by Iran and the three European Union countries in November. At that time, Iran also agreed to suspend work on its uranium-enrichment program for the duration of the talks and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring of this suspension.

In the long-term negotiations, the European governments are seeking a permanent end to Tehran’s nuclear fuel efforts, particularly its gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program. Iran originally agreed to suspend its enrichment activities in October 2003 but continued work on some elements of its centrifuge program.

European governments, as well as the United States, are concerned that Iran intends to produce its own nuclear materials not for peaceful purposes but to build nuclear weapons. While nuclear power plants usually employ low-enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium can provide the fuel for nuclear weapons, as can plutonium separated from irradiated nuclear fuel.

Iran also has begun construction of a heavy water research reactor, which could provide a source of weapons-grade plutonium. Western concerns have been heightened by a more than two-year old IAEA investigation which revealed that Iran conducted a variety of covert nuclear activities. (See ACT, December 2004.)

Persuading Iran to renounce permanently its ambitions to develop an independent nuclear fuel cycle will almost certainly be difficult. The November agreement states only that the final agreement will include “objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.” Tehran, however, has not articulated its version of objective guarantees and has repeatedly said the suspension must be temporary, although some Iranian officials have hinted at the possibility of compromise. (See ACT, November 2004.)

Rowhani stated Dec.12 that Tehran “will continue the talks if we feel that they are progressing,” the official Islamic Republic News Agency reported, but Iranian officials have indicated that they want the talks to be concluded quickly. Official statements concerning an exact timeline have been ambiguous but indicate that Iran will give the talks at least several months.

Future Diplomacy
Although several U.S. officials have expressed skepticism that Iran will adhere to its suspension agreement, Washington is publicly supporting the negotiating process. Apparently countering speculation that Washington will take a harder line on Tehran, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said Dec.1 that talk of military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities is “irresponsible.” Armitage later downplayed the prospects for a successful regime change strategy, saying Dec. 20 that the Iranian opposition would not necessarily “eschew nuclear weapons.” Secretary of State Colin Powell was more direct in a Dec.10 speech in the Netherlands, reiterating that “U.S. policy is not to advocate regime change in Iran.”

However, tensions between the United States and the Europeans could increase as a February IAEA Board of Governors meeting approaches. The board adopted a resolution in late November that emphasizes the suspension’s importance but does not specify any consequences if Iran violates the agreement. The resolution, however, does request IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to notify board members if Tehran either fails to implement the suspension or impedes IAEA monitoring.

A State Department official told Arms Control Today that the timing of the next Euro-Iran steering committee meeting, which will probably occur in March, could complicate any U.S. proposals for the IAEA to take action if Iran violates the suspension. The Europeans might argue that such efforts will undercut ongoing diplomacy, the official said.

Washington has repeatedly pushed for resolutions that take a harder line on Iran at past board meetings but has failed to persuade the other board members to agree.

The United States also continues to express concern that Iran is pursuing covert nuclear activities. U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders told the IAEA board Nov. 29 that Washington wants Iran “immediately” to provide access to Iran’s Parchin military complex, which U.S. officials believe might have facilities that could be used to test conventional high explosives for use in an implosion-type nuclear weapon. The IAEA has not yet received permission to visit, the State Department official said Dec. 16. (See ACT, October 2004.)

Washington failed to persuade the board to adopt language giving the IAEA expanded authority to inspect Iranian facilities. Instead, the November resolution requests that Iran “provide any access deemed necessary by the Agency” in accordance with Iran’s additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.

Safeguards agreements require states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to allow the IAEA to monitor their declared civilian nuclear activities to ensure that they are not diverted to military use. Additional protocols augment the agency’s authority to detect clandestine nuclear activities, but there are limits to the agency’s ability to inspect military facilities. Tehran has signed an additional protocol and has agreed to abide by its provisions until Iran’s parliament ratifies the agreement.

On the trade front, Washington’s lack of enthusiasm for engagement with Iran could also complicate the negotiations. The suspension agreement states that the Europeans “will actively support the opening of Iranian accession negotiations” at the World Trade Organization (WTO). A State Department official told Arms Control Today Dec. 20 that the Europeans wanted a WTO General Council meeting earlier in the month to call for negotiations to begin, but the U.S. delegation said that Washington is not ready to move forward on the matter. U.S. support is necessary because the WTO makes decisions by consensus.

U.S. Imposes Iran-Related Sanctions

Wade Boese

On Dec. 1, the United States sanctioned four Chinese entities and one North Korean company for allegedly shipping exports to Iran that could contribute to Tehran’s suspected development of unconventional weapons.

Levied under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, the penalties will bar the sanctioned entities from receiving U.S. government contracts, aid, and arms sales until Nov. 24, 2006. Although entities sanctioned by Washington rarely do business with the U.S. government, U.S. policymakers hope their punishment brands the accused in the eyes of the world as entities to be shunned.

Three of the entities are repeat offenders. Most notoriously, North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corp. has been sanctioned nine times over the past four years. However, two of the Chinese companies, Liaoning Jiayi Metals and Minerals Company, Ltd. and Shanghai Triple International, Ltd., had not been previously penalized by the Bush administration, which has now lowered the sanctions boom more than 100 times. The Clinton administration imposed 70 proliferation sanctions over eight years.

As it normally does, Beijing objected to the U.S. sanctions. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhang Qiyue asserted Dec. 2 that China abides by its nonproliferation commitments and has its own laws to punish entities guilty of any wrongdoing. “We hope the U.S. can bear in mind our international cooperation on nonproliferation and other fields and not resort to arbitrary sanctions on Chinese companies,” Zhang said.

Although China is generally recognized as making progress over the past decade in tightening its export controls and reforming its proliferation behavior, many countries, including the United States, still see room for improvement. For instance, China’s spotty record on controlling missile proliferation sank its recent effort to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, whose 34 members pledge to restrict their missile exports. (See ACT, November 2004.)

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