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“It will take all of us working together – government officials, and diplomats, academic experts, and scientists, activists, and organizers – to come up with new and innovative approaches to strengthen transparency and predictability, reduce risk, and forge the next generation of arms control agreements.”
– Wendy Sherman
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
June 2, 2022
April 2003
Edition Date: 
Tuesday, April 1, 2003

India, Pakistan Trade Tit-for-Tat Missile Tests

Rose Gordon

Returning to an old pattern of tit-for-tat missile testing, India and Pakistan each tested short-range, nuclear-capable missiles March 26. It is not clear who launched the first missile, but most media reports suggest India took the lead.

Since the back-to-back 1998 nuclear tests, a missile test by one state has usually prompted the other to respond with its own test in a face-off of missile strength and capability. This January and February, however, India tested four missiles without any response from Pakistan. (See ACT, March 2003.)

Both countries signed a joint memorandum of understanding in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1999, which requires that prior notice be given before a ballistic missile test takes place. This memorandum was signed shortly after the 1998 nuclear tests in order to engage the two states in confidence-building measures to limit the threat of an actual nuclear showdown. In a March 26 statement, however, the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Pakistan did not receive notice from India this time and that the missile test came as a surprise.

A spokesman with the Indian embassy in Washington said India informed “all relevant entities.”

In response to a question about the possible lack of notification on India’s side, an official Indian spokesperson said in a March 26 press briefing, “The confidence-building measure which will really have any meaning is for Pakistan to end its senseless perpetration of terrorism against India.” India blames Pakistan for directly supporting militants who oppose Indian rule in its portion of the disputed Kashmir territory; Pakistan denies direct involvement.

It is unclear how far Pakistan has progressed in developing the Abdali missile that Pakistan tested March 26. The Prithvi-I that India tested, however, has been inducted into the Indian armed forces, according to a March 5 statement by Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes.

India is developing and testing five different missile systems under its Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP). When the defense department determines that a particular missile has passed the required test, the missile might be put into production for use—induction—into the military. Several of the five systems are currently in the process of being inducted into the armed forces, including the Prithvi-II, the Dhanush, and both variants of the Agni missile, Fernandes said.

It is unclear when the Agni missiles will be available for military use. The Agni-I and Agni-II missiles are “under production,” Fernandes said in the March 5 statement. This is the second time that Fernandes has said that the 2,000-kilometer range Agni-II is ready for production and induction. In March 2002, he stated that the Agni-II “entered [the] production phase and is currently under induction.”

A third, longer-range variant of the Agni—the Agni-III—has not yet been tested, and it is unclear how far along it is in development.

Returning to an old pattern of tit-for-tat missile testing, India and Pakistan each tested short-range, nuclear-capable missiles March 26...

Proposed Missile Defense Sale to India Still in Limbo

Wade Boese

After more than a year of review, the United States has not yet decided how to respond to an Israeli request to export the jointly developed U.S.-Israeli Arrow theater missile defense system to India.

Although India has not formally asked to purchase the Arrow system, which is designed to protect against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, New Delhi is exploring acquiring an anti-missile capability and has discussed various systems with Washington. India and Pakistan are both developing and fielding an array of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

U.S. officials appeared conflicted over the possible Arrow transfer when it first became public last summer, and no unified position has emerged. The Pentagon and White House seem to view the deal favorably, but an interagency review involving the State Department has lasted longer than a year. There is no set date for when the review is to be completed.

An issue highlighted by U.S. officials is how the sale of the Arrow to a third country would square with U.S. commitments under the voluntary Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which aims to restrict transfers of missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram warhead at least 300 kilometers. The Arrow has this capability.

The MTCR does not ban transfers of missiles, but the spirit of the regime is that such sales should occur only rarely. Members are expected to subject such deals to great scrutiny, weighing the proposed export against five criteria, including whether an importing state might use the system to deliver weapons of mass destruction or modify it for roles beyond its original purpose.

A key White House official, however, suggested the MTCR is too rigid. The United States must look at ways to implement the MTCR so that it does not impair U.S. missile defense cooperation with foreign governments, according to Robert Joseph, the senior director for proliferation strategy, counterproliferation, and homeland defense on the National Security Council (NSC). Joseph was speaking March 3 at a missile defense conference in Washington, D.C.

Joseph did not single out India or the Arrow system in his remarks, and the NSC did not return calls seeking clarification. A State Department spokesperson would not comment on Joseph’s statement.

J. D. Crouch, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, said at the same conference that the United States had yet to reach a conclusion about the possible Arrow deal, but he also downplayed fears that the transfer could be destabilizing for South Asia or spur an arms race between India and Pakistan. He suggested Islamabad might not view India’s acquisition of missile defenses negatively or as a threat to its security.

But Asad Hayauddin, press attaché for the Pakistani embassy in Washington, said in a March 13 interview that any weapons acquisition that would alter the military status quo in South Asia would be destabilizing to regional security. He added that India’s purchase of missile defenses “would certainly add” to Pakistan’s strategic concerns and that Islamabad would have to respond in some way, possibly by building up its missile forces, to preserve its deterrent capability.

Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, a former director of naval research for Pakistan’s navy, echoed Hayauddin in a March 15 interview. She described Pakistan as “quite concerned” about a possible Indian purchase of the Arrow and said it would “undermine Pakistan’s deterrence capability.” Yet, she contended Pakistan would likely have a measured response, which might include an increase in missiles, although only “to a certain degree and no more.” Buying its own defenses would be too expensive for Pakistan, she said.

U.S. lawmakers have largely been silent on the issue, except for Representative Frank Pallone (D-NJ). Founder of the congressional caucus on India and Indian-Americans, Pallone wrote Secretary of State Colin Powell a July 23, 2002, letter urging the secretary to support the sale as a move to “solidify” defense ties between the United States and India. Pallone noted in his letter that he understood Powell objected to the deal while “there is [reported] support within the Pentagon and support from Israel to make this sale a reality.”

At a hearing last July at which senators questioned him about the MTCR and the proposed Arrow deal, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen warned that the United States should be aware of what type of precedent it might set through its own exports and actions. He suggested the United States might find it harder to oppose arms deals it finds objectionable, such as a Russian export of missile technology to Iran, if Washington approved similar trades to its allies and friends.

After more than a year of review, the United States has not yet decided how to respond to an Israeli request to export the jointly developed U.S.-Israeli Arrow theater missile defense system to India.

CD Still Stalled by U.S., China Spat

Blocked by a continued diplomatic stalemate, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) ended the first third of its 2003 negotiating session March 28 without any progress.

Since completing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, the conference only managed to initiate negotiations in 1998, and those negotiations yielded no final agreement. Sixty-six countries are members of the conference, which operates by consensus and is tasked with negotiating on arms control and disarmament issues.

The United States and China are the principal antagonists in the CD stalemate. The United States is pressing for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), which would prohibit the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes. While claiming to support FMCT negotiations, China demands that they do not begin without parallel negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space—a linkage the United States opposes.

On March 6, Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi reiterated a proposal that the United States rejected last year. Hu said China would accept holding talks, not negotiations, on outer space if they were done “with a view to negotiating relevant international legal instrument.” But the United States, which argues that outer space negotiations are unnecessary, opposes this formulation, saying it prejudges the outcome of the talks.

Beijing and Washington will have two more work periods this year to reach an accommodation. The first will take place May 12 to June 27 and the other July 28 to September 10.

North Korea’s Uranium Program Moving Ahead, Kelly Says

Paul Kerr

North Korea’s suspected uranium-enrichment program is “not so far behind” its plutonium-based nuclear program in its capacity to produce nuclear weapons-grade material, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly testified in a March 12 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.

Kelly said the uranium-enrichment program could produce fissile material in “probably…months and not years.” This assertion differs somewhat from earlier U.S. government estimates. A February 27 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report cites a December 2002 CIA statement that Pyongyang’s uranium-enrichment program “likely” could produce a nuclear weapon in 2004, apparently supporting Kelly’s claim. Previous reports have indicated that North Korea is building an enrichment plant—with the ability to produce enough fissile material for at least two nuclear weapons per year—that could be operational by mid-decade.

Kelly’s testimony came shortly after the Bush administration’s February 27 announcement that North Korea had restarted a small nuclear reactor that had been frozen by the 1994 Agreed Framework. (See ACT, March 2003.) That reactor could produce approximately one bomb’s worth of plutonium per year, according to the CRS report.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities were supposed to have been halted by the 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North Korea agreed to shut down its plutonium-based nuclear facilities, including the reactor, a fuel-rod fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, and two partially completed larger reactors. In return, the United States agreed to provide two proliferation-resistant reactors and supply North Korea with 500,000 metric tonnes of heating oil each year while the reactors were under construction.

Last October, however, Kelly said North Korea admitted to a U.S. delegation that it was pursuing an illicit uranium-enrichment program in violation of its commitments under the Agreed Framework and other international nuclear nonproliferation commitments. (See ACT, November 2002.)

North Korea’s admission of an enrichment program prompted the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization—the U.S.-led international consortium responsible for implementing the Agreed Framework—to announce in November that it would suspend fuel oil deliveries to North Korea.

In response, North Korea announced in December that it would restart the plutonium-based reactor to produce electricity. During the following weeks, North Korea removed seals and monitoring equipment from its nuclear facilities and ordered IAEA inspectors, who had been charged with monitoring the freeze, out of the country. On January 10, Pyongyang announced that it was withdrawing from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The withdrawal clause of the NPT, however, requires states to give 90 days’ notice before officially withdrawing.

North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT has prompted fears that Pyongyang would begin to reprocess spent fuel rods stored at the reactor site, although North Korea has said it has no plans to produce nuclear weapons. In a March 18 interview with International Wire Services, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that there was no indication that Pyongyang has begun reprocessing the fuel rods.

North Korea could extract enough plutonium for four to six nuclear weapons if it reprocesses the rods, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage testified in February. Kelly stated in his March 12 testimony that North Korea could do this within approximately six months after beginning reprocessing.

A State Department official interviewed March 24 reiterated the administration’s position that reprocessing would be a matter of “grave concern” to the administration, but the official did not elaborate.

Although North Korea currently possesses the fissile material for a nuclear weapon, it remains unclear whether the country has constructed one. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet stated that North Korea “probably” has “one or two plutonium-based devices” during a February 12 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. A State Department official was more definite in a January interview, saying that North Korea has already produced these weapons. (See ACT, January/February 2003.)

Missile Test

Meanwhile, it is unclear whether North Korea will continue to adhere to its moratorium on testing long-range missiles. North Korea conducted a missile test March 10—its second in less than a month. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said in a March 10 statement that the missile was a “land to sea cruise missile” that is not covered by the moratorium. The missile tested last month was of a similar type and also did not violate the moratorium, he said.

North Korea denied that it is planning any long-range missile tests in a March 17 statement from the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), but Pyongyang asserted in a March 19 KCNA statement that it has the “sovereign right” to have a “peaceful” missile program. Pyongyang agreed to extend indefinitely its moratorium on missile testing during a September 17 summit between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

It is unclear what effect Japan’s March 28 launch of two spy satellites will have on North Korea’s missile test moratorium. Earlier in March, North Korea said Japan’s plans to launch a satellite threatened its security, and, in response, Pyongyang threatened to break its moratorium on testing long-range missiles if Japan launched a satellite, according to a March 18 KCNA report. Shortly after the satellites were launched, Japanese Foreign Ministry Press Secretary Hatsuhisa Takashima rejected North Korea’s criticism. “[W]e have been making it very clear that this launch of the information-gathering satellite system is not a hostile action, nor does it pose a threat to anybody,” he said in a March 28 press briefing.

U.S. Policy

Washington’s position that a resolution to the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program should be negotiated through a multilateral forum remains unchanged. Fleischer reiterated in a March 19 statement that the administration’s policies “focus on working in a multilateral fashion with…other nations involved” to achieve a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, although he added that “all options are on the table,” which could include military force.

Kelly said in March 12 testimony that the administration will engage in direct discussions with Pyongyang, but “in a multilateral context,” although he added that Washington is not “ruling out” engaging in bilateral talks. Kelly also stated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be involved in any verification agreement.

Powell suggested in a March 6 Senate Appropriations Committee hearing that Washington is engaged in some behind-the-scenes diplomacy to “get a multilateral dialogue started,” but no multilateral talks have been announced.

North Korea continues to reject multilateral talks and the involvement of the IAEA, arguing in a March 11 KCNA statement that the United States has threatened its security and is trying to “evade its responsibility” for the current crisis.

North Korea continues to call for bilateral negotiations with the United States to resolve the dispute over its nuclear programs and other security issues. The country has said it would consider a U.S.-North Korea verification agreement but not international inspections. North Korea also continued to call on the United States to “conclude a non-aggression treaty” and reiterated charges that the United States is planning to attack North Korea, citing recent U.S. military exercises with South Korea and the addition of some U.S. military forces in the region.

Although Washington has rejected Pyongyang’s demand for a treaty, the Bush administration has repeatedly said that it has no plans to attack North Korea, and Kelly referred to several bilateral U.S. security guarantees in his March 12 testimony as “precedent” for similar future agreements.

Kelly argued March 12 that North Korea’s refusal to engage in multilateral discussions is not Pyongyang’s “final position,” adding that Pyongyang might accept such discussions because it does not want to remain isolated from the world community.

Kelly also asserted that multilateral talks are necessary because North Korea’s actions affect many countries and because such talks will be more effective than bilateral negotiations. Kelly stated March 12 that the bilateral nature of the Agreed Framework made it easier for the North to “abrogate” the agreement. A State Department official interviewed March 24 said North Korea would incur greater costs if it breaks a multilateral agreement, because such an action would affect Pyongyang’s relationship with many countries. Although the Agreed Framework is a bilateral agreement, it obligates North Korea to accept full IAEA safeguards when a “significant portion” of the reactor project is complete.

Kelly also repeated in his March 12 testimony that the administration will not “dole out rewards to…North Korea to live up to its existing obligations” but will consider a “bold approach” to take “economic and political steps” to help North Korea and move the bilateral relationship “towards normalcy” if Pyongyang dismantles its nuclear programs.

Since June 2001, the Bush administration has linked meetings with Pyongyang to discuss missiles and nuclear weapons with other issues, including conventional forces, terrorism sponsorship, and the government’s human rights record.

Washington also continues to argue that North Korea is engaging in provocative behavior in order to blackmail the United States. The State Department official cited Pyongyang’s demand for a nonaggression treaty as evidence of blackmail in a March 24 interview and asserted that North Korea would demand further concessions before it would “live up” to commitments it has already made.

North Korea repeated its claim that it is not engaged in blackmail or asking for a “reward” from the United States in a March 4 KCNA statement, but it wants a guarantee that the United States will not “stifle” Pyongyang “by military force.”

UN Action Stalled

Meanwhile, there has been little movement in U.S. attempts to put pressure on North Korea through the UN Security Council. The IAEA reported the matter to the council when it adopted a resolution February 12 declaring Pyongyang in “further non-compliance” with its obligations under the NPT. The board decided to report the matter to the UN Security Council, in accordance with agency mandates.

A U.S. official interviewed March 24 said that the United States was working with the permanent five members of the Security Council to get draft language approved for a Security Council president’s statement condemning North Korea’s actions and calling for Pyongyang to come back into compliance with its international nonproliferation obligations. China, however, has not been willing to “engage” the other members of the Security Council in drafting the statement, he said.

The official also said that Washington might try to overcome China’s reluctance by sharing the draft language with the rest of the Security Council in an attempt to gain their approval in the hope that Beijing will then go along. China’s approval is essential because such a statement requires consensus from the entire Security Council, he said.

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan stated in a March 13 press conference that U.S.-North Korean dialogue is “key” and that Security Council involvement is not “appropriate” at this time.

Several other key countries continue to have reservations about the administration’s approach. Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov said in a March 17 interview with the ITAR-Tass news agency that a settlement of the North Korea issue should “include a bilateral dialogue” between Washington and Pyongyang, “supplemented” by a multilateral dialogue.

South Korea also supports a peaceful solution to the crisis, and South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwan stated that Washington should show “more willingness to settle substantial issues” with North Korea, the Associated Press reported March 12.

Takashima expressed somewhat stronger support for the U.S. position in a March 22 statement, arguing that military action is not yet “appropriate” and that the matter “can be resolved diplomatically.”

North Korea’s suspected uranium-enrichment program is “not so far behind” its plutonium-based nuclear program in its capacity to produce nuclear weapons-grade material...

The Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agenda After SORT

Nikolai Sokov

When the Russian Duma finally ratifies the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), will it mark the beginning of a new era of bilateral cooperation between Washington and Moscow or the closing chapter in arms control negotiations between Russia and the United States that sought to regulate the Cold War?

Russian officials have dubbed SORT the “last in the series of traditional arms control treaties,”1 stating that the new era of U.S.-Russian cooperation requires a new approach to arms control. They implicitly endorsed some—albeit not all—of the principles advocated by the Bush administration, namely, that the United States and Russia no longer need complicated, restrictive, and expensive arms control treaties.

Indeed, one can say that coupled with the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and START II, SORT marks the end of traditional arms control. Further reductions are unlikely in the near future because, after SORT is implemented, the United States and Russia will have reached what they feel is the optimal (or close to the optimal) level of strategic arsenals that they need: 2,200 deployed warheads for the United States and 1,500 for Russia. One possible additional step is codification of the ongoing reduction of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but its chances are remote. More importantly, managing first-strike capability, which was the key motive of traditional arms control, is no longer urgent following the end of the Cold War.

Yet, there is now an opportunity and an objective need to usher in a new stage of arms control. During the SORT talks, negotiators broached, even if they were unable to fully implement, some guiding principles of an entirely new approach to arms control that would take advantage of improved Russian-American ties to move transparency and verification measures to a new level: taking such scrutiny beyond the level of missiles and other delivery systems to encompass the nuclear warheads themselves.

Given the closer ties between the two countries, the United States and Russia should be willing to subject themselves to more intrusive measures that encompass the full nuclear weapons infrastructure, including warhead storage sites and production and dismantlement facilities. SORT provides a framework for such an approach by instituting a regular series of bilateral meetings between the two countries. But turning this opportunity into reality will require strong political will.

The Bush administration’s skepticism about arms control agreements has been well documented, and commentators are right to point out that, in their eagerness to curb the U.S. military advantage and preserve scarce budget dollars, Russian officials are generally more supportive of further nuclear arms control efforts. Russian arms control preferences, however, are also driven by a mix of complex, often contradictory domestic economic, political, and military impulses that could stymie progress.

Transparency of Warhead Arsenals

The need to fill in SORT’s many blanks constitutes the core of the Russian arms control agenda for the coming years. The Kremlin’s highest priority is finding a way to close what it sees as the treaty’s biggest loophole—the ability of the United States to maintain thousands of spare nuclear warheads and not have them count against the treaty’s limit of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads—those mounted on planes, missiles, and submarines. Russian officials fear that, in a crisis or downturn in relations, the United States will be able to return as many as 2,400 of these stored warheads to missiles and heavy bombers, bringing the total to 4,600. SORT allows such “uploading” without prior notification and, theoretically, even in secret.

Russia is not likely to have such an option. The Kremlin plans to reduce its arsenal primarily by eliminating delivery systems (old types of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles), because it lacks resources to modernize the existing missiles or produce new ones in sufficient numbers. Consequently, no matter how many spare warheads Russia will have lying around and regardless of its warhead production capability,2 Moscow will be strictly limited in the number of weapons it can deploy. And this number, furthermore, is likely to be below the 1,700-2,200 missiles allowed by SORT: Russia’s announced plan (and its initial SORT negotiating proposal) is 1,500 warheads. That means that, if it comes to a showdown in the future, Russia could face a U.S. nuclear force that is more than three times its size.

While many Russian nongovernmental experts remain concerned about this imbalance, the Kremlin downplays its significance, and rightly so, given the improving relations between the two countries. Should relations worsen, however, massive U.S. nuclear superiority could theoretically make Russia vulnerable to political pressure and even to limited use of NATO’s conventional forces—the nightmare of the Russian military after a string of Balkan wars in the 1990s, especially after the conflict in Kosovo.

During the SORT talks, Russia first failed to win U.S. agreement to eliminate delivery vehicles, as had been provided for under previous arms control agreements. Moscow then offered a proposal to eliminate warheads removed from operational deployment but refrained from specific proposals on how such a measure could be verified.3 The United States rejected the proposal at that point. But it should now be resurrected. It is clearly in Russia’s interest to prevent secret, large-scale uploading and to make U.S. deployment actions more transparent and verifiable. Development of a verification system for SORT should be the centerpiece of Russia’s arms control policy in the coming years. There are several ways to achieve this goal:

  • The creation of a comprehensive data exchange and verification regime capable of tracking every warhead through its life cycle in real time or close to real time.
  • A requirement that each side notify the other when warheads are transported to storage facilities near missile and heavy-bomber bases, making deployment possible.
  • A requirement that notifications be complemented by inspections of these storage facilities in rare cases when questions and concerns need to be clarified.

At first glance, circumstances seem conducive for such an endeavor. Both the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma called for annual reports from their respective governments about the implementation of SORT and the reductions projected for the next year.4 The two countries could easily codify these mandates by agreeing on an amendment to SORT or on an executive agreement negotiated by the Bilateral Implementation Commission. U.S. officials have indicated that they support exchanging data on nuclear arsenals, although they have all but ruled out verification mechanisms.5 Russian officials have emphasized that they treated SORT as just “the first step” in longer negotiations and planned to discuss the transparency of warhead stockpiles within the Bilateral Implementation Commission.6

Relations between the United States and Russia are reasonably stable, despite unavoidable ups and downs, and the two countries can afford negotiating specific transparency and verification provisions after SORT enters into force. In the past, details of verification and data exchange had to be in place prior to the signing of treaties, and negotiations on them complicated and delayed implementation of weapons reductions.

Still, the success of these discussions is not preordained. In fact, it is not even clear if Russia will decide to commence in-depth discussion of these issues. The Russian government seems to be torn between two diametrically opposed impulses. On the one hand, the Kremlin could benefit from a verification regime that will ensure predictability and effectively remove the threat that the United States will secretly redeploy scores of warheads. Such an agreement would also eliminate what many in Moscow see as an unfair advantage that the United States enjoys because of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.

Under that decade-old program, the United States aids Russia’s effort to reduce its Cold War nuclear arsenal and in the process gains a deep understanding of the status of Russia’s nuclear force. Indeed, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN), one of the architects of the CTR program, cited the transparency benefits of CTR as one reason for blocking Democratic efforts to add verification measures to SORT. (See ACT, April 2003.) Yet, CTR, for obvious reasons, does not grant Russia similar access to the U.S. arsenal, and Russia’s military has long chafed at this asymmetry. Bilateral measures governing warhead transparency would not only represent genuine progress on arms control issues but also redress this long-standing grievance.

On the other hand, progress toward making Russian facilities more transparent has been halting, and any further steps are likely to prove even more difficult. The Russian military and the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) have long resisted opening warhead production and storage facilities to inspections and even to information exchange.7 For example, a February 2000 U.S. proposal for a comprehensive exchange of data within the context of START III consultations was flatly rejected by Russia, contributing in no small measure to the failure of START III. Even the more modest plans of the Bush administration for data exchange are likely to encounter opposition in Moscow.

All told, the current trends seem to favor the opponents of warhead verification. Support for new agreements on verification and transparency could rise, however, if both governments become convinced of the value of openness or if U.S.-Russian relations worsen sufficiently to transform the theoretical threat of U.S. redeployment into something more tangible.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Tactical nuclear weapons8 are likely to figure prominently on the Russian-American arms control agenda, if only because it is virtually impossible to create a data exchange and verification regime for strategic warheads alone. A partial regime will always give rise to misunderstandings and suspicions that strategic warheads are misrepresented as tactical.

The need for transparency for such battlefield weapons was dramatically underscored by a crisis in early 2001, when Russia was suspected of moving nuclear warheads for tactical missiles to Kaliningrad oblast.9 An extension of strategic weapons transparency to tactical nuclear weapons would ease U.S. suspicions about Russia, and it would also address Russian concerns about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the possibility that they might be redeployed closer to Russia as NATO expands further East.

Tactical nuclear weapons are currently subject only to the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs)—unilateral, parallel statements of George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev (the latter subsequently confirmed and expanded by Boris Yeltsin). In these statements, both sides declared their intention to store or eliminate warheads for nonstrategic delivery vehicles except for a share of air-based weapons. These PNIs amount to an informal arms control regime but one which is not legally binding and does not include verification or transparency measures; even the aggregate numbers of tactical nuclear weapons are unknown.

In recent years, the United States has repeatedly raised concerns about Russia’s tactical weapons stockpile. U.S. lawmakers, such as Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Lugar and ranking member Joseph Biden Jr. (D-DE), have been particularly vocal in warning that these weapons pose a significant proliferation risk. The above-mentioned data exchange proposals, which the United States tabled in February 2000, included tactical nuclear weapons along with the strategic stockpile.

Yet, Russians are even more resistant to disclosing information about their tactical nuclear warheads than their strategic weapons. This resistance springs first and foremost from uncertainty over the future role of tactical nuclear weapons. At one level, there is a broad consensus in Russia that they are vital for national security; and the armed services are reluctant to part with them. But the military and political establishments have yet to develop a coherent doctrine outlining specific missions and scenarios of use.

The most commonly cited mission is deterrence of a limited conventional attack by NATO. This mission was first described in the late 1990s as a “de-escalation” of a possible limited conventional attack by NATO and will remain “on the books” until NATO-Russian relations qualitatively improve. The mission, however, has not been fully operationalized in terms of specific requirements for types and numbers of weapons; during several exercises in recent years, the Russian military apparently preferred to use strategic weapons (air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers) for theater-level missions.

The Russian military remains suspicious of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Although U.S. officials point out that these number only in the hundreds, they are widely seen in Moscow as intended to be used against Russia, if only because no other credible mission has been attributed to them. The Kremlin fears that they could easily be redeployed to the territory of new members of NATO, closer to Russia’s borders. NATO’s unilateral pledge in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act that it had no intention to redeploy the weapons does not fully satisfy the Russian military since the pledge is not legally binding and not verifiable. The demand that these weapons be withdrawn from Europe represents a sine qua non of any progress in tactical nuclear weapon arms control. The relocation of U.S. troops from current bases in Europe closer to Russian borders in the territories of new NATO members could preserve and possibly increase the perceived relevance of tactical nuclear weapons.

In the mid-1990s, some Russian experts also discussed using tactical nuclear weapons to deter potential threats from the “South”—a broadly defined region that includes Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and South Asia—but recently this mission has not been publicly discussed. Still, the sheer power and size of Middle Eastern states, the instability of the region, and the likelihood of proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond Pakistan remain a cause of concern. Operationalization of these missions is even less developed than that for the European theater.

Until doctrinal questions are settled, an arms control strategy for tactical weapons is unlikely to emerge—Russia simply will not know how many and which types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons it might need in the future. The existing Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal is quite large, although hardly as large as some suggest. It probably amounts to nearly 8,000 warheads (compared to almost 22,000 a decade ago) with about 3,000 deployed on aircraft.10 It is clear that it will be reduced further, but the pace of elimination is limited by funding shortages and insufficient warhead dismantlement capability. The size of the arsenal, however, is the least important characteristic; the central questions are the basing modes, ranges, and other properties of weapons and delivery systems.

In line with the PNIs, Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear arsenal is exclusively concentrated in its air force, which has gradually de-emphasized strategic missions in favor of a theater-level capability. If present trends continue, Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal will continue shrinking and consist primarily of cruise missiles equipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads. Gravity bombs will probably be reduced to a very small number.

There is also a slight possibility that the Kremlin might be tempted to revise its view of the PNIs. The impetus would most likely come from the navy, which has long lobbied for the return of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to surface ships. Without such weapons, they contend, the navy will remain powerless vis-à-vis the U.S. and the majority of other navies. Since much of the navy’s tactical nuclear arsenal was stored rather than eliminated, redeployment would be fast and cheap. But so far, the navy’s lobbying has had little, if any, effect on the Putin government.

The return of land-based tactical nuclear weapons is also possible but even less likely. Russia has two types of nuclear-capable missiles: Tochka, or SS-21, and the new Iskander, which has never been tested with a nuclear warhead but in theory could carry one. Still, all warheads for land-based tactical missiles have been eliminated under the PNIs, and renuclearization would be both time consuming and costly.

Russian plans for nonstrategic nuclear weapons will also be affected by pending U.S. decisions on the development of new tactical nuclear warheads and the associated resumption of nuclear testing. If the United States were to restart nuclear testing, Russia would do so as well, even though Russia (unlike the United States) has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Kremlin would do so first to maintain its current stockpile, then to develop new warheads similar to those that are being proposed in the United States.

For the time being, though, the Kremlin appears most interested in keeping all of its options open and therefore has refrained from committing itself to any arms control talks on tactical nuclear weapons with the United States. Russian officials also contend that the deterrent value of their tactical weapons is enhanced by the uncertainty surrounding their numbers and potential uses; some Russian officials have suggested that, if the United States were ever to learn the real story about its tactical nuclear arsenal, the Pentagon would no longer fear these weapons. Finally, Russian military officials have warned that disclosing the exact locations of various storage sites, as well as the number and the types of warheads in them, might make these sites vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike—whether nuclear or conventional.

The Future of START I

In the SORT text, the United States and Russia reaffirmed START I, and the United States reportedly intends to raise with Russia the issue of extending the accord before START’s December 2009 expiration date. But before they agree to such an extension, Russian officials might be tempted to propose some changes to the treaty.

The additional cuts in both countries nuclear arsenals that are called for in SORT have in some ways superceded the significance of START I limitations on strategic delivery systems and indirectly on the number of deployed strategic warheads. Some elements of START I, however, will continue to impose constraints on the possible development of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. The most visible among them are the provisions that would make it very expensive and cumbersome to use a new Russian ICBM, the Topol-M, as a delivery vehicle for multiple warheads.11

Equipping Topol-Ms with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) seemed a foregone decision only a few years ago. But under President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s nuclear posture planning has shifted in favor of the naval leg of the strategic triad, and many plans of the land-based Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) were shelved. More recently, however, indications have appeared that the SRF has regained at least part of its standing. MIRVing apparently has been postponed rather than cancelled and might resurface by the end of the decade—at the time the expiration of START I draws nearer.

Equipping the Topol-M with three warheads might become necessary if older types of ICBMs cannot survive as long as currently planned. Russian defense officials assume that a number of SS-18 heavy ICBMs can be retained until the middle of the next decade12—perhaps about 50, each bearing as many as 10 warheads.13 The Duma’s draft law ratifying SORT mandates that the shelf life of existing delivery vehicles be maintained as long as possible. The calculation is tenuous, however, and it is far from obvious that a sufficient number of old-type missiles will last long enough. The navy is in even worse shape; it does not have a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and thus had to put on hold plans to build a new submarine.14 The air force, as noted above, is gradually shifting toward higher-priority theater-level missions.

Consequently, a faster-than-expected retirement of old ICBMs might leave Russia with fewer than 1,000 warheads in its deployed arsenal. There might simply not be enough time to deploy hundreds of Topol-Ms by the beginning of the next decade, especially since the annual rate of their deployment has declined in the last three years from 10 to six instead of increasing to 20. MIRVing therefore could help keep the arsenal at a “decent” level.

MIRVed ICBMs are also thought to be particularly well suited for the penetration of missile defenses. If the United States achieves significant progress in that area, this would constitute one more reason to allow the Topol-M to carry multiple warheads.

If START I is opened for revision, it would also be reasonable to expect that Russia will attempt to implement another change, which it had sought in the 1990s: simplification of the verification regime. Reportedly, the Kremlin intended to reduce the number of short-notice inspections (the most expensive and organizationally difficult element of verification), shifting the emphasis to data exchange and visits.

Strategic Defense

Concern about the impact of the projected U.S. missile defense system on Russia’s deterrent capability prominently figured in all past arms control talks, including on SORT. The proposed Duma law on the SORT ratification identifies deployment of a potent missile defense system by the United States as one of the triggers for Russia’s withdrawal from that treaty. (The same provision was contained in the law on ratification of START II, which was adopted in the spring of 2000.)

The Kremlin no longer appears to share these concerns. The official position is that in the foreseeable future any missile defense the United States could realistically create will not affect Russian deterrence. The vast majority of military experts simply do not believe that the endeavor can succeed at all, and certainly not in the short time frame advertised by the current U.S. administration.

Consequently, it seems unlikely that U.S. missile defense programs will become an insurmountable stumbling block to further nuclear arms control negotiations. Rather, Russian officials might be tempted to use the existence of these programs as a justification for the lack of progress caused by other reasons. This situation is likely to persist until the end of this decade, when Russia should be able to make a more realistic assessment of the impact of missile defense (if any) and space-based weapons upon the global and bilateral nuclear weapons balances.

Similarly, Russia will continue to press, along with China, for negotiations on prevention of an arms race in open space within the UN Conference on Disarmament. Its support for that proposal is genuine, but the continuing stalemate will most likely not spill over into other areas.

Meanwhile, the Russian aerospace industry will continue to be interested in joint missile defense programs with the United States and NATO. For a variety of reasons, primarily political, these plans will emphasize nonstrategic defense systems. But if the United States decided to engage in genuinely large-scale joint research and development programs—with commensurate profits for Russian companies—common work on strategic defenses might also become possible.

Multilateral Arms Control

High-level Russian military officials have declared that any reduction of nuclear weapons below the SORT levels will require the participation of other nuclear states. Projected reductions will bring Russia to a level at which it can no longer be indifferent to the arsenals of the United Kingdom, France, and especially China, whose arsenal is widely expected to grow in the coming years.

Yet, multilateral nuclear arms control negotiations will continue to be difficult. Russia clearly insists on keeping many more nuclear weapons than any of the three “second-tier” nuclear powers, probably as many as all of them combined; this might be unacceptable to some or all of them.

Therefore, we can expect a repetition of the 1980s standoff, when the Soviet Union insisted on counting French and British nuclear weapons at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks. The situation will hardly be as tense, but still one can confidently expect serious resistance on part of both the United Kingdom and France.

Finally, the advanced level of arms control that the United States and Russia might reach by the end of this decade, with an emphasis on controlling warheads instead of delivery vehicles, is unlikely to be acceptable to the second-tier nuclear states, especially China, because of the unprecedented level of intrusiveness. China might be prepared to entertain a START I-type agreement, whose accounting and verification system concentrates on delivery vehicles, but opening the nuclear weapons complex is far less feasible.

In the absence of cuts by second-tier countries in their nuclear forces, Russia is unlikely to entertain legally binding reductions below the officially projected level of 1,500 warheads and might even prefer to preserve the option of going higher in the future, to the level of 2,200 warheads.

Conclusion

Given the political and economic constraints and preferences of both the United States and Russia in the coming years, the two sides will likely be limited to a least-common-denominator approach that could yield little or no progress. Neither side is prepared to press for, much less make sacrifices in the name of, new safety and security tasks neglected by the SORT process. Both governments view the political, organizational, and financial costs of robust arms control treaties as excessive given the absence of an immediate threat of a large-scale military conflict. In addition, the Pentagon’s interest in maintaining strategic nuclear flexibility and its aversion to limits on its future military options will be difficult for other elements in the Bush administration to overcome.

In the end, the post-SORT period is likely to become the time of missed opportunity. Hopefully, however, it is only a prelude to a much more robust arms control process, perhaps when a new generation of Russian and U.S. leaders enters the scene or comes under pressure from non-nuclear states in the context of Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, under which the nuclear states agreed to work toward eventual nuclear disarmament. The agenda in front of the United States and Russia is both challenging and promising: a focus on nuclear weapons instead of the means of their delivery and, through control of nuclear warheads, achievement of genuine transparency, predictability, and trust between the United States and Russia.


NOTES

1. Yuri Baluevski, “Potentsial Doveriya,” Izvestiya, September 17, 2002.
2. “Russia: Warhead Assembly and Dismantlement Facilities,” CNS databases at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weafacl/warheada/overview.htm.
3. See interviews with Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Russia Yuri Baluevski to Kommersant-Daily (published on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, May 29, 2002, document No. 2002-05-27) and to Mayak radio station May 16, 2002 (available at http://www.radiomayak.ru).
4. The U.S. Senate approved the resolution of advice and consent to the Moscow Treaty March 6, 2003. The Russian Duma delayed voting on a proposed law of ratification on March 18, citing its opposition to the U.S. war in Iraq.
5. Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 17, 2002.
6. See statements by Defense and Foreign Ministers Sergei Ivanov and Igor Ivanov at the last stage of SORT talks, as well as unnamed high-level diplomats, to Strana.ru news service May 13, May 21, and May 15, 2002, respectively.
7. In the above-mentioned interview to Mayak (fn. 3), Baluevski specifically noted that the Russian side did not raise the issue of verification at SORT talks, because it would have entailed access to highly sensitive facilities. Russia only proposed that warheads removed from delivery vehicles be subject to elimination.
8. The term “tactical nuclear weapons” is imprecise and is used here only because it has become widespread. Unlike during the Cold War, when it denoted short-range, primarily battlefield weapons, today it often covers an array of weapons, including sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), which Russia considers strategic weapons, as well as nuclear weapons of medium bombers (such as FB-111 or Tu-22M3), i.e., all nuclear weapons that are not subject to START I. A more appropriate term should be “nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”
9. Nikolai Sokov, “The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Controversy,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 31, 2001.
10. Ibid.; Harald Muller and Annette Schaper, “Definitions, Types, Missions, Risks and Options for Control: A European Perspective,” Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control (UNIDIR, 2000, publication no. UNIDIR/2000/20), especially appendices (pp. 51-78).
11. Alexander Kuranov, “Vygody Upushchennye I Obretennye,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 23, 2002, p. 1 (interview with Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee).
12. “’Satana’ Ostanetsya na Dezhurstve do 2016 goda,” Vremya Novostei, no. 230, December 16, 2002, (interview with the SRF Chief Nikolai Solovtsov).
13. Deployment of the latest version of the SS-18 began in the late 1980s, but a number of these missiles were kept in so-called dry storage, such as stored without being fueled. Thus, not only could Russia extend the service life of deployed SS-18s, it can also fuel and deploy missiles taken from dry storage, which still have many years of deployed life ahead.
14. It is possible to equip Boreys with 10-warhead liquid-fuel Sineva SLBMs. Such a decision is unlikely to be made for several years, as long as it is still hoped that the new solid-fuel Bulava ballistic missile (intended for both land and sea basing) will be successful.

 


Nikolai Sokov is a senior research associate for nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute. He participated in START I and START II negotiations while at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and Russia.

 

U.S., Russia Agree to Plutonium Reactor Shutdown

Christine Kucia

After years of delays and stalled plans, Russia and the United States signed an agreement March 12 to shut down the last three Russian reactors dedicated to the production of weapons-grade plutonium.

The reactors, which each day can generate enough plutonium for the equivalent of approximately one nuclear weapon, also provide heat and electricity for the Siberian “nuclear cities” of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Under the agreement, the United States will pay to refurbish one fossil-fuel facility and construct one new fossil-fuel plant for the Siberian cities served by the reactors.

U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham called the accord, which was signed in Vienna on the sidelines of a radiological material security conference, “an important step in advancing our nonproliferation programs.” Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev agreed that stopping the plutonium production shows that “Russia and the U.S. are close partners in the strengthening of peace and in the war on terrorism.”

The refurbishment of an existing fossil-fuel plant at Seversk will allow the shutdown of two of the reactors by 2008, while construction of a new fossil-fuel facility in Zheleznogorsk will require that reactor to operate until 2011, when the new facility will come online. U.S. Department of Energy fiscal year 2004 draft budget documents state that, although the United States will finance the construction of the replacement power facilities, Russia will shut down the reactors.

The two countries first agreed in 1994 to cease permanently all plutonium production for nuclear weapons in both countries. The United States has not produced weapons-grade plutonium for its arsenal since 1988. The two countries have attempted to find alternative energy sources to replace Russia’s last three plutonium production reactors since signing the 1994 accord. Russia and the United States agreed in 1997 to a “core conversion” of the reactors, which was the less costly option, to be completed no later than 2000. (See ACT, September 1997.) Under that plan, the designs of the cores in the reactors would have been converted to minimize weapons-grade plutonium production and instead use uranium to fuel the reactors, providing electricity and heat for the cities.

However, cost overruns, financial troubles in Russia, and bureaucratic delays on both sides impeded the project. (See ACT, March 2000.) The countries reassessed the project and determined that core conversion would likely make the reactors less safe and potentially a greater proliferation threat, because they would use highly enriched uranium. Instead, the countries agreed in 2001 to shut down the reactors after replacing them with alternative power sources.

The reactors’ shutdown could displace up to 9,500 workers, according to a March 12 ITAR-Tass report. Many of the employees at the plutonium plants will be employed at the new fossil-fuel facilities, while some might be absorbed into the U.S.-sponsored Russian Transitions Initiative program, which helps former Russian nuclear weapons complex scientists and technicians use their expertise in civilian work sectors.

After years of delays and stalled plans, Russia and the United States signed an agreement March 12 to shut down the last three Russian reactors dedicated to the production of weapons-grade plutonium.

More Security Needed at Russian Nuke Facilities

Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev called for more money to beef up security at Russia’s nuclear facilities during a Duma meeting March 5, requesting increased funding to safeguard installations, monitor radioactive materials, and hire more guards.

Rumyantsev requested 6.5 billion rubles (about $207 million) to upgrade safety and security conditions at nuclear and chemical facilities, according to a March 5 Interfax report. “Everything boils down to money,” Rumyantsev told the lawmakers. He said, however, that nuclear safety in Russia is currently “satisfactory.”

A memorandum to the Duma from the Russian federal nuclear and radiation supervisory commission presented a more urgent appeal for funding. Citing 100 abandoned radioactive sources, such as major medical facilities, over the past year in Russia, the report documented “serious flaws” in security around nuclear installations, according to Interfax. The memorandum described accounting, control, and protection of missile materials as incomplete and noted that, in the absence of paid security personnel from the Russian interior ministry, the facilities are “guarded by non-departmental security personnel, in essence—unarmed pensioners or women.” At the Duma hearing, commission head Yuri Vishnevsky stressed, “There can be no more delays.”

Governments worldwide have expressed concern about the vulnerability of Russia’s nuclear installations, noting that terrorists could use gaps in security at the facilities to steal material. The United States and Russia established the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in 1991 to secure and destroy Russia’s weapons of mass destruction and related materials, and an initiative launched in June 2002 by the Group of Eight aims to help Russia secure more of its fissile material and facilities over the next decade. (See ACT, July/August 2002.)

U.S., Russia Spar Over Alleged Iraqi Arms Deals

Wade Boese

President George W. Bush urged Russian President Vladimir Putin in a March 24 phone call to rein in private Russian companies that the United States has implicated in illegal arms deals with Iraq. Putin denied that Russian companies are guilty—an answer the Kremlin has been giving Washington for nearly a year and which has not satisfied the Bush administration.

White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer told reporters March 24 that the United States has “credible evidence” of Russian companies supplying Iraq with weaponry prohibited by a 1990 UN arms embargo. Night vision goggles, anti-tank missiles, and equipment to jam U.S. global positioning systems are the arms at issue.

Bush administration officials have not said exactly when the deals took place or whether some are still ongoing. Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, said in a March 24 interview with Fox News that, “in the last 48 hours, I’ve seen even more information that causes me concern.”

It also remains unclear whether the Russian government authorized the alleged transactions or has simply failed to prevent them. Speaking the same day as Fleischer, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher noted, “We don’t think that we have the kind of [Russian government] oversight and interdiction that we’ve been asking for.”

Powell said that Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has pledged that Russia will act if provided proper and sufficient evidence. “Frankly, we believe we have given them more than enough information so that they should have been able to find out the truth of this,” Powell stated. The secretary added that he was “very confident of our facts” and described himself as “disappointed” in Russia’s response to date.

At least three Russian companies are reportedly suspected of engaging in the illegal deals, though the U.S. government has not named them. News accounts have identified two of the companies as Aviaconversiya and the Tula Design Bureau, which the United States sanctioned last August along with two other Russian companies for arms transfers to Libya, Sudan, and Syria.

The Bush administration has not decided whether to impose sanctions against the companies or on the Russian government, said State Department spokesman Mark Toner in a March 25 interview.

The U.S. allegations have been publicly aired after Russia failed to side with the United States during several weeks of intense and often bitter debate at the United Nations over Iraq’s disarmament.

Boucher gave three reasons to explain why the United States had not made its concerns public earlier. He suggested the United States has recently acquired more information on the alleged deals, that the issue became more “acute” as it became clearer U.S. forces might have to deal with the weapons on the battlefield, and there was a hope that Moscow would be helpful in exerting some control over the shipments or providing the United States with information.

Last fall, the United States blasted Ukraine for its possible transfer of an early-warning system to Iraq, though a joint investigation by U.S. and British experts was inconclusive. (See ACT, December 2002.) Washington also publicly identified Serbian arms companies in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as violating the UN arms embargo on Iraq. (See ACT, November 2002.)

President George W. Bush urged Russian President Vladimir Putin in a March 24 phone call to rein in private Russian companies that the United States has implicated in illegal arms deals with Iraq.

IAEA ‘Taken Aback’ By Speed Of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Paul Kerr

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials were “taken aback” by the advanced state of an Iranian gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility at a complex at Natanz during a February visit, according to a U.S. State Department official interviewed March 20. This revelation fueled concerns that Iran might be violating its nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei confirmed in a March 17 report that he visited the site, which includes a nearly completed gas centrifuge “pilot plant” designed to enrich uranium, in February. (See ACT, March 2003.) The director-general had previously acknowledged the existence of the pilot plant shortly after his February visit, but details have emerged only in the last month indicating the advanced state of the facility.

The State Department official said ElBaradei observed approximately 164 centrifuges operating in a cascade at the pilot plant, along with parts to assemble approximately 1,000 more for a larger uranium-enrichment facility still under construction.

The State Department official also said that Washington and the IAEA believe Iran might have introduced nuclear material into centrifuges at another location in order to test them, because Tehran would not have invested in a large and sophisticated facility without sufficient testing. Such activity would violate Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, an IAEA official confirmed in a March 25 interview. Safeguards agreements allow the IAEA to monitor the nuclear facilities belonging to a nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) member-state.

No nuclear material was in the centrifuges at the Natanz facility at the time of ElBaradei’s visit, the State Department official said.

The advanced state of the facility proves Iran has a “far more robust nuclear weapons development program” than has been publicly known, Secretary of State Colin Powell said during a March 9 appearance on CNN’s “Late Edition.”

The State Department official said that Washington’s current policy is to allow the IAEA to continue its investigation, emphasizing that the “credibility of the safeguards regime is at risk.” ElBaradei said in his March 17 report that the agency is discussing with Tehran “a number of safeguards issues that need to be clarified, and actions that need to be taken.”

Iran first informed the IAEA of the uranium-enrichment facility in September 2002, ElBaradei said in his report. Powell revealed during the March 9 interview that the United States provided the IAEA with intelligence about the site, but he did not specify when.

Iran Accelerates Nuclear Activities

Meanwhile, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami sparked additional concern about Iran’s nuclear capabilities when he announced shortly before ElBaradei’s visit that Iran has started mining uranium and is developing the facilities for a complete nuclear fuel cycle.

Earlier this month, Iran indicated that it is accelerating its nuclear activities. The state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported March 3 that Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rowhani announced that Iran would begin operating a plant located near Isfahan that converts uranium oxide to uranium hexafluoride, an essential component of the nuclear fuel cycle. Rowhani said March 3 that the facility is now complete, according to a March 14 Iranian state television broadcast.

Additionally, despite agreeing in February to discuss concluding an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, which is designed to provide for more rigorous inspections, Tehran now appears to have placed conditions on concluding a protocol. Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh said in a March 13 interview with Le Monde that Tehran will not conclude a protocol unless the United States lifts economic sanctions on Iran.

Aghazadeh argued that the sanctions block Iran’s ability to obtain nuclear materials, although Tehran is allowed to acquire them under Article IV of the NPT, which states that states-parties “have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

Washington has repeatedly expressed concern that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Iran will have a nuclear bomb by 2010 if it acquires the necessary technology and fissile material, according to a February Defense Intelligence Agency estimate. In addition, Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch told the Senate Armed Services Committee March 18 that Tehran could “flight test” a missile capable of reaching the United States “by mid-decade.”

Iran continues to deny that it is pursuing nuclear weapons, arguing that its nuclear activities are transparent and consistent with IAEA safeguards.

Russian Cooperation Continues

Meanwhile, Russia signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran providing for “joint efforts” in several fields, including “peaceful” development of nuclear energy, according to a March 19 IRNA report. The precise contents of the memorandum are not yet known, according to a State Department official interviewed March 21.

Russia is constructing a nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran. Washington has long opposed the project out of concern Iran will gain access to dual-use technology that can aid it in developing a nuclear weapons program, although the reactor will operate under IAEA safeguards when finished.

Russia has agreed to supply Iran with reactor fuel, but only with the condition that Iran return the spent fuel. According to a March 12 IRNA report, Assadollah Sabouri, deputy head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, said Russia will deliver the fuel in May 2003. The State Department official, however, said March 20 that the deal to provide the fuel has not yet been signed and that Russia’s condition remains in effect.

In addition, the official said in a March 21 interview that Moscow has also given the United States “assurances” that it will not ship fuel until construction of a facility to store the fresh fuel from Russia is completed. The date of that facility’s completion is unknown, he added. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev had also said March 13 that fuel would not be shipped until the storage facility was completed, Interfax reported.

The State Department official said March 20 that Moscow might change its stance on nuclear cooperation with Iran if that country is found to be in violation of its safeguards agreement. Russia has long cited Iran’s compliance with IAEA safeguards as evidence that Tehran is not pursuing nuclear weapons.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials were “taken aback” by the advanced state of an Iranian gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility at a complex at Natanz during a February visit...

Unfinished Business in Iraq

IAEA and UNMOVIC Outline Remaining Disarmament Tasks

Wade Boese

On March 19, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted work programs to the UN Security Council detailing the status of their efforts to verify Iraq’s disarmament and future steps to realize that goal. UNMOVIC was charged with overseeing Iraq’s elimination of its proscribed biological, chemical, and missile programs, while the IAEA was responsible for the abolition of Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program.

The presentation of the work programs had a surreal quality. All of the arms inspectors had departed Iraq the day before under the prospect of a looming U.S.-led invasion of Baghdad, an action that U.S. and British officials said was intended to disarm Iraq. That attack began March 19. Backed by the United Kingdom and several smaller countries, the Bush administration argued force was needed to accomplish what it said the inspectors could not do. Many other countries, including China, France, Germany, and Russia, disagreed.

Although it appears that the UNMOVIC and IAEA work programs might have come to an end with the U.S.- led invasion, the inspectors’ lists of key remaining disarmament tasks may well serve as a starting point for any post-war effort to account fully for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs.

The IAEA expressed confidence that it had a “coherent” picture of Iraq’s illegal nuclear weapons program and had succeeded in eliminating it by 1998 when inspectors first left Iraq—only days before Washington and London carried out military strikes against Baghdad for its failure to cooperate fully with inspectors. Upon resuming its Iraq inspection work in November 2002, the IAEA set out to determine whether Iraq had restarted its nuclear weapons program during the four-year absence of inspectors. This year, the IAEA has reported several times to the UN Security Council that it “found to date no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.” With that said, the IAEA still has some unresolved questions about Iraq’s past nuclear weapons efforts, which the IAEA’s work program was designed to answer.

UNMOVIC’s predecessor, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), had said it succeeded in dismantling the key facilities involved in Iraq’s efforts to acquire chemical and biological weapons and in supervising the destruction of significant quantities of proscribed weapons, including missiles. Yet, it had a much more difficult time than the IAEA in accounting for Iraq’s past weapons efforts. UNMOVIC inherited from UNSCOM a host of unresolved questions and most of those remain unanswered, which UNMOVIC’s much more extensive work program makes clear.

Summarized below is the IAEA’s list of actions Iraq needs to take with regard to its past and current nuclear activities as well as the dozen disarmament issues in the biological, chemical, and missile fields that UNMOVIC highlighted as remaining unresolved.

IAEA

Saying its main task—the elimination of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program—has been accomplished, the IAEA focused its work program on obtaining as complete a picture as possible of Iraq’s past nuclear efforts as well as a clear understanding of any current Iraqi activities or personnel that could be employed to reconstitute an illicit weapons program. To achieve these objectives, the IAEA said Iraq must provide full technical descriptions of its past nuclear weapons activities; turn over all documents related to nuclear activities; name and make available for interviews all personnel previously involved in Iraq’s nuclear weapons program; describe any industrial infrastructure improvements over the past four years; list and explain any procurement activities that could be related to a nuclear weapons program; and describe its current procurement system. The IAEA also called on Baghdad to institute laws and create administrative bodies for enforcing UN prohibitions against weapons of mass destruction.

UNMOVIC

1. Scud Missiles and Associated Biological and Chemical Warheads

Beginning in 1974, Iraq began importing Scud-B missiles, which are surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with an estimated range of 300 kilometers. Iraq claimed it imported a total of 819 Scud-B missiles, a matching number of conventional warheads, and liquid missile propellants. Iraq also initiated its own programs to develop similar capabilities. Those programs, according to Iraq, resulted in the production of seven “training” engines for its own missiles and 121 Scud-type warheads. It is uncertain whether they were biological, chemical, or conventional warheads. Iraq also imported turbo-pumps needed to produce its own missiles.

  • Although UNSCOM concluded that 817 of Iraq’s 819 imported Scud-B missiles had been “effectively” accounted for—meaning that inspectors verified each missile’s destruction or use—UNMOVIC reported, “It cannot be excluded that Iraq retained a certain number of the missiles.” In addition, UNMOVIC said Iraq had not provided evidence to support its claims that it had destroyed the seven training engines. Also unaccounted for were some 21 imported turbo-pumps and a significant amount of the liquid propellant. Iraq stated that the liquid propellant would no longer be usable even if it did exist, a contention UNMOVIC disputed. UNMOVIC further found it could not verify Iraq’s claim to have destroyed approximately 50 Scud-type warheads. Iraq could not account for a 50-ton trailer that it had imported to convert into a mobile missile launcher.

Some, perhaps all, of Iraq’s domestically produced Scud-type warheads were to be filled with chemical or biological agents. Baghdad repeatedly altered its claims as to how many “special warheads” it built and the ratio of chemical to biological warheads. The last Iraqi statement on the issue claimed that 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads were manufactured, although UNSCOM had received evidence suggesting that at least 100 total special warheads had been produced.

  • UNSCOM verified the destruction of 73-75 special warheads. Due to Iraq’s various claims, discrepancies in evidence, and its attempts to mislead UNSCOM about its biological weapons program in general, UNMOVIC assessed that “uncertainty remains concerning the types and numbers of chemical and biological agents [Iraq] filled into the special warheads.”

2. SA-2 Missile Technology

In the early 1970s, Iraq started importing SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, which are also called Volga missiles. Iraq launched a number of programs to modify or reverse engineer the SA-2 missiles into surface-to-surface missiles. Early projects were the Fahad-300 and Fahad-500 missiles. Later, when UNSCOM was in Iraq (1991-1998), Iraq initiated covert programs, G-1 and al Rafidain, based on the SA-2. Iraq subsequently claimed it had canceled these programs with few results, but it did not provide evidence to back up its assertion.

In a December 7, 2002 declaration to UNMOVIC, Baghdad admitted production of al Samoud-2 missiles, which were based on the SA-2. Iraq contended the new missile was legally compliant with the UN prohibition against any Iraqi missile capable of traveling 150 kilometers or more. But al Samoud-2 flight tests exceeded the limit, and UNMOVIC ordered Iraq to destroy its 76 al Samoud-2 missiles, 118 warheads, and 9 launchers. By the time UNMOVIC left Iraq in March, it had supervised Iraqi destruction of 72 missiles and 47 warheads.

Related to its al Samoud program, Iraq illicitly purchased an undetermined number of Volga engines. Iraq initially claimed importing 131 Volga engines, but UNMOVIC discovered 231 such engines, and one Iraqi engineer said a total of 567 Volga engines had been acquired all together.

  • UNSCOM oversaw the elimination of nine Fahad-300 missiles but said it could not confirm the total number of SA-2 missiles that Iraq modified or used in testing. UNMOVIC stated, “It cannot be excluded that some Fahad-300 missiles still remain in Iraq.” Overall, UNMOVIC remained concerned about the amount of uncertainty regarding how all the SA-2-based programs were interrelated and how much progress Iraq made on each. UNMOVIC noted, “Other missile systems with ranges in excess of 150 kilometers may possibly be under development or planned.” UNMOVIC supervised the destruction of solid propellant casting chambers that could be used to build proscribed missiles. As a result of this action, UNMOVIC described Iraq’s ability to produce large rocket motors as “diminished.”

3. R&D on Missiles Capable of Proscribed Ranges

Around the mid-1980s, Iraq began researching the development of medium-range ballistic missiles capable of traveling 1,000-3,000 kilometers. Iraq also said it looked into development of a space-launch vehicle. Baghdad further explored technology to enable warheads to separate from their boosters and imported a different fuel than what was needed for Scud-B missiles. UNSCOM uncovered Iraqi efforts initiated after 1991 to develop turbo-pumps for a proscribed missile as well as a computer disk with missile flight simulation information for illegal missiles.

  • UNMOVIC said it would be unlikely that Iraq could build proscribed missiles based on the computer simulations. The inspectors declared, however, “What is of concern is the apparent intent behind such activities and, in particular, the conscious decision to act in contravention” of UN prohibitions. UNMOVIC also stated that Iraq could use its past prohibited research and development to make headway on “less ambitious and less complex proscribed missile systems.”

4. Munitions for Chemical and Biological Agent Fill

Iraq began domestically producing a low-altitude bomb that could be filled with chemical or biological agents for use by combat aircraft in 1990. Iraq designated this bomb the R-400. Iraq initially claimed in 1992 that it had produced 1,200 R-400 bombs for chemicals but amended the figure to 1,550 following revelations about its biological weapons program in 1995. Iraq provided various figures on how many R-400 bombs had been filled with what type of agent.

  • UNSCOM could not account for at least 300-350 R-400 bombs. (Two UN reports in 1999 put this figure at 500.) Claiming that it is “impossible” to confirm production or destruction tallies for R-400 bombs, UNMOVIC stated that it “cannot discount the possibility that some [chemical] and [biological] filled R-400 bombs remain in Iraq.” UNMOVIC further noted that Iraq possesses the knowledge and resources to produce R-400-type bombs “easily.”

Iraq made or acquired more than 30,000 “major aerial bombs” for delivering chemical or biological agents between 1983 and 1990. An Iraqi Air Force document seen by UNSCOM—later handed over to UNMOVIC—suggested that Iraq used roughly 6,500 fewer chemical bombs during its eight-year war with Iran than Baghdad claimed, casting doubt on Iraq’s declarations. Iraq explained that the air force document was incomplete.

  • UNSCOM could not confirm Baghdad’s assertion that it destroyed some 2,000 empty bombs. Nor could UNSCOM verify that some 450 bombs filled with mustard, a chemical blistering agent, were destroyed in a fire. UNMOVIC noted that, although much of Iraq’s chemical and biological aerial bomb arsenal was “presumably eliminated, its ability to reconstitute that inventory remains largely intact.”

Before 1991, Iraq declared it filled some 70,000 155-millimeter artillery shells and more than 100,000 122-millimeter rocket warheads with chemical agents.

  • UNSCOM could not account for 550 155-millimeter artillery shells or some 15,000 empty 122-millimeter rocket warheads that Iraq said it had destroyed. UNMOVIC inspectors found a total of 14 empty 122-millimeter rocket warheads in January 2003, and Iraq handed over another four. UNMOVIC expressed concern about the inability to account for the 550 155-millimeter artillery shells because it determined that the mustard in the shells would still be potent. UNMOVIC further noted that Iraq possesses “significant stocks” of conventional 155-millimeter artillery shells and 122-millimeter rocket warheads that Iraqi industry could modify for chemical agents.

Starting in the 1980s, Iraq explored using cluster munitions to deliver chemical agents but denied it ever made much progress. Iraq also claimed it never investigated using cluster munitions for biological agents. UNSCOM, however, noted that Iraq’s main chemical production facility, the Muthanna State Establishment, was involved in testing sub-munitions that could be useful for cluster-type weapons. A high-ranking Iraqi official, who recanted in front of his superiors, also linked cluster bombs and biological weapons together in an interview.

  • UNMOVIC discovered a 122-millimeter cluster sub-munition component for either chemical or biological agents at the warehouse of a cluster bomb factory in February 2003. UNMOVIC concluded, “Iraq’s interest in cluster munitions, and the developments it did make, may have progressed well beyond what it had declared.”
    Iraq claimed that it explored, but abandoned in 1988, developing a warhead to deliver chemical agents for a short-range battlefield rocket known as FROG. Documents dated March 1989 and August 1990, however, were found that suggested such work was still ongoing at those times.
  • UNMOVIC assessed that no evidence exists that Iraq continued work on a chemical warhead for the FROG beyond 1990, but added that “the possibility cannot be ruled out.”

5. Spray Devices and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

Iraq researched two types of devices for spraying chemical and biological weapons from the air: modified auxiliary fuel tanks and modified agricultural sprayers. Iraq provided conflicting accounts of when it tested these systems and for what purposes. Baghdad said its plans to modify 12 auxiliary fuel tanks for use with a Mirage F-1 combat aircraft were frustrated by a shortage of valves. Iraq claimed it only managed to build three modified fuel tanks and one prototype. Baghdad said the prototype and the Mirage jet were destroyed during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and that it destroyed the three other tanks.

The other serious Iraqi research program on a spray device entailed developing biological weapon aerosol generators for a modified crop-dusting helicopter. This system was called the “Zubaidy” device. Iraq described field tests of the helicopter system as inconclusive. Iraq also separately explored using a MiG-21 fighter and a L-29 training jet as remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) for delivering various payloads.

  • Arms inspectors were never able to confirm that the Mirage F-1 combat aircraft and prototype fuel tank were destroyed. In addition, a document was found suggesting that Iraq had an excess, not a shortage, of valves for modifying fuel tanks. UNSCOM also found an Iraqi report indicating the helicopter field tests went well. None of the components of that system were ever accounted for. UNMOVIC asserted, “Spraying devices modified for [chemical and biological weapon] purposes may still exist in Iraq” and reported that Iraq possesses many agricultural aircraft spray systems identical to the ones converted to disseminate biological weapons. UNMOVIC found modified fuel tanks in December 2002, which Iraq explained as being part of an air force agricultural spray system. With regard to Iraqi RPV/UAV programs, UNMOVIC said more investigations must be done.

6. VX and Its Precursors

Iraq initiated laboratory research into VX, a potentially lethal nerve agent, as early as 1975 and intensified its work in 1985. Iraq explored four different methods for producing VX. Initially, Iraq denied that it ever produced more than a few grams of VX, but it started changing its story in 1995. Iraq eventually admitted to producing 3.9 tonnes of VX. Baghdad claimed it used or destroyed its entire stockpile. Iraq further denied ever weaponizing VX, but samples of warhead remnants revealed traces of VX.

  • Although arms inspectors found the presence of VX at the sites where Iraq contended it destroyed the chemical, no determination could be made about the actual quantities destroyed. The absence of complete production records, including for all of 1990, have frustrated inspectors’ efforts to conclude how much VX Iraq made. UNMOVIC stated, “Given Iraq’s history of concealment with respect to its VX programme it cannot be excluded that it has retained some capability with regard to VX.” UNMOVIC further highlighted that there are “significant discrepancies in the accounting for all the key precursors…required to produce VX.”

7. Mustard Gas and Its Precursors

The largest quantity of illegally produced chemical agent acknowledged by Iraq was mustard. Between 1982 and 1990, Iraq churned out 2,850 tonnes of mustard agent. However, Iraq did not provide arms inspectors with a complete accounting of its production, weaponization, and use of mustard gas, raising questions about the accuracy of its declarations.

  • As stated above, arms inspectors have been unable to verify Iraq’s claims of destroying 550 155-millimeter artillery shells and 450 major aerial bombs filled with mustard. In addition, the Iraqi air force document suggesting that Iraq used roughly 6,500 fewer chemical bombs in its war against Iran raises doubts that all of Iraq’s mustard weapons have been accounted for. UNMOVIC declared, “It is possible that viable Mustard filled artillery shells and aerial bombs still remain in Iraq.” UNMOVIC reported that Iraq is not currently capable of producing new mustard because it lacks a dedicated facility. UNMOVIC added, however, that Iraq does have the necessary equipment spread throughout the country to assemble such a facility and it has the necessary starting materials, making mustard the “easiest agent for Iraq to produce indigenously.”

8. Sarin, Cyclosarin, and Their Precursors

Sarin and cyclosarin, two related nerve agents, constituted about 20 percent of Iraq’s chemical arsenal. Iraq claims that from 1984-1990 it produced 795 tonnes of sarin-type agents using two methods. UNSCOM assessed Iraq’s sarin-type agents as being of relatively low quality.

  • UNMOVIC cited discrepancies in Iraq’s claims about the status of nearly 4,800 rocket warheads and 12 aerial bombs filled with sarin-type agents. That would be proportionate to about 40 tonnes of the chemical agent. Due to the low quality of Iraqi sarin-type agents, however, UNMOVIC asserted that it would be “unlikely that [past sarin-filled munitions] would still be viable today.” UNMOVIC noted that uncertainties remain about the amount of precursors Iraq acquired for making sarin-type agents and whether Iraq ever instituted large-scale production of binary artillery shells and rockets for use with sarin-type agents. Unless Iraq retained the right precursors after the 1991 conflict or smuggled them into the country afterward, UNMOVIC concluded Iraq would not be able to produce sarin or cyclosarin. UNMOVIC noted that its inspections had not uncovered any evidence of precursors.

9. Anthrax and Its Drying

After denying the existence of a biological weapons program up until 1995, Iraq subsequently admitted producing, over a two-year period, 8,445 litres of anthrax—a bacteria commonly found in the soil that causes diseases in animals and can be very lethal to humans in certain forms. Iraq claimed to have limited its production of anthrax to two sites, but evidence of it was also found at a third. Iraqi officials several times revised their accounts of how many bombs and warheads they filled with anthrax. Iraq’s last statement was that it had filled 50 R-400 aerial bombs and five al Hussein warheads with anthrax. Iraq contends it destroyed all of its stored anthrax in 1991.

  • UNMOVIC cited several findings by UNSCOM that cast doubt on Iraq’s declarations. UNSCOM determined that, based on Iraq’s production capabilities, it could have produced 22,000-39,000 litres of anthrax. Iraq’s unaccounted for growth media could have contributed to the production of anthrax in the range of 15,000-25,000 litres. UNSCOM further determined that at least seven, not five, al Hussein warheads had been filled with anthrax. UNMOVIC described Iraq’s claim to have ended anthrax production in 1990 as not plausible. UNMOVIC further estimated that the total amount of biological agent—the majority of it suspected to be anthrax—in bombs, warheads, and storage at the time of the 1991 Gulf War as being at least 7,000 litres more than Iraq contended. UNMOVIC concluded, “Based on all the available evidence, the strong presumption is that about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist.” Moreover, UNMOVIC assessed that Iraq “currently possesses the technology and materials, including fermenters, bacterial growth media and seed stock, to enable it to produce anthrax.”

In general, biological agents are produced in a way that results in a liquid product. Converting an agent into a dry form typically means it can be stored for longer periods of time. Iraq reported that it did not conduct any bulk drying of biological agents.

  • UNMOVIC said it did not have evidence to dispute Iraq’s claim, “but given Iraq’s interest in drying, the existence of large quantities of liquid bulk agent in 1991, the availability of suitable dryers and the expertise that Iraq had developed, UNMOVIC cannot be certain that Iraq did not dry agent.”

10. Botulinum Toxin

Iraq began researching botulinum toxin, a lethal bacteria that can be 15,000 times stronger than VX, in the 1970s, but it did not commence dedicated research and development work until 1986. Iraq said it produced a total of 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin and estimated that it filled 100 R-400 aerial bombs and 16 al Hussein warheads with the agent. These munitions and some 7,500 litres of botulinum toxin were destroyed in 1991, according to Iraq.

  • UNSCOM estimated that Iraq could have produced double the amount of botulinum toxin claimed. UNMOVIC assessed that it was unlikely that any remaining or stored botulinum toxin would be very potent. UNMOVIC reported that it was important to obtain a clear understanding of the amount of botulinum toxin produced because that would affect estimates on the quantities of other biological agents, particularly anthrax, that Iraq could have produced. Essentially, this is an issue of fermenter availability. UNMOVIC concluded that Iraq could “rapidly” recommence botulinum toxin production because it has the necessary expertise, equipment, and materials.

11. Undeclared Agents, Including Smallpox

In addition to its major research and development of anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin, Iraq said it investigated a variety of other agents for biological weapons purposes. These efforts, according to Iraq, yielded little.

  • UNMOVIC noted that its predecessor did not find any “substantial evidence” that any of the biological agents, apart from those identified by Iraq as part of its biological weapons program, was produced for weapons purposes. Yet, UNMOVIC reported that Iraq’s failure to account for certain types of growth media raised questions because that growth media is suited for biological agents Iraq declared it did not produce. “Accounting for the outstanding media…would greatly reduce the uncertainty surrounding this issue,” UNMOVIC stated.

Iraq also briefly set up a viral research program, which Baghdad claimed looked at three incapacitating but not necessarily deadly agents (enterovirus 70, rotavirus, and camel pox). Baghdad says its biological weapons virus research lasted only 47 days.

  • Although it assessed Iraq’s viral research as probably being “short-lived,” UNMOVIC noted that the scope of the research “remains unclear.” UNMOVIC further reported, “There is no evidence that Iraq had possessed seed stocks for smallpox or had been actively engaged in smallpox research.” UNMOVIC concluded that it was unlikely Iraq accomplished much through its viral research program, but it added that “these areas of research identify the possible future directions of a [biological weapons] programme and should be followed up.”

12. Any Proscribed Activities Post-1998

UNSCOM left Iraq in December 1998. Iraq contends that, during the intervening period prior to UNMOVIC’s arrival in November 2002, it did not undertake any proscribed activities. UNMOVIC warned that, given the history of Iraq’s illicit weapons programs, Baghdad “could have made considerable advancements in that time, particularly in the biological and chemical fields.” UNMOVIC also noted it had received many reports contradicting Iraq’s claim.

  • According to some governments, Iraq has mobile biological weapons facilities, namely trucks mounted with production equipment, such as fermenters. UNMOVIC noted that Iraq did seriously consider such an option in the late 1980s, but Iraqi officials said the concept was abandoned as impractical. Investigating whether Iraq does have mobile biological facilities would be “inherently difficult,” according to UNMOVIC.
  • Governments have also charged that Iraq has underground facilities for producing chemical and biological weapons. When UNMOVIC was provided with sufficiently specific information, it looked into the charges. UNMOVIC reported that “no underground facility of special interest has been found,” although it added it does not “dismiss the possibility that such facilities exist.”
  • UNMOVIC reported it had not been able to substantiate allegations that Iraq is moving proscribed items around the country deliberately to thwart arms inspectors.
  • In reviewing Iraq’s legal chemical and biological activities, UNMOVIC reported that it detected “no proscribed activities,” although it cautioned, “There are a number of chemical and biological facilities or production units that could be used for both proscribed and non-proscribed purposes.”
  • Iraq’s “largest failing” in its semi-annual declarations, according to UNMOVIC, was in providing adequate information on suppliers of its illicit programs. Iraq failed to provide sufficient information in roughly 40 biological, 70 chemical, and 500 missile cases.
  • UNMOVIC further reported that Iraq had not been forthcoming in providing names of individuals involved with its proscribed weapons programs.

On March 19, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted work programs to the UN Security Council...

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