Login/Logout

*
*  

"[Arms Control Today] has become indispensable! I think it is the combination of the critical period we are in and the quality of the product. I found myself reading the May issue from cover to cover."

– Frank von Hippel
Co-Director of Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
June 1, 2018
Fact Sheets & Briefs

Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran, 1967-2023

 

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

 

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, U.S. Secretary of State' John Kerry, and European Union High Representativ Catherine Ashton meet Sept. 25 at the Waldorf Astoria in New York.Iran and six world powers known as the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) reached a historic nuclear deal on July 14, 2015 that limited Iran's nuclear program and enhanced monitoring in exchange for relief from nuclear sanctions. Prior to that, Iran had been engaged in efforts to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons for more than two decades. Although it remained uncertain whether Tehran would have made the final decision to build nuclear weapons, it had developed a range of technologies, including uranium enrichment, warhead design, and delivery systems, that would give it this option in a relatively short time frame. Tehran maintains that its nuclear activities are entirely peaceful.

What follows is a chronological recount of the most significant developments in Iran’s nuclear program, international efforts to negotiate a settlement to address this controversial issue, and implementation of the agreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 on July 14, 2015.


Skip To: 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 20182019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

 

November 1967: Iran’s first nuclear reactor, the U.S. supplied five-megawatt Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) goes critical. It operates on uranium enriched to about 93 percent (it is converted to run on 20 percent in 1993,) which the United States also supplies.

1970s

February 1970: The Iranian parliament ratifies the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

1974: Shah Reza Pahlavi establishes the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and announces plans to generate about 23,000 megawatts of energy over 20 years, including the construction of 23 nuclear power plants and the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle.

1979: The Iranian Revolution and the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran result in a severing of U.S.-Iranian ties and damages Iran’s relationship with the West. Iranian nuclear projects are halted.

1980s

January 19, 1984: The U.S. Department of State adds Iran to its list of state sponsors of terrorism, effectively imposing sweeping sanctions on Tehran.

1987: Iran acquires technical schematics for building a P-1 centrifuge from the Abdul Qadeer Khan network.

1990s

1992: Congress passes the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, which prohibits the transfer of controlled goods or technology that might contribute “knowingly and materially” to Iran’s proliferation of advanced conventional weapons.

1993: Conversion of the TRR is completed by Argentina’s Applied Research Institute. It now runs on fuel enriched to just less than 20 percent, 115 kilograms of which is provided by Argentina; the contract for the conversion was signed in 1987.

August 5, 1996: The U.S. Congress passes the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, also known as the Iran Sanctions Act, that penalizes foreign and U.S. investment exceeding $20 million in Iran’s energy sector in one year.


 

2002

August 2002: The National Council of Resistance on Iran, the political wing of the terrorist organization Mujahideen-e Khalq (MeK), holds a press conference and declares Iran has built nuclear facilities near Natanz and Arak.

2003

September 12, 2003: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopts a resolution calling for Iran to suspend all enrichment – and reprocessing- related activities. The resolution requires Iran to declare all material relevant to its uranium-enrichment program and allow IAEA inspectors to conduct environmental sampling at any location. The resolution requires Iran to meet its conditions by October 31st 2003.

October 21, 2003: Iran agrees to meet IAEA demands by the October 31st deadline. In a deal struck between Iran and European foreign ministers, Iran agrees to suspend its uranium–enrichment activities and ratify an additional protocol requiring Iran to provide an expanded declaration of its nuclear activities and granting the IAEA broader rights of access to sites in the country.

2004

June 18, 2004: The IAEA rebukes Iran for failing to cooperate with IAEA inspectors. Iran responds by refusing to suspend enrichment-related activities as it had previously pledged.

November 14, 2004: Iran notifies the IAEA that it will suspend enrichment-related activities following talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. According to the so-called Paris Agreement, Iran would maintain the suspension for the duration of talks among the four countries. As a result, the IAEA Board of Governors decides not to refer Tehran to the UN Security Council.

2005

February 27, 2005: Russia and Iran conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement in which Russia would provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor it is constructing and Iran would return the spent nuclear fuel to Russia. The arrangement is aimed at preventing Iran from extracting plutonium for nuclear weapons from the spent nuclear fuel.

August 8, 2005: Iran begins producing uranium hexafluoride at its Isfahan facility. As a result, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom halt negotiations with Tehran.

September 24, 2005: The IAEA adopts a resolution finding Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement by a vote of 22-1 with 12 members abstaining. The resolution says that the nature of Iran’s nuclear activities and the lack of assurance in their peaceful nature fall under the purview of the UN Security Council, paving the way for a future referral.

2006

February 4, 2006: A special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors refers Iran to the UN Security Council. The resolution “deems it necessary for Iran to” suspend its enrichment-related activities, reconsider the construction of the Arak heavy-water reactor, ratify the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement, and fully cooperate with the agency’s investigation.

February 6, 2006: Iran tells the IAEA that it will stop voluntarily implementing the additional protocol and other non-legally binding inspection procedures.

April 11, 2006: Iran announces that it has enriched uranium for the first time. The uranium enriched to about 3.5 percent was produced at the Natanz pilot enrichment plant.

June 6, 2006: China, France, Germany, Russia the United Kingdom, and the United Sates (the P5+1, referring to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) propose a framework agreement to Iran offering incentives for Iran to halt its enrichment program for an indefinite period of time.

July 31, 2006: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1696, making the IAEA’s calls for Iran to suspend enrichment –related and reprocessing activities legally binding for the first time.

August 22, 2006: Iran delivers a response to the P5+1 proposal, rejecting the requirement to suspend enrichment but declaring that the package contained “elements which may be useful for a constructive approach.”

December 23, 2006: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1737, imposing sanctions on Iran for its failure to suspend its enrichment-related activities. The sanctions prohibit countries from transferring sensitive nuclear- and missile-related technology to Iran and require that all countries freeze the assets of ten Iranian organizations and twelve individuals for their involvement in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.

2007

March 24, 2007: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1747 in response to Iran’s continued failure to comply with the council’s demand to suspend Uranium enrichment.

August 21, 2007: Following three rounds of talks in July and August, the IAEA and Iran agree on a “work plan” for Iran to answer long-standing questions about its nuclear activities, including work suspected of being related to nuclear weapons development.

December 3, 2007: The United States publicly releases an unclassified summary of a new National Intelligence Estimate report on Iran’s nuclear program. The NIE says that the intelligence community judged “with high confidence” that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003 and assessed with moderate confidence that the program had not resumed as of mid-2007. The report defines Iran’s nuclear weapons program as “design and weaponization work” as well as clandestine uranium conversion and enrichment. The NIE also said that Iran was believed to be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon between 2010 and 2015.

2008

March 3, 2008: The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1803, further broadening sanctions on Iran. It requires increased efforts on the part of member states to prevent Iran from acquiring sensitive nuclear or missile technology and adds 13 persons and seven entities to the UN blacklist.

June 14, 2008: The P5+1 present a new comprehensive proposal to Iran updating its 2006 incentives package. The new proposal maintained the same basic framework as the one in 2006, but highlighted an initial “freeze-for-freeze” process wherein Iran would halt any expansion of its enrichment activities while the UN Security Council agreed not to impose additional sanctions.

2009

February 3, 2009: Iran announces that it successfully carried out its first satellite launch, raising international concerns that Iran’s ballistic missile potential was growing.

April 8, 2009: Following an Iran policy review by the new Obama administration, the United States announces that it would participate fully in the P5+1 talks with Iran, a departure from the previous administration’s policy requiring Iran to meet UN demands first.

June 12, 2009: Iran holds presidential elections. Incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is declared the winner amid many indications that the election was rigged. This sparks weeks of protests within Iran and delays diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program.

September 25, 2009: United States President Barack Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that Iran has been constructing a secret, second uranium-enrichment facility, Fordow, in the mountains near the holy city of Qom. IAEA spokesman Marc Vidricaire said that Iran informed the agency September 21 about the existence of the facility, but U.S. intelligence officials said Iran offered the confirmation only after learning that it had been discovered by the United States.

October 1, 2009: The P5+1 and Iran agree “in principle” to a U.S.-initiated, IAEA-backed, proposal to fuel the TRR. The proposal entails Iran exporting the majority of its 3.5 percent enriched Uranium in return for 20 percent-enriched uranium fuel for the TRR, which has exhausted much of its supply. This agreement was later met with domestic political opposition in Iran, resulting in attempts by Tehran to change the terms of the “fuel swap.”

2010

February 9, 2010: Iran begins the process of producing 20 percent enriched uranium, allegedly for the TRR.

May 17, 2010: Brazil, Iran, and Turkey issue a joint declaration attempting to resuscitate the TRR fuel-swap proposal. In the declaration, Iran agrees to ship 1,200 kilograms of 3.5 percent enriched uranium to Turkey in return for TRR fuel from France and Russia. France, Russia, and the United States reject the arrangement, citing Iran’s larger stockpile of 3.5 percent-enriched uranium and the failure of the declaration to address Iran’s enrichment to 20 percent.

June 9, 2010: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1929, significantly expanding sanctions against Iran. In addition to tightening proliferation-related sanctions and banning Iran from carrying out nuclear-capable ballistic missile tests, the resolution imposes an arms embargo on the transfer of major weapons systems to Iran.

June 24, 2010: Congress adopts the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act; tightening U.S. sanctions against firms investing in Iran’s energy sector, extending those sanctions until 2016, and imposing new sanctions on companies that sell refined petroleum to Iran.

July 26, 2010: The EU agrees to further sanctions against Iran. A statement issued by EU member state foreign ministers refers to the new sanctions as “a comprehensive and robust package of measures in the areas of trade, financial services, energy, [and] transport, as well as additional designations for [a] visa ban and asset freeze.

September 16, 2010: The Stuxnet computer virus is first identified by a security expert as a directed attack against an Iranian nuclear-related facility, likely to be the Natanz enrichment plant.

2011

January 21-22, 2011: Following a December meeting in Geneva, the P5+1 meets with Iran in Istanbul, but the two sides do not arrive at any substantive agreement. Iran’s two preconditions for further discussions on a fuel-swap plan and transparency measures, recognition of a right to enrichment and the lifting of sanctions, were rejected by the P5+1.

February 16, 2011: U.S. intelligence officials tell a Senate committee that Iran has not yet decided whether it wants to develop nuclear weapons but is keeping that option open through development of its material capabilities.

May 8, 2011: Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant begins operations and successfully achieves a sustained chain reaction two days later, according to Atomstroyexport, the Russian state-owned company constructing and operating the plant.

June 8, 2011: Iran announces that it intends to triple the rate of 20 percent-enriched uranium production using more-advanced centrifuge designs. It also says it will move production to the Fordow enrichment plant near Qom, which is still under construction.

July 12, 2011: Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov unveils a proposal wherein Iran would take steps to increase cooperation with the IAEA and carry out confidence-building measures in return for a gradual easing of sanctions.

October 21, 2011: EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, sends a letter to Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili calling for “meaningful discussions on concrete confidence-building steps” to address international concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

November 8, 2011: The IAEA releases a report detailing a range of activities related to nuclear weapons development in which Iran is suspected to have engaged as part of a structured program prior to 2004. The report raises concerns that some weapons-related activities occurred after 2003. The information in the report is based primarily on information received from other countries, but also includes information from the agency’s own investigation. The findings appear consistent with the U.S. 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.

December 31, 2011: As part of the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress passes legislation that will allow the United States to sanction foreign banks if they continue to process transactions with the Central Bank of Iran.

2012

January 2012: The EU passes a decision that will ban all member countries from importing Iranian oil beginning July 1, 2012. Other provisions of the decision will prevent member countries from providing the necessary protection and indemnity insurance for tankers carrying Iranian oil.

January 29-31, 2012: Following an exchange of letters between Iran and the IAEA, it was agreed that an Agency team would travel to Tehran to begin discussions on the IAEA’s investigations into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program laid out in the November 2011 IAEA report.

February 15, 2012: Jalili responds to Ashton’s Oct. 21 letter, while Iran simultaneously announces a number of nuclear advances, including the domestic production of a fuel plate for the TRR.

April 14, 2012: Iran meets with the P5+1 in Istanbul for talks both sides call “positive.” They agree on a framework of continuing negotiations with a step-by-step process and reciprocal actions.

May 23-24, 2012: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Baghdad for a second set of talks.

June 18-19, 2012: Talks between Iran and the P5+1 continue in Moscow. Representatives discuss the substance of a P5+1 proposal and an Iranian proposal. Ashton and Jalili announce that will determine if political-level talks will continue after a technical-level meeting in July.

July 3, 2012: Experts representing the six parties meet in Istanbul to discuss the technical aspects of the P5+1 proposal and the Iranian proposal.

July 24, 2012: Schmid and Bagheri meet in Istanbul to discuss the outcome of the technical level experts meeting and confirm that Ashton and Jalili will talk to determine the future of the negotiations.

August 30, 2012: The IAEA reports that Iran increased the number of centrifuges installed at the Fordow enrichment plant and is continuing to produce uranium enriched to 20 percent in excess of its needs for the Tehran Research Reactor.

September 2012: Ashton and Jalili meet in Istanbul to assess “common points” reached at the low-level expert talks held in early July. The meeting was not considered a formal negotiation.

September 27, 2012: In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu draws a red-line for an Israeli attack on Iran. Netanyahu defines his red-line as Iran amassing enough uranium enriched to 20 percent (approximately 250 kilograms), which, when further enriched, will be enough for one bomb.

November 16, 2012: The IAEA reports that since August, Iran completed installation of the approximately 2,800 centrifuges that Fordow is designed to hold, although the number enriching remains constant. The number of cascades producing 20 percent enriched uranium remains constant at Fordow. The report also notes that Iran installed more centrifuges at Natanz, and continued producing uranium enriched to 20 percent.

2013

February 26, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 resume negotiations in Almaty, Kazakhstan over Iran's nuclear program. The P5+1 offers Iran an updated proposal based largely on the 2012 package.

April 5-6, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 meet again in Almaty for a second round of talks. At the end of the meetings, negotiators announce that no further meetings are scheduled and the sides remain far apart.

June 3, 2013: At the quarterly meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, Director General Yukiya Amano says that the agency's talks with Iran over clarifying the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program have not made any progress.

June 14, 2013: Hassan Rouhani is elected president of Iran. A former nuclear negotiator, he asserts that Iran will maintain its nuclear program, but offers to be more transparent.

August 6, 2013: Three days after his inauguration, Iran's President Hasan Rouhani calls for the resumption of serious negotiations with the P5+1 on Iran's nuclear program.

September 26, 2013: The P5+1 foreign ministers meet with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif on the sidelines on the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. Zarif presents the P5+1 with a new proposal that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry describes as “very different in the vision” of possibilities for the future. Zarif and Kerry meeting for a bilateral exchange after the larger group meeting. Zarif later says he and Kerry move to agree “first, on the parameters of the end game.” Zarif says Iran and the P5+1 will think about the order of steps that need to be implemented to “address the immediate concerns of [the] two sides” and move toward finalizing a deal within a year. The parties agree to meet again on October 15 in Geneva.

September 27, 2013: President Barack Obama calls Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, marking the highest level contact between the U.S. and Iran since 1979. While President Obama says that there will be significant obstacles to overcome, he believes a comprehensive resolution can be reached.

In Vienna, Iran's new envoy to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, meets with IAEA deputy director Herman Nackaerts to resume negotiations on the structured approach to resolving the agency's concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Both sides describe the meeting as constructive and agree to meet again on October 28.

October 15-16, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Geneva to resume negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. At the end of the talks, the parties release a joint statement describing the meetings as "substantive and forward looking." The statement also says that Iran presented a new proposal that the P5+1 carefully considered as an "important contribution" to the talks. The proposal is understood to contain a broad framework for a comprehensive agreement and an interim confidence building measure to be instituted over the next 3-6 months, but no details are given as the parties agreed to keep the negotiations confidential.

Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, says after the talks that Iran approached the meetings "with a candor" she had not heard in her two years of negotiating with Tehran. The parties agree to meet again November 7-8 in Geneva with an experts level meeting October 30-31.

October 28-29, 2013: Iran meets with the IAEA to continue discussions over the agency's investigations into Iran's past nuclear activities with possible military dimensions. According to a joint statement, Iran presented a new proposal at the talks that contained "practical measures" to "strengthen cooperation and dialogue with a view to future resolution of all outstanding issues." Iran and the IAEA agree to meet again in Tehran on November 11.

November 7-10, 2013: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Geneva to continue negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. On November 8, with the expectation that a deal is close, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry flies to Geneva to join the talks, as do the foreign ministers from the other P5+1 countries. The parties fail to reach an agreement on a first-phase deal, but announce that talks will continue on November 20 in Geneva.

Secretary Kerry says in Nov. 10 press conference that the parties "narrowed the differences" and made significant progress toward reaching an agreement during the talks.

November 11, 2013: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and Ali Akbar Salehi meet in Tehran to continue talks on an approach for the agency's investigations into Iran's past nuclear activities with possible military dimensions. Amano and Salehi sign a Framework for Cooperation Agreement. The framework lays out initial practical steps to be take by Iran within three months, including allowing IAEA access to the Heavy Water Production Plant at Arak and the Gchine uranium mine, and providing the agency with information on new research reactors and nuclear power plants that Iran intends to build. The statement commits the parties to cooperation "aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA."

November 20-24, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 meet again in Geneva to continue negotiations. On November 23, the foreign ministers from the P5+1 join the negotiations. Early on November 24, Iranian Minister Javad Zarif and Catherine Ashton, leader of the P5+1 negotiating team, sign an agreement called the Joint Plan of Action. It lays out specific steps for each side in a six-month, first-phase agreement, and the broad framework to guide negotiations for a comprehensive solution.

The first-phase pauses further developments in Iran's nuclear program, rolls back significant elements like the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, and requires more extensive IAEA monitoring and access to nuclear sites. In return, Iran receives limited sanctions relief, repatriation of limited assets frozen abroad, and a commitment that no new nuclear-related sanctions will be imposed on Iran for the duration of the agreement. For more details on the agreement, click here.

The plan will establish a Joint Commission to monitor the agreement and work with the IAEA. The six month period can be extended by mutual consent of both parties.

December 8, 2013: Under the terms of the Framework for Cooperation Agreement the IAEA visits the Arak Heavy Water Production Plant.

December 9-12, 2013: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Geneva at the technical level to begin discussions on the implementation of the Nov. 24 Joint Plant of Action.

December 11, 2013: Iran and the IAEA meet again in Vienna to review progress made on the six actions that Iran agreed to take as part of the Framework for Cooperation Agreement. The parties also begin discussing the next practical steps for Iran to take and initially plan to meet again on Jan. 21 to finalize the measures. The meeting is later postponed at the request of Iran to Feb. 8.

December 30-31, 2013: Technical level discussions between Iran and the P5+1 on implementing the Joint Plan of Action continue in Geneva.

2014

January 9-10, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 meet for a third time in Geneva to discuss implementation. The parties reach an agreement and return to their respective capitals for approval.

January 12, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 announce that implementation of the Joint Plan of Action will begin on Jan. 20.

January 20, 2014: Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action begins. The IAEA issues a report on Iran's compliance with the deal. The report states that Iran is adhering to the terms of the agreement, including, halting enrichment of uranium to 20 percent, beginning to blend down half of the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to 3.5 percent, and halting work on the Arak Heavy Water Reactor. The IAEA also begins more intrusive and frequent inspections.

The United States and the European Union also issue statements saying they have taken the necessary steps to waive the specific sanctions outlined in the Nov. 24 deal and release a schedule of payments for Iran to receive oil money held up in the other countries.

February 9, 2014: Iran and the IAEA meet to discuss further actions for Iran to take under the November 11 framework agreement to resolve the agency’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. They agree on additional actions, including Iran’s past work on exploding bridgewire detonators, one of the past activities with possible military dimensions.

February 17-20, 2014: Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 on the comprehensive agreement begin in Vienna. The parties agree on an agenda and framework to guide the talks

March 17-20, 2014: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Vienna to continue negotiations.

April 7-9, 2014: Another round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 take place in Vienna.

May 13-16, 2014: The P5+1 and Iran begin drafting the comprehensive agreement.

May 21, 2014: Iran and the IAEA announce an additional five actions for Iran to complete before August 25. Two of the activities that Iran agrees to provide information on relate to possible military dimensions.

June 2-6, 2014: At the IAEA board meeting Director General Yukiya Amano says that Iran is complying with the terms of the interim agreement and the agency's investigation into the unresolved concerns about Iran's nuclear program. The agency's quarterly report shows that Iran has neutralized nearly all of its stockpile of 20 percent uranium gas by dilution or conversion to powder form.

June 16-20, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 hold another round of negotiations in Vienna.

July 2-19, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 continue talks in Vienna on a comprehensive nuclear agreement. Early on June 19, the parties announce that they will extend the talks through November 24 and keep the measures agreed to in the interim agreement in place. The parties also announce additional actions that Iran will take, namely converting 25 kg of uranium powder enriched to 20 percent into fuel plates and blending down about 3 tons of uranium enriched to less than 2 percent. The P5+1 will also repatriate $2.8 billion in funds. The parties agree to resume talks in August.

August 25, 2014: Iran misses a deadline to complete actions on five areas of concern to the IAEA as part of the agreement that Iran and the agency reached in November 2013.

September 5, 2014: The IAEA's quarterly report on Iran's nuclear program shows that Iran is complying with the interim deal, but did not provide the IAEA with information about past activities with possible military dimensions (PMDs) by the Aug. 25 deadline.

September 18, 2014: Talks between Iran and the P5+1 resume in New York City on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Both sides say that little progress was made at the end of the talks.

October 14-16, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Vienna to continue negotiations. Officials say that they remain focused on reaching an agreement by the Nov. 24 deadline and progress was made during the talks.

November 9-10, 2014: Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State Kerry meet in Muscat, Oman to continue talks. P5+1 lead negotiator Catherine Ashton is also present.

November 18-24, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Vienna to continue negotiations on an comprehensive agreement. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry joins the talks on Nov. 20. French Foreign Minister Fabiusu, British Foreign Secretary Hammond, and German Foreign Minister Steinmeier all join the talks between Nov. 20 and 22. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov arrives on Nov. 23 and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang on Nov. 24.

November 24, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 announce that negotiations will be extended because progress was made on the difficult issues and both sides see a path forward. The parties announce that they now aim to reach a political agreement by March and then complete the technical annexes by June 30. Both sides will continue to implement the conditions of the interim Joint Plan of Action from November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 also make additional commitments.

December 15, 2014: Talks between the P5+1 and Iran continue in Geneva. U.S. State Department officials say the talks are "good and substantive." Parties plan to meet again in January.

December 24, 2014: Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif says in a letter to his foreign counterparts that Iran’s goal remains to reach a comprehensive nuclear deal that assures the world its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

2015

January 15-18, 2015: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Geneva to continue negotiations.

January 21, 2015: In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 21, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken says: "We assess that we still have a credible chance of reaching a deal that is in the best interest of America's security, as well as the security of our allies."  

January 23-24, 2015: Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman and European Union Political Director Helga Schmid meet again with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Zurich, Switzerland.

February 18-20, 2015: Talks between the P5+1 and Iran resume in Vienna.

February 19, 2015: A report by the Director General of the IAEA confirms that Iran is upholding its commitments under the interim deal, including additional provisions from the November 2014 extension. The report notes “Iran has continued to provide the Agency with managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.”

March 3, 2015: Prime Minister Netanyahu delivers a speech to a joint session of Congress. His speech claims that the Iran deal  “would all but guarantee that Iran gets [nuclear] weapons, lots of them.”

March 9, 2015: Senator Tom Cotton and 46 other senators sign an open letter to the Parliament of Iran. The letter warns that any deal reached without legislative approval could be revised by the next president “with the stroke of a pen.”

March 17-20, 2015: Talks between the P5+1 and Iran continue in Lausanne. The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, says to reporters "We have made progress on technical issues… One or two issues remain and need to be discussed."

March 25-April 2, 2015: Negotiations continue in Lausanne. By March 29, all of the Foreign Ministers from the seven countries involved and EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini are present.

April 2, 2015: Iran and the P5+1 announce agreement on a general framework that outlines the broad parameters of a nuclear deal. The United States issues a more specific factsheet on the details. Iran and the P5+1 agree to continue meeting to finalize a deal before June 30.

April 14, 2015: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passes legislation authored by Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) that will require the President to submit the deal to Congress for a vote of approval or disapproval. According to the legislation, the President will not be able to waive sanctions during the 30 day Congressional review period.

April 15, 2015: Iran and the IAEA meet in Tehran to continue discussing the agency's investigations into the possibly military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.

April 27, 2015: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif meet in New York on the sidelines of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. Technical drafting work on the annexes of the agreement is underway.

May 7, 2015: The Senate passes the Corker legislation 98-1 on congressional review of an Iran nuclear deal.

May 12, 2015: EU and Iranian negotiators meet in Vienna to continue drafting a comprehensive agreement.

June 26, 2015: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrives in Vienna to continue negotiations on a nuclear deal with Iran and the P5+1. U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz joins Kerry. 

July 14, 2015: Iran and the P5+1 announce a comprehensive deal. Iran and the IAEA announce a roadmap for the agency's investigation into the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.

July 19, 2015: The Obama administration sends the comprehensive deal and supporting documents to Congress, beginning the 60 day review period mandated by the Iran Nuclear Deal Review Act.

July 20, 2015: The UN Security Council unanimously passes a resolution endorsing the nuclear deal and the lifting of UN Security Council nuclear sanctions once key steps are taken in the deal.

August 15, 2015: The IAEA confirms that Iran submitted documents and explanations to answer the agency's unresolved concerns about past activities that could be related to nuclear weapons development.

September 2, 2015: The 34th Senator announces support for the nuclear deal with Iran, meaning that Congress will not have the support to override a presidential veto on a resolution disapproving of the deal.

September 8, 2015: Four additional Senators announce that they will support the nuclear deal with Iran, bringing the total number to 42. This important milestone will prevent the Senate from reaching the 60 vote threshold required for ending debate and moving to vote on a resolution of disapproval.

September 9, 2015: The IAEA announces that is submitted follow-up questions to Iran based on the information provided by Iran on Aug. 15. The IAEA is ahead of its Sept. 15 deadline to submit the questions.

September 10, 2015: A vote to end debate and move to vote on a resolution of disapproval fails to reach the required 60 votes on the Senate floor. The measure fails 58-42. Four democrats joined the 54 Republicans in favor of moving to vote on the resolution of disaproval. Similar votes fail on Sept. 15 and Sept. 17.

September 11, 2015: A vote on a resolution of approval fails in the House of Representatives, 269-162, with 25 Democrats voting joining the Republicans in voting against the measure.

September 17, 2015: The congressional review period ends without passage of a resolution of approval or a resolution of disapproval.

September 20, 2015: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and Deputy Director General Tero Varjoranta visit the Parchin site at Iran. The IAEA has concerns about Iran conducting explosive activities there relevant to a nuclear device. Amano and Varjoranta confirm that environmental sampling was done at the site under IAEA surveillance and the agency is now testing the samples.

October 4, 2015: A panel of Iranian lawmakers reviewing the JCPOA release their assessment of the deal. The report issued says that the agreement contains some security threats, such as allowing inspectors access to military sites, but should go ahead.

October 10, 2015: Iran tests a medium-range ballistic missile, the Emad. The Emad is a more precise version of the Shahab-3, believed to be capable of carrying a 750 kg payload over 1,700 kilometers. The test is a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), which prohibits Iran from testing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. 

October 10, 2015: Iran's parliament approves a preliminary bill supporting the Iran deal. 

October 13, 2015: Iran's parliament approves a detailed bill supporting the Iran deal.

October 14, 2015Iran's Guardian Council ratifies the bill approved by the parliament, completing Iran's internal review of the agreement. 

October 15, 2015: The IAEA announces the activities laid out in the July 14 roadmap for the investigation into the past possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program has been completed. The IAEA aims to complete its report by Dec. 15.  

October 18, 2015Iran and the P5+1 formally adopt the nuclear deal. Iran begins taking steps to restrict its nuclear program. The United States issues waivers on nuclear-related sanctions to come into effect on implementation day. The EU announces it passed legislation to lift nuclear-related sanctions on implementation day. 

October 18, 2015Iran notifies the IAEA of that it will provisionally implement its additional protocol and modified Code 3.1 to its safeguards agreement as of implementation day.

October 19, 2015The first meeting of the Joint Commission takes place in Vienna. One of the purposes of the meeting is to set up working groups called for under the deal, such as the working group on procurement and the Arak reactor modification.  

October 20, 2015The Supreme Leader issues a statement endorsing the nuclear deal and bill passed by the Iranian parliament. 

October 21, 2015The United States raises Iran's ballistic missile test as a possible violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 at a meeting of the Security Council. 

November 21, 2015Iran tests another medium-range ballistic missile in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929. 

December 2, 2015: The IAEA issues its assessment of Iran's past activities related to nuclear weapons development (PMDs). The IAEA assess that Tehran had an organized weapons program prior to 2003 and that some activities continued, although not as an organized effort, through 2009. The report says that the agency has no credible indication that nuclear material was diverted from Iran's declared program or that any activities continued after 2009.

December 15, 2015: The IAEA Board of Governors holds a special meeting to consider the Dec. 2 report on Iran's weaponization activities. The board passes a resolution terminating past resolutions on Iran's nuclear program and ending the investigation. The board requests that the IAEA continue reporting on Iran's nuclear activities under the nuclear deal and report immediately on any concerns that arise with Iran's implementation.

December 28, 2015: Iran announces that it shipped 8.5 tonnes of low-enriched uranium, including the 20 percent enriched material in scrap and waste, out of the country to Russia. In return, Iran receives 140 tonnes of uranium yellowcake.

2016

January 11, 2016: Iranian officials announce that the Arak reactor core is being disabled. Iranian and P5+1 officials say that implementation day is close.

January 16, 2016The IAEA verifies that Iran met its nuclear related commitments. Based on the IAEA report, Zarif and Mogherini announce implementation day, triggering the lifting of sanctions. UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council passed in July to endorse the deal and trigger the lifting of UN sanctions comes into effect. Prior resolutions on Iran's nuclear program are terminated. 

January 17, 2016: The U.S. Treasury Department issues an announcement that new sanctions will be imposed on 11 individuals and entities involved with Iran's ballistic missile programs. U.S. President Barack Obama says that with implementation of the nuclear deal Iran will not obtain nuclear weapons and that "the region, the United States, and the world will be more secure." Iranian President Hassan Rouhani gives a speech saying that "Iran's nuclear rights have been accepted by all." 

January 26, 2016Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that Iran and China had signed a basic agreement to formalize China’s assistance in redesigning the Arak reactor during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran the previous week. 

February 11, 2016: Abbas Qaidaari, director of the Defense and Security Studies Department at the Center for Strategic Studies in the Office of the Iranian President, writes in a piece for the Atlantic Council that “Iran’s strategic defense plan currently sees no justification” for missile ranges greater than 2,000-2,300 kilometers. Qaidaari said that although Tehran is committed to developing its “deterrent conventional defense capabilities,” it will limit its ballistic missiles to that range.

February 26, 2016The IAEA issues its first quarterly report on Iran's post-implementation day nuclear activities. The report notes that Iran is meeting its nuclear obligations, although it slightly exceeded a cap set on the stockpile of heavy water allowed under the agreement. The IAEA notes that Iran had 130.9 metric tons of heavy water, slightly above the 130 metric ton limit set by the deal, but shipped out 20 metric tons on February 24 to stay below the limit. 

March 9, 2016: Iran test launches two different variations of the Qadr medium-range ballistic missile. 

March 14, 2016U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power says she raised Iran's ballistic missile tests at a Security Council meeting, saying that the tests are inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2231. 

March 15, 2016Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif defends Iran's missile launches saying that the missiles are permissible under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 because the missiles are not designed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads. 

March 21, 2016: Then-candidate Trump delivers remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s annual conference, noting his “number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”

April 22, 2016: Officials from Iran and the United States meet in Vienna, signing a purchase agreement for Washington to buy 32 metric tons of heavy water for $8.6 million. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif meet in New York to discuss implementation of the deal. In remarks after the meeting Kerry says that Washington is working to clarify confusion amongst foreign banks about the sanctions lifted in January. 

May 27, 2016The IAEA issues its quarterly report on Iran's implementation of the nuclear deal. The report shows Iran is abiding by restrictions under the agreement and inspectors have been able to access certain Iranian sites using complimentary access visits. 

July 18, 2016Iran's research and development plan for advanced centrifuge machines, leaked to the AP, is reported on in the press. 

July 29, 2016: In a statement, the IAEA notes it sent a letter to Iran denying it was the source of leaked information about Iranian plans for phasing in advanced centrifuges in 2027.

September 8, 2016: The IAEA releases its third quarterly report since JCPOA implementation day, showing Iran continues to abide by its restrictions under the JCPOA. The report notes that Iran removed 96 IR-1 centrifuges from the storage area at Natanz to replace damaged centrifuges that were enriching uranium.

September 21, 2016: The U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control grants Airbus and Boeing permission to sell planes to Iran. The licenses were made possible by sanctions waived as part of the JCPOA. 

September 22, 2016: Iran and the P5+1 meet in New York to review progress on JCPOA implementation and the pace of sanctions relief. The meeting marks the first ministerial-level meeting since the announcement of the deal’s implementation in January. Speaking to the UN General Assembly on the same day, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani expresses concern over the slow pace of sanctions relief and claims the U.S. has been in lack of compliance.

September 26, 2016: Sergei Kireienko, head of Rosatom, the state-run Russian nuclear energy company, announces that Moscow purchased 38 tons of heavy-water from Iran. The material was delivered to Russia in mid-September.

November 2, 2016: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano expresses concern to Iranian leaders regarding the size of Iran’s heavy water stock. On November 8th, the Agency confirms that Iran’s heavy water stock, at 130.1 tons, exceeds the 130 metric ton limit outlined in the deal, marking the second time Iran has exceeded the limit. On November 9th, Iran informs the IAEA of plans to remain in compliance by transferring heavy water out of the country.

November 8, 2016: Donald Trump is elected as the 45th President of the United States. During the presidential campaign, Trump referred to the JCPOA as the worst deal ever negotiated and pledged to renegotiate it. The U.S.’s European allies in the P5+1 previously signaled they would resist efforts to renegotiate the deal.

November 20, 2016: IAEA releases its fourth quarterly report on Iranian nuclear program since JCPOA implementation day. The report notes that Iran had 130.1 metric tons of heavy water, slightly over the 130 metric tons permitted under the deal. The IAEA report says Iran plans to transfer heavy water out of the country.

December 1, 2016: Congress passes a 10-year extension of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), which becomes law on December 15th. Extension of the ISA is consistent with U.S. obligations under the JCPOA, although many of the ISA’s provisions are being waived under Washington’s commitments under the agreement.

December 6, 2016: IAEA verifies that all 11 metric tons of heavy water shipped out of Iran have reached their destination and are in storage, bringing Iran back within the limit on heavy water of 130 metric tons established by the JCPOA.

December 13, 2016: President Rouhani announces Iran will respond to Washington’s extension of the Iran Sanctions Act by researching and developing nuclear propulsion for marine vessels.

December 15, 2016: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reissues sanctions waivers early, on the same day that the ISA renewal comes into effect, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the JCPOA.

December 18, 2016: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano visits Iran, meeting with President Rouhani and Ali Akhbar Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization. Amano and Salehi discussed issues related to implementation. Further, Amano sought clarification on Iran’s announcement regarding naval nuclear reactor research and development.

December 23, 2016: The IAEA, at the request of Federica Mogherini, circulates decisions made by the Joint Commission set up to oversee implementation of the nuclear deal. The documents contain additional information on hot cells, recovering waste uranium, describing and calculating efficiency for advanced centrifuges, and utilizing the procurement channel.  

2017

January 12, 2017: In his confirmation hearing for the position of Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis tells Congress that, while he believes the JCPOA is an imperfect agreement, “when America gives her word, we have to live up to it and work with our allies.” His remarks echo a previous statement in April, when he noted there is “no going back” on the deal absent a clear violation of the agreement.

Iran receives the first shipment in an order of 100 planes purchased from Airbus. Sanctions waived as part of the nuclear deal allow Iran to purchase new commercial aircraft.

January 15, 2017: IAEA verifies that Tehran has taken certain steps to remove infrastructure and excess centrifuges from Fordow within the necessary timeframe required by the JCPOA (one year after Implementation Day). Secretary of Energy Moniz releases a statement noting “Iran successfully met the milestone of removing excess centrifuges and infrastructure from Fordow, demonstrating that the deal continues to limit Iran’s nuclear program so as to provide confidence that Iran is not developing a nuclear weapon and maintain at least a one year breakout time.”

January 28, 2017: Iran test fires a medium-range ballistic missile, in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The test prompts former NSA Michael Flynn, on February 1, to declare the United States has placed Iran “on notice.”

February 9, 2017: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini travels to Washington for meetings with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, and members of Congress. Mogherini notes that the JCPOA is key for the security of Europe given its geographic proximity to Iran.

February 24, 2017: IAEA releases its first quarterly report on Iranian nuclear activity in 2017, reporting on the size of Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent for the first time. The report notes that the stockpile was 101.7 kilograms. The limit established by the deal is 300 kilograms.

March 23, 2017: Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) introduces a new Iran sanctions bill, the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, targeting Iran’s ballistic missile program and support for terrorism.

March 31, 2017: Former Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken and six former Obama administration officials release an op-ed in Foreign Policy outlining their opposition to the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017.

April 18, 2017: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, in a letter to speaker of the House Paul Ryan, certifies to Congress that Iran is compliant in meeting its obligations under the JCPOA.

April 23, 2017: Iran and China resolve a price dispute and complete an agreement to modify Iran’s Arak reactor. China will work with Iran to carry out modifications stipulated by the JCPOA to reduce the reactor’s output of weapons-grade plutonium.  

May 16, 2017: Ambassador Wendy Sherman, the lead U.S. negotiator for the JCPOA, states her opposition to the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, noting its potential to undermine the nuclear accord.

May 17, 2017: The U.S. renews sanctions waivers as required by its JCPOA obligations, marking the first time the Trump administration has waived sanctions and taken a proactive step to implement the deal.

May 19, 2017: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is re-elected to a second term. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini congratulates Rouhani on Twitter and reaffirms the EU’s commitment to full JCPOA implementation.

June 2, 2017: The IAEA releases its second quarterly report in 2017 on Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA, reporting that Iran is meeting its obligations under the nuclear deal. 

June 15, 2017: Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 (S.722) passes the Senate by a vote of 98-2. The bill was amended to correct sections that violated the JCPOA, but Iran continued to assert that the bill contradicts the spirit of the deal. 

June 20, 2017: The UN Secretary General releases the biannual report on UN Security Council Resolution 2231, affirming that Iran is complying with the JCPOA but raising concerns about Iran’s ballistic missile activity. 

July 10, 2017: White House Spokesperson Sarah Huckabee Sanders says that at the G20 summit, President Trump encouraged foreign leaders not to do business with Iran, which Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif later cited as a failure on the part of the United States to “implement its part of the bargain” in an interview

July 17, 2017: The Trump administration reluctantly certifies Iran's compliance with the JCPOA, delaying the announcement for hours and issuing new non-nuclear sanctions on Iran the next day.  

July 21, 2017: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA meets for the sixth time to address the implementation of the agreement. 

July 25, 2017: The U.S. House of Representatives passes H.R. 3364, the Countering Adversarial Nations Through Sanctions Act, which would impose new sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Russia. 

August 31, 2017: In its third quarterly report, the IAEA finds that as of Aug. 21, Iran’s stock of low-enriched uranium was 88.4 kg (194.89 pounds), well below a 202.8-kg limit, and the level of enrichment did not exceed a 3.67 percent cap. Iran’s stock of heavy water, stood at 111 tons, below the 130 ton limit.

September 20, 2017: The foreign ministers of China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly for the ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran. In remarks following the meeting, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini states that all agreed that all sides are implementing the JCPOA.

September 22, 2017: Iran parades its new medium-range ballistic missile tested in January, the Khoramshahr, with a range of about 2,000 km, in a military parade.

October 13, 2017: Trump declares that, as part of a broader new strategy toward Iran, he will not certify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) that the suspension of sanctions under the JCPOA is "appropriate and proportionate" to measures taken by Iran under the deal. Trump's decertification itself does not violate the JCPOA. However, decertification opens up a window of 60 days where Congress may re-introduce sanctions waived under the nuclear deal with Iran under an expedited process. In his address, Trump encourages Congress to enact legislation against the JCPOA's "sunset clauses" which set dates after which certain restrictions under the deal on Iran's nuclear program will no longer apply. Trump says if his concerns about the deal are not resolved he will terminate the agreement.

Trump also states that he will further sanction the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for its support for terrorism, but does not designate the group as a terrorist organization.

Immediately following the announcement, UK Prime Minister Theresa May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron released a joint statement expressing their continued support for the JCPOA.

November 13, 2017: The IAEA issues its fourth quarterly report for 2017 on Iran's implementation of the JCPOA. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano tells the agency's Board of Governors that the nuclear-related commitments are being implemented and that IAEA inspectors have had access to all locations they have needed to visit.

December 13, 2017: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets for the seventh time to oversee the implementation of the agreement.

December 15, 2017: UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issues the biannual report on the implementation of Resolution 2231. The report notes that the nuclear deal is being implemented but finds that Iran has violated the arms embargo provisions of Resolution 2231. The report also notes that the secretariat is continuing to investigate allegations that ballistic missiles launched at Saudi Arabia from Yemen were transferred by Iran to the Houthis in violation of 2231. Iran denies the claims.

2018

January 12, 2018: The Trump administration announces that it will re-issue waivers on nuclear-related sanctions on Iran to meet U.S. obligations under the agreement. However, Trump says he will not re-issue the waivers again and will withdraw from the deal unless Congress passes legislation addressing what he describes as flaws in the agreement. Trump says his administration is also engaging with European allies on a supplemental agreement of unlimited duration that would impose sanctions if Iran tests long-range missiles, thwarts inspections, or makes progress toward a nuclear weapon.

January 26, 2018: The UN panel of experts assessing implementation of sanctions on Yemen finds Iran in noncompliance with its obligations under the arms embargo established by Resolution 2216. The report notes that Iran did not take "necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer” of short-range ballistic missiles and other equipment. Iran disputes the report and argues that the evidence is fabricated.

February 22, 2018: The IAEA issues its first quarterly report for 2018 on Iran's implementation of the JCPOA. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano tells the agency's Board of Governors that the nuclear-related commitments are being implemented and that IAEA inspectors have had access to all locations they have needed to visit. As of Feb. 12, 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 109.5 kg. The report notes that Iran informed the agency of its intention to pursue naval nuclear propulsion in the future.

March 15, 2018: State Department Director of Policy Planning Brian Hook meets with representatives from the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) in Berlin to continue discussions on the JCPOA and Trump's demand for a 'supplemental' agreement with the Europeans that addresses sunsets, ballistic missiles, and inspections.

March 16, 2018: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets to oversee implementation of the agreement.

March 19, 2018: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini says at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council that the EU is not considering new sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile activities, amid reports that the E3 are developing such measures.

April 11, 2018: Political directors from the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) and the United States meet in Washington, DC to continue talks on Trump's demand for a supplemental agreement that addresses sunsets, ballistic missiles, and inspections. 

April 11, 2018: China and Iran hold a seminar on civil nuclear cooperation under the JCPOA in Beijing. 

April 19, 2018: 500 British, French and German parliamentarians urge U.S. members of Congress to help "keep the JCPOA alive" in a letter.

April 24, 2018: U.S. President Trump hosts French President Emmanuel Macron for his first state visit. Macron reports having very frank discussions with Trump about the JCPOA and said that he and President Trump had agreed to work on a "new deal" that keeps the JCPOA, but incorporates additional measures, including on Iranian ballistic missiles.

May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA and signs a presidential memorandum to institute the "highest level" of economic sanctions on Iran. In a statement, Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin states that sanctions will be reimposed subject to certain 90 day and 180 day "wind-down periods." In an address following Trump's announcement Iranian President Rouhani announces that Iran will continue negotiations with the other states in the agreement in order to try to continue the deal without the United States. British Prime Minister May, German Chancellor Merkel and French President Macron re-state their continued commitment to the deal and pledge to work with all parties to make sure its terms are upheld. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini states that the EU is committed to the JCPOA as long as Iran continues to implement its nuclear related commitments, as it has so far.

May 15, 2018: EU High Representative Federica Mogherini meets with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the three European countries and Iran in two separate meetings to discuss future coordinated work following the U.S. violation of the JCPOA. They agree to "launch intensive expert discussions" to find practical solutions to the following issues in the next few weeks:

  • "Maintaining and deepening economic relations with Iran;
  • The continued sale of Iran's oil and gas condensate petroleum products and petrochemicals and related transfers;
  • Effective banking transactions with Iran;
  • Continued sea, land, air and rail transportation relations with Iran;
  • The further provision of export credit and development of special purpose vehicles in financial banking, insurance and trade areas, with the aim of facilitating economic and financial cooperation, including by offering practical support for trade and investment;
  • The further development and implementation of Memoranda of Understanding and contracts between European companies and Iranian counterparts;
  • Further investments in Iran;
  • The protection of European Union economic operators and ensuring legal certainty; 
  • And last but not least, the further development of a transparent, rules-based business environment in Iran."

May 17, 2018: The European Commission meets in Sofia and announces that it will pursue a "blocking statute" to ban European companies and courts from complying with U.S. sanctions against Iran.

May 21, 2018: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo presents the Trump administration's new strategy on Iran after the U.S. violation of the JCPOA in a speech at the Heritage Foundation, promising to "apply unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime" and work with allies to deter Iranian aggression. If the United States were to pursue a new deal, Pompeo lists 12 demands for Iran, including stopping enrichment, ending the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the development of nuclear-capable missile systems and allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to have "unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country." In exchange, the United States would be prepared to end "the principal components of every one of our sanctions against the regime," as well as re-establish full diplomatic and commercial relationships and allow Iran to have "advanced technology."

May 24, 2018: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Iran is implementing all nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA in a quarterly report. Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 is 123.9 kg, below the 300 kg limit set by the accord, according to the report. The report notes that Iran is implementing the Additional Protocol but that “timely and proactive cooperation by Iran in providing such access would facilitate implementation of the Additional Protocol and enhance confidence.”

June 6, 2018: Iran opens a new facility for centrifuge production, an act which does not violate the JCPOA. Reza Najafi, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, tells press June 6 that the decision to open the facility is the “preparatory works for a possible scenario” if the JCPOA fails and reiterated that Iran will not start “any activities contrary to the JCPOA” at this time.

The European Commission adopts an update of the Blocking Statute to include extraterritorial sanctions that the United States re-imposed on Iran and an update of the European Investment Bank (EIB)'s External Lending Mandate to make Iran eligible for investment activities by the EIB. "These measures are meant to help protecting the interests of EU companies investing in Iran and to demonstrate the EU's commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)," reads a European Commission press release

July 6, 2018: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets in Vienna and releases a statement on "the way forward to ensure the continued implementation of the JCPOA in all its aspects following the withdrawal of the United States from the deal." 

July 16, 2018: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini confirms at a press conference that the United States refused a request by France, Germany, the UK and the EU to exempt entities doing legitimate business with Iran from U.S. sanctions penalties.

July 18, 2018: Iran's head of the Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, announces that Iran built a new factory to produce rotors for up to 60 IR-6 centrifuges a day. Salehi says building the facility does not violate the JCPOA.

July 26, 2018: Ten Republican Senators write a letter to the French, German, and British ambassadors to the United States urging compliance with the sanctions reimposed by Trump and warning against efforts to block or circumvent the measures. The letter says it would be "particularly troubling if you sought to evade or undermine American statutes" and doing so "could well prompt Congressional action." 

August 6, 2018: In a joint statement the EU, French, German, and British foreign ministers say they "deeply regret the re-imposition of sanctions by the US" and note that they are "determined to protect European economic operators engaged in legitimate business with Iran, in accordance with EU law and with UN Security Council resolution 2231." They reiterate that preserving the JCPOA is a "matter of respecting international agreements and a matter of international security." 

August 7, 2018: Certain sanctions measures reimposed by Trump May 8 come into full effect. The measures include restricting Iran's purchase of U.S. dollars, trade in gold, precious metals, aluminum, steel, coal, software, and transactions related to sovereign debt and the automotive sector. Licenses allowing certain foodstuffs to be exported to the United States and Iran to purchase commercial aircraft are also revoked. 

August 16, 2018: Secretary of State Pompeo announces the creation of the Iran Action Group, responsible for "directing, reviewing, and coordinating all aspects" of the State Department's Iran strategy and led by Brian Hook with the title Special Representative for Iran.

August 22, 2018: Iran says that the UK will help with the re-design of the Arak heavy water nuclear reactor to limit the amount of plutonium byproduct it produces, a task the United States had committed to under the JCPOA.

Sen. Cruz (R-Texas), along with 15 republican senators, sends a letter to Treasury Secretary Mnuchin urging him to take all necessary steps to ensure the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) disconnects the Central Bank of Iran and all other designated Iranian financial institutions.

August 23, 2018: The European Commission adopts an €18 million package for Iran, the first part of a larger €50 million package, including €8 million assistance to the private sector.

August 27-28: The International Court of Justice hears arguments from Iran and the United States on Tehran's allegation that the U.S. reimposition of sanctions violates the 1955 U.S.-Iranian Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations. The United States contends that the court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.

September 12, 2018: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Iran is implementing all nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA in a quarterly report. Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 is 139.4 kg, below the 300 kg of UF6 limit set by the accord, according to the report. Iran's stock of heavy water is 122.9 metric tons, below the 130 metric ton limit. 

September 24, 2018: The foreign ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini meet in New York to discuss the implementation of the JCPOA. The participants decide to establish a Special Purpose Vehicle "to facilitate payments related to Iran's export (including oil) and imports, which will assist and reassure economic operators pursuing legitimate business with Iran."

September 25, 2018: U.S. President Donald Trump speaks at the UN General Assembly in New York. "Iran’s leaders sow chaos, death, and destruction," he says, adding that many countries in the Middle East supported his decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. "Additional sanctions will resume November 5th, and more will follow. And we’re working with countries that import Iranian crude oil to cut their purchases substantially.... We ask all nations to isolate Iran’s regime as long as its aggression continues. And we ask all nations to support Iran’s people as they struggle to reclaim their religious and righteous destiny."

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, U.S. Speical Representative for Iran Brian Hook, and representatives from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, UAE and Israel attend the United Against Nuclear Iran summit. Pompeo unveiled a new report by the State Department's Iran Action Group which chronicles "Iran's destructive activities." In his remarks, Bolton warns "there will be hell to pay" if Iran doesn't change its behavior.

September 26, 2018: U.S. President Donald Trump chairs a summit-level UN Security Council meeting, officially about WMD non-proliferation, but which he tweeted would be about Iran. While Trump criticizes the JCPOA in the meeting, nearly every other leader in the council expresses support for the accord and encourages Iran to continue to comply.

September 27, 2018: In his address to the UN General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reveals what he describes as a secret nuclear warehouse “storing massive amounts of equipment and material from Iran’s secret nuclear weapons program.” Netanyahu also called on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano to “do the right thing” and inspect the warehouse “immediately” before Iran finished clearing it out. He charged that Iran removed 15 kilograms of radioactive material from the warehouse in August, but did not specify if the material was uranium, plutonium, or another radioactive source. One intelligence official quoted in Reuters says that the facility has been known to the U.S. intelligence community for some time and it is full of documents, not nuclear equipment. The official says that “so far as anyone knows, there is nothing in it that would allow Iran to break out” of the nuclear deal any faster.

October 2, 2018: IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano says in a statement that the agency does not take any information at “face value.” While Amano did not mention Netanyahu directly, he said that all material, including that received from third parties, is subject to a rigorous and independent assessment. Amano said the IAEA’s nuclear verification work “must always be impartial, factual, and professional” and that the agency’s independence is “of paramount importance.”

October 3, 2018: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rules unanimously that the United States “must remove, by means of its choosing, any impediments” to the export of food, agricultural products, medicine, aircraft parts, and other humanitarian goods. The 15-member panel concludes that Trump’s decision to reimpose sanctions on Iran was unfounded given Tehran’s compliance with the JCPOA, but the court did not order the United States to remove all sanctions or compensate Iran for damages.

November 5, 2018: The second round of sanctions on Iran following Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA, targeting Iran's banking, oil, shipping and ship-building sectors, come back into effect. In addition to redesignating entities removed from the SDN list under the JCPOA, United States designates an additional 300 new entities. The administration grants temporary waivers to China, India, Italy, Greece, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey to continue importing Iranian oil at reduced levels, as well as waivers to allow nonproliferation projects at Arak, Bushehr and Fordow to continue.  

November 22, 2018: The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related committments. The IAEA's quarterly report finds that Iran's stockpile of heavy water is 122.8 metric tons, below the 130-ton limit and that Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 is 149.4 kilograms, below the 300-kilogram limit.

November 26-27, 2018: EU and Iranian officials meet in Brussels for the third High-Level Summit on International Nuclear Cooperation. The EU and Iran review past nuclear cooperation projects and discuss ongoing modifications of the Arak reactor and conversion of the Fordow facility to a research site.

December 12, 2018: The UN Security Council meets to discuss the biannual UN Secretary-General report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The report welcomes Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments "in the face of considerable challenges" from the U.S. withdrawal of the JCPOA. The report also notes Iranian activities that might violate the ballistic transfer provision in the resolution. At the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announces that the United States will work with other UN Security Council members to reimpose on Iran the ballistic missile restrictions outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1929.

2019

January 15, 2019: Iran attempts to launch a satellite using its Simorgh launch vehicle, but the satellite fails to enter orbit. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo characterizes the launch as “continued defiance of the international community and UN Security Council Resolution 2231," although the launch does not violate the resolution.

January 29, 2019: The annual Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that "Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device." It adds that "Iran’s continued implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year."

January 30, 2019: IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano reiterates that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related obligations under the JCPOA and states that attempts to "micro-manage or put pressure on the agency in nuclear verification" are "counter-productive and extremely harmful" in remarks to the IAEA staff.  Although Amano doesn't name who was putting pressure on the agency, he is likely referencing Israeli and U.S. efforts to persuade the IAEA to investigate what they deem a "secret atomic warehouse" in Iran, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described in his September UN General Assembly speech.

January 31, 2019: Germany, France and the United Kingdom establish a "special purpose vehicle" to facilitate transactions for non-sanctioned trade with Iran, called the "Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges" (INSTEX).

February 13-14, 2019: The United States and Poland host a ministerial summit on the Middle East in Warsaw where U.S. Vice President Mike Pence explicitly calls on “our European partners to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.” Several European foreign ministers boycott the summit.

March 6, 2019: The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related commitments. The IAEA's quarterly report finds that Iran's stockpile of heavy water is 124.8 metric tons, below the 130-ton limit and that Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 is 163.8 kilograms, below the 300-kilogram limit.

The JCPOA Joint Commission also meets in Vienna March 6 and all parties reiterate their commitment to the full implementation of the JCPOA.

March 19, 2019: Iran announces that it registered its counterpart to the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX).

March 22, 2019: The U.S. Treasury Department designates 31 Iranian entities and individuals for past involvement in Iran’s nuclear weapons program under an executive order targeting the proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.

April 8, 2019: The United States designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

April 9, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces that Iran will install a cascade of 20 IR-6 centrifuges at Natanz.

April 22, 2019: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announces that the United States will not issue any additional sanctions waivers for states to continue importing Iranian oil on May 2. 

May 3, 2019: The United States announces that it will extend waivers to allow certain nuclear cooperation projects in Iran to proceed, but end others. The United States extends waivers for the Arak reactor conversion, the Fordow facility conversion, the Bushehr nuclear reactor and the Tehran research reactor for 90 days, but ends waivers for the transfer of enriched uranium out of Iran, the transfer and storage of heavy water outside of Iran and the construction of additional reactor units at Bushehr.

May 5, 2019: U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton announces that the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and a bomber task force are being deployed to the U.S. Central Command region to "send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with unrelenting force.” Some news outlets report that officials in the intelligence community claim Bolton is exaggerating the threat posed by Iran.

May 8, 2019: Iran announces that it will no longer be bound by stockpiles limitations on enriched uranium and heavy water reserves in the JCPOA and could restart construction on its unfinished heavy water reactor at Arak and resume higher level enrichment in the future if the other parties to the agreement do not deliver on sanctions relief. In late April, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told state broadcaster IRIB that Iran was considering leaving the NPT as one of Iran's numerous choices.

The United States also announces new sanctions targeting Iran's industrial metal exports. 

May 9, 2019: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and the French, German and UK foreign ministers urge Iran to continue to meet its commitments under the JCPOA and reject "any ultimatums" in a joint statement. The leaders also urge countries not party to the JCPOA "to refrain from taking any actions that impede the remaining parties' ability to fully perform their commitments."

May 20, 2019: Iran announces it will quadruple uranium enrichment output at Natanz and says it will soon surpass the 300 kilogram limit on uranium gas enriched to 3.67 percent set by the deal. 

June 3, 2019: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo says the United States is willing to engage with Iran with no preconditions. 

June 6, 2019: Russian President Vladimir Putin says there has not been "a single violation" of the JCPOA by Iran. 

June 10, 2019: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano tells the agency's Board of Governors that he is "worried about increasing tensions over the Iranian nuclear issue." He says the JCPOA represents a "significant gain for nuclear verification" and says full implementation is essential. The IAEA's report on Iran's implementation of the deal finds that Iran's stockpile of heavy water was 125 metric tons, below the 130 ton limit, and that the low-enriched uranium stockpile was 174 kilograms, below the 202 kilogram limit (which is equivalent to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas). The report notes that Iran has installed 33 IR-6 advanced centrifuges and says there are technical discussions over the IR-6 ongoing. The report notes that inspectors have had access to all sites and locations they have requested to visit. 

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas travels to Tehran and says Germany will not accept a "less-for-less" agreement on implementation of the JCPOA. An INSTEX delegation travels with Maas to discuss efforts process transactions using the channel. 

June 11, 2019: U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Jackie Wolcott says that Iran is "reported to be in clear violation of the deal," citing the number of IR-6 centrifuges installed. 

June 12-13, 2019: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visits Tehran and delivers a message from U.S. President Donald Trump to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei says Trump is "not deserving to exchange messages with" and says he will not send a response. Khamenei says that there is no sense in negotiating with the United States after Trump has "thrown away everything that was agreed upon." 

June 13, 2019: The United States accuses Iran of attacking two tankers in the Gulf of Oman. Iran denies that it is behind the attack. 

June 17, 2019: Iran announces it will breach the 300 kilogram limit on uranium gas enriched to 3.67 percent within 10 days. 

June 20, 2019: Iran shoots down a U.S. surveillance drone. Iran claims the drone was in Iranian airspace. The United States says the drone was in international airspace. 

June 24, 2019: The United States sanctions the Supreme Leader of Iran and his office. 

June 26, 2019: The UN Secretary General's office briefs the UN Security Council on his biannual report assessing the implementation of Resolution 2231. The report expresses regret for the U.S. decision not to renew waivers on nuclear nonproliferation projects and says U.S. actions are "contrary to the goals" of the nuclear deal. The report also expresses regret over Iran's May 8 announcement that Tehran will no longer be bound by the deal's limits on heavy water and low-enriched uranium. The report notes that the Secretary General's office investigated several interdicted shipments of conventional arms and missiles, as well as missile debris, and determined that in several cases that components originated in Iran, but was unable to determine if the transfers took place before or after Resolution 2231 came into effect in January 2016. 

June 28, 2019: The JCPOA's Joint Commission meets in Vienna. The chair's statement says that INSTEX transactions are being processed and that there has been positive progress on the conversion of the Arak and Fordow facilities. The statement says that experts will looking to solutions for Iran to transfer heavy water and low-enriched uranium out of Iran now that the United States is sanctioning those actions. 

Seven European states issue a statement reiterating their support for the JCPOA and their intention to participate in INSTEX. 

July 1, 2019: Iran announces that it breached the 300 kilogram limit on uranium gas enriched to 3.67 percent (202 kilograms of uranium by weight). The IAEA confirms that Iran has exceeded the limit. The White House issues a statement saying that "maximum pressure on the Iranian regime will continue until its leaders alter their course of action" and that the United States "must restore the longstanding nonproliferation standard of no enrichment for Iran." 

July 2, 2019: The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom and the EU High Representative issue a statement expressing regret for Iran's decision to breach the limit on low-enriched uranium. The ministers state that "we have been consistent and clear that our commitment to the nuclear deal depends on full compliance by Iran" and state that they are "urgently considering next steps under the terms of the JCPOA." 

July 7, 2019: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweets that Iran will exceed the 3.67 percent uranium-235 enrichment limit designated by the JCPOA, adding that Iran’s breaches of the JCPOA are “remedial” and in response to U.S. “economic terrorism.” Iran shares its new enrichment plans with the IAEA.

July 8, 2019: Iran tells the IAEA it has enriched uranium to “about 4.5 percent” uranium-235 at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant. The Agency releases a report confirming Iran has exceeded the 3.67 percent enrichment cap set by the nuclear deal. Speaking to reporters, U.S. President Donald Trump warns “Iran better be careful.”

July 10, 2019: The IAEA’s Board of Governors meets in Vienna to discuss the Agency’s verification and monitoring of nuclear activities in Iran at the request of a member state.

July 31, 2019: The U.S. State Department issues a 90-day renewal on sanctions waivers to allow certain nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation projects to continue in Iran

The United States sanctions Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif for acting on behalf of the Supreme Leader.

August 24-26, 2019: At the G-7 Summit in France, French President Emmanuel Macron offers a $15 billion credit line to Tehran in exchange for its return to compliance with the JCPOA. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif also attends the summit.

At a joint press conference with Macron, U.S. President Donald Trump suggests there is a “really good chance” of a meeting between American and Iranian officials.

August 30, 2019: The IAEA confirms that Iran continues to exceed the 300 kilogram stockpile limit on enriched uranium (correlating to 202.8 kilograms of uranium) and the 3.67 percent enrichment cap established by the JCPOA and reports that Iran has amassed 241.6 kilograms uranium, including 25.1 kilograms uranium enriched to 4.5 percent U-235. The Agency notes that Iran continues to implement the Additional Protocol and comply with IAEA inspectors.

September 3, 2019: The U.S. Treasury sanctions the Iran Space Agency and two affiliated research institutes under an executive order directed at proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.

September 4, 2019: The U.S. Treasury sanctions a shipping network linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force and Hezbollah, condemning Iran for its “provocative actions to destabilize the region and the world.”

September 5, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces a third breach of the JCPOA, stating “all of our commitments for research and development under the JCPOA will be completely removed by Friday,” and adding that Iran’s activities will remain under IAEA supervision.

September 7, 2019: Iran tells the IAEA that it plans to install and test additional advanced centrifuges with natural uranium at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant. The Agency verifies installation of 22 IR-4, one IR-5, and 33 IR-6 centrifuges.

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi announces that technicians have introduced UF6 to cascades of 20 IR-4 and 20 IR-6 centrifuges, exceeding the number of machines permitted in a cascade under the research and development terms of the JCPOA at that time. Kamalvandi adds that Iran may soon withdraw enriched uranium from its advanced centrifuges and add it to the stockpile of low enriched uranium in breach of the JCPOA.

September 8, 2019: Iran notifies the IAEA of its intention to reinstall equipment needed for additional centrifuge cascades in its pilot plant at Natanz. The Agency verifies preparation for and installation of piping and header connections.

IAEA Acting Director General Cornel Feruta meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Ali Akbar Salehi, and other officials in Tehran to discuss implementation of the Agency’s nuclear safeguards. Feruta states that the IAEA’s work requires “full and timely cooperation by Iran.”

September 9, 2019: IAEA Acting Director General Cornel Feruta delivers the opening statement at the Agency’s Board of Governors’ September meeting. He reiterates the importance of Iranian cooperation with IAEA inspections and safeguards implementation and asks that Iran “respond promptly to Agency questions related to the completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations.”

At a press conference in Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reveals an alleged Iranian nuclear weapons site. Netanyahu claims the site, located near the Iranian city Abadeh, was used to “conduct experiments to develop nuclear weapons,” but was destroyed after Tehran learned of Israel’s discovery.

September 10, 2019: The U.S. State Department reports that President Trump may meet Iranian President Rouhani at the United Nations General Assembly in New York with “no preconditions.”

September 14, 2019: A drone and cruise missile strike damages a Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia.

September 16, 2019: The Trump Administration blames Iran for the strike on the Saudi Aramco facility after U.S. intelligence findings implicate Iran in the attack.

September 17, 2019: Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei delivers a speech saying “no negotiation whatsoever will be conducted between officials of the Islamic Republic and the Americans” unless the United States comes back into compliance with the JCPOA.

September 18, 2019: Officials in Saudi Arabia claim Iran carried out the Sept. 14 attack on Saudi critical oil infrastructure.

September 20, 2019: The United States deploys additional troops to Saudi Arabia in response to the Aramco attack. Announcing the deployment, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper condemns Iran for the Sept. 14 attack on the Aramco facility.

The U.S. Treasury imposes new sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, the National Development Fund of Iran, and the Etemad Tejarate Pars Co., an Iranian company implicated in concealing the military’s financial transactions.

September 23, 2019: The United Kingdom, France, and Germany release a statement condemning Iran for the Sept. 14 strike on the Saudi Aramco oil facility.

September 24, 2019: President Donald Trump delivers a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in New York and threatens to continue the maximum pressure sanctions campaign on Iran if its “menacing behavior” continues.

French President Emmanuel Macron meets separately with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and U.S. President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Macron attempts to set up a call with both leaders to discuss his proposal for preserving the JCPOA, but Rouhani decides not to participate.

Rouhani later delivers an interview on Fox News and reiterates that Iran does not seek nuclear weapons.

September 25, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces that Iran will not engage in negotiations while under sanctions and affirms that talks with the United States will only begin if all parties return to compliance with the JCPOA.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivers a speech at the United Against Nuclear Iran annual summit, criticizing Iran’s behavior in the region and calling the Saudi Aramco attack an “act of war.” Pompeo announces the imposition of secondary sanctions on Chinese entities implicated in importing Iranian oil.

The White House issues a proclamation suspending entry of senior Iranian government officials to the United States, calling Iran’s government a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

September 24, 2019: Iran begins constructing centrifuge rotor tubes using carbon fiber material not subject to continuous IAEA surveillance, the Agency reports.

September 25, 2019: Iran alerts the IAEA of four additional cascades being configured at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant: one of 20 IR-2m centrifuges, one of 10 IR-5 centrifuges, one of 20 IR-6s centrifuges, and one of 164 IR-6 centrifuges.

The IAEA confirms that the centrifuge cascades already installed at Natanz “[are] accumulating, or have been prepared to accumulate, enriched uranium.”

The IAEA also verifies that Iran continues to install additional cascades of 164 IR-4 and 164 IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.

September 26, 2019: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom warn Tehran that a fourth violation of the JCPOA will prompt a special dispute mechanism.

October 2, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani corroborates a report that, with the support of French President Emmanuel Macron, he and President Trump had agreed upon a four-point document at the United Nations General Assembly in September.

The document outlines a lifting of re-imposed U.S. sanctions in exchange for Iran’s agreement to remain a non-nuclear weapons state in perpetuity and to pursue negotiations on regional peace. The agreement also allows Iran to exert full autonomy over its oil exports and revenue.

October 8, 2019: Director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, announces that Iran will increase its uranium enrichment capacity using 30 IR-6 centrifuges.

October 14, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces at a press conference that Iran is operating IR-6, IR-4 and IR-2 centrifuges and will soon begin operating an IR-9 centrifuge.

October 24, 2019: Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Seyyed Abbas Araqchi meets Russian counterpart Sergei Ryabkov in Moscow to discuss the JCPOA. Araqchi says "the Islamic Republic of Iran always welcomes any idea and initiative that can contribute to the peaceful resolution of the crisis," but reiterates Tehran's threat to further breach the nuclear accord if "Iran's demands are not met."

October 31, 2019: The U.S. State Department issues a 90-day renewal of sanctions waivers on certain nuclear cooperation projects in Iran, but it remains unclear which waivers are renewed. As of July 2019, the Trump administration waived sanctions to allow for China, Russia, and the European members of the JCPOA to continue certain nonproliferation activities mandated by the nuclear deal, including conversion of Iran's Arak reactor and Fordow enrichment facility, the transfer of 20 percent enriched uranium fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and the removal of spent fuel from the Buesher reactor. The July 2019 waivers expired in October.

The U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Control issues new sanctions against Iran under Section 1245 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA).
 

November 4, 2019: Director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, announces that Iran is operating 60 IR-6 centrifuges. Salehi adds that Iran is enriching uranium to 4.5 percent U-235 and that its low enriched uranium stockpile totals over 500 kilograms, breaching the 3.67 percent enrichment cap and 300-kilogram stockpile limit designated by the JCPOA.

November 5, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces that Iran will begin injecting UF6 into 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at the Fordow facility on November 6.

November 6, 2019: Spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Behrouz Kamalvandi announces that of the 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow, 696 machines will be configured into four cascades and used to enrich uranium up to 5 percent U-235. According to Kamalvandi, the other 348 centrifuges will be used for production of stable isotopes.

Iranian newspapers report the transfer of 2,000 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) to the Fordow facility.

November 7, 2019: Acting-Director General Cornel Feruta convenes a special meeting of the IAEA’s Board of Governors and reported that the agency “detected natural uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at a location in Iran not declared to the agency.”

U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo issues a press statement condemning Iran’s “latest nuclear escalations,” warning that Tehran may be preparing for “rapid nuclear breakout,” and calling on the international community to increase pressure on Iran.

November 10, 2019: Iranian officials announce that Iran has taken a step on construction of the planned nuclear reactor and begun pouring concrete for the unit at Bushehr. Officials add that uranium enriched to 4.5 percent uranium-235 may be used to fuel the reactor.

November 11, 2019: France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Union issue a joint statement warning that Iran’s recent decision to begin uranium enrichment at the Fordow facility has “potentially severe proliferation implications” and “represents a regrettable acceleration of Iran’s disengagement from commitments under the [JCPOA]”. Additionally, the E3 “affirm [their] readiness to consider all mechanisms in the JCPoA, including the dispute resolution mechanism, to resolve the issues related to Iran’s implementation of its JCPoA commitments.”

The IAEA verifies that Iran has amassed 372.3 kilograms of enriched uranium, comprised of 212.6 kilograms uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 and 159.7 kilograms UF6 enriched to 4.5 percent uranium-235. Under the JCPOA, Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is limited to 300 kilograms UF6 enriched to 3.67 percent, which equates to 202.8 kilograms enriched uranium. The IAEA also confirms installation and testing of a variety of advanced centrifuges, including of an IR-8, an IR-s, and an IR-9 centrifuge, and reports that Iran shared it would use all advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment and accumulation once testing is complete. The IAEA further reports that Iran has begun feeding uranium into two cascades of IR-1 centrifuges at the Fordow facility.

November 18, 2019: The IAEA verifies that Iran’s heavy water stockpile has reached 131.5 metric tons, exceeding the 130 metric ton limit designated by the JCPOA.

The United States announces it will no longer waive sanctions related to Iran’s Fordow facility and the existing waiver will terminate Dec. 15.

November 25, 2019: Iran and the IAEA agree to cooperate on four nuclear projects, including nuclear security and waste management.

The U.S. Department of Defense boards a ship in the Arabian Sea and discovers a cache of weapons, including advanced missile components. The Pentagon says that the weapons appear to be of Iranian origin and were being transferred in violation of Resolution 2231.

November 30, 2019: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden join the INSTEX mechanism designed to circumvent U.S. financial sanctions and to allow companies to trade with Iran without penalty.

December 1, 2019: Ali Larijani, Speaker for the Iranian Parliament, warns during a press conference that if remaining members of the JCPOA trigger a dispute resolution mechanism and reinstate sanctions, “Iran would be forced to seriously consider some of its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

December 5, 2019: The Russian company Rosatom announces it will suspend cooperation with Iran on the Fordow facility as required by the JCPOA, claiming that “uranium enrichment and the production of stable isotopes cannot be carried out in the same room.”

December 10, 2019: The UN Secretary General releases the biannual report on implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA. The report states that the Secretariat continues to investigate alleged Iranian violations of missile and arms restrictions put in place by Resolution 2231. The report notes that no proposals for exporting dual-use goods to Iran have been submitted to the procurement channel and that the U.S. decision to end waivers for nonproliferation projects are “contrary to the goals” of the JCPOA and “may also impede the ability” of Iran to meet its JCPOA obligations.

December 16, 2019: Iran confirms that a “technical problem” is the reason for Russia’s suspending cooperation at Fordow.

2020

January 2, 2020: The U.S. Department of Defense publishes a press release claiming responsibility for the targeted killing of Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, who led the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force. According to the release, “the strike was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans.”

January 5, 2020: The Iranian Cabinet releases a statement announcing that Iran will no longer adhere to JCPOA restrictions on uranium enrichment and that Iran will abandon the “last key operational restriction on the number of centrifuges.” The statement says Iran’s nuclear program going forward will be based on “technical needs.”

Tweeting the announcement, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif calls the violation Iran’s “5th & final REMEDIAL step.” Zarif reiterates that all of Iran’s violations are “reversible upon EFFECTIVE implementation of reciprocal obligations” under the JCPOA and reminds that Iran will continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA.

Mikhail Ulyanov, Russian Permanent Representative to the IAEA, tweets that Iran’s announcement to continue compliance with the IAEA was of “paramount importance.”

January 6, 2020: French President Macron, German Chancellor Merkel, and British Prime Minister Johnson release a joint statement condemning Iran’s fifth breach and urging Iran to “reverse all measures inconsistent with the JCPOA.”

French Foreign Minister Le Drian reports that the European members of the JCPOA are considering launching the deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, which could incur a snapback of United Nations sanctions that were lifted in accordance with the deal. “The repeated violations leave us today asking about the long-term validity of this (nuclear) accord,” Le Drian says.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Fontelles says that preserving the JCPOA is “crucial for global security” and that “full implementation” by all parties is “now more important than ever.”

Geng Shuang, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, at a press conference, advocates for preservation of the JCPOA and stresses that “the hard-won JCPOA, endorsed and adopted by the UN Security Council, is an important outcome of multilateral diplomacy.” The spokesperson reminds that Iran “has not violated its obligations under the NPT.”

Mahmoud Sadeghi, member of Iranian Parliament, reports he will put a bill forward for Iran’s withdrawal from the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

January 7, 2020: French President Macron, in a phone call, urges Iranian President Rouhani to “swiftly return to full compliance with [Iran’s] commitments under the JCPOA.”

January 10, 2020: The Foreign Ministers representing European members of the JCPOA hold an emergency meeting in Brussels to discuss Iran's recent breach of the nuclear accord.

January 14, 2020: The E3 (UK, France, Germany) trigger the deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, stating their intent to“[find] a way forward to resolve the impasse through constructive diplomatic dialogue, while preserving the agreement and remaining within its framework.” The dispute resolution mechanism process, if referred to the UN Security Council, has the potential to result in the re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran that were lifted in accordance with the 2015 deal. However, the E3 reminded “our 3 countries are not joining a campaign to implement maximum pressure against Iran.”

A comment released by the Russian Foreign Ministry calls the E3 trigger of the dispute resolution mechanism “profoundly disappointing and of serious concern.”

January 15, 2020: Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Geng Shuang condemns the E3 trigger of the dispute resolution mechanism and says Chinese officials “don’t believe that it well help solve any problem or ease any tensions.”

At a press briefing, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin expresses the administration’s support for efforts to trigger the dispute resolution mechanism, adding that the Trump administration “[looks] forward to working with [Europe] quickly and would expect that U.N. sanctions will snap back into place.”

January 16, 2020: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces that Iran has exceeded pre-JCPOA levels of enriched uranium production.

January 20, 2020: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif says that Iran will withdraw from the NPT if Iran is referred to the Security Council through the dispute resolution mechanism triggered by the Europeans to address Iran’s breaches of the JCPOA.

January 24, 2020: EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles, announcesthe extension of the 15-day period designated for members of the JCPOA Joint Commission (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, the EU, and Iran) to resolve issues of non-compliance within the deal’s dispute resolution mechanism. The E3 triggered the dispute resolution mechanism on Jan. 14, and the 15-day period for discussions within the Joint Commission can be extended by consensus, in theory indefinitely.

(For more on the dispute resolution mechanism, see EXPLAINER: The Dispute Resolution Mechanism.)

January 30, 2020: The Swiss embassy in Tehran announces that a channel for facilitating humanitarian transactions facilitated a trial transaction involving the sale of cancer medicine to Iran. The embassy states that the payment mechanism will soon be operational for transactions involving food, medical exports, and pharmaceuticals.

January 31, 2020: The United States announces it will renew, for sixty days, four waivers that allow for European, Russian, and Chinese companies to continue work on cooperative non-proliferation projects with IranThe United States also imposes new sanctions on the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and its director, Ali Akbar Salehi. 

 

Responding to the U.S. designation, the AEOI tweets that the sanctions “will not in any way interrupt (Iran’s) peaceful nuclear activities and policies.”

February 4, 2020: Josep Borrell Fontelles, EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, reiterates at a press conference in Tehran the EU willingness to preserve the JCPOA. He said that the European parties to the deal agreed to “continuously postponing the dates and time limits” of the dispute resolution mechanism to avoid Security Council referral.

February 5, 2020: IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi tells reporters in Washington, DC that Iran has not taken further steps to breach the JCPOA, and that Iran continues to comply with its safeguards obligations mandated by the deal.

February 9, 2020: Iran attempts to place the Zafar-1 satellite into orbit using its three-stage Simorgh launch vehicle, but the launch fails. A spokesman for the Iranian Defense Ministry says the Simorgh “took [the] Zafar satellite into space with success, but the carrier failed to reach the speed needed to get the satellite into the designated orbit.”

At a press conference in Tehran, the Commander of the Iranian military’s Aerospace Force, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, unveils a new short-range ballistic missile called the Ra’ad 500.

February 23, 2020: In an interview with The Washington Free Beacon, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says the Trump Administration will decide in the near future whether to further strengthen its sanctions campaign against Iran. He says the Trump administration may pursue the re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran and end all sanctions waivers that allow for continued nonproliferation cooperation projects in Iran.

February 26, 2020: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA (the E3, EU, Russia, China, and Iran) meets in Vienna to discuss Iranian non-compliance with the nuclear deal and the status of sanctions relief. There, participants reaffirm their commitment to preserving the multilateral agreement, support for the INSTEX trading mechanism, and backing of ongoing nonproliferation cooperation projects in Iran.

 

March 3, 2020: The IAEA reports that Iran’s stockpile has exceeded 1,000 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 4.5 percent, and that Iran is enriching uranium using additional centrifuges at the Fordow facility.

The IAEA releases a second report detailing Iran’s noncompliance with the Agency’s investigation into three locations possibly associated with Iran’s nuclear-related activities. According to the IAEA, Iran has not responded to three separate letters from the Agency requesting additional information and access.

March 9, 2020: At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, Director-General Rafael Grossi notes that “the Agency has not observed any changes to Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA” following Tehran’s Jan. 5 announcement that it is not bound by “any restrictions” of the deal. Grossi adds that the IAEA is continuing its inquiry into three locations possibly connected to undeclared nuclear activity in Iran.

March 27, 2020: The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announces that a new generation of centrifuges will be installed at the Natanz enrichment facility, and will likely be displayed April 8.

March 30, 2020: The U.S. Department of State announces the renewal of four waivers that allow for nonproliferation cooperation projects on Iran’s Bushehr reactor, Arak heavy water reactor, and Tehran research reactor to continue for an additional sixty days.

March 31, 2020: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom report that the INSTEX trading mechanism has completed its first transaction, and that necessary medical supplies were exported from Europe to Iran.

April 8, 2020: Behrouz Kamalvandi, the spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that Tehran planned to display 122 new nuclear achievements on the country’s National Nuclear Day, which was scheduled for April 8 but postponed due to the coronavirus pandemic. Kamalvandi says that Iran is producing 60 new advanced centrifuges each day, and that it plans to significantly increase its enriched uranium output.

April 22, 2020: Iran launches its first military satellite using a new space-launch vehicle (SLV), the Qased. In doing so, Iran also reveals the existence of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- run military space program that operates in parallel to the country’s civilian space program.

April 25, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo states in a press conference that “Iran’s space program is neither peaceful nor entirely civilian,” and he condemns the April 22 satellite launch. Pompeo calls on other countries to join the United States in rejecting Iran’s “development of ballistic-missile capable technologies” and constraining the country’s missile program.

April 29, 2020: Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant is refueled, as scheduled.

April 30, 2020: In a State Department briefing, U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, comments on the Trump administration’s plan to prevent the October 2020 expiration of a UN embargo that blocks arms sales to and from Iran. The embargo’s expiration date is written into UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Hook says that the administration is prepared to use “every diplomatic option available” to extend the embargo, including by making a legal argument that the United States remains a participant of the nuclear deal in order to exercise a Security Council provision to instate the UN embargo indefinitely.

In an interview, EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell says that, for the European parties to the 2015 nuclear deal, “it’s quite clear for us that the U.S. are no longer a participating member in this agreement.”

May 4, 2020: Over three-quarters of members in the U.S. House of Representatives sign on to a Foreign Affairs Committee letter addressed to Secretary Pompeo that calls on the Trump administration to extend the UN arms embargo through diplomatic means.

In a statement, co-sponsor of the letter and Chairman of the Committee, Elliot Engel (D-NY) says that “this letter, supported overwhelmingly by both parties in the House, represents an imperative to reauthorize this provision – not through snapback or going it alone, but through a careful diplomatic campaign.”

May 9, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo remarks on the two-year anniversary of the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and says that “the United States will exercise all diplomatic options to ensure the UN embargo is extended.”

May 12, 2020: Russia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia, says that the United States has “no right to trigger” the snapback mechanism included in Resolution 2231 to extend the arms embargo. According to Nebenzia, “Snapback will definitely be the end of the JCPOA… The most intrusive inspections of a country by the IAEA will cease.” Nebenzia says that he does “not see any reason why an arms embargo should be imposed on Iran.”

May 13, 2020: Brian Hook, who serves as the U.S. Special Representative for Iran, publishes an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal claiming that “if the U.N. doesn’t renew the arms embargo against Iran, the U.S. will use its authority to do so.” Hook outlines the Trump administration’s preference for a standalone Security Council resolution extending the arms embargo but states that “the United States retains the right to renew the arms embargo by other means,” namely through Security Council Resolution 2231.

May 14, 2020: China’s permanent mission to the United Nations tweets that “the US failed to meet its obligations under Resolution 2231 by withdrawing from the [JCPOA]. It has no right to extend an arms embargo on Iran, let alone to trigger snapback. Maintaining the JCPOA is the only right way moving forward.”

May 27, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announces the United States will terminate sanctions waivers that allow for nonproliferation cooperation projects to continue in Iran. These waivers cover the conversion of the Arak reactor, the provision of enriched fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and the export of Iran’s spent fuel. Pompeo notes the waivers will expire after a sixty-day wind down period and clarifies that the waiver covering international support for Iran’s Bushehr reactor will remain in place but can be revoked at any time.

June 5, 2020: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases two new reports – one on the Agency’s verification and monitoring in Iran pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA, and one on Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. The former finds that Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium continues to exceed limits set by the 2015 nuclear deal. The latter lists three sites where possible undeclared nuclear activities may have taken place before 2003, when Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program, and notes that Iran has failed to comply with IAEA requests for access to two of the sites.

June 8, 2020: The United States sanctions Iranian shipping entities for “repeatedly transport[ing] items related to Iran’s ballistic missile and military programs.”

June 11, 2020: The United Nations Secretary-General releases a regular report on implementation of Resolution 2231, which supports the 2015 nuclear deal and modifies UN sanctions on Iran. The report lists several instances of possible Iranian non-compliance with the arms-related and ballistic missile transfer-related provisions of the resolution.

The Republican Study Committee – the conservative caucus of the U.S. House of Representatives – releases a report that recommends actions to be taken by the Trump administration to strengthen the U.S. maximum pressure campaign on Iran, among other things. The report suggests extending the UN arms embargo indefinitely and applying additional sanctions on Iran.

June 15, 2020: At a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, Director-General Grossi notes “serious concern” about Tehran’s failure to cooperate with the Agency’s investigation into Iran’s past nuclear activities detailed in the June 5 safeguards report.

June 19, 2020: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passes a resolution calling on Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency’s investigation into possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities from the pre-2003 period. The resolution passes by a vote of 25-2, with 7 abstentions, one country not voting, and dissenting votes by Russia and China.

Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA Kazem Gharibabadi calls the BoG resolution “deeply disappointing and unfortunate,” and thanks Russia, China, and other nations for opposing the resolution.

U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook, U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Jackie Wolcott, and Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher Ford deliver a special briefing on “IAEA Actions to Hold Iran Accountable.” They remark on the Board of Governors’ resolution, thank France, Germany, and the United Kingdom for their role in passing the resolution, and condemn Russia and China for their attempts to “shield Iran from scrutiny.”

June 24, 2020: U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Kelly Craft virtually brief the UN Security Council on their proposed draft of a resolution to extend the arms embargo on Iran.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani says Iran is open to talks with the United States if Washington apologizes for leaving the JCPOA and compensates Tehran accordingly. Rouhani warns the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to expect a “stern response” from Iran in response to the UN watchdog’s demands for access to sites in Tehran suspected of containing undeclared nuclear material.

The United States sanctions Iranian tanker captains who delivered approximately 1.5 barrels of Iranian gasoline to Venezuela.

June 25, 2020: The United States imposes additional sanctions on Iran targeted at the country’s metal industry. A statement by U.S. Secretary of State notes that Washington “will continue to exert maximum pressure on Iran until the regime decides to start behaving like a normal country.”

An explosion is reported in Iran’s Khojir region, which houses a ballistic missile complex. Iran’s defense ministry reports the explosion was caused by a gas leak.

June 28, 2020: U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook travels to the United Arab Emirates to meet with officials from the UAE to discuss extension of the UN arms embargo on Iran.

June 29, 2020: U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook meets with Saudi Defense, Foreign, State, and Investment Ministers in Riyadh to discuss the importance of extending the UN arms embargo on Iran.

Hook meets with Bahraini officials and together they issue a joint statement expressing a strong commitment to “countering Iranian aggression,” and “call[ing] upon the United Nations Security Council to extend the arms embargo on Iran before it expires.”

June 30, 2020: A United Nations Security Council briefing is held on the 2015 nuclear deal and the implementation of Resolution 2231.

U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo reiterates the U.S. call for extending the arms embargo on Iran that is written into the Resolution and is set to expire in October 2020. According to Pompeo, “renewing the embargo will exert more pressure on Tehran to start behaving like a normal nation.”

The European Union delivers a statement noting concerns related to Iran’s reduced compliance with the JCPOA and stressing the importance of preserving the deal. On the prospect of re-imposing all Security Council sanctions on Iran, the EU Representative condemns U.S. claims to participation in the deal and criticizes the U.S. decision to terminate critical non-proliferation waivers.

Germany's Permanent Representative to the United Nations notes that by withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018, which is "enshrined in the binding resolution 2231," the United States violated international law. Speaking on the snapback of UN sanctions under that resolution, the German Representative continues, "the overarching goal for us is the preservation, continuation, and full implementation of Resolution 2231 of the JCPOA."

Russia and China also voice their opposition to U.S. efforts to extend the embargo.

An explosion is reported at a medical clinic in Tehran, killing nineteen people.

July 1, 2020: U.S. Ambassador to the UN Kelly Craft announces the United States will soon call for a Security Council vote on the U.S. draft of a resolution to extend the arms embargo on Iran.
“We want to give the council the opportunity to talk through the renewal,” she says, but continues that “we will use every measure, every tool, and if that means a snapback, that’s exactly what we’ll do, we’ll be initiating it.”

July 2, 2020: An explosion is reported at the Natanz enrichment facility. According to Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the explosion occurred “in one of the industrial sheds under construction,” but did not emit any radiation.

During a briefing, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo responds to the German claim that U.S. invocation of the snapback mechanism would further violate international law and says "as a participant in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, we are highly confident that we have the right to exercise that," but clarifies "it is not our first objective."

July 3, 2020: EU Foreign Policy chief Josep Borrell announces he received a letter from Iran triggering the deal's dispute resolution mechanism, citing concerns about the E3's implementation of the agreement. That same dispute resolution mechanism, codified in paragraph 36 of the deal, was first triggered by the E3 in January 2020.

July 4, 2020: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweets that the country triggered the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism because of violations by the United States and the European members of the deal Zarif says that European members of the deal are failing to fulfill their JCPOA duties and have given in to U.S. “bullying.”

July 6, 2020: Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), announces that construction on the damaged building at Natanz will soon begin. Kamalvandi notes that due to limitations imposed by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal, the centrifuge assembly facility where the explosion occurred was only operating at limited capacity.

July 7, 2020: Nour News, an online media outlet with close ties to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, releases a commentary on the Natanz explosion calling it “a deliberate attack.”

July 11, 2020: Iran’s Parliament approves a plan to halt implementation of the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement in response to the resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors calling on Iran to comply with the agency’s investigation into Iran’s possible past undeclared nuclear activities. Despite this action, Iran continues to implement the additional protocol.

July 14, 2020: On the fifth anniversary of the JCPOA, EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell publishes an article commemorating the deal and addressing Iran’s concerns with Europe’s implementation of the agreement. “Having already established measures to protect our companies against extraterritorial US sanctions, we in Europe can do more to satisfy Iranian expectations for legitimate trade.”

July 15, 2020: In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi notes that if Iran does not comply with the Agency’s probe into its past nuclear activities by the end of the month, it “will be bad.” “I keep insisting on the absolute necessity for us to resolve this issue very soon,” Grossi says, adding, that the issue “isn’t going to go away.”

July 21, 2020: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, meet to discuss Tehran and Moscow’s commitment to preserving the JCPOA. Lavrov tells Zarif that Russia is “sparing no effort” to “get the JCPOA back on sustainable track.”

July 27, 2020: A Swiss pharmaceutical company sells Iran a cancer treatment drug through the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement (SHTA), a channel set up to facilitate humanitarian trade with Iran. This transaction marks the channel’s first since the mechanism was declared fully operational in February. The Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs says, “further transactions should be carried out shortly” and notes that “a number of countries have already been approved” for the trade channel.

July 29, 2020: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) demonstrates Iran’s newfound capability to launch missiles from underground during a military training exercise. The firing of Iran’s underground missiles occurs during a large-scale military exercise conducted by the IRGC in the Strait of Hormuz and involving a mock-up of a U.S. aircraft carrier.

August 6, 2020: Elliott Abrams is named the new U.S. special representative for Iran after Brian Hook resigns from the position.

August 14, 2020: In a vote on a U.S.-drafted standalone resolution to extend the UN arms embargo against Iran, the United States is defeated with 2 votes against from Russia and China, 2 votes in favor, and 11 abstentions, falling drastically short of the nine votes needed for extension. The United States and the Dominican Republic are the only two countries to vote in favor.

The United States seizes cargo for the first time from Iranian fuel tankers bound for Venezuela as a part of its maximum pressure campaign against Iran.

August 15, 2020: U.S. President Donald Trump assures a unilateral reinstatement of sanctions against Iran after the U.S. UN Security Council resolution proposing an embargo extension fails to win the necessary votes.

August 20, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivers a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General and to Indonesia, currently presiding over the Security Council, calling for a resolution to continue the lifting of sanctions on Iran. Citing the text of Resolution 2231, which endorses the deal and outlines the process to reimpose sanctions at the Security Council, Pompeo says “this process will lead to those sanctions coming back into effect 30 days from today.” The resolution stipulates that if a vote is not called for within 30 days then all sanctions are automatically reimposed.

August 25, 2020: The United Nations Security Council dismisses the U.S. effort to re-impose Security Council sanctions on Iran. Representing Indonesia, the current President of the Security Council, Ambassador Dian Transyah Djani says the Council is “not in position to take further action” pursuant to the U.S. request.

August 26, 2020: Iran agrees to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to two locations that are not part of Iran’s declared nuclear program, to support the IAEA’s investigation into Tehran’s possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities before 2003. Their agreement ends a year and a half-long standoff over the investigation.

September 1, 2020: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets in Vienna to discuss the status of the accord and the U.S. attempt to claim participant status in the deal in order to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran. In a joint statement, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, Iran, and the European Union conclude that the United States “could not be considered as a participant state” and “cannot initiate the process of reinstating UN sanctions.”

September 4, 2020: After assuming the seat as President of the Security Council, Niger’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Abdou Abarry, says he will continue to uphold his predecessor’s decision to reject Washington’s call to snapback sanctions on Iran. “We’re staying with this decision… that was stated and announced by the president of the Security Council last month,” he states.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases its quarterly report on verification and monitoring in Iran pursuant to the 2015 nuclear deal. The report details Iran’s continuous efforts to incrementally expand its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 4.5 percent uranium-235. The report also notes Iran’s continued compliance with IAEA safeguards and with the additional monitoring mechanisms required under the deal. For more on the Sept. 4 quarterly report, see: Iran’s Nuclear Program Remains on Steady Trajectory.

The IAEA also releases a report on its broader safeguards activities in Iran. The report notes that Agency inspectors visited one of the sites that Iran granted access to as part of Iran and the IAEA’s Aug. 26 agreement. The second site is scheduled to be inspected in September, according to the report. For more, see: IAEA Report Notes Progress on Investigation.

September 8, 2020: Ali Akbar Salehi, spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces construction on a new centrifuge manufacturing facility “in the heart of the mountains” near the Natanz facility. The new facility will be built to compensate for the damage lost during the attack on Natanz in July. According to Salehi, “due to the sabotage, it was decided to build a more modern, larger and more comprehensive hall.”

September 16, 2020: At a press briefing with UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo states that the United States will snap back UN sanctions on Iran in accordance with Resolution 2231, claiming that, according to the nuclear deal, “there were no conditions, there was nothing else that had to happen… That’s what we will do.”

At a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, Britain, France, and Germany issue a statement expressing their support for preservation of the nuclear deal. Regarding the U.S. attempt to snapback sanctions, the Europeans say, “we cannot therefore support this action which is incompatible with our current efforts to support the JCPOA.”

September 17, 2020: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweets in response to Pompeo’s September 16 briefing, saying “nothing new happens on 9/20”, and “[the] U.S. is NOT a participant.”

September 18, 2020: Britain, France, and Germany send a letter to the UN Security Council’s president stating that “the purported notification under paragraph 11 of [Resolution 2231] received from the United States of America and circulated to the UN Security Council Members is incapable of having legal effect.” They state that all UN sanctions lifted in accordance with the nuclear deal will “continue to be terminated” following the U.S. deadline.

September 19, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo tweets that “virtually all UN sanctions have returned on Iran,” adding that, “we will not hesitate to enforce our sanctions, and we expect all UN Member States to fully comply with their obligations under these re-imposed restrictions.”

The Department of State releases a factsheet detailing these “sweeping measures” to re-impose sanctions on Iran beginning at 8 pm Eastern Time on September 19.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres tells the Security Council he will not take steps to implement the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran. His statement follows in accordance with thirteen of the Security Council’s fifteen members vote to block the U.S. snapback attempt.

Iran’s Ambassador to the UN Majid Takht Ravanchi tweets that the United States’ “illegal & false ‘deadline’ has come and gone.” Ravanchi adds that the United States is “STILL in violation of JCPOA and [Resolution 2231]” and warns that “swimming against [international] currents will only bring more isolation.”

September 21, 2020: Speaking at a news conference, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says “no matter who you are, if you violate the UN arms embargo on Iran, you risk sanctions.” Pompeo also announces new sanctions on Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, Iran’s Defense Industries Organization, and its director.

During an event at the Council on Foreign Relations, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif says that Iran will “absolutely not” renegotiate the JCPOA. Appearing to leave the door open for diplomacy, however, he says Tehran has “never been hesitant to negotiate”, and that “it is the United States that has to show that it is committed to the deal – that it will not violate it again, that it will not make demands outside the scope of the deal, that it will compensate Iran for the damages.”

September 22, 2020: In his speech to the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani criticizes the U.S. sanctions regime targeting Iran. He notes that the United States “can impose neither negotiation, nor war on us” but adds that “dignity and prosperity of our nation are essential for us; and they are attained through diplomacy relying on national will coupled with resilience.”

October 5, 2020: Iran’s energy minister Reza Ardakanian states that Iran will ramp up its nuclear power generation capacity to 3 gigawatts at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

October 18, 2020: UN restrictions on Iran’s arms trade expire in accordance with Resolution 2231. In a tweet, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif calls the expiration “momentous” but assures that Tehran will not go on a weapons “buying spree”.

U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo issues a press statement reiterating the U.S. stance that “virtually all UN sanctions on Iran returned” September 19, including the indefinite extension of the arms embargo. Pompeo states that the United States is “prepared to use its domestic authorities to sanction” any state or individual that contributes to the sale or transfer of arms to and from Iran.

October 26, 2020: The Trump administration announces new sanctions targeting Iranian banks and designates several entities related to Iran’s oil sector for terrorism-related activities under Executive Order 12334.

October 27, 2020: IAEA inspectors confirm that Iran has begun construction on an underground centrifuge assembly facility near Natanz, to replace what was damaged in the July sabotage attack. According to IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi, “they have started [construction], but it’s not completed.”

Grossi also confirms that IAEA inspectors have taken samples from both undeclared sites agreed to in the Agency’s August 2020 joint resolution with Iran. Grossi says those samples are undergoing analysis in IAEA laboratories.

November 3, 2020: Iran’s Parliament approves a provisional bill calling on the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to begin enriching up to 20 percent uranium-235 at the Fordow facility and to take additional steps in violation of the nuclear deal.

November 11, 2020: The IAEA releases a new report on Iran which indicates that Iran’s stockpile of uranium gas enriched up to 4.5 percent uranium-235 equates to 2,443 kilograms, up 338 kilograms from the last quarter. The report also notes that Iran will move three centrifuge cascades from the pilot facility to the enrichment hall at Natanz. The report notes that only the cascade of IR-2m centrifuges has been moved so far. (For more on the Nov. 11 quarterly report, see: Iran’s Accumulation of Enriched Uranium Slows.)

November 14, 2020: The IAEA releases a report on Iran’s nuclear activities. The report states that Iran fed uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for enriched uranium, into the newly-installed cascade of 174 IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility. Enrichment using advanced IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz marks a further violation of the JCPOA, which dictates that Iran enrich uranium with only 5,060 first generation IR-1 machines at Natanz.

November 16, 2020: Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer, states that it would be a mistake for the United States to re-enter the JCPOA. Dermer suggests that the administration of U.S. President Elect Joe Biden should instead consult with U.S. allies in the Middle East to forge a path forward. “It will put the U.S. in a much better position to deal with Iran,” he adds.

November 17, 2020: Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif says that if the United States adheres to its commitments under Resolution 2231, Iran will return to compliance with the JCPOA. This can be done without negotiations, he says. Zarif also says that negotiations will be necessary, however, for the formal U.S. re-entry to the nuclear deal.

November 18, 2020: Bahrain’s foreign minister, Abdullatif al-Zayani, says that U.S. President Elect Joe Biden should consult with Bahrain and the other Gulf countries before re-entering the JCPOA.

Speaking at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Iran’s permanent representative to the Agency Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi says “the JCPOA can only be saved through joint efforts and actions to ensure that the rights and obligations therein are fully materialized.”

November 27, 2020: Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is assassinated near Tehran.

November 28, 2020: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani suggests that Israel is behind the assassination of Fakhrizadeh.

December 2, 2020: Iran's Guardian Council approves legislation mandating the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to increase enrichment levels to 20 percent and to suspend implementation of the Additional Protocol in 60 days, among other things, if certain sanctions are not addressed. 

December 4, 2020: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases a new report stating that Iran intends to install three additional cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant. 

December 7, 2020: The European members of the JCPOA – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – release a joint statement expressing their concern with the IAEA's new report and Iran's enrichment activities. The E3 also address the Iranian Parliament's newly approved law and urge Tehran not to implement the law's provisions, stating that doing so would "substantially expand Iran's nuclear programme and limit IAEA monitoring access" and would "be incompatible with the JCPoA and Iran's wider nuclear commitments." 

Iran's foreign ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh says that the Parliament's proposed legislation has yet to be approved or signed into law by President Hassan Rouhani. 

The United Nations Security Council completes its newest report on the implementation of Resolution 2231, which endorses the nuclear deal with Iran. The report notes no new allegations of illicit ballistic missile activities and concludes that in one instance of alleged illicit arms transfers the weaponry was not of Iranian origin and in another the evidence was inconclusive.

December 9, 2020: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani says during a cabinet speech that the 2015 nuclear deal can be restored without any negotiations. “We’ll be back where we were,” he states, adding that the new IR-2m centrifuges currently being installed at the Natanz enrichment facility in violation of the deal can be switched off once all signatories to the agreement return to full compliance.

December 10, 2020: In an op-ed published by Foreign Policy, European Union Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell reiterates the importance of full implementation of the JCPOA.

December 16, 2020: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA meets virtually to discuss efforts to preserve the nuclear deal and support effective implementation by all members of the agreement.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei gives a speech saying that Iran should not delay if sanctions can be lifted in an “honorable” way.

December 18, 2020: Satellite imagery reveals that Iran has begun construction at the underground Fordow enrichment facility. The design and purpose of the new construction remains unclear.

December 21, 2020: EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell chairs a JCPOA ministerial meeting. Foreign Ministers from China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Iran emphasize their commitment to preserving the nuclear deal and pledge readiness to support any future U.S. efforts to return to the agreement. The statement also notes the importance of Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

 

2021

January 1, 2021: Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that Iran will resume enriching to 20 percent uranium-235 “as soon as possible” at the Fordow facility. Iran informs the IAEA of its boost in enrichment, adding that it must do so to comply with recent legislation passed by the Iranian parliament.

January 4, 2021: Iran begins enriching uranium to 20 percent uranium-235, and a spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relays that agency inspectors are monitoring enrichment activities at Fordow.

The IAEA releases a report confirming that Iran has begun producing uranium enriched up to 20 percent uranium-235 at Fordow.

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweets the news, but adds that “our measures are fully reversible upon FULL compliance by ALL.”

January 3, 2021: Jake Sullivan, who has been tapped to become President-elect Joe Biden’s national security advisor, says in an interview with CNN that the United States will pursue follow-on negotiations to the JCPOA over Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities once it has returned to compliance with the existing deal.

January 5, 2021: European Union spokesman Peter Stano says that Europe is gravely concerned with Iran’s enrichment activities, and notes that Tehran’s actions “will have serious implications when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation.”

Iran launches a series of military exercises testing an array of domestically-produced drones.

The U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control imposes a new round of sanctions on Iran’s steel industry. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin says in a statement that “the Trump Administration remains committed to denying revenue flowing to the Iranian regime as it continues to sponsor terrorist groups, support oppressive regimes, and seek weapons of mass destruction.”

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that Iran is in the process of installing one thousand new IR-2m centrifuges that will be used to significantly boost the country’s enriched uranium output.

January 9, 2021: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo issues a statement falsely asserting that Iran’s new legislation requires “expulsion of [IAEA] nuclear inspectors unless all sanctions are lifted.” Pompeo urges that “Iran’s expulsion of international inspectors must be met by universal condemnation.”

Responding to Pompeo’s statement, the spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry Saeed Khatibzadeh states that Iran does not plan to expel IAEA inspectors dispatched for regular inspections that occur in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. Behrouz Kamalvandi, the spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, reaffirms Khatibzadeh’s clarification and adds that regular inspections will occur even if Iran suspends its implementation of the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement.

January 11, 2021: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says in an interview that “it is clear that we don’t have many months ahead of us. We have weeks,” to restore the JCPOA. Commenting on Iran’s recent jump to 20 percent enrichment levels, Grossi says Iran is progressing “quite rapidly” and will be able to produce about 10 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium per month at Fordow.

The Spokesman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Abolfazl Amouyee announces that Iran is designing a new IR2M heavy water reactor, similar to the Arak reactor’s original design. According to Amouyee, the new reactor will be installed in accordance with the implementation schedule of Iran’s new nuclear legislation.

January 13, 2021: The IAEA releases a new report detailing Iran’s plans to conduct research and development activities into uranium metal production, seeking to eventually design an improved type of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. That reactor runs on 20 percent enriched fuel. This action marks another violation of the JCPOA, which prohibits Iran from producing or otherwise acquiring uranium metal for fifteen years.

January 16, 2021: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom release a statement condemning Iran’s plans to produce uranium metal. The E3 urge Iran to halt the activity and return to its JCPOA commitments immediately.

January 18, 2021: Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al-Thani urges other Gulf Arab states to enter into a dialogue with Iran. Remarking on the possibility for U.S. re-entry to the JCPOA, he says “we want the accomplishment, we want to see the deal happening.”

February 1, 2021: Iran tests a new satellite launcher, which it says will help to achieve its “most powerful rocket engine.” According to Iranian state media, the launcher, dubbed the Zuljanah, is a “three-stage satellite launcher [that] uses a combination of solid and liquid fuels.”

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases a report detailing Iran’s installation of a cascade, or chain, of 174 IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility. According to the report, Iran is in the process of installing an additional two identical cascades, as well as one IR-4 cascade and one IR-6 cascade.

February 2, 2021: During an interview with CNN, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif notes there is a “limited window of opportunity” for the United States to re-enter the JCPOA. He suggests that EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell could help to mediate conversations centered on a mutual U.S. and Iranian return to compliance with the deal and emphasizes that Iran can return to compliance with its obligations “in less than a day.”

Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s energy minister, estimates it would take Iran about six months to produce enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon.

February 4, 2021: Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security advisor, says during a White House press conference that the administration is “actively engaged with the European Union right now” in consultations on Iran. He continues that “[those consultations] will produce a unified front when it comes to our strategy towards Iran and towards dealing with diplomacy around the nuclear file.”

February 5, 2021: The White House convenes a National Security Council principals committee meeting about Iran. According to Axios, a main action item of the meeting is to decide “whether to push toward returning to the nuclear deal before the June presidential elections in Iran or wait until after.”

A group of 41 retired military and national security officials sign on to a letter encouraging a swift U.S. re-entry to the JCPOA.

A new report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that traces of radioactive material were found in samples taken from two undeclared Iranian nuclear sites in August and September 2020. That ongoing investigation pertains to Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear activities.

February 7, 2021: Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says during an interview with Iranian state media that “if [the United States] wants Iran to return to its commitments, it must lift all sanctions in practice, then we will do verification… then we will return to our commitments.”

February 9, 2021: Iran’s Intelligence Minister, Mahmoud Alavi, remarks that Iran could seek nuclear weapons if “cornered” by the Western states. His comments diverge from those of other prominent Iranian officials, who maintain that Iran is not interested in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

A United Nations Panel of Experts report affirms that Iran resumed cooperation with North Korea on the development of long-range missile projects in 2020. According to that report, “this resumed cooperation is said to have included the transfer of critical parts, with the most recent shipment associated with this relationship taking place in 2020.”

February 10, 2021: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies that Iran has started producing uranium metal, and that it succeeded in producing a small amount of metal derived from natural uranium. Production of uranium metal is prohibited under the JCPOA for 15 years.

February 18, 2021: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets with his ministerial counterparts from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to discuss Iran. A joint statement released that day highlights that “the E3 welcomed the United States’ stated intention to return to diplomacy with Iran as well as the resumption of a confident and in-depth dialogue between the E3 and the United States.”

The United States sends a letter to the United Nations Security Council formally rescinding former President Donald Trump’s request that all sanctions lifted in accordance with the JCPOA be re-imposed on Iran.

A State Department official reportedly indicates the Biden administration would attend a meeting with Iran if it is hosted by the European Union and attended by the other members of the JCPOA – China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom.

February 21, 2021: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi travels to Tehran to meet with Iranian Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri and Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. They discuss Iran’s planned Feb. 23 suspension of the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement and together reach an arrangement whereby the IAEA will continue its necessary verification activities for up to 3 months.

February 22, 2021: Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says Iran might enrich uranium up to 60 percent uranium-235. “Iran’s uranium enrichment level will not be limited to 20%,” he says, “we will increase it to whatever level the country needs.”

February 23, 2021: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweets that Iran has suspended implementation of the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement. “Understandings [with IAEA Director-General Rafael Gross] show our good faith. All remedial measures reversible,” he adds.

Zarif also suggests that Iran will consider an informal meeting with the P4+1 and the United States.

A new verification monitoring report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium continues to grow, and notes that Iran has accumulated 17.6 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent uranium-235.

A second IAEA report details the agency’s ongoing investigation into Iran’s past nuclear activities and affirms the finding of radioactive particles in samples taken from Iran in August and September 2020. For more on both February 2021 IAEA reports, see: Iran, IAEA Stave Off Monitoring Crisis.

March 4, 2021: Britain, France, and Germany decide not to pursue a resolution censuring Iran for halting implementation of the additional protocol and failing to comply with an investigation into past undeclared nuclear activities at the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA)’s Board of Governors meeting. For more, see: E3 Put JCPOA at Risk, Luckily Cooler Heads in Vienna Prevailed.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi announces plans for technical talks between Iran and the agency aimed to resolve outstanding IAEA concerns regarding the completeness of Iran’s safeguards declaration and its pre-2003 nuclear activities.

March 10, 2021: Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, affirms that “if Iran comes back into compliance with its obligations under the nuclear agreement, we would do the same thing”. Speaking to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Blinken says “that would involve – if it came to that, if Iran made good on its obligations – sanctions relief pursuant to the agreement.”

March 12, 2021: U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan says the United States is engaged in indirect diplomacy with Iran. He tells reporters that “communications through the Europeans” enable the United States to “explain to the Iranians what our position is with respect to the compliance for compliance approach and to hear what their position is.”

March 15, 2021: Iran begins enriching uranium using IR-4 centrifuges at the Natanz facility.

March 17, 2021: Javad Zarif, Iran’s Foreign Minister, notes during an interview that Iran is “ready to agree to a choreography” to coordinate the steps for each side to return to compliance with the deal.” However, he says a meeting between Iran and the United States is unnecessary, because there is “nothing to talk about.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani delivers remarks wherein he states that the delayed removal of sanctions by the United States would constitute “betrayal.”

March 17, 2021: In an interview, U.S. Special Envoy for Iran, Robert Malley, reiterates that the United States still seeks a meeting “in whatever format the Iranian government is comfortable with.” Malley says U.S. maximum pressure has failed, and that the United States wants to “get to the position of lifting sanctions” in return for Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA.

March 19, 2021: Behrouz Kamalvandi, the spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that Iran will soon conduct a cold test of the Arak heavy water reactor, which includes starting the machine to monitor the fluid and support systems.

March 21, 2021: Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says Iran is “in no rush” to return to the 2015 nuclear deal. Tweeting in reference to the Iranian demand that the United States lift sanctions prior to a restoration of the agreement, Khamenei says, “the US must lift all sanctions. After verifying that sanctions have truly been lifted, we will return to the JCPOA commitments.”

April 2, 2021: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA meets for its first consultative session in Vienna. They establish two working groups: one tasked with outlining which sanctions against Iran the United States must lift to reenter the deal, and the other with what nuclear limits Iran must revert to in order to meet its own obligations under the agreement.

April 9, 2021: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA reconvenes in Vienna.

The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence releases the 2021 Worldwide Threat Assessment, which assesses that Iran has not conducted “key nuclear weapons-development activities that… would be necessary to produce a nuclear device.”

April 10, 2021: Iran celebrates its 15th annual National Nuclear Day, unveiling a total of 133 nuclear achievements, including the IR-9, a new and advanced uranium enrichment centrifuge.

April 11, 2021: An act of sabotage damages the power supply for Iran’s primary uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.

April 13, 2021: Iran notifies the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has begun to boost enrichment levels to 60 percent uranium-235 at the Natanz facility using IR-6 centrifuges in response to the April 11 attack.

April 14, 2021: Britain, France, and Germany issue a joint statement condemning Iran for ratcheting up its uranium production. Their statement notes that “this is a serious development since the production of highly enriched uranium constitutes an important step in the production of a nuclear weapon.” They add that “Iran has no credible civilian need for enrichment at this level.”

White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki says that the “provocative announcement” by Iran calls into question Tehran’s “seriousness with regard to the nuclear talks and underscores the importance of returning to mutual compliance” with the JCPOA.

April 15, 2021: The Joint Commission meets in Vienna to discuss the progress of the two working groups.

April 17, 2021: The Joint Commission meets in Vienna to discuss the progress of the two working groups.

The International Atomic Energy Agency verifies that Iran has begun enriching uranium to 60 percent purity at the Natanz facility.

April 18, 2021: Jake Sullivan, U.S. National Security Advisor, states in an interview that the United States will not lift sanctions “unless we have clarity and confidence that Iran will fully return to compliance” with the deal.

Iranian officials meet with experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency to discuss the agency’s investigation into Iran’s past nuclear activities.

April 19, 2021: Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister and lead negotiator Abas Aragchi says work has begun on a “joint draft” detailing the required steps for JCPOA restoration. He notes there is “agreement over final goals,” but cautions that the path will not be easy.

April 20, 2021: The Joint Commission meets in Vienna to discuss the progress of the working groups. They agree to establish a third working group aimed to consider how the United States and Iran could sequence mutual steps toward compliance with the agreement.

Enrique Mora, the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service and chair of the Vienna meetings, tweets that “progress has been made over the last two weeks.” He shares his view that “diplomacy is the only way forward… to address ongoing challenges.”

U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price tells reporters that the United States believes progress has been made, but there have been “no breakthroughs.” He adds that “we have more road ahead of us than we have behind us.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani states that Iran will return to compliance with its obligations after the United States lifts sanctions and Tehran verifies those sanctions have been lifted.

An Iranian government spokesman confirms that the decision by Iran to boost enrichment to 60 percent uranium-235 was “a demonstration of our technical ability to respond to terrorist sabotage at these facilities” and not a hedge toward weapons-grade fissile material. That official adds that “this measure can be quickly reversed for a return to the agreed enrichment level in the nuclear accord if other parties commit to their obligations.”

April 27, 2021: The Joint Commission meets to discuss the findings of the working groups.

May 1, 2021: The JCPOA Joint Commission convenes in Vienna to discuss the progress of the three working groups.

May 4, 2021: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets with Josep Borrell, the European Union foreign policy chief, on the sidelines of the G7 ministerial meeting in London to address the latest developments in the ongoing discussions toward restoration of the JCPOA.

May 19, 2021: The fourth round of Joint Commission negotiations wraps up in Vienna. Enrique Mora, the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service and chair of the Vienna meetings states that “an agreement is shaping up,” and that he “is quite sure that there will be a final agreement not far from now.”

May 24, 2021: Iran agrees to a one-month extension of the February 2021 temporary bilateral monitoring agreement that allows the IAEA to continue monitoring its nuclear activities in lieu of the additional protocol.

May 26, 2021: The Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, calls Iran’s uranium enrichment program “very concerning” and emphasizes the need for continued verification measures.

May 31, 2021: The IAEA issues its quarterly report on verification and monitoring in Iran, which outlines Iran’s recent steps to breach JCPOA limits and provisions. For more, see: Iran Nuclear Deal Talks Head to Sixth Round.

The IAEA issues a report on Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement with the agency, which details the status of the agency’s ongoing investigation into Iran’s past undeclared nuclear activities. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi issues a report warning that the failure of bilateral discussions to clarify questions regarding the correctness of Iranian safeguards declarations “seriously affects the ability of the Agency to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”

June 2, 2021: The fifth round of Joint Commission negotiations wraps up in Vienna. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister and lead negotiator Abbas Araghchi says that the next round of talks, slated to begin June 10, “logically could and should be the final round.”

Enrique Mora, the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service and chair of the Vienna meetings, says he believes an agreement will be reached during the next round of negotiations.

June 3, 2021: U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price says in a press briefing that there is “every expectation” that there will be “subsequent rounds beyond” the sixth.

June 19, 2021: Ebrahim Raisi wins Iran’s presidential election. A conservative, he has expressed his commitment to reviving the JCPOA.

June 20, 2021: The sixth round of negotiations adjourns, no deal is reached.

Israel’s new Prime Minister Naftali Bennett criticizes the new president of Iran, and calls on world powers including the U.S. to “wake up” in regards to the dangers of returning to the JCPOA.

In an interview, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stresses the urgency of clarifying the agency’s outstanding questions pertaining to Iran’s previous undeclared nuclear activities. “We are on a ventilator,” he says.

June 21, 2021: The biannual report assessing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorses the JCPOA, is released. In it, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres voices support for the Vienna talks and appeals to the United States and Iran to return to compliance with the JCPOA.

The IAEA relays news from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran that the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant was temporarily shut down due to a technical problem.

June 24, 2021: A senior U.S. official says that the U.S. may need to rethink its approach with Iran if differences regarding the deal cannot be resolved “in the foreseeable future.”

The IAEA’s temporary monitoring arrangement with Iran expires.

June 25, 2021: The IAEA demands a reply from Iran regarding a potential extension of the temporary monitoring agreement, originally negotiated in February 2021. Iran says that it has no obligation to reply, and the agreement expires.

June 29, 2021: Iran’s government spokesman Ali Rabiei says Iran is considering extending the monitoring arrangement, but no decision has been made.

July 1, 2021: Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova says that sizeable progress has been made towards restoring the JCPOA and that Russia expects the talks to be successfully completed by July 14, the sixth anniversary of the deal.

Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s envoy to the IAEA, says that some parties to the talks need more time before a new round of negotiations begins and that the next round will likely not begin next week.

It is reported that, for several weeks, Iran has further reduced IAEA access to the enrichment facility at Natanz.

July 2, 2021: An unnamed Iranian senior official affirms that Tehran will not share data recorded pursuant to the temporary monitoring arrangement unless the nuclear deal is salvaged, suggesting that the data is still being collected. “If talks succeed Iran will surely show the tapes to the IAEA,” that official says, caveating that “sharing the tapes depends on the way that negotiations will proceed.”

July 3, 2021: Iran’s Ambassador to the UN announces that IAEA Deputy Director General, Massimo Aparo, will visit Iran to conduct routine safeguards pursuant to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.

Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant resumes operations.

July 6, 2021: The IAEA reports that Iran has initiated the production of uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent. For more, see: New Iranian President May Prolong Deal Talks.

The European members of the nuclear deal, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, issue a statement claiming that “Iran has no credible civilian need for uranium metal production.” They characterize the move as a “key step in the development of nuclear weapons,” and urge a swift return to compliance with the JCPOA.

July 8, 2021: Russian Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov tweets that a date for the seventh round of Vienna talks has not been set and clarifies that Iran “needs more time for preparations” after the Presidential election. “The sooner the talks resume the better,” he adds.

July 12, 2021: In his report to the parliament, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif notes that the Vienna talks have approached “the framework of a possible agreement to lift US sanctions,” and adds that he hopes “what has been achieved so far will be completed in the beginning of the [new presidential administration].”

July 14, 2021: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani says during a press conference that Iran has the technical capability to enrich uranium to 90 percent purity – weapons grade – but clarifies that Tehran still seeks a revival of the JCPOA.

 

August 5, 2021: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi assumes office. In his inauguration speech, he pledges to pursue “smart engagement” with the P4+1 and the United States in order to lift sanctions on Iran.

August 7, 2021: After attending Raisi’s inauguration, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Enrique Mora, says talks in Vienna between Iran and the other parties to the JCPOA could resume in early September.

August 14, 2021: Iran produces 200 grams of uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent, for the first time. Iran says it is producing the material to fuel its Tehran Research Reactor.

August 17, 2021: Iran accelerates its enrichment of 60 percent uranium-235, the IAEA reports.

August 19, 2021: Britain, France, and Germany release a statement condemning Iran’s uranium metal production and enrichment activities. According to the statement, “both are key steps in the development of a nuclear weapon and Iran has no credible civilian need for either measure.”

August 31, 2021: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says that a two- or three- month process will be necessary for the Raisi government to resume negotiations.

September 1, 2021: France and Germany implore Iran to resume nuclear negotiations after the Iranian elections stalled discussions over the summer. The sixth round of talks ended June 20.

September 8, 2021: The IAEA releases its quarterly monitoring report on Iran’s nuclear activities, which includes details on Iran’s growing enriched uranium stockpile, its development of advanced centrifuges, and its production of uranium metal. The IAEA’s report also highlights the agency’s ongoing efforts to recover data from four cameras installed in an Iranian centrifuge assembly facility after Tehran suspended implementation of the additional protocol in February 2021. Iran removed the cameras in June after an attack on the facility allegedly damaged the machines.

The IAEA also releases a report on Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, which outlines that Iran remains uncooperative with the agency’s investigation into possible undeclared nuclear materials from its pre-2003 activities.

September 8, 2021: Following release of the reports, and ahead of the IAEA’s Board of Governors’ meeting, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi warns the IAEA’s board against criticizing Iran for its nuclear activities, suggesting that rebukes against Tehran could slow progress on talks.

September 9, 2021: German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas says that Iran’s proposed two- to three-month timeline is “much too long for us.”

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, when asked about a deadline to resume talks, says “I’m not going to put a date on it, but we are getting closer to the point at which a strict return to compliance with the (JCPOA) does not reproduce the benefits that the agreement achieved.”

September 12, 2021: Iran and the IAEA reach a special agreement that will allow Agency inspectors to access the remote monitoring equipment referenced in the IAEA’s Sept. 7 report to service the units and install new data storage.

September 14, 2021: At the IAEA Board of Governors’ meeting, U.S. Charge d’Affairs to the UN Missions in Vienna, Louis Bono, says that the United States welcomes the Sept. 12 joint agreement between Iran and the IAEA, and that “the onus must be on Tehran to do its part.”

September 21, 2021: Ebrahim Raisi criticizes U.S. sanctions on Iran during his first address to the United Nations, and says sanctions are a “new way of war” with the rest of the world.

Speaking before the General Assembly, U.S. President Joe Biden says that the United States remains committed to restoring the JCPOA, and to “preventing Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon.”

Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh announces that talks in Vienna to restore the JCPOA will resume within the “next few weeks.”

EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell announces that Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian will not meet with his foreign minister counterparts from the P4+1 countries for a meeting of the Joint Commission during the UN General Assembly. Borrell emphasizes the importance of promptly resuming negotiations in Vienna.

September 22, 2021: During a meeting with German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says that the Vienna talks are not intended to strike a new deal, but rather to ensure a full and guaranteed return by the United States to the JCPOA.

September 23, 2021: An unnamed senior U.S. official states that the opportunity to revitalize the JCPOA has not yet lapsed.

That same official also says that the United States is working on contingency plans if Iran’s nuclear activities continue to accelerate and the JCPOA is not restored.

September 26, 2021: The IAEA is denied access to the Karaj centrifuge assembly facility, where inspectors were sent to install new monitoring equipment to replace cameras Iran claims were damaged in a June attack. Iran agreed to grant inspectors access to that facility on Sept. 12, according to the IAEA. Iran denies that the facility is covered by that agreement.n The IAEA reports that inspectors were able to replace the data storage for cameras installed in other facilities September 20-22.

October 2, 2021: Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian suggests that the United States should release $10 billion in Tehran’s frozen funds as a gesture of goodwill.

October 3, 2021: Israel’s intelligence head shares his assessment that Iran is over two years away from mastering the weaponization activities which would constitute nuclear breakout. “To the best of our knowledge, the directive has not changed and they are not heading toward a breakout,” he says, “they are not heading toward a bomb right now.”

October 7, 2021: Iran’s Ambassador to the IAEA, Kazem Gharibabadi, announces his term as Ambassador will end October 15.

October 14, 2021: EU Deputy Secretary-General Enrique Mora travels to Tehran to meet with Iranian deputy foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and discuss the resumption of negotiations to restore the JCPOA. They agree to a meeting between Iranian and EU officials in Brussels the following week.

 

October 17, 2021: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi reportedly tells Iranian lawmakers that that the negotiating team may take an action-for-action approach to restoring the JCPOA.

 

October 18, 2021: EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell clarifies that no date for a meeting between Iran and EU officials in Brussels has been set. He says that he “made it clear to the Iranians that time is not on their side and it’s better to go back to the negotiating table quickly.”

 

In a televised interview, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi remarks that Iran is “serious about results-oriented negotiations” and suggests that “for the other side, a readiness to lift sanctions can be a sign of their seriousness.”

 

October 19, 2021: On a trip to Washington, DC, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi tells reporters that the IAEA needs access to the Karaj centrifuge manufacturing plant immediately, and stresses that Iran’s failure to cooperate with the agency on this matter has “seriously affected” the IAEA’s monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program.

October 25, 2021: The IAEA reports that Iran is expanding its production of high enriched uranium at the Natanz facility but specifies that Iran is not stockpiling the extra product.

U.S. Special Envoy Rob Malley warns that efforts to restore the JCPOA are in a “critical phrase”.

The European Union announces that Enrique Mora, Deputy Secretary General of the European External Action Service, will meet with Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Ali Bagheri Kani, in Brussels to discuss the JCPOA.

October 26, 2021: During a phone call, Russian President Vladimir Putin and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson reiterate their shared commitment to preserving the JCPOA.

October 27, 2021: Deputy Secretary General of the European External Action Service Enrique Mora meets with Iranian negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani in Brussels to discuss Iran’s return to JCPOA negotiations in Vienna. “We agree to start negotiations before the end of November,” Kani tweets.

An Israeli public broadcaster, Kan, reports that Israel plans to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities if diplomatic efforts and negotiations fail to revive the JCPOA.

October 29, 2021: U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan announces that President Biden will meet with his British, French, and German counterparts at the G20 summit in Rome, to coordinate a “united” policy on Iran and the JCPOA.

The Biden administration imposes new sanctions on members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and on two companies involved in the supply of lethal drones to insurgent groups.

October 30, 2021: Following a meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, a senior U.S. official tells reporters the discussion was a “substantive strategic conversation about the way forward” with respect to restoring the JCPOA.

October 31, 2021: Secretary of State Antony Blinken says that the United States is “absolutely in lockstep” with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom on coordinating efforts to restore the JCPOA, emphasizing that all four countries “still believe diplomacy is the best path forward.”

U.S. President Joe Biden promises that the United States will return to the JCPOA so long as Iran does, and assures that Washington will only abandon efforts to restore compliance if Tehran reneges on the deal.

At the G20 meeting in Rome, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov comments on Russia’s support for restoring the JCPOA as it was originally signed, without added obligations or exemptions.

Tehran formally appoints Reza Najafi, who served as ambassador to the IAEA under President Rouhani and helped to negotiate the JCPOA, as deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs. The appointment solidifies Najafi’s place on the Raisi administration’s nuclear negotiating team.

November 3, 2021: The European Union confirms that the seventh round of talks to restore the JCPOA will commence November 29, in Vienna. The sixth session finished in June.

U.S. Special Envoy Rob Malley, who will represent the United States in Vienna, notes his hope that Iran will return to the talks “in good faith”.

November 6, 2021: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, call for the JCPOA to be restored. Amirabdollahian confirms that Iran is prepared to comply with the deal provided that the United States does not demand any additional concessions.

November 12, 2021: A statement released by the U.S. Department of State outlines Special Envoy Rob Malley’s plans to meet with allies in the Middle East to “coordinate our approaches on a broad range of concerns with Iran, including its destabilizing activities in the region and the upcoming seventh round of talks on a mutual return to full compliance” with the JCPOA.

November 16, 2021: A report by the Wall Street Journal reveals that Iran resumed production at the Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing workshop.

November 17, 2021: The IAEA releases two new reports on Iran’s nuclear program and its compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement, respectively, highlighting Iran’s activities in violation of the JCPOA and its failure to comply with an IAEA over an investigation into four undeclared locations. For more on the nuclear report, see: Iran’s Failure to Cooperate with the IAEA is Raising Tensions.

It is reported that IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi will travel to Tehran on November 22 and 23 in an effort to resolve an ongoing dispute over access to the Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing workshop, where the IAEA aims to re-install cameras that Iran removed in June following an alleged sabotage attack. The report notes IAEA inspectors have attempted to access the site to reinstall the cameras on three occasions.

joint statement released by the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council affirms the importance of restoring the JCPOA, following a meeting in Riyadh between senior U.S. officials and members of the Council.

November 22-23, 2021: IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi travels to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials.

November 24, 2021: Speaking to reporters in Vienna, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi says that although talks in Tehran were “constructive” they were “inconclusive” in resolving the dispute between the Agency and Iran over access to the Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing facility. The IAEA is close to the point where the Agency would “not be able to guarantee continuity of knowledge” with respect to Iran’s nuclear activities, he concludes.

A meeting of the IAEA’s Board of Governors meeting begins, in virtual format. In his statement to the Board, Grossi saysthat “the lack of access to the Karaj workshop has meant that restoration of surveillance and monitoring at all of Iran’s facilities and locations in relation the JCPOA could not be completed.” Grossi warns that the ongoing dispute over access to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities at Karaj “is seriously affecting the Agency’s ability to restore continuity of knowledge at the workshop, which has been widely recognized as essential in relation to a return to the JCPOA.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian tweets that talks in Vienna were “cordial, frank [and] fruitful.” He writes that “to work out a text, we need work on a few words,” adding that “agreement is possible” and that another meeting between Iran and the IAEA will be held soon.

November 29, 2021: The seventh round of talks to restore the JCPOA begins in Vienna, five months after the sixth round concluded.

Enrique Mora, the EU official charged with chairing the talks, says after the first day of negotiations concludes “ I feel extremely positive about what I have seen today,” adding that the negotiating parties “accepted that work done over the first six rounds is a good basis to build our work ahead.”

December 1, 2021: The IAEA reports that Iran has begun operating 166 advanced IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordow enrichment facility, and is using the machines to produce uranium enriched up to 20 percent uranium-235.

December 2, 2021: Iranian chief negotiator Ali Bagheri-Kani reports that his delegation submitted two suggested drafts, on sanctions and nuclear issues, to the other parties.

December 3, 2021: Negotiating parties depart Vienna to prepare for a second session of the seventh round of discussions, scheduled to begin Dec. 9.

Addressing Iran’s submitted drafts, senior diplomats from Britain, France, and Germany tell reporters that “Iran is breaking with almost all of the difficult compromises reached in months of tough negotiations and is demanding substantial changes to the text.” They warn that “it’s not clear how these new gaps in the negotiations could be closed in a realistic timeframe on the basis of the Iranian amendments.”

December 4, 2021: Responding to news that Iran began operating new centrifuges at Fordow, a senior U.S. State Department official remarks that the United States “[cannot] accept a situation in which Iran accelerates its nuclear program and slow-walks its nuclear diplomacy.”

December 5, 2021: A background briefing released by a senior Iranian official stresses Iran’s view that “all sanctions imposed in the framework of the maximum pressure policy are designed with the clear aim of eliminating the JCPOA, and therefore all of these sanctions are related to the JCPOA” and must be lifted.

December 7, 2021: A senior U.S. official shares concern with journalist Laura Rozen that Iran’s breakout window – or the time it would take for Iran to produce enough high-enriched uranium for one nuclear bomb – could “approach the margin of error” within the first quarter of 2022.

A second senior U.S. official tells Rozen “I think if we get into the latter part of the [first quarter], close to the margin of error, we will reach a decision point,” and “a decision will be made” on whether to continue talks in Vienna.

December 9, 2021: The seventh round of discussions to restore the JCPOA resumes in Vienna.

Ned Price, the U.S. State Department spokesperson, says that the United States is focused on diplomacy and continues to believe a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA is possible.

After a meeting of the JCPOA Joint Commission, the European Union’s Enrique Mora says that there is a “renewed sense of purpose on the need to work and to reach an agreement on bringing the [JCPOA] back to life.” He warns that we don’t have all the time of the world” to reach agreement on outstanding issues.

Russia’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, tweets that the talks will proceed from drafts concluded June 20, but that Iran’s ideas will be “properly discussed and thoroughly considered.”

December 10, 2021: Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, visits Vienna to meet with his counterpart at the IAEA, Margarete Doane.

December 12, 2021: In Vienna, the working group on implementation, tasked with determining the sequence for the United States and Iran to return to mutual compliance with the JCPOA, meets for the first time.

Satellite imagery suggests Iran is preparing for a space launch.

December 13, 2021: Senior European diplomats tell reporters that “to date, we have not yet been able to enter into any real negotiations. We are wasting precious time with new Iranian positions that are incompatible with or beyond the JCPOA.” They warn that “without rapid progress, the JCPOA could soon be an empty shell, given the rapid pace of Iranian nuclear activity.”

December 14, 2021: Mohamad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that the IAEA’s demands for access to the Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing facility are beyond the scope of its safeguards agreement.

December 15, 2021: Iran and the IAEA reach an agreement whereby the agency will replace the cameras at Karaj before the end of the year.

December 17, 2021: IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi tells a press conference that the cameras installed at Karaj cannot be targeted by cyberattacks, challenging a claim by Tehran that the cameras may have been hacked to aid in a June 2021 sabotage attack against the facility.

Asked by a reporter whether the newly installed centrifuges at Iran’s Fordow enrichment facility were produced at Karaj, Grossi says, “it would be a logical conclusion.”

The seventh round of talks concludes in Vienna, after parties agree to a joint text that will serve as the basis for future discussions on the nuclear file.

Senior diplomats from the three European parties to the deal tell reporters that “we remain fully available, with our teams, to engage in negotiations on all aspects of the return to the JCPOA. This negotiation is becoming ever more urgent.” They say that the decision to pause talks was made by Iran’s team, who requested time to return to Tehran for consultations.

December 21, 2021: U.S. Special Envoy for Iran, Rob Malley, warns that if talks “continue at their current pace, we have some weeks left but not much more than that, at which point, I think, the conclusion will be that there’s no deal to be revived.”

December 27, 2021: The eighth round of talks begins in Vienna.

As talks begin, Enrique Mora, the EU official charged with chairing the talks, warns “we don’t have much time,” but says “we have come a long, long way since the beginning of the negotiation… [and] from the point of view of the coordinator we are exactly at the point where we should be if we want to get the final successful result.”

December 28, 2021: Senior European diplomats tell reporters “it is clear that we are reaching the point where Iran’s nuclear escalation will have eliminated the substance of the JCPOA,” and that “we have some weeks and not months to reach an agreement.”

December 30, 2021: Negotiations in Vienna pause for the New Year’s holiday.

Ned Price, the U.S. State Department spokesperson, tells reporters “there may have been some modest progress at the end of the seventh and beginning of the eighth rounds, but it is too soon to tell if we are making real progress toward an understanding on mutual return to full compliance with [the JCPOA].”

A spokesman from Iran’s defense ministry announces the launch of the Simorgh space-launch vehicle.

 

2022

January 3, 2022: The eighth round of negotiations resumes in Vienna.

January 4, 2022: Israeli military intelligence chief, Aharon Haliva, says at a meeting of the security cabinet that restoration of the JCPOA is better for Israel than if an agreement is not reached.

January 6, 2022: Iranian chief negotiator and deputy foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani meets with his South Korean counterpart, Jong Kun Choi, to discuss the Iranian assets frozen in South Korea.

January 7, 2022: The IAEA spokesperson confirms that “by the end of December 2021, the Agency had reinstalled cameras to replace those removed from the workshop at Karaj and performed other related technical activities.”

January 11, 2022: Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, addresses the negotiations in Vienna and implicitly endorses the talks.

January 12, 2022: Rob Malley, the U.S. special envoy for Iran, meets with the Gulf Cooperation Council ambassadors in Vienna to discuss the status of JCPOA talks.

January 14, 2022: Speaking to reporters, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki says, “if we don’t reach an understanding soon [on the JCPOA] … we will have to consider a different path.” She says that, several weeks ago, U.S. President Joe Biden “asked his team to prepare a range of options,” and, “they have done that,” but adds, “obviously our preference is always diplomacy.”

January 19, 2022: U.S. President Joe Biden, speaking about efforts to restore the JCPOA, says, “it is not time to give up,” and, “there is some progress being made.”

January 20, 2022: Antony Blinken, U.S. secretary of state, reports, “there is a real urgency [to restore the JCPOA] and this is really a matter of weeks,” and adds that while “returning to mutual compliance remains possible,” “We are not where we need to be there and if we don’t get there very soon, we will have to take a different course.” Blinken says he discussed with his European counterparts “the steps that we would take together if Iran refuses to return” to the JCPOA.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian says, “there is partial, timid and slow progress, but negotiations cannot continue at such slow pace while, in parallel, Iran’s nuclear program advances so rapidly.” He warns that “we will quickly find ourselves in an untenable situation.”

China's customs office reports the first import of Iranian crude oil in a year, in violation of U.S. sanctions.

January 27, 2022: In an interview with Maariv, former Israeli military chief Gadi Eisenkot says the U.S. decision to withdraw from the JCPOA was a “strategic mistake,” breaking from Jerusalem’s typically hostile attitude toward the nuclear deal.

January 28, 2022: The eighth round of talks to reestablish the nuclear pact pauses in Vienna. German, French, British, Russian, Chinese and Iranian diplomats return home for consultations with their governments, according to European Union political director Enrique Mora, who is chairing negotiations, after five weeks of the longest-running talks yet.

Negotiators from France, Germany and the United Kingdom call January the “most intensive period of these talks to date.” In a statement released after the eighth round of talks in Vienna concluded, the E3 say, “Everyone knows we are reaching the final stage, which requires political decisions. Negotiators are therefore returning to capitals for consultation.”

January 31, 2022: Iran relocates its centrifuge production facilities near Karaj to another workshop in Isfahan, according to the IAEA, just weeks after the nuclear watchdog reinstalled cameras previously knocked out in an alleged Israeli cyberattack against the factory. The IAEA says cameras have already been installed at the new workshop, and that the Karaj facility is closed.

February 2, 2022: Following a Feb. 1 meeting of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, the commission’s spokesperson, Mahmoud Abbaszadeh Meshkini, says “important issues still remain” in talks to return to compliance with the JCPOA but signals conditions are favorable “for a win-win agreement.”

February 4, 2022: The Biden administration reinstates waivers allowing Russian, Chinese and European companies to work with Iran’s civilian nuclear program without penalty of U.S. sanctions.

February 5, 2022: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian welcomes the Biden administration’s limited sanctions relief, calling it “the good will that Americans talk about,” but says the move is “not sufficient.”

Amirabdollahian tells state media Iran is looking for “political, legal and economic” guarantees in the United States’ return to the nuclear deal.

February 7, 2022: Thirty-three Republican senators send U.S. President Joe Biden a letter warning him to gain congressional approval before inking a new nuclear deal with Iran. They write, “[A] genuinely robust nuclear agreement with Iran would be compelling enough to secure assent from two-thirds of the Senate – and the only reason not to present it for a resolution of ratification is that it is too weak to pass muster. Any agreement related to Iran’s nuclear program which is not a treaty ratified by the Senate is subject to being reversed, and indeed will likely be torn up, in the opening days of the next Presidential administration, as early as January 2025.”

February 8, 2022: The eighth round of talks resumes in Vienna after a 10-day break for political consultations. As the talks begin, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian says negotiators “should enhance the sense of urgency,” criticizing the United States as the “culprit of the Iranian nuclear crisis.”

February 9, 2022:  Iran displays a new, solid-fuel missile with a reported range of 900 miles. Later, State Department spokesperson Jalina Porter tells reporters, “Iran’s development and proliferation of ballistic missiles poses a threat to the international security and remains a significant nonproliferation challenge.”

February 11, 2022: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi says his foreign policy is “balanced” against ongoing talks in Vienna to resuscitate the JCPOA. “We put our hopes on the east, west, north, south of our country and never have any hope in Vienna and New York,” he says. “Looking toward the West has made the country's relations unbalanced, we need to look at all countries and capacities in the world, especially our neighbors.”

February 14, 2022: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian tells European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, “some hasty moves, repeatedly playing with the text, and a lack of serious will on the part of the West to reach a good and credible agreement in Vienna have led to unnecessary prolongation of the talks,” according to a statement released following the two leaders’ phone call. The statement mentions Iran’s commitment to its “red lines,” which it says, “are based on logic and realism.”

Amirabdollahian tells reporters Iran is “in a hurry” to wrap up talks in Vienna with a successful nuclear deal.

February 16, 2022: In an address to parliamentarians, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian says of nuclear talks with Iran, “We have reached tipping point now. It's not a matter of weeks, it's a matter of days.” Whether or not the needle moves on returning to the deal, according to Le Drian, will depend on Iran’s next steps. “Either they trigger a serious crisis in the coming days, or they accept the agreement which respects the interests of all parties,” he says.

February 25, 2022: State Department spokesperson Ned Price says Moscow and Washington will continue to cooperate in negotiations to recertify the JCPOA despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine making it a “pariah on the world stage.” He says, “The fact that Russia has now invaded Ukraine should not give Iran the green light to develop a nuclear weapon.”

February 28, 2022: Ali Bagheri Kani, Iran’s chief negotiator to the nuclear talks in Vienna, returns from Tehran and meets with Enrique Mora, the European Union-appointed chairman for the negotiations; Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s envoy to the talks; and China’s top diplomat in Vienna, Wang Qun. 

March 2, 2022: IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi tells reporters the agency will continue investigation into  undeclared nuclear sites in Iran despite calls from Tehran to end the probe. “The IAEA will never abandon a process that it launched because of the necessity of clarification of certain situations in Iran because of a political reason,” he says. “This is not how the IAEA works.”

March 3, 2022: The IAEA reports that Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium is about 3,197 kilograms, 33 kilograms of which is enriched up to 60 percent purity and 182 kilograms to 20 percent. This latest measurement is more than 700 kilograms of enriched uranium over the IAEA’s previous report in November.

March 5, 2022: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov says Russia has "asked for a written guarantee ... that the current process triggered by the United States does not in any way damage our right to free and full trade, economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with the Islamic Republic,” Lavrov says. 

IAEA Director General Grossi travels to Tehran. In a joint statement the AEOI and Iran outline agreed-upon steps to advance the agency's ongoing investigation into the presence of uranium at undeclared locations in Tehran.

March 11, 2022: Talks in Vienna to restore the nuclear deal are paused, according to European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. Borrell attributes the pause to “external factors” affecting the negotiations.

March 14, 2022: A group of Senate Republican sign a letter criticizing the Biden administration’s progress toward restoring the nuclear deal.

March 15, 2022: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov tells reporters he has received “written guarantees” about Russia’s role in the nuclear pact with Iran. “They are included in the very text of the agreement on reviving the JCPOA,” Lavrov says, “and in these texts there is a reliable defence of all the projects provided for by the JCPOA and those activities.”

A senior State Department official says Russia would not be sanctioned for its nuclear work as part of a newly negotiated JCPOA. “We continue to engage with Russia on a return to full implementation of the JCPOA,” the official says. “Perhaps it is now clear to Moscow that, as we have said publicly, the new Russia-related sanctions are unrelated to the JCPOA and should not have any impact on its implementation."

March 18, 2022: Two kilograms of Iranian uranium enriched to 60 percent purity has been processed into powder, the IAEA reports.

March 23, 2022: U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan tells reporters it’s unclear whether final issues stalling nuclear negotiations in Vienna will be resolved, despite notable progress made toward finalizing the deal in recent weeks.

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says negotiations are nearly ready to advance to the foreign-minister level. “We believe that today we are closer to an agreement in Vienna than ever before,” Amirabdollahian says. 

April 12, 2022: Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei says negotiations are "going ahead properly" and the Iranian negotiating team has "resisted the other party's excessive demands." 

April 13, 2022: EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell says in Dohan that "everything is essentially ready and on the table" for a deal to restore the JCPOA. 

April 14, 2022: The IAEA says it installed cameras at Iran's new centrifuge production facility at Natanz and Iran begins operating the facility.

April 17, 2022: Iran confirms that the centrifuge production facility at Natanz is now operational. Equiptment for the site was moved from the Karaj facility. Other equiptment from Karaj was moved to a new centrifuge production facility at Esfahan, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran says. 

April 2022: The annual State Department report assessing compliance with arms control treaties assesses that "Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities it judge necessary to produce a nuclear device."

May 10, 2022: IAEA Director General Grossi tells the European Parliment that Iran has produced 42 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent and that Iran had not yet provided the necessary information in response to the IAEA's inquiries about undeclared nuclear materials and activities. 

May 11, 2022: Enrique Mora, the senior EU official coordinating talks to restore the JCPOA, travels to Tehran. 

May 13, 2022: EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell says Mora's trip was "positive enough" to relaunch talks.

May 16, 2022: Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh says that Iran will return to talks if the United States responds to Iran's proposal. 

May 17, 2022: State Department spokesperson Ned Price says to conclude a deal to restore the nuclear deal, Iran must decide “whether it insists on conditions that are extraneous to the JCPOA.” 

Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz says that Iran is working to produce 1,000 IR-6 centrifuges at its new underground centrifuge production facility at Natanz. 

May 25, 2022: Robert Malley, US Special Envoy for Iran, testifies to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iran could potentially produce enough weapons-grade nuclear material for a bomb "before we can know it, let alone stop it." He says that a restored JCPOA would increase breakout to about 6 months and that the Biden administration will submit an agreement to restore the JCPOA to Congress for review under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). 

May 30, 2022: The IAEA issues two reports on Iran's nuclear program. One report detailing the agency's investigation into undeclared nuclear materials and activities concludes that Iran conducted uranium metal activities prior to 2003 that should have been declared to the IAEA. The agency notes in the report that Iran has not provided technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium at three other undeclared locations and says the uranium may have been caused by third party sabotage. The second report estimates that Iran has produce 43 kilgorams of uranium enriched to 60 percent and 238 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent. 

June 6, 2022: Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that the IAEA's safeguards investigation is based on "fake documents and accounts" and the agency lacks the "will" to find Iran's responses convincing. 

June 8, 2022: The IAEA Board of Governors votes to pass a resolution calling upon Iran to cooperate with the agency's safeguards investigation. The vote is 30-2, with 3 states abstaining.U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Laura Holgate tells the Board that the United States, which co-sponsored the resolution, did not pursue the censure “to escalate a confrontation for political purposes.” She says the United States seeks “credible explanations, consistent with Iran’s safeguards obligations, that can finally put these issues behind us.”

Iran announces it will turn off cameras and equiptment that monitors Iran's enrichment level. 

June 9, 2022: Iran announces that it will disconnect 27 IAEA cameras installed in its nuclear facilities. 

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says Iran's decision will be a "fatal blow" to efforts to restore the JCPOA in 3-4 weeks. After that point the IAEA may not be able provide the accuracy required to implement a restored JCPOA, he says. 

Germany, France, and the United Kingdom release a statement saying that Iran's “actions will only aggravate the situation and complicate our efforts to restore full implementation of the JCPOA" and casts “further doubt on Iran’s commitment to a successful outcome.”

June 12, 2022: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi says that the June 8 IAEA Board resolution will not make Iran "take a step back from its positions." 

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi confirms in a CNN interview that Iran has disconnected the cameras. 

June 16, 2022: The Treasury Department announces sanctions targeting Chinese and Emerati entities engaged in exporting Iranian petrochemical products in violation of U.S. sanctions.

June 25, 2022: EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell travels to Tehran. After meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdhollahian he says that negotiations to restore the JCPOA will resume in the coming days. Amirabdhollahian confirms that Iran is willing to restart talks and says that he and Borrell agreed to “end the tension that has existed in recent days."

June 28-29, 2022: Indirect talks between Iran and the United States resume in Doha. 

June 29, 2022: EU coordinator for the JCPOA negotiations, Enrique Mora, says the Doha talks did not produce the progress the EU hoped for. 

July 5, 2022: EU foreign policy cheif Josep Borrell tweets that " if we want to conclude an agreement, decisions are needed now." He says the political space to revive the JCPOA may narrow soon. 

US Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley says in an interview that the EU negotiators put a detailed outline of a deal to restore the JCPOA on the table in Doha and the United States is "prepared to take that deal" but Iran has not said yes. Malley says the Biden administration's assessment is that Iran has not made the "fundamental decision whether they are interested or not" in returning to the JCPOA. 

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says in a speech in Australia that "the lack of progress in verifying the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program may affect other countries' decisions." 

July 7, 2022: The British Royal Navy says it seized Iranian origin missiles and related components in January and February of 2022 that were being shipped in violation of Resolution 2231.  

July 9, 2022: The IAEA verifies that Iran is enriching to uranium to 20 percent using IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow. The cascade has modified sub-headers. 

U.S. President Joseph Biden says in an oped in The Washington Post that "my adiministration will continue to increase diplomacy and economic pressure until Iran is ready to return to compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal."

July 12, 2022: French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna says there are only a few weeks left to revive the JCPOA. 

July 13, 2022: U.S. President Biden says in an interivew that he will use force as a "last resort" to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

July 14, 2022: U.S. President Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Lapid meet in Jerusalem and sign a declaration reaffirming the "unshakeable U.S. commitment to Israel's security," and, as part of the pledge, to use "all elements of its national power" to ensure Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. 

July 17, 2022: Kamal Kharrazi, advisor to Iran's Supreme Leader, says in an Al-Jazeera interview that Iran is technically capable of making a nuclear bomb, but has not decided whether to build one. 

Israeli Prime Minister Lapid tells his cabinet that he made clear to Biden that Israel opposes the JCPOA and maintains "complete freedom to act, diplomatically and operationally, in the face of the Iranian nuclear program."

July 21, 2022: Richard Moore, head of the UK's MI6, says he does not think that the Supreme Leader of Iran wants to reach a deal to restore the JCPOA. 

July 22, 2022: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says if there is an agreement to restore the JCPOA, “it is going to be very difficult for me to reconstruct the puzzle of this whole period of forced blindness.” 

July 26, 2022: EU High Representative Josep Borrell writes in an oped for the Financial Times that “space for additional significant compromises has been exhausted.” He says he has “put on the table a text that addresses, in precise detail, the sanctions lifting as well as the nuclear steps needed to restore” compliance with the JCPOA.

July 28, 2022: Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announces that Iran will build a new reactor to test nuclear fuels. He says the reactor will “complete the chain of research, evaluation, testing and assurance of our nuclear power production.

August 1, 2022: The United States announces new sanctions targeting entities in Hong Kong, the UAE, and Singapore that help facilitate Iranian oil transactions. 

August 2, 2022: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says the “lack of progress in verifying the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme will have consequences on the regional security landscape.”Those who “truly favour effective safeguards, would never use their cooperation as a bargaining chip, or IAEA inspectors as pawns in a political game," he says.

August 3, 2022: The IAEA releases a report noting that Iran has completed the installation of three IR-6 cascades at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. The report also states that Iran has begun enriching uranium with an additional two cascades at of IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz that were previously installed but not enriching. Iran also notified the IAEA of its intention to install another 1,000 IR-2 centrifuges. 

AEOI spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi says Iran began enriching uranium using the three new cascades of IR-6s. 

August 3-8, 2022: Indirect talks between the United States and Iran take place in Vienna. 

August 8, 2022: EU High Representative Josep Borrell tweets that he circulated a "final" draft to restore the JCPOA. He says “what can be negotiated has been negotiated,” and that it is time for political decisions to be made in the capitals. The draft includes reference to the IAEA's safeguards investigation for the first time. 

August 12, 2022: US Special Envoy for Iran Rob Malley says in an interview with PBS that the US team is “considering the text very carefully to make sure that it lives up to the president’s very clear guidance” that the deal is “consistent with U.S. national security interest.” He says the administration will not pressure the IAEA into closing the safegaurds investigation. 

August 15, 2022: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says Iran responded to the EU's draft. He says Iran made several proposed changes on the issue of sanctions guarantees. Iran needs to see a “realistic approach” from Washington, he says. 

August 16, 2022: State Department spokesperson Ned Price says the Biden administration is studying Iran's comments, but the United States agrees with Borrell that "what could be negotiated over the course of these past 16, 17 months has been negotiated. 

August 21, 2022: EU High Representative Josep Borrell says Iran's response to the EU's proposal is "reasonable." 

August 22, 2022: Seyed Mohammad Marandi says that "no deal will be implemented before the IAEA permanently closes" the safeguards investigation. 

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says in a CNN interview that the agency will "absolutely not" drop the safeguards investigation and that the IAEA has a "legal obligation" to seek clarity regarding the presence of uranium at undeclared locations in Iran. 

August 24, 2022: The US sends its response to Iran's proposed changes to the draft text to the EU. White House National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby says that "gaps remain" and "we're not there yet." 

Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid says the draft text is a "bad dea" and urges negotiators to walk away from the talks. 

September 1, 2022: Biden administration officials say the United States is studying Iran's most recent response to the draft text and describe it as not encouraging. 

September 7, 2022: The IAEA circulates two reports on Iran's nuclear program. One report, addressing the safeguards investigation, states that Iran has not engaged with the agency since the prior quarterly report and that there has been no progress on the investigation. The second report notes that, since the prior report, Iran's stockpiles of enriched uranium continue to grow and that Tehran continues to install and operate additional advanced centrifuges. It also warns that the IAEA might face challenges in reestablishing a baseline centrifuge inventory if the JCPOA is restored, even with Iran's full cooperation. 

September 10, 2022: The E3 release a statement saying that the draft proposed by Borrell "took us to the limit of our flexibility" and that Iran's "latest demands" raise serious doubts about Tehran's intentions and "commitment to a successful outcome on the JCPOA." They say that Iran's advancing nuclear program has esclated "way beyond any plausible civilian justification." 

September 11, 2022: Secretary of State Antony Blinken says that in the past several weeks the United States and Iran had closed some gaps but that Iran's latest response is a "step backward" and that "Iran seems either unwilling or unable to do what is necessary to reach an agreement." 

September 12, 2022: Mossad head David Barnea says that a restored JCPOA "will not give Iran immunity from Mossad operations." 

September 13, 2022: The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran says that Iran has been "fully cooperative" regarding the IAEA's safeguards investigation and that "there are no disagreements" over Iran's inventory of nuclear materials. 

September 14, 2022: EU foreign policy cheif Josep Borrell says that he does not have anything more to propose to break the stalemate in negotiations and that he expects the stalemate to continue given "the political situation in the US." 

The E3 and the United States release a statement signed by more than 50 countries during the IAEA's Board of Governors meeting uring Iran to meet its legal safeguards obligations and cooperate with the IAEA's investigation. 

September 19, 2022: French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna says "there will not be a better offer on the table" for Iran and that there are no intiatives underway to break the impasse. 

September 20, 2022: French President Emmanual Macron meeting with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Macron says Iran should take the deal at hand. Raisi criticizes France for acting in an "unconstructive" manner on JCPOA restoration. 

September 21, 2022: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi tells the UN General Assembly that Iran is still interested in restoring the JCPOA but seeks assurances and guarantees from the United States. 

U.S. President Joseph Biden tells the UN General Assembly that the United States will meet its JCPOA commitments if "Iran steps up to its obligations." 

September 22, 2022: Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid tells the UN General Assembly that "the only way to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is to put a credible miltiary threat on the table" and then negotiate a "longer and stronger" deal. 

September 23, 2022: Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan says that while his country is concerned over aspects of the JCPOA, a flawed deal is better than no deal. 

September 25, 2022: US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan says that the United States will continue to pursue diplomacy to reach a deal on the JCPOA while "pushing back and speaking out" about Iran's brutal repression and response to protests. 

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says in an interview with Al-Monitor that Iran is "ready to provide answers" to the IAEA's questions. 

September 26, 2022: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says "dialouge has restarted with Iran" on the safeguards issues and that "a lot of work lies ahead of us." 

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami tells the IAEA General Conference that the IAEA has not acted fairly and impartially in its investigation of Iran and says that the allegations are based on fabricated evidence. 

September 29, 2022: The United States announces new sanctions targeting Iran's oil trade. 

October 3, 2022: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says he thinks Iran and the IAEA reached a "common understanding" on the way forward for the safeguards investigation. He says that an agreement to restore the JCPOA is within reach and that the U.S. side is engaging with a "better understanding."

The IAEA reports that Iran is changing the mode of operation for its IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow.  

October 7, 2022: U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley tells NPR that “[t]here was a deal on the table... and all the other participants were OK with it in March. Then again over the summer. Then again in August. And each time Iran has come up with some new requests, some new demands, most of the time either an unrealistic demand or one that was extraneous to the nuclear talks, something that had nothing to do with it."

October 10, 2022: Iran informs the IAEA that it is installing additional cascades of IR-2 centrifuges at Natanz.

October 19, 2022: The UN Security Council holds a meeting regarding the allegations that Iran transferred drones to Russia for use in Ukraine in violation of Resolution 2231.

October 20, 2022: National Security Council strategic communications coordinator John Kirby says the US can confirm that Russians military personnel in Crimea “have been piloting Iranian UAVs… to conduct strikes across Ukraine” and that “Iranian military personnel were on the ground in Crimea and assisted Russia in these operations.”

October 24, 2022: White House spokesperson Karine Jean-Pierre says that “we don’t see a deal [on the JCPOA] coming together anytime soon.”

October 27, 2022: Iran begins building a 10MW Light Water reactor at Isfahan. Iran says the reactor will use 20 percent enriched uranium.

October 31, 2022: U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley says that reviving the JCPOA is not the U.S. focus at this time, but that diplomacy remains the best way of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

November 4, 2022: German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock says that the JCPOA has “has been put on ice for the time being.”

November 5, 2022: Iran launches a rocket capable of putting satellites into orbit, according to Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC’s aerospace division.

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollohian says that Iran did sell drones to Russia, but that the sale took place prior to the war in Ukraine.

November 9, 2022: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says that Iran did not bring anything new to recent meetings regarding the agency’s safeguards investigation.

November 10, 2022: The IAEA issues two reports on Iran’s nuclear program. The safeguards reports states that Iran has not provided technically credible answers regarding the presence of uranium at three undeclared locations. The report on Iran’s nuclear program notes increases in Iran’s stockpiles of 60 and 20 percent enriched uranium. The report warns that due to the monitoring gaps the IAEA “would still face considerable challenges” in confirming the baseline inventory of Iran’s centrifuge components, uranium ore concentrate, and heavy water even if Iran resumes application of the additional protocol and cooperates with the agency.

November 14, 2022: French President Emmanuel Macron says that a “new framework” will likely be necessary to address Iran’s nuclear program and that he did not believe that the JCPOA will be revived in the near future.

U.S. Special Envoy Robert Malley says that the U.S. focus is not on the JCPOA, but rather on the protests in Iran and Iran’s sale of drones to Russia.

Iran says it attacked several bases in Iraq used by terrorist groups using Fateh-110 ballistic missiles.

November 15, 2022: The U.S. Navy announces the seizure of explosive materials used for ballistic missile fuel.

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami says that Iran has responded to the IAEA’s questions and there is no further IAEA visit scheduled.

November 17, 2022: The IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution censuring Iran for failing to cooperate with the IAEA’s safeguards investigation and calling on Iran respond to the IAEA’s inquiries. In a statement introducing the resolution the US and E3 say that “last-minute promises from Iran to hold additional meetings in the future, after years of delay and denial, are late and inadequate. Iran must fulfill its safeguards obligations and provide substantive, credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles at undeclared locations.”

November 20, 2022: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says the IAEA has no evidence that Iran is engaged in weaponization-related work.

November 22, 2022: Iran announces its intentions to enrich uranium to 60 percent at Fordow and install an additional 12 cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at the facility. Iran says it is taking these steps in response to IAEA Board of Governor’s decision to censure Iran on Nov. 17.

The E3 issues a statement saying that by increasing uranium enrichment production at Fordow Iran “has taken further significant steps in hollowing out the JCPOA” and that the decision “carries significant proliferation-related risks” and “no credible civilian justification.”

December 2, 2022: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says that Iran’s decision to triple 60 percent enrichment capacity is “is not banal” and that IAEA must verify Iran’s actions.

December 8, 2022: EU coordinator for the JCPOA negotiations, Enrique Mora, says at the Aspen Security Forum that Iran lacks the political will to reach a deal to restore the JCPOA.

December 11, 2022: Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud says that “if Iran gets an operational nuclear weapon, all bets are off” and that Saudi Arabia needs “more assurance” that Iran has no interest in building a nuclear weapon.

December 12, 2022: EU High Representative Josep Borrell says that “we do not have a better option than the JCPOA to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons” and that “we have to continue engaging as much as possible in trying to revive this deal.” Iran’s nuclear escalation “is of great concern,” she says.

December 18, 2022: Mohammad Eslami says that Iran’s enrichment capacity “has reached more than twice the entire history of this industry.”

December 18-19, 2022: An IAEA team visits Iran to continue discussions on the safeguards investigation.

December 19, 2022: During a biannual meeting on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, U.S. alternative representative to the UN, Robert Wood, says the UN Secretary General’s failure to investigate evidence of Iran selling drones to Russia in violation of Resolution 2231 is “not acceptable” and that there must be “some degree of accountability for openly violation resolutions” of the Security Council. Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebezia says Russia hopes that the Secretary General “will not succumb to pressure” of western states.

December 27, 2022: IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-General Aviv Kohavi says the “level of preparedness for an operation in Iran has dramatically improved” and that the IDF “will be ready for the day when an order is given to act against the nuclear program.”

December 28, 2022: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says that “the window to reach an agreement” on the JCPOA “will not always be open.” He says that if the West continues “hypocritical and interventionist behavior, we will move in another direction.”

2023

January 3, 2023: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says that Israel “will act powerfully and opening on the international level against a return to the nuclear agreement.”

Coverage will be continued in Arms Control Today. 

 

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Country Resources:

Fact Sheet Categories:

Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022

May 2021

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, 202-463-8270 x107; Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, 202-463-8270 x102.

In July 2012, Syria publicly acknowledged that it possesses chemical weapons. For a number of years preceding this announcement, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that Syria has a stockpile of chemical weapons, including blister agents such as mustard gas, and nerve agents such as sarin and VX. Syria has the capability to deliver these agents using aerial bombs, ballistic missiles, and artillery rockets. An Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-UN joint investigative team found Syria and the Islamic State responsible for numerous chemical weapons attacks in Syria over the past several years.

Below is a timeline of significant events related to Syria’s chemical weapons program from July 2012 to the present.


 

Skip to: 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022

2012

July 23, 2012: Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdissi confirmed for the first time that Syria has chemical weapons, stating that these weapons would never be used against the Syrian people, but only against “external aggression.”

August 20, 2012: President Barack Obama articulated his red-line regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Obama said his calculations on a military response would change significantly if the United States sees “a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.”

August 23, 2012: An official in the State Department confirmed that “Syria has a stockpile composed of nerve agents and mustard gas” and that the U.S. government monitors Syria’s chemical weapons activities “very closely.”

December 23, 2012: The first allegation of  chemical weapons use was reported. Seven people were allegedly killed in Homs by a “poisonous gas” used by the Assad regime. The coverage included the report of side effects such as nausea, relaxed muscles, blurred vision, and breathing difficulties.

2013

January 15, 2013: A secret State Department cable from the U.S. consul general in Istanbul said there was compelling evidence that the Syrian military had used a chemical weapon known as Agent 15 in Homs on December 23, 2012.

January 16, 2013: Tommy Vietor, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said that the alleged incident of chemical weapons use in December was not consistent with information that the White House has about Syria’s chemical weapons program.

March 19, 2013: Alleged chemical weapons attacks were reported in Syria’s two main cities, the Khan al-Assel neighborhood of Aleppo and the Damascus suburb of al-Atebeh. About 25 people reportedly were killed and dozens more injured. The Assad regime claimed that Syrian opposition forces used chemical weapons in the fighting there.

March 20, 2013: The Syrian government requested the United Nations conduct an investigation of the March 19 attack on Aleppo, claiming that opposition forces used chemical weapons and killed 25 people.

President Obama said in a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu that “the use of chemical weapons is a game changer,” in Syria.

March 21, 2013: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced the United Nations will conduct an investigation on the possible use of chemical weapons in Syria, in conjunction with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Prior to the announcement, France and the United Kingdom sent letters to the Secretary-General, calling for investigations into three alleged incidents of the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

March 24, 2013: Syrian opposition activists reported that Syrian forces used chemical weapons from multiple rocket launchers at the town of Adra, northeast of Damascus, alleging two deaths and 23 injuries. Doctors described that the weapons used were phosphorus bombs that harm the nervous system and induce imbalance and loss of consciousness.

April 13, 2013: Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said that the Syrian army dropped two gas bombs on rebel-controlled Aleppo, killing two people and wounding 12. Opponents of the Syrian government accused the army of using chemical weapons.

April 17, 2013: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that Syria has impeded the UN investigation by failing to agree to the scope of the UN inquiry on chemical weapons use.

April 25, 2013: A letter sent to Sens. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) from the U.S. intelligence community said that the Assad regime may have used the nerve agent sarin “on a small scale” in Syria, but that the United States needs more evidence to provide “some degree of certainty” for any decision-making on further action. The letter also said that the Assad regime maintains custody of the chemical weapons in Syria.

April 26, 2013: President Obama remarked that the United States and the international community will work together to gain “strong evidence” of the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons.

April 29, 2013: A helicopter dropped canisters allegedly containing chemical weapons on the town of Saraqeb. Eight people claimed symptoms such as nausea and breathing problems, and one of them later died.

June 4, 2013: French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius asserted that there was “no doubt” that the Syrian regime used sarin in multiple cases. Fabius said that the French government confirmed the use of sarin by testing specimen taken from Syria. A UN report also said that there are “reasonable grounds” to have confidence in Syria’s use of chemical weapons four times in March and April, although the report cannot specify the chemical agents or verify who used them.

June 13, 2013: The White House said that the U.S. intelligence community has “high confidence” that the Assad regime attacked opposition forces by using chemical weapons multiple times over the past year. In the statement, Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, said that physiological samples from multiple sources show exposure to chemical weapons. The evidence of use is recognized as “credible” in the statement.

August 14, 2013: Assad agreed to allow the UN inspection team into Syria to investigate three possible uses of chemical weapons. The team’s mandate only allows it to establish whether or not chemical weapons were used, not who used them.

August 21, 2013: Syrian opposition activists claimed that a large-scale chemical weapons attack occurred at the suburbs of the Ghouta region, where Syrian forces had been attempting to expel rebel force. Reports said that thousands of victims of the attack have been counted in the Damascus suburbs, whose symptoms were typically body convulsion, forming from mouths, blurry vision and suffocation. Although the number of victims has not been clarified yet, it is estimated to exceed 1,000 people, many of whom were non-combatants.

The United Nations Security Council also held an emergency meeting regarding the attack. The meeting produced a statement demanding further clarity of the incident.

August 23, 2013: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s spokesperson expressed the intention of the UN to conduct “a thorough, impartial and prompt investigation” on the alleged chemical weapons attack in Syria on August 21.

The OPCW Director General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, expressed grave concerns about the latest attack in Syria, and said that the OPCW experts were already in Syria with the UN investigation team.

August 25, 2013: The Syrian regime announced that it will let the UN inspection team investigating past incidents of chemical weapons use visit the Damascus sites in the following days.

August 26, 2013: The U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said in his press briefing that all information the U.S. has, including reports of the number of victims, their symptoms, and the firsthand accounts from humanitarian organizations, strongly indicate that chemical weapons were used in Syria. He also said that Syria attempted to cover-up the incident in the days following the attack.

Syrian President Bashar Assad announced that his army did not use chemical weapons in the August 21 attack in Damascus. Assad recognized the allegation of his use of chemical weapons as “politically motivated," in his meeting with Russia's Izvestia daily.

A convoy transporting the UN investigation team of chemical weapons was attacked by snipers in Syria. No UN personnel were injured, but they were unable to visit all of the sites affected by the attack.

August 28, 2013: The United States has concluded that the Assad regime conducted chemical weapons attacks against civilians, President Obama said in “PBS NewsHour.” Obama said he had not yet made a decision whether to take a military action in Syria.

A second UN Security Council meeting was held.

August 29, 2013: The British Parliament voted against supporting military action in Syria. Before the vote, a report from the Joint Intelligence Committee released a report which stated that chemical weapons were used in the August 21 attach, and that it was "highly likely" that the Assad regime was responsible.

August 30, 2013: The White House released the U.S. Government Assessment on the use of chemical weapons in Syria on August 21. The report says that the intelligence community has "high confidence" that the Syrian government used chemical weapons against the opposition elements in Damascus. Secretary Kerry, in an address, also said that the regime used chemical weapons "multiple times" over the past year. Kerry said discussions on military action are underway. The U.S. Government Assessment included this map of Damascus and the areas impacted by the alleged August 21 chemical weapons attack.

alternate text

August 31, 2013: President Obama made a statement saying that he would seek an authorization for the use of force from Congress for a limited military strike in Syria. Given the evidence of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime in the August 21 attack, Obama said he supported limited action in order to deter further chemical weapons use and uphold international norms.

September 2, 2013: France released its declassified intelligence assessment, which concluded that the Assad regime used Sarin gas in the August 21 attack, and in two earlier attacks in April. The report also said France assessed that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

September 9, 2013: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced a Russian proposition whereby Syria would agree to place its chemical weapons under international control and dismantle them and the United States would agree not to conduct a military strike on the country. Prior to the Russian announcement, Secretary of State Kerry, speaking in the United Kingdom, suggested that if the Assad regime turned over all of its chemical weapons to the international community "without delay", a military strike could be averted. Speaking to media outlets after Secretary Kerry, President Barack Obama said that the United States would consider the plan.

September 10, 2013: Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem said that the Assad regime welcomed discussion on Russia's plan to give up Syria's chemical weapons and join the Chemical Weapons Convention. President Barack Obama, French President Francois Hollande, and British Prime Minister David Cameron discussed how to implement the plan through the UN Security Council, with France beginning to draft a resolution based on the Russian proposal, but with stipulations that force be authorized if Assad fails to implement the provisions of the resolution.

President Obama, in an address to the nation, also requested that Congress postpone a vote on the use of force while the diplomatic path proposed by the Russians is pursued in the UN Security Council. However, he also reiterated his commitment to pursue military action if a deal on securing Syria's chemical weapons is not reached.

September 12, 2013: The Assad regime sent a letter to the United Nations Secretary General which said that Assad signed a legislative decree providing the accession of Syria to the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the letter, Assad said Syria would observe its CWC obligations immediately, as opposed to 30 days from the date of accession, as stipulated in the treaty.

In Geneva, Secretary of State John Kerry met with his Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, to begin discussions of the Russian proposal for securing the Assad regime's chemical weapons.

September 14, 2013: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reached an agreement on a detailed plan for the accounting, inspection, control, and elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons. The plan requires Syria to provide a full declaration of its stockpile “within a week” and provide the OPCW and the UN access to all chemical weapons sites in Syria. The plan calls for the OPCW inspectors  to complete their initial inspections by November and calls for the destruction of the stockpile of chemical weapons and chemical agents by the first half of 2014. The United States and Russia secured approval of the plan by the OPCW executive council and then a UN Security Council resolution. The agreement outlined states that “in the event of non-compliance, including unauthorized transfer, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in Syria, the UN Security Council should impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

September 16, 2013: UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon delivered a report on the UN investigation into the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The report concluded that chemical weapons were used against on August 21 on a "relatively large scale", and that the victims included civilians. The report cited evidence of the nerve agent sarin both in the environment and present in victims of the attack. It was outside of the report's mandate to assign blame for who used the chemical weapons.

September 20, 2013: In accordance with the terms of the agreement negotiated by the United States and Russia, Syria submitted a declaration of its stockpiles of chemical weapons to the OPCW.

September 27, 2013: The Executive Council of the OPCW adopted a timeline for destroying Syria's chemical weapons. Hours later, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted to adopt a resolution that endorses the OPCW timeline for destroying Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. The Security Council Resolution says that the body will impose measures under Chapter VII of its charter if Syria does not comply with the resolution, or uses or authorizes the transfer of any chemical agents.

October 1, 2013: A joint team of OPCW and UN officials arrived in Syria to begin destruction of the country's declared chemical weapons stockpiles and facilities.

October 6, 2013: Officials from the OPCW and UN team said that destruction of Syria's stockpiles of chemical weapons began. The officials confirmed that the Syrians will actually complete the destruction work, while the UN and OPCW team will monitor and verify the activities.

October 27, 2013: Syria submitted the details of its plans for "total and verified destruction" of its chemical weapons stockpile and production facilities to the OPCW. This declaration follows an initial declaration submitted on Sept. 20.

October 31, 2013: The OPCW confirmed that Syria destroyed, or rendered inoperable, all of its declared facilities for mixing and producing chemical weapons. The OPCW was able to inspect 21 of the 23 sites where these facilities were housed. The remaining two sites could not be visited due to security concerns, but inspectors said that the equipment was moved out of these sites and destroyed.

November 15, 2013: The OPCW Executive Council approved a plan for the elimination of Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons. The plan call for transporting the weapons outside of Syria and destruction of the chemical agents in a country that has yet to be identified. The "most critical" chemicals are to be transported out of Syria by December 31, 2013 and the remainder by February 5, 2014. The plan calls for the destruction no later than June 30, 2014, and the destruction of certain priority chemicals by March 15, 2014.

The Executive Council also announced that the OPCW was able to verify that 60 percent of Syrian declared, unfilled, munitions for chemical weapons delivery had been destroyed. Syria committed to destroying all of its unfilled munitions by January 31, 2014.

November 30, 2013: The OPCW announced that Syria's chemical weapons will be destroyed on a U.S. ship using hydrolysis. Hydrolysis is a process that breaks down chemical agents using hot water and other compounds to neutralize the agents.

December 12, 2013: The UN team led by Ake Sellstrom investigating incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria issued its final report to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. The report found that chemical weapons were likely used in five of the seven attacks investigated. The nerve agent sarin was likely used in four of the attacks, one of which was the large scale attack on a Damascus suburb in August.

December 31, 2013: Syria missed the deadline for sending all of its chemical weapons out of the country. This deadline was set by a UN Security Council Resolution approved in September.

2014

January 7, 2014: Syria delivered the first load of chemical weapons to its port city Latakia. The chemical weapons were then loaded on a Danish ship that sailed out into international waters. China and Russia are providing protection for the ship, which will eventually transfer the cargo to the US ship, the MV Cape Ray, to be neutralized using hydrolysis.

January 9, 2014: The German government announced its willingness to assist in the disposal of the chemical waste byproduct that will be created from the hydrolysis process.

January 16, 2014: Italian Transport Minister Maurizio Lupi said that Gioa Tauro, a port in southern Italy, will be used to transfer Syrian chemical weapons to the US ship, the Cape Ray, that will neutralize the chemicals using hydrolysis.

January 27, 2014: A second shipment of Syrian chemical weapons was loaded onto Danish and Norwegian ships at the Syrian port of Lattakia. The U.S. ship that will receive the chemical weapons and then neutralize them using hydrolysis, the Cape Ray, left port. The chemicals will be transferred to the Cape Ray at the Italian port Gioa Tauro.

February 6, 2014: Sigrid Kaag, head of the UN/OPCW mission for destruction of Syria's chemical weapons, addressed the UN Security Council a day after Syria missed a second deadline for handing over its critical chemicals and said that she did not believe that the Assad regime was deliberately stalling the removal process. However, she urged Syria to speed up the shipments in order to meet the destruction deadline of June 30.

February 10, 2014: A third shipment of Syrian chemical weapons was loaded on a Norwegian cargo ship. In total, 11 percent of Syria's chemical weapons were shipped out of Syria.

February 14, 2014: The OPCW announced that two companies, one in Finland (Ekokem OY AB) and one in Texas (Veolia), were awarded contracts to dispose of the effluent created during the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons.

February 21, 2014: The OPCW executive committed met to consider the Assad regime's new proposal for shipping out its chemical weapons. After failing to meet a Feb. 5 deadline to remove all of its chemical weapons and precursor chemicals out of the country, the regime proposed a 100 day extension. The OPCW executive committee, however, said that it can be accomplished more quickly. The 100 day extension also will not allow the Cape Ray enough time to destroy the chemical weapons by the June 30 UN Security Council deadline.

February 25, 2014: The Assad regime delivered a shipment of mustard gas to the Syrian port of Latakia to be loaded onto ships.

March 4, 2014: The Assad regime submitted a revised proposal to remove its chemical weapons from Syria by the end of April 2014. Two additional shipments of chemical weapons also reached the port of Latakia and were loaded onto ships. In total, more than 35% of the country's chemical weapons have been removed.

March 7, 2014: The Executive Council concluded its 75th Session and noted in its report the “increasing pace” of removal of Syria’s chemical stockpile and requested the Syria continue “systematic, predictable and substantial movements” to complete the shipments.

Another shipment of priority 1 chemicals was reached the port of Latakia, bringing the total amount of chemical agents removed from Syria to 29 percent of the total stockpile.

March 19, 2014: The OPCW said that two additional shipments of Priority 1 and Priority 2 chemicals were delivered to the port of Latakia and loaded onto cargo vessels during the past week. Syria has now shipped out more than 45 percent of its stockpile.

April 4, 2014: The 12th shipment of Syrian chemical weapons reached the port of Latakia, according to the OPCW.

April 11, 2014: Reports emerged of an attack using chlorine-gas bombs in Kafr Zita, a village controlled by opposition forces in northwestern Syria.

April 14, 2014: The Syrian government delivered its 13th consignment of chemicals to Latakia, which was removed today from the port on cargo ships. As of this delivery, the OPCW said that the Assad regime has shipped out 65 percent of its total stockpile of chemical weapons, including 57 percent of the Priority 1 chemicals.

April 18, 2014: Additional shipments of chemical weapons reached the port of Latakia between April 14-18. The OPWC said in an April 18 statement that in total, the 16 shipments constitute about 80 percent of Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons.

April 22, 2014: Another shipment reached Latakia port, bringing the total of the chemical weapons stockpile removed from Syria to 86 percent.

April 24, 2014: An additional shipment to Latakia brings the total to 92 percent.

April 29, 2014: The OPCW announced that it would send a team to investigate the April 11 attacks that the Assad regime used chlorine gas.

May 1, 2014: Syria missed the revised deadline to remove all of its chemical weapons stockpile from the country by the end of April. Approximately 8 percent of the declared stockpile, largely sarin precursor chemicals, remains in Damascus.

June 8, 2014: The Norwegian ship Taiko departed for Finland and the United States to deliver Syrian chemical weapons for destruction.

June 17, 2014: The OPCW's fact finding mission in Syria to investigate the use of chlorine gas concluded that it was used in earlier attacks. The team was unable to visit all of the locations due security issues.

Click image to enlarge.

June 23, 2014: OPCW Director General Uzumcu announced that the last 8 percent of Syria's declared chemical weapons stockpile was shipped out of the country from the port of Latakia on the Danish ship Ark Futura. Uzumcu says the chemicals should be destroyed within four months.

July 2, 2014: Over 600 metric tons of chemical weapons were loaded on to the Cape Ray at the port of Gioia Tauro in Italy.

July 21, 2014: The OPCW announced that all of the chemical weapons have reached the various facilities in Finland, the United States, the United Kingdom, or the Cape Ray for destruction. At the time of the announcement nearly 32 percent of the total stockpiles had been destroyed.

July 24, 2014: The executive council of the OPCW also announced that seven hangars in Syria that were part of the country's chemical weapons will be destroyed and five bunkers will be permanently sealed.

August 13, 2014: The OPCW announced that 581 metric tonnes of a precursor chemical for sarin gas have been neutralized on the Cape Ray. Operations to neutralize the blister agent sulfur mustard have now begun.

August 19, 2014: The Cape Ray completed destruction of 600 metric tons of Syrian chemical weapons and precursor chemicals. The OPCW announced that the ship will now transport the effluent to Finland and Germany for disposal at land-based facilities.

September 10, 2014: The OPCW confirmed that chlorine gas is being used in Syria. While the OPCW did not assign blame for the attacks, US Secretary of State John Kerry said that the use of helicopters to drops the chlorine gas "strongly points" to the Assad regime as the perpetrator.

2015

March 6, 2015: The UN Security Council adopted a resolution March 6 condemning the use of chlorine as a weapon in Syria’s civil war and threatening action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter if chemical arms are used again.

April 16, 2015: Doctors testified at the UN Security Council about recent chlorine gas attacks in Syria. Human Rights Watch estimated that over 200 were killed by recent chlorine attacks.

May 8, 2015: Reuters reported that the OPCW confirms traces of sarin and VX gas at a military facility in Syria that were not declared. The samples were taken in December and January.

August 7, 2015: Security Council Resolution 2235 was adopted, creating an investigative unit to determine the responsible parties for reported chemical weapons attacks in Syria.

2016

November 6, 2015: A press release from the OPCW fact-finding team claimed with "the utmost confidence" that the Islamic State used sulfur mustard in an attack on August 21, 2015 in Marea, in northern Syria.

January 4, 2016: The OPCW announced in a press release that the last of the declared Syrian chemical weapons material, 75 cylinders of hydrogen fluoride, had been destroyed by Veolia Environmental Services Technical Solutions.

August 10, 2016: Hospital officials reported a chemical weapons attack using chlorine gas in Aleppo.

August 24, 2016: The third report of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism was released, finding that the Syrian government was responsible for chemical weapons attacks in Talmenes in April 2014 and in Sarmin in March 2015. The report found that the Islamic State was responsible for an attack using sulfur mustard in Marea in August 2015.

September 7, 2016: Allegations were made that toxic chemicals, likely chlorine gas, were used in Aleppo. 

October 21, 2016: The OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism issued a report finding that the Syrian regime was responsible for a third attack using chlorine gas in Idlib province on March 16, 2015. 

November 11, 2016: The OPCW Executive Council adopted a decision that condemns the use of chemical weapons in Syria and calls upon parties responsible for use, as identified in the OPCW-UN Joint Investigate Mechanism reports, to desist from further attacks using chemicals. The decision called for additional investigations at Syria at sites identified by the UN-OPCW reports and inspection of facilities in Syria. 

December 13, 2016: Allegations were made that chemical weapons were used in the Islamic State controlled areas of the Hama Governate, northwest of Palmyra. 

2017

April 4, 2017: Chemical weapons were used in an attack that killed dozens of people in Syria's northern Idlib province. Initial reports suggest the attack used sarin gas, a nerve agent. The attack is believed to have been perpetrated by the Syrian government, due to the type of aircraft in the area at the time. The OPCW announced that it is investigating the reports. Syria denied it was responsible. 

April 5, 2017: The UN Security Council called an emergency meeting to discuss the chemical weapons attack in Idlib. 

April 6, 2017: The United States used Tomahawk cruise missiles to target an air base in Syria. The Assad regime is believed to have conducted the April 4 chemical weapons attack from that base.  

April 11, 2017: The United States released a declassified report that confirmed victims were exposed to sarin in the April 4 attack. 

April 12, 2017: Russia vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution that condemned the April 4 chemical attack, called upon Syria to provide full access to investigators, and expressed determination to hold perpetrators accountable. Russia said that blame for the April 4 attack was prematurely attributed to the Assad regime. 

April 19, 2017: The OPCW said there was "incontrovertible" evidence that the April 4 attacks used sarin or a sarin-like substance. 

June 26, 2017: The White House issued a release saying it identified "possible preparations for another chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime." The statement said that Assad will "pay a heavy price" if he conducts an attack using chemical weapons. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said in a separate statement that by supporting the Assad regime, Russia and Iran would also be accountable for any further use of chemical weapons. 

June 30, 2017: The OPCW fact-finding mechanism confirmed that sarin was used in a chemical weapons attack in Khan Sheikhoun on April 4, 2017.

October 24, 2017: The UN Security Council failed to adopt a resolution to extend the mandate of the OPCW-UN JIM for another year before it expires on November 17. Eleven members voted in favor of the resolution, China and Kazakhstan abstained and Boliva and Russia voted against it. The resolution did not pass because of Russia's veto.

October 26, 2017: The seventh report of the OPCW-UN joint investigative mechanism found the Assad regime guilty of using sarin nerve agent in the April 4 attack in Khan Sheikhoun and the Islamic State responsible for the use of sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh in September 2016.

November 6, 2017: The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission reported that sarin was more than likely used as a chemical weapon on March 30, 2017 in the south of Ltamenah.

November 8, 2017: U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, U.K. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel released a joint statement condemning the use of chemical weapons in Syria as described in the seventh JIM report and calling on the UN Security Council to act to continue the investigations. 

November 16, 2017: The mandate of the OPCW-UN JIM, responsible for determining the culpable actor for chemical weapons attacks in Syria, expired after both resolutions introduced at the UN Security Council to extend it failed. The resolution sponsored by the United States received 11 votes in favor, 2 against and 2 abstentions and failed because Russia vetoed it. The Russian resolution received 4 votes in favor, 7 against and 4 abstentions.

November 17, 2017: A UN Security Council resolution introduced by Japan to extend the JIM's mandate for 30 days received 12 votes in favor but failed because of a Russian veto. 

2018

January 23, 2018: France launched the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, a new initiative that seeks to increase information sharing about reported chemical weapons attacks and publically lists individuals and entities sanctioned for their involvement in chemical weapons use. Russia then called a last minute UN Security Council meeting, introducing a new proposal to extend the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). The United States rebuked the proposal on the grounds that it was merely intended as a distraction from the launch of the new partnership.

February 1, 2018: The third chemical weapon attack in 2018 in Douma, Damascus is reported. The two earlier attacks were reported on January 13 and January 22. Reports assess that chlorine gas was used in all attacks. At a UN Security Council briefing on February 5, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu stated that reports from the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission on these alleged attacks are pending.

April 7, 2018: Reports surfaced of a major chemical weapons attack in Douma, a suburb outside of Damascus, Syria, killing at least several dozen civilians. This followed smaller chlorine gas attacks that were reported in Douma on March 7 and 11. Human Rights Watch has documented 85 chemical weapons attacks since 2013 in Syria. The OPCW announced that its Fact Finding Mission is investigating the incident to determine which chemical weapons may have been used.

April 10, 2018: The UN Security Council voted on three resolutions to address chemical weapons use in Syria. Russia vetoed a U.S.-sponsored resolution which would have created a UN Independent Mechanism of Investigation with a one-year mandate to investigate the responsible actors for chemical weapons use in Syria. A Russian resolution which would have created a similar body but would have allowed the UN Security Council, not the investigative body, to ultimately determine accountability failed to receive enough votes to pass. A second Russian resolution, which urged the OPCW Fact Finding Mission to investigate the incident and offered Russian military protection for investigators, also failed to receive enough votes to pass. The OPCW had already announced earlier that day that it was planning to deploy a Fact-Finding Mission to Douma. 

April 13, 2018: The UN Security Council met for the fourth time that week to discuss chemical weapons use in Syria. Russia and Bolivia continued to urge the United States against taking unilateral military action as the United States, France and the United Kingdom seemed to make the case for a strike. "Should the United States and our allies decide to act in Syria, it will be in defense of a principle on which we all agree, U.S. UN Ambassador Nikki Haley said.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States launched precision strikes on three Syrian chemical weapons facilities. In a televised address to the nation, President Trump explained that the purpose of the strike was to "establish a strong deterrent against the production, spread and use of chemical weapons." He continued "To Iran and Russia, I ask: What kind of a nation wants to be associated with the mass murder of innocent men, women and children?" Syrian state television reported that its air defense system had shot down 13 of the missiles, although the United States later denied that any missiles had been engaged. Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov said in a statement shortly after the announcement of the strike: "We warned that such actions will not be left without consequences."

April 14, 2018: The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission was in Syria investigating the April 7 chemical weapons attack to verify that the attack occurred and to identify which chemical agent was used. 

France released its national assessment of the April 7 chemical weapons attack, concluding that "(i) beyond possible doubt, a chemical attack was carried out against civilians at Douma on 7 April 2018; and (ii) that there is no plausible scenario other than that of an attack by Syrian armed forces as part of a wider offensive in the Eastern Ghouta enclave."

The UN Security Council met to discuss the situation in Syria. The United Kingdom stated that the legal basis for its joint strike was humanitarian intervention. Russia and Bolivia condemned the strike, which they asserted was a violation of the UN Charter. Russia also introduced a draft resolution which condemned "aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by the US and its allies," but it only received three votes and failed to pass. France, the United Kingdom and the United States announced their intention to introduce a draft resolution on political and humanitarian tracks to resolve the conflict.

April 21, 2018: The OPCW Fact-Finding mission team visited one of the sites in Douma to collect samples for analysis in connection with the April 7 attack. 

May 16, 2018: The OPCW Fact-Finding mission reported that "chlorine, released from cylinders through mechanical impact, was likely used as a chemical weapon on 4 February 2018 in the Al Talil neighborhood of Saraqib."

June 13, 2018: The OPCW Fact-Finding mission reported that sarin was "very likely used as a chemical weapon" in Ltamenah, Syria on March 24, 2017 and that chlorine was "very likely used as a chemical weapon" at and around Ltamenah Hospital on March 25, 2017.

June 27, 2018: A special session of the OPCW conference of states-parties voted to grant the OPCW the mandate to investigate and attribute responsibility for chemical weapons attacks in Syria confirmed by the Fact-Finding Mission.

September 12, 2018: The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, established in 2011 by the UN Human Rights Council reported that the Syrian government used chlorine as a weapon four times from January to July 2018.

2019

March 1, 2019: The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission released a final report concluding that a toxic chemical, likely chlorine, was used as weapon on April 7, 2018 in Douma, Syria. The OPCW had issued an interim report on the incident in July 2018. 

May 19, 2019: The United States alleged that the Syrian government used chlorine in an attack in the Idlib area.

May 28, 2019: Responding to news of the unauthorized disclosure by a former OPCW official of an internal document related to the organisation’s investigation in Douma, the OPCW Director-General launches an independent investigation into possible breaches of confidentiality.

September 26, 2019: The United States announced the results of its investigation into the May 19, 2019 attack and concluded that the Syrian government used chemical weapons.

2020

January 20, 2020: Russia held an open United Nations Arria-formula meeting on the OPCW Douma report. In his remarks to the press, Russian Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia said there is “high probability” that the March 2019 Fact-Finding Mission report on the OPCW investigation in Douma was “fabricated.”

U.S. Acting Deputy Permanent Representative Cherith Norman Chalet condemned Russia for a "blatant attempt to use a Security Council meeting to weaken the credibility of the OPCW and its findings on the Douma attack" and reaffirmed U.S. support for the March 2019 Fact-Finding Mission report.

February 6, 2020: The OPCW released the findings of its independent investigation into possible breaches of confidentiality which commenced after a former OPCW official released a document alleging that the March 2019 Fact-Finding Mission report was fabricated. The OPCW concluded that the dissenting official and a colleague, who knew of the document ahead of its release, had “failed to protect confidential information related to the Douma FFM investigation” and the information was “misused to call into question the Organisation’s competence and credibility.”

OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias reaffirmed the March 2019 Fact-Finding Mission report’s conclusion that a chemical weapon was used in Douma in April 2018.

April 8, 2020: The OPCW releases the first report by its Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which attributes responsibility for a series of chemical weapons attacks in March 2017 to the Syrian Arab Republic's Air Force.

May 12, 2020: A closed-setting Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) is held via teleconference between members of the United Nations Security Council and high-ranking officials from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to discuss the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The dialogue focuses on the OPCW’s April 2020 report that blames the Syrian air force for three chemical incidents in the town of Ltamenah, Syria, in March 2017.

Russia and China boycott the IID. Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia, condemns the meeting’s closed setting as contradictory to “the slogans of openness and transparency of the Security Council.” China does not comment on the meeting.

July 9, 2020: At the 94th Session of the Executive Council of the OPCW, the council passed EC-94/DEC.2 "Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic." The decision was in response to the 8 April 2020 Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) report. It gave Syria 90 days to declare any chemical weapons and CW facilities - in particular, those related to the March 2017 CW attacks - and resolve all outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration of its chemical weapons stockpile and program.

July 20, 2020: OPCW Director General Fernando Arias sent a letter to the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, H.E. Dr. Faisal Mekdad, to outline the obligations of the Syrian Arab Republic under ED-94/DEC.2 and to indicate the readiness of the Secretariat to assist the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilment of these obligations. 

October 14, 2020: The Director General of the OPCW, H.E. Fernando Arias, released a report stating that Syria had not made progress on any of the measures detailed in EC-94/DEC.2 within the 90 day timeframe. 

2021

April 12, 2021: The OPCW releases the second report by its Investigation and Identification Team (IIT). The IIT concluded "there were reasonable grounds to believe that, at approximately 21:22 on February 2018, a military helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force under the control of the Tiger Forces hit eastern Saraqib by dropping at least one cylinder. The cylinder ruptured and released chlorine over a large area, affecting 12 named individuals." 

The U.S. State Department expressed its support for the findings of the report in a press release: "The United States concurs with the OPCW's conclusions cited in this report" and "support the impartial and independent work of the OPCW."

April 16, 2021: Russia held an open United Nations Security Council Arria-formula meeting following the release of the OPCW's IIT report. During the meeting, which was titled "Protection of Developing Nations Against Political Pressure: Upholding the Integrity of International Non-Proliferation Regimes," several speakers questioned the work of the OPCW's Fact Finding Mission and Investigation and Identification Teams.

Russia's ambassador to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia, alleged that his Western colleagues were "attempt[ing] to mobilize public opinion against Syria authorities with a sole purpose. And it is not about upholding non-proliferation regime. It is all about regime change."  

 

April 20-22, 2021: At the second session of the 25th Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the member states passed a decision that suspended Syria's rights and privileges under the Convention. This means that, until Syria completes the measures laid out in EC-94/DEC.2, Syria is not able to vote or hold any office in the Conference or Executive Council. 

2022

January 26, 2022: The Fact-Finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons published a report concluding there were reasonable grounds to believe that on September 1, 2015 in Marea, Syria, a chemical blister agent was used as a weapon.

February 1, 2022: The Fact-Finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons published a report concluding were reasonable grounds to believe that an industrial chlorine cylinder was used as a chemical weapon on October 1, 2016, in Kafr Zeita, Syria. 

Updated by Julia Masterson and Leanne Quinn

Strategic Arms Control and Policy

Country Resources:

Subject Resources:

Fact Sheet Categories:

Nuclear Testing and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Timeline

December 2023

Contact: Daryl KimballExecutive Director, (202) 463-7280 x107

While widely understood to have only been used twice in wartime with terrible consequences, nuclear weapons have also been “used” elsewhere—through more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions by at least eight countries since 1945.

The world’s nuclear-armed states have used these nuclear test explosions to develop new nuclear warhead designs and to demonstrate nuclear weapons capabilities. The tests, particularly the atmospheric detonations, have negatively affected the lives and health of millions of people around the globe. In response, ordinary citizens, scientists, legislators, and government leaders have pursued a multi-decade effort to bring into force a global verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Currently, the treaty has 187 signatories and 178 ratifications, though it still will not enter into force until eight key states, including the United States, ratify it.

Brief Overall History of the Test Ban Treaty

A global halt to nuclear weapons testing was first proposed in 1954 by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as a step toward ending the nuclear arms race and preventing nuclear proliferation. A ban on nuclear testing has been a key national security objective of the United States since the late-1950s, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower initiated U.S.-UK-USSR comprehensive test ban negotiations.

In 1962-1963, President John F. Kennedy pursued comprehensive test ban talks with Russia, but the two sides could not agree on the number of on-site inspections. Instead, the two sides agreed to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.

Since the late-1960s, the conclusion of a comprehensive ban against nuclear testing has also been understood to be an essential part of the nuclear weapon states’ commitment to fulfill their nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI nuclear disarmament commitments.

President Jimmy Carter again sought to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty with Russia from 1977-1980, but that effort also fell short as U.S.-Soviet relations soured after Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan.

Under intense pressure from people in the then-Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan who were outraged by the environmental and health effects of Soviet testing at the Semipalatinsk Test Site,  leaders in Moscow were compelled to shut down the facility on August 29, 1991. A month later, on Oct. 5, 1991, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced a unilateral nuclear test moratorium.

In response, later that year, legislation was introduced in the U.S. Congress for a reciprocal test moratorium. The legislation, which overcame opposition for the George H. W. Bush admistration, became law in 1992. It mandated a 9-month moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions. In July 1993, President Bill Clinton decided to extend the U.S. test moratorium.

From 1994-96, the world's nations came together to negotiate the CTBT, which prohibits all nuclear test explosions and is intended to help curb the spread of nuclear weapons and impede nuclear arms competition.

In 1995, during the NPT review conference, the parties agreed to indefinitely extend the NPT as well as to conclude CTBT negotiations by no later than 1996.

On September 24, 1996, the United States was the first nation to sign the CTBT, which prohibits all nuclear weapon test explosions or other nuclear explosions, but the Senate rejected ratification in 1999 and the treaty has yet to enter into force.

In recent years, international support for the CTBT has grown. While the global test ban monitoring and verification system established by the treaty has matured and is far more capable than its designers originally envisaged.

In 2009, President Barack Obama vowed to pursue ratification of the CTBT, saying, "After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned." Unfortunately, the Obama administration ultimately did not pursue ratification, though the United States did pursue the first UN Security Council resolution supporting the treaty. The Trump administration's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review noted that it would not seek ratification of the CTBT, but would support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and the International Monitoring System (IMS) and International Data Center (IDC). The Biden administration reiterated U.S. support for the CTBT and the global halt to all nuclear testing, but has not yet pursued an effort to build necessary support for U.S. ratification of the treaty.

In 2023, Russia withdrew its ratification of the CTBT "mirror" the posture of the United States. As a treaty signatory, however, Russia remains obligated not to take any action contrary to the object or purpose of the treaty, which bars all nuclear test explosions, at any yield.

The following are key events in the history of nuclear testing and the nuclear test ban.


Skip to: 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2010s

1940s

Image of the first nuclear test explosion in New Mexico, July 16, 1945. (Library of Congress Photo)July 16, 1945: At 5:30 a.m. near Alamogordo, New Mexico, the United States conducts the first ever nuclear test explosion, code-named Trinity.

August 6 and 9, 1945: The United States drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leading to over 340,000 casualties by 1950.

July 1, 1946: The United States begins Operation Crossroads, a series of nuclear weapons tests, by deploying the first nuclear bomb since August 9, 1945. Operation Crossroads takes place at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands during 1946. The 167 residents of Bikini Atoll are forced to evacuate because of the tests.

August 10, 1946: Operation Crossroads is terminated due to radiation concerns.

1946-1958: The U.S. conducts a total of 23 nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll. Residents of Bikini Atoll are still unable to return to their homes in present day.  

1946-1962: The United States conducts 193 atmospheric tests, mainly in the Pacific and Nevada, involving over 200,000 military and civilian personnel of which, 2,000-3,000 military personnel were used as subjects of government-sponsored medical research. Thousands of other civilians and soldiers are also directly affected or involved in test explosions conducted by other nuclear powers.

August 29, 1949: The Soviet Union conducts its first nuclear test explosion, accelerating the nuclear arms race. By 1962, the Soviet Union explodes a total of 142 atmospheric nuclear tests. Back to top.

1950s

October 3, 1952: The United Kingdom conducts its first nuclear test in Western Australia, code-named Hurricane.

November 1, 1952: The United States’ Ivy Mike nuclear test, the first test of a hydrogen bomb, results in a 10 megaton explosion, which obliterates the island of Elugelab in the Enewetak Atoll of the Marshall Islands.An image of the Yankee nuclear test of the Castle series on May 14, 1954. At 13.5 megatons, the Yankee test was the second largest nuclear test in U.S. history. (National Archives, Air Force Collection Photo)

1954: The U.S. Castle test series and Soviet tests in Siberia arouse international outrage about radioactive fallout, particularly after the 15 megaton Castle Bravo test contaminates the Marshall Islands and the Japanese fishing vessel, Lucky Dragon. The hydrogen bomb tests prompt the formation of the Japanese Committee Against A & H Tests. 

April 2, 1954: Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposes a nuclear testing "standstill" agreement, which is later forwarded to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Albert Einstein and Pope Pius XII later call for a cessation of nuclear testing.

May 10, 1954: The Soviet Union proposes, for the first time by either superpower, a nuclear test ban as the initial step toward nuclear disarmament.

1957: The United Kingdom conducts its first hydrogen bomb test, and the United States and the Soviet Union accelerate testing. These countries conduct 42 above ground nuclear blasts during the year.

1957: Otto Hahn, the scientist who split the uranium atom in 1938, joins eighteen of his colleagues in pledging to have nothing to do with nuclear weapons development or testing. Chemist and Nobel Laureate Linus Pauling circulates a petition calling for a test ban, which is signed by 9,000 scientists in 43 countries. The Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy (SANE) places ads in major newspapers calling attention to the perils of nuclear war. Thousands of letters protesting continued nuclear testing are sent to President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

May 1957: The United States and the Soviet Union trade test ban and weapons production cut-off proposals but fail to reach an agreement, due in part to opposition from U.S. nuclear weapons scientists. In the summer, the American Friends Service Committee, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the World Council of Churches circulate petitions calling for an end to all nuclear tests.

September 19, 1957: The United States conducts the first ever underground nuclear test, known as Rainier, in an underground tunnel at the Nevada Test Site.

November 8, 1957: The United Kingdom carries out its first thermonuclear test, code-named Grapple X, at Chrismas Island. 

March 31, 1958: The Soviet Union announces a unilateral suspension of testing after completing their latest series of blasts.

April 8, 1958: President Eisenhower proposes a technical conference to explore test ban verification. U.S. citizens are joined by citizens in Europe, led by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, in creating a climate of support for a test moratorium and test ban talks.

August 22, 1958: President Eisenhower proposes a one-year test moratorium if the Soviets also refrain from testing as well as the initiation of U.S.-UK-USSR test ban negotiations, which begin on October 31.

1959: Test ban negotiations continue in Geneva despite opposition from lab scientists about test ban verification. Back to top.

1960s

February 13, 1960: France conducts its first nuclear test explosion in Algeria.

February 1960: The Eisenhower administration redoubles its diplomatic efforts by proposing a phased approach to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The proposal is endorsed by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and with some further modifications, it is positively received by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. This makes it likely that the test ban treaty could be signed at the Paris summit that both Eisenhower and Khrushchev have agreed to attend in May. However, the shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union on May 1 wrecks the chance for the Paris summit and the chance of a test ban agreement.

January-July, 1961: President John F. Kennedy accelerates U.S. nuclear weapons deployments and East-West relations deteriorate over the Berlin crisis.

August 1961: Soviet nuclear tests resume, followed by the resumption of U.S. testing in September.

October 30, 1961: The Soviet Union conducts the largest nuclear test explosion ever—a 58 megaton atmospheric blast code-named Tsar Bomba.

November 1, 1961: Approximately 100,000 women in 110 American communities leave their homes and offices in a national "strike" for a test ban, leading to the formation of Women Strike for Peace. Boston area physicians form Physicians for Social Responsibility, which documents the presence of strontium-90, a by-product of nuclear tests, in the teeth of children across the United States and worldwide.

March 1962: The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) is established. The ENDC, later to become the Conference on Disarmament (CD), will continue multilateral discussions on the test ban for over three decades.

July 6, 1962: The United States conducts the Sedan nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site as a part of Project Plowshare, an initiative to investigate the civilian and peaceful uses of nuclear weapons. The level of radioactive fallout from the Sedan test is one of the highest of U.S. nuclear tests, leading to the termination of Project Plowshare in 1977 after public opposition. 

October 1962: The Cuban Missile Crisis brings the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of all-out nuclear war.

November 1962-April 1963: Norman Cousins, a prominent U.S. citizen, and leader of SANE, meets with President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev several times privately to urge both leaders to find a way to ease tensions and break the impasse on the test ban negotiations.

June 8, 1963: Soviet Premier Khrushchev invites UK and U.S. negotiators to a conference in Moscow in July to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

June 10, 1963: President Kennedy accepts the Soviet invitation for renewed talks in his commencement address at American University. He argues that peace without competition between the United States and the Soviet Union is not possible, but the prevention of nuclear war is.

July 15, 1963: U.S., UK, and Soviet negotiators meet in Moscow to try to work out an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. However, due to disagreements concerning on-site inspections, an agreement on a comprehensive ban is not reached. Negotiators turn their attention to the conclusion of a limited ban, which would prohibit tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and beneath the surface of the seas.

July 25, 1963: The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) is initialed by the U.S., UK, and Soviet representatives, W. Averell Harriman, Viscount Quinton Hailsham, and Andrei Gromyko, respectively. 

July 26, 1963: President Kennedy addresses the nation on the merits of the LTBT and asks for their support in ensuring Senate approval.

August 5, 1963: The U.S., UK, and USSR signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in Moscow.

August 8, 1963: President Kennedy places the LTBT before the Senate for its advice and consent. Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban is formed. SANE and prominent physicians place pro-ratification ads in major newspapers.

September 24, 1963: The U.S. Senate votes to provide its advice and consent for ratification of the LTBT by a vote of 80 to 14.

October 11, 1963: The LTBT enters into force, but nuclear weapons development and production continue with underground nuclear testing.

October 16, 1964: China explodes its first nuclear bomb—a 20-kiloton atmospheric blast—at Lop Nur in northwestern China.

June 17, 1967: China tests its first hydrogen bomb with a yield of 3.3 megatons.

July 1, 1968: The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is signed in Washington, London, and Moscow. Among other obligations, the NPT requires parties to the treaty to "seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end.” 

August 24, 1968: France tests its first hydrogen bomb, code-named Canopus, at Fangataufa Atoll, becoming the fifth nation to test a thermonuclear device. Back to top.

1970s

Early 1970s: Approximately 150 residents of Bikini Atoll are resettled on their home islands years after U.S. nuclear testing.

September 15, 1971: Greenpeace activists sail from Vancouver to Amchitka, Alaska, intent on stopping a scheduled U.S. nuclear test, which fuels further public opposition to testing. Within a year, the United States cancels further tests at Amchitka for "political and other reasons."

1972-1974: Australia and New Zealand ask the International Court of Justice to halt continuing French atmospheric tests in Polynesia and send naval vessels to the test area to signal their opposition. Greenpeace sails into the French testing zone in protest of the explosions in what is the first of several actions against French testing.

A crater marks the site of India’s May 18, 1974 underground nuclear test at Pokhran in the desert state of Rajasthan. (Punjab Photo/AFP/Getty Images)

May 1974: On May 18, India conducts its first nuclear test in the Thar Desert near its border with Pakistan. Bowing to international pressure, France announces all its future nuclear tests will be conducted underground.

1974-1976: The United States and the Soviet Union conclude the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties limiting military and non-military underground tests to explosive yields below 150 kilotons. However, they continue to design, develop and produce new weapons. It is not until 1990, after a stronger verification protocol is negotiated, that both treaties enter into force.

1976-1978: The United States develops and tests an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW), otherwise known as a neutron bomb. After public outrage, U.S. President Jimmy Carter cancels production of the neutron bomb. 

1977-1980: U.S., UK, and Soviet negotiators make substantial progress toward an agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty, but opposition from the Pentagon, Energy Department, and Congress, combined with the deterioration of East-West relations after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, scuttle the chance for a test ban agreement as well as further controls on U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals.

September 1978: Bikini Atoll residents are evacuated once again when residual radioactive fallout is discovered.

1979: At a meeting organized by the American Friends Service Committee, U.S. arms control and peace groups agree to pursue a new approach on nuclear disarmament: a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons to be followed by reductions in nuclear arsenals. Later, the concept leads to the formation of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, which merged with SANE in 1986, to form what is now known as Peace Action. Back to top.

1980s

1981: Fear of nuclear war increases as the Reagan administration embarks on massive nuclear buildup and East-West tensions worsen. A December NBC/Associated Press survey finds that 76 percent of the U.S. public believes that a nuclear war is "likely" within a few years.

August 1981: President Ronald Reagan reauthorizes the production of the enhanced radiation weapon or neutron bomb. 

November 1981: The Union of Concerned Scientists and dozens of other citizen groups organize nuclear war teach-ins on 151 campuses in 41 states. Physicians for Social Responsibility showcase the potential devastating medical effects of nuclear war.

March 1982: Sens. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.) introduce a nuclear-freeze resolution supported by 150 representatives and 20 senators.

May 1982: Ground Zero national education week on nuclear war prompts thousands to sign nuclear-freeze petitions.

June 12, 1982: Approximately 750,000 people gather in New York's Central Park during the 2nd UN Special Session on Disarmament to call for an end to the nuclear arms race.

July 1982: President Ronald Reagan decides to set aside the comprehensive nuclear test ban effort, calling it a "long-term" U.S. objective, which allows the United States to pursue the development and deployment of new nuclear warheads.

November 1982: Voters in eight U.S. states overwhelmingly pass referenda calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons.

1983: The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops delivers a pastoral letter calling for a halt to the testing and production of nuclear weapons and is joined by national Protestant and Jewish organizations in support of a nuclear freeze.

1985: Arms control groups form the U.S. Comprehensive Test Ban Coalition. By 1991, the coalition includes over 75 national arms control, peace, faith, environmental, labor, and civic organizations.

December 11, 1985: The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty of Rarotonga enters into force. Parties to the treaty include Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa.

1985-1987: The Soviet Union announces a unilateral test moratorium, partly in response to personal appeals to President Mikhail Gorbachev from leaders of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

1986: Physicians for Social Responsibility organizes "Code Blue" congressional lobbying events on the test ban. The U.S. House of Representatives passes a non-binding resolution (224-155) led by Reps. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.), Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and Jim Leach (R-Iowa) calling for a one-year U.S. testing moratorium if the Soviet Union accepts on-site-inspections.

1986: U.S. President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev meet in Reykjavik, Iceland and discuss nuclear disarmament but fail to reach an agreement.

1986-1993: Annual protests at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site involving 3,000 to 9,000 people maintain public awareness of the continuation of nuclear testing and weapons development. In 1988 alone, over 14,000 people attend two nuclear testing protests at the test site with over 4,000 people arrested for non-violent civil disobedience.

August 1988: Six non-aligned states request a special conference to consider amending the 1963 LTBT to make it comprehensive.

Kazakh citizens gather to demand a nuclear test ban at the Soviet nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk in August 1989. (UN Photo/MB)

1988: Physicians for Social Responsibility and five other groups sponsor the First International Scientific Symposium on a Nuclear Test Ban, in Las Vegas, Nevada. The American Medical Association and the American Public Health Associations pass resolutions calling for a CTBT.

February 1989: Olzhas Suleimenov, a popular Kazakh poet and writer, forms the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement (NSM) in cooperation with leaders of the Western Shoshone nation to oppose further nuclear testing in Kazakhstan and elsewhere. Meetings and demonstrations are organized in many Kazakh and Soviet cities, including Moscow. The Soviets are forced to cancel 11 of 18 scheduled tests in 1989. Back to top.

1990s

December 11, 1990: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) enters into force. 

January 1991: The LTBT Amendment Conference convenes, but no decision is made to amend the limited test ban into a comprehensive one because of opposition from the declared nuclear powers.

August 29, 1991: The Soviet Semipalatinsk nuclear test site officially closes. In 2009, the United Nations General Assembly adopts resolution 64/35 which designates Aug. 29 as the International Day Against Nuclear Tests. 

October 5, 1991: President Gorbachev announces a unilateral, one-year moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing and invites the United States to join.

October 29, 1991: Prompted by national disarmament groups and Oregon peace groups, a bipartisan congressional coalition led by Rep. Michael Kopetski (D-Ore.), Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.), and Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.) introduces legislation that would impose a one-year U.S. testing moratorium. A group of 112 Members of the House of Representatives introduce H.R. 3636 to establish a 1-year moratorium on U.S. nuclear weapons tests. A companion bill would later be introduced by Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.) and others in the Senate.

December 25, 1991The Soviet Union dissolves into 12 separate republics, and Gorbachev resigns as president of the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin assumes the presidency of the newly independent Russian state. 

April 8, 1992: French President François Mitterrand announces a unilateral French nuclear testing moratorium.

June 1992: Russian President Boris Yeltsin extends the Soviet/Russian test moratorium.

September 13, 1992: After a sustained national grassroots lobbying campaign led by disarmament groups, the U.S. Senate adopts the "Hatfield-Exon" amendment to require a nine-month U.S. testing moratorium, establish strict conditions on any further U.S. testing, and require the start of global test ban negotiations and a prohibition on U.S. testing after September 30, 1996, unless another nation conducts a test. The test moratorium amendment is approved 55-40. On Sept. 24, the U.S. House of Representatives adopts the "Hatfield-Exon" amendment by a margin of 224-151, and on Oct. 2, President George H. W. Bush reluctantly signs the law containing the test moratorium legislation.

September 23, 1992: The United States conducts its 1,030th—and last—nuclear weapons test explosion, a 20 kiloton detonation at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site, code-named "Divider." 

January 1993: At a meeting organized by Greenpeace, Peace Action, and Physicians for Social Responsibility, pro-CTBT groups agree that in order to keep prospects for a test ban alive, the U.S. moratorium must be extended and CTBT talks must be initiated.

March 3, 1993: National Security Advisor Anthony Lake orders the completion of an interagency review of U.S. policy on nuclear testing and a comprehensive test ban.

April 1993: CTBT advocates uncover a Clinton administration draft plan to renew U.S. testing and to substitute a one-kiloton threshold treaty in place of a comprehensive treaty. On April 30, The Washington Post broke the story, triggering national debate. Physicians for Social Responsibility, Greenpeace, and other groups place pro-CTBT, "Don't Blow It Bill" ads in major newspapers.

May 1993: Sens. J. James Exon (D-Neb.), Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.), George Mitchell (D-Maine), and Rep. Michael Kopetski (D-Ore.) express opposition to the one-kiloton plan. At the urging of pro-CTBT groups, they and Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) organize letters from 38 senators and 159 representatives in support of a moratorium extension and a total ban. Editorials from 46 leading newspapers almost entirely favor extending the moratorium. Polls show that 72 percent of the U.S. public favor continuing the moratorium.

June 1993: The Clinton administration debates nuclear testing policy, with the Energy Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the White House science advisor favoring the extension of the moratorium.

July 3, 1993: President Clinton announces he will extend the moratorium through at least 1994 unless another nation conducts a test and will pursue completion of a CTBT by September 1996. Clinton states that the current U.S. arsenal is "safe and reliable" and that there is no immediate need for further tests.

August 10, 1993: The Conference on Disarmament (CD) agrees to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to begin negotiations on a CTBT in January 1994.

December 16, 1993: The United Nations unanimously adopts a resolution calling on the CD to proceed with the negotiation of a CTBT as rapidly as possible.

January 1994: CTBT negotiations begin at the CD in Geneva. Pro-CTBT groups press negotiators to complete talks by the end of the year and begin an effort to ban all nuclear test explosions, including low-yield hydronuclear explosions. A worldwide petition drive amasses one million signatures for a CTBT and is delivered to the president of the CD at the outset of the negotiations.

June 1994: The U.S. House of Representatives votes 263-156 on a resolution offered by Rep. Michael Kopetski (D-Ore.), urging completion of the CTBT by the end of 1994.

September 7, 1994: The CD ends CTBT talks for the year without an agreement. Pro-CTBT groups learn of a U.S. proposal to make a CTBT only 10 years in duration and begin efforts to force the United States to withdraw the idea.

January 1995: U.S. officials announce that they will pursue a test ban that is permanent in duration. CTBT talks resume in Geneva without agreement on the scope of the treaty, with the declared nuclear states favoring low-yield, hydronuclear tests under a CTBT. Australia begins a diplomatic effort to get consensus on a zero-yield test ban.

March 1995:  U.S. officials announce the extension of the U.S. moratorium.

April-May 1995: Over 180 nations meet and agree to indefinitely extend the NPT and conclude CTBT negotiations by no later than 1996. China conducts a nuclear test one day after the conclusion of the NPT review and extension conference.

June 13, 1995: Newly-elected French President Jacques Chirac announces France will resume nuclear testing before signing a CTBT, which foments international outrage and a spontaneous worldwide consumer boycott of French goods. U.S. officials debate a new proposal, backed by the Pentagon and Joint Chiefs of Staff, calling for the United States to pursue a 500-ton threshold test ban that would allow low-yield blasts.

Late June 1995: Pro-CTBT groups rally a group of 24 senators and 113 representatives to urge Clinton to reject low-yield tests and to support "a truly comprehensive test ban."

July-August 1995: Over 35,000 citizens deliver calls and letters to the White House calling for a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban. The Clinton administration debates the 500-ton threshold proposal, with the National Security Council, Energy Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and White House science advisor favoring a zero-yield CTBT.

August 8, 1995: A new technical report by former weapons scientists is released that refutes the argument that there is a need for low-yield nuclear tests.

August 10, 1995: In response to constituent pressure and public opposition to French testing, the U.S. Senate unanimously adopts a resolution introduced by Sen. Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii) condemning continued French and Chinese nuclear testing. Shortly thereafter, French President Chirac announces France will support a zero-yield test ban.

August 11, 1995: President Clinton announces his support for a "true zero-yield" test ban.

September 6, 1995: France renews nuclear testing despite international opposition and efforts by Greenpeace vessels to reach the test zone. CTBT talks in Geneva end for the year without producing an agreement.

September 14, 1995: The United Kingdom announces it will support a zero-yield CTBT.

January 1996: CTBT talks resume in Geneva as India announces it will only support a test ban agreement if the declared weapon states commit to a time-bound nuclear disarmament framework. India later announces it does not intend to sign the treaty. China insists on allowing peaceful nuclear explosions. Pro-CTBT citizen groups in the U.S. and dozens of other countries write, call, and meet with CD representatives to urge completion of a zero-yield CTBT by the end of the year and to urge nations not to support India's conditions for supporting the CTBT, but rather to support disarmament through separate initiatives.

Jan. 27, 1996: France conducts its last test.

May-June 1996: China drops its insistence on peaceful explosions, but new disagreements emerge on verification issues and entry-into-force. Pro-CTBT groups worldwide press the declared and undeclared nuclear powers to reach agreement on verification and to support a "flexible" entry-into-force formula.

June 18, 1996: The United States indicates its willingness to allow an entry-into-force formula that requires all nuclear-capable states to ratify the CTBT, making a flexible formula less likely.

June 26, 1996: Pro-CTBT groups rally Senate support for the CTBT and defeat the Kyl-Reid nuclear testing amendment by a margin of 53-45. The amendment authored by Sens. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) and Harry Reid (D-Nev.) would have allowed the president to conduct nuclear tests even under a CTBT.

June 28, 1996: CD Chairman and the Netherlands Ambassador Jaap Ramaker presents a final CTBT text for member-states of the conference to consider.

July 29, 1996: CTBT talks resume in Geneva. China sets off a nuclear test blast and announces it will not test after September 1996.

July-August 1996: Verification disputes are settled, but India announces it will block agreement on the CTBT at the CD.

August 1996: Consensus on a final CTBT text is blocked by India and Iran, ostensibly due to the failure to include pledges on disarmament. Australia intensifies its work to bring the CTBT directly to the UN for endorsement. Pro-test ban citizens’ organizations worldwide press the United States, other nuclear powers, and non-nuclear-weapon states to support the Australian CTBT resolution.

September 10, 1996: With 127 co-sponsors for the Australian CTBT resolution, a special session of the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approves the CTBT by a margin of 158 to 3, with five abstentions, opening the way for CTBT signature and ratification.

September 24, 1996: The CTBT opens for signature at the UN in New York. On the first day, 71 countries sign the CTBT, including the United States.

June 10, 1997: Seven U.S. senators make floor speeches on the anniversary of President John F. Kennedy's historic address at American University and call for the prompt approval of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate.

July 15, 1997: In a floor speech, Sen. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) notes, "There are certainly benefits to a comprehensive test ban treaty, but there are also costs and risks." He also adds that he is "leaning strongly in support of the international treaty."

August 1997: A "seismic event" occurs near the Russian nuclear test site at Novaya Zemlya. Initial reports suggest that the event might be a Russian nuclear test. However, the U.S. government later determines that the event occurred in the Arctic Ocean, 130km from the Russian test site, and the data suggests the event was in fact an earthquake.

September 22, 1997: President Clinton transmits the CTBT to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent for ratification.

January 21, 1998: Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, writes to President Clinton and argues that Senate consideration of the CTBT should wait until the Senate addresses "higher priority" issues, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Kyoto Climate Treaty.

January 27, 1998: In his annual State of the Union address, President Clinton calls on the Senate to approve the CTBT in 1998 and secures support for the treaty from four former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nuclear weapons laboratory directors, and the members of NATO.

February 10, 1998: President Clinton replies to Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) arguing that the CTBT should be ratified in 1998.

April 6, 1998: The United Kingdom and France both ratify the CTBT, after jointly signing it on September 24, 1996, becoming the first two nations who have tested nuclear weapons to ratify the treaty.

May 11 and 13, 1998: India, under the leadership of newly elected Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, announces India has conducted five underground nuclear test explosions in the Thar Desert. The tests are met with global condemnation and calls for India to sign and ratify the CTBT without conditions.

May 13, 1998: Sens. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) and Joseph Biden (D-Del.) draft and circulate a resolution calling for Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings and a vote on the CTBT "as expeditiously as possible."

May 15-17, 1998: A new national opinion survey is conducted to gauge public support of Senate approval of the CTBT. The results show that the American public continues to support the CTBT by an overwhelming majority (73 percent approve of Senate ratification; 16 percent disapprove; 11 percent don't know). Among those who heard about the Indian nuclear test (63 percent of respondents), approval was even higher (78 percent approve, only 15 percent disapprove).

May 28 and 30, 1998: Pakistan announces it has conducted six nuclear test explosions. The tests are met with global condemnation and calls for Pakistan and India to sign and ratify the CTBT without conditions.

May 28, 1998: U.S. disarmament and peace groups across the country stage protests and rallies at embassies, consulates, and local Senate offices calling on India and Pakistan to stop nuclear testing and for the U.S. Senate to approve the CTBT.

May-June 1998: Dozens of protests to condemn the tests are held in India involving a spectrum of prominent citizens. In addition, a new organization of professionals, the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND), is formed. In Pakistan, despite the imposed state of emergency banning protests following its tests, intellectuals and activists sign a petition calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Nongovernmental organizations and professionals hold a conference to condemn the tests by India and Pakistan and the ensuing arms race in South Asia. The Pakistani Coalition for Nonproliferation (CNFP) is formed to urge Pakistan to sign the CTBT and to take other steps to prevent an arms build-up.

January-August 1999: In the late spring of 1999, Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.) and pro-treaty nongovernmental organizations redouble efforts to raise attention to the plight of the CTBT and to press the Senate leadership to begin the process of considering the treaty.

July 20, 1999: A bipartisan group of nine senators holds a press briefing, citing overwhelming public support for the treaty and calling for prompt Senate action. That same day, all 45 Democratic senators write to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), asking for “all necessary hearings...to report the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to the Senate for timely consideration” by October 1999. As he has done for nearly two years, Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) rebuffs his Senate colleagues’ request.

August 1999: Most in the Clinton administration remain dubious about the prospect of real action on the treaty, and little more is done to build support.

August and September 1999: Treaty opponents accelerate preparations for a possible vote on final passage. James Schlesinger, who once headed the Defense and Energy Departments, and Sen. Jon Kyl (R.-Ariz.) step up their lobbying efforts against the treaty with uncommitted Republican senators.

Late-September 1999: Without information about the opposition’s lobbying effort, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), along with other leading Senate CTBT proponents and the White House, decides to try to introduce a nonbinding Senate resolution that called for beginning the process for Senate consideration of the CTBT and scheduling a vote on the treaty by March 31, 2000. The resolution, however, was never introduced.

September 29, 1999: Having been informed of the Democrats’ intention to introduce their resolution, Sens.  Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Trent Lott (R-Miss.) abandon their blocking strategy and propose a vote on final passage of the treaty by October 7. According to Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), 34 senators have already been persuaded to vote against ratification, by September 14.

Lott’s initial proposal for 10 hours of debate on the treaty with only six days’ notice is not accepted by the Democratic leadership. Some Senate supporters, the White House, and the NGO community criticize the offer, calling it a “rush to judgment.” In consultation with the White House, Senate Democratic leaders negotiate for more time and a more thorough series of hearings.

October 1, 1999: Senate Democrats decide to accept Sen. Trent Lott’s (R-Miss.) final “take it or leave it” counteroffer for a vote as soon as Oct. 12. With the final vote on the CTBT just days away, President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and Secretary of Defense William Cohen finally launch a high-profile effort to win Senate support for the treaty. However, the effort was simply too little too late. By the end of October 8, the first day of Senate floor debate, the most crucial of these Republican senators have declared their intention to vote against the treaty.

October 6-8, 1999: The first Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or the Article XIV Conference, is held in Vienna. Article XIV of the CTBT stipulates that if the CTBT has not entered into force three years after its opening for signature (September 24, 1996), the Depository will hold a conference and every two years after in order to facilitate the treaty’s entry into force.

October 12, 1999: Recognizing that the votes needed for ratification are not there and the damage a rejection of the treaty could cause, 62 senators write to the leadership on October 12 “in support of putting off final consideration until the next Congress.”

On the eve of the vote, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) are on the verge of an agreement to postpone the vote; but Sens. Paul Coverdell (R-Ga.), Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), James Inhofe (R-Okla.), Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), and Bob Smith (R-N.H.) reportedly race to the majority leader’s office to tell him that they are prepared to block any new agreement that would postpone the vote.

October 13, 1999: The U.S. Senate rejects the CTBT by a vote of 51-48.

November 10, 1999: U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announces the formation of an administration-appointed task force, which will be led by retired General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to work with key senators to address concerns regarding the CTBT and make recommendations about its future consideration. Back to top.

2000s

June 30, 2000: Russia ratifies the CTBT.

January 5, 2001: U.S. General John Shalikashvili’s report, “Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” is released after a 10 month-long review of the CTBT following the 1999 Senate rejection of the treaty. Shalikashvili’s report voices strong support for the treaty and outlines measures to build bipartisan support.

2001: The George W. Bush administration announces it will not seek reconsideration of the CTBT by the Senate but will not resume U.S. nuclear testing.

July 31, 2002: The U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) releases a report on “Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” assessing the key technical issues that arose during the Senate debate over treaty ratification. The report concludes that the United States does not need nuclear testing to maintain the safety and reliability of its arsenal, that the ability of countries to cheat is limited, and that there is confidence in the ability of the verification regime to detect nuclear tests.

October 9, 2006: North Korea conducts its first nuclear test explosion. Despite being only partially completed and operating in test mode, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)’s International Monitoring System (IMS) was able to detect the nuclear test and showcase the efficiency of the treaty’s verification regime.

September 2008: The 2008 Integrated Field Exercise is conducted in Kazakhstan. This large-scale simulation organized by the CTBTO's Provisional Technical Secretariat is designed to test crucial elements of the treaty’s on-site inspection provisions.On April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama spelled out steps leading to a world free of nuclear weapons, including pursuing U.S. ratification of the CTBT. Official White House Photo by Pete Souza

April 5, 2009: In Prague, U.S. President Barack Obama states his commitment to seek “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” including a pledge to “immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” 

May 25, 2009: North Korea conducts its second nuclear test, one month after declaring that it would no longer participate in multilateral talks on its denuclearization and would carry out nuclear and missile tests to strengthen its deterrent capability. With only three-quarters of the IMS in place, the CTBTO’s seismic stations are able to immediately confirm the nuclear test, and the noble gas system of the IMS later corroborates the seismic findings. The United Nations Security Council unanimously expands sanctions and counterproliferation measures against North Korea in response. Back to top.

2010s

May 28, 2010: The 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference concludes, and an agreement is reached on a Final Document, including conclusions and recommendations regarding nuclear testing and the CTBT.

February 6, 2012: Indonesia becomes the 36th Annex 2 state to ratify the CTBT, after signing on September 24, 1996, leaving eight remaining Annex 2 states needed to ratify the CTBT to bring the treaty into force: China, Egypt, India, Israel, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States.

March 30, 2012: In a follow-up to their 2002 report on the CTBT, NAS releases a report noting that there have been significant advancements to the technical issues related to the CTBT, particularly since the 2002 report. The 2012 report reaffirms that the United States no longer needs—and would not benefit from—nuclear explosive testing and also cites substantial advances in the U.S. national monitoring and the IMS capabilities across all of the key verification technologies deployed worldwide to detect and deter nuclear tests.

February 12, 2013: North Korea conducts its third nuclear test. The test is announced by the state-run Korean Central News Agency and confirmed by the CTBTO’s IMS verification regime on the same day.

August 2013: CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo visits China to discuss progress on CTBTO IMS in China. Following Zerbo’s meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and training for Chinese station personnel in September, China agrees to begin sending data from its IMS stations to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna.

September 26, 2013: The CTBTO creates the Group of Eminent Persons (GEM) at the United Nations in New York to bring together a group comprising eminent personalities and internationally recognized experts to promote the CTBT’s ratification by the remaining Annex 2 states.

March 19, 2014: The Times of Israel reports that Israel has strongly indicated support for the CTBT, noting that Israeli sources claim Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu considers the CTBT to be “very significant,” Israel is “proud” to have signed it, and he “has never had a problem with the CTBT.” CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo also notes that "Israel could be the next" Annex 2 state to ratify the CTBT.

November 3, 2014: The CTBTO Preparatory Commission launches their second on-site inspection exercise, called the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 in Jordan. The exercise involves two fictitious countries, lasts for five weeks, and uses 150 tons of equipment to comb a large swath of land next to the Dead Sea to test the procedures and operations required for a real on-site inspection of a country accused of testing a nuclear weapon.

January 6, 2016: North Korea's state-run Korean Central News Agency announces that the country's military and scientific teams have conducted a fourth nuclear weapon test explosion, claiming the test “scientifically verified the power” of a smaller hydrogen bomb that signifies a “higher stage” of development of North Korea’s nuclear force.  Initial seismic readings confirm a smaller-yield nuclear test detonation but technical experts are doubtful that North Korea conducted a test of a two-stage hydrogen bomb. The detonation, at North Korea's underground nuclear test near the village of P’unggye-ri, is immediately detected by the CTBTO's IMS and many other national and civilian monitoring stations.

The nuclear test is widely condemned by North Korea's neighbors and the international community. Lassina Zerbo, the CTBTO Executive Secretary, said in a Jan. 6 statement that the fourth DPRK test should "serve as the final wake-up call to the international community to outlaw all nuclear testing by bringing the CTBT into force."

June 13-14, 2016: Foreign ministers and representatives from more than 69 states and international organizations gathered in Vienna on June 13-14 for a special meeting to mark the 20th anniversary of the opening of the signature of the CTBT and to explore options for advancing its entry into force. Following a visit from the head of the CTBTO to Jerusalem on June 20, the Israeli government pledged to ratify the treaty “at the right time.”

September 9, 2016: Seismic activity indicates that North Korea conducted a fifth nuclear test at 9:00 a.m. local time. The CTBTO reported that more than two dozen seismic stations that are part of the International Monitoring System confirmed that the seismic event was in the 5.1 magnitude range, occurred at a very shallow depth, and took place in the immediate vicinity of North Korea's P'unggye-ri test site.

September 23, 2016: The UN Security Council adopted its first resolution specifically supporting the CTBT, with the vote intended to reaffirm the global norm against nuclear testing and to encourage the ratifications necessary to trigger the treaty’s entry into force. Resolution 2310, introduced by the United States, was approved 14-0, with Egypt abstaining. A total of 42 countries, including Israel, co-sponsored the resolution, which comes 20 years after the treaty was opened for signature. The resolution took note of a Sept. 15 joint statement by the five permanent Security Council members recognizing that “a nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT.” By endorsing this language, the resolution affirmed the view of these five states that even before the treaty enters into force, all CTBT signatories have an existing obligation not to conduct nuclear test explosions.

July 7, 2017: The Treaty On the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is adopted following a negotiating conference held at the United Nations. The TPNW, negotiated by more than 130 states, further reinforces the commitments of these states against the use, threat of use, development, production, manufacture, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, transfer, stationing, or installation of nuclear weapons. It reinforces states' commitments to the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

September 3, 2017: Seismic activity indicates that North Korea conducted its sixth and largest nuclear test to date at 12:00 p.m. local time. The CTBTO reported that over 100 IMS stations are contributing to the analysis. Its initial estimate is that the seismic event's magnitude was around 5.8, occurred at a very shallow depth, and took place in the immediate vicinity of North Korea's P'unggye-ri test site. A secondary, "subsequent aftershock at same location was recorded at 2 units of magnitude smaller 8.5 mins after" the 5.8 magnitude event. Comparison of seismic signals (to scale) of all six declared DPRK nuclear tests, as observed at IMS station AS-59 Aktyubinsk, Kazakhstan.On September 7, the CTBTO announced that it revised its initial magnitude estimate to 6.1. Experts assess the explosion could have had a yield in excess of 100 kilotons TNT equivalent.

February 2, 2018: The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) asserts that “the United States will not seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." However, it stated that the United States will "continue to support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Committee," and “the related International Monitoring System, and the International Data Center." The NPR calls upon other states not to conduct nuclear testing and states that “[t]he United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. arsenal.”

April 20, 2018: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declares that he will suspend nuclear and missile tests starting on April 21 and that he will shut down the P'unggye-ri test site where the previous six nuclear tests were conducted. At the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference preparatory committee meeting from April 25 - May 7, several countries call on North Korea to sign and ratify the CTBT to codify this pledge into international law.

May 24, 2018: North Korea reports that it destroyed its nuclear testing site at P'unggye-ri, setting off explosions to destroy the north, west, and south portals to tunnels that could have been used to test nuclear weapons. It is not clear if North Korea completely destroyed the long-abandoned east portal. No nuclear experts were granted access to verify the destruction of the test site. North Korea did transport several international journalists to observe the explosions from a distance.

May 29, 2019: At a Washington event, U.S. Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley Jr. accuses Russia of "probably not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the 'zero yield' standard." This allegation had not been listed in the 2019 State Department Arms Control Compliance report released just a few months earlier and was the first instance of this allegation being made publicly. Following these remarks, the Defense Intelligence Agency releases a June 13 statement with a more definitive allegation that "The U.S. government, including the intelligence community, has assessed that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons tests that have created nuclear yield." On June 17, Russia calls the allegations "groundless" and accuses Washington of preparing to withdraw from the CTBT and resume testing.

August 22, 2019: The State Department releases the full version of the arms control compliance report, which raises concerns about potential Chinese and Russian nuclear testing in 2018. Regarding Russia, the report says, “[d]uring the 1995–2018 timeframe, Russia probably conducted nuclear weapons-related tests at the Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test Site.” Regarding China, the report says that there are questions about China’s adherence to the zero-yield standard, citing concerns with “China’s possible preparation to operate its test site year round and its use of explosive containment chambers…[and] China’s lack of transparency on their nuclear testing activities.” Back to top.

2020s

April 15, 2020: The State Department releases the executive summary of the annual compliance report, which covers 2019 activities. The full version is released June 23. The report charges that Russia and China have engaged in activities that are inconsistent with the “zero-yield” standard.  The report says that some Russian activities since 1996 “have demonstrated a failure to adhere to the U.S. ‘zero-yield’ standard, which would prohibit supercritical tests.” But it also added the caveat that “the United States does not know how many, if any, supercritical or self-sustaining nuclear experiments Russia conducted in 2019.” The report also claims that certain activities at China’s former nuclear testing grounds at Lop Nur “raise concerns” that Beijing might not be complying with the zero-yield nuclear weapons testing. It mentions China’s “use of explosive containment chambers and extensive excavation activities at Lop Nur.”

May 15, 2020: At a meeting of senior U.S. officials representing the top national security agencies, Trump administration officials discuss the possibility of resuming U.S. explosive nuclear weapons testing. One senior official stated that the proposal to renew U.S. nuclear testing is “very much an ongoing conversation.” In the following weeks, members of Congress, former U.S. government officials, and former nuclear weapons scientists speak out against a resumption of nuclear testing, and the international community criticizes the idea as well.

April 2021: The U.S. State Department releases the executive summary of the annual compliance report, which covers 2020 activities. In particular, the State Department said that Russia has continued to undertake activities that are inconsistent with the “zero yield” standard regarding nuclear testing, established through negotiations on the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all nuclear test explosions regardless of yield (See ACT May 2021). “Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that have created nuclear yield and are not consistent with the U.S. ‘zero-yield’ standard,” the report stated, reaffirming a finding reflected in previous reports. It added that “Russia’s development of new warhead designs and overall stockpile management efforts have been enhanced by its approach to nuclear weapons-related experiments.” Yet again, the report called into attention possible nuclear testing activities by China in its Lop-Nur site and cited China’s lack of transparency.

Sept. 23, 2021: The Biden administration reiterates that "the United States supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and is committed to work to achieve its entry into force" at the 12th Article XIV Conference on Facilitating Entry Into Force.

April 2022: The State Department releases the executive summary of the annual compliance report, which covers 2021 activities. Overall, the State Department did not report new compliance developments with Russia or China, although concerns remain “due to the uncertainty” of the activities in the Novaya Zemlya in Russia’s case and the activities in the Lop Nur Nuclear Test Site when it comes to China. (See ACT May 2022.)

June 2023: At the CTBTO's Annual Science and Technology Conference in Vienna, U.S. National Nuclear Security Administrator, Jill Hruby, announces that her agency is "open to working with others to develop a regime that would allow reciprocal observation with radiation detection equipment at each other's subcritical experiments to allow confirmation that the experiment was conistent with the CTBT."

July 2023: A new study, released by Princeton University researchers, shows that the fallout from the 1945 Trinity test reached 46 states, Canada, and Mexico within 10 days of detonation. The study also reanalyzed fallout from all 93 aboveground U.S. atomic tests in Nevada and suggests that earlier official assessments underestimated the scope of the contamination, which reached all regions of the continental United States and points beyond.

August 2023: Credible reports emerge that senior Russian officials are considering the option of "unratifying" the CTBT in order to achieve symmetry with the United States in areas or nuclear policy, but no official decisions have been made.

November 2, 2023: A law signed by President Vladimir Putin that revokes Russia’s ratification of the treaty takes effect. Russian officials claimed they decided to withdraw the country's ratification of the CTBT in 2023 to "mirror" the posture of the United States. They say they will continue to cooperate with the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the operation of the treaty's International Monitoring System and International Data Center. A a treaty signatory, Russia remains obligated not to take any action contrary to the object or purpose of the treaty.

 Back to top.

Nuclear Testing

The Nuclear Testing Tally

Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Since the first nuclear test explosion on July 16, 1945, at least eight nations have detonated over 2,000 nuclear tests at dozens of test sites, including Lop Nor in China, the atolls of the Pacific, Nevada, and Algeria where France conducted its first nuclear device, Western Australia where the U.K. exploded nuclear weapons, the South Atlantic, Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, across Russia, and elsewhere.



Most of the test sites are in the lands of indigenous peoples and far from the capitals of the testing governments. A large number of the early tests—528—were detonated in the atmosphere, which spread radioactive materials through the atmosphere. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty brought about the end of most, but not all, nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere. However, many underground nuclear blasts have also vented radioactive material into the atmosphere and left radioactive contamination in the soil.

Type of Test United States USSR/ Russia United Kingdom France China India Pakistan North Korea Total
Atmospheric 215 219 21 50 23 0 0 0 528
Underground 815 496 24 160 22 3 2 6 1,528
Total 1,0301 (Note: total does not include the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.) 715 45 210 45 3 2 6 2,0562


Through nuclear test explosions, the nuclear testing nations have been able to proof-test new warhead designs and create increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons. The overwhelming majority of the nuclear weapon test detonations were for "weapons development" and "weapons effects" purposes.

Following Russian and U.S. nuclear testing moratoria, multilateral negotiations on a global Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) began in 1994 and were concluded in 1996. The treaty was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. The CTBT, which prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" and established an international test monitoring and verification system, has not yet entered into force.

United States
(1,030)
First test:
July 16, 1945.
Last test:
Sept. 23, 1992.
Signed CTBT:
Sept. 24, 1996.

USSR/Russia
(715 tests)
First test:
Aug. 29, 1949.
Last test:
Oct. 24, 1990.
Deposited CTBT Ratification:
June 30, 2000.

United Kingdom
(45 tests)
First test:
Oct. 3, 1952.
Last test:
Nov. 26, 1991.
Signed CTBT:
Sept. 24, 1996.
Deposited CTBT Ratification:
Apr. 6, 1998.

France
(210 tests)
First test:
Feb. 13, 1960.
Last test:
Jan. 27, 1996.
Signed CTBT:
Sept. 24, 1996.
Deposited CTBT Ratification:
Apr. 6, 1998.

China
(45 tests)
First test:
Oct. 16, 1964.
Last test:
July 29, 1996.
Signed CTBT:
Sept. 24, 1996.

India
(3 tests2)
First test:
May 18, 1974.
Last test:
May 13, 1998.
Not a CTBT signatory.

Pakistan
(2 tests3)
First test:
May 28, 1998.
Last test:
May 30, 1998.
Not a CTBT signatory.

North Korea
(6 tests)
First test:
Oct. 9, 2006.
Last test:
Sept. 3, 2017.
Not a CTBT signatory.

Year United States USSR/ Russia United Kingdom France China India Pakistan North Korea Total
1945 1               1
1946 2               2
1947 0               0
1948 3               3
1949 0 1             1
1950 0 0             0
1951 16 2             18
1952 10 0 1           11
1953 11 5 2           18
1954 6 10 0           16
1955 18 6 0           24
1956 18 9 6           33
1957 32 16 7           55
1958 77 34 5           116
1959 0 0 0           0
1960 0 0 0 3         3
1961 10 59 0 2         71
1962 96 79 2 1         178
1963 47 0 0 3         50
1964 45 9 2 3 1       60
1965 38 14 1 4 1       58
1966 48 18 0 7 3       76
1967 42 17 0 3 2       64
1968 56 17 0 5 1       79
1969 46 19 0 0 2       67
1970 39 16 0 8 1       64
1971 24 23 0 5 1       53
1972 27 24 0 4 2       57
1973 24 17 0 6 1       48
1974 22 21 1 9 1 1     55
1975 22 19 0 2 1 0     44
1976 20 21 1 5 4 0     51
1977 20 24 0 9 1 0     54
1978 19 31 2 11 3 0     66
1979 15 31 1 10 1 0     58
1980 14 24 3 12 1 0     54
1981 16 21 1 12 0 0     50
1982 18 19 1 10 1 0     49
1983 18 25 1 9 2 0     55
1984 18 27 2 8 2 0     57
1985 17 10 1 8 0 0     36
1986 14 0 1 8 0 0     23
1987 14 23 1 8 1 0     47
1988 15 16 0 8 1 0     40
1989 11 7 1 9 0 0     28
1990 8 1 1 6 2 0     18
1991 7 0 1 6 0 0     14
1992 6 0 0 0 2 0     8
1993 0 0 0 0 1 0     1
1994 0 0 0 0 2 0     2
1995 0 0 0 5 2 0     7
1996 0 0 0 1 2 0     3
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0     0
1998 0 0 0 0 0 2 2   4
1999-2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2007-2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 03 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
2017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2018-Present 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1,030 715 45 210 45 3 2 6 2,056

NOTES

1. The total number and yearly listing of U.S. nuclear test explosions listed in this fact sheet are based on the figures published in United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992  DOE/NV-209 (Rev. 14), December 1994. The Department of Energy has since pubished two revisions of the pubication that slightly revise these numbers and reassign the purposes originally described for certain nuclear test explosions.

2. This "Nuclear Testing Tally" includes nuclear tests announced or reported by governments and/or intergovernmental organizations. As such, it does not take into account the "Vela Incident" of 1979 because it has not yet officially been determined by any government or intergovernmental organization to have been a nuclear test explosion. However, there is strong evidence and analysis by independent experts that suggests it was an atmospheric nuclear weapon test explosion.

3. In accordance with the definition of a nuclear test contained in the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and to allow accurate comparison with other countries' figures, India's three simultaneous nuclear explosions on May 11 are counted as only one nuclear test, as are the two explosions on May 13. Likewise, Pakistan's five simultaneous explosions on May 28 are counted as a single test.

4. In the article "Radionuclide Evidence for Low-Yield Nuclear Testing in North Korea in April/May 2010," Lars-Erik De Geer argued that the xexon and barium isotope concentrations in air currents from North Korea in April and May of 2010 were consistent with two low-yield nuclear tests. However, this theory was largely debunked when the Earth Institute at Columbia University measured seismology records and determined that no well-coupled explosion larger than one ton could have occurred during that timeframe. According to the report, such a low yield explosion would have been incapable of advancing the North Korean's technical understanding of a nuclear weapon explosion.


 
Nuclear Testing

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at a Glance

 

 

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion” anywhere in the world. The treaty was opened for signature in September 1996, and has been signed by 187 nations and ratified by 177. The treaty cannot formally enter into force until it is ratified by 44 specific nations, nine of which must still do so: China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, Iran, Egypt, Russia and the United States. Although Russia ratified the CTBT in 2000, it withdrew its ratification of the CTBT in 2023 to "mirror" the posture of the United States; as a treaty signatory, Russia remains obligated not to take any action contrary to the object or purpose of the treaty

In order to verify compliance with its provisions, the treaty establishes a global network of monitoring facilities and allows for on-site inspections of suspicious events. The CTBT contains a preamble, 17 treaty articles, two treaty annexes, and a protocol with two annexes detailing verification procedures.

Since the conclusion and opening for signature of the CTBT in 1996, nuclear testing has become taboo. Today, even those nuclear-armed states that have not signed or not ratified the CTBT, including India, Israel, and Pakistan, observe nuclear testing moratoriums. Only one country has conducted nuclear test explosions in this century, and even that country—North Korea—has halted nuclear testing in 2017. Although the CTBT has not formally entered into force, the treaty has, for now, achieved its primary goal: ending nuclear weapon test explosions.

Preamble

The preamble, which lists disarmament principles and objectives, sets the overall political context of the treaty. In particular, it stresses the need for the continued reduction of nuclear weapons worldwide with the ultimate goal of their elimination. Also of significance, the preamble recognizes that a CTBT will constitute an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by “constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.” It further recognizes that a test ban will constitute “a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament.”

Scope

Article I establishes that all state parties are prohibited from conducting “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.” On the basis of the negotiating record, this includes all nuclear explosions, in accordance with President Bill Clinton’s August 1995 “zero yield” proposal.

Implementing Organization

Article II establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which ensures treaty implementation and provides states-parties with a forum for consultation and cooperation. The organization consists of a Conference of the States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. The organization, which is located in Vienna, is structurally independent from, but operating in collaboration with, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Conference of the States Parties is the overall governing body of the organization. It handles treaty-related policy issues and oversees the treaty’s implementation, including the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. The conference meets once a year, unless otherwise decided.

The Executive Council, which meets regularly and acts as the treaty’s principal decision-making body, consists of 51 members. In order to distribute membership evenly throughout the world, the Executive Council comprises 10 states-parties from Africa; seven from Eastern Europe; nine from Latin America and the Caribbean; seven from the Middle East and South Asia; ten from North America and Western Europe; and eight from Southeast Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. The states in each of these geographical regions are listed in Annex 1 to the treaty.

The members of the council are elected by the conference. In order to ensure that those countries with a vested interest in a comprehensive test ban are adequately represented in the council, at least one-third of the seats allotted to each region will be filled by states-parties on the basis of their nuclear capabilities applicable to the treaty, such as the number of monitoring facilities they contribute to the International Monitoring System (IMS). One seat allocated to each region will be designated on an alphabetical basis and the remaining seats will be determined by rotation or elections. Thus, each state-party will eventually have the opportunity to serve on the council.

The Technical Secretariat is the primary body responsible for implementing the treaty’s verification provisions. In this capacity, it supervises the operation of the IMS and receives, processes, analyzes and reports on the system’s data. It also manages the International Data Center (IDC) and performs procedural tasks related to conducting on-site inspections. Until the treaty enters into force, these functions are being handled by the Provisional Technical Secretariat.

Article III requires each state-party, in accordance with its constitutional process, to take any necessary measures to implement its treaty obligations.

Verification and Compliance

Article IV and the verification protocol establish the treaty’s verification regime, which consists of four basic elements: the IMS, consultation and clarification, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The verification regime will not be completely operational until the treaty enters into force. For instance, on-site inspections cannot be authorized until the treaty formally comes into effect.

The purpose of the IMS is to detect nuclear explosions, which are prohibited under Article I. The monitoring system comprises a network of 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismological monitoring stations designed to detect seismic activity and distinguish between natural events, such as earthquakes, and nuclear explosions. In addition, the system incorporates 80 radionuclide stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories that seek to identify radioactivity released during a nuclear explosion. The IMS also includes 60 infrasound (acoustic) and 11 hydroacoustic stations designed to pick up the sound of a nuclear explosion conducted in the atmosphere or underwater, respectively. The host state and the location of each facility is listed in Annex 1 to the protocol. There will be a total of 337 IMS certified facilities.

Information collected by the IMS is transmitted to the IDC—an essential part of the Technical Secretariat responsible for data storage and processing. Because the IMS generates an enormous amount of raw data, the IDC will regularly provide states-parties with a number of services designed to help them monitor compliance with the treaty’s provisions. In this regard, the data center produces integrated lists of all signals picked up by the IMS, as well as standard event lists and bulletins. In accordance with the parameters outlined in Annex 2 to the protocol, the center also generates standard event bulletins that screen out those events that appear to be of a non-nuclear nature. However, notwithstanding this analysis role, the IDC must make both the raw and processed information available to all states-parties.

The consultation and clarification component of the verification regime encourages states-parties to attempt to resolve, either among themselves or through the organization, possible instances of non-compliance before requesting an on-site inspection. A state-party must provide clarification of an ambiguous event within 48 hours of receiving such a request from another state-party or the Executive Council.

Each state-party has the right to request an on-site inspection in the territory of the party in question. The inspection request must be based on information collected by the IMS; data obtained through national technical means (NTM) of verification, such as satellites, in a manner consistent with international law; or a combination of IMS and NTM information. The request must contain the approximate geographical coordinates and the estimated depth of the ambiguous event, the proposed boundaries of the area to be inspected (not to exceed 1,000 square kilometers), the state-party or parties to be inspected, the probable environment and estimated time of event, all evidence upon which the request is based, the identity of the proposed observer (if available) and the results of the consultation and clarification process (if any).

The Executive Council would make a decision on the on-site inspection request within 96 hours of its receipt from the requesting state-party. The inspection would be authorized to proceed if it has been approved by at least 30 of the council’s 51-members, the so-called “green light” procedure. An inspection team would arrive at the point of entry within six days of the council’s receipt of the inspection request. During the course of the inspection, the inspection team may submit a proposal to extend the inspection to begin drilling, which must be approved by 26 council members. The duration of the inspection must not exceed 60 days, but may be extended by a maximum of 70 additional days (subject to council approval) if the inspection team determines that more time is needed to fulfill its mandate.

If the Executive Council rejects an on-site inspection request (or terminates an inspection already underway) because it is of a frivolous or abusive nature, the council may impose punitive measures on the requesting state-party. In this regard, it may require the requesting state-party to provide financial compensation for preparations made by the Technical Secretariat and may suspend the party’s right to request an inspection and serve on the council for an unspecified period of time.

The verification regime also incorporates confidence-building measures intended to promote treaty compliance. In order to reduce the likelihood that verification data may be misconstrued, each state-party voluntarily provides the Technical Secretariat with notification of any chemical explosion involving a magnitude of 300 tons or more of TNT-equivalent on its territory. Each state-party may also assist the Technical Secretariat in the calibration of IMS stations.

In order to ensure compliance with the treaty’s provisions, Article V empowers the conference to revoke a state-party’s rights under the treaty, recommend to the states-parties punitive measures such as sanctions or bring the case to the attention of the United Nations. Article VI describes the mechanism by which disputes pertaining to the application or interpretation of the treaty may be settled.

Amendment Process

Under Article VII, each state-party has the right to propose amendments to the treaty after its entry into force. Any proposed amendment requires the approval of a simple majority of states-parties at an amendment conference with no party casting a negative vote.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

Under Article VIII, a conference will be held 10 years after the treaty’s entry into force to review the implementation of its provisions, including the preamble. At this review conference, any state-party may request that the issue of so-called “peaceful nuclear explosions” (PNEs) be put on the agenda. However, the presumption is that PNEs remain prohibited unless certain virtually insurmountable obstacles are overcome. First, the review conference must decide without objection that PNEs may be permitted, then an amendment to the treaty must also be approved without objection at a separate amendment conference, as is explained above. The amendment must also demonstrate that no military benefits would result from such explosions. This double hurdle makes it extremely unlikely that peaceful nuclear explosions would ever be permitted under the treaty.

Duration and Withdrawal

Under Article IX, the treaty has an unlimited duration. In addition, each state-party has the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides, “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.” Notice of intent to withdraw must be given at least six months in advance.

Miscellaneous Provisions

Article X specifies that the treaty’s annexes, protocol, and annexes to the protocol are a formal part of the treaty. Article XI declares that the treaty is open to all states for signature prior to its entry into force. Article XII maintains that each signatory state will ratify the treaty according to its own constitutional procedures. Under Article XIII, any state that has not signed the treaty prior to its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

Entry into Force

Under Article XIV, the treaty will not enter into force until it has been signed and ratified by 44 states listed by name in Annex 2. These states include the five original nuclear weapon states—United States, Russia, Britain, France and China—as well as India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. (Actual entry into force would occur 180 days after all 44 states deposit their instruments of ratification with the UN Secretary General.) The 44 states, all of which are participating members of the recently expanded Conference on Disarmament, possess nuclear power and research reactors as determined by the IAEA.

Progress toward CTBT entry into force has stalled for years due to inaction by the remaining Annex 2 hold out states, of which the United States is probably the most pivotal. After a brief and highly partisan debate, the U.S. Senate voted against ratifying the CTBT, including the six safeguards, in October 1999. Although President Barack Obama announced in 2009 his intention to seek Senate reconsideration of the treaty, he did not pursue the initative. But in 2016, the United States did see through UN Security Council Resolution 2310, which was the first UN Security Council resolution to support the CTBT.

The 2018 Trump administration Nuclear Posture Review walked back the United States support for the CTBT. It said: "Although the United States will not seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it will continue to support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Committee as well as the International Monitoring System [IMS] and the International Data Center [IDC]. The United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing."

In 2021 the Joe Biden administration reaffirmed U.S. support for the CTBT stating that "... the United States supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and is committed to work to achieve its entry into force, recognizing the significant challenges that lie ahead in reaching this goal. In line with the goals of the CTBT, the United States continues to observe its zero-yield nuclear explosive testing moratorium and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain such a moratorium."

Until entry into force, conferences may be held for those states that have already deposited their instruments of ratification to “decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process.” Since 1999, the Conference Facilitating Entry Into Force of the CTBT has been convened every other year.

Other Provisions

Article XV stipulates that the treaty’s provisions will not be subject to reservations. Article XVI establishes the UN Secretary General as the depositary of the treaty. Under Article XVII, the treaty will be authentic in six languages.

Nuclear Testing

The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

Despite overwhelming global support and decades of global efforts to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty’s enactment still appears a long way off, due to the treaty's unusually onerous entry into force provision, which requires ratification by 44 states (listed in Annex 2 of the treaty). To date, 187 states have signed and 174 have ratified the treaty. Of the 44 specified countries, India, Pakistan, and North Korea still have not signed, and six others (China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, the United States) have not yet ratified the pact. Although Russia ratified the CTBT in 2000, it withdrew its ratification of the CTBT in 2023 to "mirror" the posture of the United States; as a treaty signatory, Russia remains obligated not to take any action contrary to the object or purpose of the treaty, which bars all nuclear test explosions, at any yield.

For more information on the CTBT, see Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at a Glance.

The following chart identifies the treaty’s signatories and ratifiers. States whose ratification is required for the treaty to take effect are shaded and marked with an asterisk (*).


Total Signatories: 187
Total Ratifiers: 177

Annex 2 Ratifications (out of 44): 35

Country
Signature
Ratification
Afghanistan 9/24/03 9/24/03
Albania 9/27/96 4/23/03
Algeria* 10/15/96 7/11/03
Andorra 9/24/96 7/12/06
Angola 9/27/96 3/20/15
Antigua and Barbuda 4/16/97 1/11/06
Argentina* 9/24/96 12/4/98
Armenia 10/1/96 7/12/06
Australia* 9/24/96 7/9/98
Austria* 9/24/96 3/13/98
Azerbaijan 7/28/97 2/2/99
Bahamas 2/4/05 11/30/07
Bahrain 9/24/96 4/12/04
Bangladesh* 10/24/96 3/8/00
Barbados 1/14/08 1/14/08
Belarus 9/24/96 9/13/00
Belgium* 9/24/96 6/29/99
Belize 11/14/01 3/26/04
Benin 9/27/96 3/6/01
Buhtan    
Bolivia 9/24/96 10/4/99
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9/24/96 10/26/06
Botswana 9/16/02 10/28/02
Brazil* 9/24/96 7/24/98
Brunei Darussalam 1/22/97 1/10/13
Bulgaria* 9/24/96 9/29/99
Burkina Faso 9/27/96 4/17/02
Burundi 9/24/96 9/24/08
Cambodia 9/26/96 11/10/00
Cameroon 11/16/01 2/6/06
Canada* 9/24/96 12/18/98
Cape Verde 10/1/96 3/1/06
Central African Republic 12/19/01 5/26/10
Chad 10/8/96 2/8/13
Chile* 9/24/96 7/12/00
China* 9/24/96  
Colombia* 9/24/96 1/29/08
Comoros 12/12/96  
Congo 2/11/97 9/2/14
Cook Islands 12/5/97 9/6/05
Costa Rica 9/24/96 9/25/01
Côte d'Ivoire 9/25/96 3/11/03
Croatia 9/24/96 3/2/01
Cuba    
Cyprus 9/24/96 7/18/03
Czech Republic 11/12/96 9/11/97
Dem. Republic of Congo* 10/4/96 9/28/04
Denmark 9/24/96 12/21/98
Djibouti 10/21/96 7/15/05
Dominica    
Dominican Republic 10/3/96 9/4/07
Ecuador 9/24/96 11/12/01
Egypt* 10/14/96  
El Salvador 9/24/96 9/11/98
Equatorial Guinea 10/9/96  
Eritrea 11/11/03 11/11/03
Estonia 11/20/96 8/13/99
Ethiopia 9/25/96 8/8/06
Fiji 9/24/96 10/10/96
Finland* 9/24/96 1/15/99
France* 9/24/96 4/6/98
Gabon 10/7/96 9/20/00
Gambia 4/9/03  
Georgia 9/24/96 9/27/02
Germany* 9/24/96 8/20/98
Ghana 10/3/96 06/14/11
Greece 9/24/96 4/21/99
Grenada 10/10/96 8/19/98
Guatemala 9/20/99 1/12/12
Guinea 10/3/96 09/20/11
Guinea-Bissau 4/11/97 09/30/13
Guyana 9/7/00 3/7/01
Haiti 9/24/96 12/1/05
Holy See 9/24/96 7/18/01
Honduras 9/25/96 10/30/03
Hungary* 9/25/96 7/13/99
Iceland 9/24/96

6/26/00

India*    
Indonesia* 9/24/96 2/6/12
Iran* 9/24/96  
Iraq 8/19/08 09/26/13
Ireland 9/24/96 7/15/99
Israel* 9/25/96  
Italy* 9/24/96 2/1/99
Jamaica 11/11/96 11/13/01
Japan* 9/24/96 7/8/97
Jordan 9/26/96 8/25/98
Kazakhstan 9/30/96 5/14/02
Kenya 11/14/96 11/30/00
Kiribati 9/7/00 9/7/00
Kuwait 9/24/96 5/6/03
Kyrgyzstan 10/8/96 10/02/03
Laos 7/30/97 10/5/00
Latvia 9/24/96 11/20/01
Lebanon 9/16/05 11/21/08
Lesotho 9/30/96 9/14/99
Liberia 10/1/96 8/17/09
Libya 11/13/01 1/6/04
Liechtenstein 9/27/96 9/21/04
Lithuania 10/7/96 2/7/00
Luxembourg 9/24/96 5/26/99
Macedonia 10/29/98 3/14/00
Madagascar 10/9/96 9/15/05
Malawi 10/9/96 11/21/08
Malaysia 7/23/98 1/17/08
Maldives 10/1/97 9/7/00
Mali 2/18/97 8/4/99
Malta 9/24/96 7/23/01
Marshall Islands 9/24/96 10/28/09
Mauritania 9/24/96 4/30/03
Maritius    
Mexico* 9/24/96 10/5/99
Micronesia 9/24/96 7/25/97
Moldova 9/24/97 1/16/07
Monaco 10/1/96 12/18/98
Mongolia 10/1/96 8/8/97
Montenegro 10/23/06 10/23/06
Morocco 9/24/96 4/17/00
Mozambique 9/26/96 11/4/08
Myanmar 11/25/96 9/21/16
Namibia 9/24/96 6/29/01
Nauru 9/8/00 11/12/01
Nepal 10/8/96  
Netherlands* 9/24/96 3/23/99
New Zealand 9/27/96 3/19/99
Nicaragua 9/24/96 12/5/00
Niger 10/3/96 9/9/02
Nigeria 9/8/00

9/27/01

Niue 4/9/12 3/5/14
North Korea*    
Norway* 9/24/96 7/15/99
Oman 9/23/99 6/13/03
Pakistan*    
Palau 8/12/03 8/1/07
Panama 9/24/96 3/23/99
Papua New Guinea 9/25/96  
Paraguay 9/25/96 10/4/01
Peru* 9/25/96 11/12/97
Philippines 9/24/96 2/23/01
Poland* 9/24/96 5/25/99
Portugal 9/24/96 6/26/00
Qatar 9/24/96 3/3/97
Romania* 9/24/96 10/5/99
Russia* 9/24/96

6/30/00 (*Revoked its ratification in 2023)

Rwanda 11/30/'2004 11/30/04
St. Kitts and Nevis 3/33/04 4/27/05
St. Lucia 10/4/96 4/5/01
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 7/2/09 9/23/09
Samoa 10/9/96 9/27/02
San Marino 10/7/96 3/12/02
Sao Tome and Principe 9/26/96  
Saudi Arabia    
Senegal 9/26/96 6/9/99
Serbia and Montenegro 6/8/01 5/19/04
Seychelles 9/24/96 4/13/04
Sierra Leone 9/8/00 9/17/01
Singapore 1/14/99 11/10/01
Slovakia* 9/30/96 3/3/98
Slovenia 9/24/96 8/31/99
Solomon Islands 10/3/96  
Somalia    
South Africa* 9/24/96 3/30/99
South Korea* 9/24/96 9/24/99
South Sudan    
Spain* 9/24/96 7/31/98
Sri Lanka 10/24/96  
Sudan 6/10/04 6/10/04
Suriname 1/14/97 2/7/06
Swaziland 9/24/96 9/21/16
Sweden* 9/24/96 12/2/98
Switzerland* 9/24/96 10/1/99
Syria    
Tajikistan 10/7/96 6/10/98
Tarzania 9/30/04 9/30/04
Thailand 11/12/96 9/25/18
Timor-Leste 9/26/08  
Togo 10/2/96 7/2/04
Tonga    
Trinidad and Tobago 10/8/09 5/26/10
Tunisia 10/16/96 9/23/04
Turkey* 9/24/96 2/16/00
Turkmenistan 9/24/96 2/20/98
Tuvalu 9/25/18  
Uganda 11/7/96 3/14/01
Ukraine* 9/27/96 2/23/01
United Arab Emirates 9/25/96 9/18/00
United Kingdom* 9/24/96 4/6/98
United States* 9/24/96  
Uruguay 9/24/96 9/21/01
Uzbekistan 10/3/96 5/29/97
Vanuatu 9/24/96 9/16/05
Venezuela 10/3/96 5/13/02
Viet Nam* 9/24/96 3/10/06
Yemen 9/30/96  
Zambia 12/3/96 2/23/06
Zimbabwe 10/13/99 2/13/19

Nuclear Testing

Country Resources:

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance

History of the INF Treaty between the United States and Russia and details on potential violations by Russia

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate and permanently forswear all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The treaty marked the first time the superpowers had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, and employ extensive on-site inspections for verification. As a result of the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by the treaty's implementation deadline of June 1, 1991.

The United States first alleged in its July 2014 Compliance Report that Russia was in violation of its INF Treaty obligations “not to possess, produce, or flight-test” a ground-launched cruise missile having a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers or “to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” Subsequent State Department assessments in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 repeated these allegations. In March 2017, a top U.S. official confirmed press reports that Russia had begun deploying the noncompliant missile. Russia has denied that it is in violation of the agreement and has accused the United States of being in noncompliance.

On Dec. 8, 2017, the Trump administration released an integrated strategy to counter alleged Russian violations of the treaty, including the commencement of research and development on a conventional, road-mobile, intermediate-range missile system. On Oct. 20, 2018, President Donald Trump announced his intention to “terminate” the INF Treaty, citing Russian noncompliance and concerns about China’s intermediate-range missile arsenal. On Dec. 4, 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States found Russia in “material breach” of the treaty and would suspend its treaty obligations in 60 days if Russia did not return to compliance in that time. On Feb. 2, the Trump administration declared a suspension of U.S. obligations under the INF Treaty and formally announced its intention to withdraw from the treaty in six months. Shortly thereafter, Russian President Vladimir Putin also announced that Russia will be officially suspending its treaty obligations as well. 

On Aug. 2, 2019, the United States formally withdrew from the INF Treaty.


 

Early History

U.S. calls for the control of intermediate-range missiles emerged as a result of the Soviet Union's domestic deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in the mid-1970s. The SS-20 qualitatively improved Soviet nuclear forces in the European theater by providing a longer-range, multiple-warhead alternative to aging Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 single-warhead missiles. In 1979, NATO ministers responded to the new Soviet missile deployment with what became known as the "dual-track" strategy: a simultaneous push for arms control negotiations with the deployment of intermediate-range, nuclear-armed U.S. missiles (ground-launched cruise missiles and the Pershing II) in Europe to offset the SS-20. Negotiations, however, faltered repeatedly while U.S. missile deployments continued in the early 1980s. The INF Treaty prohibited all U.S. and Soviet missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The official figures above show missiles deployed November 1, 1987, shortly before the INF Treaty was signed. The treaty also required destruction of 430 U.S. missiles and 979 Soviet missiles which were in storage or otherwise not deployed. The treaty prevented the planned deployment of an additional 208 GLCMs in the Netherlands, Britain, Belgium, Germany, and Italy. The Pershing IAs, under joint U.S.-German control, were not formally covered by the INF Treaty but were also to be eliminated by U.S. and West German agreement.

INF Treaty negotiations began to show progress once Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet general-secretary in March 1985. In the fall of the same year, the Soviet Union put forward a plan to establish a balance between the number of SS-20 warheads and the growing number of allied intermediate-range missile warheads in Europe. The United States expressed interest in the Soviet proposal, and the scope of the negotiations expanded in 1986 to include all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles around the world. Using the momentum from these talks, President Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev began to move toward a comprehensive intermediate-range missile elimination agreement. Their efforts culminated in the signing of the INF Treaty on Dec. 8, 1987, and the treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988.

The intermediate-range missile ban originally applied only to U.S. and Soviet forces, but the treaty's membership expanded in 1991 to include the following successor states of the former Soviet Union: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which had inspectable facilities on their territories at the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also possessed INF Treaty-range facilities (SS-23 operating bases) but forgo treaty meetings with the consent of the other states-parties.

Although active states-parties to the treaty total just five countries, several European countries have destroyed INF Treaty-range missiles since the end of the Cold War. Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic destroyed their intermediate-range missiles in the 1990s, and Slovakia dismantled all of its remaining intermediate-range missiles in October 2000 after extensive U.S. prodding. On May 31, 2002, the last possessor of intermediate-range missiles in Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, signed an agreement with the United States to destroy all of its INF Treaty-relevant missiles. Bulgaria completed the destruction five months later with U.S. funding.

States-parties' rights to conduct on-site inspections under the treaty ended on May 31, 2001, but the use of surveillance satellites for data collection continues. The INF Treaty established the Special Verification Commission (SVC) to act as an implementing body for the treaty, resolving questions of compliance and agreeing on measures to "improve [the treaty's] viability and effectiveness." Because the INF Treaty is of unlimited duration, states-parties could convene the SVC at any time.

Elimination Protocol

The INF Treaty's protocol on missile elimination named the specific types of ground-launched missiles to be destroyed and the acceptable means of doing so. Under the treaty, the United States committed to eliminate its Pershing II, Pershing IA, and Pershing IB ballistic missiles and BGM-109G cruise missiles. The Soviet Union had to destroy its SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, and SS-23 ballistic missiles and SSC-X-4 cruise missiles. In addition, both parties were obliged to destroy all INF Treaty-related training missiles, rocket stages, launch canisters, and launchers. Most missiles were eliminated either by exploding them while they were unarmed and burning their stages or by cutting the missiles in half and severing their wings and tail sections.

Inspection and Verification Protocols

The INF Treaty's inspection protocol required states-parties to inspect and inventory each other's intermediate-range nuclear forces 30 to 90 days after the treaty's entry into force. Referred to as "baseline inspections," these exchanges laid the groundwork for future missile elimination by providing information on the size and location of U.S. and Soviet forces. Treaty provisions also allowed signatories to conduct up to 20 short-notice inspections per year at designated sites during the first three years of treaty implementation and to monitor specified missile-production facilities to guarantee that no new missiles were being produced.

The INF Treaty's verification protocol certified reductions through a combination of national technical means (i.e., satellite observation) and on-site inspections—a process by which each party could send observers to monitor the other's elimination efforts as they occurred. The protocol explicitly banned interference with photo-reconnaissance satellites, and states-parties were forbidden from concealing their missiles to impede verification activities. Both states-parties could carry out on-site inspections at each other's facilities in the United States and Soviet Union and at specified bases in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

The INF Treaty’s Slow Demise

Since the mid-2000s, Russia has raised the possibility of withdrawing from the INF Treaty. Moscow contends that the treaty unfairly prevents it from possessing weapons that its neighbors, such as China, are developing and fielding. Russia also has suggested that the proposed U.S. deployment of strategic anti-ballistic missile systems in Europe might trigger a Russian withdrawal from the accord, presumably so Moscow can deploy missiles targeting any future U.S. anti-missile sites. Still, the United States and Russia issued an Oct. 25, 2007, statement at the United Nations General Assembly reaffirming their “support” for the treaty and calling on all other states to join them in renouncing the missiles banned by the treaty.

Reports began to emerge in 2013 and 2014 that the United States had concerns about Russia's compliance with the INF Treaty. In July 2014, the U.S. State Department found Russia to be in violation of the agreement by producing and testing an illegal ground-launched cruise missile. Russia responded in August refuting the claim. Throughout 2015 and most of 2016, U.S. Defense and State Department officials had publicly expressed skepticism that the Russian cruise missiles at issue had been deployed. But an Oct. 19, 2016, report in The New York Times cited anonymous U.S. officials who were concerned that Russia was producing more missiles than needed solely for flight testing, which increased fears that Moscow was on the verge of deploying the missile. By Feb. 14, 2017, The New York Times cited U.S. officials declaring that Russia had deployed an operational unit of the treaty-noncompliant cruise missile now known as the SSC-8. On March 8, 2017, General Paul Selva, the vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed press reports that Russia had deployed a ground-launched cruise missile that “violates the spirit and intent” of the INF Treaty.

The State Department’s 2018 annual assessment of Russian compliance with key arms control agreements alleged Russian noncompliance with the INF Treaty and listed details on the steps Washington has taken to resolve the dispute, including convening a session of the SVC and providing Moscow with further information on the violation.

The report says the missile in dispute is distinct from two other Russian missile systems, the R-500/SSC-7 Iskander GLCM and the RS-26 ballistic missile. The R-500 has a Russian-declared range below the 500-kilometer INF Treaty cutoff, and Russia identifies the RS-26 as an intercontinental ballistic missile treated in accordance with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The report also appears to suggest that the launcher for the allegedly noncompliant missile is different from the launcher for the Iskander. In late 2017, the United States for the first time revealed both the U.S. name for the missile of concern, the SSC-8, and the apparent Russian designation, the 9M729.

Russia denies that it breached the agreement and has raised its own concerns about Washington’s compliance. Moscow charges that the United States is placing a missile defense launch system in Europe that can also be used to fire cruise missiles, using targets for missile defense tests with similar characteristics to INF Treaty-prohibited intermediate-range missiles, and making armed drones that are equivalent to ground-launched cruise missiles.

Congress for the past several years has urged a more assertive military and economic response to Russia’s violation. The fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized funds for the Defense Department to develop a conventional, road-mobile, ground-launched cruise missile that, if tested, would violate the treaty. The fiscal year 2019 NDAA also included provisions on the treaty. Section 1243 stated that no later than Jan. 15, 2019, the president would submit to Congress a determination on whether Russia is “in material breach” of its INF Treaty obligations and whether the “prohibitions set forth in Article VI of the INF Treaty remain binding on the United States.” Section 1244 expressed the sense of Congress that in light of Russia’s violation of the treaty, that the United States is “legally entitled to suspend the operation of the INF Treaty in whole or in part” as long as Russia is in material breach. For fiscal year 2020, the Defense Department requested nearly $100 million to develop three new missile systems that exceed the range limits of the treaty.

On Dec. 8, 2017 the Trump administration announced a strategy to respond to alleged Russian violations, which comprised of three elements: diplomacy, including through the Special Verification Commission, research and development on a new conventional ground-launched cruise missile, and punitive economic measures against companies believed to be involved in the development of the missile.

However, President Trump announced Oct. 20 that he would “terminate” the INF Treaty in response to the long-running dispute over Russian noncompliance with the agreement, as well as citing concerns about China’s unconstrained arsenal of INF Treaty-range missiles. Trump’s announcement seemed to take NATO allies by surprise, with many expressing concern about the president's plan. 

After repeatedly denying the existence of the 9M729 cruise missile, Russia has since acknowledged the missile but denies that the missile has been tested or is able to fly at an INF Treaty-range.

On Nov. 30, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats provided further details on the Russian treaty violation. Coats revealed that the United States believes Russia cheated by conducting legally allowable tests of the 9M729, such as testing the missile at over 500 km from a fixed launcher (allowed if the missile is to be deployed by air or sea), as well as testing the same missile from a mobile launcher at a range under 500 km. Coats noted that “by putting the two types of tests together,” Russia was able to develop an intermediate-range missile that could be launched from a “ground-mobile platform” in violation of the treaty.

On Dec. 4, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States found Russia in “material breach” of the treaty and would suspend its treaty obligations in 60 days if Russia did not return to compliance in that time. Though NATO allies in a Dec. 4 statement expressed for the first time the conclusion that Russia had violated the INF Treaty, the statement notably did not comment on Pompeo's ultimatum.

Russian President Vladimir Putin responded Dec. 5 by noting that Russia would respond “accordingly” to U.S. withdrawal from the treaty, and the chief of staff of the Russian military General Valery Gerasimov noted that U.S. missile sites on allied territory could become “targets of subsequent military exchanges." On Dec. 14, Reuters reported that Russian foreign ministry official Vladimir Yermakov was cited by RIA news agency as saying that Russia was ready to discuss mutual inspections with the United States in order to salvage the treaty. The United States and Russia met three more times after this, first in January in Geneva, on the sidelines of a P5 meeting in Beijing, and again in Geneva in July—all times to no new result.

On Feb. 2, President Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the United States suspended its obligations under the INF Treaty and will withdraw from the treaty in six months if Russia did not return to compliance. Shortly thereafter, Russian President Vladimir Putin also announced that Russia will be officially suspending its treaty obligations. 

Six months later, on Aug. 2, the United States formally withdrew from the INF Treaty. In a statement, Secretary Pompeo said, “With the full support of our NATO Allies, the United States has determined Russia to be in material breach of the treaty, and has subsequently suspended our obligations under the treaty.” He declared that “Russia is solely responsible for the treaty’s demise.” A day later, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said that he was in favor of deploying conventional ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles in Asia “sooner rather than later.” 

Strategic Arms Control and Policy

Country Resources:

Subject Resources:

U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance


Contact: Daryl Kimball, executive director

Over the past five decades, U.S. and Soviet/Russian leaders have used a progression of bilateral agreements and other measures to limit and reduce their substantial nuclear warhead and strategic missile and bomber arsenals. The following is a brief summary.

Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

SALT I

Begun in November 1969, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) produced two agreements by May 1972.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited strategic missile defenses to 200 (later 100) interceptors each. In June 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty, feeling that it limited the country’s ability to defend itself against terrorist or “rogue-state” ballistic missile attacks.

Under the second negotiated deal, the Interim Agreement, both sides pledged not to construct new ICBM silos and not to increase the dimensions of existing ICBM silos “significantly,” as well as capped the number of SLBM launch tubes and SLBM-carrying submarines. The agreement ignored strategic bombers and did not address warhead numbers but succeeded in limiting the United States to 1,054 ICBM silos and the Soviet Union to 1,618 ICBM silos. The agreement also capped the number of SLBM launch tubes for each side and allowed for an increase in launchers if done alongside the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of older ICBM or SLBM launchers. The United States was limited to 710 SLBM launch tubes, from its base level of 656 SLBM launch tubes, and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union was limited to 950 SLBM launch tubes, from its base level of 740 SLBM launch tubes, and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

SALT II

In November 1972, Washington and Moscow agreed to pursue a follow-on treaty to SALT I.

Signed in June 1979, SALT II would have limited U.S. and Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bomber-based nuclear forces to 2,250 delivery vehicles (defined as an ICBM silo, a SLBM launch tube, or a heavy bomber) and placed a variety of other restrictions on deployed strategic nuclear forces. The agreement would have required the Soviets to reduce their forces by roughly 270 delivery vehicles, but U.S. forces were below the limits and could actually have been increased.

U.S. President Jimmy Carter asked the Senate not to consider SALT II for its advice and consent after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and the treaty was not taken up again. Both Washington and Moscow subsequently pledged to adhere to the agreement’s terms despite its failure to enter into force. However, U.S. President Ronald Reagan said on May 26, 1986 that future decisions on strategic nuclear forces would be based on the threat posed by Soviet forces and not on "a flawed SALT II Treaty.”

START I

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), first proposed in the early 1980s by President Ronald Reagan and finally signed in July 1991, required the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,600 delivery vehicles, carrying no more than 6,000 warheads as counted using the agreement’s rules.

The agreement required the destruction of excess delivery vehicles, which was verified using an intrusive verification regime that involved on-site inspections, the regular exchange of information (including telemetry), and the use of national technical means (i.e., satellites). The agreement’s entry into force was delayed for several years because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing efforts to denuclearize Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus by returning their nuclear weapons to Russia and making them parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and START I agreements.

START I reductions were completed in December 2001, and the treaty expired on Dec. 5, 2009.

START II

In June 1992, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed to pursue a follow-on accord to START I.

START II, signed in January 1993, called for ultimately reducing deployed strategic arsenals to 3,000-3,500 warheads and banned the deployment of destabilizing multiple-warhead land-based missiles. START II would have counted warheads in roughly the same fashion as START I and, also like its predecessor, would have required the destruction of delivery vehicles but not warheads.

The agreement's original implementation deadline was January 2003, ten years after signature, but a 1997 protocol moved this deadline to December 2007 because of the extended delay in ratification. Both the Senate and the Duma approved START II, but the treaty did not take effect because the Senate did not ratify the 1997 protocol and several ABM Treaty amendments, whose passage the Duma established as a condition for START II’s entry into force. START II was effectively shelved as a result of the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

START III Framework

In March 1997, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to a framework for START III negotiations that included a reduction in deployed strategic warheads to 2,000-2,500.

Significantly, in addition to requiring the destruction of delivery vehicles, START III negotiations were to address “the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads” so as to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions. Negotiations were supposed to begin after START II entered into force, which never happened.

SORT (Moscow Treaty)

On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty) under which the United States and Russia reduced their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads each. The warhead limit took effect and expired on the same day, Dec. 31, 2012. As part of the agreement, the two countries also agreed to keep START I in force, which helped provide the monitoring and verification procedures left out of SORT.      

Although the two sides did not agree on specific counting rules, the Bush administration asserted that the United States would reduce only warheads deployed on strategic delivery vehicles in active service (i.e., “operationally deployed” warheads) and would not count warheads removed from service and placed in storage or warheads on delivery vehicles undergoing overhaul or repair. The agreement’s limits are similar to those envisioned for START III, but the treaty did not require the destruction of delivery vehicles, as START I and II did, or the destruction of warheads, as had been envisioned for START III.

The treaty was approved by the Senate and Duma and entered into force on June 1, 2003. SORT was replaced by New START on Feb. 5, 2011.

New START

On April 8, 2010, the United States and Russia signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), a legally binding, verifiable agreement limiting each side to 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 700 strategic delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers assigned to a nuclear mission) and limiting deployed and nondeployed launchers, including those in overhaul, to 800. The treaty does not limit non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs.

The treaty-accountable warhead limit is 30 percent lower than the 2,200 upper limit of SORT, and the delivery vehicle limit is 50 percent lower than the 1,600 allowed in START I. The treaty has a verification regime that combines elements of START I with new elements tailored to New START. Measures under the treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. The treaty also provides for the continued exchange of telemetry (missile flight-test data on up to five tests per side, per year) and does not meaningfully limit missile defenses or long-range conventional strike capabilities.

The U.S. Senate approved New START on Dec. 22, 2010. The approval process of the Russian parliament (passage by both the State Duma and Federation Council) was completed Jan. 26, 2011. The treaty entered into force on Feb. 5, 2011, and both parties met the treaty’s central limits by the implementation deadline on Feb. 5, 2018. The United States and Russia agreed on Feb. 3, 2021, to extend New START by five years, as allowed by the treaty text, until Feb. 5, 2026.

Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Agreements
  SALT I SALT II INF Treaty START I START II START III SORT

New START

 

Status Expired Never Entered Into Force Terminated Expired Never Entered Into Force Never Negotiated Replaced by New START In Force
Deployed Warhead Limit N/A N/A N/A 6,000 3,000-3,500 2,000-2,500 1,700-2,200 1,550
Deployed Delivery Vehicle Limit US: 1,764 ICBMs & SLBMs
USSR: 2,568
2,250 Prohibits ground-based missiles of 500-5,500 km range 1,600 N/A N/A N/A 700
Date Signed May 26, 1972 June 18, 1979 Dec. 8, 1987 July 31, 1991 Jan. 3, 1993 N/A May 24, 2002 April 8, 2010
Date Ratified, U.S. Aug. 3, 1972 N/A May 28, 1988 Oct. 1, 1992 Jan. 26, 1996 N/A March 6, 2003 Dec. 22, 2010
Ratification Vote, U.S. 88-2 N/A 93-6 93-6 87-4 N/A 95-0 71-26
Date Entered Into Force Oct. 3, 1972 N/A June 1, 1988 Dec. 5, 1994 N/A N/A June 1, 2003 Feb. 5, 2011
Implementation Deadline N/A N/A June 1, 1991 Dec. 5, 2001 N/A N/A N/A Feb. 5, 2018
Expiration Date Oct. 3, 1977 N/A Aug. 2, 2019 Dec. 5, 2009 N/A N/A Feb. 5, 2011 Feb. 5, 2026*

*Initially set to expire Feb. 5, 2021, New START was extended by five years until 2026 as allowed by the treaty text.

Non-strategic Nuclear Arms Control Measures

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

Signed Dec. 8, 1987, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to verifiably eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Distinguished by its unprecedented, intrusive inspection regime, including on-site inspections, the INF Treaty laid the groundwork for verification of the subsequent START I. The INF Treaty entered into force June 1, 1988, and the two sides completed their reductions by June 1, 1991, destroying a total of 2,692 missiles. The agreement was multilateralized after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and active participants in the agreement came to include the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were also parties to the agreement but did not participate in treaty meetings or on-site inspections with permission from the other states-parties. The ban on intermediate-range missiles was of unlimited duration.

Both the United States and Russia raised concerns about the other side’s compliance with the INF Treaty. The United States first publicly charged Russia in 2014 with developing and testing a ground-launched cruise missile—the 9M729 missile—with a range that exceeds the INF Treaty limits.

Russia denied that it breached the agreement and raised its own concerns about Washington’s compliance. Moscow charged that the United States placed a missile defense launch system in Europe that could also be used to fire interceptor and cruise missiles, using targets for missile defense tests with similar characteristics to INF Treaty-prohibited intermediate-range missiles, and was making armed drones that were equivalent to ground-launched cruise missiles.

On Oct. 20, 2018, President Donald Trump announced his intention to “terminate” the agreement citing Russian noncompliance and concerns about China’s missiles, and on Dec. 4, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared Russia in “material breach” of the treaty. The Trump administration provided official notice to the other treaty states-parties on Feb. 2, 2019, that it would both suspend its obligations to the treaty and withdraw from the agreement in six months—per the treaty's terms—and "terminate" the agreement unless Russia returned to compliance by eliminating its ground-launched 9M729 missiles.

On Aug. 2, 2019, the United States formally withdrew from the INF Treaty.

Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

On Sept. 27, 1991, President George H.W. Bush announced that the United States would remove almost all U.S. tactical (non-strategic) nuclear forces from deployment so that Russia could undertake similar actions, reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation as the Soviet Union dissolved. Specifically, Bush said the United States would eliminate all of its nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles and remove all non-strategic nuclear warheads from surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocated on Oct. 5, pledging to eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, and nuclear landmines. He also pledged to withdraw all Soviet tactical naval nuclear weapons from deployment.

Under these initiatives, the United States and Russia reduced their deployed non-strategic stockpiles by an estimated 5,000 and 13,000 warheads, respectively. However, significant questions remain about Russian implementation of its pledges, and there is considerable uncertainty about the current state of Russia’s tactical nuclear forces. The Defense Department estimates that Russia possesses roughly 1,900 non-strategic nuclear weapons and that the numbers are expanding. The United States maintains an estimated 200 non-strategic B61 gravity bombs.

 
Strategic Arms Control and Policy

Country Resources:

The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance

Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107

On September 17, 2009, President Obama announced that the United States would pursue a “Phased Adaptive Approach” to missile defense in Europe. This approach is centered on the Aegis missile defense system and began deployment in three main phases starting in 2011 and lasting until perhaps 2022. A fourth phase, to have been fielded in the 2020 timeframe, was canceled in March 2013; instead, an additional interceptors were to be added in Fort Greeley to bring the total to 44 as of 2018.

The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is the U.S. contribution to NATO’s missile defense system and is designed to protect Europe against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles launched from Iran. The approach consists of sea- and land-based configurations of the Aegis missile defense system, the centerpiece of which is the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor. A new, more capable version of the SM-3 is being developed, and the system will be increasingly integrated with an evolving network of land and space-based sensors. According to the Obama administration, the plan uses technology that is “proven, cost-effective, and adaptable to an evolving security environment.”

The EPAA broke with the plans pursued by the Bush administration. The Bush plans had called for deployment of a ground-based missile defense (GMD) system in Europe, similar to the system deployed in California and Alaska. This included bilateral agreements to station ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic.

As part of the EPAA, Turkey is hosting a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) radar at Kürecik; Romania is hosting an Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu Air Base; Germany is hosting a command center at Ramstein Air Base; and Poland will host another Aegis Ashore site at the Redzikowo military base.

Phase 1—consisting of the radar in Turkey, command center in Germany, and deployed ballistic missile defense (BMD)-capable Aegis ships by the U.S. Navy—has been operational since the end of 2011. Starting in 2014, Spain hosted four of those ships (equipped with the SPY-1 radar) at its naval base in Rota.

In May 2016, NATO declared operational the Romania Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu as part of EPAA Phase 2. At the July 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO declared the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the NATO ballistic missile defense system.

Phase 3 will see the deployment of the Poland Aegis Ashore system perhaps by the end of 2022 at the earliest instead of the original 2018 target. According to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Aegis system deployment was initially delayed until FY2020 due to contractor performance issues. According to a June 2019 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the construction in Poland has “failed to meet schedule milestones from the start of the contract.” Deployment was delayed another two years due to poor weather and a shortage of necessary resources, according to MDA’s former director, Lt. Gen. Samuel Greaves. According to an April 2021 GAO report, the Missile Defense Agency attributes $79 million in costs increases due to the delays.

The following chart provides an overview of the different EPAA phases. It contains information on the planned scheduling of the phases, the deployment platforms, the missile upgrades, and the sensors which will be integrated into the system.

 

Phase 1, Deployed

 

Missile Platforms and Numbers

      • In March 2011, the USS Monterey, one of the BMD-capable Aegis ships, was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. This represented "the first sustained deployment of a ballistic missile defense-capable ship" in support of the EPAA.
      • In FY2012, 113 SM-3 Block IA and 16 SM-3 Block IB interceptors were delivered and 29 Aegis-equipped BMD ships deployed.
      • Starting in 2014, Spain has hosted four BMD-capable Aegis ships at its naval base in Rota.

         

         

        SM-3 Variant and Numbers

        • SM-3 Block IA interceptors have a velocity of 3 km/second and are designed to engage short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase.
        • Block IA has a single-color seeker, a 21-inch-diameter booster, and a 13.5 inch diameter along the rest of the interceptor.
        • Block IA costs between $9 and 10 million per unit.
        • Some SM-2 Block IVs (the SM-3 predecessor) will also be retained for use against missiles in the terminal phase.
        • All of the SM-3 variants fire from the Mk 41 vertical launching system.

         

         

         

         

        Sensors and Combat System

        • Initially, the system will use sea-based sensors mounted on the Aegis ships, as well as a forward-based mobile X-band radar on land. The first EPAA radar—the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system (AN/TPY-2) manufactured by Raytheon and part of THAAD—was deployed in Turkey in late 2011.
        • In May 2018, the GAO reported a total of seven AN/TPY-2 radars are deployed to support regional defense. Four radars are deployed to Pacific Command (two for use in forward-based mode and two for use in terminal mode), two to European Command, and one to Central Command.
        • The sensors and interceptors will be brought together under the Aegis combat system. This is a system capable of tracking 100 simultaneous targets. Phase 1 will primarily use Aegis version 3.6.1 software.
        • According to the Defense Science Board, the current Aegis shipboard radar is inadequate to support the EPAA mission, and the future Navy ship-based Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) is needed.
        • U.S. and European BMD systems are integrated for battle management at Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany.

         

         

        Phase 2, Operational as of May 2, 2016

         

         

         

         

        Missile Platforms and Numbers

            • Phase 2 includes interceptors on land in the first "Aegis-Ashore" deployment in Deveselu, Romania. Interceptors have also been mounted on an increasing number of Aegis BMD ships in support of global missions.
            • According to the Defense Department’s FY2022 budget submission, the United States will have 48 BMD-capable Aegis ships by the end of FY2022, rising to 65 by the end of FY2025.
            • The first Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania, (which completed an update in August 2019) is equipped with one land-based Aegis SPY-1 radar and 12 missile tubes for 24 SM-3 Block IB interceptor missiles.
            • Phase 2 achieved a Technical Capability Declaration (TCD) in December 2015, which indicates that the system will operate as designed.
            • In May 2016, NATO declared the Romania Aegis Ashore site operational. NATO declared the IOC of the system in July 2016.

               

               

              SM-3 Variant and Numbers

              • Phase 2 included the SM-3 Block IB variant, also with a velocity of 3 km/sec. This interceptor differs from the Block IA in its "seeker" technology, consisting of a two-color seeker, or "kill warhead," and improved optics.
              • The Defense Department’s FY2022 budget requested funding for procuring 40 SM-3 Block IB missiles for deployment in Romania and Poland, as well as on some Aegis ships. The previous year, the goal was to reach 395 SM-3 Block IB missiles by the end of FY 2021. 
              • The Block IB is estimated to cost between $12 and 15 million per interceptor.

              Sensors and Combat Systems

              • In Phase 2, sensors were integrated with updated versions of the Aegis combat system. BMD ships carry versions 3.6.1, 4.0.1, and 5.0. 

               

              Phase 3, Planned Deployment Date: ~2022

               

              Missile Platforms and Numbers

                • Phase 3 will see the introduction of the second Aegis Ashore site in Poland with another SPY-1 radar and 24 SM-3 missiles. This will supplement the deployments at sea and in Romania and will extend coverage over a greater percentage of Europe. Originally scheduled to be completed by 2018, the Poland site will not become operational until at least 2022.

                 

                 

                 

                 

                 

                SM-3 Variant and Numbers

                • Phase 3 will include the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This new variant will be faster than Block I with a velocity of 4.5 km/second and will have a 21-inch diameter for the whole length of the missile, which allows for more fuel and hence a more powerful motor. This will give the system an “enhanced” capability to address intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and potentially a “limited” capability to address intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
                • The first intercept test of the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor occurred in February 2017 and was successful. However, the second and third intercept tests of the missile in June 2017 and January 2018 failed to destroy their targets. There were two more tests before the end of 2018 on Oct. 26 and Dec. 11, both successful, with the December test particularly notable for being the first successful intercept of an IRBM target and using the ability to "engage on remote" using a forward-based sensor. In November 2020, an SM-3 Block IIA interceptor launched from an Aegis BMD-equipped destroyer successfully intercepted an ICBM-class target.
                • MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill said in June 2020 that the SM-3 Block IIA has completed development and is ready for production.
                • The Defense Department’s FY2022 budget requested funding for procuring 8 SM-3 Block IIA missiles for deployment in Romania and Poland, as well as on some Aegis ships. The previous year, the goal was to have 60 SM-3 Block IIA missiles procured by the end of FY 2021. 

                 

                 

                 

                Sensors and Combat Systems

                  • In Phase 3, the United States intended to deploy two new tracking systems to support early interception: the airborne infrared (ABIR) sensor platform, a system designed to track significantly larger numbers of incoming missiles, and the Precision Tracking and Surveillance System (PTSS), which would include as many as 12 satellites. Both the ABIR program and PTSS, however, were written out of the FY2013 and FY2014 budgets, respectively.
                  • Aegis BMD ships are scheduled to be equipped with version 5.1 of the combat system software in this timeframe.
                  • Phase 3 of the EPAA is scheduled to include an “engage on remote” capability for Aegis interceptors to conduct operations based entirely on off-board radar information, thereby expanding the range of the Aegis systems. In this capability, the interceptor can be both launched and guided to intercept by sensors remote from the launching ship.

                     

                    Phase 4, Cancelled March 2013

                    Missile Platforms and Numbers

                      • The platforms supporting the SM-3 interceptors under Phase 4 would have remained the same as those deployed under Phase 3: sea-based platforms and the Aegis Ashore deployments in Romania and Poland.

                       

                       

                      SM-3 Variant and Numbers

                      • The SM-3 Block IIB interceptor missiles, which were only in a conceptual stage, were scheduled to be deployed in order to combat medium- and intermediate-range missiles and ICBMs. These missiles were planned to have an improved seeker and a higher performance booster, with a velocity of 5-5.5 km/second.
                      • According to the Defense Science Board, the SM-3 Block IIB's planned mission to intercept targets prior to the deployment of multiple warheads or penetration aids—known as "early intercept"—requires "Herculean effort and is not realistically achievable, even under the most optimistic set of deployment, sensor capability, and missile technology assumptions.”

                      Sensors and Combat Systems

                      • According to the Missile Defense Advocacy Agency, space-based sensors would have played a role in Phase 4.

                       

                      Missile Defense

                      Country Resources:

                      Subject Resources:

                      Current U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance

                      An overview of the current U.S. approach to national and regional missile defense, its costs, and sustainability.

                      For more information on the European system, see European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) at a Glance and for the Asia-Pacific Region, see U.S. and Allied Ballistic Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region.

                      Contact: Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy, 202-463-8270 x104


                      Executive Summary

                      Two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors are launched during a successful intercept test. (Photo: US Missile Defense Agency Flickr)

                      According to Missile Defense Agency (MDA) estimates, Congress has appropriated over $200 billion for the agency’s programs between fiscal years 1985 and 2019. That total does not include spending by the military services on programs such as the Patriot system or the many additional tens of billions of dollars spent since work on anti-missile systems first began in the 1950s.

                      For nearly two decades, U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) policy has sought to protect the homeland against limited long-range missile strikes from states such as Iran and North Korea, but not major nuclear powers like Russia and China as that mission would pose significant technical, financial, and geopolitical challenges. The United States has also pursued programs to defend U.S. troops and facilities abroad, as well as some close allies, from attacks by ballistic missiles—and to a much lesser extent cruise missiles.

                      The overall U.S. missile defense effort enjoys strong bipartisan support in Congress. Additionally, many U.S. allies place a high value on missile defense cooperation with the United States.

                      However, the U.S. pursuit of effective missile defenses has been accompanied by intense debate about the technical capabilities of the system and realism of testing, the scope of the ballistic missile threat, the deterrence and assurance benefits of defenses, the cost-effectiveness of shooting down relatively inexpensive offensive missiles with expensive defensive ones, and the repercussions for U.S. strategic stability with Russia and China.

                      According to the Defense Department’s independent testing office, existing U.S. missile defenses have "demonstrated capability" to defend the U.S. homeland against a small number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats that employ "simple countermeasures." The testing office assesses that defenses to protect allies and U.S. troops deployed abroad possess only a “limited capability” to defend against small numbers of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). The capability of defenses against short-range ballistic missiles is labeled as “fair.” Apart from the point-defense Patriot system, no systems in the U.S. BMD arsenal have been used in combat.

                      Leaders of the U.S. missile defense enterprise have increasingly voiced concerns that the current U.S. approach to national and regional missile defense is unsustainable and that existing defenses must be augmented with emerging capabilities to reduce the cost of missile defense and keep pace with advancing adversary missile threats.

                      The Trump Administration

                      In May 2017, pursuant to direction from President Donald Trump and Congress, then Defense Secretary James Mattis formally announced the beginning of the department’s Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which is taking a wide-ranging look at missile defense policy and strategy. The review was finally released in February 2019, one year after its original completion target.

                      Broadly, the review proposes to expand the role and scope of U.S. missile defenses by focusing not only on ballistic missiles, but also other types of missile threats, such as regional cruise and hypersonic missiles. It also proposes placing greater emphasis on the importance of space and new technologies to intercept missiles during their boost phase when they are traveling at their slowest. The review also calls for integrating offensive attack operations more closely with missile defenses and to supplement the defense of the U.S. homeland with the Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA interceptor.

                      The review also re-affirmed previously announced plans by the Trump administration to arm unarmed aerial vehicles with lasers to zap long-range missiles during their boost phase, expand the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system from 44 to 64 interceptors by 2023 (though this plan has since been indefinitely delayed), focus on “left of launch” capabilities to destroy a missile threat before it launches, and field a space-sensor layer to provide birth-to-death tracking of ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles. The review also called for 11 follow-up studies, which are detailed in the below section, The 2019 Missile Defense Review To-Do List.

                      Since President Trump’s inauguration, the administration has vowed to expand national and regional missile defense systems of every kind, and Congress has supported these efforts. In fiscal year 2018, Congress approved $11.5 billion for the Missile Defense Agency, an increase of $3.6 billion, or 46 percent, from the Trump administration’s May 2017 initial budget request. The appropriation is the largest Congress has ever provided for the agency after adjusting for inflation. 

                      Congress approved another big increase for fiscal year 2019, approving $10.3 billion for the agency, an increase of $1.4 billion above the budget request of $9.9 billion.

                      Notably, the fiscal year 2020 request seeks $380 million over the next five years to develop and test by 2023 a prototype space-based laser weapon to destroy ICBMs during their boost and midcourse phases of flight.

                      For ballistic missile and missile defense basics, as well as the historical background of missile defense programs, please visit “Missiles and Missile Defense Systems at a Glance.”


                      Elements of the Current U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System

                      The following charts provides a brief look at some of the major missile defense programs maintained by the United States. It contains information on what type of ballistic missile each defense would be intended to counter and at which stage of the enemy missile’s flight an attempted intercept would take place. Also included are the Pentagon’s estimates on when each defense may have an initial, rudimentary capability, as well as when it could be fully operational. For basics about missiles, missile defense systems and their various components, or the general history of the U.S. missile defense system and recently cancelled programs, visit the “Missile Defense Systems at a Glance” fact sheet.

                      GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE

                      Program & Key Elements

                      • Key element: Ground-based missile interceptor (GBI) consisting of a multistage booster and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV).
                      • The EKV separates from the booster in space and seeks out its target through radar updates and use of its onboard visual and infrared sensors.
                      • The EKV destroys its target by colliding with it. This process is referred to as "hit-to-kill" or "kinetic kill."

                      Designed to Counter

                      • Goal: Intercept strategic ballistic missile warheads in midcourse-stage.

                      Status

                      • Initially fielded in 2004.
                      • As of the end of 2018, the total cost of the GMD system is estimated to be over $67 billion.
                      • MDA claims that the system has had 11 successful intercepts in 19 tests. 
                      • The first test of the GMD system against an ICBM-class target with simple countermeasures took place on May 30, 2017, and was deemed successful.
                      • The first test which involved firing two interceptors against one ICBM target occurred in March 2019 and was deemed “successful.” In a real-world scenario, multiple interceptors would be fired at an incoming missile.

                      Capability / Schedule

                      • As of April 2018, the Pentagon deploys 44 ground-based interceptors (GBIs)–40 at Fort Greely, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Twenty of the 40 interceptors deployed in Alaska are armed with an older CE-1 kill vehicle that has not had a successful flight intercept test since 2008. In 2017, the Trump administration announced its plan to deploy twenty more GBIs to be installed in a fourth missile field in Ft. Greely beginning in the FY 2021 timeframe. According to the Missile Defense Review, all 64 interceptors would be ready by 2023. These interceptors will be armed with the new, under-development Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), which is intended to enhance the performance of the current EKV. But the RKV has been plagued by reliability and design problems, which led to the Pentagon stopping work on the program in May 2019 and, after a short review, terminating the program in August. The new timeline for expanding the GMD system to 64 interceptors is uncertain.
                      • The interceptors are supported by land- and sea-based radars. Early Warning Radar units are being upgraded to support the system. As of June 2018, upgrades have been carried out at Beale Air Force Base, California and at Fylingdales, the United Kingdom, as well as Thule Air Force Base, Greenland and Clear, Alaska. The less powerful, westward-facing COBRA Dane radar on Shemya Island, in the Aleutian archipelago, was also upgraded in February 2010.
                      • Former MDA Director Adm. James Syring told a Senate panel in 2013 that the MDA tests the GMD system “in a controlled, scripted environment based on the amount of time and money each one of these tests costs.” This means there are limits to the realism of the test scenarios.
                      • Following the May 30, 2017, test, the Pentagon's testing office updated its assessment, which had described the GMD system as having only a “limited capability" to defend the U.S. homeland from a small number of simple long-range missiles launched from North Korea or Iran. In a June 6, 2017, memo, the office said that the system has "demonstrated capability" to defend against a small number of long-range missiles threats that employ "simple countermeasures." However, researchers with the Union of Concerned Scientists noted in a 2017 report that the only test of the GMD system against an ICBM-class target was “simplified in important ways that enhanced the test’s chance of success instead of challenging the system to work in a realistic way.”

                      AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD)

                      Program & Key Elements

                      • Key elements include: the RIM-161 Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), RIM-174 Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), and the Aegis combat system.
                      • The SM-3 is a hit-to-kill missile comprised of a three-stage booster with a kill vehicle. There are three variations of the SM-3 missile: Block IA, Block IB, and Block IIA. Each variation will be deployed in different phases.
                      • The SM-6 is a hit-to-kill missile based on the SM-3 but offers extended range and firepower against cruise missile targets deep inland.
                      • As the Navy’s component of the missile defense system, the Aegis system is central to the defense footprint in Asia and the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe. Aegis is a sea-based system, with missile launchers and radars mounted on cruisers and destroyers but is adaptable to land systems as well.

                      Designed to Counter

                      • Geared toward defending against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their midcourse phase with an emphasis on the ascent stage.

                      Status

                      • In 2005, the role of Aegis missile defense evolved from that of a forward sensor to include engagement capability.
                      • As of April 2019, the SM-3 has a test record of 40 intercepts in 49 attempts, comprising both the SM-3 and SM-6 missiles. 
                      • Japan’s four KONGO Class Destroyers have been upgraded with BMD capabilities. Japan and the United States are co-developing the SM-3 block IIA.

                      Capability / Schedule

                      • Under the fiscal year 2020 budget submission, by the end of fiscal year 2018, there are scheduled to be 39 Aegis BMD ships, and by the end of fiscal year 2024, there are scheduled to be 59 Aegis BMD ships.
                      • As of October 2017, thirty-three ships are currently deployed. Of these, 17 are assigned to the Pacific Fleet and 16 to the Atlantic Fleet.
                      • A land-based SM-3 block IB deployment occurred in Romania in 2016, and that same year, ground was broken in Poland on a site to house land-based SM-3 IIAs. The Polish site was originally scheduled to become operational in 2018 but has been delayed until 2020.
                      • The first intercept test of the new SM-3 IIA interceptor occurred in February 2017 and was successful. However, the second and third intercept tests of the missile in June 2017 and January 2018 failed to destroy their targets. There were two more tests before the end of 2018 on Oct. 26 and Dec. 11, both successful, with the December test particularly notable for being the first successful intercept of an IRBM target and using the ability to "engage on remote" using a forward-based sensor.
                      • The 2019 Missile Defense Review reaffirmed administration plans to test the SM-3 Block IIA missile interceptor against an ICBM-class target by 2020.

                      TERMINAL HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE (THAAD)

                      Program & Key Elements

                      • Key elements include: 1) an interceptor missile comprising a single rocket booster with a separating kill-vehicle, 2) an advanced AN/TPY-2 radar unit to identify and discriminate between incoming missiles, and 3) an infrared seeker to home in on its target.
                      • The THAAD kill vehicle relies on hit-to-kill kinetic interception.
                      • THAAD batteries have four components: launcher, interceptors, radar, and fire control. Each battery can carry 48-72 interceptors (there are eight interceptors per launcher and typically each battery is believed to contain six to nine launch vehicles).
                      • THAAD missiles are fired from a truck-mounted launcher.

                      Designed to Counter

                      • THAAD’s mission is to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles at the end of their midcourse stage and in the terminal stage.
                      • Intercepts could take place inside or outside the atmosphere.

                      Status

                      • As of April 2019, THAAD has succeeded in completing 15 interceptions in 15 tests since 2006. Four other THAAD tests, as of April 2019, have been classed as “no-tests.” (Note: A “no-test” occurs when the target malfunctions after launch so the interceptor is not launched.)
                      • On July 11, 2017, MDA executed a successful intercept test of the THAAD system against an air-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) target. The test was the first against an IRBM-class target.

                      Capability / Schedule

                      • The U.S. Army operates seven THAAD batteries, each with its own AN/TPY-2 radar. Three batteries, each comprising six launchers, are deployed in the Pacific: one in South Korea, one in Guam, and one in Hawaii.
                      • Production of the first THAAD interceptors began in March 2011. The Army received its 200th operational interceptor in August 2018.
                      • MDA is exploring development of an upgraded version of THAAD known as THAAD extended range, which is designed to counter ultrafast gliding weapons.
                      • The U.S. and South Korea decided in July 2016 to deploy a THAAD battery in South Korea to counter North Korean threats despite strong objections from China. The battery began operating in April 2017.
                      • A THAAD battery was deployed to Guam in 2013 to counter potential North Korea IRBM threats to the island and U.S. military assets there. The first test of the THAAD system against an IRBM target occurred in July 2017.

                      PATRIOT ADVANCED CAPABILITY-3 (PAC-3)

                      Program & Key Elements

                      • Key elements include: a one-piece, hit-to-kill missile interceptor fired from a mobile launching station, which carries 16 PAC-3 missiles.
                      • The missile is guided by an independent radar that sends its tracking data to the missile through a mobile engagement control station.
                      • A blast fragmentation warhead kills the target.

                      Designed to Counter

                      • PAC-3 is designed to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their terminal stage at lower altitudes than the THAAD system.

                      Status

                      • PAC-3s destroyed two Iraqi short-range ballistic missiles during the 2003 conflict and shot down a U.S. fighter jet. Earlier Patriot models also deployed to the region shot down nine Iraqi missiles and a British combat aircraft.

                      Capability / Schedule

                      • PAC-3 is now considered operational and has been deployed to several countries including Bahrain, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and the UAE.

                      The following is an overview of an early warning system to complement the missile defense systems listed above.

                      SPACE-BASED INFRARED SYSTEM-HIGH (SBIRS-HIGH)

                      Program Elements

                      • Key Elements: 1) geosynchronous (GEO) satellites orbiting the earth; 2) sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical earth orbit (HEO).

                      Dates Operational

                      • Primary objective is to provide early warning of theater and strategic missile launches.
                      • Provides data for technical intelligence and battle space awareness.

                      Cost

                      • Currently there are three SBIRS sensors mounted on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO-1, HEO-2, and HEO-3).
                      • There are four SBIRS satellites in geosynchronous orbit. GEO-1 was launched in May 2011, GEO-2 in March 2013, GEO-3 in January 2017, and GEO-4 in January 2018.
                      • As of March 2018, the program is projected to cost $19.6 billion for six satellites—four times greater than its initial estimated $5 billion for five satellites.

                      Major Issues

                      • The first sensor in highly elliptical orbit—HEO-1—was certified for operations by U.S. Strategic Command in December 2008.
                      • The most recent sensor, GEO-4, was launched aboard an Atlas V rocket on January 19, 2018.
                      • Lockheed Martin is under contract to produce GEO-5 and GEO-6, which will be launched in 2021 and 2022, respectively.
                      • SBIRS originally called for two additional sensors, GEO-7 and GEO-8, but these were scrapped in favor of pursuing an entirely new SBIRS follow-on program. The successor program has yet to be identified or developed. Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson (who resigned in May 2019) suggested the new system will be "simpler" and more survivable to enemy attacks.

                      The 2019 Missile Defense Review To-Do List

                      The 2019 Missile Defense Review identified 11 issues that needed “follow-up” analysis to make a policy direction determination, which were scheduled to be completed within six months after the January 2019 review release date.

                      Homeland Cruise Missile Defense

                      Designating a service or defense agency with acquisition authority—by using the existing requirements-generation process—to find ways to defend the homeland against offensive cruise missiles.

                      Worldwide THAAD Number Requirements

                      The Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and MDA will prepare a report that assesses the number of THAAD battery requirements needed to support worldwide deployments.

                      Aegis Destroyers Fully-BMD Capable Timeline

                      The Navy and MDA must deliver a report on how the entire fleet of Aegis destroyers can be converted to become fully capable against incoming missiles, including ballistic missiles, within 10 years.

                      Homeland Missile Tracking and Discrimination

                      MDA and Northern Command must prepare a plan to “accelerate efforts to enhance missile defense tracking and discrimination sensors, to include addressing advanced missile threats,” particularly focused on the homeland.

                      F-35 Missile Defense

                      The Air Force and MDA are on the hook for a joint report on how best to integrate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, including its sensor suite, into America’s missile defense networks for both regional and homeland defense. The MDR posits that the F-35 could eventually be used to take out ballistic missiles during their boost phase, which experts have said is unlikely to be technically feasible.

                      Aegis Ashore Test Center in Hawaii

                      The Department of Defense is looking at the potential to operationalize the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center location in Hawaii into a full-up missile defense site to counter potential missile launches from North Korea. MDA and the Navy will evaluate the option and develop a plan that could operationalize the location within 30 days, if needed.

                       

                      Study on Space-based Intercept Layer

                      MDA will study development and fielding of a space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense, including the most promising technologies, estimated schedules, cost, and personnel requirements.

                       

                      More Efficient Acquisition and Development

                      A big point of emphasis from officials talking about the MDR is that they believe the acquisition and development of new technologies can and will go faster. To that end, the review calls for reviews of the current Warfighter Involvement Process, which determines missile defense requirements, in order to make sure commanders who will use the systems are involved early in the process of developing the systems and requirements.

                       

                      Transregional Defense Integration

                      While the Pentagon divides the world into regional areas of responsibility, the nations capable of threatening American assets or allies with missiles do not necessarily. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the head of U.S. Strategic Command are therefore ordered to come up with a plan for “optimal roles, responsibilities, and authorities for achieving greater transregional missile defense integration.”

                      Left of Launch

                      Another requirement from the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act is for the designation of an office with acquisition authority specific to pre-launch attack operations—that is, someone who leads procurement of new technologies designed to destroy an enemy missile before it can take off. That agency must be identified within six months; after that happens, a larger review will begin to examine roles and responsibilities for updating operational doctrine in terms of left-of-launch strikes.

                       

                      Hypersonic and Cruise Missile Homeland Warning

                      And for a change of pace, the Pentagon will have nine months to research improvements for timely warnings on hypersonic and advanced cruise missiles launched at the U.S. homeland. At the completion of the study, the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation will initiate an analysis of alternatives for materiel solutions to provide early warning and attack assessment against these advanced threats and their integration into the nuclear command-and-control architecture.

                       


                      Next Generation Efforts

                      The Missile Defense Agency is focusing its newest efforts to ensure the system stays ahead of developing foreign missile threats (see the below chart). Some of the advanced anti-missile technologies the Defense Department is pursuing, such as airborne lasers to zap missiles in the early stages of their flight, have been unsuccessfully pursued in the past.

                      Multi-Object Kill Vehicle

                      Three defense contractors (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon) have been awarded contracts to develop concepts to deploy multiple kill vehicles from one booster in order to destroy decoys and multiple warheads ejected from ICBMs. MDA had planned to begin fielding that kill vehicle in 2025, but the future of this effort is uncertain.

                      Boost Phase Laser Defenses

                      MDA is recommitting to research to determine how to develop laser beams that could destroy missiles in their boost phase. Inspired by the ABL program, the vision for the new system is to mate a powerful solid-state laser to drones. MDA aims to develop a laser demonstrator by 2020 or 2021 and a deployed capability by 2025. The MDR also called for a review of developing a new weapon for the F-35 fighter jet which could intercept an intercontinental ballistic missile its in boost-phase.

                      Left of Launch

                      Left of launch is a proposed strategy that would be designed to counter missile threats before the missile is launched so as to reduce the need for expensive anti-missile interceptors to attempt to shoot down the missile. Tactically, the strategy would likely include the of cyber-attacks and electronic warfare to achieve this goal. Despite much speculation in the press about the U.S. ability to hack North Korean missile tests, the data shows that North Korea’s missile tests are succeeding at a high rate and that the failures are concentrated in new systems that had not been previously tested. The 2019 MDR reaffirmed the Trump administration’s plans to continue with this strategy

                      Space-Based Sensor Layer

                      In August 2018, then MDA Director Samuel Greaves described what the agency envisages for a future more comprehensive space sensor layer. Such a layer could look like the Air Force’s Overhead Persistent Infrared Global Scanning system and could have a regional detection and tracking capability staring down at Earth that could go after targets that are currently harder to detect or in low earth orbit, such as hypersonic missiles, and could catch missiles in the boost or burnout phases of flight. The sensor could also cover the midcourse portion of a missile’s flight by looking against the background of space and discriminate, track, and eventually send data directly to the ballistic missile defense weapon system for fire control. Finally, the sensor could also record towards the end of a missile’s trajectory whether an intercept against a target occurred or was missed.

                      Space-Based Interceptor Layer

                       

                      According to the 2019 MDR, “Given the significant advantages of space-basing for sensors, and potentially interceptors, particularly for boost-phase defense, MDA will study development and fielding of a space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense and provide a report to USDR&E, and USDP within six months after the release of the MDR.”

                      The fiscal year 2020 White House budget requested $15 million for the new Space Development Agency to “develop a government reference architecture for a space-based kinetic interceptor layer for boost-phase defense.” It also requested $34 million for the 2020 fiscal year to develop and test by 2023 a prototype space-based directed-energy (laser) weapon for ICBMs during their boost phase. Over the course of five years, the program is expected to cost $380 million.


                      Congressional Proposals

                      In recent years, Congress has sought to encourage the expansion of the U.S. ballistic missile defense effort in the face of advancing adversary ballistic missile capabilities. These initiatives, which are summarized below, have been met with strong resistance from the administration.

                      A Third National Missile Defense Site on the U.S. East Coast

                      In the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress required the Defense Department to conduct a study to evaluate at least three possible new long-range interceptor sites that could augment the GMD system, including at least two on the East Coast. The Defense Department announced in May 2016 that it completed a draft study of three possible locations in the eastern United States for a new ballistic missile defense interceptor site, but said it had no plans to actually build such a site. The three sites are: Ft. Drum, New York; Camp Ravenna, Ohio; or Ft. Custer, Michigan. The draft environmental impact statement, which was posted on the MDA website May 31, 2016, said that the Defense Department “does not propose and has not made a decision to deploy or construct an additional interceptor site.”

                      The Trump administration missile defense review noted the benefits of a new third GBI interceptor site in the eastern United States and noted that the Defense Department has already prepared an Environmental Impact Statement evaluating locations. Though the administration declined to name a third missile defense site on the East Coast in that review, on June 26 the Defense Department sent a letter to Rep. Eliste Stephanik (R-N.Y.) announcing that Fort Drum, in her district, was selected as the third missile defense site, but that there was “no intent to develop one” because of a study earlier this year noting its cost due to environmental challenges.

                      Revising the 1999 National Missile Defense Act

                      The FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act revised the 1999 National Missile Defense Act to remove the world “limited,” and the 2018 NDAA authorized expansions in the national missile defense program. Proponents of the change argue that the 1999 legislation has prevented the Defense Department from adequately planning for the protection of the U.S. homeland from the full spectrum of ballistic missiles threats, including threats posed by Russia and China. The Obama administration strongly objected to the change, stating that the word “limited” is specifically intended to convey that the U.S. homeland missile defense system is designed and deployed to counter limited attacks (in number and sophistication) from Iran and North Korea, and not to counter the strategic deterrence forces of Russia and China.

                      Missile Defense

                      Country Resources:

                      Subject Resources:

                      Pages

                      Subscribe to RSS - Fact Sheets & Briefs