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– General John Shalikashvili
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Fact Sheets & Briefs

U.S. Conventional Arms Sales to Taiwan 1980-2010

October 2012

Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: October 2012

Since the United States switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been one of the most contentious issues in U.S.-China relations. Beijing wants control of the island and has not ruled out military action to achieve its goal, threatening to use force if Taiwan indefinitely refuses negotiations on reunification, declares independence, or is occupied by another country. Washington has urged the two sides to settle Taiwan's future peacefully and warned that it would view efforts to coerce reunification with "grave concern."

The value of annual U.S. government arms sales agreements with Taiwan varies, ranging from a low of $10 million in fiscal year 2006 to a high of nearly $5.37 billion in fiscal year 1993. (See chart below.) The United States also authorizes private U.S. arms companies to conclude weapon deals with Taiwan. The value of reported arms deliveries through these commercial channels has varied between roughly $5 million and $364 million each year.

The United States justifies these sales under the Taiwan Relations Act, which declares that the United States "will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." Passed by Congress in March 1979 after the United States changed its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the act became law on April 10, 1979.

China, which claims Taiwan is the "most crucial and most sensitive issue" in its relations with the United States, maintains that U.S. arms sales to Taipei infringe on China's sovereignty because Washington acknowledges that Taiwan is part of China. Beijing also charges that sales contradict the U.S.-China joint communiqué issued August 17, 1982. That document stated that the United States

"Does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution."

China had demanded in October 1981 that the United States set a fixed date for ending arms sales to Taiwan, but Washington refused. A strong supporter of Taiwan, President Ronald Reagan made the August 1982 commitment because he wanted better relations with China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and because his administration believed the level of arms supplied by the Carter administration in its last years set the bar relatively high for future U.S. transfers.

Reagan assured Taiwan that the communiqué did not spell out a date for cutting off U.S. arms supplies and that Washington would not consult with Beijing about what U.S. arms would be provided to Taipei. In addition, Reagan and subsequent U.S. presidents interpreted the U.S. pledge to gradually reduce sales as conditioned on the maintenance of a military balance between China and Taiwan. The United States also contends the 1982 communiqué is a political document that is not legally binding, whereas the Taiwan Relations Act is U.S. law.

U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan 1980- 2010 (values not adjusted for inflation):

Fiscal Year
U.S. Government
Arms Agreements
U.S. Government
Arms Deliveries
U.S. Commercial
Arms Deliveries
2010$1.25 billion$713 million

unavailable

2009

3.17 billion

646 millionunavailable
2008608 million618 million$364 million
200722 thousand777 million200 million
200610 million1.07 billion5 million
2005244 thousand1.39 billion20 million
2004591 million917 million34 million
2003445 million709 million9 million
2002
71 million1.37 billion134 million
2001
272 million1.15 billion29 million
2000
134 million784 million15 million
1999
546 million2.44 billion16 million
1998
591 million1.42 billion173 million
1997
354 million2.39 billion261 million
1996
449 million820 million20 million
1995
208 million1.33 billion28 million
1994
361 million845 million262 million
1993
5.37 billion815 million346 million
1992
478 million710 million96 million
1991
474 million549 million160 million
1990
518 million452 million150 million
1989
522 million387 million85 million
1988
487 million497 million195 million
1987
501 million357 million210 million
1986
506 million249 million229 million
1985
709 million336 million54 million
1984
670 million292 million70 million
1983
631 million387 million85 million
1982
489 million386 million75 million
1981
312 million373 million67 million
1980
487 million210 million58 million
Total
$21.21 billion$25.39 billion$3.41 billion

Specific Weaponry:

Prior to 2006, the United States voluntarily reported conventional arms transfers to Taiwan--including specific weapon types--to the United Nations.  However, in 2006 a United Nations group of governmental experts recommended that all future reports submitted to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms only include information on conventional arms transfers to United Nations' member states.  As a result, there is no new available data on the specific weaponry transferred to Taiwan since 2006.

Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, China's February 2000 White Paper on Taiwan, Congressional Research Service

Conventional Arms Issues

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Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements From January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011

October 2012

Contact: Jeff Abramson, Non-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, [email protected]

Updated: October 2012

After a record high of an estimated $102.5 billion in proposed conventional arms sales agreements in 2010, government-to-government arms sales agreements fell to $25 billion in 2011.  The spike in the value of U.S. arms control agreements in 2010 was largely due to a proposed $61 billion in arms sales by Saudi Arabia.  The $25 billion in agreements requested in 2011 was $10 billion below the ten-year average from 2001 to 2010 ($35.9 billion), but was nearly identical to the average once the 2010 outlier is taken out ($25.6 billion).

The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of proposed sales of “major defense equipment,” as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as “major defense equipment” which total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.[1] However, if the proposed sale involves NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, or New Zealand, the notification thresholds are $25 million for major defense equipment, $100 million for other defense articles and services, and $300 million for construction or design services.[2] Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never stopped a sale once formally notified.

Taiwan requested the most expensive package of arms sales agreements in 2011, with $5.8 billion requested.  Approximately $5.3 billion of Taiwan's request was for the retrofitting of Taiwan's 145 aging F-16A/B aircraft, along with associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support.  The agreement also includes an extension of the Taiwanese pilot training program at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, as well as provides advanced radar systems and guided bombs.  However, Washington continued to deny Taipei the 66 F-16 C/D aircraft that it has been seeking since 2006.  The proposed sale of F-16C/D to Taiwan has been a contentious issue in U.S.-China relations since its proposal in 2006 and has recently caused domestic political problems for the Obama administration.  For instance, in 2011 Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Robert Menendez (R-NJ) attempted to pass an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 that would have forced President Obama to approve the F-16C/D deal with Taiwan.

Australia also requested $3.4 billion in arms from the United States in 2011, a 36% increase from 2010.  The Australian government sought 2 C-17 Globemaster III aircraft, 10 C-27J aircraft, and 110 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles.  Additionally, the proposed agreement included 10-years of Through-Life-Support (TLS) for 24 MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters.  This is the second year in a row that Australia has been among the five countries that sought the highest value of U.S. arms exports.

The Middle East once again had three out of five of the nations seeking the highest values of U.S. arms exports in 2011 with Iraq ($3.4 billion), Saudi Arabia ($2.3 billion), and the United Arab Emirates ($1.4 billion) each requesting significant amounts of military equipment.  In 2011, Iraq requested the second-highest amount of U.S. arms exports at $3.4 billion.  Iraq's request included a variety of advanced radar and radio systems, 18 F-16IQ aircraft, 44,608 M107 155mm High Explosive Projectiles and 9,328 M485A2 155mm Illumination Projectiles.  Saudi Arabia sought a variety of thermal and night vision equipment, over 100 Light Armored Vehicles, and 450 High Mobility Multipurpose Vehicles of varying models.  The United Arab Emirates requested 218 AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II tactical missiles, support for their existing F-16 fleet, 5 UH-60M Blackhawk VIP Helicopters, and over 750 Hellfire and Javelin missiles.


Below are the five countries that sought the highest values in U.S. arms exports in 2011 and some of their specific requests.

Country

Total Value

Weapons/Services

Taiwan

$5.8 billion

  • Spare Parts for F-16A/B, F-5E/F, C-130H, and Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) Aircraft
  • Retrofitting of F-16A/B Aircraft
  • Pilot Training Program

Iraq

$3.4 billion

  • 6 AN/TPQ-36(V)10 Firefinder Radar Systems
  • 18 AN/TPQ-48 Light Weight Counter-Mortar Radars
  • 750 50-Watt Vehicular Multiband Handheld Radio Systems
  • 900 5-Watt Multiband Handlheld Radio Systems
  • 50 50-Watt Multiband Handheld Base Station Radio Systems
  • 50 20-Watt High Frequency Base Station Radio Systems
  • 100 5-Watt Secure Personal Role Handheld Radio Systems
  • Support for TC-208s, Cessna 172s, AC-208s, T-6As, and King Air 350s
  • 44,608 M107 155mm High Explosive Projectiles
  • 9,328 M485A2 155mm Illumination Projectiles
  • 18 F-16IQ aircraft

Australia

$3.4 billion

  • 10-year Through-Life-Support (TLS) for 24 MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters
  • 2 C-17 Globemaster III aircraft
  • 110 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles
  • 10 C-27J aircraft

Saudi Arabia

$2.3 billion

  • 200 High-performance In-Line Sniper Sight Thermal Weapon Sights
  • 200 MilCAM Recon III LocatIR Thermal Binoculars
  • 7,000 Dual Beam Aiming Lasers (DBAL A2)
  • 6000 AN/PVS-21 Low Profile Night Vision Goggles (LPNVG)
  • 48 LAV-25mm Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), 17 LAV Personnel Carriers, 5 LAV Recovery Vehicles, 27 LAV Command and Control Vehicles, 28 LAV Anti-Tank (TOW) Vehicles
  • 404 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons
  • AN/VRC-92E Export Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS)
  • 36 M777A2 Howitzers, 54 M119A2 Howitzers
  • 24 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS)
  • 17,136 Rounds M107 155mm High Explosive (HE) Ammunition
  • 2,304 Rounds M549 155mm Rocket Assisted Projectiles
  • 60 M1165A1 High Mobility Multipurpose Vehicles (HMMWVs)
  • 120 M1151A1 HMMWVs
  • 252 M1152A1 HMMWVs
  • 124 M1152A1-B2 Up-Armored HMMWVs
  • Continuation of Services for Patriot Systems Engineering Services Program (ESP)

United Arab Emirates

$1.4 billion

  • 218 AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II Tactical Missiles
  • Support and Maintenance of F-16 Aircraft
  • 5 UH-60M Blackhawk VIP Helicopters
  • 107 MIDS/LVT Link 16 Terminals
  • 500 AGM-114R3 Hellfire Missiles
  • 4,900 JDAM Kits
  • 260 Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missiles

Below are all 28 countries that sought U.S. arms exports in 2011 according to FMS notifications and the total value of their identified requests (in billions of U.S. dollars):

Country

Total Value
($ Billions)

Taiwan

5.84

Iraq

3.42

Australia

3.35

Saudi Arabia

2.34

U.A.E.

1.40

Egypt

1.33

India

1.29

Oman

1.25

Indonesia

.750

Qatar

.750

Finland

.585

U.K.

.427

Hungary

.426

Germany

.300

Greece

.260

Poland

.200

France

.180

Argentina

.166

Canada

.125

Malaysia

.124

Peru

.124

Morocco

.117

Turkey

.111

Kuwait

.100

Norway

.095

Pakistan

.062

Ecuador

.060

Bahrain

.053

Below are the total values of all notified requests each yearfrom 1997 to 2011 in billions of U.S. dollars as compiled each year, in current dollars (unadjusted for inflation):

Year

Total Value
($ Billions, current dollars)

2011

25

2010

103

2009

39

2008

75

2007

39

2006

37

2005

12

2004

12

2003

7

2002

16

2001

19

2000

12

1999

21

1998

12

1997

11

 

-Written by Marcus Taylor

 


 

 

ENDNOTES
1. The Department of State is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales it approves of “major defense equipment” that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as “significant military equipment.” As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea). There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data comparable to the FMS notifications and what exists is often incomplete and less precise than data on government-to-government transactions (Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, p. 23). The annual Section 655 report, prepared by the State and Defense Departments for Congress, details commercial licenses approved, but states have four years to act under the licenses. The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement, and reporting.

2. Congress approved the higher notification thresholds for NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in legislation passed in September 2002. South Korea was added to this list in 2008, and Israel was added in 2010.

Sources: Congressional Research Service, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Department of State.

 

Conventional Arms Issues

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The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at a Glance

August 2012

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Updated: August 2012

The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in March 1970, seeks to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. Its 190 (191 with North Korea*) states-parties are classified in two categories: nuclear-weapon states (NWS)—consisting of the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Under the treaty, the five NWS commit to pursue general and complete disarmament, while the NNWS agree to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.

With its near-universal membership, the NPT has the widest adherence of any arms control agreement, with only South Sudan, India, Israel, and Pakistan remaining outside the treaty. In order to accede to the treaty, these states must do so as NNWS, since the treaty restricts NWS status to nations that "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967." For India, Israel, and Pakistan, all known to possess or suspected of having nuclear weapons, joining the treaty as NNWS would require that they dismantle their nuclear weapons and place their nuclear materials under international safeguards. South Africa followed this path to accession in 1991.


Select Treaty Articles

Under Articles I and II of the treaty, the NWS agree not to help NNWS develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the NNWS permanently forswear the pursuit of such weapons. To verify these commitments and ensure that nuclear materials are not being diverted for weapons purposes, Article III tasks the International Atomic Energy Agency with the inspection of the non-nuclear-weapon states' nuclear facilities. In addition, Article III establishes safeguards for the transfer of fissionable materials between NWS and NNWS.

Article IV acknowledges the "inalienable right" of states-parties to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes. It also supports the "fullest possible exchange" of such nuclear-related information and technology between NWS and NNWS. Article V, now effectively obsolete, permits NNWS access to NWS research and development on the benefits of nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes. As the perceived utility of peaceful nuclear explosions has diminished over time, the relevance of this clause has lost much of its practical value. It is now moot due to the restriction on all nuclear explosions mandated by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—to which all five NWS are signatories.

Article VI commits states-parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Acknowledging the necessity of intermediate steps in the process of nuclear disarmament, Article VII allows for the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones.

Article VIII requires a complex and lengthy process to amend the treaty, effectively blocking any changes absent clear consensus. Article X establishes the terms by which a state may withdraw from the treaty, requiring three month's advance notice should "extraordinary events" jeopardize its supreme national interests.

The remainder of the treaty deals with its administration, providing for a review conference every five years and a decision after 25 years on whether the treaty should be extended. The 1995 review conference extended the treaty indefinitely and enhanced the review process by mandating that the five-year review conferences review past implementation and address ways to strengthen the treaty.

For more on the history of the NPT and its review conferences, see the Timeline of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).


NOTE

*North Korea announced January 10, 2003 that it was withdrawing from the treaty, effective the next day. Although Article X of the NPT requires that a country give three months notice in advance of withdrawing, North Korea argued that it satisfied this requirement because it originally announced its decision to withdraw March 12, 1993, and suspended the decision one day before it was to become legally binding. There is not yet a definitive legal opinion as to whether North Korea is still a party to the NPT.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Text

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

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The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty at a Glance

August 2012

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107; Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy, (202) 463-8270 x104

Updated: August 2012

Negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the now-defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed on May 26, 1972 and entered into force on October 3, 1972. The treaty, from which the United States withdrew on June 13, 2002, barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. In the treaty preamble, the two sides asserted that effective limits on anti-missile systems would be a "substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms."

The treaty originally permitted both countries to deploy two fixed, ground-based defense sites of 100 missile interceptors each. One site could protect the national capital, while the second could be used to guard an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field. In a protocol signed July 3, 1974, the two sides halved the number of permitted defenses. The Soviet Union opted to keep its existing missile defense system around Moscow, while the United States eventually fielded its 100 permitted missile interceptors to protect an ICBM base near Grand Forks, North Dakota. Moscow's defense still exists, but its effectiveness is questionable. The United States shut down its permitted ABM defense only months after activating it in October 1975 because the financial costs of operating it were considered too high for the little protection it offered.

The United States and the Soviet Union negotiated the ABM Treaty as part of an effort to control their arms race in nuclear weapons. The two sides reasoned that limiting defensive systems would reduce the need to build more or new offensive weapons to overcome any defense that the other might deploy. Without effective national defenses, each superpower remained vulnerable, even at reduced or low offensive force holdings, to the other's nuclear weapons, deterring either side from launching an attack first because it faced a potential retaliatory strike that would assure its own destruction.

On December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush, who argued that Washington and Moscow no longer needed to base their relationship on their ability to destroy each other, announced that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty, claiming that it prevented U.S. development of defenses against possible terrorist or "rogue-state" ballistic missile attacks. During his presidential campaign, Bush said he would offer amendments on the treaty to Russia and would withdraw the United States from the accord if Russia rejected the proposed changes. However, the Bush administration never proposed amendments to the treaty in its talks with Russia on the subject. Although of "unlimited duration," the treaty permits a state-party to withdraw from the accord if "extraordinary events…have jeopardized its supreme interests." The U.S. withdrawal took effect June 13, 2002, and the treaty is no longer in force.

What the ABM Treaty Prohibited

  • Missile defenses that can protect all U.S. or Soviet/Russian territory against strategic ballistic missiles
  • Establishing a base for a nationwide defense against strategic ballistic missiles
  • Development, testing, or deployment of sea-, air-, space-, or mobile land-based ABM systems or components. (Because of the inability of either country to verify activities behind closed doors, the development and testing ban was understood to apply when components and systems moved from laboratory to field testing.)
  • Development, testing, or deployment of strategic missile interceptor launchers that can fire more than one interceptor at a time or are capable of rapid reload
  • Upgrading existing non-ABM missiles, launchers, or radars to have ABM capabilities and testing existing missiles, launchers, or radars in an ABM mode (i.e. against strategic or long-range ballistic missile targets)
  • Deployment of radars capable of early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack anywhere other than on the periphery of U.S. or Soviet/Russian territory and oriented outward
  • Deployment of ABM radars capable of tracking and discriminating incoming strategic targets and guiding defensive interceptors, except within a 150 kilometer radius of the one permitted defense
  • Transfer or deployment of ABM systems or components outside U.S. and Soviet/Russian territory

What the ABM Treaty Permitted

  • One regional defense of 100 ground-based missile interceptors to protect either the capital or an ICBM field
  • A total of 15 missile interceptor launchers at designated missile defense test ranges
  • Research, laboratory, and fixed land-based testing of any type of missile defense
  • Use of national technical means, such as satellites, to verify compliance. (The ABM Treaty was the first treaty to prohibit a state-party from interfering with another state-party's national technical means of verification.)
  • States-parties to raise questions about compliance, as well as any other treaty-related issue, at the Standing Consultative Commission, which was a body established by the treaty that meets at least twice per year
  • Theater (nonstrategic) missile defenses of any type to protect against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. (The ABM Treaty originally did not specifically delineate the point at which a missile defense would be considered strategic or nonstrategic. The United States and Russia negotiated and signed a demarcation agreement on this subject in September 1997. Russia ratified the agreement in May 2000, but it has never been transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, and therefore the agreement has not entered into force. The Bush administration's June 13 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty makes the demarcation agreement moot)
  • Either state-party to propose amendments
Missile Defense

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance

August 2012

Contact: Daryl KimballExecutive Director, 202-463-8270 x107; Kingston ReifDirector for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy, 202-463-8270 x104

Updated: August 2012

Negotiated during the final years of the Cold War, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is often referred to as the "cornerstone of European security." The treaty, signed on November 19, 1990, eliminated the Soviet Union's overwhelming quantitative advantage in conventional weapons in Europe by setting equal limits on the amount of tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains.

The CFE Treaty was designed to prevent either alliance from amassing forces for a blitzkrieg-type offensive, which could have triggered the use of nuclear weapons in response. Although the threat of such an offensive all but disappeared with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, member states have repeatedly touted the enduring value of the treaty's weapons limits and inspection regime, which provides an unprecedented degree of transparency on military holdings.

Original CFE Treaty

The principal features of the original CFE Treaty are:

Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE): NATO and the former Warsaw Pact were each limited to 20,000 tanks, 30,000 ACVs, 20,000 heavy artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters for the treaty's area of application. Member states of each alliance then divided their respective "bloc" limit among themselves, in effect creating national limits. (The Soviet Union's limits were subsequently parceled out among eight of its successor states in 1992.) To prevent any country from amassing a significant asymmetrical stockpile of weapons, the treaty prohibits a single state from possessing more than a third of the TLE total.

As of January 2007, NATO's 22 CFE states-parties claimed collective holdings of 61,281 TLE versus a cumulative limit of 101,697. Russia reported holdings of 23,266 TLE against limits of 28,216.[2] Russia has not provided detailed reports to CFE since 2007.

From 1992 through 2008, CFE states have reduced more than 52,000 pieces of conventional armaments under the treaty. Many states reduced their holdings more than required – with over 17,955 voluntary reductions or conversions below treaty limits. States also carried out some 6,000 CFE inspections through 2008.[3]

Concentric Zones: The CFE Treaty has four concentric zones capping the deployment of tanks, ACVs, and artillery radiating out from the center of Europe (much like a shooting target). The innermost zone with the smallest limits incorporates Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, while the fourth and largest zone encompasses the entire treaty area. (There are no zone limits for combat aircraft and attack helicopters.)

The Flank Zone: To alleviate concerns that either alliance would launch a flanking maneuver against the other, the treaty placed specific limits on the number of tanks, ACVs, and artillery for Europe's southern and northern flanks, including portions of Russia. Moscow has consistently sought to abolish the flank zone as it considers the limits to be unfair because it is the only country (aside from Ukraine) that has specific limits on where it can deploy TLE in its own territory. Russian concerns were partially met in 1996 when the CFE parties agreed that Russia's original flank zone limits would apply to a smaller area, while Russia's original flank territory would have larger limits. Moscow's total CFE limits, however, remained the same. Although Russia has been in noncompliance with even the higher May 1996 flank limits, Moscow has remained within its overall treaty limits and has repeatedly stated that its flank noncompliance is only temporary.

Transparency: CFE states-parties have carried out more than 4,000 on-site inspections.

Adapted CFE Treaty

Should it enter into force, the principal features of the adapted treaty are:

National Ceilings: Each country will have a specific limit on tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters—collectively referred to as treaty-limited equipment (TLE)—that it can deploy in the treaty’s area of application, which covers the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains.

Territorial Ceilings: Each country with territory in the treaty’s area of application will have a cap on the total number of tanks, ACVs, and heavy artillery that can be deployed within its borders. This restricts national and foreign-stationed TLE. During the adaptation negotiations, NATO refused Russia’s persistent efforts for similar caps on combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

Most countries, including Russia and new NATO members, agreed to set territorial ceilings equal to national ceilings, in effect requiring a state’s own TLE on its territory to be lower than its national ceilings if that state wanted to host foreign-stationed forces. A host country must give advance consent for any foreign TLE deployments.  Both Russia and Ukraine will have subceilings establishing areas in which their ground TLE deployments on their own territories will be limited within their overall limits.

Temporary Deployments: A country’s territorial ceilings can be exceeded by 153 tanks, 241 ACVs, and 140 artillery pieces for military exercises and temporary deployments. In “exceptional circumstances,” countries outside the original treaty’s flank zone, which limited ground TLE in the northern and southern flanks of Europe, can temporarily exceed their territorial ceilings by 459 tanks, 723 ACVs, and 420 artillery pieces. “Temporary” is not defined, but regular notifications are required for TLE exceeding territorial ceilings.

Transparency: States-parties will be required to permit inspections of 20 percent of their “objects of verification,” which are military units down to the regiment level and storage, repair, and reduction sites with TLE present.

Annual reports on the actual location of tanks, ACVs, and artillery are required if they are different from their designated peacetime location. Quarterly reports must detail by territory the actual location of tanks, ACVs, and artillery, as well as the total number of combat aircraft and attack helicopters in the entire treaty area. Changes of mor e than 30 tanks, 30 ACVs, or 10 artillery pieces on a state’s territory must be reported. Any increase by 18 or more combat aircraft or attack helicopters in a country’s holdings in the entire treaty area must be notified to all states-parties.

History

CFE members signed an adaptation agreement in 1999 to update the treaty’s structure to reflect the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and an expanding NATO alliance. The revised agreement jettisons the bloc-to-bloc and zonal limits of the original treaty and replaces them with a system of national and territorial ceilings. The adapted treaty will enter into force when all 30 states-parties have ratified the agreement. However, only Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have ratified, and Ukraine has yet to deposit its instrument of ratification. As a result, the original treaty remains in effect.

Meanwhile, the United States and its NATO partners in CFE have refused to ratify the new treaty until Russia first complies with its new weapons limits and with the commitments Moscow made in the CFE Final Act and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Istanbul Summit Declaration. The Final Act and Declaration are political, not-legally binding documents concluded along with the adapted treaty. They set out additional commitments by CFE states-parties on future weapons deployments, including pledges by Russia to withdraw its treaty-limited weapons and military forces from Georgia and Moldova.

In 2002, Moscow declared that it had met the adapted treaty’s weapons limits. NATO accepted this claim but repeated that Russia must still fulfill its commitments with regard to Georgia and Moldova before NATO states would ratify the adapted treaty. Moscow was especially displeased at NATO’s decision not to ratify because four new NATO members (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) are not party to the original treaty and therefore have no arms limits. No provision exists for additional countries to accede to the original treaty; they must wait to join the adapted treaty once it enters into force.

Citing the ongoing delay of the adapted treaty’s entry into force, Russia issued a Dec. 12, 2007 statement “suspending” its implementation of the CFE Treaty. (The treaty does not contain a provision for suspension, only withdrawal.)  Under suspension, Moscow stated that it will not participate in treaty data exchanges, notifications, or inspections. Although the Kremlin noted that it has no plans for arms buildups, it also declared that it would not be bound by the treaty’s limits. NATO members, including the United States, called on Russia to reverse course and declared their intention to continue implementing the treaty "without prejudice to any future action they might take."

Recent Efforts Stall

Sporadic efforts have been made since 2007 to bridge the divide. Beginning in 2010, the Obama administration sought to resolve the CFE dispute through the development of a draft “framework” for new negotiations to strengthen the CFE Treaty regime. But by mid-2011, the talks stalled as Russia could not agree to the principle of host-country consent or to a resumption of compliance with the original CFE Treaty.

In response, the U.S. Department of State announced in a Nov. 22, 2011 press release that Washington “would cease carrying out certain obligations” under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia, putting the future of the 1990 pact in serious doubt.

At a press briefing the same day, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said the decision means that the United States “will not accept Russian inspections of our bases under the CFE [Treaty], and we will also not provide Russia with the annual notifications and military data called for in the treaty.” She added that “it is our understanding that a number, if not all, of the U.S. NATO allies will do the same.”

According to the press release, Washington “will continue to implement the Treaty and carry out all obligations with all States Parties other than Russia” and will not exceed the pact’s numerical limits on conventional armaments. The United States would resume full CFE Treaty implementation “if Russia resume[d] implementation of its Treaty obligations,” according to the statement.

If CFE members [1] cannot get the treaty back on track, there is concern that Russian will increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons to defend itself from what Moscow now sees as NATO’s conventional superiority in Europe.

ENDNOTES

1. CFE States-Parties: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

2. Crawford, Dorn. "Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements," Arms Control Bureau, Department of State, January 2007. The limits are the entitlements permitted under the original 1990 accord. Under the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty, the cumulative national weapons limits for NATO members currently bound by the original CFE Treaty equal 92,678 arms.

3. U.S. Department of State, Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, And Disarmament Agreements And Commitments, July 2010, p. 28, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145181.pdf

Conventional Arms Issues

Country Resources:

Fact Sheet Categories:

Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements From January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010

February 2011

Contact: Jeff AbramsonNon-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, [email protected]

Updated: February 2011

After a dip in proposed arms transfers the previous year, in 2010 the Pentagon notified Congress of an estimated $102.5 billion in proposed, government-to-government, conventional arms transfer agreements with 28 countries, setting a new high that surpasses even the $75 billion proposed in 2008. The total amount presented to Congress was nearly four times higher than the 10-year average from 2000 to 2009 ($27 billion), and two and a half times the comparable 2009 and 2007 figures ($39 billion each).  

The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of proposed sales of “major defense equipment,” as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as “major defense equipment” which total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.[1] However, if the proposed sale involves NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, or New Zealand, the notification thresholds are $25 million for major defense equipment, $100 million for other defense articles and services, and $300 million for construction or design services.[2] Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never stopped a sale once formally notified.

The total amount in 2010 is heavily influenced by $60.1 billion in proposed arms transfers to Saudi Arabia (see ACT, December 2010) including 84 F15-SA multi-role aircraft, equipment for the upgrade of 70 Saudi F15-S aircraft, 70 AH-64D Block III Apache Longbow helicopters, and 72 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters, as well as AH-6i and MD-530F light helicopters.  Present in the packages are 300 Sidewinder and 500 AMRAAM missiles, 400 air-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and 600 HARM missiles, plus thousands of Hellfire IIs, and 150 infantry operable Javelin anti-tank missiles. The sale of thousands of laser and GPS guided bombs were also proposed including 1,100 Paveway IIIs and 1,000 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) units, both of the 2,000-pound variety. Included as well were 1,300 units of the CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapon/Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, a cluster bomb of the type banned by the Convention on Cluster Munitions but which is still sold by the United States as permitted by its own policies. Saudi Arabia last proposed significant FMS purchases in 2008 ($2.9 billion), and had also been the largest proposed recipient of U.S. arms transfers in 2006 ($11.3 billion).

Saudi Arabia was not the only state in the Middle East that sought new arms and armaments in 2010, with the United Arab Emirates ($5.4 billion), Iraq ($4.9 billion), Oman ($3.6 billion), Israel ($2.0 billion), and Kuwait ($1.6 billion) all expressing interest in purchases. Helicopters, their parts, and their servicing constituted a significant proportion of global proposed sales [3]; the U.A.E. followed in its neighbor’s footsteps in ordering 60 Apache Longbows. Iraq proposed new requests for 18 F-16IQ aircraft, ammunition for its M1A1 tanks, and refurbishment of 440 M113A2 Armored Personnel Carriers. Oman likewise sought to reinforce its air force, putting forward plans to buy 18 F16 Block 50/52 aircraft. Israel’s requested package was limited to the purchase of gasoline for its ground forces and jet fuel. As a percentage of overall proposed sales, requests from Middle Eastern states rose from around 68 percent in 2009 to 78 percent in 2010.

Early in the year the proposed sale of 60 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters along with 114 PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles to Taiwan was finally presented to Congress after nearly a decade of negotiations (see ACT, March 2010). The package drew the ire of mainland China, despite the omission of the diesel submarines and F16C/D fighter aircraft originally intended as a core part of the deal. The total value of intended U.S. sales to Taipei amounted to $6.4 billion, matching 2008 figures. Harpoon missiles again featured as they did two years earlier but on a much smaller scale, with only the purchase of a dozen proposed. Two OSPREY class mine-hunting ships were also requested. In reaction to the proposed sale, China cut strategic military dialogue talks with the United States for nearly a year.  

The U.S. government also proposed several large sales to India during the year, amounting to $8.0 billion. 145 units of the M777 155mm light towed Howitzer were requested as part of an extended artillery modernization program, as well as 10 C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft. New Delhi also sought parts and weapons systems for 22 Apache Longbow helicopters and 21 Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles for the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft. Unlike many other notifications, the proposed sale of Apache helicopters was made in advance of an official letter of request from India. Instead, it was submitted as part of an international competition so that, “in the event that the…[U.S.] proposal is selected, the United States might move as quickly as possible to implement the sale,” according to the notification. As of year’s end, India had not announced whether the U.S. bid was accepted. In 2009, a similar speculative notification was made for Super Hornet fighter aircraft for Brazil, which still had not decided how to proceed as of the end of 2010.

Below are the five countries that sought the highest values in U.S. arms exports in 2010 and some of their specific requests.

Country

Total Value

Weapons/Services

Saudi Arabia

$61.0 billion

  • 84 F-15SA aircraft, equipment to upgrade another 70 Royal Saudi Air Force F15-S aircraft to F-15SA specifications
  • 70 AH-64D Block III Apache Longbow helicopters, 72 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters, and 36 AH-6i Light Attack helicopters
  • 300 AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles
  • 500 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air missiles (AMRAAM)
  • 2,000 Dual Mode Laser guided/GPS guided munitions (500-pound  and 2000-pound)
  • 1,100 GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser guided bombs (2000-pound)
  • 1,000 GBU-31B Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) (2000-pound)
  • 400 AGM-84 Block II HARPOON air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles
  • 600 AGM-88B HARM missiles
  • 3,000 General purpose bombs (500-pound and 2000-pound)
  • 1,300 CBU-105D/B Cluster bombs (Sensor Fuzed weapons) with Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers
  • 4,768 AGM-114R HELLFIRE II missiles
  • 150 JAVELIN Anti-tank missiles

India

$8.0 billion

  • 10 C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft
  • 145 M777 155mm Light-Weight Towed Howitzers
  • 21 AGM-84L Block II HARPOON anti-ship cruise missiles
  • Equipment, parts, and weapons systems for 22 Apache Longbow helicopters

    Taiwan

    $6.4 billion

    • 60 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters with 120 T700-GE-701D engines
    • 18 spare T700-GE-701D engines
    • 114 PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles
    • 10 RTM-84L Block II HARPOON Telemetry anti-ship cruise missiles
    • 2 ATM-84L Block II HARPOON Telemetry anti-ship cruise missiles
    • 2 OSPREY class mine-hunting ships

    United Arab Emirates

    $5.4 billion

    • 30 AH-64D Block III Apache Longbow helicopters
    • 30 AH-64D Block II Apache Longbow helicopters, remanufactured to Block III configurations
    • 120 T700-GE-701D engines
    • 100 Army Tactical Missile System units and 60 Low Cost Reduced-Range Practice Rockets
    • Logistics support for two C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft

      Iraq

      $4.9 billion

      • 18 F-16IQ aircraft
      • 200 AIM-9L/M-8/9 SIDEWINDER missiles
      • 150 AIM-7M-F1/H SPARROW missiles
      • 50 AGM-65D/G/H/K MAVERICK air-to-ground missiles
      • 200 GBU-12 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (500-pound), 50 GBU-10 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000-pound), 50 GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000-pound)
      • Refurbishment of 440 M113A2 Armored Personnel Carriers including installation of M2 .50 Cal machine guns
      • 33,630 rounds of ammunition for the M1A1 Abrams tank

        Below are all 28 countries that sought U.S. arms exports in 2010 according to FMS notifications and the total value of their identified requests (in billions of U.S. dollars):

        Country Total Value
        ($ Billions)
        Saudi Arabia 60.976
        India 8.047
        Taiwan 6.392
        U.A.E. 5.390
        Iraq 4.884
        Oman 3.630
        Australia 2.533
        Denmark 2.000
        Israel 2.000
        Kuwait 1.593
        Thailand .700
        Pakistan .575
        Sweden .546
        Canada .520
        U.K. .512
        Switzerland .358
        Egypt .287
        Tunisia .282
        Netherlands .194
        Colombia .162
        Spain .155
        Japan .152
        Singapore .150
        Germany .146
        Chile .105
        Finland .100
        Bahrain .070
        France .069

        Below are the total values of all notified requests each yearfrom 1997 to 2010 in billions of U.S. dollars as compiled each year, in current dollars (unadjusted for inflation):

        Year   
        Total Value
        ($ Billions, current dollars)
        2010 103
        2009 39
        2008 75
        2007 39
        2006 37
        2005 12
        2004 12
        2003 7
        2002 16
        2001 19
        2000 12
        1999 21
        1998 12
        1997 11

        Xiaodon Liang assisted in the research and writing of this fact sheet.

        ENDNOTES
        1. The Department of State is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales it approves of “major defense equipment” that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as “significant military equipment.” As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea). There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data comparable to the FMS notifications and what exists is often incomplete and less precise than data on government-to-government transactions (Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2009, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, p. 23). The annual Section 655 report, prepared by the State and Defense Departments for Congress, details commercial licenses approved, but states have four years to act under the licenses. The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement, and reporting.

        2. Congress approved the higher notification thresholds for NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in legislation passed in September 2002. South Korea was added to this list in 2008, and Israel was added in 2010.

        3. Helicopter related (units, engines, parts, support, electronics, and training) requests were proposed by Australia, Colombia, Denmark, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.

        Sources: Congressional Research Service, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Department of State.

        Conventional Arms Issues

        Country Resources:

        Fact Sheet Categories:

        Vienna Document 1999

        August 2010

        Contact: Jeff AbramsonNon-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, [email protected]

        Updated: August 2010

        The Vienna Document is a confidence- and security- building measure in which members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agree to inspections and data exchanges in order to increase transparency of their conventional forces. With Russia’s suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) in 2007 and subsequent loss of transparency around conventional forces, the politically binding procedures and related reports associated with the document have become more important.

        Background: The Vienna Document encompasses the goals of the Helsinki Final Act Decalogue of 1975 and incorporates them into a politically binding document. The Helsinki Final Act principles created the initial confidence- and security- building measures that would be elaborated upon, first in the Stockholm Document (1986) and later in the first Vienna Document. The first document, Vienna Document 1990, would have successors in Vienna Documents 1992, 1994, and 1999. All of the Vienna Documents have sought to strengthen the transparency and openness in the OSCE area.

        Helsinki Final Act Decalogue[1]

        1     Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty

        2     Refraining from the threat or use of force

        3     Inviolability of frontiers

        4     Territorial integrity of States

        5     Peaceful settlement of disputes

        6     Non-intervention in internal affairs

        7     Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief

        8     Equal rights and self-determination of peoples

        9     Co-operation among States

        10   Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law

         

         

        Document Status: Vienna Document implementation is discussed weekly at the Forum for Security Co-operation (an OSCE body) and at annual meetings in Vienna.  Signatories to the document are the fifty-five member states of the OSCE. [2]

        During the most recent Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM), held March 2-3, 2010, the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre reported that the Vienna Document’s “overall implementation level has remained relatively stable and high." [3] Per the Meeting’s Consolidated Summary, although the number of inspections and evaluations fell in 2009 from their 2008 levels, the number was still above the five-year average. There is some speculation that the economic conditions facing Vienna Document countries could play a part in the lower numbers.

        The 2010 State Department report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, which considered treaty and agreement compliance from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2008, found that “compliance with VD99 has been good.” [4] The report acknowledged that some states did not submit their information for the December meeting but that “most” of the States eventually submitted the required paperwork.

        In regards to the sharing of information under the Vienna Document, there was conversation at the March 2010 AIAM that changes may need to be made to the document because of new technology, capabilities, and military structures that have not been accounted for.

        Information Exchange: Under the Vienna Document, countries agree to an Annual Exchange of Military Information where information regarding “military forces concerning the military organization, manpower and major weapon and equipment systems” will be shared with other member states. [5] A country that plans to change the structure of their military forces for a period longer than 21 days (such as increasing the size of a combat unit) reports the change to other states. States also share information about their weapon systems and if there are plans to deploy new systems (if so, countries share information about these systems). Under Article II, countries are also expected to provide information regarding their defense planning.  Under a general considerations report, a state provides information regarding their military structure (including specific unit and formation information), major weapons and equipment systems, and their hardware. The specific equipment that is covered by the Vienna Document can be found in Article I.

        Year

        Number of Submitted Reports (General Considerations)[6]

        2009

        Not Available

        2008

        55

        2007

        54

        2006

        51

        2005

        53

         

        Year

        Number of Submitted Reports (Defense Planning)

        2009

        47

        2008

        41

        2007

        47

        2006

        40

        2005

        45

        The Vienna Document also says that states should inform other states if “certain military activities” will take place, which means a military activity will be subject to notification whenever it involves at any time during the activity:

        • at least 9,000 troops, including support troops, or
        • at least 250 battle tanks, or
        • at least 500 armored combat vehicles, as defined in Annex III, paragraph (2), or
        • at least 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket-launchers (100 mm calibre and above). [7]

        States also can invite other member states to militarily significant actions for observation purposes. [8] There are some constraints on states, including limits on the number of exercises that can be carried out within a specific timeframe under certain conditions. [9]

        If a Vienna Document state has concerns about a militarily significant action, they can request an explanation of the action from the party responsible. If there are concerns after an explanation is offered, the concerned state can request a meeting with the acting party.  Participation in the meeting will be open to any states interested in the action. Either party can also request a meeting of all states, which would be conducted as a joint Permanent Council and Forum for Security Cooperation meeting, where recommendations from states will be considered.

        Process: The Vienna Document 1999 encourages countries to host visits to military facilities, create military contacts, and hold joint exercises and demonstrations of military equipment as ways of increasing confidence between states. [10] By November 15, states are expected to submit a schedule of prior notification military activities for the next year.  According to the Consolidated Summary of the 19th Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting , held March 3-4, 2009, “a total of 109 inspection visits in 2008 had resulted in more than 1,000 arms control personnel having the opportunity to meet their counterparts and improve their relations.” [11]

        Year

        Number of Evaluation Visits [12]

        2009

        46

        2008

        41

        2007

        55

         

        Year

        Number of Countries Hosting Evaluation Visits

        2009

        Not Available

        2008

        44

        2007

        33

         

        Year

        Number of Inspection Visits

        2009

        96

        2008

        109

        2007

        88

        Under the Document, states can host three inspections on their territory per year and do not have to exceed that limit if they do not wish.  Inspection teams observe notable military activities.  In addition to inspection visits, there are also evaluation visits, which verify data that is part of the information exchange.  A state must host at least one and no more than 15 evaluation visits a year (number of visits is determined by number of units). [13]

        Article XI calls for an Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting where states will have the opportunity to discuss questions of implementation, operations, and questions that may have arisen from information that has been exchanged.  The meeting, hosted by the Forum for Security Cooperation, is also an opportunity to discuss confidence- and security- building measures.  If a state has not offered their data at the Annual Exchange of Military Information, held no later than December 15, they are expected to offer an explanation as to why it has not been submitted and an expected date for contribution.

        Amendments to Vienna Document 1999: A May 19, 2010 decision by the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC.DEC/1/10) created a procedure for continuous updating of the Vienna Document, under which decisions that update document text will be called Vienna Document Plus. [14] Every five years the Vienna Document will be reissued with the changes from “Plus” incorporated.  This will not delay the entry into force of changes, which will be effective immediately, unless expressly stated otherwise.  Decisions in Vienna Document Plus will supersede those of Vienna Document 1999 as they are the most recent.

        -Researched and prepared by Valerie Pacer

         


        [1] For a more detailed description of the Decalogue, see European Navigator’s explanation http://www.ena.lu/helsinki_decalogue_august_1975-2-19193

        [2] OSCE member states are: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Uzbekistan

        [3] Consolidated Summary of the 2010 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM)

        [4] See “Vienna Document 1999 on the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures (page 36) ”http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/july2010compliancereport072710.pdf

        [5] See Article I “Annual Exchange of Military Information” for specific information that is exchanged: http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/1999/11/4265_en.pdf

        [6] Numbers of Submissions can be found in the 2009 AIAM Consolidated Summary http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2009/03/37422_en.pdf, 2010 AIAM Consolidated Summary and at http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/synopses/gemi.cfm

        [7] Vienna Document 1999, Article V

        [8] See Article VI “Observation of Certain Military Activities” for an explanation of observation procedures.

        [9] See Article VIII “Constraining Provisions” for thresholds and limits of activities.

        [10] See Articles III “Risk Reduction” and IV “Contacts” of VD99 for recommendations.

        [11] Consolidated Summary of the 19th Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting 2009 http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/37422_en.pdf.html , pg. 49

        [12] Numbers of evaluation and inspections can be found in the AIAM Consolidated Summary 2009 http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2009/03/37422_en.pdf and AIAM Consolidated Summary 2010.

        [13] See Article IX “Compliance and Verification” for an explanation of measures, including inspections and evaluations.

        [14] “Decision No.1/10 Establishing a Procedure for Incorporating Relevant FSC Decisions Into the Vienna Document” (FSC.DEC/1/10) http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2010/05/44706_en.pdf

        Conventional Arms Issues

        Fact Sheet Categories:

        Biological Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties

        Body: 

        Press Contact: Tom Z. Collina, Research Director, (202) 463-8270 x104

        The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) currently has 163 states-parties. 13 signatory states have not yet ratified. The BWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972 and entered into force on March 26, 1975. A country that did not ratify the BWC before it entered into force may accede to it at any time.

        For a guide to the terms of the convention, see The Biological Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance.


        Country

        Signature

        Ratification/Accession

        Afghanistan 4/10/72
        3/26/75
        Albania -
        6/3/92
        Algeria -
        7/22/01
        Antigua & Barbuda - 1/29/03
        Argentina 8/1/72 11/27/79
        Armenia -
        6/7/94
        Australia 4/10/72
        10/5/77
        Austria 4/10/72
        8/10/73
        Azerbaijan -
        2/26/04
        Bahamas -
        11/26/86
        Bahrain -
        10/28/88
        Bangladesh -
        3/11/85
        Barbados 2/16/73 2/16/73
        Belarus 4/10/72
        3/26/75
        Belgium 4/10/72
        3/15/79
        Belize [1]
        - 10/20/86
        Benin 4/10/72
        4/25/75
        Bhutan -
        6/8/78
        Bolivia 4/10/72
        4/25/75
        Bosnia and Herzegovina [2]
        -
        8/15/94
        Botswana 4/10/72
        2/5/92
        Brazil 4/10/72
        2/27/73
        Brunei Darussalem -
        1/31/91
        Bulgaria 4/10/72
        8/2/72
        Burkina Faso -
        4/17/91
        Burundi 04/10/72
        -
        Cambodia 4/10/72
        3/9/83
        Canada 4/10/72
        9/18/72
        Cape Verde -
        10/20/77
        Central African Republic 4/10/72 -
        Chile 4/10/72
        4/22/80
        China -
        11/15/84
        Colombia 4/10/72
        12/19/83
        Congo -
        10/23/78
        Cook Islands - 12/4/08
        Costa Rica 4/10/72
        12/17/73
        Côte d'Ivoire 5/23/72
        -
        Croatia [2]
        -
        4/28/93
        Cuba 4/10/72
        4/21/76
        Cyprus 4/10/72
        11/6/73
        Czech Republic [3]
        -
        4/5/93
        Democratic Republic of Congo [4]
        4/10/72
        9/16/75
        Denmark 4/10/72
        3/1/73
        Dominica -
        11/8/78
        Dominican Republic 4/10/72
        2/23/73
        Ecuador 6/14/72
        3/21/73
        Egypt 4/10/72 -
        El Salvador 4/10/72
        12/31/91
        Equatorial Guinea -
        1/16/89
        Estonia -
        6/21/93
        Ethiopia 4/10/72
        5/26/75
        Fiji 2/22/73
        9/4/73
        Finland 4/10/72
        2/4/74
        France -
        9/27/84
        Gabon 4/10/72
        8/16/07
        Gambia 6/2/72
        11/21/91
        Georgia -
        5/23/96
        Germany [5]
        4/10/72
        11/28/72
        Ghana 4/10/72
        6/6/75
        Greece 4/10/72
        12/10/75
        Grenada -
        10/22/86
        Guatemala 5/9/72
        9/19/73
        Guinea-Bissau -
        8/20/76
        Guyana 1/3/73
        -
        Haiti 4/10/72
        -
        Holy See 1/4/02
        1/4/02
        Honduras 4/10/72
        3/14/79
        Hungary 4/10/72 12/27/72
        Iceland 4/10/72
        2/15/73
        India 1/15/73
        7/15/74
        Indonesia 6/20/72
        2/19/92
        Iran 4/10/72
        8/22/73
        Iraq 5/11/72 6/19/91
        Ireland 4/10/72 10/27/72
        Italy 4/10/72
        5/30/75
        Jamaica -
        8/13/75
        Japan 4/10/72
        6/8/82
        Jordan 4/10/72
        5/30/75
        Kazakhstan -
        6/15/07
        Kenya -
        11/7/76
        Kuwait 4/14/72
        7/18/72
        Laos 4/10/72
        3/20/73
        Latvia -
        2/6/97
        Lebanon 4/10/72 3/26/75
        Lesotho 4/10/72
        9/6/77
        Liberia 4/10/72
        -
        Libya - 1/19/82
        Liechtenstein -
        5/30/91
        Lithuania -
        2/10/98
        Luxembourg 4/10/72
        3/23/76
        Macedonia [2]
        -
        12/24/96
        Madagascar 10/13/72
        3/7/08
        Malawi 4/10/72
        -
        Malaysia 4/10/72
        9/6/91
        Maldives -
        8/2/93
        Mali 4/10/72
        11/25/02
        Malta 9/11/72
        4/7/75
        Mauritius 4/10/72
        8/7/72
        Mexico 4/10/72
        4/8/74
        Monaco -
        4/30/99
        Mongolia 4/10/72
        9/5/72
        Montenegro [6] 4/10/72
        6/3/06
        Morocco 5/2/72
        3/21/02
        Myanmar 4/10/72
        -
        Nepal 4/10/72
        -
        Netherlands 4/10/72
        6/22/81
        New Zealand 4/10/72
        12/13/72
        Nicaragua 4/10/72
        7/8/75
        Niger 4/21/72
        6/23/72
        Nigeria 7/3/72
        7/3/73
        Norway 4/10/72
        8/1/73
        Oman -
        3/31/92
        Pakistan 4/10/72
        9/25/74
        Palau - 2/20/03
        Panama 5/2/72 3/20/74
        Papua New Guinea -
        10/27/80
        Paraguay -
        6/9/76
        Peru 4/10/72
        6/5/85
        Philippines 4/10/72
        5/21/73
        Poland 4/10/72
        1/25/73
        Portugal 6/29/72
        5/15/75
        Qatar 11/14/72
        4/17/75
        Romania 4/10/72
        7/25/79
        Russia [7]
        4/10/72
        3/26/75
        Rwanda 4/10/72
        5/20/75
        St. Kitts & Nevis
        -
        4/2/91
        St. Lucia [8]
        -
        11/26/86
        St. Vincent & the Grenadines [8]
        -
        4/2/91
        San Marino 9/12/72
        3/11/75
        Sao Tome and Principe - 8/24/79
        Saudi Arabia 4/10/72
        5/24/72
        Senegal 4/10/72
        3/26/75
        Serbia [2] [6]
        4/10/72 10/25/73
        Seychelles -
        10/11/79
        Sierra Leone 11/7/72
        6/29/76
        Singapore 6/19/72
        12/2/75
        Slovakia [3]
        -
        5/17/93
        Slovenia [2]
        -
        4/7/92
        Solomon Islands [8]
        -
        6/17/81
        Somalia 7/3/72 -
        South Africa 4/10/72
        11/3/75
        South Korea 4/10/72
        6/25/87
        Spain 4/10/72
        6/20/79
        Sri Lanka 4/10/72
        11/18/86
        Sudan -
        10/17/03
        Suriname -
        1/6/93
        Swaziland -
        6/18/91
        Sweden 2/27/75
        2/5/76
        Switzerland 4/10/72
        5/4/76
        Syria 4/14/72 -
        Tajikistan - 6/27/05
        Tanzania 8/16/72
        -
        Thailand 1/17/73
        5/28/75
        Timor Leste - 5/5/03
        Togo 4/10/72
        11/10/76
        Tonga - 9/28/76
        Trinidad & Tobago - 7/19/07
        Tunisia 4/10/72
        5/18/73
        Turkey 4/10/72
        10/25/74
        Turkmenistan - 1/11/96
        Uganda -
        5/12/92
        Ukraine 4/10/72
        3/26/75
        United Arab Emirates 9/28/72
        6/19/08
        United Kingdom 4/10/72
        3/26/75
        United States 4/10/72
        3/26/75
        Uruguay -
        4/6/81
        Uzbekistan -
        1/11/96
        Vanuatu -
        10/12/90
        Venezuela 4/10/72
        10/18/78
        Vietnam -
        6/20/80
        Yemen [9]
        4/26/72
        6/1/79
        Zambia -
        1/15/08
        Zimbabwe -
        11/5/90

         

        Taiwan has also stated its intent to abide by the treaty, despite not being a state party. The Republic of China signed the treaty on April 10, 1972 and ratified it on February 9, 1973.

        Non-Signatory States

        • Andorra
        • Angola
        • Cameroon
        • Chad
        • Comoros
        • Djibouti
        • Eritrea
        • Guinea
        • Israel
        • Kiribati
        • Marshall Islands
        • Mauritania
        • Micronesia
        • Namibia
        • Nauru
        • Niue
        • Samoa
        • Tuvalu

        Source: BTWC Website

        Footnotes

        1. Succession from the United Kingdom

        2. Succession from Yugoslavia

        3. Succession from Czechoslovakia

        4. Ratification as Zaire

        5. Ratification as East Germany and West Germany

        6. Ratified as Serbia and Montenegro

        7. Ratified as the Soviet Union

        8. Succession from the United Kingdom

        9. Ratified as South Yemen and North Yemen

         

         

         

         

         

         

         

         

        Description: 

        Factsheet, August 2010

        Country Resources:

        Resource Page: The 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference

        May 2010

        Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107; Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy, (202) 463-8270 x104


        Online Resources and Documentation
        ACA’s Recommendations and Analysis
        U.S. Government Perspectives
        Fact Sheets
        Official Conference Documentation and Speeches
        Support ACA’s Work/ Subscribe to Arms Control Today

        Updated: May 2010

        Introduction

        From May 3-28, leaders from the nearly 190 members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), along with hundreds of nongovernmental organizations, will gather at the United Nations in New York to discuss how one of the world’s most vital international security instruments can be strengthened to address both long-standing and emerging nuclear challenges.

        Over the course of four decades, the NPT has established an indispensable yet imperfect set of interlocking nonproliferation and disarmament obligations and standards. Reinforced by nuclear export controls and the safeguards system, the NPT makes it far more difficult for non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire or build nuclear weapons and to do so without being detected. Equally important, NPT Article VI commits the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China to end the arms race, stop nuclear testing, and achieve nuclear disarmament.

        Rather than the dozens of nuclear-armed states that were forecast before the NPT entered into force in 1970, only four additional countries (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) have nuclear weapons today, and taboo against the use of nuclear weapons has grown stronger.

        Yet, once again the nonproliferation system is facing a crisis of confidence. New measures to renew and update the NPT bargain are needed.

        The May 2010 treaty review conference provides an important opportunity for the treaty’s 189 members to adopt a balanced action plan to improve nuclear safeguards, guard against treaty withdrawal, accelerate progress on disarmament, and address regional proliferation challenges.

        There is widespread support for common-sense initiatives that would advance treaty implementation and compliance. U.S. President Barack Obama’s renewed commitment to the NPT, deeper nuclear reductions, and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has rejuvenated hopes for a successful conference.

        But friction over Iran's controversial nuclear activities and pending action by the UN Security Council to further sanction Iran, as well as the lack of progress toward one NPT-related goal—the pursuit of a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone—threaten to overshadow the broad degree of support for the treaty and measures to strengthen it.

        To succeed, all states have a responsibility to fulfill their part of the NPT bargain and support common sense measures to update and strengthen the nonproliferation and disarmament system.

        Online Resources, Analysis, and Documentation from ACA

        ACA offers the following resources related to the NPT Review Conference:

        “Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: a Resource Guide,” March 2010, by Cole Harvey is available from http://www.armscontrol.org/reports. ACA’s 75-page guide outlines the major points of debate and governmental proposals for moving forward in key areas. It includes:

        • An overview of the recent history of the NPT;
        • A description of 14 key issues NPT members will address during the Review Conference along with positions and proposals;
        • Key NPT documentation, including the text of the treaty and decisions taken at past Review Conference;
        • A pictorial timeline of the history of the treaty.

        ACA’s Recommendations and Analysis

        Strengthen the Nonproliferation Bargain, Focus editorial by Daryl G. Kimball in Arms Control Today, May 2010: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Focus

        “Challenges and Solution for the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” Remarks by Daryl G. Kimball at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 31, 2010: http://www.armscontrol.org/events/StrengtheningNPT

        U.S. Government Perspectives

        “Previewing the NPT Review Conference,” Remarks by Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Washington, D.C., April 29, 2010: http://www.state.gov/t/us/141029.htm

        An interview with the U.S. Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Ambassador Susan Burk in Arms Control Today, March 2010: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/Burk

        Fact Sheets

        “The NPT at a Glance,” an ACA Fact Sheet: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact

        “Who Has What at a Glance,” an ACA Fact Sheet tallying states’ nuclear weapons holdings: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat

        “The IAEA Additional Protocol,” an ACA Fact Sheet outlining efforts to strengthen nuclear safeguards: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtoco

        Official Conference Documentation and Speeches

        Support ACA’s Work and Stay Informed

        • Become a member of the Arms Control Association
        • Subscribe to the leading journal in the field, Arms Control Today for only $25!
        Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

        Fact Sheet Categories:

        Proposed U.S. Arms Export Agreements From January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009

        March 2010

        Contact: Jeff AbramsonNon-Resident Senior Fellow for Arms Control and Conventional Arms Transfers, [email protected]

        Updated: March 2010

        During 2009, the Pentagon notified Congress of an estimated $38.6 billion in proposed, government-to-government, conventional arms transfer agreements with 20 countries.

        The United States conducts government-to-government transfers through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Not all notified sales result in final transactions. Under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be notified of proposed sales of “major defense equipment,” as defined on the U.S. Munitions List, that equals or exceeds $14 million; defense articles and services that are not defined as “major defense equipment” which total $50 million or more; and construction or design services amounting to or surpassing $200 million.[1] However, if the proposed sale involves NATO members, Australia, Japan, South Korea, or New Zealand, the notification thresholds are $25 million for major defense equipment, $100 million for other defense articles and services, and $300 million for construction or design services.[2] Once notified, Congress has 30 calendar days (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) to block a sale by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it has never stopped a sale once formally notified.

        The proposed 2009 arms sales total was approximately half as much as the sum of the 2008 proposed sales ($75 billion), and more similar to the sums of 2007 ($39 billion) and 2006 ($37 billion). The 2009 proposed sales were about three times the 2005 total ($12 billion) and 1997-2005 average ($14 billion), unadjusted for inflation.

        As in 2008, countries in the Middle East accounted for more than half the total value of proposed sales, with four of the top five countries (by total request value) located in the region. Proposed sales to Turkey were $9.0 billion, an increase of $8.4 billion from 2008, and the greatest boost in potential sales to one country during the period. Ankara’s request includes 14 CH-47F Chinook helicopters, often used for troop movement and other heavy-lift missions, and hundreds of Patriot missiles. Potential sales to Egypt were valued at $5.5 billion, up from $564 million in 2008, and also included Chinook helicopters. In addition to the Chinook, Cairo’s request featured more heavily armed weapons, including 24 F-16C/D fighter aircraft, 12 Apache Longbow helicopters, 450 Hellfire II missiles, 20 Harpoon II anti-ship cruise missiles. Other requests by Middle Eastern states came from Kuwait ($3.8 billion, up from $506 million in 2008), the United Arab Emirates ($3.4 billion, down from $9.0 billion in 2008), Iraq ($1.2 billion, down from $18.7 billion in 2008), Jordan ($814 million), and Bahrain ($74 million). No sales were proposed to Israel, which in 2008 requested more than $20 billion in weapons and services.

        Brazil’s 2009 request totaled $7.0 billion, the second largest single country total in 2009 and up from $525 million in 2008. Unlike many other notifications, the proposed sale of more than 30 Super Hornet fighter aircraft and associated armaments was made in advance of an official letter of request from Brazil. Instead, it was submitted as part of an international competition so that, “in the event that the…[U.S.] proposal is selected, the United States might move as quickly as possible to implement the sale,” according to the notification. As of year’s end, Brazil had not announced whether the U.S. bid was accepted.

        Below are the five countries that sought the highest values in U.S. arms exports in 2009 and some of their specific requests.

        Country

        Total Value

        Weapons/Services

        Turkey

        $9.0 billion

        • 72 PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles
        • 197 MIM-104E PATRIOT Guidance Enhanced Missiles-T (GEM-T)
        • 14 CH-47F CHINOOK Helicopters

        Brazil

        $7.0 billion

        • 28 F/A-18E Super Hornet Aircraft
        • 8 F/A-18F Super Hornet Aircraft
        • 72 F414-GE-400 installed engines
        • 28 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles
        • 28 AIM-9M SIDEWINDER missiles
        • 60 GBU-31/32 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)

        Egypt

        $5.5 billion

        • 24 F-16C/D Block 50/52 Aircraft
        • 12 AH-64D APACHE Longbow Helicopters
        • 6 CH-47D CHINOOK Helicopters
        • 450 HELLFIRE II Air-to-Surface Anti-Armor Missiles
        • 20 Harpoon Block II Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles

        Kuwait

        $3.8 billion

        • Facilities and infrastructure construction support services
        • PATRIOT sustainment and repair/return program
        • 8 KC-130J Multi-mission Cargo Refueling Aircraft
        • Technical/Logistics Support for F/A-18 Aircraft

        United Arab Emirates

        $3.4 billion

        • 16 CH-47F CHINOOK Helicopters
        • 362 AGM-114N3 HELLFIRE missiles
        • 800 MK-84 2000-pound bombs
        • 400 MK-82 500-pound bombs
        • 400 BLU-109/B 2000-pound bombs
        • Logistics support and training for 12 C-130J-30 Aircraft and 4 C-17 Globemaster Aircraft. Aircraft being purchased through the U.S. direct commercial sales program.

        Below are all 20 countries that sought U.S. arms exports in 2009 according to FMS notifications and the total value of their identified requests (in billions of U.S. dollars):

        CountryTotal Value
        ($ Billions)
        Turkey9.000
        Brazil7.000
        Egypt5.514
        Kuwait3.830
        UAE3.436
        Saudi Arabia2.207
        South Korea1.461
        Iraq1.200
        Chile.940
        Australia.860
        Jordan.814
        Ghana.680
        Morocco.463
        Singapore.365
        Netherlands.314
        Mexico.153
        Thailand.150
        Peru.082
        Bahrain.074
        Italy.063

        Below are the total values of all notified requests each year from 1997 to 2009 in billions of U.S. dollars as compiled each year, in current dollars (unadjusted for inflation):

        Year   Total Value
        ($ Billions, current dollars)
        200939
        200875
        200739
        200637
        200512
        200412
        20037
        200216
        200119
        200012
        199921
        199812
        199711

        Caitlin Taber assisted in the research and writing of this fact sheet.

        ENDNOTES
        1. The Department of State is also required to report to Congress any commercial sales it approves of “major defense equipment” that amount to $14 million or more, defense articles and services that equal or exceed $50 million, and any items defined as “significant military equipment.” As in the case of FMS sales, Congress can block the sale with a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 calendar days of notification (15 in the case of NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand). There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data comparable to the FMS notifications and what exists is often incomplete and less precise than data on government-to-government transactions (Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2008, Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, September 4, 2009, p. 18). The annual Section 655 report, prepared by the State and Defense Departments for Congress, details commercial licenses approved, but states have four years to act under the licenses. The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has final responsibility for license applications for commercial defense trade exports and all issues related to defense trade compliance, enforcement, and reporting.

        2. Congress approved the higher notification thresholds for NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand in legislation passed in September 2002. In October 2008, Congress added South Korea to this list.

        Sources: Congressional Research Service, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and Department of State.

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