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“Your association has taken a significant role in fostering public awareness of nuclear disarmament and has led to its advancement.”
– Kazi Matsui
Mayor of Hiroshima
June 2, 2022
October 2004
Edition Date: 
Friday, October 1, 2004
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Pakistan Advances Export Controls

Gabrielle Kohlmeier and Miles A. Pomper

 

Pakistan’s Senate Sept. 18 approved export control legislation intended to strengthen current measures to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The bill is expected to be signed into law by Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf shortly.

Movement on the export control bill comes as the United States eased controls on dual-use space- and nuclear-related exports to Pakistan’s nuclear rival, India.

The bill is an effort by Pakistan to assuage concerns after Abdul Qadeer Khan revealed in February that he had passed nuclear technology to Iran and Libya, among others. (See ACT, March 2004.) Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, was pardoned by Musharraf. The legislation as passed will not apply retroactively, even though Pakistani officials had claimed that the bill could affect that pardon. (See ACT, September 2004.)

Under the Pakistani legislation, those convicted of proliferating materials relating to nuclear and biological weapons technology and missile delivery systems will face up to 14 years in prison and up to $85,000 in fines. Federal agencies will be empowered to hold any material delineated by the bill meant for export and will also have the power to inspect shipments and confiscate records of people involved in the export. The bill also stipulates that Islamabad may investigate government officials for any alleged violations and arrest perpetrators.

In passing the bill, Pakistan’s lower house, the National Assembly, rejected amendments put forth by members of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), the main opposition party. Some members of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz voiced concerns that the bill could limit Pakistan’s nuclear program, but MMA objections were more concerned about procedural changes undertaken to get the legislation approved.

With Musharraf’s supporters in control of the Senate, the bill also passed that house, but not without further complaints from opponents. Members of opposition parties accused the government of rushing the bill through both houses so that it would be passed into law in time for Musharraf’s meetings with President George W. Bush on the sidelines of the meeting of the UN General Assembly. MMA representative Ghafoor Ahmed claimed that, even with the passage of this legislation, the United States will not be satisfied with Pakistan’s nuclear policies.

Members of the government, however, maintained steadfast support for the bill. Pakistan’s minister for foreign affairs, Khusro Bakhtiar, emphasized that the legislation represents an important move to strengthen regulations and controls on exports, re-exports, transshipments, and transit of items of proliferation concern. “This law provides a framework to deal with sensitive technologies and proliferation,” he said.

With the passage of this bill, Pakistan asserted it is in compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and is acting as a responsible nuclear power. Resolution 1540, passed earlier this year, directs all states to implement domestic legislation that stiffens controls over sensitive materials and technologies in an effort to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. (See ACT, May 2004.)

The United States still has not, however, been allowed access to Khan. In an interview with The New York Times on Sept. 20, Musharraf contended that the United States has never asked for access to Khan but that, if they did, they would be rebuffed. “We wouldn’t let them [have access to Khan],” Musharraf asserted. “That would show a lack of trust in our agencies.” In his meeting with Musharraf two days later, Bush made no effort to persuade Musharraf on that issue.

U.S., India Ease Licensing Rules

Meanwhile, the United States and India announced an easing of dual-use exports to India’s nuclear and space facilities, the first concrete step in implementing a new “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” initiative between New Delhi and Washington launched in January. The change, the Department of Commerce estimated, could cut by as much as one-fourth the number of licenses U.S. firms need to obtain for exporting dual-use goods to India.

A Sept. 20 Commerce Department press release said that the move came as part of a package of measures, including “implementation of measures to address proliferation concerns.” No details of more nonproliferation measures were released.

Under the new rules, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), India’s civilian space program, will be removed from the Commerce Department entity list. That step will allow many items with both civilian and military uses to be exported from the United States to India without a license. The United States will also eliminate the need for many of ISRO’s subsidiaries to obtain licenses for importing “low-level” U.S. dual-use goods.

The announcement also expanded the scope of civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. U.S. officials will now be told to presume that certain Indian facilities should be eligible to import dual-use U.S. nuclear-related equipment not restricted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG is an informal group of 44 states that seek to control nuclear exports.

The rule would limit these exports to facilities that are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. India has safeguarded nuclear facilities in Rajasthan and Tarapur, each boasting two reactors. IAEA safeguards are intended to prevent civilian nuclear material from being used for military purposes.

Moreover, exports would only be permitted to the part of a nuclear power plant used for power generation, such as turbines, controllers, or power distribution, not to the nuclear reactor itself.

The changes in South Asia come as India and Pakistan have continued a series of nuclear confidence-building talks. Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri met with his Indian counterpart, Natwar Singh, Sept. 5-6 for the highest-level official talks to date. The foreign ministers agreed on 13 proposals, including further meetings between experts of each country to draft an agreement providing for advance notification of missile tests. (See ACT, September 2004.)

 

 

U.S. Lifts Remaining Economic Sanctions Against Libya

Paul Kerr

President George W. Bush lifted most remaining U.S. sanctions on Libya Sept. 20, two days before Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter told Congress that verification of Libya’s disarmament tasks is “essentially complete.”

White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan said Sept. 20 that Bush “[t]erminated the national emergency declared in 1986 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and revoked related Executive Orders.” This action “rescinds the remaining economic sanctions under IEEPA and ends the need for Treasury Department licenses for trade with Libya,” McClellan added.

The United States also will permit direct air flights between the two countries as well as unfreeze Libyan assets in the United States. President Ronald Reagan imposed sanctions against Libya under the IEEPA in January 1986 after its involvement in terrorist attacks in Europe the previous month.

Bush also waived prohibitions on extending certain U.S. export assistance programs to Libya as well as on the ability of U.S. taxpayers to claim credits for taxes paid to Libya.

Libya is still subject to some sanctions because it remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. These sanctions include prohibitions on arms exports and Department of Defense contracts. The United States also is required to oppose loans from international financial institutions to such countries and impose export controls on dual-use items.

The decision to lift sanctions is Washington’s latest effort to improve relations with Tripoli as the latter has continued to make progress in implementing its disarmament commitments. Tripoli pledged in December 2003 to give up its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, as well as its longer-range missiles.

Washington formally resumed diplomatic ties with Tripoli in June and has established a liaison office there. This past April, the Bush administration terminated the application of the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, as well as modified sanctions imposed under the IEEPA. (See ACT, May 2004.)

McClellan stated that “concerns over weapons of mass destruction no longer pose a barrier to the normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations.” The United States still has concerns regarding Libya’s ties to terrorism and its human rights record.

DeSutter testified that the United States, working with the United Kingdom, has completed verifying “with reasonable certainty that Libya has eliminated, or has set in place the elimination of,” its weapons programs. The verification process included interviews with relevant Libyan personnel, along with visits to possible weapons-related facilities, she explained.

Some disarmament tasks remain, DeSutter said, adding that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Libya have established a Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee to “facilitate Libya’s further implementation of its commitments.” The committee will also handle “any additional [disarmament] issues that arise,” she stated.

Libya has already destroyed its chemical weapons-capable munitions but must still destroy its stockpiles of chemical agents. DeSutter added that Libya also is seeking approval from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to convert its former chemical weapons facility at Rabta into a pharmaceuticals plant.

In addition, Libya has agreed to destroy its medium-range Scud B missiles. Although Washington and London had previously agreed “in principle” to allow Libya to keep modified versions of the missiles, an administration official said Sept. 23 that the plan is now off the table. Libya has five years to destroy the missiles and find an appropriate substitute to meet its legitimate defense needs. The United States has already removed Libya’s longer-range Scud C missiles. (See ACT, May 2004.)

The United States also has already removed most components of Libya’s nuclear weapons program, but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is continuing to investigate the program’s origins. After Libya’s December 2003 decision, the agency discovered that the government had secretly been pursuing nuclear weapons. (See ACT, July/August 2004.)

In an Aug. 30 report to the agency’s Board of Governors, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei stated that information Tripoli has given to the agency about its past nuclear activities “appear[s] to be consistent with the information available to and verified by” the IAEA.

According to ElBaradei’s report, the IAEA continues to investigate several outstanding issues regarding the program, particularly nuclear material and other assistance provided to Libya by a clandestine procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan. The report states that cooperation from other countries is “essential” for determining the role of the network in supplying Libya.

Entities in countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates were part of the network. Legal investigations also are underway in countries such as South Africa and Germany. An IAEA official told Arms Control Today in June that the agency has “uncorroborated information” that North Korea supplied Libya with nuclear material.

 

President George W. Bush lifted most remaining U.S. sanctions on Libya Sept. 20, two days before Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter told Congress that verification of Libya’s disarmament tasks is “essentially complete.” (Continue)

Does China Belong in the Missile Technology Control Regime?

Victor Zaborsky

The prospect that China might soon join a U.S.-initiated regime aimed at controlling ballistic missiles might seem laughable. After all, the United States has imposed sanctions on China for years for hawking missiles and missile technologies to dozens of countries scattered around the globe. Yet, this month a gathering of U.S. and other diplomats in Seoul could signal support for China’s bid to join the two-decades-old Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Although the effort is likely to spur opposition from defense hawks worried about the growth of China’s military power and those who oppose any cooperation with China because of trade or human rights disputes, backing China’s entry into the MTCR is the right call. China has recently improved its export controls and has adjusted other policies so as to play a more cooperative and active role in nonproliferation efforts. Allowing Beijing to join the regime will support these positive trends toward transparency and prevent backsliding, particularly as MTCR membership could grant the right to participate in cooperative projects with fellow members of interest to the Chinese government and key industries. Leaving China out of the MTCR, on the other hand, is only likely to encourage Beijing to continue selling missile technology to countries of concern.

China’s Spotty Record
Negotiations to create an MTCR began in 1983 and reached fruition in 1987. The initial membership consisted of seven economically developed, technically advanced, and largely Western states—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These founding countries viewed themselves as having a mission to control transfers of missile technology to the rest of the world, primarily to the Communist bloc and countries with nuclear weapons programs. Communist China with its ICBM force was viewed by the Western nations as a particular threat and as one of the “target” countries with which the MTCR members should strictly control their missile exports. The MTCR restricts exports of missiles and related technology capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers or delivering any type of weapon of mass destruction.

Lessons From China's Successful
NSG Campaign

On May 28, China was accepted as a full member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Although China’s accession to the NSG received more solid support in the U.S. government than the issue of MTCR membership, partly because China is already an acknowledged nuclear power, it was still accompanied by a great deal of controversy and criticism. The debates that took place over the pros and cons of China’s NSG accession may shed light on the heated disputes likely to accompany China’s bid for MTCR membership.

First, does China’s nonproliferation record warrant membership in good standing in a regime whose mission is to fight proliferation?
Many in the Bush administration argued that China’s nuclear nonproliferation record and national nuclear export control infrastructure have improved enough to grant it membership. In public testimony, administration officials supported China’s membership in the NSG. In private, however, some administration officials, including Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton; Department of Defense officials; and some influential think tanks opposed admitting China to the NSG.[1] Beijing’s detractors pointed to China’s alleged sales of sensitive nuclear technology and equipment to countries of proliferation concern, which had previously triggered U.S. sanctions. They stated that it would be risky to assume that China will not sell nuclear materials, equipment, and expertise to its allies, given its lack of restraint in the past.

China has also drawn criticism by insisting on fulfilling a pledge to build two nuclear reactors in Pakistan, even though these sales would not have been permitted under NSG guidelines. Beijing argues that it announced its plans to do so three weeks prior to becoming an NSG member. This narrow approach angered many NSG members.[2] “One of the basic concepts of the Nuclear Suppliers Group is that you don’t supply reactors to countries [such as Pakistan] that are not members of the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. What are the Chinese really giving up if they can supply a proliferant country like Pakistan with nuclear technology? What’s the point of having them in the group?” argues Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Arms Control.[3]

Given that China has often followed a similar legalistic approach to its past missile proliferation commitments, critics may well ask about the wisdom of having China in the MTCR. To be sure, China’s formal missile export control infrastructure is becoming more and more compatible with that of most MTCR members. Nevertheless, the willingness of the government to fully implement and enforce the letter and spirit of the new system—and, consequently, China’s eligibility for MTCR membership—remains
questionable.

Second, what would be the effect of China’s joining the NSG?
More precisely, in the words of Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, “how [might] China’s accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group…hinder the work of that body?” Hyde referred to difficulties that Russia has posed in the NSG on certain issues, namely its involvement in exports with questionable legitimacy. Responding to this concern, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf argued that “[w]e do not foresee China posing the same difficulties regarding [its] nuclear supply relationship, as this is not an issue for China.”[4] Yet, this may be an issue with respect to China’s MTCR obligations. For many years, China has been defending its right to export missiles and missile technology at its own discretion. It has developed a network of actual and prospective customers, including Pakistan and North Korea. If it came to sacrificing lucrative export deals because of MTCR membership obligations, it is reasonable to expect that China would, as with the NSG, use the narrowest possible interpretation of the regime’s norms and would search out loopholes to make those deals possible.[5]

Third, does China have sufficient economic incentives to join the NSG?
Absolutely. In 1998, the U.S.-Chinese agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation entered into force. According to the congressional resolution approving the agreement, U.S. nuclear exports to China could not begin until the president made certain nonproliferation-related certifications.

As of today, the peaceful U.S.-Chinese nuclear cooperation contemplated in the agreement has only moved ahead slowly: U.S. officials announced in early September that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued export licenses for certain components for Chinese nuclear power reactors. All told, 20 license exports for U.S. nuclear goods to China have been granted between August 1998 and June of this year.[6] Senior Department of State officials make it clear that the administration will continue to tie the implementation of the agreement on nuclear cooperation to China’s record on nuclear exports and its NSG membership. Moreover, referring to China’s plans to expand its nuclear energy sector significantly (Beijing aims to spend up to $35 billion in the next decade to build 30 nuclear power reactors), they argue that, “if the Chinese buy from the United States, we would have substantial influence on how China manages its civilian nuclear program in such areas as nuclear safety.”[7] Supporters put forward a similar argument about China’s bid for the MTCR, that the United States would know more about and exert more influence on the Chinese missile and space program if China were admitted into the MTCR and the International Space Station partnership. At the moment, it is not clear how strongly joint U.S.-Chinese nuclear and space projects will constrain China from nuclear and missile sales of proliferation concern, but it is obvious that the desire to secure lucrative commercial deals is a powerful motive behind China’s newly favorable attitude toward the MTCR and the NSG.

ENDNOTES

1. Carol Giacomo, “U.S. Backs China Joining Nuclear Group,” Reuters, May 12, 2004, available at http://in.news.yahoo.com/040511/137/2d173.html.

2. Daniel Horner, “Joining NSG Won’t Require China to Scrap Pakistan Reactor, U.S. Says,” Nuclear Fuel, March 1, 2004.

3. Giacomo, “U.S. Backs China Joining Nuclear Group.”

4. John S. Wolf, statement before the House International Relations Committee, May 18, 2004, available at http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/
108/wol051804.htm (hereinafter Wolf statement).

5. See Manpreet Sethi, “Despite NSG, China’s Aims Remain Unclear,” Defense News, July 27, 2004.

6. Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, “Nuclear Technology Exports to China,” September 2, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/35937.htm.

7. Wolf statement.

In the early 1990s, the proliferation concerns with respect to China became twofold. In addition to concerns about missile proliferation to China, there emerged a challenge of missile proliferation from China. Although it remained a targeted recipient of MTCR-controlled technologies, China became a supplier of MTCR-restricted missiles, components, and technologies to countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.[1] In other words, it had become an exporter not bound by any missile nonproliferation export control obligations. During this period, the United States assumed the role of the principal “watchdog” over China’s alleged missile sales. U.S. officials sought to use sanctions as levers to encourage China to follow MTCR guidelines, even though Beijing was not a regime member. All told, Washington has imposed sanctions on China 10 times, including three times last year.

In response, Beijing has repeatedly assured Washington that it would end the sales and twice endorsed joint statements avowing that they would respect MTCR guidelines. Nevertheless, Beijing has been accused of adhering to an overly narrow interpretation of the MTCR restrictions and neglecting the nonproliferation spirit and standards set by the regime’s “founding fathers” (see sidebar). The limits of this approach have clearly frustrated U.S. policymakers. As Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter stated in July 2003, “At the highest levels, the Chinese government has claimed that it opposes missile proliferation…. Unfortunately, the reality has been quite different.”[2]

Whether China’s membership in the regime would lessen or exacerbate this frustration is not obvious and depends on the answer to three questions. First, will the MTCR membership criteria allow the regime to admit a country like China? Second, if the MTCR deems Chinese membership acceptable in principle, what will be the potential bargaining chips in negotiations between China and the regime and, most importantly, between China and the United States? Third, in the long run, will China be more of an asset or a burden to the MTCR once it is admitted?

Will China Satisfy Membership Criteria?
At its inception, the regime’s informal membership criteria emphasized like-mindedness, effective export control laws and enforcement, and a strong nonproliferation track record and counted only exporters as members. As the MTCR has expanded to 34 members, however, its standards have eased, allowing countries to be admitted which are not completely like-minded, do not completely share the same nonproliferation ideals as the original members, and are not even exporters. These have included EU and NATO members such as Norway and Iceland, but also former Soviet republics such as Russia and Ukraine.

Rather than the more standardized criteria of the past, admission of new members to the MTCR today has become a bargaining process involving political and commercial tradeoffs and side payments. So, whether or not China joins the organization is going to depend largely on what demands the current members and Beijing bring to any accession negotiation and the prospects that they can be realized or surrendered.

China’s Goals
What benefits might China gain by joining the MTCR? For China, the most obvious advantages of joining the MTCR would be access to new technology and participation in new space-related projects that are not available to regime outsiders. Beijing is also looking for trade and concessions not directly related to space and missile activities.

Resuming Satellite Launches
Resuming the launching of U.S. satellites aboard Chinese rockets would pay immediate dividends for China. In January 1995, the United States and China signed the Agreement Regarding International Trade in Commercial Launch Services that gave Beijing the right to launch 15 U.S.-built satellites into geosynchronous orbit through 2001. The downturn in U.S.-China relations in the last years of the Clinton administration, however, rendered the agreement moot and darkened its prospects for extension.

In November 2000, the Department of State pledged to discuss an extension and provide China with a new satellite launch quota after China issued its most stringent and specific policy statement on missile nonproliferation to date, but the imposition of missile proliferation sanctions in September 2001 nullified that pledge. Presently, the negotiations are in limbo, although there is reason to believe that both sides will use the issue as a major bargaining chip while negotiating the terms of China’s accession to the MTCR.

Participation in the International Space Station
Another bargaining chip could be China’s participation in building the International Space Station (ISS). In October 2003, China launched its Shenzhou-5 spacecraft into orbit with taikonaut Yang Liwei on board, becoming the third nation to launch a man into space. The Chinese space program is ambitious, calling for the construction of a space station and a space shuttle, as well as lunar exploration, by 2010. China’s budding space effort would surely benefit by gaining a role in these prestigious and lucrative space endeavors and by learning from countries such as the United States and Russia.

The ISS, a 16-nation, $95 billion endeavor, could surely use the potential of China’s space program. It could also use China’s financial support. Yet, the notion of Chinese participation in the ISS has met with a tepid response from U.S. officials. For the record, they say that Chinese “technology is not mature” compared to the technology of the leading ISS partners.

The real reason behind Washington’s uncooperative reaction may be a suspicion that Beijing’s space effort is less a civilian program than a military endeavor that could eventually threaten the United States. Some experts contend that it is possible to develop military space technology through a manned program and that China’s piloted Shenzhou spacecraft could serve as a reconnaissance platform.[3] In such a case, bringing China into an ISS partnership that involves sharing information and technology would risk proliferating military technology to China. Moreover, given China’s proliferation record, that could further equate to the proliferation of missile technology from China to countries of concern.

Yet, some outside experts contend that allowing China to become an active ISS participant would bring significant nonproliferation advantages, by increasing transparency about its programs and capabilities.[4] By engaging China in joint space projects, the United States would have a better appreciation of how the military and civilian arms of the integrated Chinese rocket-science program interact and how the decision-making mechanism works. It would also provide Washington with much-needed leverage to persuade Beijing to stay in compliance with MTCR export control norms. U.S. law allows the United States to impose certain sanctions against individual companies in MTCR member states if they violate regime provisions. Until now, the dozens of sanctions imposed on Chinese companies have had a rather limited effect because most of these firms do no business with U.S. partners anyway.[5] (See ACT, September 2003.) Engaging Chinese firms in U.S.-led space projects would put Beijing in a position where it has much to lose if slapped with sanctions for inappropriate missile sales.

Full Market Economy Status
A non-space-related bargain between China and the United States could center around granting China full market economy status, which would effectively lower tariffs on Chinese imports and allow Beijing to better defend itself against charges that it dumps its goods by selling them abroad at below-production prices.[6] This issue has become more pressing due to recent trade spats between China and the United States and as China comes under increasing U.S. criticism for allegedly engaging in trade practices that hurt U.S. industry.[7]

The prospect of granting China full market economy status and providing it with nuclear reactor technology was among the major themes of the talks between U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney and Chinese officials in Beijing in mid-April 2004. China is soon expected to solicit bids from foreign partners to build new nuclear reactors, and U.S. companies will compete against other bidders for lucrative contracts.

U.S. May Not Deliver Its Part of the Bargain
China may receive less than it expects from entry into the MTCR. As the previous experience of other space powers such as Brazil, Russia, and Ukraine illustrate, MTCR membership does not guarantee equal treatment by Washington in civilian space programs or technology-sharing.

As the MTCR has grown, the United States has demonstrated a tendency to categorize MTCR members as more trusted and less trusted. The less trusted partners get less privileged treatment from Washington when it comes to sharing of technology or help in developing civilian space programs. For instance, Brazil entered the MTCR in hopes of gaining access to space technology unavailable to outsiders to the regime. In the bargain, Brasilia hoped to modernize its failure-plagued program. U.S. policy, however, has been to press Brazil to curb its space-launch development efforts, not improve them.[8]

The sometimes bumpy implementation of the Sea Launch venture also exemplifies the lack of “nonproliferation trust” extended by the United States to its partners in space exploration projects. Sea Launch is a U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian-Norwegian endeavor to launch payloads from a floating platform stationed in the equatorial waters south of Hawaii. The Ukrainian company Yuzhmash supplies Zenith rockets, Russian company Energia provides upper-stage engines for these rockets, the Norwegian firm Kvaerner modified the 30,000-ton oil rig into a launch platform and built a command ship, and Boeing is the lead investment partner and serves as overall system integrator. In 1998 the State Department put the Sea Launch project on hold for a couple of months and fined Boeing $10 million for allegedly violating Cold War-era export control procedures in transferring sensitive technology to its partners in the project—and fellow MTCR members—Russia and Ukraine.

In the case of China, it is more than likely that cooperative space projects with the United States and possibly some other Western nations will experience similar difficulties arising from a lack of trust about Beijing’s nonproliferation declarations and MTCR commitments. Concerns about the possibility of space cooperation between the United States and China turning into proliferation of missile technology was set in the mid-1990s, when U.S. satellite manufacturers improved the reliability of China’s Long March space launchers. In the aftermath of three failed launches that destroyed satellites built by Hughes and Loral, the two companies transferred rocket design information to China without obtaining the legally required licenses.

Congress’s controversial Cox report, issued in May 1999, blamed the two U.S. satellite manufacturers for improving China’s ballistic missile capabilities because the technology they had transferred could be used for both commercial and military purposes. The Cox report argued that, “[t]o the extent any valuable information was transferred to the [People’s Republic of China’s (PRC)] space program, such information would likely find its way into the PRC’s ballistic missile program. The ballistic missile and space-launch programs have long been intertwined and subordinate to the same ministry and state-owned corporation in the PRC.”[9]

Many in the U.S. government and Congress still argue that transferring dual-use technology to China for joint space projects would contribute to China’s effort to refine its ballistic missile capabilities or that China would secretly re-export technology it obtained from joint space projects to third parties. A long-time tradition of viewing China as a cheater will not vanish overnight, even if China acceeds formally to the MTCR.

China’s Likely Behavior as an MTCR Member

Still, a decision about admitting China to the MTCR ultimately involves a judgment by the United States and current MTCR members about China’s likely behavior once it becomes a member.

One concern stems from China’s impact on efforts to reach consensus on key decisions within the MTCR. Some argue that having a powerful member likely to have a “special opinion” on key issues would be destructive for a consensus-based regime. When making a decision on whether to bring China into the MTCR, the regime members will attempt to ensure that the new participant will contribute to constructive decision-making within the institution. A number of concerns will have to be addressed: Will China share the common perception of the rules and norms in the regime, or will it opt for a narrow interpretation of compliance? Will China facilitate more stringent control measures within the regime, or will it obstruct the introduction of such measures? Will China actively share information with other regime members, or will it be reluctant to do so? Will other members trust China enough to share sensitive information? Beijing has definitely come a long way from condemning the MTCR to considering full-fledged membership in the regime, but it remains unclear whether Beijing has come far enough to become a really valuable addition.

Most importantly, however, Beijing will have to persuade the MTCR that its days of spreading missiles and missile technology around the globe are over. After all, what current members would hope to gain from China’s entry into the MTCR is an end to this behavior and its assistance in deterring others from following the same path. Notwithstanding China’s numerous nonproliferation pledges and export control improvements, many administration officials fear that China might cheat on its obligations if it becomes a full member of the regime, undermining the integrity of the MTCR. Some argue that the right way to persuade China to comply with MTCR norms would be to continue the carrot-and-stick policy Washington has applied toward Beijing since the early 1990s. Getting them to end this policy requires them to feel confident that China will act as a responsible global citizen as part of the MTCR.

Conclusion
Such a judgment should not be impossible. In fact, the international community has already made a similar judgment in permitting China to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (see sidebar). China is clearly trying to assume a prominent role in the international arena, and the most effective way to do so is through integration into current economic, political, and security institutions and initiatives. Today’s war against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation could serve as a vehicle driving China to a new level of trust and a new level of technological cooperation with the United States and other Western nations. For export control regimes such as the MTCR and NSG, China has been a target country for a long time. Its decision to apply for membership in these regimes—its apparent turn from being a part of the “problem” to being a part of the “solution”—marks a significant shift in China’s attitude toward nonproliferation policies and practices, toward the “discriminatory,” U.S.-led export control arrangements, and toward the United States itself.

As a part of its overall policy shift, China earlier this year voted for UN Security Council Resolution 1540, intended to strengthen nonproliferation measures. Under the six-party negotiations framework, Beijing is actively participating in the effort to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. On a national level, China has also made dramatic improvements to its nonproliferation export control infrastructure. As a follow-up to November 2000 and August 2002 statements imposing stringent missile nonproliferation measures, the Chinese government in December 2003 released a “White Paper on China’s Nonproliferation Policy,” which significantly upgraded the elements of China’s national export control mechanism.[10] (See ACT, January/February 2004.)

As far as the MTCR’s membership philosophy is concerned, embracing China seems to be a development in the right direction. One has to remember that the MTCR is the missile nonproliferation export control regime that strives mainly to combat the proliferation of WMD delivery systems, using controls on exports of WMD-relevant technology. Today, it seems that the political reasons for joining the MTCR appear to be much more important than those related to the ability to supply this technology. Although Romania, Malta, and Cyprus—other countries currently in line for MTCR membership—could be viewed as a valuable addition to the regime in terms of political support, they are nonexporting states and present rather limited, if any, proliferation risk. Instead, the major focus of MTCR activities should be to engage active exporters, such as China, within the control framework. It makes far more sense to bring China in and give it a chance to improve its image and practices than to keep it on the sidelines with no international constraints on its enormous missile export capabilities. ACT

ENDNOTES

1. “China Denies Missile Sales to Iran, S. Arabia,” Middle East Newsline, August 8, 2001.

2. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China’s Proliferation Practices and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” 108th Cong., 1st sess., July 24, 2003, p. 7.

3. Tariq Malik, “U.S. Snubbed China’s Offer for Space Cooperation: ‘Technology Not Mature,’” SPACE.com, April 28, 2004.

4. Jeff Foust, “China, Shenzhou, and the ISS,” Space Review, October 20, 2003.

5. See Jonathan Yang, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on China, North Korea,” Arms Control Today, September 2003, p. 35.

6. Market economy status is usually used for anti-dumping cases. If the United States grants China full market economy status, the domestic price of a certain good and relevant cost calculation provided by Chinese enterprises can be applicable in the anti-dumping cases. Otherwise, prices and cost calculation of the same goods in the United States will be applied in the anti-dumping cases, and Chinese enterprises would be in a disadvantageous position when involved in anti-dumping cases.

7. “China Urges U.S. to Ease Tech Export Restrictions, Grant Full Market Status,” Agence France-Presse, April 14, 2004.

8. Frank Braun, “Brazilian Congress Criticizes Bilateral Agreement with U.S.,” Space News, May 14, 2001, p. 28.

9. The Cox report is the informal name for a report issued by a committee headed by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.) that investigated the transfers. See House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, 105th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rep. 851.

10. “Romania to Join Missile Technology Control Organization,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, February 14, 2003; “Weapons Control: Poland Presiding,” Warsaw Voice, February 23, 2003.

An End to the Game of Carrot and Stick?

Introducing and lifting sanctions and wringing nonproliferation assurances from China has been part of a “game” that the United States and China have played since the early 1990s, as Washington has tried to get Beijing to adhere to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines without granting China membership in the organization. Imposing sanctions has been the main “stick” that Washington has used, and lifting sanctions the main “carrot.” Reluctant to trust Beijing, Washington has made small steps, lifting only the most recent sanctions and leaving previous ones intact.

In 1991 the United States for the first time imposed sanctions on China in accordance with the newly passed Missile Technology Control Act. The sanctions were imposed for alleged exports of M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan and alleged planned exports of M-9 missile technology to Syria. After verbal and written assurance from the Chinese government to abide by the MTCR restrictions, sanctions were lifted in 1992.

But not for long. In December 1992, reports surfaced that China had transferred 34 complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan and also allegedly built a turnkey missile plant for Pakistan at Tarwanah, a suburb of Rawalpindi, in violation of its 1991 pledge. As a result, in May 1993, the Clinton administration reimposed MTCR-related sanctions against China.

The Chinese government responded by calling the sanctions groundless and threatening to scrap its promise to abide by the MTCR guidelines. During post-sanctions negotiations with the United States, China argued that the deal did not violate the MTCR because the M-11 could deliver a 500-kilogram payload only over an advertised range of 280 kilometers, within the MTCR’s parameters, which only permit transfers of missiles that can fly less than 300 kilometers with that payload size. U.S. experts, however, insisted that the missiles in question could easily fly another 20 kilometers as a result of small shifts or cuts in the payload.

The impasse was broken in October 1994 when China and the United States issued a joint statement that underscored the intention of both countries “to work toward a Chinese commitment to control missile-related exports according to the current MTCR guidelines, as well as to promote eventual Chinese membership in the MTCR.” In particular, Beijing pledged that it would abide by Category I of the MTCR and ban exports of all ground-to-ground missiles exceeding the primary parameters of the MTCR. More significantly, China also agreed to the concept of “inherent capability,” which binds it from exporting any missile that is inherently capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload a distance of more than 300 kilometers. Hence, by agreeing to the inherent capability clause, China agreed to prohibit future exports of the M-11 missile and other longer-range missile systems.[1]

At the time, the Clinton administration “encouraged China to undertake negotiations on a binding missile agreement whereby Beijing would adhere to current MTCR Guidelines and Annex.”[2] Beijing, however, instead waited nine years and endured the imposition and lifting of many U.S. sanctions. Finally, in September 2003, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing wrote MTCR Chairman Mariusz Handzlik that Beijing was “ready to positively consider membership in the MTCR.” The first round of negotiations between Chinese officials and an MTCR delegation headed by the new chairman, Carlos Sersale di Cerisano, was held in Paris in mid-February 2004. The discussions focused on comparing Chinese law, particularly the missile-related control list, with the MTCR Annex. A second round of technical exchanges on the expert level was held in Beijing in June and centered around missile export control enforcement issues. Eventually, Beijing moved even further, and in July 2004, at the Fifth Sino-U.S. Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui clearly stated that “we are willing to sign up” to the MTCR.[3]

The U.S.-Chinese nonproliferation negotiations, however, have been clouded recently by sanctions that the State Department imposed Sept. 20 on the Chinese company Xinshidai, which markets equipment for many of the country’s top state-owned firms. Under the two-year sanctions, the United States will ban imports of Xinshidai goods, contracts with the firm, and U.S. assistance. The sanctions came on the heels of press reports that Beijing had supplied missile technologies to Iran. In leaks to the press, some members of the U.S. intelligence community alleged that the transfers took place earlier this year as Beijing was negotiating its prospective membership in the MTCR.[4]

China has not yet officially applied for the MTCR membership, but most experts believe that it is just a matter of time before it does. Either President George W. Bush or Sen. John Kerry (Mass.), the Democratic presidential nominee, will soon have to decide what serves the U.S. interests the best: having China in the MTCR or out.

ENDNOTES

1. Philip Saunders, Jing-dong Yuan, and Gaurav Kampani, “How and Why China Proliferates Ballistic Missiles to Pakistan,” Rediff.com, August 22, 2000.

2. Nuclear Threat Initiative Database, available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/mtcrusch.htm.

3. Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui, speech at the Fifth Sino-U.S. Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, July 20, 2004.

4. Bill Gertz, “China Breaks Vow on Halting Arms Transfers,” The Washington Times, August 23, 2004.

 

 


Victor Zaborsky is a senior research associate at the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia in Athens. He specializes in missile nonproliferation and export control issues.

 

 

 

The prospect that China might soon join a U.S.-initiated regime aimed at controlling ballistic missiles might seem laughable. After all, the United States has imposed sanctions on China for years for hawking missiles and missile technologies to dozens of countries scattered around the globe. Yet, this month a gathering of U.S. and other diplomats in Seoul could signal support for China’s bid to join the two-decades-old Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). (Continue)

North Korea Skips Six-Party Talks

Paul Kerr

Despite a June agreement, North Korea refused to take part in another round of six-party talks before the end of September, blaming both U.S. policy and South Korea’s recently revealed nuclear experiments. Still, all parties continue to express interest in future talks.

All six parties—which also include China, Japan, and Russia—agreed during the last round of talks in June to hold another high-level session, as well as another working-group meeting of lower-level officials, before the end of September. North Korea, however, had already signaled in August that the talks would be delayed, saying President George W. Bush’s criticism of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il made it “impossible” to attend further talks. (See ACT, September 2004.)

The talks are designed to resolve the most recent North Korean nuclear crisis, which began in October 2002 when U.S. officials claimed that their North Korean counterparts had acknowledged having a clandestine uranium-enrichment program. Since then, North Korea has accelerated its nuclear activities.

Seeking to shift the blame for the delay, North Korea argued in a Sept. 27 government newspaper article that the United States has “destroyed the fundamental basis” of the talks. The article asserted that Washington is refusing to “reward” Pyongyang for freezing its nuclear facilities—a repeated North Korean demand. It also accused the United States of continuing its “hostile policy” of threatening North Korea with military force. This criticism did not directly address the proposal that the United States introduced at the June round of talks. (See ACT, July/August 2004.)

North Korea also criticized the United States for applying “double standards” to North Korea’s and South Korea’s nuclear activities, which it describes as similar. In August, South Korea revealed that government scientists had conducted small-scale uranium-enrichment experiments and separated a small quantity of plutonium (see page 33). Both uranium enrichment and plutonium separation can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. There is no evidence, however, that South Korea’s recently disclosed experiments are part of a nuclear weapons program.

By contrast, North Korea has developed the infrastructure to manufacture nuclear weapons and said it possesses such weapons. On Sept. 27, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon made the most definitive public statement about the matter to date, telling reporters in New York that Pyongyang has reprocessed approximately 8,000 spent fuel rods produced in a small nuclear reactor and “weaponized” the separated plutonium, the Associated Press reported.

North Korea produced the spent fuel rods before its reactor program was frozen by the 1994 Agreed Framework, a bilateral agreement with the United States. In December 2002, North Korea ejected UN inspectors who were monitoring the spent fuel as part of the agreement. (See ACT, January/February 2003.)

In a Sept. 27 statement from the state-run Korean Central News Agency, North Korea denied widespread speculation that it is delaying the talks until after the November U.S. presidential election.

It does not appear that the six-party talks process will break down altogether. The other five parties have said they will work to make sure another round takes place. For its part, North Korea demanded Sept. 27 that Washington “take practical action to revive the…fundamental basis” for the talks, as well as admit its “involvement” in the South Korean nuclear experiments. The article did not elaborate.

 

 

Russia, U.S. Bolster Regional Nuclear Security Following Terrorist Attacks

Claire Applegarth

A series of recent terrorist attacks in Beslan and Moscow attributed to Chechen rebels have spurred the United States and the Kremlin to step up activities to guard Russia’s high-risk nuclear materials.

The Russian Atomic Energy Agency announced Sept. 1 that Russia had moved additional troops to guard dozens of its nuclear facilities in the wake of the attacks, which included the seizure of a school in North Ossetia, a suicide bombing in Moscow, and the downing of two Russian airplanes. The announcement, reported by Reuters, did not specify the number of troops dispatched or the names of nuclear facilities slated to receive the additional security.

The United States did not formally respond to the report of the Russian troop movement, but Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton alluded to the liability posed by loosely guarded Russian reactors in a Geneva press conference Sept. 10. He said that “the recent tragedy in Beslan is a good example of the risk that they [the Russians] fully understand: that if terrorist groups are capable of carrying out that kind of operation, how much more horrible it would be if such a terrorist group got a nuclear weapon.”

In its most recent threat reduction effort in the region, the U.S. Department of Energy successfully returned 11 kilograms of enriched uranium fuel to a secure Russian facility from Uzbekistan on Sept. 9. Approximately three kilograms of the uranium consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which could be used to make a nuclear bomb. The U.S.-funded retrieval project was completed under the Energy Department’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).

The mission is the fifth such Russian fuel repatriation project undertaken since 2002, following removals in Bulgaria, Libya, Romania, and Serbia. In total, however, 20 sites in 17 countries have been identified as possessing Russian or Soviet-origin fuel that needs to be retrieved. The Energy Department aims to repatriate all fresh HEU fuel of Russian origin to Russia by the end of 2005 and all spent fuel by 2010.

The threat of nuclear theft became a central point of discussion during the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Partners’ Conference in Vienna, Austria, Sept. 18-19. Russian Atomic Energy Agency head Alexander Rumyantsev urged the nearly 600 delegates attending from more than 90 countries to “consistently and constantly improve the complex of measures aimed at ensuring nuclear and physical security.” Rumyantsev reported to Agence France-Presse Sept. 15 that Russian officials have managed to recover small quantities of weapons-grade uranium stolen over the past 25 years but that greater cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and foreign governments is needed to prevent future theft.

Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham told attendees at the conference that countries with nuclear materials “must…be the responsible custodians of these materials and the facilities in which they are located.” He also stated that the United States has helped eliminate 216 metric tons of HEU, has secured 43 percent of unspecified weapons-usable material in Russia, and anticipates securing all Russian navy nuclear-warhead sites by the end of 2006.

Iran: Getting Back on Track

Daryl G. Kimball

Since the world’s nuclear watchdog agency confirmed reports of Iran’s extensive and secret nuclear activities more than two years ago, international concerns that Tehran might soon acquire bomb-making capabilities have grown.

The crisis will surely worsen in the next few months unless Iran exercises greater restraint and stops short of completing a large-scale nuclear material production capability. At the same time, the United States must recalibrate its strategy to complement, not complicate, the European diplomatic initiative to reduce Iran’s incentives to acquire the bomb and keep it within the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Last year, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom persuaded Iran to agree to voluntarily and temporarily halt its uranium-enrichment program and accept tougher International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. The deal created valuable diplomatic breathing space and the opportunity for the IAEA to gather detailed information about the full extent and nature of Iran’s program.

Iran has grudgingly allowed the IAEA extensive access and information about its covert projects. But several questions still remain, including whether Iran has already enriched uranium. And, last spring, Iran began to undermine confidence by delaying the entry of inspectors and by continuing to manufacture parts for centrifuges for the enrichment process.

The leaders of energy-rich Iran insist these activities are for peaceful purposes and are allowed under the NPT. Their assurances are hardly reassuring. Uranium-enrichment technology cannot only be used to produce low-enriched fuel for power reactors, but also weapons-grade nuclear material.

A close reading of the NPT makes it clear that peaceful nuclear endeavors are a benefit that accrues only to those nonweapons NPT states that credibly fulfill their obligation not to divert nuclear material and technology for weapons.

Accordingly, the Europeans have privately held out the possibility of greater economic ties and a guaranteed nuclear power fuel supply if Tehran’s leaders agree to forgo the capacity to produce nuclear weapons-usable materials. Though this would open the way for much needed foreign investment and allow Iran to produce nuclear energy, the idea has not yet been embraced by Tehran.

Meanwhile, U.S. diplomats have maintained a harder line, charging that Iran has already violated its safeguards agreements. U.S. and Israeli officials have unsuccessfully called on IAEA states to refer the case to the UN Security Council, where they could seek international sanctions against Iran.

This, in turn, has inflamed Iranian nationalism and hardened the government’s stance. Shortly after IAEA member states urged it not to do so, Iran announced last month that it will begin processing about 40 tons of uranium into feed material, which, if enriched to weapons grade, would be enough for several bombs.

Some U.S. officials argue that diplomacy at the Vienna-based IAEA has run its course. However, referral of the Iranian case to the Security Council may push Iran to eject IAEA inspectors or withdraw from the NPT. Getting the council’s approval for sanctions is far from guaranteed and would do little to halt Iran’s advanced nuclear program. More drastic action is also unwise. The effect of a pre-emptive strike by Israel or the United States on Iran’s capabilities would be temporary and would likely trigger a wider war in the region involving exchanges of ballistic missiles.

Although difficult, diplomacy remains the best option. First, Iran should be careful not to escalate the crisis. The European powers must hold Iran to its earlier pledge to halt all uranium-enrichment work and provide the access and cooperation necessary to finally resolve outstanding questions about its past activities. Otherwise, the credibility of Iran’s claim that it has no weapons ambitions will diminish further.

For its part, the United States should tone down its tough talk and work with the Europeans to test Iran’s “peaceful” intentions by endorsing the proposal to provide Iran with a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel. If Iran is only interested in developing a nuclear power capacity and its perceptions of vulnerability are not reinforced, it should eventually agree to such a deal.

To prevent other states from acquiring the means to produce nuclear bomb material, the international community must be prepared to guarantee nuclear fuel services to states that forgo indigenous uranium-enrichment and plutonium production capabilities. In addition, all states should be pressed to allow more intrusive inspections under the terms of the IAEA Additional Protocol.

Even if Iran complies with its NPT commitments now, it may still choose to follow the nuclear weapons route in the future. Given the stakes, the United States must counter arguments from Iranian hard-liners who wrongly believe that nuclear weapons will enhance Iran’s prestige and counter Israel’s nuclear arsenal. To help do so, Washington should reiterate its long-standing commitment to achieve a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Time is running out. The situation demands a new and more sophisticated U.S. strategy that increases Iran’s incentives to halt its dual-purpose nuclear projects and reinforces the view within Iran that it does not need and will not benefit from nuclear weapons.

ElBaradei Cites Progress by Iran, but Investigation Continues

Paul Kerr

In a Sept. 1 report to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said he was closing the agency’s probe into two aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. But contrary to Iran’s wishes, he said that the more than two-year-old investigation would continue.

In his report, ElBaradei pointed to “steady progress” that has allowed him to conclude special investigations into Iran‘s laser-based uranium-enrichment program and its past uranium-conversion experiments, adding that “further follow-up [on these issues] will be carried out as a routine safeguards implementation matter.”

The agency is still investigating several other issues relating to Iran’s nuclear program, but the report contains little new information about them.

Most importantly, IAEA investigators continue to probe the source of uranium particles enriched by centrifuges and found at several locations in Iran. Uncertainty about the particles’ origin has caused concern because it suggests that Iran may have conducted nuclear experiments that it has not yet admitted or may be concealing nuclear material it either produced or imported. Such actions would also violate Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. (See ACT, July/August 2004.)

Uranium enrichment increases the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope to produce low-enriched uranium for civilian nuclear reactor fuel or, if enriched enough, highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. Uranium conversion can produce uranium compounds from uranium oxide. These include uranium hexafluoride, which can be used as the feedstock for gas centrifuges. Such centrifuges enrich uranium hexafluoride gas by spinning it at very high speeds. (See ACT, September 2004.)

Iran has admitted to testing centrifuges with nuclear material, but maintains that it only produced uranium enriched to a very low level and asserts that other types of enriched uranium particles originated from centrifuge components obtained from a procurement network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Iran continues to say that it does not know the origin of the components.

According to the report, several unanswered questions about the particles remain. For example, the IAEA still does not know why Iran’s domestically manufactured centrifuge components have been contaminated with a different type of enriched uranium than their imported equivalents or why uranium enriched to 36 percent U-235 has been found at some facilities where imported components were located, but not at other sites.

Previous reports from ElBaradei have said that some HEU particles found in Iran likely did not come from imported components. The September report, however, states that it “appears plausible” that uranium particles found at the Kalaye Electric Company and Iran’s pilot uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz “may not have resulted from enrichment of uranium by Iran.” Tehran tested centrifuges at Kalaye Electric and has a pilot centrifuge facility at Natanz, where Iran also is constructing a much larger commercial centrifuge facility.

A diplomatic source in Vienna close to the IAEA told Arms Control Today in August that imported components can probably account for all of the uranium particles in question, but cautioned that this will not be confirmed for some time. The source confirmed press reports that particles enriched to 54 percent came from centrifuges imported from Pakistan and that particles enriched to 36 percent apparently came from equipment originating in the former Soviet Union. That equipment reached Iran via China and Pakistan, the source said.

The IAEA also is still attempting to determine the source of uranium hexafluoride found in a storage facility located at the Tehran Research Reactor. According to the report, agency experts continue to regard “as not technically plausible” Iran’s claim that the material leaked from bottles stored at the site.

The agency also continues to examine the scope of Iran’s advanced P-2 centrifuge activities, which Iran initially omitted from an ostensibly complete October 2003 declaration of its nuclear activities. Tehran later claimed that the program was solely for research and development and that it had not obtained any components from foreign sources.

However, Iran later admitted to acquiring magnets for the centrifuges from foreign suppliers. Furthermore, Tehran has indicated interest in acquiring thousands of additional magnets, suggesting that it intends to mass-produce centrifuges. Iran has not yet provided the IAEA with enough information regarding these procurement efforts, the report says.

Additionally, the IAEA continues to doubt Iran’s claim that it obtained the designs for the P-2 centrifuge in 1995 from a foreign source, but did not test any components until 2002. In discussions with the IAEA, Iran attributed this lack of activity to its focus on the P-2’s predecessor, as well as to “organizational” changes in the relevant government agency. The report, however, says this explanation does not “provide sufficient assurance that there were no related activities carried out” during the period in question. IAEA experts believe that Iran’s program is too advanced for Tehran’s time frame to be accurate.

Suspension of Enrichment Activities


The IAEA continues to monitor Iran’s declared suspension of its uranium-enrichment activities. Iran agreed to the suspension as part of an October 2003 agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Tehran then specifically agreed in February to stop assembling centrifuges and manufacturing related components. However, ElBaradei reported in June that Iran had not stopped manufacturing components.

In June, responding to European support for a toughly worded IAEA resolution adopted earlier that month, Iran notified the IAEA that it would resume both component manufacturing and centrifuge assembly under agency supervision. The resolution had specifically called on Iran to fully suspend these activities.

According to the September IAEA report, Iran has since removed from relevant facilities the IAEA seals used to monitor the suspension. As of mid-August, Iran had assembled about 70 centrifuge rotors. Iran has not accepted an IAEA proposal to place these rotors under seal after they have been tested, the report says, adding that the agency’s supervision of the suspension “cannot be considered effective” without such seals.

In addition to its centrifuge activities, Iran produced “about 30-35” kilograms of uranium hexafluoride in its uranium-conversion facility between May and June. Tehran also told the IAEA that it would soon begin another test involving a larger quantity of uranium oxide. Iranian Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh announced Sept. 21 that Tehran had begun the test, Reuters reported.

According to ElBaradei’s report, Iran intends to use 37 metric tons of uranium oxide for the test. This amount of uranium could yield a quantity of uranium hexafluoride sufficient to produce HEU for four or five crude nuclear weapons, an IAEA official told Arms Control Today Sept. 22.

Other Issues

The IAEA also is continuing to investigate Iran’s plutonium separation experiments. Separating plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel is another method for obtaining explosive material for a nuclear weapon. According to the report, Iran previously understated the amount of plutonium it separated from uranium irradiated in a research reactor in Tehran, but now agrees with the IAEA’s assessment that Iran produced “milligram quantities” of plutonium. Additionally, the agency continues to investigate the timing of Iran’s plutonium experiments, which may have been conducted more recently than Tehran stated.

The report also describes the agency’s investigation of the Lavizan Shian site, which agency inspectors visited in late June. The IAEA still needs to analyze environmental samples taken at the site, but the Vienna source told Arms Control Today in August that there is no evidence Iran undertook prohibited nuclear activities there. According to the report, Iran told the IAEA that it had established a physics research center at Lavizan Shian in 1989.

Additionally, the report states that the IAEA and Iran have “discussed…open source information relating to dual-use equipment and materials,” apparently a reference to press accounts describing Iranian attempts to purchase deuterium and high-speed electronic switches. Both of these materials can be used in more advanced nuclear weapons.

 

IAEA Puts Off Showdown With Iran

Paul Kerr

With three key European countries intent on giving Iran a final chance to resolve international concerns about its nuclear program, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors has again refused to meet U.S. demands that the matter be sent immediately to the UN Security Council.

Instead, the board adopted a resolution Sept. 18 calling on Iran to cooperate fully with the agency’s investigation of its nuclear programs and to suspend “all” activities related to its uranium-enrichment program. Tehran, however, has not yet complied with the latter request, setting the stage for a possible showdown at the board’s next meeting in November, after the U.S. presidential elections.

The latest in a series of similar measures, the resolution calls on IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to provide the board with three reports before its November meeting: a report on the “implementation” of the most recent resolution, an account of the IAEA’s investigation since its inception in September 2002, and a report on Tehran’s response to requests made in previous IAEA resolutions. It also states the board is to decide in November “whether or not further steps are appropriate.”

Furthermore, the resolution “strongly urges” Tehran to cooperate with the IAEA’s investigation into its nuclear programs, including providing agency inspectors with documentation of its nuclear activities, as well as access to nuclear-related sites.

ElBaradei submitted a report to the board Sept. 1 describing the investigation to date as a mixed picture. Additionally, in Sept. 20 remarks to the IAEA general conference, ElBaradei stated that IAEA inspectors have “gained access to requested locations” in Iran.

But a Department of State official told Arms Control Today Sept. 27 that Washington is concerned that Tehran may be complicating the agency’s investigation in other ways. For example, Iran is not allowing IAEA inspectors to take pictures in some facilities and is also insisting that all interviews be conducted in Farsi. Iran has previously delayed inspectors’ visits to the country and limited their access to certain facilities. (See ACT, May 2004.)

Frayed Suspension


In its most diplomatically charged provision, the resolution states that the board “considers it necessary…that Iran immediately suspend all enrichment-related activities.” It further specifies that the suspension should include the “manufacture or import of centrifuge components, the assembly and testing of centrifuges,” and the production of uranium hexafluoride.

Iran has a gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program, which can produce low-enriched uranium for use in nuclear reactors and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use as the explosive material in nuclear weapons. Gas centrifuges spin uranium hexafluoride gas at very high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope, thus “enriching” the uranium.

Iran originally agreed to suspend its enrichment activities as part of an October 2003 agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The scope of this suspension, however, has been contentious for some time. Tehran had agreed in February to cease building centrifuges and manufacturing components, but did not entirely stop component production. Then, irritated by a June IAEA resolution, Iran fully resumed both activities.

According to a European diplomat interviewed Sept. 27, the October agreement included an understanding that Iran would permanently suspend enrichment and eventually dismantle its enrichment facilities. Iran, however, has repeatedly stated that its suspension is “temporary.”

An IAEA official told Arms Control Today Sept. 28 that, contrary to the agency’s previous understanding, Iran has now said its suspension agreement does not include uranium hexafluoride production. Iran has already produced uranium hexafluoride in its uranium-conversion facility, and Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh announced three days after the resolution’s adoption that Tehran had begun another test of the facility. That “test” is to use approximately 37 metric tons of uranium oxide, a quantity sufficient to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for several crude nuclear weapons.

The State Department official said that Iran seems anxious to test the conversion facility for possible weaknesses. U.S. officials judge that Iran cannot manufacture some necessary equipment for the facility and that Tehran lacks sufficient quantities of fluorine to process the quantity of nuclear material Iran has described. The United States is waiting on IAEA inspectors to present more details about the conversion facility so Washington can verify these judgments, the official added.

Since the October agreement, Iran has maintained a freeze on its gas centrifuge facilities, which consist of a pilot facility and an uncompleted commercial facility, both located at Natanz. Although Tehran had previously introduced uranium hexafluoride into some centrifuges at the pilot facility, it has refrained from doing so since the October agreement. (See ACT, September 2003.)

The September resolution also repeats past calls for Iran to ratify its additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. As a state-party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has a safeguards agreement, which empowers the IAEA to monitor its nuclear facilities to ensure that they are used solely for civilian purposes. Iran signed an additional protocol as part of its agreement with the three European countries and has agreed to act as if it is in force. The protocol augments the IAEA’s existing authority to detect clandestine nuclear activities.

Pointed Diplomacy

The resolution was the product of intense diplomacy, mainly between the United States and the three European countries that have been dealing with Iran. According to the State Department official, the final resolution was “the bare minimum we could have lived with.”

The Bush administration initially wanted the board to find Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. Such a finding requires the board to refer the matter to the UN Security Council, which may then take action against Tehran, including imposing economic sanctions. The Bush administration believes that European diplomatic efforts have run their course but was unable to persuade the board to go along. The United States first tried to get such a finding in November 2003. (See ACT, July/August 2004.)

The United States also failed to win support for a draft resolution that would have included an Oct. 31 deadline for Iran to cooperate with the agency and suspend its enrichment activities. Including the deadline would have increased Iran’s “defiance” of the agency, the European diplomat argued, adding that the Europeans felt that Washington’s wish for a “trigger” requiring a Security Council referral was “going too far.” Rather, the Europeans wanted the resolution to convey to Iran that it had a “last chance” to comply with the IAEA’s wishes.

Persuading the board to refer Iran to the Security Council will be nearly impossible unless other countries believe Iran has been given a “reasonable chance” to meet its IAEA obligations, the European diplomat added.
The diplomat also argued that the November date mentioned in the resolution is “clear enough” and Iran “knows what it has to do.” Iran will need to act in a timely fashion in order to enable ElBaradei to write his reports, the diplomat said, adding that the date also serves as a signal to Tehran that the process cannot last indefinitely.

Showdown Ahead?

Although Iran has criticized the resolution and somewhat accelerated its enrichment activities, it has also suggested that it is prepared to negotiate a settlement.

A critical element of the dispute concerns Iran’s legal obligations as an NPT member. Because parties to the NPT may enrich uranium under IAEA safeguards, Tehran’s suspension agreement is not legally required by the agency but is part of the political agreement Tehran concluded in October 2003. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rowhani told reporters Sept. 19 that Tehran will discuss the suspension in negotiations, but it will not decide the question based on IAEA resolutions.

Hossein Moussavian, head of Iran’s delegation to the IAEA, told the Islamic Students News Agency Sept. 25 that Iran is willing to negotiate with its European interlocutors about its enrichment technologies. If the Europeans recognize Iran’s “right to benefit from the capabilities of the fuel cycle,” Iran will be “flexible” on measures to assure other countries that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons, he said. As an example, Moussavian said that Iran will guarantee that it will not enrich uranium “above the level determined by the agency’s regulations.” He also hinted that Iran may “one day” give up its enrichment technologies.

Despite this display of flexibility, Rowhani also warned that Iran may stop adhering to its additional protocol if its nuclear activities are referred to the Security Council. Iran may also withdraw from the NPT if the council imposes economic sanctions, he added.

The State Department official dismissed Iran’s apparent flexibility as a tactic to dissuade the IAEA board from taking stricter action. U.S. officials are now attempting to line up the European countries to support a finding of noncompliance at the November board meeting in the event that Iran does not comply with the resolution.
For their part, the three European governments are willing to talk with Iran about providing possible benefits if the latter fully suspends its enrichment activities, according to the diplomat. Outlined in the original October agreement, these benefits include potential technology transfers, a possible “informal security dialogue,” and a guaranteed “external supply of nuclear fuel,” the diplomat added.

 

 

 

U.S. Pushes IAEA to Probe Suspected Iranian Nuclear Site

Paul Kerr

The United States wants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate a site where Iran may be conducting tests for a nuclear weapons program, a Department of State official told Arms Control Today Sept. 21.

The official said the site, called the Parchin military complex, has facilities that could “lend themselves” to testing conventional high explosives for use in an implosion-type nuclear weapon. In such weapons, conventional charges compress a core of fissile material in order to start a nuclear chain reaction.

The official said the facilities have vents and duct work indicating that they may be suitable for such tests. Additionally, the “configuration” of some buildings on the site is similar to some found in a high-explosives testing facility Iraq built for its nuclear weapons program prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The United States has been aware of the Parchin site for some time, the official said, adding that work on the suspect facilities appears to have accelerated during the past 18 months.

Although anonymous administration officials have been quoted in press reports as saying that the Parchin site shows Iran’s intention to develop nuclear weapons, the State Department official said such statements went “too far” and that Washington has no compelling evidence Iran has been conducting nuclear weapons activities there.

Nevertheless, the official said Washington and the IAEA share “concerns” about the site. An IAEA official told Arms Control Today that the agency has asked Tehran for permission to visit Parchin, but according to the U.S. official, Iran ignored the request. The U.S. official also confirmed a Sept. 17 Washington Post report that the IAEA first requested to visit the site in June.

Iranian officials first denied that the IAEA had asked to visit Parchin, but in a Sept. 19 television broadcast, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rowhani acknowledged that the agency had done so. Dismissing the reported U.S. characterization of Parchin as a possible nuclear site as a “lie,” Hossein Moussavian, head of Iran’s delegation to the IAEA, said agency inspectors may visit the site if they wish, the official Islamic Republic News Agency reported.

Despite the IAEA’s request, the U.S. official argued that the agency should pursue the matter more aggressively, asserting that the IAEA “seems” to have been reluctant to press the issue with Tehran.

The United States wants IAEA inspectors to take environmental samples at the site in an effort to detect any secret nuclear activities. However, such samples may not produce conclusive results, the official acknowledged, arguing that Iran may have already been able to thwart inspectors by removing traces of nuclear materials and otherwise altering the site.

Concerns that Tehran has taken similar measures at other sites have surfaced throughout the IAEA’s two-year-old investigation of Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program. For example, the IAEA found that Iran altered the interior of a building under agency investigation in an unsuccessful attempt to conceal secret past nuclear activities. (See ACT, July/August 2004.)

In June, State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher asserted that Iran was trying to conceal nuclear activities by demolishing buildings and removing topsoil at a suspected nuclear site in Tehran. However, Boucher declined to discuss the Parchin site during a Sept. 16 press briefing.

More U.S. Claims on Iraq WMD Rebutted

Paul Kerr

A recent report from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) further undermines pre-war U.S. claims that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons. The report also notes that more material looted after the war from sites associated with Iraq’s past weapons programs has turned up in other countries.

The Aug. 27 report includes an analysis of information collected during the UN inspections that took place from late November 2002 until just before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. It concludes that there was “no technical evidence” that Iraq had been developing UAVs capable of delivering prohibited weapons or exceeding the 150-kilometer range permitted by UN Security Council resolutions.

The Security Council tasked UNMOVIC in 1999 with inspecting and supervising the destruction of Iraq’s prohibited weapons. UNMOVIC has not resumed inspections since the invasion began.

UNMOVIC assembled its UAV analysis in response to March testimony from Charles Duelfer, head adviser to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). The ISG is the task force the U.S. government established after the 2003 invasion to search for Iraq’s suspected illicit weapons. Duelfer told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Iraq tested UAVs whose range “easily exceeded” 150 kilometers. (See ACT, May 2004.)

Before the war, U.S. officials had placed heavy emphasis on the UAV allegation as part of their contention that Iraq possessed prohibited weapons. The public version of an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that Iraq had “several development programs, including for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.” These vehicles “could threaten Iraq’s neighbors, U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the U.S. Homeland,” the estimate added.

Additionally, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the UN Security Council in February 2003 that Iraq had several UAV programs intended to deliver chemical and biological weapons. These included converting MiG-21 and L-29 military aircraft into UAVs, as well as developing smaller UAVs. Powell also stated that Iraq failed to declare a UAV with a range of 500 kilometers to UNMOVIC. UN Security Council Resolution 1441, adopted in November 2002, required Iraq to disclose all of its prohibited weapons activities to the inspectors.

But a July Senate Intelligence Committee report found that the 2002 NIE’s assessment of Iraq’s UAV efforts did not accurately reflect either the available information regarding these vehicles or the judgments of “most analysts,” who believed the UAVs were for conventional missions.

The UNMOVIC report states that the L-29 project “appeared to have ceased in late 2001” and that inspectors found “no clear indication” that Iraq intended the aircraft to deliver chemical or biological agents. Similarly, the inspectors found no evidence that Iraq ever planned to modify any of its smaller UAVs to deliver biological weapons or achieve prohibited ranges.

As for Iraq’s MiG-21 program, a UNMOVIC official told Arms Control Today Sept. 22 that inspectors found no evidence contradicting Iraq’s claim that it ended the project, which began in 1990, after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. UNMOVIC inspectors were unable to verify information Iraq provided about the program in a March 2003 letter because it was received the day the invasion began, the report said.

Investigation

The report outlined the commission’s ongoing investigation into the discovery of weapons-related materials in several locations outside Iraq. Both UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency have previously reported that sites associated with Iraq’s past weapons programs had been looted and destroyed.

The amount of material shipped out of Iraq appears substantial. According to the report, 130,000 tons of scrap metal passed though Jordan alone from June 2003 to June 2004, an amount comprising “only a small part of all scrap materials exported from Iraq” to other countries during that time. In addition, UNMOVIC experts were told that “a lot of high-quality industrial equipment” had been exported from Iraq, some of which “could include equipment subject to [UNMOVIC] monitoring,” the report said.

UNMOVIC experts are continuing to investigate sites in the Netherlands and Jordan where Iraqi missile engines subject to UN monitoring have been discovered. (See ACT, July/August 2004.)

 

 

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